"Blaue Blumen", lexicographers and textual battlefields (re: translation)

Thu Jan 4 16:56:38 UTC 1996

As a reply to both M. Witzel's and J. Houben's postings on translation, a
collection of relevant quotations with a few remarks, again, predominantly
on the translation of shaastra-texts (which is the only thing I am not
completely, but only partly ignorant of): 

"...Der Gelehrte hat einen totalen Sieg errungen. Auf dem philologischen
Schlachtfeld liegen die Textkoerper, zerschlagen und entseelt, schoen in
einer Reihe geordnet, neben einem Schutthaufen von inneren Widerspruechen,
Missverstaendnissen, Verderbnissen. Ueber dem Totenfeld aber leuchtet in der
Ferne in positivistischer Abstraktheit die romantische blaue Blume des
Ursprungs" (Paul Hacker, Zur Methode der geschichtlichen Erforschung der
anonymen Sanskritliteratur des Hinduismus, ZDMG 111/2, 1961, 483-492). 

	The initial requirement for translation to meet the "original intent" of
the texts rests on several presuppositions, or at least, asks for further
specifications (I am sure, more could be enumerated): 
(1)	Naturally, as with every assumption of an "original" idea, we presuppose
that the form in which the idea reaches us corresponds either precisely or
at least roughly to the form in which it was originally expressed. Hence, if
we talk about "original intent", we should better say something to the
effect of "the original intent of that text which, after careful
philological investigation, comes closest to a supposed original text". If
we talk about "original intent" as in "intention on part of the author", we
are likely to end up in various hermeneutical dead-end-roads (esp. in the
case of anonymous literature), so I would rule that interpretation out from
the beginning. 
(2)	A text may have several parts with varying specific intents.
Philosophical texts may have varying intents - not to re-use and over-use my
most favourite expression, "functions" -, e.g. refuting an opponent's view
from one's own viewpoint, refuting his views from within his own system,
advocating an independent doctrine, trying to accord one's own ideas with
that of authorities of one's own school etc. These intents are sometimes
"marked" (...iti cet for opponent's views etc.), sometimes not, and in some
cases - Jn~aana'srii is a good example for this -, a passage can be read in
one way as well as in another, and if one compared the two resulting
translations, one would hardly guess that they are based on the same
source-text. Hence, it would be more useful to talk about overall intents
and specific intents. 
(3)	The "original intent" can be (at least) twofold: That intent which the
author himself expresses at the beginning of the text (e.g. as a
man.gala-verse or as a prayojana-statement), or that which we arrive at
after a careful study of the text. These need not be the same. An author
might pay lip-service to a certain tradition in the beginning verses
("hereby, I state the theory of blablabla, following the revered master
so-and-so"), but then expound his own views, completely irrespective, or
maybe even in contradiction, with his initial statements. Add to which, in
the case of man.gala-verses, the possibility of them having been added
later, again, changes the interpretational framework (e.g. the infamous
man.gala-verses of Dharmakiirti's Pramaan.avaarttika). 

--------

"Non-literalness is...no more a guarantee of fidelity in translation than is
mere literalness. For true faithfulness is neither directly nor inversely
proportional to any undifferentiated concept of literalness _per se_:
everything will depend on what precisely is to be understood by 'literal'.
As a criterion, either positive or negative, the concept of literalness thus
proves to be something of an irrelevance." (David Seyfort Ruegg, Translating
Buddhist Philosophical Texts, Asiatische Studien/Etudes Asiatiques 46/1,
1991, 367-391). 

	Paul Hacker has - in my opinion - convincingly shown that the principle of
lexical equivalence is at odds with the idea of consequent literal
translation, by which he means that the same word of the source-language is
consistently translated with the same word of the target-language (with
reference to the translation of philosophical terms - something which, I
believe, M. Witzel would like to have discussed. See Paul Hacker, Zur
Methode der philologischen Begriffsforschung, ZDMG 115/2, 1965, 195-308.) 
	One should add that the concept of lexical equivalence, of equivalence
altogether, has its origins in contrastive linguistics and is used in the
comparison of individual languages. (See Mary Snell-Hornby,
*bersetzungswissenschaft - eine Neuorientierung: zur Integrierung von
Theorie u. Praxis. T*bingen: Francke, 1986, where it is also argued that the
German _Aequivalenz_ and the English _equivalence_ are, er, not
"equivalent"). In translational studies, the insight that translational
equivalence is not a constant, and by no means the same for different types
of texts, has lead to an enormous growth of types of equivalences - in 1986,
M. Snell-Hornby counted about 58 different types of equivalence. 

	Now, it seems that both Witzel and Houben find it regrettable that a
mechanical procedure of translation is not possible - simply replacing one
construction/expression for another - in all cases. Houben suggests that "if
certain basic transformations are allowed,,,it is possible to remain close
to the original and yet produce a 'digestible' translation", and, in
particular, points out the problems which a constantly changing lexicon
poses for translation (whereas, fortunately, syntax is more stable). 
        This "modular" (Neubert, in Snell-Hornby, op.cit.) approach to
equivalence, which ends up calculating one item against another, is a
confusion of the tasks of lexicography and the tasks of translation.
Lexicography compares languages, semantic fields, individual expresions and
their systematical arrangement. Translation involves the constant
interaction of two texts, a source-text and a gradually evolving
translation, which is directed towards a specific target-audience.
Undoubtedly, the process of translation rests on the results of
lexicography, and sometimes, a translator finds himself carrying out the
business of a lazy lexicographer, but still, producing a translation of a
concrete text is not the same as producing a dictionary (Hacker, in his
article on "philologische Begriffsforschung", specifically makes a point in
confining lexicography to the level of deSaussure's "langue"). 

	A first attempt at engaging in discussions on translation, thus, would have
to clarify whether we would like to discuss "philologische
Begriffsforschung" a la Hacker, that is, discuss individual terms and what
to do about them when translating into different languages, or whether we
would like to discuss the process of textual translation, its underlying
assumptions, its purpose, what general criteria we can agree on and what
other criteria we will eternally fight about. 

Birgit Kellner
Institute for Indian Philosophy
University of Hiroshima