

COLLECTION INDOLOGIE — 122

AN ENQUIRY INTO THE NATURE OF LIBERATION

BHAṬṬA RĀMAKAṆṬHA'S PARAMOKṢANIRĀSAKĀRIKĀVṚTTI,
A COMMENTARY ON SADYOJYOTIḤ'S REFUTATION OF
TWENTY CONCEPTIONS OF THE LIBERATED STATE (MOKṢA),
FOR THE FIRST TIME CRITICALLY EDITED, TRANSLATED
INTO ENGLISH AND ANNOTATED

by

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CONTENTS

Preface	13
Introduction	15
1 Preliminary Remarks	15
2 Vedānta	23
3 Pāñcarātra	27
4 Buddhists and Cārvākas	36
4.1 Buddhists	36
4.2 Cārvākas	37
5 Atimārga	40
5.1 Pāśupatas	42
5.2 Mahāvratas, Lākulas	51
5.3 Kāpālikas, Somasiddhāntins	60
5.4 Concluding Remarks	63
6 The <i>Paramokṣanirāsakārikā</i> is itself a commentary; The <i>Raurava-</i> <i>vṛtti</i> and <i>Rauravavṛttiviveka</i>	68
7 The levels of the universe attainable by the proponents of the twenty views	70
8 The choice of these particular twenty views	76
Sources and Conventions	81
Manuscripts of the <i>Paramokṣanirāsakārikā</i> and its commentary . .	81
Previous editions	93
Remarks on the relationships between the manuscripts	95
Conventions in the Apparatus	99
Conventions in the Translation	101
Edition of the Sanskrit Text	103

Translation	219
1 Introduction: verse 1	219
2 Exposition of <i>Pūrvapakṣas</i>	224
2.1 Isolation: verse 2a'	225
2.2 Enjoyment of <i>sattva</i> : verse 2a'	228
2.3 Dissolution into the Supreme Self: verse 2b	231
2.4 Dissolution into the Supreme Material Cause: verse 2cd	237
2.5 Dissolution into Primal Matter, Egoity and the like: verse 2cd	247
2.6 A Chief Attendant of the Supreme Lord: verse 3a	249
2.7 An Omniscient Non-Agent: verse 3b	251
2.8 Agency, and yet Being Instigated [to act]: verse 3c	254
2.9 Becoming the Same as the Treasury of Light: verse 3d	261
2.10 Superiority to the Lord: verse 4a	263
2.11 Just Being Devoid of Impurity: verse 4b	266
2.12 Agency in the Perfected Soul, Indifference in the Lord: verse 4cd	267
2.13 Existing in a <i>bhuvana</i> in the Stars: verse 5ab	269
2.14 Cessation of Cognition and Agency: verse 5c	270
2.15 Cessation of Everything, as advocated by the Bud- dhists: verse 5d	271
2.16 Cessation of Everything, as advocated by the Cārvākas: verse 5d	274
2.17 Conclusion of the exposition of fruits of systems non- congruent with Śaiva Siddhānta: verse 6	275
2.18 Becoming Equal to the Lord: verse 7	276
2.18.1 The Rise of the Lord's Qualities	277
2.18.2 Transference of the Lord's Qualities	279
2.18.3 Possession by the Lord's Qualities	281
3 Refutation of <i>Pūrvapakṣas</i>	282
3.1 Enjoyment of <i>sattva</i> ; Existing in a <i>bhuvana</i> in the Stars: verse 8	282
3.1.1 Enjoyment of <i>sattva</i>	283
3.1.2 Existing in a <i>bhuvana</i> in the Stars	283
3.2 A Chief Attendant of the Supreme Lord; Becoming the Same as the Treasury of Light: verse 9ab	284
3.3 An Omniscient Non-Agent; Agency, and yet Being In- stigated [to act]: verse 9cd	286

3.4	Superiority to the Lord: verses 10–11ab	287
3.4.1	Absence of means of knowing superiority	287
3.4.1.1	The Lord's entry into <i>laya</i> , <i>bhoga</i> and <i>adhikāra</i>	288
3.4.1.2	Śakti is superior to Śiva	292
3.4.1.3	The scriptural assertions that the Lord is a bound soul	293
3.4.2	Non-fixedness	296
3.4.2.1	Of the Condition of Being the Lord	297
3.4.2.2	Of the Perfected Soul	297
3.5	Being Devoid of Impurity: verse 11cd	299
3.6	Agency in the Perfected Soul, Indifference in the Lord: verse 12	300
3.7	Rise of the Lord's Qualities: verse 13a	303
3.8	Possession by the Lord's Qualities: verse 13b	303
3.9	Transference of the Lord's Qualities: verses 13c–42	304
3.9.1	The Examples of Verbal Teaching and <i>Śāstra</i>	304
3.9.1.1	Refutation of the Example of Ver- bal Teaching	305
3.9.1.2	Refutation of the Example of <i>Śāstra</i>	306
3.9.2	The Example of Transference of merit and sin	307
3.9.3	The Example of a Flame	310
3.9.4	The Example of the Transfer of Smells	311
3.9.5	The Example of Universals	311
3.9.5.1	Universals cannot transfer, because we do not accept universals as sep- arate from individuals	312
3.9.5.2	Universals could not transfer even if they were separate from individuals	313
3.9.5.2.1	Because they manifest in in- dividuals	313
3.9.5.2.2	Because they lack form	314
3.9.5.3	Even if transference of universals and flames were accepted, it would not instantiate the transference of qualities	315
3.9.6	The Example of Sacred Water	315

3.9.7	The Example of Transference of Consciousness into Non-Conscious Matter	317
3.9.7.1	Relation of the Example to the Exemplified	319
3.9.7.2	Refutation of the Example of Transference of Consciousness into Non-Conscious Matter	320
3.9.8	The Siddhāntin's own example to illustrate the influence of the Lord on the soul	323
3.9.9	The difference of the Siddhānta from Saṅkrāntivāda and two related positions	325
3.9.10	Contact with rather than transference of the Lord's qualities	328
3.9.11	Response to the opponent's rejection of Abhivyaktivāda	329
3.9.12	The problem that transference involves leaving the previous substrate	334
3.9.13	The problem that qualities cannot be transferred	335
3.9.14	Liberation for the opponent is connected only with Śiva (<i>śāmbhava</i>), not with the soul (<i>pauruṣa</i>)	338
3.9.15	The opponent does not accept purification of qualities even in liberation	341
3.9.16	Saṅkrāntivāda entails non-duality with Śiva	346
3.10	Cessation of Everything, as advocated by the Buddhists: verse 43	347
3.10.1	The Saiddhāntika Argument from Memory	347
3.10.2	Buddhist Response to the Saiddhāntika Argument from Memory	348
3.10.2.1	Memory is not capable of proving non-difference	348
3.10.2.2	There is no self separate from mental events	350
3.10.2.2.1	The self is not perceived	350
3.10.2.2.2	It cannot be shown to be concomitant with anything else	351

3.10.2.2.3	It cannot be inferred through <i>anyathānupapatti</i>	351
3.10.2.2.4	Who is the inferrer?	351
3.10.2.2.5	Anything that can be inferred is ‘other’, and thus cannot be the self	352
3.10.2.2.6	The shining forth of cogni- tion must be accepted	355
3.10.3	Rāmakaṇṭha’s own view	356
3.10.3.1	Rāmakaṇṭha’s overlap with Buddhism	356
3.10.3.2	Does the perceiver appear as per- manent or momentary (<i>sthira-grāha-</i> <i>kaprakāśa</i> or <i>bhinnagrāhakaprakāśa</i>)?	358
3.10.4	The Buddhist Response: stability is super- imposed.	360
3.10.5	Rāmakaṇṭha’s Response: Superimposition of a permanent perceiver is impossible.	361
3.10.6	The condition of being a rememberer is our logical reason, not memory.	370
3.11	Cessation of Everything, as advocated by the Cārvākas: verses 44–46	371
3.11.1	Proof of the existence of consciousness prior to birth from the behaviour of newborn babies	372
3.11.2	Memory of past lives	376
3.11.3	Proof of a beginningless sequence of lives . . .	377
3.11.4	Something beginningless cannot cease	377
3.11.5	Cārvāka: Causal efficacy proves that the self is subject to destruction	378
3.11.5.1	Something eternal would be inca- pable of producing effects either se- quentially or simultaneously	378
3.11.5.2	Rāmakaṇṭha: Both direct percep- tion and inference refute the mo- mentariness that you postulate . . .	384
3.11.5.3	The nature of things is to produce effects only when certain auxiliaries are present	385

	3.11.5.4	Cārvāka: There are three options; each of them is problematic	385
	3.11.5.5	Rāmakaṇṭha's Response	386
	3.11.5.6	The single nature of the auxiliaries defended	389
	3.11.5.7	The production of several different effects	395
	3.11.6	Conclusion	398
3.12		Cessation of Cognition and Agency: verse 47	400
3.13		Dissolution into the Supreme Material Cause: verse 48	404
	3.13.1	Souls Dissolved into a material cause would Return Again	404
	3.13.1.1	Only the bound return	405
	3.13.2	Destruction of selves	406
	3.13.3	Two contradictory effects cannot arise from the same material cause	407
	3.13.4	Selves are not Effects	409
	3.13.5	Selves do not have a Common Continuous Nature	409
	3.13.5.1	Selves are never objects of perception	409
	3.13.5.2	Only my own self appears to me; I have no direct experience of other people's selves	413
	3.13.5.3	To the omniscient are not all other selves objects of perception?	413
	3.13.5.4	Inference of continuous nature is im- possible	416
	3.13.5.5	Selves do not have continuity with existence; but they do exist	416
	3.13.5.6	Without continuity, how can we ac- count for word usage?	417
	3.13.5.6.1	Do not pots have potness as their continuous nature?	419
	3.13.5.6.2	Similarity and continuous na- ture are two different things	419
	3.13.5.7	How can the similarity of selves be known?	421

3.13.6	Even if Selves were effects of a Supreme Cause, recurrent return would make your position untenable	422
3.14	Dissolution into Primal Matter (<i>prakṛti</i>), Egoity (<i>ahaṅkāra</i>) and the like: verse 48	423
3.15	Dissolution into the Supreme Self: verses 49–52	423
3.15.1	Souls dissolved into a material cause neces- sarily return again	423
3.15.1.1	Brahman is not a material cause, so your objection does not apply	424
3.15.2	Why is this world unreal?	424
3.15.2.1	Because it is not of the nature of consciousness	424
3.15.2.1.1	Something can be cognised by something other than it, and yet real	425
3.15.2.2	Because of not standing up to analysis	425
3.15.2.2.1	That is the fault of the anal- yser not the world	426
3.15.2.2.2	Doubt is appropriate, not cer- tainty as to non-existence . .	427
3.15.2.2.3	Things <i>do</i> stand up to analysis	427
3.15.2.3	Because scripture tells us so	428
3.15.2.4	Rāmakaṇṭha's own position: Plu- rality can be established through self-awareness	432
3.15.2.5	Plurality can be established by di- rect perception	437
3.15.2.6	<i>brahman</i> is the material cause of the world	438
3.16	Isolation: verses 53–56	442
3.16.1	Those liberated in the Sāṅkhya system have not had all of their karma destroyed	442
3.16.1.1	They still have karma to be experi- enced above <i>guṇatattva</i>	442
3.16.1.2	Sāṅkhya response: all karma pro- duces just one life	447

3.16.1.3	No: karma produces more than one future life	450
3.16.2	The Isolation of the <i>viññānakevalin</i> is not the same as your Sāṅkhya Isolation	455
3.16.3	Isolation is not Liberation	459
4	Conclusion: verses 57–59	461
4.1	To aim for the annihilation of the self is the ultimate in foolishness	461
4.2	The value of the teachings of other traditions	464
4.3	The result of following other traditions	466
4.4	The purpose of the exposition of other traditions	467
Abbreviations and Symbols		469
Works Consulted		471
General Index		493

INTRODUCTION

1 Preliminary Remarks

The *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā*¹ of Sadyojyotiḥ (675–725 CE)² is a text of 59 verses that lists and then refutes twenty positions regarding the nature of liberation (*mokṣa*). Its commentary by Rāmakaṇṭha (950–1000 CE) expounds the twenty positions, not necessarily in the way Sadyojyotiḥ understood them, and then refutes them, occasionally just by elaborating Sadyojyotiḥ’s refutation, but frequently by adding long digressions and new arguments.

The twenty positions are listed in the left-hand column of Figure 1. They are given there in the order in which they are listed by Sadyojyotiḥ, and expounded by Rāmakaṇṭha (which happens to be different from the order in which they are refuted).

The proponents of these positions are never named by Sadyojyotiḥ, and only very occasionally by Rāmakaṇṭha. But enough evidence can be garnered to propose identifications of the proponents in almost all cases. These are listed in the right hand column.³

¹The ‘Verses that Refute the Conceptions of Liberation Advanced by Others’.

²For this date, see SANDERSON (2006a) and WATSON (2006: 111–114).

³A question mark indicates that the evidence is weak. That Rāmakaṇṭha took view 1 to be that of both Sāṅkhya and Yoga is clear from a remark he makes in section 2.10. The evidence that view 2 was a Sāṅkhya and Yoga view is given in notes 114 and 84 respectively. For view 3 see section 2 of the Introduction, and section 2.3 of the translation. For the attribution of view 4 to the Pāñcarātrikas, see note 146. For the attribution of views 5 and 6 to the Tauṣṭikas, see section 2.5 and note 163. For the attribution of view 7 to the Paurāṇikas and Pāśupatas, see note 167. For the attribution of views 8, 11 and 13, see section 5.2 of the Introduction. The evidence to connect the Somasiddhāntins with view 9 is given in note 200. For the attribution of view 10, see notes 201 and 203. The evidence to connect view 12 with the Vaimālas is given on pp. 65–67. For the attribution of view 15, see notes 223 and 224. That Rāmakaṇṭha took Sadyojyotiḥ’s words ‘Cessation of everything’ (*sarvanāśaḥ*) to refer to the liberation doctrines of both the Buddhists and Cārvākas is clear from his commentary on verses 5d and 43–46; that Sadyojyotiḥ intended them in that way is clear from his refutation of the position in verses 43–46. The evidence

VIEW OF LIBERATION	PROPONENT
1) Isolation (<i>kaivalyam</i>)	Sāṅkhya and Yoga
2) Enjoyment of Sattva (<i>sattvasambhogah</i>)	Sāṅkhya and Yoga?
3) Dissolution into the supreme self (<i>vilayah paramātmani</i>)	Advaita Vedānta
4) Dissolution into the supreme material cause	Pāñcarātrikas
5) Dissolution into Prakṛti	Tauṣṭikas
6) Dissolution into Ahankāra	Tauṣṭikas
7) Becoming a great attendant of God (<i>mahāgaṇo maheśasya</i>)	Paurāṇikas / Pāśupatas
8) Being omniscient but lacking agency (<i>akartā sarvavedyavit</i>)	Followers of the Pramāṇa Scriptures (Mahāvratas)
9) Being an agent yet subject to the control of God (<i>kartṛtve 'pi prayojyatvam</i>)	Somasiddhāntins?
10) Becoming the same as 'The Treasury of Light', i.e. the sun or fire (<i>samatvaṃ tejasāṃ nidheḥ</i>)	Sauras, Āgneyas, Vaiṣṇavas
11) Becoming superior to God (<i>ādhikeyaṃ parameśānāt</i>)	Lākulas? Saiddhāntikas? Śāktas? Pātañjalas?
12) Becoming devoid of Impurity (<i>nirmalatvam</i>)	Vaimalas?
13) Taking on the rôle of God temporarily, then retiring to a state of indifference (<i>audāsīnyam</i>)	Pravāhanityeśvaravādins
14) Going to a world in the stars (<i>tārakābhuvana</i>) having acquired a refined body and faculties (<i>satkāryakaraṇopetas tārakābhuvane sthitah</i>)	
15) Cessation of cognition and agency (<i>jñānakartṛtvayor nāśah</i>)	Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas
16) Cessation of everything (<i>sarvanāśah</i>)	Buddhists (Pradīpanirvāṇavādins)
17) Cessation of everything (<i>sarvanāśah</i>)	Cārvākas (Bhūtacaitanyavādins)
18) The rise (<i>utpatti</i>) of omniscience and omnipotence	Kālamukhas
19) The transference (<i>saikrānti</i>) from God of omniscience and omnipotence	Pāśupatas
20) Possession (<i>āveśa</i>) by omnipotence and omniscience	Kāpālikas?

Figure 1: The Views Refuted in the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā* and their Proponents

The texts thus give us a view outwards on to what traditions Saiddhāntikas (= those belonging to Sadyojyotiḥ and Rāmakaṇṭha's tradition, the Śaiva Siddhānta) in the final centuries of the first millennium saw surrounding their own, whom they regarded as their rivals, and which doctrines and arguments of these opponents they considered to require refutation. Of Rāmakaṇṭha's nine surviving texts⁴ five have up to now been partially translated into a Western language⁵ and one completely.⁶ This publication adds a second complete translation.

This is one of the most interesting of Rāmakaṇṭha's texts for Indologists who are not specifically concerned with Śaiva Siddhānta, because of the snapshot it provides of the religio-philosophical landscape of tenth-century India. About half of the twenty positions are well known from other sources, but the other half have left little trace elsewhere in Sanskrit literature. The text thus offers a unique glimpse of certain forgotten conceptions that came to be swamped by those of the classical traditions. Some of them seem to be unknown even to Rāmakaṇṭha, having presumably been pushed into obscurity in the centuries between Sadyojyotiḥ's time and his own.⁷ The value, for the historian of ideas, of this record of archaic views is not only that it provides a fuller picture of the variety of conceptions of liberation, but also that it helps to explain the genesis of some of the more well-known classical views.⁸

concerning the attributions of views 18, 19 and 20 is given in notes 234, 235 and 238 respectively. We have included a question mark in the last case, since the only evidence we know of regarding its proponents comes from the sixteenth century.

⁴(1) *Mataṅgavṛtti*, (2) *Kiraṇavṛtti*, (3) *Sārdhatrīśatikālottaravṛtti* (which includes the *Nādakārikā*), (4) *Vyomavyāpistava*, (5) *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti*, (6) *Mokṣakārikāvṛtti*, (7) *Tattvatrayanirṇayavivṛti*, (8) *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa*, (9) *Āgamaprāmāṇyopanyāsa*.

⁵The twenty-five verses of the *Nādakārikā* have been translated by FILLIOZAT (1984), the first six chapters of the *Kiraṇavṛtti* by GOODALL (1998), the first eleven (out of twenty-three) verses of the *Āgamaprāmāṇyopanyāsa* by GOODALL (1998: xxii–xxv), four sections of the first chapter of the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* by WATSON (2006: 125–346), and one section of the sixth chapter of the *Mataṅgavṛtti*, *vidyāpāda*, by WATSON (2006: 349–382).

⁶The *Tattvatrayanirṇayavivṛti* has been translated by GOODALL, KATAOKA, ACHARYA and YOKOCHI (2008).

⁷Unless the explanation of Rāmakaṇṭha's not being acquainted with them is that they were not known in Kashmir, while being familiar in other parts of India. Which part of India Sadyojyotiḥ came from is not known. See SANDERSON (1990: 158) and WATSON (2006: 111–112). Rāmakaṇṭha regarded himself as Kashmirian, but, as his concluding verses to the *Tattvatrayanirṇayavivṛti* and *Kiraṇavṛtti* suggest, his usual working area may have been Dārvābhisāra, an area often subject to Kashmir that lay to the South West between the Vitastā and the Candrabhāgā rivers: see GOODALL, KATAOKA, ACHARYA and YOKOCHI 2008: 312, quoting BISSCHOP.

⁸Thus we can see, for example, that the Sāṅkhya and Yoga view that liberation involves

The verses and Rāmakaṇṭha's commentary contain sections only for the twenty positions that are refuted, having no separate section giving the authors' own Saiddhāntika view. This is presented in Sadyojyotiḥ's *Mokṣakārikā* and its commentary by Rāmakaṇṭha, the *Mokṣakārikā* being considered to some extent a separate text, and to some extent part of a larger text encompassing it, the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā* and others.⁹ It should not be thought, though, that our texts are of no value to those seeking to understand the philosophy and theology of Śaiva Siddhānta. We get insights into Saiddhāntika thinking at every stage of the refutations, for in refuting rival traditions Sadyojyotiḥ's and Rāmakaṇṭha's own presuppositions are brought to bear, and we see what separates their own thinking from that of their opponents. The Saiddhāntika view of liberation, furthermore, is expounded in passing at several points in Rāmakaṇṭha's commentary (ad verses 6–7, 27, 31–32, 37–42).

The Saiddhāntika view is that liberation consists in the manifestation of the soul's innate qualities of omniscience and omnipotence. The soul is then the same as God (*īśvarasama*), where 'same' means qualitatively identical but numerically distinct. This is very close to views 18, 19 and 20, which also hold that the liberated soul is the same as God, being omniscient and omnipotent. They differ from each other and from the Saiddhāntika view in their explanations of how omniscience and omnipotence become associated with the liberated soul. In view 18 those two qualities arise from scratch (*Utpattivāda*); in view 19 they are transferred from God (*Saṅkrāntivāda*); in view 20 the soul is possessed by them, as one can be possessed by a spirit (*Āveśavāda*); in the Saiddhāntika view, omniscience and omnipotence already exist in souls prior to liberation in an unmanifest state, and at liberation they become manifest as a result of the removal of the soul's Impurity (*Abhivyaktivāda*). Sadyojyotiḥ and Rāmakaṇṭha divide views 18, 19 and 20 off from the rest (see verses 6 and 7). Rāmakaṇṭha describes the proponents of these three views as 'belonging to our own religion' (*samānatāntrikas*), meaning not that they are quite Saiddhāntikas but that, unlike the proponents of all the other seventeen positions, they belong to the same wider (Śaiva) religion.

going beyond the three *guṇas* followed on from, and transcended, view 2 in our text, according to which liberation involves experiencing *sattva* alone, without any *rajas* and *tamas*. See also SANDERSON's view (2006b: 197–199) that the Saiddhāntika liberation doctrine arose out of view 13.

⁹For the relation of the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā* and the *Mokṣakārikā*, see section 6 below.

The twenty views are not classified by our authors in any way other than by this dividing off of the last three, and the aligning of them with the Śaiva Siddhānta. But here are two ways in which they could be arranged thematically.

(1) The views can be differentiated through the following sequence of dichotomies (see Figure 2). First there are those that are theistic and those that are non-theistic, a ‘theistic’ view being one according to which the liberated soul exists alongside, below or, in one case, above God. Those which are non-theistic can then be subdivided into those according to which not only is there no God, but there is also no self, and those for whom what exists in the liberated state is a self. Into the former category fall the Buddhist and Cārvāka views. Finally, those which accept a self can be subdivided into those for whom individuality is preserved in liberation, and those for whom liberation consists in the dissolution of the individual self. In the first camp the principal proponents are Sāṅkhya and Nyāya; in the second they are Advaita Vedānta and Pāñcarātra.

(2) Liberation has been contrasted with another goal of Indian religion, the acquisition of supernatural powers (*siddhis*), by regarding the pursuit of the former as a search for ‘freedom from’, and the pursuit of the latter as a search for ‘freedom to’.¹⁰ There is no denying that the liberated states of the Buddhists, Naiyāyikas, Vaiśeṣikas, Sāṅkhyas and Advaita Vedāntins, involving as they do a complete lack of cognition and action, are strongly marked by a propensity for ‘freedom from’. But this tendency was rejected, and indeed ridiculed,¹¹ by other traditions, for example the theistic ones. In many of these we find a pronounced predilection for ‘freedom to’ in the omniscience and omnipotence that they claim to be the culmination of the path they teach. Once the diversity of liberation doctrines is taken into account, the dichotomy of the two kinds of freedom becomes useful not because we can equate one kind with liberation, but because we see how the two kinds are differentially present within the various liberation doctrines. The twenty views can be laid out on a continuum, the two poles of which are the two types of freedom.

At one extreme we have the Buddhist view according to which liberation consists not just in freedom from suffering but freedom from existence itself. Here there is clearly no ‘freedom to’ know or do anything. This was not

¹⁰GELBLUM (1965).

¹¹See *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* ad 1:66 and WATSON (2006: 96).




Figure 2: Thematic classification of the twenty views

the only Buddhist view,¹² but it is the one that is given in our text (view 16). With the Buddhists fall the Cārvākas. They too maintain (view 17) that the individual completely ceases to exist, though for them this ‘liberation’ happens to everyone at death, and is not an achievement accruing only to the enlightened. To the right of these two come the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas. They do maintain (view 15) that the individual continues to exist in liberation, but without any consciousness or agency. Here we have freedom from knowing and doing, but not freedom from existence. Next come the Sāṅkhyas (view 1), Advaita Vedāntins (view 3) and Pāñcarātrikas (view 4). Consciousness continues in liberation for these, but it is a consciousness that is completely devoid of objects of experience. The light of consciousness is switched on in the liberated souls of these traditions, unlike in liberated Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas, but it is a light that, as it were, shines out into empty space without illuminating anything.

So all of these conceptions of liberation deny the presence of any changing states of consciousness, something that attracted comment from André BAREAU. Having said of Buddhist *nirvāṇa* (1973: 94) that it either must be pure nothingness in which nothing of the person remains, or ‘must have resembled a profound and dreamless sleep, a complete unconsciousness’, he goes on to write:

To people who, like all Indians,¹³ believed themselves to pass without ceasing, without rest, immediately, from one existence to another, that is to say from one series of states of consciousness to another, that eternal and complete peace of psychic nothingness must have seemed desirable, whereas it has always terrified people in the West.¹⁴

This is an important reflection on the question of why a complete lack of experience was promoted by some as the highest aspiration and the upper

¹²See WATSON and KATAOKA (2010: 323, note 82).

¹³It hardly needs to be stated that this is an exaggeration: it was certainly not the case that all Indians believed in reincarnation.

¹⁴We cite here COLLINS’ (1982: 11) translation. BAREAU’s own words were (1973: 94–95): ‘À des gens qui, comme tous les indiens, croyaient passer sans cesse, sans repos, immédiatement, d’une existence à l’autre, c’est-à-dire d’une série d’états de conscience à une autre, cette paix éternelle, définitive, du néant psychique devait sembler désirable alors qu’elle a toujours terrifié les hommes d’Occident.’

limit of human achievement.¹⁵ But as we continue along the continuum, we will see that such a contentless liberation was desirable neither to all Indians, nor even to all of those who believed themselves to pass ceaselessly from one incarnation to another.

Next comes view 12 in our text, according to which liberation consists just in freedom from impurity (*mala*). Here we reach the first view that postulates knowing and doing in the liberated state. Then in views 8, 11 and 13, which are examined in some detail in section 5.2 of this Introduction, the power of knowing becomes expanded in liberation into omniscience, though the power of action is not found. In the views dealt with before this paragraph, the goal of freedom from suffering is taken to necessitate freedom from all cognitive experience, including that which is either pleasurable or neutral. In the views so far mentioned in this paragraph, cognitive activity continues, but it is not clear whether pleasure is present. Pleasure may have been regarded as only possible if alternating with suffering, its nature and existence deriving from a contrast with the latter. But in view 2 we find an explicit rejection of the presupposition that freedom from suffering requires also freedom from pleasure; the upholders of this view maintain that in liberation souls experience pure, uninterrupted, unexcelled and unbounded (*śuddhanirantaraniratiśayānavacchinna*) pleasure.

With the postulation of this kind of pleasure and of omniscience, we have arrived at views according to which liberation entails not just the removal of life's possibilities (such as suffering), but the addition of things not possible in the life of the unliberated. In other words we have arrived at conceptions of liberation that involve an element of 'freedom to'. This becomes more pronounced as we continue through the remaining views. These last two views still deny any action on the part of the liberated; though cognitive powers may increase, agency decreases. That changes at this point of the continuum.

Liberation as conceived of by the proponents of view 7 involves becoming one of God's principle attendants (*mahāgaṇa*), with all the extra powers and privileges that this promotion involves. This and view 14 are the only two of the twenty that conceive of liberation as an embodied state. According

¹⁵An additional point is that freedom from suffering was considered by many to be impossible while cognition continued. If the latter is inevitably imbued with suffering, to continue to desire cognitive experience is arguably akin to continuing to desire milk, in spite of knowing that it contains poison (a Naiyāyika comparison). Given that the imbibing of one without the other is not possible, it is better to renounce both.

to the latter, the liberated soul sheds its saṃsāric body and sense faculties, but takes on new, highly elevated (*prakṛṣṭatara*) ones. This new body and sense faculties, which unlike the previous ones are not caused by karma and not characterised by pain, allow a liberated existence on another planet (*tāraakābhuvane*, literally ‘in a world in the stars’).

We are nearing the end of the continuum, and the advocates of all of the remaining four views claim that the liberated soul is omnipotent. For these proponents, to leave behind one’s body and sense faculties as one enters the liberated state is not to leave behind the possibility of action; rather it is to expand its potential range. It is not the body that acts, nor is the body a necessary instrument of agency. It is the agent, i.e. the soul, that acts; and its agency consists not in moving, but in causing movement, as a magnet causes movement in iron-filings without itself moving.¹⁶ Having thrown off the bonds that limit the full expression of its power of action, and without a spatially limited body to restrict its sphere of operation (its ‘magnetic field’), this sphere becomes equal in extent to that of the soul itself, i.e. all-pervading.

The difference between the four views (9, 18, 19 and 20) is just that, though they all postulate omnipotence and omniscience, in view 9 the operation of this omnipotence is subject to God’s instigation, so that such souls lack complete autonomy.¹⁷

We now introduce more detail about those views whose treatment by Sadyojyotiḥ and Rāmakaṇṭha is of most philosophical or historical interest.

2 Vedānta

There is a difference between the kind of Advaita Vedānta expounded and refuted in the verses by Sadyojyotiḥ, and the kind of Advaita Vedānta expounded and refuted in the commentary. This difference is acknowledged by Rāmakaṇṭha (end of section 2.3), who labels the two kinds *pariṇāma-vāda* or *pariṇativedānta* (‘transformationism’) and *vivartavāda* or *māyāvāda* (‘illusionism’).

The former is not widely known about, since it was superseded by the

¹⁶See section 2.8 (of the Edition and Translation).

¹⁷Three views have not been placed on this continuum—5, 6 and 10: any specific location for them would be controversial. On the first two see section 2.5. On one interpretation of view 10, it involves omniscience and omnipotence (see section 3.2); in that case it would fall with 18, 19 and 20 at the very end.

māyāvāda of Maṇḍanamīśra and Śaṅkara, after which it soon became obscure. Whose was this *pariṇāmavāda*? On which author was Sadyojyotiḥ basing his account? SANDERSON (2006a: 70–71) has argued that the *pariṇāmavāda* outlined and refuted by Sadyojyotiḥ corresponds exactly with the doctrine put forward by Bhartṛprapañca in his commentary on the *Bṛhad-āraṇyakopaniṣat*, composed according to NAKAMURA in the middle of the sixth century (see SANDERSON 2006a: 71, note 42). That text does not survive, but Ānandagiri cites fragments of it, which HIRIYANNA (1924) has collected; SANDERSON demonstrates their close correspondence with the Vedānta known to Sadyojyotiḥ.

What were the differences between *pariṇāmavāda* and *māyāvāda*? For *pariṇāmavāda* *brahman* evolves into the world of plurality; for *māyāvāda* it does not, all plurality being simply a product of ignorance. This means we can isolate four kinds of difference between the two views.

(1) Difference in the status of *brahman*: For *pariṇāmavāda* *brahman* undergoes transformation (*pariṇāmin*); for *māyāvāda* it does not. For *pariṇāmavāda* *brahman* is the Material cause (*upādānakāraṇa*) of the world; for *māyāvāda* it is not.

(2) Difference in the status of the world: For *pariṇāmavāda* the world is not unreal; it is of the nature of *brahman*. For *māyāvāda* the world *is* unreal: it is a dream-like illusion (*māyā*) resulting from our ignorance, and at liberation it simply disappears, as a dreamworld disappears on waking.

(3) Difference regarding individual souls (*jīvas*): For *pariṇāmavāda* the relation between *brahman* and individual souls is (material-)cause and effect (*kāryakāraṇabhāva*); an individual soul is one part (*ekadeśa*) of *brahman*, as the clay in a pot is one part of the larger lump from which it was derived. For *māyāvāda* the relation is not *kāryakāraṇabhāva* or *ekadeśatva*, but *aikya*, complete identity.

(4) Difference in the nature of liberation: For *pariṇāmavāda* liberation consists in the dissolution of the individual soul into *brahman*; for *māyāvāda* it consists in the realisation that one has never been different from *brahman*. No merging into *brahman* takes place; rather simply the ignorance that causes us to see a world of plurality ceases.

Pariṇā mavāda, incidentally, avoids a problem that arises for *māyāvāda* as a result of the latter's combining of non-dualism with illusionism: If everything is of the nature of *brahman*, then surely the reality of *brahman* guarantees the reality of everything. In other words, a tension results if one holds that X is not different from Y, yet also claims: Y is real, X is not. (In the case in hand, X = the world; Y = *brahman*.) This tension does not arise for *pariṇā mavāda*, since it does not make the second claim.

* * *

That these two views are different, that Sadyojyotiḥ was familiar with only *pariṇā mavāda*, and that Rāmakaṇṭha prefers to expound Vedānta in terms of *māyāvāda*, since by his time *māyāvāda* had become the predominant kind of Vedānta—none of these claims are new: all have been pointed out by SANDERSON (1985: 210, note 41; 2006a: 68–73) and used by him as evidence for an early date for Sadyojyotiḥ.

But a new point to be made here is that the kind of Vedānta that Rāmakaṇṭha expounds is not precisely the *māyāvāda* of Maṇḍanamiśra and Śaṅkara, differing from it in not insignificant ways. The purpose of the rest of this section is to clarify the difference and to show how the Vedānta outlined by Rāmakaṇṭha is in many respects a third kind.

Rāmakaṇṭha's account of Vedānta (section 2.3) begins with standard *māyāvāda*, drawing on Maṇḍanamiśra through both paraphrase and direct citation.¹⁸ But his characterisation of the status of individual selves (*jīvas*) differs from that of *māyāvāda*; he grants *jīvas* less reality and less permanence. He compares them to illusory figments of a dream experience and states that liberation consists of their dissolution. The *jīva*, then, is neither real nor eternal. He denies, furthermore, that it can attain true awakening knowledge. It is not the *jīva* that is compared to a person waking up, but rather the supreme soul; the *jīvas* are elements within the dream of the supreme soul and cease to exist when the supreme soul wakes up.

Rāmakaṇṭha's assertion that individual souls are dissolved is more characteristic of *pariṇā mavāda* than *māyāvāda*. But in *pariṇā mavāda* the dissolution is in the manner of effects being dissolved into their Material cause, pots into an undifferentiated lump of clay. In Rāmakaṇṭha's Vedānta, by

¹⁸Rāmakaṇṭha seems to have no knowledge of Śaṅkara, another thing that has been pointed out by SANDERSON (1985: 210, note 41).

	<i>māyāvāda</i>	<i>pariṇāmavāda</i>	Rāmakaṇṭha's Vedānta
<i>brahman</i> is real	✓	✓	✓
the world is unreal	✓	✗	✓
<i>jīvas</i> are not different from <i>brahman</i>	✓	✓	✗

Figure 3: Three kinds of Vedānta (1)

contrast, the dissolution is in the manner of illusory figments of a dream dissolving when the dreamer wakes up.

In order to summarise how the kind of Vedānta outlined by Rāmakaṇṭha differs not only from *pariṇāmavāda*, but also from standard *māyāvāda*, we can consider them from the point of view of what are often said to be the three constituents of *māyāvāda*. These three constituents are the claims that: *brahman* is real, the world is unreal, and *jīvas* are not different from *brahman*. All three, then, are assented to by *māyāvāda*. *Pariṇāmavāda* makes the first claim, but not the second. How about the third? Yes, for it *jīvas* are non-different from *brahman*, ‘non-different’ at least in the sense that a pot is non-different from the clay that constitutes its Material cause. As for Rāmakaṇṭha’s Vedānta, it follows *māyāvāda* in making the first two claims, but it rejects the third: see Figure 3.

It is not clear whether Rāmakaṇṭha’s Vedānta reflects a doctrine put forward by Vedāntins known to him or whether it was made up by him. If the latter, then the most plausible explanation is as follows. He wanted to expound *māyāvāda* but also to combine it with the claim that individual souls dissolve, since that is what is stated in the verse by Sadyojyotiḥ on which he is commenting. See Figure 4.

But in order to give ‘dissolution’ a *māyāvādic* rather than a *pariṇāmavādic* flavour, he characterises it not as the dissolution of an effect into its Material cause, but as the dissolution of a dreamworld on waking. Once he has made the claim that the *jīva* dissolves in *that* sense, he has arrived at a view shared neither by *pariṇāmavāda* nor by *māyāvāda*: the unreality of the *jīva* and its fundamental difference from *brahman*.

	<i>māyāvāda</i>	<i>pariṇāmavāda</i>	Rāmakaṇṭha's Vedānta
<i>jīvas</i> dissolve	✗	✓	✓

Figure 4: Three kinds of Vedānta (2)

3 Pāñcarātra

The Pāñcarātrika opponent begins by mentioning one of the Sāṅkhya proofs of the existence of *pradhāna* as the Material cause of bodies and sense-faculties. We know, so the argument goes, that clay pots and other objects made of clay, which have *anvaya*¹⁹ with clay, all have clay as their Material cause (i.e. they are effects, in the sense of transformations, of clay). So this suggests a general principle that anything that has *anvaya* with X has X as its Material cause.

Observation: Things that have *anvaya* with clay all have clay as their Material cause.

General Principle: Things that have *anvaya* with X all have X as their Material cause.

Anvaya, then, can be used to determine that a group of things all have one common Material cause. The argument is often briefly stated as: ‘All Ys have *anvaya*’ (the conclusion being that all Ys share the same Material cause).²⁰ To ‘have *anvaya*’ here is shorthand for ‘have *anvaya* with the same thing (X)’,²¹ from which it follows that Ys all have that thing (X) as their material cause.

¹⁹The precise meaning of *anvaya* here is discussed below.

²⁰Cf. *asti pradhānam, bhedānām anvayadarśanāt*, ‘Because we find that [all] differentiated objects have *anvaya*, *pradhāna* exists [as their Material cause]’ (*Śaṣṭitantra* of Vārṣaṅgaṇya, p. 264 of FRAUWALLNER 1958); and *ekaprakṛtīdaṇ vyaktam, vikārānām anvayadarśanāt*, ‘Because its transformations are seen to have *anvaya*, this [whole] manifest world has a single Material cause’ (*Nyāyabhāṣya* ad 5.2.23, paraphrased by Dharmakīrti at *Vādanīyā* p. 65,13–14).

²¹For an example of the fuller formulation, see *bhedānām ekajātisamanvayo dṛṣṭaḥ*, ‘We find that differentiated things have *samanvaya* with the same type’ (from an unknown commentary on Śāntarakṣita’s *Tattvasaṅgraha*, the first fragment of which has been edited and translated by HARIMOTO and KANO 2008; see p. 16).