[INDOLOGY] some thoughts about modality, vyaapti and `eva'
birgit.kellner at oeaw.ac.at
Thu Jul 1 11:26:17 UTC 2021
Dear list members,
in support of Patrick McAllisters point, in particular the second aspect
strikes me worthwhile exploring in connection with modality: the
Dharmakirtian (and post-Dharmakirtian) notion of "incompatibility"
(virodha), of which two types are distinguished:
(1) a factual incompatibility which means that two spatio-temporally
bound real entities cannot coexist in the same environment (like hot and
cold temperature), insofar as the presence of the one invariably
destroys the other one. This is referred to as
(2) a conceptual incompatibility that broadly speaking corresponds to
Aristotelian contradiction or contrariety between two predicates (there
is a divergence of viewpoints in the Buddhist logical tradition whether
contrariety or mere "difference" is really a type of virodha or not).
Both the stronger and the weaker version of this relationship are
subject to the principle that the determination (pariccheda) of the one
amounts to the exclusion (vyavaccheda) of the other, but only the
stronger version -- obtaining between a predicate and its negation, like
"blue" and "non-blue" -- is subject to the principle that also the
exclusion of the one amounts to the determination of the other. The
weaker version, by the way, would be exemplified by "blue" and "yellow".
This type of incompatibility is referred to as
The elaboration of (1) leads to discussions relating to the theory of
universal momentariness (the problem being that real entities, when
analyzed as momentary phases, are after all not destroyed by external
agents; they "self-destruct", so this kind of factual incompatibility
has to be analyzed on the level of series (santāna)). But it is in the
elaboration of (2) where one may gain further insights into thinking
about logical impossibility.
With best regards,
Am 01.07.21 um 13:03 schrieb Patrick McAllister:
> Dear list members,
> just two small additions to the already very useful pointers on
> Within the vyāpti discussions of Buddhist logicians, it might be useful
> to focus on the “all-inclusive pervasion relations”
> (sarvopasaṃhāra-vyāpti). Kano and Sakai have recently discussed
> struggles within the post-Dharmakīrtian tradition to account for how the
> most prominent type of this pervasion, the one between existence and
> momentariness, undermines the trairūpya requirement.
> A second thing to consider in this regard could be arguments involving
> the impossibility of positing opposing properties
> (“viruddha-dharma-adhyāsa” or similar). This impossibility, it seems to
> me, derives from the strong notion “These properties can’t possibly
> coexist”, rather than from “These properties just never happen to occur
> together.” But of course, it would all depend on the reasons given for
> the impossibility of their co-existence.
>  See Kano 2020 at https://austriaca.at/0xc1aa5576%200x003c19db.pdf
> and Sakai 2020 at https://austriaca.at/0xc1aa5576%200x003c19f3.pdf,
> both from this volume: https://austriaca.at/8781-3inhalt.
> With best wishes,
Prof. Birgit Kellner, PhD
Institut für Kultur- und Geistesgeschichte Asiens
Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften
Prof. Birgit Kellner, PhD
Institute for the Cultural and Intellectual History of Asia
Austrian Academy of Sciences
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