

Joanna Jurewicz

# INVISIBLE FIRE

Memory, Tradition and the Self  
in Early Hindu Philosophy

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**Joanna Jurewicz**

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Warsaw 2021

The book was supported by the National Science Center Poland research grant 2016/21/B/HS1/00789.

Reviewed by: Prof. dr hab. Joanna Sachse

Cover design: Agnieszka Miłaszewicz

The text corrected by: Tim Clapham

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ISBN 978-83-8017-311-8



Typesetting and printed by:  
Dom Wydawniczy ELIPSA  
ul. Inflancka 15/198, 00-189 Warszawa  
tel. 22 635 03 01  
e-mail: [elipsa@elipsa.pl](mailto:elipsa@elipsa.pl), [www.elipsa.pl](http://www.elipsa.pl)

*In Memory of My Parents*



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# Introduction

## 1. How I have reached here

This monograph is based on research began in 1990 and its first results were presented in the printed version of my PhD thesis (Jurewicz 1994). It was a study of the philosophical paradigms presented in the early Smṛti texts: the *Manusmṛti* (henceforth MS),<sup>1</sup> the *Bhagavadgītā*, (henceforth BhG) and the *Mokṣadharmā* (henceforth MDhP, 168–278).<sup>2</sup> The basic thesis is that those who composed these texts shared a common conceptual framework as to the main assumptions about reality. These frames were not explicit but rather taken for granted in the same way as European philosophers take theirs for granted. Such common ground, accepted by a group of people, is seen as the condition for the appearance of language and for the sophisticated mental constructs which are expressed in language (Tomasello 2008). We will return to this issue below (see section 6).

As argued in that PhD thesis, this early Hindu conceptual framework was based on certain fundamental assumptions. The first is that reality is one, the second is that cognition precedes being, the third is that creation of the world is the creation of subject-object cognition within the manifest aspect of reality and the fourth is that man is expected to continue this cognition

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<sup>1</sup> The MS is also called the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra*. The abbreviation MS, not MDh, was chosen to make it easier for the reader to distinguish this text from the *Mokṣadharmā* which has been abbreviated to MDhP.

<sup>2</sup> This part of MDhP was chosen for analysis because the later chapters are characterised by a greater degree of abstraction. One has the impression that the first part of MDhP is a conceptual preparation for the second part as the Composers could then apply abstract concepts with the conviction that the recipient will understand them thanks to their knowledge of the earlier part of the MDhP. It should also be noted that the border between the first and the second parts of the MDhP is fluid. It will be shown that abstract concepts are used in the first part while the last part of the MBh, the *Nārāyaṇīya*, reverts to a more descriptive argument. This confirms the impression that the concepts were specifically created for the Purāṇic description. It must be emphasised however that the division proposed here does not prove that the first part is historically earlier. It is hoped to investigate this issue in future research.

in the microscale. If he does, he becomes free, if not he remains within the manifest aspect for consecutive rebirths. My further research has confirmed the validity of these assumptions.

One was sure that early Smṛti thought would remain the main focus of study. Moreover, being always interested in philosophy, it was planned to enlarge the research to selected strands of classical Indian philosophy (Darśana). There were, however, some minor issues that were rather bothersome. When reading BhG or MDhP there were some words or phrases which seemed very strange and their larger meaning was rather obscure. For example, why does Kṛṣṇa, who in BhG 10.22a is presented as manifesting himself in the best manifestation of various phenomena, then describes himself as the *Sāmaveda* among the Vedas. Why the *Sāmaveda* and not the *Ṛgveda*?<sup>3</sup> And in BhG 15.14 he calls himself *vaiśvānara* who is present in the bodies of living being and, being connected with exhalation and inhalation, cook's food.<sup>4</sup> What does it mean? And what is the meaning of the strange cosmogony presented in the early chapter of the MDhP 176 (see chapter 1.2.1)?

It was clear that these terms and concepts probably referred back to earlier Vedic thought. One knew the so called 'philosophical' hymns of the *Ṛgveda* (henceforth RV) and *Atharvaveda* in the Śaunakīya recension (AVŚ)<sup>5</sup> but little about the Brāhmaṇas except for them being examples of so called 'ritualistic speculations'<sup>6</sup> or having no meaning at all (Staal 1979). One had also read the main Upaniṣads such as the *Brhadāraṇyaka* (henceforth BU), the *Chāndogya* (henceforth CU), the *Aitareya* (henceforth AU), the *Kaṭha* (henceforth KaU), the *Maitrāyaṇīya* (henceforth MaU) and others. They seemed stranger than the early Smṛti texts and contained even more annoying issues. Anyway, I decided to go to the roots thinking that it would not take too much time (just a few hymns!) and then return to study the Upaniṣads more thoroughly. Two or three years at most and one could return back to the Smṛti Composers!

However, it turned out that the journey to the roots took twenty years. In 2005, I published my habilitation on the metaphors and philosophy of the RV which was then republished in 2010 in much revised and enlarged English version. One was completely overwhelmed by the coherence and beauty of the Ṛgvedic hymns realising that the RV can be seen as cosmogony, as the creation of the world, of human beings in their everyday life and of the ultimate mental capacities that men can gain thanks to soma. Critically

<sup>3</sup> BhG 10.22ab: *vedānām sāmavedo 'smi devānām asmi vāsavaḥ*.

<sup>4</sup> BhG 15.14: *ahaṃ vaiśvānaro bhūtvā prāṇinām deham āśritaḥ | prāṇāpānasamāyuktaḥ pacāmy annaṃ caturvidham ||*

<sup>5</sup> See e.g., Edgerton (1965).

<sup>6</sup> For discussion, see Smith (1989).

the assumption of the precedence of cognition is valid here and it motivates the thinking of the poets and its expression. Further, reality is conceived as an internally contradictory fire which manifests its opposite aspects (fiery and liquid, conceived as soma) in the cosmos and in men exalted with soma. But how to describe and explain what one could see in the RV without being accused of fantasy and without using the language of the poets who express that ontology in their own terms. One had therefore to identify an appropriate methodology, for example, the concept of ‘defining events’ to analytically present the philosophical content of the RV.

Sometime in the mid 90’s I was fortunate to attend a lecture given by the Polish linguist, Professor Renata Grzegorzczkova. It was part of a short symposium organised to commemorate the achievements of my grandfather, Witold Doroszewski, who had been a linguist and the editor of the greatest dictionary of Polish language (which it remains till now). Outside the window it was spring, the chestnuts were blossoming... All of the sudden Professor Grzegorzczkova’s lecture caught my attention. She was speaking about a methodology which would be of help. It was Lakoff’s approach to cognitive linguistics. This was the hammer I was looking for! So began my study of cognitive linguistics though it took some years before I could use this methodology effectively.

In the meantime, I commenced the study of the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* (henceforth ŚB) and again felt overwhelmed by its content, by the way that cosmogonies are coherently applied to ritual thought and activity. Cognitive linguistics turned out to be wonderful tool which not only allows one to understand holistic cosmogonic concepts, but also the metonymic nature of so called ‘ritual identifications’<sup>7</sup> and ‘etymologies’<sup>8</sup> which turned out to be definitions based on a prototypical theory of categorisation. And one saw that the Composers of the ŚB refer to fire as the general concept of reality in the same way as it is presented in the RV. Sometimes they explain it explicitly, sometimes implicitly. They also refer to it in cosmogonies and they aim for its perceptible expression during ritual.

One should add that the *Jaimīniya Brāhmaṇa* (henceforth JB) and the *Jaimīniyopaniṣad Brāhmaṇa* (henceforth JUB) especially their descriptions

<sup>7</sup> E.g., according to Gonda (1975: 248–249) many expressions of the RV which we could interpret as metaphorical are ‘rather statements of an equalisations or assimilation’ and ‘express beliefs in identity between various elements of reality, such as object and its source or material cause.’

<sup>8</sup> E.g., Gonda (1955–1956). It is proposed to see them ‘as a part of the overall attempt to build a conceptual system and terminology, aiming to organise knowledge about the world, both in theoretical and pragmatic terms, and to organise a language to express this knowledge. In this system, the etymologies should be treated as definitions that name the constitutive features of an entity’ (Jurewicz 2016a).

of the afterlife confirm the thesis, formulated on the basis of funeral hymns of the RV (Jurewicz 2010), that the concept of rebirth within one's family had already been accepted in the Veda. This conviction is explicitly expressed as *punarmṛtyu* (repeated death) in later Vedic texts.

Equipped with knowledge about the earlier Vedic thought one could see the early Upaniṣads (BU, CU, *Taittirīya*, henceforth TU, *Kauṣītaki*, henceforth KU and *Praśna*, henceforth PU) from this perspective. The texts attest to an important change in ontology in that, while the range of investigations of earlier Vedic philosophers is reality in its manifest aspect together with the borderline sphere between the two aspects, the Upaniṣadic philosophers also try to cognise and describe the unmanifest aspect. This changed ontology is the result of a change in liberating practice which has led the philosophers beyond the manifest aspect to the unmanifest reality. Much of the content of the older Upaniṣads refers to liberating practices, based on recitation with proper breathing, which needs further investigation. These practices are often presented with the use of ritual terms which are more easily understood when we know the earlier Brahmanic texts. Much remains to be done in this respect but already we can reconstruct the development of the early Hindu liberating practices. Thanks to the early Upaniṣadic descriptions one could see the efforts Hindu philosophers made to reach the state after soma which they had heard about while listening, memorising and reciting the Veda. Although conceptualisation of reality in terms of fire gradually vanishes in the early Upaniṣads, the conviction that the cosmos is a manifestation of subject-object cognition of reality becomes very important and is often explicitly expressed. The outcome of this research is presented in my second book (Jurewicz 2016/18).

Finally, one was ready to come back to early Smṛti thought. The first idea was to extend the research to include the later Upaniṣads particularly KaU and MaU. The analysis has now been completed but it has turned out that there is too much material for one book. It had already become very large when compared to my PhD thesis because the Vedic background gives one a much wider perspective for understanding the early Smṛti texts. Since the analysis of the MaU is almost finished it will be published in a separate volume in the near future. In this study therefore, one will only touch on some aspects of that magnificent text. The KaU has been extensively explored by some contemporary scholars<sup>9</sup> so an investigation into that text will have to wait its turn. The texts that are going to be analysed here are generally the same as in my PhD thesis: selected chapters of the MS, of the BhG and of the first part of MDhP (168–278).

<sup>9</sup> Bodewitz (1985), DeVries (1987), Oberlies (1988), Grinshpon (2003: 80–100), Cohen (2008), Smith (2016), Norelius (2017), Haas (2019).



## 2. The basic assumptions of the book

As stated above the assumption is that the Composers of the early Smṛti texts shared a common philosophical paradigm about one reality which manifests its aspect in subject-object cognition. Man, identical with reality, is supposed to repeat cognition of reality in microscale. This paradigm had already been developed in the ṚV and has then been transmitted through generations of the philosophers who began to take that paradigm for granted, not as a description of reality, but as accepted understanding. We could compare this paradigm to the philosophical paradigm coined in ancient Greece, especially by Plato and Aristotle, but also by Pre-Socratics such as Heraclitus and Parmenides. We could not understand much of European philosophy and, more generally, European culture if we began its study with, for example Descartes, without knowing anything about earlier tradition. Yet this is what happens in studies of history Indian philosophy which usually begin with the Upaniṣads or even later works.<sup>10</sup> One suspects that a principal reason for this attitude is a specific narrow definition of philosophy that is seen as based on rules of bivalent logic but also as identified with analytical philosophy and the philosophy of language. Such an approach makes studies of the earlier thought very difficult. It is not suggested that it is impossible to investigate a specific philosophical strand or a specific philosopher without reference to the earlier tradition. What is being suggested is that the history of Indian philosophy should begin with the ṚV and that those who investigate later Darśanas should be aware of that earlier thought. In exactly the same way as those who investigate Heidegger need to be aware of ancient Greek philosophy and subsequent thought. The basic paradigms of a culture do not have to be expressed explicitly, just the opposite, they are so obvious that people don't talk about it, they begin to talk about them only when they feel that the paradigms are endangered (as seems to be happening at the present time in Europe).<sup>11</sup>

<sup>10</sup> Just to mention Dasgupta (1951–1955), Frauwallner (1990[1953]), Kumar (1991), Gupta (2012), Szymańska (2001), Kudelska (2002), Balcerowicz (2013, 2016), Ganeri (2017a), Bilimoria (2018), and monumental *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies* (Potter et al 1981–2015). Adamson and Ganeri (2020) begin their history of philosophy with the Veda, but, in their chapter 'Origins', they discuss only one hymn (10.90) and one stanza of the ṚV 1.164 (without giving its number! it is stanza 6), and then pass on to the appearance of Buddhism. The Brāhmaṇas are omitted and the discussion of the Upaniṣadic philosophy does not go beyond what has been repeated so far, which is based on several well-known fragments. Rather sadly the book is published in the series 'A History of Philosophy Without Any Gaps.' A rather bitter title for those who understand the importance of Vedic philosophy!

<sup>11</sup> Basic cultural paradigms are like air: one does not know that it is necessary for life until it is gone.

This book can be seen as the third volume of a history of ancient Indian philosophical ideas as it is an investigation into early Smṛti thought seen against its earliest antecedents. By exploring what has been inherited one can identify a new development and this will also be discussed. The title of the book reflects the main areas of interest. The first is the concept of **fire**, so important for the Vedic Composers. It has disappeared as a concept in terms of which reality is conceived but it can be clearly seen at the human level. It determined how humans conceptualised the creation of the cosmos, their conception as to how humans, especially Brahmins, had been conceived, the basis for morality and how liberating cognition is seen. Because of that fire is invisible, but only at first glance. The concept, understood as it has been understood in the Veda, influences thinking of the philosophers in an implicit way too. It constitutes the invisible basis of Indian culture. Without reference to the Vedic concept of fire the concept of Brahmin who will burn down the house of a man who has not welcomed him properly seems to be strange. At least it had seemed strange until one went to the roots of that culture. Fire is visible, of course, in cremation rite which refers not only to RV, but also to ŚB 2.2.4 where the body of a person who performs Agnihotra is the oblation for the ever-present insatiable fire which constitutes reality.

**Memory and tradition** are at the very centre of this study which is an analysis as to how the Vedic conceptual past is present in the texts analysed in this study. It is not accidental that they belong to a large corpus of texts collectively called *smṛti*, literally ‘remembrance, reminiscence, thinking of or upon; calling to mind; memory’.<sup>12</sup> This name shows the significant difference in the understanding of these texts compared to the Vedic texts which are called *śruti*, literally ‘hearing, listening; that which is heard or perceived with the ear, sound’. While the latter are seen as being obtained directly by the seers from absolute reality, the former are a result of the memory of generations of Composers. Taking into account the oral transmission of the Vedas, it is not surprising that memory was crucial for the Brahmins. But during the times of composition of the early Smṛti texts, whether or not they were composed orally or were written (see below, section 3), the role of memory seems to be even greater. The generations of Brahmins, confronted with new religious movements and new cultural traditions (see below, section 3), must have been horrified at the possibility of *forgetting* the Vedas and therefore *forgetting* themselves. After all, forgetting is a reverse side of memory (A. Assmann 2008, Esposito 2008).<sup>13</sup> So, they had to not

<sup>12</sup> All definitions of Sanskrit words are after Monier William’s dictionary.

<sup>13</sup> As Shulman (1998: 315) writes: ‘We can, in fact, distinguish several types or modes of remembering (and forgetting) in Hindu narratives, variously evoked in varying contexts

only preserve the Vedas but also to express their content in ways which would allow them to renew their individual and social identity. That they were able to do so, and simultaneously develop that same culture even more, is a credit to them,

The phenomenon of memory began to be seriously investigated by the neuroscientists in the 70s of the last century (Markowitsch 2008). Since then, our knowledge about this special ability has been much enlarged. The early division into short- and long-term memory has been systematised. Long term memory involves five subsystems for which different parts of brain are responsible (procedural memory, priming, perceptual and semantic memory, episodic memory system, Markowitch 2008, Gazzaniga 1998, 2000). Alongside neuroscience research there has also been research into autobiographical memory (Rubin 1997, Sutton 1998), into the connection between body and memory (Koch et al 2012), and into collective memory also called social memory (Burke 1997: 43–66) or, more recently, cultural memory (Erll 2008, 2011, Radstone 2000).<sup>14</sup> This division is more analytical than practical as in reality individual and cultural memory is intertwined and continuously interact (Erll 2008: 1–18). More general outcomes of cognitive research have shown the socio-situatedness of cultural memory, its stability and, at the same time its dynamism together with its adaptability to new circumstances (Olick 2008). On the one hand there is the cultural memory of a whole community, while on the other such memory is internally divided by social class and by other social grouping (Fentress, Wickham 1992). Some scholars postulate that less attention should be paid to the assumed differences between oral and literate societies as far as the creation of cultural memory is concerned (Rowlands 1993). As Jan Assman points out ‘even where the sacred tradition is committed to writing, memorisation plays the central role’. (2008: 115) In both cases certain people decide what is to be forgotten and what is to be preserved which gives way to canonisation and sanctification (A. Assmann 2008: 100). The Smṛti Composers had to show that the texts they produced were directly derived from the Vedas or even, as in case of the MBh, were part of them (MBh is called the fifth Veda). The body of Smṛti texts was meant to express ‘the cognitively simplified visualisation of the past’ on one hand and, on the other, to provide ‘a symbol for the formation of ideological convictions conceived in analogy to the internalisation of concepts of religious belief’ (Harth 2008: 91).

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by the Sanskrit root *smṛ*.’ On the meaning of *smṛti* as activation of tradition, see Olivelle (2006: 183).

<sup>14</sup> Maurice Halbwachs, Aby Warburg, Bloch, Rubin, Bartlett, Lotman, Pierre Nora, Peter Burke. For the survey of work of these scholars, see Erll (2008).

Jan Assmann (2008) enumerates five features of cultural memory in respect to the conceptualisation of content, forms, media, time and participation structures. These are:

- 1) mythical history, events in absolute past (*in illo tempore*),
- 2) high degree of formation, ceremonial communication,
- 3) mediated in texts, icons, dances, rituals, and performances of various kinds; ‘classical’ or otherwise formalised language(s),
- 4) absolute past, mythical primordial time ‘3000 years’,
- 5) specialised carriers of memory, hierarchically structured (cultural memory 117).

We could say that these were the aims of the Smṛti Composers which they fully achieved. While all the above features characterised the Vedas, the Smṛti texts were particularly characterised by the first, the third and the fourth feature: they described mythical history (like the MBh) or derived it (like the MS), they were mediated in Sanskrit and they suspended the time interval between the mythical past and the present. The idea of cyclical time, expressed by recurring cycles of eons (yugas and kalpas), was an important metaphysical assumption which gave rational ground for such a conceptualisation of the content of the texts.<sup>15</sup> The imperative to remember the texts seen as culturally powerful (notwithstanding oral or written transmission) gave grounds for the identity of the Brahmins and those who wanted to belong to the society created by them. We can again quote Jan Assmann (2008: 14):

Remembering is a realisation of belonging, even a social obligation. One has to remember in order to belong... Assimilation, the transition of one group into another one, is usually accompanied by an imperative to forget the memories connected with the original identity.

As mentioned above the aim of this study is to look at how Vedic concepts and theories are referred to and redefined by the early Smṛti Composers. They clearly tell us this by their conventional introduction to philosophical teaching ‘and in this moment they tell this ancient story’ (*atra udaharātīmam itihāsam purātanam*).<sup>16</sup> The convergence with tradition is achieved, not just by recalling the name of an ancient king, but by evoking concepts that encompass their entire common understanding through one word or the specific syntax of a stanza. And often it is not explicitly evoked, but for those who knew the

<sup>15</sup> For a thorough analysis of the appearance of this concept and of possible Greek influence, see Hildebeitel (2011a: 273–336), (2011b: 73–110).

<sup>16</sup> Tokunaga (2009), Hildebeitel (2011a: 73–110).

Veda by heart, just a passing reference would have been much more explicit than it is for us.

Cultural memory is ground for identity, be it personal or collective. Let us now turn to a more individual experience of memory reflected in Jacobson's research on Marleau-Ponty's research on memory. She states that our memories allow us to continual return to our self which is experienced as the same as our self (2015: 39). But she then emphasises that we can never return to ourselves as we were in the times we recall because we have changed since that time. Hence, we remember an event as a person who was reconstituted by that event and perhaps by many others that have unfolded since then:

Our memory then returns us to our self, but not to the self we once were; instead, in this very return, we experience our present self, which is necessarily already a newly constituted self. In this return, we are even propelled forward to a new self – a self that has made the journey back to a past self and developed through this very return.

The Brahmins, constituted by their contemporary historical and social conditions, recalled texts composed by those who lived hundreds of years before and who had been motivated and influenced by the conditions of their own time and space. Notwithstanding the urge to search for what had not changed, the Brahmin's self-expression in the texts they now composed creates a new cultural text. This might be one of one of the reasons why the concept of self (*ātman*) was still the most important concept in early Hindu philosophy.

And thus, we have come to the third topic of this study which is the concept of the self (*ātman*). One's research on the Vedic thought has shown that this concept was still crucial for the Brahminic ritual presented in ŚB, JB and JUB and this is attested particularly in the exegesis of the Agnyādhāna, Agnihotra and Agnicayana rituals. Their aim is to create an immortal self of the sacrificer (*yajamāna*) which will be able to survive death on earth and the heat of the sun which is conceived as the place reached by the dead. This is already in the ṚV (Jurewicz 2010, 2016/18). In the Brāhmaṇas, it is the self as identical with the self of Prajāpati, the creative power of reality which transforms itself into the cosmos through toil and heating. Creation of the immortal self of the sacrificer is conceived as being created in the same way, as if being forged in fire the final stage of which is cremation (Jurewicz 2016/18). This idea has been coined in the ṚV where a person exalted with soma is presented as immortal, ever free and happy (Jurewicz 2010) even if this state is temporary: it happens during the lifetime sacrifices and after death. And this transformation takes place under the influence of heat felt in

the body by a drinker of soma.<sup>17</sup> As indicated the dead person comes back to the earth to be reborn in his family. In the JB and JUB the afterlife is presented differently and it depends on a man's deeds and on his knowledge as to his identity with Prajāpati (Jurewicz 2016/18). If his deeds and his knowledge were correct, he remained in the sun with his fathers. If not, he returned to the earth. It is therefore argued that the quest for an immortal self is the perennial quest which began in the dawn of Indian culture.

However, creation of the immortal self concerns not only human beings. Already in the RV (RV 10.129) creation of the cosmos is conceived in terms of the creation of the ability to perform subject-object cognition which implies that reality creates a second self able to do that (Jurewicz 1995, 2010). Cosmogonies of the ŚB explicitly attest that the cosmos is the self (*ātman*) of Prajāpati immortality which is realised in its constant dying and resurrection. As will be shown, the selves created by reality are elaborated in the early Smṛti thought in a much more detailed way: apart from the cosmic self, it creates the ritual self, the social self and the human self. All of them are expected to act in such a way as to ensure that reality can confirm its ontological unity in the multilevel process of subject-object self-cognition. Human existence is also seen as a creation of the self which encompasses not only the immortal self that is composed during liberating practice, but also the self that is composed during everyday life which ends with death and then rebirth and is immortal in the same sense as Prajāpati's self is immortal in the cosmos.

The quest for the immortal self is realised not only in ritual practice but in the psycho-mental and bodily search mentioned above. During the times of the Brāhmaṇas it consists of extreme toil that leads to heat and transformation of consciousness. Taking into account that the concept of the highest reality (be it God or impersonal reality) is conceived in terms of human being in all cultures (see *General Conclusion* 1), we may assume that the descriptions of Prajāpati reflect the real activities of men. We could say that Prajāpati is a real *śramaṇa* who toils and heats himself in order to transform his mind into the cosmos. We do not have explicit descriptions of the human effort required as the only explicit mention of these activities refers to excessive fasting and running. Such activities are universally recognised as ways of inciting altered states of consciousness (Lewis-Williams 2004, 2010, Walsh 2014). Moreover, beginning with the late hymns of the RV, the descriptions of recitation with breathing are more and more frequent and they also attest the efforts required to create the immortal self. They find their culmination in the late chapters of the ŚB, in the JUB and the Āraṇyakas (e.g., *Aitareya*),

<sup>17</sup> See one of the most explicit expressions: *agnim nā mā mathitām sām didīpaḥ* (RV 8.48.6a). See Jurewicz 2010.

and in the early Upaniṣads. The early Smṛti texts attest that the techniques which led to the altered states of consciousness were further developed to become conscious psycho-mental and bodily practice which could be taught, learned, repeated and described in an analytical way.

Early Smṛti philosophy can thus be seen as a philosophy of the self. And since the concept of self necessarily includes consciousness, early Smṛti thought is also a philosophy of consciousness.<sup>18</sup> Again we have to go back to the RV where the frames of this thinking were coined and to the concept of Agni, the fire which manifests in the consciousness of man thanks to the conscious work of the poet when he tried to create the mental state called *dhī* ‘the inspired thought’. It is argued that the liberating state of the mind called *dhyāna* in the early Smṛti texts (and MaU) reflects this ancient concept. Again we have to evoke RV 10.129 where the creation of the cosmos is conceived as the creation of subject-object cognition. Although the Composers of the ŚB mostly express this concept of creation in metaphor (mainly with the use of the general domain of Cooking) which was probably caused by their specific experience and tension between being hungry and overeating, the mental dimension of this process is also mentioned (ŚB 2.2.4, 10.5.3). The Composers of the early Upaniṣads begin to express the cognitive nature of reality more and more explicitly, so one’s justification for calling early Hindu philosophy a philosophy of consciousness becomes clear. The early Upaniṣadic cosmogonies can be seen as a treatise on its transformation, while the analysis of men’s consciousness and action is the analysis of the consciousness of ultimate reality. Early Smṛti philosophy is also a theory of the development of consciousness and its activity in two dimensions, cosmic and human, and these two perspectives are elaborated by its Composers. Ultimately the cosmic dimension and the human dimension are a realisation of the consciousness of unmanifest reality which has become manifest and cognises itself from different perspectives. The ontological concepts are primarily epistemological and this is continued in the classical Darśanas as one hopes to show in the final volume on the history of ancient Indian philosophical ideas.

Such a philosophical theory requires a radical change of our cognitive apparatus. We have to abandon the dualistic approach and accepted reasoning which ontologises and reifies objects in language. This requires reversing the order of knowing and not beginning with being and its features but

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<sup>18</sup> The analysis of classical Indian philosophy (Hindu Darśanas, Buddhist and Jain philosophy) using concepts of modern theories of mind (Ganeri 1999, 2011, 2012) is only possible because of the root influence and development of Vedic and Smṛti tradition, as while they might seem to be poetic texts or ritual manuals, they in fact express and develop a coherent metaphysical theory.

with the way our cognitive apparatus classifies both being and things. In this respect we need to follow Kant rather than Descartes. The best example of this required turn in our thinking, is the concept of *guṇa* usually understood in philosophical discourse as an attribute of the five cosmic elements (space, wind, fire, water and earth).<sup>19</sup> In this analysis we start from its most literal meaning which is the thread that relates to two specific experiences. The first is measuring and the second is weaving to produces cloth. Both activities allow us to recognise in the former the concept of space and in the latter the concept of people. We can therefore translate the noun *guṇa* as ‘class’ which forces us to look at these experiences from the point of view of the knowing subject who uses class as a tool. Hence it is not that elements have features but the elements are created when they are cognised by a class. This way of thinking reverses the way we perceive the world and takes us out of ontology.

It is more acceptable than earlier because neurological research in the last century has shown that the objectivist approach, which is based on dualism of mind and body and assumes the existence of objects and their features and so begins with ontology to explain the world, is no longer sustainable (Gazzaniga 1985, 1998, 2012, Damasio 1994, 1999, 2010, 2018, Edelman 1992, Panksepp, Biver 2012). Though of course there are still neuroscientists and philosophers who accept it.<sup>20</sup>

The research in psychology over the last half of the previous century also shows the problems with the so-called objectivistic approach in the way that human categorise objects, processes and states. We will come back to this issue below (see section 6.1). For now, we will need only mention that categorisation is not done according to assumption as to the necessary and sufficient conditions an object has to meet to fall into an appropriate category, which in turn assumes that the objects objectively possess such categories. It has been shown that categorisation is embodied depending on biological, personal and cultural experience. We will see that the early Smṛti cosmogonies, especially that presented in MS 1, also begin from a subject which creates categories which then creates the object which it is possible to cognise. In some sections of the present book, we will refer to the outcomes of modern research in neuroscience, not to convince the readers that Smṛti philosophers had previously discovered what modern science has discovered, but in order to show that their focus and work on mind and consciousness had brought them to some similar general conclusions as to the nature of human consciousness.

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<sup>19</sup> And as three classes (sattva, rajas, tamas).

<sup>20</sup> As a researcher into the role of the first cultural paradigms for later tradition one does not find it surprising. It is difficult to abandon one’s earliest cultural frameworks without being threatened with the loss of one’s identity.



### 3. The texts and their historical context

The period, during which the texts analysed in this study were composed, was a turbulent period in the history of northern India. It is briefly outlined to show the context within which the Brahmins composed the MS and MBh.

Let us start with the political changes.<sup>21</sup> In ca 500 BCE the period called the second urbanisation began in the northern India. New political organisations appeared, called Mahājanapada, just to mention Kuru, Pañcala, Kosala and Kaśi (in the centre of the Indo-Gangetic Plain), Videha and Magadha (on the east) or Avanti to the south-west. Of these, the kingdom of Magadha gradually gained more and more importance. This region is seen by some scholars (Bronkhorst 2007) as a culturally distinct from Vedic culture and was developing in its own way.<sup>22</sup> According to Bronkhorst, this distinctiveness caused the appearance of the non-Vedic religious movements such as Buddhism and Jainism. His hypothesis still needs confirmation<sup>23</sup> but there is no doubt that Magadha was the epicentre for the Mauryan empire. However, before that empire was founded, Magadha was reigned by kings with expansionary aims. The most successful was Nanda who created an empire which extended from Bengal in the east, to the Punjab region in the west and to the Vindhya Range in the south. Some years after his death, when the empire was ruled by Dhana Nanda, Alexander the Great attacked the north-western ranges of his empire and established his satrapy of Gandhāra with Taxila as its capital. Then he moved eastward and, in 326 BCE, defeated king Porus ruler of a regional kingdom situated between the Jhelum and Chenab Rivers. Alexander's then army reached the river Beas where, in 325 BCE, he was finally forced to retreat due to the exhaustion of his soldiers and his fear of a revolt.

Dhana Nanda was the last ruler of the Nanda dynasty. In 322 BCE, the empire was seized by king Candragupta the founder the Maurya Empire (322–185 BCE). At its greatest extent, under the rule of Aśoka, Candragupta's son, it extended to present-day Pakistan and the Hindukush in the west and north-west (after defeating the Greek satrapies), to the Himalayas to the north, to the region of contemporary Assam in the east and to the northern parts of the present Kerala and Tamil Nadu states in the south. Mauryan rule ended in 187 BCE when power was seized by Puṣyamitra Śuṅga, the founder of the Śuṅga dynasty which ruled over the central parts of the Śuṅga empire

<sup>21</sup> Keay (2000), Kulke, Rothermund (2004), Thapar (2004), Stein (2010), Ludden (2013), Coningham, Young (2015), Dyson (2018).

<sup>22</sup> For a longer discussion about the possible connection between urbanism and the rise of asceticism, see Olivelle 1993: 55–58.

<sup>23</sup> Bronkhorst's arguments are referred to in Jurewicz 2016/2018.

(over Magadha and neighbouring territories) until 78 BCE. Puṣyamitra Śuṅga ruled for 36 years and after his death the power of the Śuṅgas gradually weakened. The Śuṅgas fought battles with the neighbouring rulers and dynasties (the Indo-Greeks from the west, the Śātavāhana dynasty from the south, the rulers of Kalinga from the east). The Śuṅgas were overthrown by the dynasty of Kaṇvas which ruled to ca 30 BCE.

In the middle of the 1st century the Indo-Scythians (called Śāka in Sanskrit) took power over the north-western parts of India, having fought with and conquered some of the Indo-Greek kingdoms and Indian local kings. In the first century CE, they were gradually subjugated to the Kushanas who came from Bactria. The Kushanas created an empire in the second part of the 100 CE which reached its peak under Kanishka the Great (ca 127–150 CE). The Kushana dynasty ruled up to ca 350 CE, but it began to disintegrate and from 270 it was ruled locally by so called ‘Little Kushanas’. From 300 CE until 543 BCE the Gupta ruled Northern India. The Gupta empire, at its zenith, covered much of the Indian sub-continent. The time of their reign is called the classical period of Indian culture.

These complex political changes were accompanied by social, religious and cultural changes. They began during the reign of the Magadha rulers with the appearance of Buddhism and Jainism. In his paper, Falk (2006) reprises the complex history, the outlines of which has been just presented, into four phases. The first phase is Mauryan rule which favoured the Buddhists and was open to external influences, especially those from the West. The second phase, beginning with the Śuṅgas, is indigenous, with little contact with Western cultures and more focused on the ancient culture attested by the Vedas. During the third phase, the Westerners such as the Indo-Scythes and Kushanas returned to northern India. The fourth phase is the reign of the Gupta dynasty, the phase of ‘Indian resurrection’ (Falk 2006: 145) during which there is a return to ancient values. Falk sees two aspects of the changes which took taking place during this period. One is linear and connected with the development of script – from the early Mauryan Brāhmī to the final shape of Nāgarī. The second is the oscillation between openness to external values and inclusiveness based on tradition and indigenous values. Falk uses four examples to illustrate the impact of these changes such as family structures and titles, the currency system, arts and crafts and the perception of time. In times of extraversion, women are allowed to participate in public affairs, business is conducted on a large scale, stone art is produced, non-Brahminic religions are supported and the reckoning of time is connected with the rulers. In times of introversion, women withdraw from public life, business is not highly evaluated, there is a reluctance to use stone in art, and time is seen as

cyclical. Of course, the Guptas accepted some features of extravert evolution such as gold coins and stone art. Falk is aware that his proposal is ‘a gross simplification’, but his analysis is very valuable for understanding the situation of generations of Brahmins confronted with changes they had to deal with to survive and preserve their tradition.

Before this process began circa 7–6 BCE the Brahmins, who had preserved the Vedas through memory and orally composed the Āraṇyakas and the early Upaniṣads, lived a sedentary life in enclosed village communities. They earned their living through ritual service; without the sacrificial fees (*dakṣiṇā*) paid to Brahmins the ritual was invalid. The main focus of Brahmins intellectual enterprises was ritual. Its thorough analysis resulted in its interpretation which led to highly sophisticated metaphysical theories (Jurewicz 2010, 2016/18). It also resulted in the composition of ancillary texts called the ‘limbs of the Veda’ (*vedāṅga*), mostly concerned with aspects of language, but also astronomy and the construction of sacrificial places and objects. Since ritual was connected with the preserved memory of the altered states of consciousness realised through soma, described in the RV, they looked for the ways to gain this state without soma. These efforts became more and more explicit in the Brāhmaṇas, Āraṇyakas and Upaniṣads. They composed their texts in Sanskrit which was the sacred language.

The appearance and growing popularity of people who offered different religious proposals like the Buddha and Jina Mahāvīra,<sup>24</sup> the change of traditional ways of living with the appearance of cities and the growing role of trade together with the intrusion of foreign civilisations from the West threatened the complete destruction of Vedic tradition. This is especially so as this tradition was preserved only orally. This situation is described by Bronkhorst (2006a) as ‘a catastrophe’<sup>25</sup> and forced successive generations of Brahmins to find ways to survive and defend their identity, personal and cultural. In his book *The Snake and the Mongoose. The Emergence of Identity in Early Indian Religion* (2019), McGovern shows how the concept of Brahmanhood was negotiated not only between the various Brahmins communities, but also between them and heterodox movements (Buddhists and Jains).

There were many factors that allowed the Brahmins not only to preserve their culture, but to impose it on the elites of the various cultural and religious communities living after the period of the ‘catastrophe,’ that is with the beginning of the Gupta empire. They would never have succeeded without their own intellectual effort and political skill. We will limit ourselves to the

<sup>24</sup> And other non-Brahminic ascetic movements.

<sup>25</sup> Many Westerners see their situation in the present time in the same terms.

two significant developments which contributed to their success.<sup>26</sup> The first is the development of Sanskrit as the language of political, religious and cultural discourse. We can refer here to Pollock's (1996) view who observes that, although there are so many inscriptions from the period under discussion, none of them up to the second century CE is in Sanskrit. And yet the texts were composed in Sanskrit!<sup>27</sup> Pollock maintains that a radical change in the attitude towards Sanskrit took place in that it 'escaped the domain of the sacred' under the Śakas and began to be used in literature (Pollock 1996: 74). This meant its desecralisation. This must have been a crucial problem for the Brahmins for whom Sanskrit was the eternal manifestation of eternal absolute reality. It is not surprising that it took so long for them to approve its use to express the mundane. For Pollock, this change is not the 'revival' of Sanskrit as the language of literature and administration after the Maurya period but its new invention as a 'Sanskrit cosmopolitan formation' (Pollock 1996: 74).<sup>28</sup>

The second development was the concept of dharma seen as everlasting because it was based on the Vedas, the 'beginningless and transhuman textual sources' (Fitzgerald 2006: 277). According to Olivelle, the early meanings of the noun *dharma* are the 'community standards' prevalent in different regions and communities that were taken to constitute dharma (2006: 172). There were dharmas of region (*deśadharmā*), of caste (*jātidharma*) and of family/lineage (*kuladharmā*, Olivelle 2006: 173). Olivelle also emphasises that, taking into account that the noun *dharma* is quite rare in the Veda and that it was widely used (in its Pāli version *dhamma*) by Aśoka in his inscriptions, the Brahmins had no other choice than to introduce this noun to their own vocabulary and redefine it according to their worldview and needs (2006: 171).<sup>29</sup> They began with the Dharmasūtras (*Āpastamba*, *Gautama* and *Baudhāyana*), composed under the Mauryans (Hiltebeitel 2011a: 8) to finally create the great corpus of Dharmasāstric treatises of which the MS is an eminent example.<sup>30</sup>

Scholars also agree that the two great epics, the MBh and the *Rāmāyana*, were the most effective medium of negotiation for the status of Brahmin and generally for their vision of culture which has prevailed among Indian elites to the present. Moreover those epics did considerably influence the

<sup>26</sup> For other discussion see Bronkhorst (2006a).

<sup>27</sup> For example, linguistic treatises of Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* and Kātyāyana's *Vārttikas* (commentaries on the treaty of Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī*).

<sup>28</sup> As Jan Assmann (2008: 116) writes, such specific intra-cultural diglossia is a widespread feature of the process of creation of cultural memory during which, according to Redfield (1956), the 'great tradition' and 'little traditions' are linguistically distinguished.

<sup>29</sup> On influence of the Buddhist *dhamma* exposed by Aśoka, see also Hiltebeitel (2011a: 103–179), Bronkhorst (2006a).

<sup>30</sup> For some general remarks on orality in early Indian culture, see Rocher (1994).

thinking of the population of the Indian sub-continent (Pollock 1996).<sup>31</sup> While the Dharmaśāstras declaimed what one should and should not do, the MBh presented a thorough reflexion on dharma which is seen as a difficult and complex concept.<sup>32</sup> As will be shown, in the first chapter of the MS, dharma is redefined into an even more complex concept to become a category used by absolute reality in its creation which contributes much to its absolute, everlasting status. The Brahmins became its depositaries just as they were depositaries of the eternal Veda. Olivelle (2006: 188) recalls Pollock's (1985, 1990) observations regarding the tendency of Brahmin authors to 'deliberately exclude all references to the lived reality of their authors, to the social, religious, political and economic conditions in which they lived and wrote'. In this way they, could create an impression of eternity and permanence of the texts and their content.

Thus, we come finally to the texts analysed in this study. According to Olivelle (2005), the MS is older than the other metric Dharmaśāstras (that of Yājñavalkya, Nārada, Bṛhaspati and Kātyāyana) and yet it occupies the pre-eminent position. As is usual with early Indian texts it is difficult to settle their absolute chronology. Olivelle assumes that since the MS attests the existence of gold coins and since gold coins appeared in northern India at the end of the first and beginning of the second century CE, the MS most probably was composed circa 2–3 CE (2005: 24–25). Hildebrandt (2011a), however, moves its composition into the earlier period of the reign of Śuṅga-Kaṇva dynasties (2–1 BCE).

Scholars also diverge as far as the authorship of the MS is concerned. It has been generally assumed that the MS, as with other early Indian texts, had been composed through generations, by many authors, in a somewhat unconscious way (Olivelle 2005: 5). However, Olivelle himself proposes a contrary hypothesis: having thoroughly analysed the overall composition of the MS, its structure and exposition, he tends to believe that the text was composed by a single author whose eponym was *Manu* (Olivelle 2005). The analysis of the first chapter on cosmogony supports that thesis as its coherence seems even greater than it seemed to Olivelle.

The problems with the second text, the MBh, are the same. Scholars generally agree that the MBh must have been composed between the two empires, the Mauryan and the Gupta. There is, however, a spirited discussion as to how it was composed (Fitzgerald 2004b). The traditional view accepts that the MBh had been composed orally and its main plot was a heroic story about a fight between two royal families, the Pāṇḍavas and the Kauravas. 'It is

<sup>31</sup> See also Fitzgerald (2006, note 28).

<sup>32</sup> On dharma, see Kane (1962–75), Olivelle (1999), (2003), Hildebrandt (2011a).

clear – Brockington (1998: 3) writes – that the *Mahābhārata* and the *Rāmāyana* represent the culmination of a lengthy tradition of oral poetry, transmitted through recitation by the sūtas or bards. The oral origins of the Sanskrit epics have, indeed, long been recognised'.<sup>33</sup> During the time of its composition various motives and discussions were added such as stories which seem to have no relationship to the main plot (*upākhyānas*), religious treatises (such as BhG), expositions which deal with philosophical and ethical problems such as the MDhP and chapters which divinise Kṛṣṇa or introduce more theistic views (such as BhG again or the *Nārāyaṇīya* section in the MDhP). The final version we know was composed circa 400 CE. The name Vyāsa, which is presented by the MBh as its author, is a fictive name. Fitzgerald (2002) moves its written composition towards the Gupta period but also accepts its oral roots.<sup>34</sup>

On the other hand, there is a relatively new position the most eminent advocate of which is Alf Hiltebeitel. He argues that the archetype of the MBh was produced within two generations by the group of 'out of sorts' Brahmins who were supported by some minor kings and who worked circa 150 BCE and at the turn of the millennium.<sup>35</sup> Although Hiltebeitel does not appear to mention it, one can presume that this compositional work could be similar to that of the Composers of the final redaction of the ṚV circa 7 BCE. If this postulate is right it would mean that the Composers of the MBh in Vyāsa's atelier remembered this precedent and could refer and rely on it in their compositional work. Hiltebeitel also insists that the MBh (unlike the ṚV) was written during its composition. Based on these assumptions, Hiltebeitel proposes to read the MBh as a whole, consistent composition.<sup>36</sup> In this way, he continues the approaches of Dalhman and that of Madeleine Biardeau, who first put forward a similar view.<sup>37</sup>

Both proposals, the one which assumes a slow oral composition which was finally written and the other an immediate composition in writing, are hypothesis not yet convincingly verified due to the relative scarcity of proofs both textual and archaeological. What makes the problem even more difficult is the question as to which version of the MBh to refer to when it is discussed. The MBh had been transmitted all over India in many manuscripts written in many languages and scripts and scholars generally divide the Mbh manuscript tradition into their Northern and Southern recensions. In 1933–1971, the critical

<sup>33</sup> Witzel (2005: 20) that the MBh derives 'right from RV 7.18'.

<sup>34</sup> For discussion between Hiltebeitel and Fitzgerald, see Fitzgerald (2003), Hiltebeitel (2011b: 333–366). See also Brockington (1999).

<sup>35</sup> Hiltebeitel (2001: 20–21, 2011a: 11, 2011b: 3–30, 31–48, 49–72).

<sup>36</sup> See also Adluri (2010), Adluri, Bagchee (2016).

<sup>37</sup> Hiltebeitel (2011b: 14, 73, 131, footnote 3). See also Adluri, Bagchee (2011: xv–xvii).

edition of the MBh was published under the auspices of the Bhandarkar Oriental Institute in Pune. During this impressive undertaking thousands of manuscripts were meticulously examined which finally yielded a version which Sukthankar, one of the editors of the critical edition, calls ‘the oldest form of the text which it is possible to reach on the basis of the manuscript material available’ (Sukthankar 1933: lxxxvi). Appearance of the critical edition made the discussion on the origination of the MBh even more heated.<sup>38</sup> By giving scholars a standardised version of the MBh it also allowed for more profound comparative studies. For example, Mahadevan having compared the Southern recensions against each other and against the critical edition, could propose a hypothesis on the migration of Brahmins from the Mathurā-Kuru-Pañcāla region of northern India to the south and reconstruct a possible track of the transmissions and transformations of written versions of the MBh.<sup>39</sup>

We turn now to the parts of the MBh chosen for analysis in this study namely, the BhG and MDhP. There are scholars who postulate that they were composed gradually and that we are able to detect the process of their composition.<sup>40</sup> And it is true we can see an evolution in thinking, especially in the MDhP. Cosmogonies in its early chapters are more motivated by the Vedic tradition which is consciously – as it seems – evoked and redefined. The second part uses more abstract language in cosmogonies and, at the end of the MDhP, the story exposition on Nārāyaṇa is introduced. However, this does not mean that these chapters were added later. What is clear from the research for this study is that the Brahminic Composers were aware of their creative process and, as far as metaphysical issues are concerned, they create a coherent exposition expressing very abstract theories. Moreover, notwithstanding how much a theory seems to be different to that attested to in earlier texts, one can reconstruct the redefining work not only linguistically but also conceptually. This work aims to reconcile newer theories to tradition. The earlier chapters of the MDhP with their more explicit reference to Vedic concepts can be seen as attesting such a definitional effort. The Composers of the MDhP, once they had established the semantics of the various concepts, could then safely use them, and their abstract linguistic forms, in later chapters. This hypothesis will be proven in a future book.

The MDhP consists of expositions or dialogues between teachers and listeners. Most of those in which the teachers are eminent Brahmins are

<sup>38</sup> For presentation of this discussion, see e.g. Reich (1998), Bronkhorst (2006a), Brodbeck (2013), Sathaye (2013). For discussion and critics, see Adluri (2013), Adluri, Bagchee (2018).

<sup>39</sup> See Mahadevan (2008, 2013, 2016).

<sup>40</sup> On BhG, see Szczurek (2005), Ježić (2009). On MDhP, Fitzgerald (1980), Frauwallner (1973), Brockington (2004: 99–113), Wynne (2009).

composed in a strikingly similar way. Firstly, cosmogony and the nature of the world is discussed. Secondly, the incorrect views of everyday men are discussed. Thirdly, means to achieve ultimate freedom are proposed. Moreover, some chapters betray this scheme too (e.g. MDhP 187, see chapter 2.3.2). This shows very conscious conceptual work on the text. As we well see, it is betrayed not only in the common general scheme of exposition, but also in the way the terms are used and concepts evoked.

One finds that one is in agreement with those scholars who postulate reading the MS and the MBh as a whole notwithstanding specific issues connected with their composition. The moment the text has been composed it becomes the property of a community which reads and understands it as a whole. As Olivelle (2005: 50) states:

After it leaves the hands of the author, every text assumes an independent life. This is especially true in the case of texts published before the advent of printing. These pre-modern texts continue their life as they are copied by hand, read, studied, interpreted and commented on by succeeding generations of scribes, readers, and scholars.<sup>41</sup>

Only when understood as a whole is the MS or the MDhP able to impress and influence their readers. Only then can they fulfill the role the Composers intended for them, namely, to create a society in which the Brahmins held a unique position justified by social and ethical arguments and, critically, metaphysical ones. Both texts, the MS and MDhP are composed in such a way that seemingly later additions (if they were really later) are interwoven into the exposition or the main plot (Adluri, Bagchee 2016). The recipients of the time would not have analysed which chapter of the BhG has been added earlier or later, or if the upākhyānas belonged to the first version of the MBh or not and so on. Similarly, European recipients are not really interested whether or not Homer existed and they do not analyse in close detail the way Shakespeare composed his dramas. As Sukthankar (1957) states, MBh has been understood intuitively in India for centuries. The task of this monograph is to clarify the possibility of such an intuitive reception and to show how much of it is not intuitive but accords with a specific cultural conceptual scaffold. Further how

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<sup>41</sup> See also Brodbeck (2013): ‘For serious literary work on the *Mahābhārata*, the boon of having a single text – albeit only in allegedly reborn form – is incredible, indispensable, and exciting. There is a lot of work now in textual interpretation, work in poetry, work where the pronouncements of the commentators will perhaps not be in the form of hypotheses about matters of historical fact, but will be more of a teasing out of layers of meaning and significance in the poem, an offering of possible perspectives for textual appreciation. This suggestive style of commentary is inclusively collaborative’.



the Composers of the MBh and MS created philosophical theories anticipating that their recipients will understand them as they wanted.

The version of the MBh used in this work is the critical edition. Not all the scholars chose it even those who accept the option of the MBh as a whole.<sup>42</sup> Hence, this reconstruction is as far from the real state of affairs as is the critical edition. One is also aware that the critical edition reflects the assumptions of its authors. Moreover, one can see these assumptions, especially in the way they reject the more religious fragments and prefer the so called ‘Proto-Sāṃkhyan’ versions.<sup>43</sup> The latter preference often results in rejecting fragments which cannot be understood without a Vedic background. But even though this background is evident the critical edition had to be chosen if one was to reconstruct the general way of thinking and basic assumptions of the Composers rather than undertake a comparative study of different versions of manuscripts. This choice is also necessary if we are to look at Indology as a part of humanities generally and not reduce it to purely philologic-historical studies. Since one is interested in the history of the ideas more generally, and the way human mind creates them, the former choice also makes academic sense. However, comparative studies have contributed much to this research.

Generally speaking, the view of this author is that the early Indian texts were composed consciously, notwithstanding if they were the results of the inter-generational work or composed by one or several people. The tacit (and sometimes explicit) assumption expressed by some Indologists about the unconscious or the mechanical composition (Reich 1998: 15) of such marvellous works as the MS or the MBh is biased by the Western ideas of artistic creation which is seen as having a single author who, moreover, signs composition with his own name. This issue have been boldly (by some evaluated as too boldly) discussed by Adluri and Bagchee (2014, 2018). This study will not delve further into these areas.

This study proposes a new interpretation of the early Smṛti texts seen from the perspective of Vedic tradition. Further, it aims to explore the skill of their Composers who managed to keep to tradition in spite of all the difficulties with which they had to grapple in order not to disappear into the darkness of history.

<sup>42</sup> For example, Madelaine Biardeau used in her work the 17th century version composed by the Indian commentator of the MBh Nīlakaṇṭha.

<sup>43</sup> For example, in MDhP 224.33, in the description of the way the cosmos is created, the redactors chose version *vidyayā* ‘by knowledge’ while in the apparatus the version with *avagraha* appears (‘vidyayā’) which implies that the cosmos is created ‘by ignorance’. This way of thinking betrays Vedic roots (it is also accepted by Nīlakaṇṭha and Arjunamīśra). On the problem of ‘proto-Sāṃkhya’ in the MDhP and BhG, see below, section 8.

#### 4. The Vedic tradition in the early Smṛti texts

Scholars generally agree that the early Smṛti texts analysed in this study, especially the MBh, refer to the Vedic tradition (see Fitzgerald 2003: 807–808). The legitimisation of the new dharma was only possible if it was seen as stemming directly from the Veda. Scholars show how Vedic tradition was redefined within the larger historical frame (Witzel 2006, Sathaye 2016, Malinar 2007). They also discuss more specific issues, connected with the incorporation of Vedic ritual within the epic idiom (like Hildebeitel 2011b: 259–278, 485–512) or names of Vedic kings, heroes or heroines (Witzel 2005, Sathaye 2016, Adluri 2016). Minkowski (1989, 1991) shows how the Vedic ritual frame of *sattra* is applied in the construction of the MBh. Feller (2004) analyses how various Vedic motives are appropriated and redefined in the MBh according to the needs of the new time in which their Composers happened to live. McGrath defends the Indo-Aryan origin of the main plot and looks for similarities between both traditions (2004, 2017, 2019). Mahadevan, on the basis of an analysis of the use of names Brahminic families (*gotra*) which appear in the *Mudgala Upākhyāna*, argues that it ‘can be delineated backward from the epic period to his Vedic origins and milieu and forward through the historical period to the present’ (2016: 386). Hildebeitel maintains that the incorporation of the four-age (*yuga*) history can be seen as ‘an historical armature’ which allowed Brahminic Composers to arrange genealogies of dynasties and present them in MBh and *Rāmāyana* that ‘would have been done by people interested in narrating and preserving their own history in Vedic idioms, with the emphasis on their Kuru-Pañcāla and other’ (2011b: 108).<sup>44</sup>

While the theory of the four-ages was probably incorporated under Greek influence, non-Vedic Indian traditions, especially the Buddhist tradition, were also included into the Brahminic texts and redefined with the use of Vedic concepts and terms. Quoting Hegarty (2012: 13–14):

the MBh naturalised a wide range of religious practices and ideologies that were distinctly non-Vedic or post-Vedic (including influences from anti-Vedic religious ideologies such as those of the Buddhists and Jains) whilst establishing the capacity to legitimate or transform these new practices in Vedic terms and often by Vedic means (by drawing on radically charged imagery, characters, structural forms and models of interpretation).

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<sup>44</sup> For the concept of four yugas and their appearance in Hindu tradition, see also Gonzalez-Reimann (2002), Eltschinger (2012).

What makes these analyses different from this present work is that they are based on the analysis of the signs themselves: on language and archeological artifacts such as inscriptions or coins. The approach of this study is partly based on such an analysis in that philological methods are used in the analysis of the original texts. In addition, however the cognitive approach, with its models of interactions between signs and thought (see below, section 6), allows for a more precise reconstruction of thinking and its changes. It allows one to see the way new concepts are construed and redefined and how the new theories that appear are consciously connected to tradition.

## 5. The features of the discourse

From what has been stated above it follows that the Brahmins had to redefine the content of their memory and, moreover, go beyond strictly defined spheres of ritual to extend oral tradition. The world had radically changed and the earlier ways by which it had been explained turned out to be insufficient. At the same time, they wanted to preserve the core of their culture as expressed in concrete language, without which they would cease to be themselves as had happened and does happen with many traditions and cultures. Moreover, they had developed techniques leading to liberating cognition so they had to find a language through which these new phenomena could be grasped.

The centuries-old habituation to oral transmission surely influenced the way of thinking and its expression in a new discourse,<sup>45</sup> notwithstanding the fact that scripture had appeared in India circa 4rd BCE which is attested in inscriptions and by coins. Among the features motivated by oral transmission, that are important for the exposition of its philosophical content, is brevity and the repetitiveness of some motifs and descriptions. The brevity of exposition is possible thanks to the activation of holistic concepts which express the whole structure of a phenomenon and the scenario of a process. For example, cosmogonies are often presented in a concise way and the consecutive stages of creation are evoked by juxtaposed nouns or nominal sentences. One might say that much of the meaning was transmitted beyond words, because it was shared by the Composers who did not feel the need to describe everything *ab ovo*. Much was obvious for them and it constituted a background against which they could develop new theories and practices. As far as repetitiveness is concerned more important are not the \ulaic verses but the fact that the

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<sup>45</sup> Vassilkov (1973), Grintser (1974), Brockington (1998, 1999), Sellmer (2016). For influence of orality on the form of the written text (Genesis 1.1–5) see Ong, Hartley (2012: 37–38).

Composers present their arguments cyclically, not linearly, in that the same topic is discussed from various perspectives (that of absolute reality, that of the highest cognitive agent, that of a man who does not cognise properly, that of man who cognises properly).

It should also be noted the conceptual frames inherited by the Smṛti Composers are expressed in such a way that it is sometimes possible to identify the Vedic texts in which a given concept is expressed. Among the specific texts the content of which is often evoked one can identify the following: RV 1.164; RV 10.129; ŚB 2.2.4, ŚB 6.1.1–3, ŚB 10.5.3; ŚB 11.1.6, BU 1.2, 1.4, 3–4; BU 6.2.9–16; CU 5.4–10, 8.2–12; TU 2.1–5. However, it should be emphasised that most often the Composers refer to general ideas expressed in these and in other Vedic texts. The shared conceptual background guaranteed that the associations would be performed in a similar way in the minds of the recipients too.

These features of the discourse are also motivated by the main content of the Composers' philosophical exposition which is consciousness and its transformations. This cannot be fully expressed in an analytical way. Human mental and psychical experience is impossible to describe in a binary language: we think many thoughts at the same time and we experience ambivalent emotions. We could say that this is the price the early Hindu Composers paid for their inherited assumption about the precedence of cognition over being. It is this very assumption makes Sukthankar's (1957) interpretation of the MBh as expressing the inner world of men with its all complexity so convincing!

It is important to add however that, alongside these concise and holistic descriptions, we find new and more analytical descriptions. These refer to every day cognition and liberating cognition and their content such as the functioning of the world, forms of consciousness, and manifestations of reality. The influence of the Buddhist and Jain analytical tradition is obvious. The great novelty introduced into philosophy during the times of Smṛti was the analysis of sensual cognition performed with the use of the ten senses: the five senses of reason (*buddhīndriya*)<sup>46</sup> and the five senses of action (*karmendriya*). The data which comes through sensual cognition can be understood and described more analytically than can data recognised in liberating cognition and the Smṛti Composers began to use it to recognise their mental transformations during the latter. This intellectual practice resulted in a more precise description of the stages of creation of the world and of liberating cognition. The texts witness how their Composers clarify the concepts and terminology which

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<sup>46</sup> Also called 'the senses of knowledge', *jñānendriya*.

refer to their psychosomatic experience. For example, the noun *citta* appears which is still used interchangeably with the noun *manas* (mind), but which later, in classical Yoga, will be separated and seen as referring to a different activity of consciousness. It is argued that the distinction between the senses of reason and the senses of action is also an effect of such an analytical approach. This approach ultimately allowed the Composers of the BhG to propose the ideal of action without attachment, that is action performed only with senses of action while senses of reason are focused on the mind that is on the self (*ātman*).

## 6. The research approach and methodology

As mentioned above cognitive linguistics is the approach used in this research.<sup>47</sup> It is not necessary to introduce it in much detail as this has already done so in my earlier books and the approach is now widely used in the humanities. It is now used not only for the interpretation of verbal texts, but also for non-verbal signs, fine arts, music, architecture and for human social behaviour seen as the complex composition of signs. The basic aim of cognitive linguistics is to understand how signs become meaningful both to their creators and their recipients. The usefulness of this approach has been proven in previous research in that it has allowed one to reconstruct the ideas motivated by human behaviour expressed in historically different texts (Jurewicz 2010, 2016/18). With its use one can not only reconstruct the basic common frames of thinking inherited by generations of philosophers but also, what may be even more important, differences between the consecutive layers of tradition. Here we need only remind readers of the basic assumptions and methods of this approach.

The starting point for the cognitive linguistics approach used in this research are the linguistic signs of the texts. However, this approach is based on wider assumptions on the intertwined connections between language, thought, experience (biological, personal, social and cultural), and brain.<sup>48</sup> These connections are seen as reciprocal: thought motivates language, language motivates experience, experience motivates language and thought. One of

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<sup>47</sup> General information on cognitive linguistics can be found in (among others): Dirven, Verspoor (2004), Evans, Green (2006), Evans, Pourcel (2009), Geeraerts, Cuyckens (2007), on cognitive semiotics, see Zlatev, Sonesson, Konderak For cognitive research on Tantras, see Timalsina (2016), Hayes, Timalsina (2017).

<sup>48</sup> Damasio (1994, 2010, 2018), Edelman (1992), Gazzaniga (1985, 1992, 2000, 2012), Panksepp (1998), Panksepp, Biven (2012).

the basic assumptions of cognitive linguistics is that human cognition is embodied which is now much less controversial than it was half of century ago when George Lakoff and Mark Johnson published their *Metaphors We Live By* (1980).<sup>49</sup> Most generally, it means that the mind is not independent from the body and that it is impossible to achieve a cognitive position that is pure of its influence and from influences of the environment which had been the ideal of European philosophy and science for centuries. It has also been the ideal of yogins for even more centuries but they were rather more justified in postulating it, taking into account the mental and bodily techniques they developed during that time. But no one can state with certainty if any of them has really achieved such a state. The embodiment of thinking has been investigated by neuroscientists beginning with Antonio Damasio who in his book *Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain* (1994) presented the outcome of his research on the crucial influence of emotions on our thinking which he has continued subsequently.

Let us come back to cognitive linguistics. Its second basic assumption is that most thinking is expressed neither in signs nor language. The relationship between thought and language can be conceived in terms of an iceberg in which thought is conceived as the totality of the iceberg while that expressed in language is merely its tip. Research in neuroscience confirms this assumption proving that many concepts already exist in the BrainMind/MindBrain<sup>50</sup> before they are spoken and some will never be spoken. The research of Gazzaniga and his collaborators shows that before we consciously think our body is already acting or reacting which poses important questions about human free will (2012). According to Haidt's (2012) metaphor, 'the mind is divided, like a rider on an elephant, and the rider's job is to serve the elephant. The rider is our conscious reasoning... The elephant is the other 99 percent of mental processes – the ones that occur outside of awareness but that actually govern most of our behavior.' Our body which might be seen as a perceptible extension of our BrainMind/MindBrain is in turn, immersed in the external environment both natural and cultural and its influences also shape our thoughts considerably.

Taking the dependence of language on thinking on the one hand, and on experience on the other, tools are needed which model their mutual connections in such a way that we can understand what people say. And this applies not only to literary texts but to everyday discourse.

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<sup>49</sup> Embodiment is also a separate issue in cognitive science and linguistics (Pecher, Zwaan 2005, Gibbs 2005, Clark 2008, Robbins Aydede 2009, Lakoff, Johnson 1999, Lakoff, Núñez 2000, Rohrer 2007, Maaley, Yu 2011, Hampe 2017, Frank et al 2007, Ziemke et al 2017, Foolen et al 2018, Tyler, Evans 2003, Kraska-Szlenk 2019).

<sup>50</sup> The wording of Panksepp and Biven is used here (2012).

## 6.1. Categorisation and Idealised Cognitive Models (ICM)

Let us begin with the issue of categorisation. Roughly from Aristotle to the middle of the 20th century, the main theory of categorisation accepted by European philosophers and scientists has been so called objectivistic categorisation. It assumes, on the basis of the classical concept of truth, that categories exist in the world and that the role of the proper cognising mind is to recognise them on the basis of a bundles of necessary and sufficient features. Such categories are conceived in terms of containers which has important implications for their understanding: they have strict boundaries and elements are either members of a given category or they are not, each member of category has the same bundle of necessary and sufficient features as have other members and categories are more or less universal.

However, Wittgenstein has already observed that there are concepts which cannot be categorised in this way. One of his examples was the concept of game. It is impossible to find a bundle of necessary and sufficient features of bridge, horse races, basketball and hide-and-seek which could allow them all to be incorporated into one category. He maintained that some categories were created on the basis of family resemblance which meant that, while all members of a family could be tall, have green eyes and black hair, none possessed all these features.

Psychology research in the second half of the previous century has enlarged Wittgenstein's idea and has shown that people do not categorise in the way described by objectivistic theory (Berlin, Kay 1969, Rosch 1973, 1978). A prototypical theory of categorisation has been proposed according to which categories are creations of cognising minds and not part of the world. Their boundaries are fuzzy and sometimes it is not easy to decide to which category an object belongs. Categories are not universal but culturally-dependent, moreover they also depend on expertise or personal experience. It is impossible to discern necessary and sufficient features that their all members possess. Cognitive research has also shown that people do not organise their knowledge in hierarchical taxonomical lists as presupposed in objectivistic theory. Cognitively, the most relevant is so called basic-level cognition which is based on sensori-motor interaction and on one's most frequent contact with an object. The concept of objects at this level have an overall gestalt that is easy to be drawn or ostensibly define. The concepts from this level are usually the best examples of a given category and are called its prototypical example. If we think about the category 'bird' we will quickly realise that it is difficult to find a bundle of necessary and sufficient conditions which would allow us to discern birds from other animals. Feathers are an endemic feature of

birds but not many people would agree that it is the most important feature of a bird as the basis on which they will recognise one. Other features of birds such as the ability to fly, being born from an egg or possessing a beak, not to mention singing are also found in other animals. Thus, although the category bird will include all kinds of birds, not all kinds will be seen as matching our presumptions of how birds look. Those which match best are prototypical examples and depend in which geographical region the category is created. For some of my students who live in Warsaw a prototypical bird is the pigeon but, for me, it is the sparrow which is remembered from my childhood in Warsaw and so on. As can be seen a change of experience does not necessarily change the prototype as it is in case of 'my' sparrow which shows that categories, once created, become stable constructs in our minds.

Lakoff (1989) has proposed calling such stable mental structures idealised cognitive models (ICM). They do not do not precisely describe the world (as it is in case of my sparrow because today the bird most frequently met in Warsaw *is* a pigeon), because they are idealised. They are cognitive because they enable cognition and understanding of our experience and discourse. They are models because they are construed on the basis of prototypical categorisation. This means that they are also culturally based. For example, all of us has an ICM of a restaurant with its prototypical features the most important of which is that we can eat if we pay. Other features are waiters who take our order and bring us food, we eat at tables on plates with use of cutlery and they have some specific features which differentiates them from cafés or clubs or diners. But this model is motivated by the experience of a European restaurant. For example, in India, there are restaurants organised in a European style but normally there are just small eateries, often without cutlery (in some, you may ask for cutlery), and in South India you find banana leaves instead of plates and you sit on the floor. And in a traditional Japanese restaurant one eats with sticks seated on chairs with little legs which makes one sit with one's legs tucked in under the seat. And so on. The most prototypical feature (i.e., you have to pay for the meal) is the same but imagine yourself talking with a traditional Hindu and Japanese (not influenced by European culture though that may be difficult to imagine) and saying 'I went to a restaurant yesterday and I forgot my wallet!' You expect curiosity as to what happened and they might sympathise with you and so on. But imagine yourself saying 'I went to a restaurant yesterday and they forgot to give me the fork!' Are you sure that your surprise would be understood? You expect a shared feeling of surprise instead you may see on their faces a mute question 'what is the problem?'. This is because their ICM of restaurant (still talking about a traditional Indian or Japanese) is different from yours. And



they activate its elements but may have no concept of a dining fork. This is how ICMs enable or disable effective discourse. Needless to say, even within one culture, ICMs can be different for example an ICM of marriage. When a couple decides to get married, they do not usually don't agree on the ICM of marriage as both assume that they think the same. And after some time, it occurs that the prototypical feature of his ICM is that all duties are equally shared and hers is that he should earn money and she should stay at home taking care of children (or the other way round). They have failed to communicate although they use the same language and even the same word.

The ICM of restaurant is an example of a propositional ICM. There are other types of ICMs construed on the basis of our mental abilities such as conceptual metonymy, conceptual metaphor and conceptual blending (see below, sections 6.2–5). They reflect the basic cognitive assumption that human thinking is embodied but is not literal and propositional. Rather the opposite, as most of our thinking is based on the aforementioned abilities which allow for understanding as per the example of the iceberg and its tip. The terms used to name two of these abilities (metonymy and metaphor) derive from literary studies though they do not refer to purely linguistic phenomena but to conceptual connections between words and thoughts. This is indicated by the adjective 'conceptual'. It is thanks to those abilities that we are able to think about the ICM of restaurant when we hear 'fork' (provided we share the same ICM) and it is thanks to these abilities that we are able to understand the simile comparing thought and language to an iceberg and its tip which actually are quite disparate concepts and in our everyday experience have nothing in common.

## 6.2. Conceptual metonymy

Conceptual metonymy is a mental ability which allows for the activation of the whole concepts or of their relevant parts *via* a linguistic (and non-linguistic) sign. A sign which triggers activation is called a metonymic vehicle, the concept evoked by it, the target domain. So, the ICM of restaurant is the target domain while the concepts of fork or wallet is the metonymic vehicle in the preceding conversation. However, in other conversations, or more generally, in other discourses the concept of restaurant can be the metonymic vehicle, for example, when we sit at the table ready to eat our food and we notice that something is missing. Then, our metonymic ability tells us that it is a fork. Again, the fork is a target domain only in the European culture of eating, in the Japanese, it would be sticks, and for a traditional Indian Brahmin nothing would be missing because a traditional Indian Brahmin eats with his right hand.

A concept of a concrete old and worn-out wallet we see on a desk can be a metonymic vehicle domain that reminds us our late grand-father who never wanted a new one. Then, the concept of grand-father is the target domain. On the other hand, when one needs to put money somewhere, one looks for one's wallet. Now the concept of wallet is the target domain activated *via* the concept of coins activated by real coins. All these metonymic operations depend on our ICMs of restaurant, fork, grand-father and wallet. It seems clear that they are motivated not only by our bodily and cultural experience but also by personal experience.

Conceptual metonymies are such ubiquitous mental phenomenon that we hardly notice them. They are the ground for associations and the creation of symbols and abstract concepts. They make communication possible. As can be seen much of what we communicate is implicit in that it is not expressed in language. Facial expressions, gestures and conversational context also are meaningful for us thanks to metonymies. We understand emotions on the basis of their physical symptoms. For example, frowning can be a metonymic vehicle which activates the concept of anger or of pondering depending in which context we see this facial expression. Our friend whom we see from a distance with their hand to their ear with extended thumb and little finger metonymically communicates to us that she will phone later, the hand in this specific position is a metonymic vehicle which activates the target domain of phoning. Even in everyday language we do not talk literally. When someone tells you that he was bitten by a dog we activate the target domain which are the teeth of the dog in a part of a body and even this target domain could be a vehicle for a surgeon who will have to sew the wound. If we could not understand metonymies, we could not communicate.<sup>51</sup>

The schema for metonymies is X FOR Y where X is metonymic vehicle and Y is target domain. It is possible to discern a set of general metonymies which seem to be universal, such as PART FOR WHOLE and WHOLE FOR PART.<sup>52</sup> This metonymy allows us to understand a passport photo which someone shows us saying 'this is my daughter'. Face as a part of a human being is a metonymic vehicle for the whole human being. It is worth noting that when we see a photo with the face of a woman, usually we activate the prototypical ICM of a woman as the target domain, so we would be somehow surprised if the father adds that she cannot walk and is in a wheelchair. The reason why a face is such a good metonymic vehicle has been extensively explored by developmental psychology and is also elaborated in philosophy.<sup>53</sup>

<sup>51</sup> Radden, Kövecses (1999). See also Littlemore (2018).

<sup>52</sup> For types of metonymies see Radden, Kövecses (1999).

<sup>53</sup> Especially in Philosophy of Dialogue (Martin Buber, Emmanuel Levinas).

Just to give an example of the reverse metonymy, WHOLE FOR PART. In the RV, the word which means cow (*gó*) is used in reference to milk. In this case, the concept of a cow (a whole) is the metonymic vehicle which activates the target domain which is the concept of milk. Why of milk and not of its udder (*údhara*) or of its horns (*śṛṅga*). They seem equally important features of the ICM of a cow as the milk it gives. But the relationship between the metonymic vehicle and its target domain is not random. It is not that everything can be associated with everything. This relationship is experientially motivated and depends on our ICM of a thing. For R̥gvedic Aryans who were cowherders, the most important feature of the ICM of cow was that it gave milk. We could say that the giving of milk was its definitional feature and that a cow which does not give milk is not a cow at all. Thus, the noun used in reference to a cow could be replaced by the noun used in reference to milk. The R̥gvedic Aryans are not alone in creating a metonymic ICM<sup>54</sup> in which a cow is reduced to milk, modern mass production of meat, milk, eggs or fur reduces animals to their parts relevant for human consumption. The same metonymy operates in modern medical discourse in hospitals when a person is reduced to the diseased part of their body. One can forget one is dealing with a human being who has emotions, feelings and a family and is not just a liver cancer. These examples show how metonymic thinking influences human thinking and then behavior, because most probably the doctor's behavior towards the patient will be different depending on whether he takes into account the whole person (he is not thinking metonymically) or reduces him to a problem that needs to be solved (he is creating the metonymy LIVER CANCER FOR HUMAN BEING). One should add that such a reduction (if any) only took place in the cow herding Aryan ICM, for in other contexts body parts of cattle (such as legs, udder, penis, horns) and cattle behavior were conventionally used as source domains for the conceptualisation of various abstract concepts (Jurewicz 2013, 2018, 2019).

### 6.3. Conceptual metaphor

While conceptual metonymy operates within one ICM, conceptual metaphor operates between two ICMs. In research the parts of ICM which are active in metaphoric thinking are called conceptual domains. We should bear in mind that we are talking about what happens in our minds when confronted with signs. Conceptual metaphor is the mental ability which allows us to think

<sup>54</sup> When part of a ICM is not just a metonymic vehicle, but is identified with a whole (Lakoff 1989).

about something in terms of something else. Thanks to it one can compare thought to the iceberg and a tongue to its tip and it has meaning. One does not expect readers to imagine the iceberg in all its beauty and awe but just to highlight the proportions between its totality and its tip and the fact that we only see the tips of icebergs. These features are mapped onto the concepts of a tongue and thought and allow us to understand their relationship. The concept in terms of which another concept is conceived is called the source domain, the concept conceived, the target domain and the schema IS X IS Y. So, the concept of iceberg is the source domain (Y) and the concepts of thought and language are the target domain (X). Usually, the source domain is more concrete than the target domain.

Without conceptual metaphors we could not make our experience meaningful. Most of its target concepts are impossible to name directly. One refers not only to philosophical concepts such as being or cognition, time or God, but also to emotions and feelings, social structures and relationships, pain when our body is damaged or we are sick, illness generally and so on. All these seemingly obvious concepts are thought of in terms of other concepts. We think about emotions in terms of concrete things and processes (Kövecses 1986, 2000),<sup>55</sup> nations in terms of families (Lakoff 2000), pain in terms of being wounded by a sharp tool (Semino 2008, 2010), etc. All these examples do not exhaust the richness of metaphoric conceptualisation of those experiences. One source domain can be used to conceive various target domains, for example, we use the concept of plant to conceive relationships, organisations and ideas (Lakoff, Johnson 1980).<sup>56</sup> On the other hand, a complex target domain can be conceived in terms of various source domains: love is conceived in terms of a war, of a patient, of physical force.<sup>57</sup> This feature of metaphoric thinking was noticed by Steven Collins; he was not a cognitive linguist himself, but in his book *Nirvāṇa: Concept, Imagery, Narrative* wrote:

In *Selfless Persons*, I tried to show, following in the footsteps of many previous writers, that metaphors are very frequently not, or not merely, illustrative of some otherwise articulable ‘literal’ language of thought (whatever that might mean); they are constitutive of thought, both on an individual level and – still more, and for this discussion still more importantly – for collective traditions. Here I will try to do the same thing. (2010: 62)

<sup>55</sup> E.g., anger is conceived in terms of a boiling pot (Lakoff, Kövecses 1987, Kövecses 1986).

<sup>56</sup> Relationships and organisations can *grow* ‘The *seeds* of his great ideas *were planted* in his youth’ (Lakoff, Johnson 1980: 47).

<sup>57</sup> ‘She *fought* for him, but his mistress *won*’, ‘This is *sick* relationship’, ‘They *gravitated* to each other immediately’ (Lakoff, Johnson 1980: 49).

An important feature of metaphoric conceptualisations is that each source domain mapped onto the target domain highlights some of its features but hides others. Conceptualisation of thought and language in terms of the iceberg highlights their basic unity and the fact that language, perceived by sight and seeing, reveals only part of our thought.

Although it is accepted that an ability for metaphoric conceptualisation is common to all human brains, most conceptual metaphors are culturally motivated. As in the case of metonymies we have to share a common net of conceptual metaphors in order to be able to communicate. If one culture conceives nation in terms of family and another one in terms of agreement there is no doubt that communication will be difficult even if both sides use the same word. The same happens within cultures and their smaller units like families and in this case the situation is even worse because we assume that, if we use the same language, we think the same. And this is not always true because the source and target domains draw upon ICMs which, as has been shown above, may be different even for two people.

As far as this investigation into philosophical concepts is concerned conceptual metaphors will be the basic mode of thinking and expression notwithstanding how much philosophers like to make them literal. Such concepts as being, cognition and time can be seen as literal as long as one does not want to say any more about them. So, being can be conceived in terms of something that does not move (Heraclitus) or something that moves (Parmenides), in terms of a sphere (Parmenides), in terms of fire (Heraclitus) while cognition is conceived in terms of seeing and illuminating (Descartes), time in terms of a moving entity and God in terms of a king or a shepherd. Lakoff and Johnson (1999) have shown that even the basic concepts of analytical philosophy are metaphorical.

Most philosophical metaphors draw upon metaphors that people use in their everyday thinking and because of that they are meaningful (Lakoff, Johnson 1999). Philosophers, like artists, elaborate metaphors in order to express their specific target domain as precisely as it is possible. Much of this elaboration is elaboration of the source domain<sup>58</sup> and the more features he finds, the more innovative theory he will create. Of course, there are other mental processes which should be active in philosophy, like reasoning, but metaphoric conceptualisation can be seen as the scaffolding on which reasoning is based. Reasoning is very often based on the logic of the source domain which refers to experiences which are well known and seem natural

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<sup>58</sup> For example, let us imagine Plato's theory of ideas without the logic of the concept of a cave in which men are enclosed and are only able to see their shadows.

(Lakoff, Johnson 1999, Lakoff, Nuñez 2000). The source domains also refer to cultural heritage which taken for granted.

However, this is not to say that abstraction is impossible. Just the opposite. The beginning of abstraction is experience and concrete concepts. We will see below how the process of creation of abstract concepts can be explained with the use of cognitive tools.

#### 6.4. Image schemas

As stated above most metaphors are culturally motivated. There are however, some metaphors which seem to be more universal. These are metaphors the source domain of which is based on early human experience, before language and its concepts appear. This experience creates in the mind recurrent general patterns as to the basic structure of objects and the basic scenario of processes and activities. These recurrent mental patterns are called image schemas and are very important source domains for reasoning and abstract concepts.<sup>59</sup>

There is discussion between neurologists, developmental psychologists and cognitive linguists as to the number and typology of image schemas (Mandler, Cánovas 2014). However, there is a group accepted by all scholars. These are the image schemas of CONTAINER, SOURCE-PATH-GOAL, FORCE, VERTICALITY, BALANCE, CENTRE-PERIPHERY.<sup>60</sup>

The baby experiences its body in terms of a CONTAINER into which something is put and from which something emerges, it experiences the crib or playpen as a container from which something can be thrown out which is then put back, finally as a container from which it can go out and in. When the child starts to crawl and wants to reach a toy or its parent and immediate family it has to move forwards in some way, avoid some piece of furniture, before it reaches its destination. Thus, the SOURCE-PATH-GOAL image schema is created. The image schema of FORCE is created when the child does not want to do something, so the parent or a close family member picks it up despite its protests, or pushes it in a given direction. When the child sits down and stands on its feet for the first time, it experiences a significant change in cognitive perspective combined with the delight of the family, which is also very enjoyable. And then the child falls down and tries again and again until it learns how to catch its balance. Thus, the image schemas of VERTICALITY and of BALANCE are created. Finally, the child feels itself as

<sup>59</sup> Johnson (1987), Mandler (2004: 59–120), Hampe, Grady (2005).

<sup>60</sup> The full list of the image-schemas is much larger, but the image schemas mentioned above will be used in my analysis.

the CENTRE of the world, closest are its parents and immediate family whom it trusts while those less well known and are at the PERIPHERY of the child's experience and cognition may engender some anxiety or aversion. All these examples are based on the prototypical development of a child. Of course, in individual cases it may be different and later it may bring various cognitive and emotional difficulties. Why? Because image schemas are very important source domains that allow us to conceptualise abstract concepts, to make inferences about various phenomena and thus make our experience meaningful.

For example, within the frames of the objectivistic theory, categories are conceived in terms of containers with strict boundaries, either an element is within a container or outside it, there is no other possibility.<sup>61</sup> Taking a seemingly less abstract example, let us think about countries which are conceived in terms of containers with tight borders that can only be crossed at border crossings guarded by the military. These containers are less airtight under the Schengen Agreement, but that applies to a minority of countries. And yet countries only exist in our heads, how is the land different before and after the border crossing? Certainly, the houses may be different, the language may be different (or similar in some way) but any difference is a product of culture, something that we invented ourselves and decided to put in containers, not only conceptually, but actually.

Here are examples of other schema. The SOURCE-PATH-GOAL image schema allows us to design our thinking and acting; it is so strongly embedded in our cognitive apparatus that we are hardly able to think and talk about plans other than in these categories. The FORCE image schema allows us to understand causality, beginning with classical physics and ending with emotional submission.<sup>62</sup>

The VERTICALITY image schema allows us to understand a lot of phenomena and evaluate them on a vertical axis: BETTER IS UP and WORSE IS DOWN. We understand in these terms such abstract concepts as temperature, inflation, emotions, intelligence, etc. In terms of the image schema of BALANCE understand proportion, symmetry, beauty, moral and legal justice. Finally, thanks to CENTRE-PERIPHERY image schema we know how to distinguish what is ours and what is not ours, what is more important to us and what is less important, starting with our own desk and room and ending with social groups:

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<sup>61</sup> Lakoff (1987), Lakoff, Johnson (1999), Lakoff, Nuñez (2000).

<sup>62</sup> One might say that Hume's critic of causation ('an objective, mind-independent, necessary connection between causes and effects is unintelligible... necessity turns out to be a product of our own minds. So, whatever we might think we are doing when we engage in causal talk and thought, we are not referring to mind-independent necessity', Beebe 2016: 228) is based, on its deepest grounds, on the recognition of this image-schema as a mental pattern.

an accident that happened in Spain in which none of my countrymen died is less important than one that happened in Spain in which one of my fellow countrymen died. All these three schemata enable evaluation.

If one is not convinced by the above examples try to imagine at least one of the above concepts *without* using one of the above-mentioned schemas. Some of them will be easier to think about in other terms but with some it will be impossible. The rejection of the CONTAINER schema in relation to categories underlies new thinking about those categories, as in the case of the understanding of states in the framework of the Schengen Treaty. But try to think of causality in terms other than FORCE, or justice in terms other than BALANCE. Of course, as with other conceptual metaphors, we think of these target domains with use of many other source domains, but the image schemas are the most basic and many of them are universal.

## 6.5. Conceptual blending

The great Indian historian of philosophy and art, Coomaraswamy (1997 [1918]) in response to European critical reviews at the beginning of the 20th century of Indian works of art<sup>63</sup> writes that this criticism could be justified if we assume that the representation of the world is the ultimate aim of art. But it is not true and Coomaraswamy claims that also European art shows it. He writes that ‘some painters in the present day’ (i.e. in 1918):

have sought many strange devices to create a synthetic and symphonic art representing a continuity of thought or action, and an interpretation of ideas belonging to more than a single phase of personality – an art of interpretation.’ (Coomaraswamy 1997 [1918]: 100)

Coomaraswamy argues this approach in Indian art is even more important because it is God in its many manifestations that is presented by Indian artists. He states that if human nature is compound, the more compound is God’s nature who, thanks to its various attributes, is able to be in many places in one time. He states that:

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<sup>63</sup> Coomaraswamy quotes the negative opinions of the early 20th century ‘After 300 A.D. Indian sculpture properly so-called hardly deserves to be reckoned as art. The figures both of men and animals become stiff and formal, and the idea of power is clumsily expressed by the multiplication of members. The many-headed, many-armed gods and goddesses whose images crowd the walls and roofs of medieval temples have no pretention to beauty, and are frequently hideous and grotesque... In a country like this we must not expect to find anything that appeals to mind or deep feeling.’



‘to reflect such conception in art demands a synthetic rather than a representative language.’ (Coomaraswamy 1997 [1918]: 100).

The image of the dancing Śiva is one of the most famous Hindu images. Zvelebil (1985) has published a thorough analysis of that image. He discusses the meaning of each hand, of the way the hair is presented, of the legs and the figure on which Śiva dances, of the flames that surround him etc. And then he writes:

we must realise that *none* of these significant, meaningful features should be absent: it is their systemic, structural totality that constitutes the meaning of the whole – the meaning of the *ānanda-ṭaṇḍava* (the cosmic dance of Śiva – JJ)’ (Zvelebil 1985: 33)

The ability to create ‘the synthetic and symphonic art’ as Coomaraswamy calls it, or to understand ‘structural totality that constitutes the meaning of the whole’ in Zvelebil’s words, is possible thanks to our ability to integrate various concepts and compress them in conceptual blends.

The theory of conceptual blending has been presented by Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner in their book ‘*The way we think. Conceptual Blending and the Mind’s Hidden Complexities* published in 2003’. They discuss linguistic and non-linguistic expressions which cannot be analysed using conceptual metaphor. In many cases, they argue, the mental operations we perform to create and understand such expressions do not merely project elements of one concept (as is in the case of conceptual metaphor) onto another but create a new emergent meaning. This is thanks to the compression of some elements of at least two concepts that are referred to as mental spaces. Their characteristic feature is that they are often created to meet the need of the current discourse and can be less stable than ICMs and conceptual domains.

Let us think about Śiva’s hands: one of them is holding a drum, another a flame, the third is raised and the fourth is gesturing. Each of these hands metonymically activate a posture of dance or rather of a dancer making such a posture. A dancer holding a drum is one concept, a dancer holding flame is another concept, a dancer raising a hand and making a gesture are two further concepts. The concepts of dancers are called the input spaces. New meaning is created in a new space called a blend; from the input spaces some elements are projected into this space namely the dancer and the moving hands which are now more than just two elements. Each hand projects its meaning into the blend. Thus, we can understand the meaning of the whole which is Śiva as creator, supporter and destroyer of the world (Zvelebil 1985). This is a new emergent meaning.

There is another space of a blend called the generic space. Its content are the common features of the input spaces. In case of the dancing Śiva, it is a human dancing figure but often the generic space is much more general, for example it can simply be an image schema. As research shows, conceptual blendings are created not only when creating and understanding art, they are part of our everyday thinking and communication.

Conceptual metonymies, metaphors and blendings take place in our mind automatically and unconsciously. Before we think, they have already happened. Imagine *not thinking* about a restaurant when you see a road-sign with a knife and spoon crossed, *not to understand* someone who tells you 'I see what you mean' to state he knows what you think and *not to understand* an image of a man with wings as an angel. Well, someone could answer that we know this because we were brought up in such a culture and learned a language in which these images and expressions make sense. But the fact that they are meaningful is built on those mental abilities referred to above. In a different culture the images and expressions could be different but their meaning is always built with the same mental abilities.

### **6.6. Why cognitive linguistics in research on the history of early Indian philosophical ideas**

Let us begin with a word of caution. Cognitive linguistics is not a universal key that will allow us to solve all the difficulties we face when researching ancient Indian thought. What we can say is that it is useful for the reconstruction of the thinking and the experience that motivates linguistic expressions that cannot always be reconstructed by other methods. It allows us to reconstruct the invisible cultural foundations on which philosophers have built their ideas. For them, they were obvious and they did not need to express them verbally. For us, they are hidden unless we go back to the very beginnings of a culture where they began or do not refer to the experiences evoked by them.

This author's long journey from the early Smṛti texts to the ṚV, then to the later Vedic texts and subsequently back has already been described. At the beginning one did not feel the need to go beyond standard philological and philosophical methods. The motivation was the desire to understand what their Composers wanted to say. It was contact with the hymns of the ṚV that forced one to explore alternative methodologies that were found in cognitive linguistics. Those cognitive tools also turned out to be extremely useful in the analysis of the ŚB. Their use in the analysis of later texts, the early Upaniṣads and the early Smṛti texts also shed more light on the philosophical assumptions and theories built in those texts.

Reconstruction of the metonymies, metaphors and blends evoked by the philosophers shows the coherence of their thought. It is strengthened even more if we are able to reconstruct the experience which motivated their thinking. In case of early Indian philosophers, the experience which can be reconstructed with the aid of cognitive tools is simple and closely connected with everyday experience. This shows the limitations of this method, it cannot replace historical and social analysis!

The cognitive reconstruction has allowed one to see that expressions, bizarre at first glance, are motivated by the abilities of the human mind, and their strangeness is merely due to the distance in time and space that separates us from the Composers of the early Indian texts. It has also revealed the way the concepts were inherited and transformed, how the Composers change metonymic vehicles and source domains in order to express new target domains and how they look for new input spaces of their blends.

Cognitive tools are very useful in analysing the creation of abstract concepts. Readers are reminded as to the hypothesis about their origination (presented in Jurewicz 2016/18). The first stage is metonymic (MIND FOR MAN) and metaphoric (GOD IS MAN). In this case the logic and topology of the vehicle (MIND) and the source domain (MAN) actively map the target domain. In the same way in everyday life, in a typical prototype conversation, we may say that someone is about to explode but we do not mean it literally we just want to say that a person is furious. At the same time, however, the concept of exploding can be easily evoked as in a cartoon. The second stage is the blending of vehicle/source domain with the target domain. They become input spaces, and the generic space is the feature which makes them similar (it is the concept of thinking in both cases). Some features of the vehicle/source domain and the target domain are projected into the blend and thus a new concept of the mind and the God emerges: the mind as creative, God as thinking. The final stage is that the target domain is detached from any experience and only its topology or logic of its scenario is incorporated into it. We do not ask why the mind is creative or why God thinks. We just take these features of these concepts as describing an abstract reality.

The more difficult the logic of experience is to discover, the more abstract are the concepts. This happened with the R̥gvedic concept of udder (*úḍhar*), which is used in hymns to All Gods, in contexts such that it is impossible to grasp its meaning beyond the general one relating to an aspect of reality (Jurewicz 2014). Probably not only scholars have had a problem with this concept but also later Indian philosophers because the abstract concept of udder had already disappeared in the Brāhmaṇas, as well as many other concepts derived from cow herding experience. This may mean that the experience was

no longer so meaningful for the Composers. The only concepts that remained are the concepts where the logic of the experience was fully fused with the target domain (such as the leg, *pada*). In other words, when a blend was strong enough to remain meaningful.

The theory of blending has become especially useful in clarifying specific aspects of early Hindu way of presenting their theories. It is the ability to form fused concepts that is fundamental to the vitality of tradition. In this case, the content of a text is one complex input space and tradition is the second input space. The generic space is constituted by those features of the input spaces that the composers consider to be common to both of them. In the blend, the present theory is the same as that taught by tradition. A magnificent blend is created in the MaU but, as we will see, they also are created by the Composers of the texts analysed by this study.

The ability to create conceptual blends also allowed the early Hindu Composers to create a cyclical argument in which one phenomenon is discussed from different points of view and the recipient is triggered to remember that the discussed topic has not changed. As mentioned above (see section 3), the conventional frame of the exposition of philosophical theory is that the creation of the world is discussed first, then the presence of reality in space and in man, then wrong cognition and finally liberating cognition. These constitutes a generic space and the subsequent stages of the activity of reality are the input spaces. In the blend the recipient understands that the final object of the argument are changes in reality.

Further we enlarge the scope of application of conceptual blending to clarify some aspects of the theories and practices described in the analysed texts. It allows one to better understand the nature of wrong and liberating cognition seen as the creation of blends during the former and their decompression and compression in a new way in the latter (chapters 3–4). We will also discuss liberating cognition against the broader background of mystical experience interpreted as the ability to consciously activate new input spaces and incorporate them into the blend run by the mystic (chapter 5.1).

As stated above, cognitive tools allow us to reconstruct experience though this study limits itself to reconstructing only as much as it is needed to understand its motivating influence on concepts. In most cases, it is everyday experience, close to ordinary people. Political or more general social experiences are evoked more rarely and when they are, they are evoked generally. For example, the use of the concept of the relationship between the king and his subjects to conceive the relationship between reality and its manifestations.<sup>64</sup>

<sup>64</sup> Angelika Malinar (2007) has proposed to see the BhG as proposing a new interpretation of kingship, but her approach is different from mine in that she looks for the proofs for her

New theories proposed in the humanities are like new devices in science such as a new telescope in astronomy that allows one to see more of the universe. Of course, like any device, each theory allows us to perceive only that which is possible within its scope though its application sheds light on phenomena that may be invisible with use of other theories. The reader will now recognise that within the frames of the conceptual metaphor just activated, devices in science are the source domain and new theories in humanities are the target domain. It depends on the reader as to how it is elaborated.

## 7. Other methodological issues

The basic tool used in this study remains philological analysis and close reading of the original Sanskrit texts. They form the basis for cognitive analysis. In this research the etymological meaning of words plays an important role because it allows us to reconstruct the experience that motivates the meaning of the word, and therefore thinking. Even if the meaning of a word is already abstract, the logic of the experience incorporated into it allows us to understand more about the way the abstract concept is conceived; which of its aspects are highlighted and which are hidden.

In the same way as in my previous books I prefer to take into account as much of a text's context as is possible according to some general assumption as to the internal coherence of the final form of that text. Often it is not possible taking into account the total size of a text but in such a case one analyses whole chapters or a large part. The sequence of stanzas, verses and words reflects a sequence of thinking and it is the thinking that one wants to reconstruct and understand. It has happened many times that, having discussed generally a fragment or stanza, one found one was analysing them once again verse by verse. This time guided by the Composer's way of thinking rather than one's initial thoughts and it turned out that the fragment or stanza is much more coherent than it would appear from that initial overview. Probably the MDhP needs a separate analysis accordingly to the whole as presented by the teachers but this goes beyond the scope of the present studies.

Not being a native English speaker, one has generally quoted translations from authoritative scholars (Olivelle's of the MS, Wynne's of the MDhP and van Buitenen's of the BhG). However, in many cases, especially in the case of Wynne, one has put forward one's own translation. There are two reasons

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argument in historical testimonies (iconographical, epigraphic and numismatic data) and the broader textual context of the MBh and not in the way the concepts of experience are used in philosophical thinking.

for this. The first is that it was not considered appropriate to translate all Sanskrit terms into English. Secondly, and more importantly, it was considered worthwhile to offer the most literal translation for the purposes of the analysis in order to activate metonymies, metaphors and blends which frame the Composers' thinking even if it had unconsciously. One is aware that such a translation is not suitable as an independent translation proposal but it is considered worth doing for the purposes of analysis.

The most important philosophical terms which are not translated are *dharma/adharma* and the names of three classes (*guṇa*) namely *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. These terms are translated variously by scholars and this fact reflects their rich meaning. Interpretation are proposed, as to how they should be understood, that is grounded in a holistic understanding of the philosophical assumptions and their outcomes put forward by the philosophers (see below). So, they are left in their Sanskrit original. As far as other technical terms are concerned such as *samādhī*, their literal meaning is the base for their interpretation because they do not yet have a fully abstract meaning as in later philosophical or religious thought and this literal meaning was important for the Composers. Also left is the translation of the term *brahman* with its two main meanings 'reality' or 'the Veda' placed in brackets for the purpose of analysis. We must remember however that, as it is in case of other holistic concepts, they are all activated in the mind of the recipients at once. The Composer might want to highlight one of these meaning in a given contexts and another meaning in other context one time and sometimes another time but all meanings are potentially present.

Finally, the translation of the noun *tapas* as 'heat' with noun *tapas* in brackets needs some explanation. This noun is most often translated by the scholars as 'austerities' or 'ascetic toil'. Yet it is difficult to find in the early Smṛti texts any activity, apart from fasting and adopting a stationary body posture, that could be called ascetic effort. The suggestion is that the central features of the ICM of this concept were fasting and recitation of the Veda with proper breathing and in some contexts both meanings are activated while in others only one. This activity was either experienced as heating (which is sometime quite clearly implied) or conceived in this way and this is the reason why the Smṛti Composers used the word to denote heat. In Vedic Sanskrit it means any heating, be it the activity of fire and the sun or the activity of man who searches for an altered state of consciousness the concept of which was the source domain for thinking of Prajāpati. It should also be added that the noun *tapas* means both heating and shining and this blended meaning is preserved in early Smṛti thought.<sup>65</sup>

<sup>65</sup> The experience of heat gained thanks to techniques leading to altered states of consciousness is attested in many cultures (e.g., Katz 1982, Winkelmann 2010).

The word ‘man’ is used in reference to human beings because only men were fully human beings in ancient Indian culture. In the analysis of the texts the noun ‘Composer’ is normally used in the singular although one is aware that there were probably many composers. However, the singular noun is preferred for the sake of clarity and fluidity.

Those who have realised the ultimate goal of human life, which is freedom (*mukti*, *mokṣa*) are called free men not liberated men. In this way one can show that the Smṛti philosophers aspired to a state that can be expressed in terms of European thinking. It allows one to grasp more clearly aspects of the concept of freedom, that can be reconstructed from the texts, that are congruent to European thinking. At the same time, it allows the differences in the understanding of this concept in both philosophical traditions to be highlighted. Finally, translating the concepts of *mukti/mokṣa* and *mukta* (as ‘freedom’ and ‘free man’) enables the nature of this state and the way to its realisation to be better understood. Man, as an embodiment of free reality, is always free, although his thoughts and actions usually contradict this. Liberating cognition is understood in terms of a path whose goal is already fulfilled during the journey itself (which is expressed by the meaning of the noun *gati* ‘way’ and ‘destination’). The goal of the road which is freedom, is present in man as is his immortal self. Liberating cognition makes it come true at every stage. Freedom is realised in action. That is why the Smṛti philosophers emphasise its necessity.

## 8. Philosophical issues

In this study terms are used as they are in my earlier books (Jurewicz 2010, 2016/18). Instead of the term ‘Absolute’ the term ‘reality’ is used to express the self-existent being that creates and sustains contingent beings. But even this definition does not apply here because reality in its pre-creative state cannot be called being/truth (*sát*) or non-being/untruth (*ásat*, RV 10.129). That however, is not only reason to avoid the term ‘Absolute’. In European philosophies the Absolute is changeless and unmanifest while the Absolute in early Indian philosophy is both changeable and manifested. Conversely the concept of ‘God’ implies personal features of the Absolute which is absent in early Indian philosophy. The concept of a personal God does appear in the early Smṛti texts though, in this study, this question will not be considered in its philosophical-religious aspects. If such a concept appears the names ascribed to it by the Composers (Brahma, Kṛṣṇa, Nārāyaṇa etc) will be used.

Reality described in the early Smṛti texts is a more complex concept as far as its aspects beyond the perceptible cosmos are concerned. As mentioned above, the range of interest of the early Vedic Composers includes the cosmos seen as the manifest aspect of reality and the borderline sphere between two aspects, the manifest and the unmanifest. This sphere is marked by the daily and yearly movement of the sun and is reached by men in ritual. The unmanifest aspect is seen as impossible to be cognised and expressed in thought and language. It constitutes an inconceivable and inexpressible basis of everything which can be thought and expressed and which is its perceptible manifestation.

In the ṚV, creation is generally conceived in terms of the appearance of light from darkness which is elaborated in most detail in the cosmogony presented in ṚV 10.129 (Jurewicz 2010). Here the stages are as follows. Impossible to be cognised and expressed reality manifests itself in the first act of self-cognition (it is one and internally contradictory).<sup>66</sup> Thus it manifests its cognitive and creative power. Then it sees itself in terms of the object of its cognition that does not include all of it, but only an aspect. In these terms the cosmos in its pre-creative state is conceived and it is also conceived in terms of darkness (stage 2)<sup>67</sup> hiding darkness and as muddy water without any sign (stage 3).<sup>68</sup> The object is cognised (which is conceived in terms of appearance of heat, *tapas*, stage 4).<sup>69</sup> Reality desires to further cognise the cosmos which is conceived in terms of the sexual act (stage 5).<sup>70</sup> The first superhuman cognitive powers of reality (poets, *kavī*) are created that are identical with it as sons are identical with their father.<sup>71</sup> Then subject-object cognition takes place within the cosmos: the poets repeat cognitive activity of reality and divide the cosmos into an upper and lower sphere (stage 6). The last two stanzas of the hymn trigger the recipients to repeat the creative activity of the seers, its cognitive manifestations. Creation is re-enacted in the functioning of the cosmos and in the cognition of men. We can call this model of creation as the ICM of creation of the cosmos and it is shared by the following generations of philosophers who elaborate it in various way although its basic stages are preserved, beginning with the ŚB.

The Composers of early Upaniṣads do not concentrate on cosmogony as much as the Composers of the earlier Vedic texts, but when they describe creation, they elaborate the ICM in two directions. On one hand, they present

<sup>66</sup> *ānīd avātām svadhāyā tād ēkaṃ tasmād dhānyān nā parāḥ kiṃ canāsa* (ṚV 10.129.2cd).

<sup>67</sup> *tāma āsīt tāmasā gūḥām āgre* (ṚV 10.129.3a).

<sup>68</sup> *apraketām salilām sārvaṃ ā idām* (ṚV 10.129.3b).

<sup>69</sup> *tuchyēnābhū āpihitam yād āsīt tāpasas tām mahinājāyataikam* (ṚV 10.129.3cd).

<sup>70</sup> *kāmas tād āgre sām avartatādhi mānaso rétaḥ prathamām yād āsīt* (ṚV 10.129.4ab). The description of stage 5 is very concise, see Jurewicz 1995, 2010.

<sup>71</sup> *satō bāndhum āsati nīr avindan hrđī pratiṣyā kavāyo manīṣā* (ṚV 10.129.4cd).



the creation of an individual man (AU 1.2.3–4) and of manhood i.e., the social states (BU 1.4.15), on the other, they extend the scope of their philosophical investigation to include the unmanifest aspect. This was due to the development of liberating techniques that allowed for insight beyond the borderline sphere between two aspects. Now this sphere is, *inter alia*, understood in terms of a dike between two bodies of water and the logic of the source domain suggests the possibility of crossing it (BU 4.4.22, CU 8.4.1). The Composers of cosmogonies of AU and BU call reality and manifestations of its cognitive powers *ātman* (the self) highlighting various semantic aspects of this holistic noun (the essence of an entity and the entity as a whole) so that recipients could understand which aspect is meant in a given context. This noun is used in the same way in the teaching Yājñavalkya gives to king Janaka (BU 3–4, Jurewicz 2016/18). In the analysis of this teaching, it was decided to propose the term ‘the highest cognitive agent’ to denote reality in its creative cognitive manifestation in the cosmos and in men (Jurewicz 2016/18). This term allows one to describe the philosophy of Yājñavalkya as a theory of self-cognition of reality during which it goes through various states of consciousness.

In the analysis of the early Smṛti thought, the concept of the highest cognitive agent is used in reference to the first manifestation of the cognitive powers of reality in the cosmos. Now, the highest cognitive agent is not always identical with the very first manifestation of cognitive powers of reality as it is in the Brāhmaṇas and the early Upaniṣads. For example, in the MS, Brahma, as the highest cognitive agent, appears after it. It is related to the broadening of the scope of liberating cognition which does not end, as in the early Veda, on borderline sphere of the cosmos but goes beyond it. Thus, the use of this concept not only allows us to see clearly the structural correspondence between various cosmogonies in which the highest cognitive agent is not named. It also allows us to see the development of philosophical thought.

The very first manifestation of reality (or its mind, *manas*), be it identified with the highest cognitive agent or not, corresponds to the borderline sphere between two aspects. It is ambivalent because it is manifest and unmanifest at the same time. In its cosmic activity it is manifest, but since it is the manifestation of unmanifest reality it is also unmanifest. It is also manifest in men as they self cognise in liberating cognition. In this manifestation the self is called e.g., *adhyātman* (the deepest self), *antarātman* (the inner self) and *paraātman* (the highest self). These various names of the highest cognitive agent as human self reflect a more analytical insight into states of consciousness.<sup>72</sup>

<sup>72</sup> This issue will be discussed in my forthcoming book in which various terms will be analysed that refer to various states of manifestation of reality which in later philosophical and theological strands became strict technical terms.

The monistic assumption must have posed a serious philosophical challenge in the early Smṛti especially when it came to border concepts such as the highest cognitive agent being identified with the first manifestation of reality. Their increasingly analytical mind, building on the model of sensory cognition that gives knowledge that can be summarised in unambiguous categories (as opposed to mental cognition which allows for ambivalence) demanded a clear distinction between aspects of reality. The concept of the highest cognitive agent is still ambivalent, but its source domain, which is human cognition, emotions and activity, allows one to grasp the borderline sphere between aspects of reality in a more understandable logic than the earlier concepts of this sphere as determined by the movement of the sun in the sky. Yet while its manifestation in the cosmos could be presented in less ambivalent terms, its manifestation in man is again a challenge because when a human being cognises wrongly, its epistemological and ontological status becomes unclear: it is not known whether it ultimately succumbs to human ignorance or not. In other words, within the frames of monistic assumption it is not known if and how much the influence of creation extends to the Creator.

The Smṛti early texts testify to the ever-clearer presence of the concept of a personal God entering into an intimate relationship with man or, in other words, the origins of the bhakti movement in its various forms. The concept of the personal God begins to replace the impersonal highest cognitive agent or is identified with the first subjective power of reality. Already in the early chapters of the MDhP Viṣṇu Nārāyaṇa is mentioned, and this concept is especially elaborated in the late chapters called *Nārāyaṇīya* (Hiltebeitel 2011b: 49–72, 136–186, 188–220). In the cosmogonies presented there, the role of Brahma is reduced to the creation of the cosmos in subject-object cognition according to the will of the highest cognitive agent but Brahma is not seen as a human self. The term *Nārāyaṇa* with its definition is also used in the cosmogony of MS 1 but does not seem to play an important role. On the other hand, in the BhG the personal God is Kṛṣṇa Vāsudeva and is seen as an incarnation of Viṣṇu. This issue is left for the next book (except for a general interpretation on the concept of bhakti as presented in the BhG, see chapter 4.11) which will show the development of this religious tradition and its conceptual links with earlier Vedic one.

As stated above, the motivating influence of tradition on the early Smṛti philosophers is attested not only in the use of Vedic words and expressions, but also in the conceptual scaffold refreshed in everyday memorisation and repetition of the Vedic texts. Jurewicz (2010) used the concept of the general model of Reality Transformation according to which internally contradictory reality, conceived in terms of fire, alternatively manifests its opposing aspects,

fiery and fluid (conceived in terms of soma). According to this model soma, poured in the morning sacrifice to fire, becomes the sun. When the sun reaches its zenith, soma is purified again and falls to the earth as rain. This model is preserved in the cosmogonies of the ŚB and in the early Upaniṣads (Jurewicz 2016/18). At the same time, the Composers of the early Upaniṣads often explicitly interpreted manifestations of reality as the opposition of subject and object.

In early Smṛti thought, the scope of the model is reduced to the cosmos and is used to explain the role of ritual and its validity while the opposition between aspects of reality is not elaborated in its terms. Using cognitive linguistics terminology, the general model of Reality Transformations is an ICM explaining how the world has been created, how it functions and what is the role of man. These types of ICMs are inherited by successive generations of philosophers and are taken for granted by them.

My research on the ṚV suggests that the so called ‘mythological’ stories about the gods e.g., the fight of Indra with Vṛtra, are used by the Composers as source domains to conceive abstract concepts connected with the most fundamental philosophical questions. It should be noted that the models based on stories about the gods are rarely described at length in the ṚV. For example, the story of the fight of Indra with Vṛtra is described in some detail in only in few hymns (4.18, 1.35). In most cases they are activated metonymically, *via* their most salient features. This means that the Ṛgvedic Composers assumed that everyone remembered the stories and knew what they were about. At the same time, however, it allowed them to use their salience as source domains, the topology and scenario of which could be mapped onto abstract concepts. Thus, the model of Indra Fights With Vṛtra has been used to express cosmogony and cosmology in more concrete terms than the general model of Reality Transformation and is also used for the situation of the sacrificer during ritual (Schmidt 1992, Jurewicz 2010). The Composers of the Brāhmaṇas elaborated this source domain in a ritual context but also used it to express the moment of radical transformation of consciousness (ŚB 6.1.1.3). In the same context, the concept of Indra is used in AU (2.3.13–14),<sup>73</sup> CU (8.7),<sup>74</sup> TU (1.6.1).<sup>75</sup>

<sup>73</sup> The definition of Indra is ‘the one who saw this’ (*idandra*), i.e. the unity of reality (AU 1.1.14, Jurewicz 2016/18).

<sup>74</sup> It is Indra who is presented as gaining liberating cognition and thus becomes a prototypical example of those who perform it in the same way as he is the prototypical soma drinker in the ṚV. In the same role it is presented in KU 4.20.

<sup>75</sup> The uvula is called ‘Indra’s womb’ (*indrayoni*) which betrays the role of recitation with proper breathing in gaining the altered states of consciousness which are conceived as Indra. In AU 3.4.3, KU 1.3.6, Indra and Prajāpati are at the borderline sphere between two aspects: Prajāpati as the embodiment of creative power of reality and Indra as the embodiment of the

The Ṛgvedic models are used in the MBh, redefined and presented as stories about men and gods, but construed in such a way that the recipient also understands their target domains. The concept of Indra still remained as the source domain for the conceptualisation of radical change of consciousness.<sup>76</sup> The early Smṛti philosophers evoke these Ṛgvedic models rarely though in some contexts they play a significant role in construction of meaning.

In research on the metaphysical content of the ṚV, the term ‘the general domain’ has been used.<sup>77</sup> It is understood as an abstract and general concept, not necessarily expressed in words, but as motivating the thinking of the poets and later philosophers and used by them in a coherent way to conceive some chosen target domains. As with other concepts of this kind they can be reconstructed with cognitive tools. They were quite numerous in the ṚV though in later tradition there are fewer. The general domains are attested in the early Smṛti texts are as follows. The general domain of Procreation which comes from the ṚV is mostly used to conceive creation. The Ṛgvedic general domain of Cleansing by Heat (in its specific realisations of Churning Butter and the Refining of Gold/Iron) is used to conceive creation and transformation of men during liberating practices. The general domain of Cooking which began to be used in the Brāhmaṇas is mostly used to express the influence of time and liberating cognition; in BhG 11 it activates its Vedic meaning based on the conceptualisation of reality as fiery.

Finally, the general domain of Journey (with its specific realisation as Riding In A Chariot) is used to conceive the influence of time and liberating cognition. This domain is an elaborated version of the SOURCE-PATH-GOAL image schema which, as stated earlier, is used as the source domain for planned activities.<sup>78</sup> Since freedom is understood in terms of free movement (Lakoff 2006), this concept became a source domain for any activity which

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liberating power of men. In the *Kena Upaniṣad* 4.3, Indra is described as ‘somehow’ surpassing the other gods, ‘for he both came into close contact with it and was the first to recognise it as brahman’ (Olivelle’s translation). See also Jurewicz (2016/18: *General Conclusion*).

<sup>76</sup> For example, the story of Arjuna who gets the miraculous weapons from Śiva can be interpreted as expressing the liberating process conceived in terms of metaphor YOGA IS A JOURNEY (see chapter 4.6.2). Before Arjuna meets Śiva, Indra appears before him and tells him how to ask Śiva for the weapons (MBh 3 38). Without his advice, Arjuna probably would not obtain them, in spite of his powerful heating effort (tapas) which obscures the world with smoke (MBh 3.39.26cd: *ugre tapasi duṣpāre sthito dhūmāyayan diśaḥ*; for tapas as heat see below, section 7 and chapter 4.3–6). The appearance of Indra is not only motivated by the fact that he is Arjuna’s father in the epic but also by tradition where this concept is used to denote a radical transformation during liberating cognition (see also footnote 101 in Chapter One on page 129).

<sup>77</sup> The general domain includes the most prototypical features of a given concept.

<sup>78</sup> This general domain, together with the domain of war, constitutes the defining event called Expansion (Jurewicz 2010).

leads to freedom in the RV, i.e., creation of the cosmos, ritual activity and somic exaltation (Jurewicz 2010). It should be noted, however, that this source domain has not been widely elaborated in the RV and it seems that the R̥gvedic Composers were more interested on the aim of journey than in the journey itself. This can be seen in general domain of Finding A Treasure (a specific realisation of the general domain of Finding The Hidden) in the RV where the teleological aim conceived in terms of treasure is clear. The other concept used in terms of this domain in the RV is the influence of time and this conceptualisation is also attested in the texts analysed in this study. The most important target domain conceived in terms of the general domain of Riding In A Chariot by early Smṛti philosophers is liberating cognition. The scenario of the journey, its participants, its dangers, the worries during the journey and the happiness when one reaches the destination together with the skill needed to be successful and so one is mapped onto various stages of liberating cognition. The suggestion is that the R̥gvedic conceptualisation of the aim of journey, which is freedom, has been the basic conceptual frame for the use of this general domain to conceive liberating cognition: it leads to ultimate freedom from suffering and death by realizing one's immortal self identical with all reality.

A more general issue, which is important from the point of the Darśanas which introduce dualistic/pluralistic theories, does need to be addressed. As Bronkhorst (2006b) writes there is no reason to suppose that such theories were developed in the early Smṛti times. However, scholars who look for the sources of these philosophical schools have noticed the use of terms which are used in Darśanas, especially in Sāṃkhya and Yoga, and postulate the existence of a Proto-Sāṃkhya attested already in the MDhP.<sup>79</sup> This issue will not be analysed here and is left for future research. But one needs to point out that each interpretation depends on the framework adopted at the beginning of the study: we find what we are looking for. The researchers who are interested in history of Sāṃkhya or Yoga will find it, even in the nascent state.

<sup>79</sup> For example, Frauwallner (1925), Buitenen (1956, 1957), Larson, Bhattacharya (2000). Over time, however, many scholars have recognised that not only do the early Smṛti texts reflect the process of formation of Sāṃkhya, but that their authors take the concepts from Sāṃkhya philosophy, which is rather a far-fetched conclusion (e.g., Malinar 2007: 6: 'The creation of the world, the different species of being and the common basic elements that form a body are explained by using concepts drawn from Sāṃkhya philosophy'). In his analysis of MDhP 12.194-99 (*Manubr̥haspatisaṃvāda*), Fitzgerald continues the way of thinking of Bakker and Bisschop (1999) and Schreiner (1999) who dispense (as he writes) 'from the tyranny of the idea that all of these texts are either Sāṃkhya or proto-Sāṃkhya' and thanks to that new meanings of the text under research can be shown (unfortunately only access to the abstract of that particular study was available).

Since this study is searching for the influence of Vedic tradition on early Smṛti thought, the meanings of terms characteristic for the later classical school of Sāṃkhya attested in the *Sāṃkhyakārika* or *Yogasūtra* such as *puruṣa*, *prakṛti*, or *guṇa* will be interpreted against this background. We need to reconstruct how meanings are motivated by it and reformatted by the early Smṛti Composers in order to create new concepts that could explain their new theories. For example, viewed from the point of view of earlier tradition the concept of *prakṛti*, literally ‘making or placing before or at first’ used in cosmogonies, corresponds to the concept of foundation (*pratiṣṭhā*) that in earlier thought is necessary for creation (see Jurewicz 2016/18). In other contexts, it refers to the manifest aspect of reality. It also means the nature of something. A similar problem is with terms related to liberating cognition, such as *manas* (the mind), *dhyāna* (thoughtful concentration) or *samādhi* (focused concentration) as these terms do not have the same meaning as they do in the classical Sāṃkhya and Yoga schools.

The Composers use more specific source domains which might imply dualistic assumptions but nevertheless such an assumption would run counter to the presentation of the creation of the world seen as transformation of one reality and the state of ultimate freedom seen as the realisation of a state of ontological unity. As mentioned previously each conceptual metaphor highlights some elements of the target domain and hides others. Typically, our prototypical understanding of the source domain maps these features into the target domain. The source one has in mind are those which express relationships between the king-his subjects, the farmer-his field, spider-its thread, fish-water and a mosquito-an Udumbara tree which are used to present the relationship between the highest cognitive agent and its manifestations in the cosmos and in man. When Composers activate these metaphors, they use the word *anya* which means ‘other, different’. And here emerges the problem of interpretation as to in what way is something is different from something else. For many of us the prototypical feature of the relationship between the elements of the source domains mentioned above would be that they are different objects, so that there is an ontological difference between them. Yet the prototypical feature of this relationship could be a difference in their activity and their mutual interconnection. Arguably, the contexts of these metaphors and the general coherence of the exposition allows us to assume that these features are highlighted. The way the Smṛti Composers profile the source domains is different from the way Western philosophers or scholars do, as the former tend to highlight the relationships between objects and the latter the difference between them.<sup>80</sup>

<sup>80</sup> This is in line with contemporary research on the differences between East and West (Nisbett 2003).

The interpretation of conceptual metaphors is connected with a more general feature of our minds. We each have our implicit frames on which we build theories about Indian philosophy and often these frames reflect our knowledge about classical Darśanas or philosophical Buddhism. Our minds are so formatted by our knowledge that it becomes the lens through which we look on the earlier texts. It is a very tempting position because the philosophy of the Darśanas is systematised in a way similar to European philosophy. The result is that we describe our conceptualisation of early Smṛti thought from the point of view of the Darśanas and Buddhism and not by what is said in the texts. Hence, we are inclined to attribute to authors the influence of some later philosophical school.

This crucial epistemological problem has been discussed by Hans-Georg Gadamer who, in *Truth and Method* (2006), has put it forward as a problem of prejudices (*das Vorurteil*) which, accordingly to the Enlightenment's postulates about true knowledge, should be overcome. Gadamer (2006: 277) sees these postulates as prejudice and writes:

Does being situated within traditions really mean being subject to prejudices and limited in one's freedom? Is not, rather, all human existence, even the freest, limited and qualified in various ways? If this is true, the idea of an absolute reason is not a possibility for historical humanity. Reason exists for us only in concrete, historical terms – i.e., it is not its own master but remains constantly dependent on the given circumstances in which it operates.

And later:

A person who believes he is free of prejudices, relying on the objectivity of his procedures and denying that he is himself conditioned by historical circumstances, experiences the power of the prejudices that unconsciously dominate him as a *vis a tergo*.<sup>81</sup>

This way of seeing the human mind is very close to the results from neurocognitive and cognitive research discussed above. Gadamer's answer to the concreteness of human experience and, hence, of reasoning, is the theory of fusion of horizons. Our horizon of the present is determined by our present prejudices but they are not a 'fixed set of opinions and valuations' but continually tested by us in our encounter with tradition (2006: 305). The second horizon is that of the past and

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<sup>81</sup> Gadamer (2006: 354).

[i]n a tradition this process of fusion is continually going on, for there the old and new are always combining into something of living value, without either being explicitly foregrounded from the other.

In this way the ‘historically effected/effective consciousness’ (*Wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein*) makes understanding possible and the relationship between the horizons is seen as a kind of personal relationship between ‘I’ and ‘Thou’.

Gadamer’s basic idea about interpretation of ancient texts is significant for two reasons. Firstly, it enables us to understand our Indological hermeneutic. On one hand it permits us as researchers of ancient Indian thought and of the totality of Indian culture, our prejudices, their indelible presence and role in knowing what it is we want to know. Prejudices come from our own culture but also from our Indological knowledge which we organise in a certain way. Conversely it makes us aware of the difficulty we face as we are not naturally immersed in the horizon of the Indian past. Like Gadamer, we can recognise that the awareness of limitations has a positive effect on cognition.

Secondly, his theory of historically effected/effective consciousness provides us with an excellent starting point for the research in this book. It can be seen as the description of the state of the minds of the Composers of the early Sanskrit texts. The horizon of the past was almost tangible for them due to memorisation and repetition of the Veda. The horizon of the present influenced them, forced them, to constantly test their prejudices in relation to the horizon of the past active in their memory. The direction of fusion of these horizons led to the ultimate denial of change in the complete fusion of the present and the past, to the state achieved in a liberating process where ‘I’ becomes ‘Thou’. Such an approach to tradition is confirmed in many cultures striving to preserve the vitality of the past.

It is striking that this ideal is similar to the ideal of freedom realised in liberating cognition. The Brahminic fusion of horizons has absolute character, it concerns both theory and practice in its finest detail. One can suggest that this feature results from the aforementioned belief (or prejudice) in the unity of reality, the manifestation of which are all elements of the perceptible world and the most perfect manifestation of which is the Veda.

Gadamer’s theory, according to which our life is a continuous fusion of horizons, an active and personal conversation with the past which gives meaning to our experience, captures the nature of the relationship to tradition that arises when its content is present in memory and animated by daily recitation. In such a situation a person probably experiences a paradoxical



life ‘here and now’ and ‘there and then’. The life of a person who preserves and recites the Veda is a visible sign of the presence of these two temporal and spatial dimensions, and their unity, thanks to the fusion of horizons that is constantly taking place.

Before we come finally to the short presentation of the contents of this book, it is worth closing this section with the words of Charles Taylor (1989: 27), for whom the study of tradition is also an important element of research on the history of philosophy:

I want to defend the strong thesis that living without frameworks is utterly impossible for us; otherwise put that the horizons within which we live our lives and make sense of them have to include these strong qualitative discriminations. Moreover, this is not meant just a contingently true psychological fact about human beings, which could perhaps turn out one day not to hold for some exceptional individual or a new type, some superman of disengaged objectification. Rather the claim is that living in such strongly qualified horizons is constitutive of human agency, that stepping outside these limits would be tantamount to stepping outside what we would recognise as integral, undamaged human personhood.

These words apply to any human culture of course. In our research on the later strands of Hindu philosophy we should seriously take into account Vedic tradition, beginning with the RV and do research not only on a linguistic level but also on a conceptual one. Only then we will be able to discover the framing horizons of this culture which define its uniqueness and exceptionality, its self and the self of its members.

## 9. General outline of the content of this book

This book consists of five chapters. In the **first chapter**, we look at early Smṛti cosmogonies presented in MS 1 and MDhP 175–176, 240. It is argued that the creation of the world is seen as a cognitive act during which one reality manifests its aspect within which it cognises itself in subject-object cognition. Ontic changes are the results of epistemic transformations. The Composer of the MS presents a coherent model the levels of which corresponds to levels of creation of the self, beginning with mental abilities, then abilities for sensual cognition and finally the body endowed with the ability to move. The selves of reality are as follows: the cosmos, ritual, society, man and unmanifest reality present within them. All these manifestations are conceived in terms of man.

The self is the subject and the object of its cognition. At each level of manifestation subjective power is created first, then categories able to cognise this level of manifestation and then the object appears in the cognitive act. Categories become rules for the next level of manifestation. In this way freedom of reality is realised, conceived as freedom to do whatever it wants and when it wants to restrict itself it can do so perfectly. The internal contradictions of reality which is unmanifest (as a whole) and manifest (as the cosmos), and of the unmanifest self which is present within the manifest aspect reflects the Vedic conceptualisation of reality as simultaneously fiery and fluid. This model is deeply entrenched in tradition.

The influence of tradition is seen not only in the basic epistemic nature of creation but in the role of the mind (*manas*) which is the most important cognitive faculty of reality that allows reality to manifest at more and more perceptible levels. Other residual influences of inherited tradition can be reconstructed with the aid of cognitive tools but it seems that in many cases the Composers do not consciously refer to inherited tradition but treat its concepts and terms as abstract. However, the reconstruction of traditions allows for a better understanding of their meaning.

In the **second chapter** we discuss the implications of creation conceived as presented in the first chapter. It will be shown that adopting the assumption about the primarily cognitive nature of creation allows for a new look at the ontology presented in the early Smṛti. Its basic implications are two perspectives as to how reality can be described. These two perspectives are already described by Yājñavalkya in BU 3–4 (Jurewicz 2016/18).

The first is the perspective of the highest cognitive agent. It is the self (*ātman*) of the cosmos and man understood not only in terms of their inner essence but also in terms of their perceptible appearance. As implied already in the RV and then explicitly expressed in the AU, reality manifests itself in its aspect in order to cognise itself from within itself and this basic assumption is preserved in early Smṛti thought. Viewed from this perspective, the basically cognitive nature of existence of the cosmos is clear.

The second perspective is that from within the manifest aspect where the cognitive nature of reality is obscured and where the multimodal features of the cosmos are treated ontologically. This perspective is a result of the nature of self-cognition which needs cognitive separation in that oneself is a subject that cognises and in that self cognition is the object. The inclination to separate oneself as the subject of cognition gives reality the ability to cognise and, at the same time contains the danger that this division will be repeated by particular human subjects who will, moreover, treat it as an ontological division.

Man is conceived as a specific self of reality in that man is endowed with all its cognitive faculties and with its freedom understood as the ability to do what one wants. Such a theory of man is based on the specific theory of the mind (*manas*) proposed by the early Smṛti philosophy. The mind is seen in two ways. On one hand, it manages the activity of the ten senses and mediates between the agent and the external world. On the other, it allows man to transcend the levels of manifestations of reality and reach its unmanifest aspect. Thus understood, the mind is the locus of man's freedom and allows him to achieve realisation. Man's freedom makes the categories that emerged in the cognitive process of creation not only the rules of his behaviour but also the norms he should follow. Observance of norms allows man to grasp proper knowledge that leads to realisation of his identity with reality experienced as his self while rejection of norms leads to improper cognition which prevents it. The first situation leads to eternal happiness, the second is to constant suffering.

The **third chapter** is devoted to a discussion of wrong cognition. It is argued that philosophical anthropology can be explained on the basis of the subject-object cognition scenario in terms of which the functioning of the cosmos is conceived. Wrong cognition causes man to treat the epistemic division of reality as ontic and himself as an ontically separate subject. Since cognition precedes being the way man thinks has ontic results. Wrong cognition causes a desire of self-cognition that constitutes the existence of the cosmos in a deformed form and leads man towards treating objects as separated from himself. This in turn causes man to deprive himself of his cognitive abilities: his reason (*buddhi*) loses the ability to discriminate and make decisions, his mind (*manas*) ceases to be a centre of freedom and is limited to reflex reactions to external stimuli coming from the senses. Man's activity is focused on those external stimuli and on building self led by the desire to possess more and more – objects, power and so on. The self he builds is immortal in that it constantly dies and is reborn in an increasingly degenerate forms in terms of cognitive abilities. One can call this form of man an 'amalgamate agent' and his status as objectified. Since, according to the cosmogonic model, the cosmos in its pre-creative state remains in a relation of object to subject until subject-object cognition is internalised, the amalgamate agent is enclosed in the manifest aspect seen as the object. Unmanifest reality is enclosed in such a man.

In the **fourth chapter**, we consider liberating cognition which is the opposite process to wrong cognition and consists of the decompression of the amalgamate agent, the radical transformation of consciousness and a change of cognitive perspectives from the perspective of the particular subject to the

perspective of reality. We can call this the process of ‘subjectivisation’. It begins with the proper desire to cognise oneself i.e., the unmanifest self of man. When such a desire appears, reason is able to make a right decision to realise it and to achieve it eventually. In the first stage of liberating practice ‘primary subjectivisation’ man suspends sensual cognition. The activity of senses of action is suspended by the immobility of the body, fasting and celibacy. The activity of senses of reason are suspended during conscious work on mind which consists of inner concentration during which recitation with proper breathing plays an important role. It is also the mind that finally enables recognition of the unmanifest self of man. Man experiences his identity with reality and allows it to use his cognitive faculties in its self-cognition. We can call this stage ‘higher subjectivisation’. Now man can either close his relationship with the manifest aspect or take part in it from the perspective of reality as the whole ‘expanded subjectivisation’. The latter option is especially elaborated in the BhG.

In this chapter, the fragments of MDhP and MS which describe the liberating practice and the conceptual links between liberating practice and fire, are analysed. This will show us the motivating influence of this concept on Smṛti thought and its narrowed (in comparison with the Veda) range which is human supernatural cognition.

The **fifth chapter** is an analysis of the early Smṛti thought using some theories proposed in the humanities.<sup>82</sup> The first two are developed within the framework of cognitive linguistics. We will consider the mystic experience described in BhG 11 using the compression of vital relations proposed by Fauconnier and Turner (2003). It allows us to better understand the specificity of this experience and draw some comparative conclusions with Christian mysticism. We then see how the theory of two perspectives in early Smṛti ontology can be understood using the framework of viewpoint theory (Dancygier 2012) as used in cognitive literary studies. The third section of this chapter is devoted to the analysis of the theories of play (beginning with Johan Huizinga), philosophy (Eugen Fink, Hans-Georg Gadamer) and psychoanalysis (Donald Winnicott) and the possible use of these approaches to analyse early Smṛti thought. In the fourth section, we look at the concept of karman through the lens of the theory of responsibility proposed by Roman Ingarden to show the moral dimension of the early Hindu theory of action.

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<sup>82</sup> Thus this research will enrich that of Ganeri (especially 2017b) who analyses classical Indian philosophical texts (Hindu and Buddhist) in more general terms of contemporary theories of mind.

# Chapter One

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## Creation of the world

This chapter will discuss some examples of the Smṛti cosmogonies. It will be shown that creation is conceived as the creation of the possibility of subject-object cognition. The ontic changes are the results of what are primarily cognitive transformations. It will be argued that, during the process, reality manifests its aspect when subject-object cognition is performed and that this aspect is conceived in terms of its self (*ātman*). In the first stages of creation its cosmic self is created. In the following stages other selves are able to perform cognition among which the human self is the most important. In its manifest aspect, reality recognises itself from within the cosmos and from within men. This will be shown in the following chapters. Although the geographical, historical and cultural conditions have changed radically in comparison with Vedic conditions, the earliest assumptions of tradition remain the most important frame that motivates the thinking of Hindu philosophers.

In the cosmogonies analysed in this study, the cognitive character of creation is presented more directly than it is in the Veda although, as will be shown, metaphors are also activated and some of them are well entrenched in the earlier tradition. It will also be shown that the cognitive frames and even implicit reference to tradition allow us to better understand the sequence of the creative stages and the concepts used by the Smṛti Composers.

As far as the early Vedic assumption about the fiery nature of reality is concerned it is rarely explicitly evoked. This absence is particularly noticeable in the cosmogony of the MS. Its influence, however, can be seen in the way that concepts are construed and in the logic of the creative scenario and its topology.

The chapter is divided into two parts. In this part we analyse the cosmogony presented in the first chapter of the MS which, except for the first and the last chapter, it is not a philosophical text. However, the cosmogony presented in this text seems to summarise various cosmogonic theories of the time and it can be seen that its Composer aims at an ordered sequence of the creative stages. This analysis will confirm the insightful words of Olivelle (2005: 501) that ‘the structure of his work shows that Manu had a very methodical mind and a systematic work plan.’ Such an approach is scientifically much more fruitful than an explanation of all the seeming inconsistencies of the text by later interpolations.

In the second part, we will look at two selected cosmogonies presented in the early chapters of the MDhP (175, 176, MDhP 224).

### **1.1. Creation of the world in the *Manusmṛti* 1**

The Composer of the MS takes the earlier tradition for granted as the ground for new explorations and redefinitions. The main general domain elaborated here is the general domain of Procreation. In some contexts, the recipient is prompted to activate the general domain of Cooking. It can be seen that the Composer strives for abstract form in his exposition and he succeeds. At the same time, there are concepts which cannot be understood without referring to Vedic thought and which need some reference to experience to be fully understood.

The fact that a legal and moral code, which is what the MS is, begins with cosmogony shows how important it was for its Composer to place these issues in a general metaphysical context. Thanks to that he could show that his instructions were absolutely grounded and were meant to maintain an order which went beyond the level of society and individual human beings. Within the frames of this assumption, society is the next manifestation of reality and should be subject to the same rules as the cosmos. The same applies to man conceived as part of society and, at the same time, as the next manifestation of reality.

The general scenario proposed in this study is based on the process explicitly presented in MS 1.14–15.<sup>1</sup> The subjective power on a given level creates a category which enables it to cognise itself in a given stage of cognition. The use of a category creates the object. Then the next subjective manifestation is created which creates a specific category enabling cognition and creation

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<sup>1</sup> And agrees with the sequence presented in the Veda, especially in AU 1 (Jurewicz 2016/2018).

of the object. Viewed from this point of view, creation is categorisation and the elements of the manifest aspect assume their shapes and forms only when they are perceived by the manifestations of the subjective powers of reality.<sup>2</sup>

### 1.1.1. The pre-creative state of the world (MS 1.5)

The content of cosmogony is put into the mouth of Manu and begins as follows:

#### MS 1.5

*āsīd idam tamobhūtam aprajñātam alakṣaṇam |  
apratarkyam avijñeyam prasuptam iva sarvataḥ ||*

There was this world – pitch-dark, indiscernible, without distinguishing marks, unthinkable, incomprehensible, in a kind of deep sleep all over.<sup>3</sup>

The Composer begins with a description of the pre-creative state of the world. In this state, it is impossible to be cognised. Its qualifications as ‘indiscernable’ (*aprajñāta*, verse b), ‘unthinkable’ (*apratarkya*) and ‘incomprehensible’ (*avijñeya*, verse c) activate conceptualisation of this state in terms of the lack of a possibility to cognise. The qualification ‘without distinguishing marks’ (*alakṣaṇa*, verse b) indicates the lack of any sign of the possible object of cognition which is the reason for the lack of the possibility to cognise. In the same way, the Composer of ṚV 10.129 qualifies the pre-creative state of the world as ‘water without any sign’ (*apraketam salilam*, 10.129.3b). All these qualifications are abstract terms.

The concept of darkness (*tamas*, verse a) activates the experience which motivates conceptualisation of the pre-creative state. It is the concept of night. The same concept is used already in ṚV 10.129 to conceive the pre-creative state of the world (*tāma āsīt tāmasā gūḥām āgre* (10.129.3a) and then in other Vedic cosmogonies (Jurewicz 2010, 2016/18). The concept of night in turn, metonymically triggers the recipient to evoke the concept of a sleeping man. The logic of the source domain allows the recipient to understand that, even if the subject wakes, he would not be able to cognise. In this way the Composer of the MS can outline two spheres of the future cosmos: the subjective one (conceived in terms of a man who sleeps or does not perceive the outside world) and the objective one (conceived as dark and cognitively impenetrable).

<sup>2</sup> For the earlier studies on cosmogony in the MS, see Hacker (1959, 1961), Lane (1981).

<sup>3</sup> All translations of the MS, if not marked, are by Olivele (2005).

### 1.1.2. The first manifestation of the cognitive power of reality (MS 1.6–7)

The next two stanzas describe manifestation of the first cognitive power of reality:

#### MS 1.6

*tataḥ svayāmbhūr bhagavān avyakto vyañjayann idam |  
mahābhūtādi vṛttaujāḥ prādur āsīt tamonudaḥ ||*

Then the Self-existent Lord appeared – the Unmanifest manifesting this world beginning with the elements, projecting his might, and dispelling the darkness.

Now reality manifests its manifestation, cognitive power. It is called ‘the Self-existent Lord’ *svayāmbhūr bhagavān* (verse a). The former attribute (*svayāmbhu*) highlights its self-existence and its identity with the unmanifest aspect. The latter (*bhagavat*) implies that it is conceived in terms of a powerful man.<sup>4</sup>

In verse b, manifestation of the first cognitive power is qualified as ‘unmanifest manifesting this world’ (*avyakto vyañjayann idam*, verse b). The term *avyakta* has become an abstract term by Smṛti times and means ‘unmanifest’. However, it is worth remembering its etymology. The participle *avyakta* derives from the verb *añj-* ‘to apply an ointment or pigment, smear with, anoint’.<sup>5</sup> In the ṚV, the concept of applying a balm is the specific realisation of the general domain of Cleansing By Heat used to conceive cognition under the influence of soma (Jurewicz 2010). The result of applying a balm is to make its object bright, clean and visible (Gonda 1975a). If the recipient activates this etymological meaning he will understand the cognitive nature of the manifestation of the world. At the same time, the juxtaposition of *avyakta* and *vyañjayan* highlights the contradictory nature of the first cognitive power of reality, which is unmanifest, but able to manifest itself (within the frames of the monistic assumption). In the same way this first manifestation of the highest cognitive agent is conceived in ṚV 10.129 as breathing without breath (*ānīd avātāṃ svadhāyā tād ékaṃ*, 10.129.2c, Jurewicz 2010).

The first cognitive power is qualified then, as *vṛttaujas* (verse c). The noun *ojas* ‘energy, power’, is the common Ṛgvedic noun and its use directs the recipient’s mind towards the earlier tradition. The participle *vṛtta* (‘projecting’ in Olivelle’s translation) literally means ‘set in motion’. The recipient understands

<sup>4</sup> It may also activate the religious attitude towards the highest cognitive agent characteristic for bhakti which will be discussed in my next book.

<sup>5</sup> All the definitions of meanings are after Monier-Williams (1899).



that the first stage of the manifestation of reality is conceived as the beginning of movement or activity. At the same time the verb *vṛt-* activates a question used in reference to the pre-creative stage in RV 10.129: *kīm āvarīvaḥ*. The form *āvarīvar* can be interpreted as an aorist of *vṛt-* and *vṛ-*. In the former case the question refers to an ability to move, in the latter, the ability to cover (Jurewicz 2010). The Composer of MS asserts that the ability to move has already appeared in the first stage of creation or is its cause. If the recipient elaborates the phonetic similarity between the verbs *vṛt-* and *vṛ-*, he might activate the Rgvedic model of Indra Fight With Vṛtra and understand that the pre-creative state of the cosmos is conceived in terms of the snake Vṛtra as it is in the RV (Jurewicz 2010, Kuiper 1983). Since Vṛtra makes movement impossible, and here the movement is asserted, the recipient will again see the internal contradictoriness of the first stage of the manifestation of reality.

As far the compound *mahābhūtādi* (verse c) is concerned Olivelle interprets it as ‘beginning with the elements’ which are the great beings constituting the cosmos (space, wind, light, water, earth, see analysis of MS). This interpretation implies that reality not only moves, but also has power over its final objective manifestations which are the great beings (see section 1.1.5).

However, a complementary translation to that of Olivelle is proposed. In the Veda, the concept of being great refers to the first form of manifestation which could be recognised as great (Jurewicz 2016/18).<sup>6</sup> In BU 2.1.20 this form is explicitly called *mahad bhūta*, ‘the great being’ and creation is conceived in terms of exhalation. In MDhP 224.31, the first manifestation is called *mahad bhūta* and in MDhP 224.33 *mahābhūta* (see section 1.2.2). So, there is the possibility to understand the compound *mahābhūtādi* as ‘beginning with the great being’. The creative energy of the first cognitive power of reality is set in motion in order to transform itself into its first manifestation which can be cognised as great.

Manifestation of the first cognitive power of reality corresponds to the first act of creation in RV 10.129, when That One manifests itself as breathing without breath thanks to *svadhā* (Jurewicz 1995, 2010). In his description, the Composer of the MS reverses the order of cosmogony. He firstly describes the pre-creative state of the world and then the appearance of the cognitive power of reality. At the same time, it is possible that he also wants his

<sup>6</sup> This is explicitly expressed in the cosmogony of the *Gopatha Brāhmaṇa* 1.1 according to which brahman in the beginning is only the self-existent brahman identified with the syllable AUM which thought ‘What a great prodigy I am!’ (*mahad vai yakṣam yad ekam evāsmi*) and then continues creation conceived as self-measuring, see also below, footnote 25. For the meaning of *yakṣa*, see Srinivasan (1997: 205 ff.).

recipient to blend the description of the pre-creative state of the world with the description of the pre-creative state of reality. This can be demonstrated by the accumulation of negative adjectives in MS 1.5, similar to that in the beginning of RV 10.129 1–2ab.

In verse d, the first cognitive power of reality is described as ‘becoming visible’ (*prādur āsīt*) and ‘dispelling darkness’ (*tamonuda*). Thus, creation is conceived in terms of transfer from darkness to light as in the RV 10.129.4 (and later Vedic cosmogonies) but the Composer of the MS compresses two stages of creation, the first and the fourth. The concepts of darkness and light are abstract while the ability to see and visibility are the only features of the morning which are incorporated.

It is possible that the scenario of the morning activities of a Brahmin motivates the thinking of the Composer: man, having woken up, performs morning ablutions which are metonymically activated by their final stage which is applying a balm (THE LAST PHASE OF THE PROCESS FOR THE WHOLE PROCESS). However, the concepts used by the Composer of the MS were, most probably, understood as abstract. The only trace of their experiential source domain in the target domain is a sequence of stages which were understood as logical. This is the final stage of the creation of abstract concepts. The words used within the scenario of the morning activities of Brahmins (darkness and sleeping – appearance of light – awakening – applying a balm<sup>7</sup> – being visible) become the source domain for the metaphoric conceptualisation of creation. They become detached from any experience and only the logic of its scenario is used to conceive the abstract target domain. This is why the sequence of the stages of creation described above seems to us logical. If the stages of creation were in opposite order (i.e., being visible – awakening – appearance of light – darkness and sleeping), most probably we would be surprised and consider them as unusual because they are opposed to our deeply entrenched experience. Then we would look for their logic and it is possible that we would find it in another experience which would explain such a sequence of creation.

The next stanza emphasises that the manifestation of the cognitive power described above is the transformation of unmanifest reality:

### MS 1.7

*yo 'sāv atīndriyagrāhyaḥ sūkṣmo 'vyaktaḥ sanātanaḥ |*  
*sarvabhūtamayo 'cintyaḥ sa eva svayam udbabhau ||*

<sup>7</sup> This concept is one of the specific realisations of the general domain of Cleansing By Heat. If the recipient activate this domain, he might conceive the implied logic of the first manifestation in terms of heating.

That One – who is beyond the range of senses; who cannot be grasped; who is subtle, unmanifest, and eternal; who contains all beings; and who transcends thought – it is he who shone forth on his own.

This stanza clearly expresses the internally contradictory state of the manifestation of the first cognitive power of reality. On one hand, it is beyond the range of senses (*atīndriya*), it cannot be grasped by any cognitive faculty (*agrāhya*), it is subtle (*sūkṣma*), unmanifest (*avyakta*), eternal (*śāśvata*) and transcends thought (*acintya*, verses a–c). On the other hand, it is composed of all beings (*sarvabhūtamaya*) which means that it is embodied as the manifest aspect of reality. In verse d, the Composer emphasises the internally contradictory state of reality in its first manifestation which itself came into being (*sa eva svayam udbabhau*).

### 1.1.3. The manifestation of the highest cognitive agent (Brahma) (MS 1.8–11)

Now reality manifests as the highest cognitive agent which will begin and continue the subjective-objective self-cognition of reality:

#### MS 1.8

*so 'bhidhyāya śarīrāt svāt sisṛkṣur vividhāḥ prajāḥ |  
apa eva sasarjādau tāsu vīryam avāsrjat ||*

As he focused his thought with the desire of bringing forth diverse creatures from his own body, it was the waters he first brought forth; and into them he poured his semen.

In the previous stanza, the first cognitive power of reality is presented as composed of all beings (*sarvabhūtamaya*). Now it wants to create them from its body. The recipient understands that in the previous stage, the beings constituted the first cognitive power of reality as potential manifestations. Now they will be cognitively separated from it.

The activity of the first cognitive power of reality is expressed by the verb *abhi dhyai-* (*abhidhyāya*, verse a). This verb and its nominal derivative *dhyāna* are used in the early Smṛti texts to express the activity of the mind (*manas*) which takes place during liberating practice (see chapter 4.9.2). The use of this verb implies that the creative activity of the first cognitive power of reality is performed by its mind (*manas*). In the target domain, the first cognitive power of reality focuses its cognitive activity onto the subject which is still unknown but potentially present in it. Moreover, the concept of water

activates the concept of speech (SPEECH IS WATER), so the recipient may activate this concept as well, and understand that reality in this stage of creation is conceived in terms of a thinking and reciting man.

At the same time the concept of creation of beings, called here *prajā* literally ‘offspring’ from the body of the first cognitive power of reality, activates its conceptualisation in terms of a living being. It draws the recipient’s mind to the cosmogonies of the ŚB, where Prajāpati is presented as desiring offspring and creating them from himself (Jurewicz 2016/18). The concept of *prajā* activates the general domain of Procreation in terms of which the next creative stage will be conceived. This domain allows the Composer of the MS to express the potential state of the future beings: the first cognitive manifestation of reality is presented as a living being which desires and thinks about its future offspring which are about to be. This state of future is described in RV 10.129 with the equivocal *ābhú/ābhū* (Jurewicz 1995, 2010).

In verses c–d, the Composer elaborates the general domain of Procreation. The concept of waters (verse c) created by the first cognitive power of reality metonymically activates the concept of a pregnant woman (WATER FOR WOMB, WOMB FOR WOMAN). The next stage of creation is conceived in terms of insemination: a woman is inseminated (metonymically activated *via* the concept of semen which is placed in waters, verse d).

The conceptual network, created by the Composer, looks as follows. Creation of the world is the first input space, a thinking and reciting man is the second input space, the general domain of Procreation is the third input space. The generic space is transformation. In the blend, reality is simultaneously conceived in terms of a man who recites and is sexually active and a woman who gets pregnant (in the same way it is conceived in ŚB 2.2.4, Jurewicz 2016/18). Thus, reality is conceived as androgenic: having manifested itself (as one may presume on the basis of the Vedic cosmogonies) as a male, it then manifests as female to again manifest as male.

The recipient may add one more input space which is the general model of Reality Transformation which, in creation, manifests its opposing fiery and fluid aspects (Jurewicz 2010, 2016/18). It will be shown that thoughtful concentration (*dhyāna*) performed in the mind, together with recitation, is conceived in terms of heat (*tapas*, see chapter 4.4.3–5).<sup>8</sup> Manifestation, as water, opposes the fiery aspect.

<sup>8</sup> Fitzgerald (2015: 114) writes in the similar vein: ‘But the word *dhyāyan* need not be construed as “meditating,” as that practice is understood in the Yoga tradition. The word may just as well refer simply to thinking about some mental content at length; to reflecting upon or contemplating a matter.’ I propose to translate the noun *dhyāna* as ‘thoughtful concentration.’ McGrath (2019) interprets *dhyāna* as poetic inspiration.

**MS 1.9**

*tad aṅdam abhavad dhaimaṃ sahasrāṃśusamaprabham |  
tasmīṅ jajñe svayaṃ brahmā sarvalokapitāmahaḥ ||*

That became a golden egg, as bright as the sun; and in it he himself took birth as Brahma, the grandfather of all the worlds.

According to the logic of the general domain of Procreation, insemination causes conception of an egg which is called the Golden Egg and is compared to the sun (verses a–b). Thus, the Composer again creates a conceptual network. Its first input space is self-cognition, the second is the general domain of Procreation (in its specific realisation of mammalian pregnancy and of hatching a bird), the third is the creation of the world and the fourth is the sun in its daily movement. The generic space is the concept of the appearance of something new and of transformation. In the blend the egg becomes the cosmos. The concept of the Golden Egg appears already in the RV (Jurewicz 2010) and is also used in ŚB 11.1.6 (Olivelle 2005: 238, Jurewicz 2016/18). In Smṛti times, the concept of the Golden Egg is an abstract concept and means the cosmos.<sup>9</sup> Identification of the cosmos with the sun appears already in the AVŚ (see Jurewicz 2016/18).

There is an offspring in the egg. It is called Brahma (*brahmán*). The recipient might elaborate the logic of the general domain of Procreation and understand the appearance of Brahma in terms of the ritual of giving a secret name during the *Jātakarman* ritual.<sup>10</sup> The name is *brahmán* (Brahma) which literally means something or someone who derives from *bráhman* which means reality. Thus, the Composer elaborates the Vedic conviction that the father is reborn as his son. Brahma is the highest cognitive agent which will continue creation within the cosmos.

The recipient understands that when Brahma appears, the objective world around him also appears. In the blend, the logic of human birth-giving and hatching a bird is compressed: Brahma is the egg (as it is in mammalian pregnancy) but, at the same time, it is within the egg (as it is in hatching the bird). This compression, together with the logic of the input space of self-cognition, implies that Brahman is ontologically the same as the egg but cognitively different.

Olivelle (2005: 238) sees the next two verses (10–11) as ‘either interpolations or a parenthetical remark linking Brahma with the cosmic waters and with Nārāyaṇa an epithet associated with Viṣṇu’. One contends

<sup>9</sup> It is the blend the two input spaces of which are: cosmos and the Golden Egg (which is already blend, see Jurewicz 2010).

<sup>10</sup> Kane (1941, Vol. 2, Part 1: 228–237), Czerniak-Drożdżowicz (1998).

however that, even if he is right, they were also added to express the unity of the unmanifest aspect of reality and Brahma using the concept of identity between the father and his son:

### MS 1.10

*āpo narā iti proktā āpo vai narasūnavaḥ |  
tā yad asyāyanaṃ pūrvaṃ tena nārāyaṇaḥ smṛtaḥ ||*

The waters are called ‘Nārā’; the waters, clearly, are the offspring of Nara. Because its first sojourn (*ayana*) was in them, tradition calls him ‘Nārāyaṇa’.

In verse a, waters are called *nārā*. The term means ‘something related to or proceeding from Nara’ (Olivelle 2005: 238). Although the term *āpas* on the conceptual level evokes the feminine form, confirmed by the feminine form of their name, in the Sanskrit original of the stanza (verse b) waters are called sons (*sūnavaḥ*) of man (*nara*). This agrees with what has been stated in MS 1.8 where the first creative power of reality is presented as creating waters (*apa eva sasarjādau*). The result of this transformation is internally contradictory, the female element is the male element at the same time. This way of thinking is based on the metonymic compression of the cause (the first manifestation of reality) and the effect (waters, which are the offspring, are the same as their progenitor). Thus, the internal contradictoriness of reality is expressed.

In verse c it is stated that waters were the first sojourn (*ayana*) of him. The metonymic compression is now decompressed and the recipient is expected to see difference between the progenitor (cause) and his offspring (effect). The name *Nārāyaṇa*<sup>11</sup> explains this state and activates the general domain of Procreation, because *Nārāyaṇa* is ‘a patronymic derived from Nara’ (Olivelle 2005: 238). If we take into account the literal meaning of *nara* ‘man’, we will understand *nārāyaṇa* as ‘he whose father is man’. The recipient is triggered to activate RV 10.90.5 where man (*puruṣa*) creates *virāj* and from it man (*puruṣa*) is born. In the context of this hymn *virāj* (apart from its other meanings), activates the meaning of the female manifestation of reality and of speech (Jurewicz 2016/18). The pattern of creation expressed in MS 1.10 is the same: the first creative power of reality (brāhman) creates its manifestation conceived in terms of a pregnant woman and a man who thinks

<sup>11</sup> On this stanza of the MS, Hildebeitel (2011: 265–266) writes: ‘Moreover, early on, one may see an outcropping of familiarity with epic bhakti in a verse explaining the name Nārāyaṇa (M 1.10)’ and refers to Biarreau (2002, I) who sees this verse as expressing ‘the Vedic sense of Nārāyaṇa’ where the term is known but without conceptual connections with Viṣṇu as it is in the MBh.

and recites in order to manifests itself again as Brahma (brahmán) who is conceived as a man born from a man. As stated above, such a way of thinking about the relationship between a father and his son is motivated by cultural convictions according to which the father is reborn in his wife as his own son (Kakar 1983).

This interpretation accords with the thinking of some of the Composers of the MS. In his critical edition of the MS, Olivelle (2005: 384–385) mentions two additional stanzas.<sup>12</sup> In the first it is stated that ‘Nārāyaṇa is higher than the Unmanifest’ and that ‘the egg came into being from the Unmanifest.’ Olivelle asserts that the concept of the Unmanifest (*avyakta*) ‘probably refers to the primordial stuff (*prakṛti*) from which, according to Sāṃkhya cosmology, the manifest creation was produced.’ However, according to the general assumption outlined earlier in this chapter, the meaning of the terms which are used in the classical Sāṃkhya, refer to the model of reality which is consistent with Vedic tradition and in this context *avyakta* refers to the first manifestation of reality which is internally contradictory, because it is also unmanifest (see below, MS 1.11). The claim that Nārāyaṇa is higher than this first manifestation is an attempt to call unmanifest reality by this name and to express the reflexive nature of the process of creation.

The next additional stanza, ‘very faint and difficult to read,’ as Olivelle states, explicitly evokes ṚV 10.90.1 (*sahasraśīrṣaḥ puruṣo rukmabāhuḥ svatīndriyaḥ*, ‘Man has a thousand heads, his arms are golden and he is much beyond the senses’) evoked above. In verse c, the identity of Brahma and Nārāyaṇa is stated (*brahmānārāyanākhyas*). Verse d (*tu sraṣṭvāpasalile tadā*) evokes the concept of muddy water (*salila*) which is used to conceive the pre-creative state of the cosmos already in ṚV 10.129.3 in which, we may presume, the highest cognitive agent, identical with reality, manifests itself.

Taking all this into account, the suggestion is that, apart from the religious meaning of this name, the definition given in MS 1. 10 is an attempt to create an abstract language which, in a concise way, expresses the unity of reality.

This unity is explicitly expressed in the next stanza:

<sup>12</sup> ‘Additional verse in Be1 [ma] xMd4 oMd5 sOx1 sPu6 MTr4 MTr6:  
*nārāyaṇa paro ’vyaktād aṇḍam avyaktasambhavam |*  
*aṇḍasyāntas tv ime lokāḥ saptavidhā ca medinī ||*  
 A further verse in sOx’ sPu6 [very faint and difficult to read]:  
*sahasraśīrṣaḥ puruṣo rukmabāhuḥ svatīndriyaḥ |*  
*brahmānārāyanākhyas tu sraṣṭvāpasalile tadā ||’*

**MS 1.11**

*yat tat kāraṇam avyaktaṃ nityaṃ sadasadātmakaṃ |  
tadvīṣṣṭaḥ sa puruṣo loke brahmeti kīrtyate ||*

That cause which is unmanifest and eternal, which has the nature of both the existent and the non-existent – the Male produced from it is celebrated in the world as Brahṃā.

The sequence of the adjectives presented here reflects the creative process in a concise way. Reality is the unmanifest and eternal cause (verses a–b). The manifestation of the highest cognitive agent is qualified as *sadasadātmakaṃ* (verse b), ‘which has the nature of both the existent and the non-existent’. In RV 10.129, reality in the pre-creative state is qualified as neither *sat* nor *asat*. It is not divided into unmanifest and manifests aspect but is both *sat* and *asat*. In ŚB 10.5.3 the Composer presents an exegesis of the first verse of RV 10.129. Reality in its pre-creative state is conceived as mind but mind exists as if it does not (Jurewicz 2016/18). Reality in its first manifestation contains both being and non-being, truth and untruth, which will be split in the course of further creation.<sup>13</sup>

Verse d calls Brahma ‘the Male’ (*puruṣa*) which betrays his conceptualisation in the form of man as he is already in the RV (10.90). It is evoked implicitly in MS 1.10 and explicitly in one of two additional stanzas just mentioned. Thus, Brahma is called by the Vedic name (*puruṣa*) and with the name of Brahma. Olivelle (2005: 238) points out that the phrase *brahmeti* allows the recipient to think about brahman (*brāhman*, reality) and Brahma (*brahmān*) at the same time. This seems to be intentional in that it also clearly expresses the unity of reality.

From now on the process of creation can be seen, more and more perceptibly, as the process of manifestation of the self (*ātman*). Firstly, reality manifests its mental self with its cognitive abilities, then its sensori-motor self followed by ritual and human selves. This process is conceived in terms of the general domain of Procreation, in terms of recitation of the Veda and in terms of measuring with a cord as during the construction of the fire altar.

<sup>13</sup> It is possible that the recipient is prompted to think that the highest cognitive agent is conceived in terms of thinking (*dhyai-*) mind. For links between these two cosmogonies, see Bodewitz (1995).



### 1.1.4. The creation of the mental self (*ātman*) of reality (MS 1.12–17)

#### MS 1.12–13

*tasminn aṅde sa bhagavān uṣitvā parivatsaram |  
svayam evātmano dhyānāt tad aṅdam akarod dvidhā ||*

After residing in that egg for a full year, that Lord on his own split the egg in two by brooding over on his body.

*tābhyāṃ sa śakalābhyāṃ ca divaṃ bhūmiṃ ca nirmame |  
madhye vyoma diśaś cāṣṭāv apāṃ sthānaṃ ca śāsvatam ||*

From these two halves, he formed the sky and the earth, and between them the mid-space, the eight directions, and the eternal place of the waters.

The logic of the general domain of Procreation is, on one hand, elaborated, on the other, broken. In everyday experience bestowal of a name takes place when a child is born, here the Composer present the further presence of Brahma in the egg which lasts for one year (like in ŚB 11.1.6). In the blend, one year corresponds to pregnancy. A year is the first measure of time (Gonda 1984). The logic of experience implies that a baby or a nestling grows within his mother's womb/the egg and this growth is measured by the category of time.

Then manifestation of Brahma in his objective form is described. The Composer elaborates the input space of hatching a bird: Brahma is presented as splitting the egg into two halves. In the blend, they become the earth and the sky while between them is a space. Such a conceptualisation of the activity of the highest cognitive agent in the cosmos is attested already in the RV 10.90 presented as growing thanks to food (Jurewicz 2016/18). In ŚB 11.1.6, the same concept of the development of a child and the hatching of a bird is elaborated in more detail: Prajāpati is presented as a growing child who stands up and thus creates the earth, the space and the sky (see Jurewicz 2016/18). The most ancient conceptual sources of this way of thinking is the concept of Indra who grows under the influence of soma to such an extent that he fills the whole cosmos and Viṣṇu creates space for him (Jurewicz 2010). Creation of parts of the cosmos is conceived in terms of Brahma growing up to the sky and it is implied that they are created with the use of the category of time.

The cognitive nature of this process is expressed explicitly: it is thoughtful concentration (*dhyāna*) which is the means of creation. Using the terms of the source domain, we could say that Brahma has inherited the ability to think (*dhyai-*) from his father, brahman. As one may presume, Brahma is also conceived in terms of man who recites the Veda. This conceptualisation is expressed explicitly in other cosmogonies presented in the MDhP

(see MDhP 175.15, section 1.2.1a, MDhP 335, chapter 5.2.3) and will also be expressed later in the MS. In ŚB 11.1.6, mentioned above, the creation of the earth, the space and the sky are conceived in terms of giving them names (*bhūr*, *bhuvas*, *svar*, Jurewicz 2016/18).

In MS 1.13d, the creation of space is expressed with use of the verb ‘to measure’ (*nir mā-*, MS 1.13d). Its use betrays conceptualisation of cognition in terms of measuring. It seems that the most basic experience, which motivates this way of thinking about the creation of space, is measuring a field with steps and naming each measured part (as belonging to someone or as being the sacred space). It is elaborated in the conceptualisation of creation of the three spaces of the cosmos by the three steps of Viṣṇu (Jurewicz 2010). The creation of eight directions activates the Atharvavedic cosmogony where the highest cognitive agent is conceived in terms of the Vrātya who go into the different directions of the cosmos (beginning with the eastern direction) and are thus created (Jurewicz 2016/18). The logic of the source domain of a growing child also implies that he grows not only vertically but also horizontally. This is also implied by the etymological meaning of the verb *br̥h-* ‘to become thick’ (see the next stanza, MS 1.14). So, we can assume that the characteristics of Brahma are conceived not only in terms of a growing child and a reciting man, but also in terms of a priest who measures the earth with steps. These are the three main input spaces of the conceptual network that is now created, the other two being the concepts of cognition and creation of the cosmos. The generic space is the concept of change. It is difficult to state to what extent the Composer expected his recipients to evoke tradition. However, its activation allows us to better understand the complex and abstract thought that is too easily called ‘mythological’. Its most general scaffold are image schemas of VERTICALITY and CENTRE-PERIPHERY which include movement up and width wise, and transformation of the agent cognised by the categories of time (which categorises movement) and name (which categorises space).

The reflexive character of Brahma’s activity is explicitly expressed: thinking is directed to Brahma himself (*svayam evātmano dhyānāt*, 1.11c). Brahma cognitively splits himself into the cognising subject (Brahma), then creates a category which expresses his cognitive activity (time) and which allows him to create the object (cosmos) which is ontologically identical to him. As the object, Brahma is again divided into three parts: the sky (manifestation of his subjective power conceived in terms of the head in ŚB 11.1.6), the earth (manifestation of his objective power conceived in terms of the feet in ŚB 11.1.6) and space which simultaneously separates and unites the subject and the object. In his cognitive activity, Brahma categorises himself as the dynamic cosmos possible to be measured with the category of time.

Olivelle (2005: 239) interprets ‘the eternal place of the waters’ (*apām sthānaṃ śāśvataṃ*, MS 13.d) as ‘the Milky Way, which is regarded also as the bright ocean of heaven in Vedic cosmology’ and refers to Witzel (1984). It is also possible that in these terms the unmanifest aspect of reality is conceived.<sup>14</sup>

### MS 1.14

*udbabarhātmanaś caiva manaḥ sadasadātmakam |  
manasaś cāpy ahaṃkāram abhimantāram īśvaram ||*

From his body, moreover, he drew out the mind having the nature of both the existent and the non-existent; and from the mind, the I-form – the king who creates presuppositions.<sup>15</sup>

As mentioned above the verb *br̥h-* (*udbabarha*, verse a) literally means ‘to become thick, grow great or strong, increase’ which agrees with the scenario of the growth of a baby/a nestling elaborated earlier. The verb *br̥h-* expresses the essence of the activity performed by brāhman/brahmán (these words are nominal derivatives of this verb): it grows and becomes thick.

One possible understanding of the intention of the Composer is that he wants to express that Brahma becomes more visible, as it is expressed in ŚB 10.5.3 where reality wants to be more substantial (*mūrtatara*, Jurewicz 2016/18). Visibility is conceived in terms of being thick (*sthūla*). On the other hand, the adjective *sūkṣma* (‘thin, subtle’) is used to denote what is unmanifest and invisible. Thus, the Composer could trigger the concept of *mūrti* (form) seen as the result of thickening (*mūr̥ch-*) to express that now Brahma transforms himself into a form which will be perceptible.

As shown elsewhere the word *brāhman* is also used to express the body’s experience during recitation with proper breathing when the diaphragm is compressed (Jurewicz 2016/18, 2019). So, we can argue that the use of this particular verb implies that the Composer also conceives creation as performed by Brahma in terms of recitation measured by the category of time. According to the cosmogonic model presented in the beginning of this section a new subjective manifestation should now appear.

The form of appearance of this new manifestation conceived in terms of thickening or recitation is the mind (*manas*). Let us again recall ŚB 10.5.3 where reality in its pre-creative state is identified with the mind (*manas*) which is neither existent nor non-existent (*nēva vā idám āgrè 'sad āsīn nēva sād*

<sup>14</sup> The unmanifest aspect is conceived as water from the point of view manifest, see BU 1.2.3, AU 1.1.2–3 (Jurewicz 2016/18).

<sup>15</sup> Olivelle (2005: 87): ‘Ego – producer of self-awareness and ruler.’

*āsīt | āsīd iva vā idām āgre nēvāsīt tād dha tām māna evāsa*). Here the mind is presented in the same way as the first cognitive manifestation of reality is presented in MS 1.11: as encompassing both aspects, unmanifest and manifest (*sadasadātmaka*, verse b). This again implies identity between reality and its creation, now conceived as the mind. The fact that mind (*manas*) is presented here as the first cognitive manifestation of Brahma accords with the role of the mind in liberating cognition (see chapter 4.9.2).<sup>16</sup> It should be noted that the idea, that liberating cognition reverses the stages of creation, is attested already in the early Upaniṣads and is continued in Smṛti philosophy.<sup>17</sup>

The sequence of the nouns *manas* (the mind, verse a) and *ahaṃkāra* (the I-form, verse c) activates the stages of the creative process. While reciting, Brahma begins to think about the content of his recitation which is himself. This results in him becoming aware of himself as the cognising subject which is metonymically expressed as the appearance of the I-form (*ahaṃkāra*, Olivelle translates it here as Ego) from the mind (*manas*). The same cognitive scenario is used in BU 1.4 where the self (*ātman*) is presented as thinking about itself and giving itself the name *aham* (see Jurewicz 2016/18).

The I-form is an awareness of self that enables Brahma to properly perform subject-object cognition (see chapter 2.2.1). It is called *abhimantṛ* (Olivelle: ‘producer of self-awareness,’ verse d). Here we will translate the verb *abhi man-* ‘to presuppose’:<sup>18</sup> I-form is the basis for the presupposition of the duality of the subject and the object. Thanks to it, the subject is able to perform cognition of the object. If the recipient further elaborates the general domain of Procreation, he will conceive this stage of creation in terms of the stage in a child’s development when it begins to talk, think and to recognise its separateness from the world (ŚB 11.1.6, Jurewicz 2016/18). In case of Brahma, this process is only epistemological and not ontological (see chapter 2.1). The noun *īśvara* ascribed to the I-form (verse d) highlights the immense power, conceived in terms of kingly power, with which it influences the subject and which makes it so difficult to suspend. It may also activate conceptualisation of Brahma in terms of a king.

Now the manifestation of the subjective power of Brahma is presented:

<sup>16</sup> Described in the MaU as the threefold practice (*vidyā, tapas, cintā*) which I hope to discuss in a separate study soon.

<sup>17</sup> The commentator of the MS, Medhātithi (9th CE), states that it is the reason which should appear as the first which shows that he is influenced by classical Sāṃkhya cosmogonical model.

<sup>18</sup> Following Buitenen (1962).

**MS 1.15**

*mahāntam eva cātmānaṃ sarvāṇi triguṇāni ca |  
viṣayāṇāṃ grahītṛṇi śanaiḥ pañcendriyāni ca ||*

– as also the Great Self, and everything that can be cognised by three classes<sup>19</sup>, and gradually the five sensory organs that grasp the sense objects.

If the recipient elaborates the outcomes implied by the general domain of Procreation, he will understand the first verse of this stanza as describing the next stage of creation conceived in terms of the growth of a child. Brahma thinks about himself and realises that he is great (*mahānt*, verse a), i.e., adult. The literal meaning of the verb *brh-* ‘to become thick, grow great or strong, increase’ accords with this interpretation. In the target domain, Brahma repeats the first cognition of reality which recognises itself as great (MS 1.6). His great manifestation is called the ‘self’ (*ātman*, verse a). This shows not only the reflexive nature of creative activity but also that the creation of the cosmos is the creation of the perceptible self of reality. In this way, the Composer activates the Vedic cosmogonies and ritual (see Jurewicz 2016/18).

The Great Self (*mahān ātman*) is the main cognitive faculty used by Brahma in his manifestations within the Golden Egg. The relationship between them will be discussed in the next chapter as will the relationship between the Great Self in the cosmos and reason (*buddhi*) in men (see chapter 2.1.2).

Having manifested as the Great Self, Brahma creates categories of self-cognition. These are the three classes (*guṇa*). The Composer presents their creation together with the creation of the object that can be cognised by them (*sarvāṇi triguṇāni*, verse b). Cognition has its immediate results in that beings and the object are created in the very same moment when its category appears. It is possible that this is why the subjective manifestation of Brahma is called the Great Self, *mahān ātman*: the adjective *mahat* refers to recognition of himself as the object, the noun *ātman*, self, refers to his subjective power.

The category of classes is very general. On one hand, it expresses the subject-object structure of the cosmos seen as manifestation of self-cognition. The state of *sattva* is connected with ability to cognise, the state of *tamas*, with lack of cognition (see chapter 2.1.2). The double meaning of *rajas* which means ‘the space’ in the RV and ‘passion’ in the Smṛti texts, expresses everything that happens between the subject and object i.e., desire to cognise and the act of cognition (see also chapter 2.1.2). If the recipient elaborates the source domain of growth of a child, he may again conceive this process as the process of growing up during which it cognises itself with the use of new

<sup>19</sup> Olivelle (2005: 87): ‘all things composed of the three attributes.’

‘adult’ categories. Firstly, the earth is cognised with the aid of the attribute of darkness (*tamas*), then space is cognised with aid of the attribute of *rajas* (which means space between the earth and the sky in the Vedic language) and finally the sky with the aid of the attribute of *sattva*.

Moreover, category of classes (*guṇa*) allows Brahma in the form of the Great Self to perform a new kind of cognition i.e., sensual cognition (verses c–d). The five senses (*pañcendriyāṇi*) are the senses of reason (*buddhīndriya*), hearing, touching, seeing, tasting and smelling. They become a new subjective faculty endowed with categories to recognise the next subject (*viṣayāṅām grahītṛṇi*) which are the great beings (*mahābhūta*) i.e., what can be heard (space), what can be touched (wind), what can be seen (light), what can be tasted (water) and what can be smelt (earth). We could say that the great beings are the perceptible manifestations of the Great Self which appears thanks to the use of the five classes. In other words, the Great Self categorises itself with use of new categories and this categorisation cognitively splits it into five great beings. The reflexive nature of this cognition is even more clear when we take into account that, in the early cosmogonies of the MDhP, the first manifestation of reality in the cosmos is called the Great Being (*mahad bhūta*, 224.31, see section 1.2.2).

Creation of the great beings (*mahābhūta*) is described separately in the MS (1.75–78, see chapter 2.1.3). Olivelle (2005) classifies this passage as an excursus (interpolations or parenthetical statements), but it could be argued that the description is actually a separate explanation of the same process. The Composer of the MS presents the creation of objects cognised by the subjective faculties and the category of classes to give additional clarity to his exposition. He describes it after the description of creation with all kinds of beings and of the divisions of time together with the periods of manifestation and lack of manifestation of the cosmos conceived in terms of a waking and a sleeping man (1.61–73). Then the Composer begins the cosmogony as if from the beginning to present the manifestation of Brahma as the object i.e., the cosmos divided into the five great beings.

The great beings are created by mind qualified in the same way as in MS 1.14: it encompasses what is and what is not (*sadasadātmaka*) and they are cognised with use of the category of the five classes (*guṇa*, MS 1.76–78).<sup>20</sup> This makes the recipient assume that they are created in cognition performed by the mind with the aid of the Great Self (*mahān ātman*) as described in that part of the cosmogony devoted to the creation of the subject. It is worth

<sup>20</sup> The same description of creation of great beings is in MDhP 224.35–38. For the same or similar stanzas in MS 1 and MDhP 224, see Bühler’s ([1886] 1969, lxxxi–lxxx, after Hildebeitel 2011: 266–267, footnote 55).

noting that the word *mahābhūta* implies that in his objective creation Brahma, in the form of the Great Self, again recognises himself as great.

So, the creation of the great beings can be reconstructed as follows. When Brahma, in the form of the Great Self, begins to hear he hears himself and categorises himself as space. When he begins to touch, he touches himself and categorises himself as wind. When he begins to see, he sees himself and categorises himself as light. When he begins to taste, he tastes himself and categorises himself as water. When he begins to smell, he smells himself and categorises himself as the earth. The great beings are the highest cognitive agent in its objective form: that which can be heard, touched, seen, tasted and smelt.<sup>21</sup> Recognition of the successive manifestations means that in their creation, the Great Self of Brahma becomes space, wind, light, water and the earth.

In the classical Sāṃkhya and in Yoga, as in the *Yājñavalkyasmṛti* (composed later than the MS, circa 5–3rd BCE), the category within which the great beings are cognised is called *tanmātra*, literally ‘measure-of-that’. This term is not often used in the early Smṛti texts and one of its earliest usage is in MaU 3.2 Bronkhorst (2006: 306). But it is worth noting that the noun *mātra* in the meaning of the category of the five great beings is used in PU 4.7–8,<sup>22</sup> while the meaning of *tanmātra* as the category for the five great beings is attested in MBh 1.85.14. It is used in the context of rebirth: the wind which carries the semen to the womb is called *tanmātrakṛtādhikārah*, ‘that which has power over activity of the measures-of-that’ and it causes the embryo to grow so that man, when born, can hear sounds with its ears, see forms with its eyes etc.<sup>23</sup>

It is worth noting that the compound *tanmātra* reflects conceptualisation of creation in terms of admeasuring, activated already in MS 1.13 via the verb *nir mā-* (see above, section 1.1.4). The meaning of admeasurement is reflected in MDhP 210.19 where *tanmātram*, used as an adverb, refers to the

<sup>21</sup> In ŚB 10.5.3, creation is presented as transformations of the mind (*manas*) and its stages are metonymically evoked by the name of faculty which performs them (*vāc*, *prāṇa*, *cakṣus*, *śrotra*, *karman*, *agni*, Jurewicz 2016/18).

<sup>22</sup> PU 4: *sa yathā somya vayāṃsi vāsovrkṣaṃ sampratiṣṭhante | evaṃ ha vai tat sarvaṃ para ātmani sampratiṣṭhate | (7) pṛthivī ca pṛthivīmātrā ca | āpaś cāpomātrā ca | tejaś ca tejomātrā ca | vāyuś ca vāyumātrā ca | ākāśaś cākāśamātrā ca | cakṣuś ca draṣṭavyaṃ ca | śrotraṃ ca śrotavyaṃ ca | ghrāṇaṃ ca ghrātavyaṃ ca | rasaś ca rasayitavyaṃ ca | tvak ca sparśayitavyaṃ ca | vāk ca vaktavyaṃ ca | hastau cādātavyaṃ ca | upasthaś cānandayitavyaṃ ca | pāyuś ca visarjāyitavyaṃ ca | pādau ca gantavyaṃ ca | manaś ca mantavyaṃ ca | buddhiś ca boddhavyaṃ ca | ahaṅkāraś cāhaṅkartavyaṃ ca | cittam ca cetayitavyaṃ ca | tejaś ca vidyotayitavyaṃ ca | prāṇaś ca vidhārayitavyaṃ ca | (8)*

<sup>23</sup> MBh 1.81: *vāyuḥ samutkarṣati garbhayonim; ṛtau retāḥ puṣparasānuprktam | sa tatra tanmātrakṛtādhikārah; krameṇa saṃvardhayaṭīha garbham || (14) sa jāyamāno viḡrhitāgātrah; ṣaḍjñāniṣṭhāyatano manuṣyah | sa śrotārbhyāṃ vedayatiha śabdaṃ; sarvaṃ rūpaṃ paśyati cakṣuś ca || (15) ghrāṇena gandhaṃ jihvayātho rasaṃ ca; tvacā sparśaṃ manasā veda bhāvam | ity aṣṭakehopacitiṃ ca viddhi; mahātmanaḥ prāṇabhṛtaḥ śarīre || (16)*

quantity of food a man who wants to liberate himself should take: only as much (*tanmātram*) of it as it is needed for his purpose (MDhP 210.19).<sup>24</sup> The noun *mātrā* means ‘measure,’ while the literal meaning of the noun *guṇa* is ‘thread, rope, string.’ The concept of measuring with steps activated *via* the concept of growing was mentioned above (see section 1.1.4). However, it is not an accident that the Vedic ‘manuals for altar constructions’ (Seidenberg 1983) are called the *Śulbasūtras*, ‘Rules of the cord’ (Plofker 2009);<sup>25</sup> this name metonymically evokes the process of construction *via* the concept of measuring (THE FIRST PHASE OF THE PROCESS FOR THE WHOLE PROCESS) which is again metonymically evoked *via* the concept of a cord (*śulva, rajju*; INSTRUMENT FOR AN ACTIVITY). A characteristic feature of the classical philosophical thinking is its more analytical approach and it is not surprising that the terminological differentiation between the three and five classes appeared. While in the MS the same noun (*guṇa*) is used in reference to three and five classes, the conceptual difference is obvious and the same as in the later philosophy.<sup>26</sup> This implies that the Composer of the MS saw the creation of everything what can be cognised with the aid of the three classes and the creation of the great elements in the same way: as measuring with cords.<sup>27</sup> Such measuring activates the concept of measuring the fire altar as described in the *Śulbasūtras*. If this argument is correct then the creation of the cosmos by Brahma would be conceived in terms of the construction of the fire altar which begins with measuring with cords. The identity of Brahma and the cosmos is strengthened by traditional analysis where the fire altar (the source domain for the cosmos) is the sacrificer of one hand and the highest cognitive agent (Prajāpati) on the other. It should be noted, however, that this source domain is so not explicitly elaborated in the MS as it is in the MaU. It can be reconstructed mainly *via* the literal meaning of the noun *guṇa*, but will be confirmed below (MS 1.17–19).

<sup>24</sup> MDhP 210.19: *vaimanasyaṃ ca viṣaye yānty asya karaṇāni ca | tasmāt tanmātram ādadyād yāvad atra prayojanam ||*

<sup>25</sup> Thibault (1875), Ranade (1978), Bhagwat (2009), Amma Sarasvati (1999).

<sup>26</sup> Malinar (2017a: 192) writes that one of the differences between the epic Sāṃkhya and the classical Sāṃkhya is that they ‘do not mention the *tanmātras*, the subtle matrices of the visible five elements (fire, water, etc.) that are usually listed in the S[āṃkhya] K[ārika]’ and refers to Schrader (1995). It can be argued that it is the term *tanmātra* which is missing in the early Smṛti cosmogonies, but not the concept which is attested and called here by use of the noun *guṇa*. As we will see, this fact has important philosophical implications.

<sup>27</sup> Conceptualisation of creation in terms of measuring of the second self is expressed in *Gopathabrāhmaṇa* 1: brahman, having realised his greatness, thinks: ‘Come, let me measure out from myself a second god of like measure with myself’ (*hantāhaṃ mad eva manmātram dvitīyaṃ devaṃ nirmimā iti*, translation of Srinivasan’s 1997: 205). Here brahman literally creates ‘a second god,’ but the further creation, conceived in terms of transformation of its sweat, confirms that the god is its self. A similar conceptualisation of creation (as transformation of Prajāpati’s sweat) is attested in ŚB 11.1.6. See Smith (1989: 73 ff.) See above, footnote 6.



**MS 1.16**

*teṣāṃ tv avayavān sūkṣmān ṣaṇṇām apy amitaujasām |  
saṃniveśyāt mamātrāsu sarvabhūtāni nirmame ||*

Then he introduced these subtle limbs<sup>28</sup> of these six, possessing boundless might, into measures of himself<sup>29</sup> and thus he measured<sup>30</sup> all beings.

According to Olivelle: ‘the exact meaning of ‘six’ remains unclear, but mind and the five elements are the best candidates because they are again referred to in verse 18’ (Olivelle 2005: 239). The logic of the description does imply however, that these are rather subjective powers of Brahma namely the Great Self (*mahān ātman*) and five senses of reason with their categories.<sup>31</sup> Since one of the meanings of *avayava* (verse a) is ‘a limb or member of the body’ it can be argued that the cognition performed is conceived in terms of extending limbs.<sup>32</sup> They are multiple because Brahma performs various kinds of cognition with their use. It is worth recalling the R̥gvedic description of creation in RV 1.164.41 where the highest cognitive agent is conceived in terms of a female buffalo which multiplies its legs (*pada*) and thus creates the world with aid of speech (Jurewicz 2016/18).

The six cognitive faculties are qualified as *amitaujas* ‘possessing boundless might’ (verse b). The noun *ojas* ‘energy’ is used in MS 1.6 (*vṛttaujas*). The use of the same noun to denote the first cognitive power of reality and power of the highest cognitive agent within the temporal cosmos implies that the Composer wants to highlight that the first energy of reality, that has been activated *in illo tempore*, is still active. It is now possessed by the six cognitive faculties of the subject (the Great Self and five senses).

Brahma is presented as placing the multiple limbs of his six cognitive faculties into ‘the measures of himself’ (*ātmamātrāsu*, verse c). Cognition is conceived in terms of entering a container (the subject is conceived in terms of a person, the object in terms of a container, the act of cognition in terms of entering it).<sup>33</sup> In the beginning the subject which performs the sensual

<sup>28</sup> Olivelle (2005: 87): ‘By merging these subtle parts.’

<sup>29</sup> Olivelle (2005: 87–88): ‘particles of his own body.’

<sup>30</sup> Olivelle (2005: 88): ‘he formed.’

<sup>31</sup> Olivelle (2005: 239), having quoted interpretations of the commentators writes: ‘The exact meaning of ‘six’ remains unclear, but mind and the five elements are the best candidates because they are again referred to in verse 18.’

<sup>32</sup> COGNITION IS TOUCHING, COGNITION IS CATCHING OBJECTS (Lakoff, Johnson 1999).

<sup>33</sup> COGNITION IS MOVING (Lakoff, Johnson 1999). It is a realisation of a more basic conceptualisation with use of the image schema of CONTAINER: CHANGE IS CHANGE OF CONTAINERS. This way of thinking is attested in Sanskrit expression *pañcatvaṃ gam-*, ‘to die:’ the number five metonymically evokes the five great beings into which the human body is transformed under

cognition (conceived in terms of extending limbs), having measured itself as an object, feels separate from its objective part and then cognise its unity which is conceived of its entering into its objective part. This logic of this scenario can also be motivated by the general domain of Procreation; within its frames the object of cognition is conceived in terms of a female into which a male's limb (penis) is introduced. The fact that *mātrā* is feminine may confirm the motivation for this conceptualisation.

The use of the noun *mātrā* also allows us to activate the meaning of recitation of the Veda, because the noun *mātrā* also means 'a metrical unit, a mora or prosodial instant i.e., the length of time required to pronounce a short vowel.' It is therefore suggested that the compound *ātmamātrā* refers to the names of the Veda in which Brahma manifests himself during recitation. Placing his multiplied subjective powers into them he confirms the correctness of his cognition and the names of the Veda are embodied in all creatures, which is then expressed in verse d (*śarvabhūtāni nirmame*): they hear and are possible to be heard, touch and are possible to be touched, see and are possible to be seen, taste and are possible to be tasted, smell and are possible to be smelt. Let us recall RV 1.164.41 again: in terms of the multiplying legs (*pada*) of the female buffalo words are conceived which become the cosmos (Jurewicz 2016/18). The concept of measuring with cords also motivates this description (*via* the verb *nir mā-*) and the recipient can introduce this concept as a next input space of the conceptual network. Its other input spaces are: the concept of creation, the concept of self-cognition, the concept of recitation of the Veda and the image schema of CONTAINER. The generic space is the concept of change. In the blend, the self-cognition of the highest cognitive agent with the five senses is conceived in terms their entering into its objective aspect, and creation is recitation of the Veda during construction of fire altar.

### MS 1.17

*yan mūrtyavayavāḥ sūkṣmās tānīmāny āśrayanti śaṭ |*  
*tasmāc charīram ity āhus tasya mūrṭim maṅṣiṇaḥ ||*

Because the six subtle limbs of the perceptible form are attached (*ā śri*) to them, the wise call his call his perceptible form 'body' (*śarīra*).<sup>34</sup>

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the heat of crematory fire (e.g. MS 6.50.59: *ūruvegena cāpy anyān pātayām āsa bhūtale | apare cainam ālokya bhayāt pañcatvam āgatāḥ ||*).

<sup>34</sup> Jurewicz's translation. Olivelle: 'Because six parts of his physical form become attached (*ā śri*) to these beings, the wise call his physical form 'body' (*śarīra*).'

Now six cognitive faculties (the Great Self and five senses) are conceived in terms of limbs (verses a–b).<sup>35</sup> They are not presented as multiplied because the correct way of self-cognition has been settled when their cognition conformed to the self-measurement of Brahma. They compose the perceptible form of Brahma called *mūrti*. Most probably the recipient is not expected to activate the etymological meaning of the noun *mūrti* that comes from the verb *mūrch-* which means ‘to congeal’ as in the Veda (ŚB 10.5.3, AU 1.1.2, Jurewicz 2016/18). The abstract word *mūrti* means a perceptible form of reality and the idea of perceptibility comes from the source domain of congealing: butter is easier to be grasped (literally and metaphorically: COGNITION IS GRASPING) than the milk from which it is produced.

The cognitive faculties are presented as attached ‘to them’ (*tānīmāny āśrayanti*, verse b). Olivelle interprets them as beings, though one can also think about them as ‘the own measure’ (*atmamātrā*) of Brahma i.e., the names of the Veda. In the previous stanza, the Composer has presented how cognitive faculties become attached to self-measurement with the use of the image schema of CONTAINER. When subjective faculties recognised the sounding form of Brahma with aid of the category of classes, they transformed it into the perceptible form of multiple beings conceived in terms of his body (*śarīra*).

The Composer of MS evokes here the tradition in his definition of the word *śarīra* which comes from the verb *ā śri-* ‘to be attached’. *Śarīra* is defined in the same way at the beginning of the description of Agnicayana i.e., the ritual during which the fire altar is construed (ŚB 6.1.1.4): here the breaths are attached (*śri-*) to the body (*śarīra*)<sup>36</sup>. All the beings with their cognitive faculties are called the perceptible body of Brahma. Thus, the Composer implies that Brahma manifests himself not only as one cosmic highest cognitive agent but also as a multiple subject i.e., as many forms which are now able to cognate with the use of the category of the three classes and the category of the five classes.

In this way, the mental self of reality is created. It is composed of subjective faculties, such as the mind (*manas*), reason (*buddhi*) and five senses (hearing, touch, sight, taste and smell) equipped with categories of classes (*guṇa*) and the objective manifestation which is cognised by these categories. Now the manifest aspect of reality begins to move.

<sup>35</sup> For that topic see also analysis of MDhP 224.41–43, chapter 1.2.2.

<sup>36</sup> ŚB 6.1.1.4: *tāsminn etāsmiṇ prāṇā āśrayanta tāsmād vevaitāchirò ‘tha yāt prāṇā āśrayanta tāsmād u prāṇāḥ śriyau ‘tha yāt sārvasmiṇ āśrayanta tāsmād u śarīram |*

### 1.1.5. The creation of the sensori-motor self (*ātman*) of reality (MS 1.18–20)

#### MS 1.18

*tad āviśanti bhūtāni mahānti saha karmabhiḥ |  
manasā cāvayavaiḥ sūkṣmaiḥ sarvabhūtakṛd avyayam ||*

The great beings<sup>37</sup> enter it accompanied by their activities, as also the mind, the imperishable producer of all beings, accompanied by its subtle limbs.<sup>38</sup>

The creative cognition of Brahma now passes to the next level. The subjective power is again mind (*manas*) and its category is action (*karman*). Cognition is again conceived in terms of the image-schema of entering of a CONTAINER as it is in MS 1.16. In verse c, the Composer states that it enters with subtle limbs (*avayava*) which are the Great Self and its senses.

It is worth noting that in MS 1.18d the mind it is qualified as the imperishable producer of all beings (*sarvabhūtakṛd avyayam*) which prompts the recipient to understand it as being the same as the first manifestation of the mind in the temporal cosmos. This would imply that the manifestation of thinking in action is similarly crucial. It seems that the cognition conveyed previously does not allow Brahma to manifest all his cognitive abilities. Using the terms of ŚB 2.2.4.3, creation is still in his mind (*tād evāśya mānasy āsa*). In order to fully manifest himself he again needs the mind (*manas*), conceived as the mental power able to transgress the borderline spheres between manifestations of reality. The mind appears in its new function as the cognitive power that can use the category of action (*karman*). Thus, it can be seen as a new subject able to cognise the manifestation of Brahma's thinking at a new cognitive level.

In the Vedic tradition, *karman* refers to ritual activity seen as the externalisation of the mind (*manas*, ŚB 10.5.3). The noun *karman* acquires the general meaning of any action in the early Upaniṣads and this meaning is used in later Indian thought. In the early Smṛti texts, the concept of *karman* encompasses the whole scenario of action i.e., the action itself, its value and its results (see chapters 2.1.4, 2.6.2, 5.4).

The physiology of the Smṛti period recognised ten senses: five senses of reason (*buddhīndriya*)<sup>39</sup> the creation of which has already been described and the five senses of action (*karmendriya*) the creation of which is described now. According to Medhātithi they are speaking, catching, walking, excreting and

<sup>37</sup> Olivelle (2005: 88): 'elements.'

<sup>38</sup> Olivelle (2005: 88): 'particles.'

<sup>39</sup> Let me remind that they are also called 'the senses of cognition/knowledge', *jñānendriya*.

procreation. Great beings had already been categorised thanks to the category of classes (*guṇa*), now they are categorised thanks to the category of action (*karman*). In this context, this word evokes the special activities of great beings which, again according to Medhātithi, are: giving space, distribution, cooking, conglomeration and supporting (see chapter 2.1.3).

The new category allows Brahma to cognise his objective manifestation in great beings more precisely. The recipient may imagine Brahma as performing various kinds of actions and categorising himself through them. In his subjective aspect: when he speaks he categorises himself as space; when he catches he categorises himself as wind; when he walks he categorises himself as light; when he excretes he categorises himself as water and when he procreates he categorises himself as the earth. At the same time in his objective aspect: when he gives space he categorises himself as space; when he distributes he categorises himself as wind; when he cooks he categorises himself as light; when he conglomerates he categorises himself as water and when he supports he categorises himself as the earth.

However, the recipient may also presume that Brahma still cognises his objective manifestation with the use of the category of classes (*guṇa*). We can reconstruct it as follows. Space is the manifestation of Brahma possible to be heard and giving space and is cognised by the sense of speaking. Wind is the manifestation of Brahma possible to be touched and spreading objects which are cognised by the sense of catching. Light is the manifestation of Brahma possible to be seen and cooking and is cognised by the sense of walking. Water is the manifestation of Brahma possible to be tasted and the conglomeration of various objects which is cognised by the sense of excreting. Finally, the earth is the manifestation of Brahma possible to be smelt and supporting objects cognised by the sense of procreating.

The recognition of the unity of the subject and the object is again conceived in terms of the image schema of CONTAINER: the great beings with their characteristic actions and the mind with its subtle limbs (senses of action) enter *tad* i.e., the mental body of Brahma composed of the Great Self and the five senses of reason (*tad āviśanti*, verse a).

It is also worth noting that if the recipient activates the Vedic cosmogonies, he will understand the logic of the specific activity of each of the senses of action and their arrangement. In the beginning of creation Brahma begins to move and recognises itself by mind. When Brahma manifests itself as space (*ākāśa*), he not only makes sounds but creates space. In Vedic philosophy this is the moment when reality cognitively splits itself into two aspects which can be interpreted as a division into the subject and the object of cognition. In RV 10.129, this stage is conceived in terms of darkness hidden by darkness.

Brahma categorises this manifestation with the aid of the category of class (*guṇa*) of sound and with the aid of the category of action (*karman*) which is giving space. Then, Brahma begins to cognise this aspect of itself that is now far away because of its previous movement when space appeared. This corresponds to the wish of reality to annihilate the cognitive split expressed in the fifth stage of creation in RV 10.129,<sup>40</sup> or Prajāpati's wish to get back everything that he emitted from himself (see Jurewicz 2016/18). So, Brahma becomes the wind which fills the space. Brahma categorises this manifestation with the aid of the category of the class (*guṇa*) of touch and with the aid of the category of action (*karman*) which is catching.

In the next stage, Brahma begins to walk in order to recover himself. Creation, conceived in terms of running, is attested in the ŚB 6.1.2.12, 7.1.2.1. In AU 1.3.3–10, a scenario of catching a victim is elaborated (see Jurewicz 2016/18). Walking, and in particular running, causes heat in the agent conceived in terms of a fire burning inside. This manifestation is categorised with the aid of the category of the class (*guṇa*) of form and with the aid of the category of action (*karman*) of cooking. These first manifestations are motivated by the general domain of Cooking. In the source domain, there is an agent who knows that a victim is somewhere in the space and wants to catch it. The agent runs after it, catches it, kills it, cooks it and eats. At this moment, the unity of the subject and the object is realised. One can argue that the form (*rūpa*) through which light is cognised is motivated not only by the fact that one can see when it is light but also by the physical experience of catching a victim in its real form.

If the recipient further elaborates the general domain of Cooking, he will understand the next great being i.e., water is cognised by the faculty of excretion. In the source domain, the agent, having eaten a good meal, begins to excrete. This again activates the Vedic cosmogonies: The creative activity of Prajāpati is conceived in terms of excretion (Jurewicz 2016/18). In the target domain the highest cognitive agent, having realised its unity, splits itself again into subject and object which is now conceived in terms of excretion. It manifests itself to itself as water. This manifestation is cognised by the category of the class (*guṇa*) of taste and by the category of action (*karman*) which is conglomeration. It not only gains from the experience but may also activate earlier cosmogonies where the creation of the cosmos is conceived in terms of the general domain of Cleansing By Heat, the particular realisation of which are activities which aim at the creation of a more concrete form of a fluid, e.g. production of cream, butter, gold (Jurewicz 2010, 2016/18).

<sup>40</sup> RV 10.129.4ab: *kāmas tād āgre sām avartatādhi mānaso rétaḥ prathamam yād āsīt.*

In RV 10.164.41–42, creation is conceived in terms of solidification of mud (*salilá*), in ŚB 6.1.1.8–13 and in terms of making future creatures from clay (Jurewicz 2016/18). The concept of taste implies that the excreted form is eaten and such a conceptualisation of creation is attested most clearly in ŚB 10.4.2.2–3 where Prajāpati excretes creatures from himself and then wants to eat them to incorporate them in himself (Jurewicz 2016/18). If the recipient activates the concept of eating, he will understand that unity returns.

And Brahma splits itself again which is conceived with the use of the general domain of Procreation widely used in Vedic thought to express the realisation of the unity of reality and, at the same time, its further multiplication. As the progeny gives support to its parents (especially after death), the earth gives it to all beings. When Brahma manifests himself as the earth, he categorises himself with the class (*guṇa*) of smell and the category of action (*karman*) of supporting. The concept of smell metonymically activates the concept of eating and the Vedic images of Prajāpati who eats his son (Agni, ŚB 6.2.1.1–9) or offspring.

We can see that the concepts of senses of action (*karmendriya*), their categories and their connection with the great beings can be explained with reference to the earlier thought. One is not arguing that the Smṛti philosophers consciously used Vedic thought as in this reconstruction. Rather Vedic thought influenced later thinking as it was an unconscious scaffold taken for granted by the later generations of philosopher. This both limited those philosophers but also provided them with a foundation on which they could build.

Now the cosmic self of reality is composed of the Great Self able to use the category of classes (*guṇa*) and of the mind able to use the category of action (*karman*). Although we will use the term ‘Brahma’ to denote this cosmic mental and moving manifestation of reality, we should bear in mind its perceptible and embodied form that is able to perform sensori-motor activity. It is also worth noting that the Smṛti philosophers explicitly expressed what has been seen already in the Veda namely, thinking does not take place only in our heads but encompasses the whole body. Only then is it fully realised. This is a very modern understanding of the mental activity. Quoting Geertz (1973: 45):

Human thought is basically both social and public (...) its natural habitat is the house yard, the market place, and the town square. Thinking consists not of ‘happenings in the head’ (though happenings there and elsewhere are necessary for it to occur) but of a traffic in (...) significant symbols – words for the most part but also gestures, drawings, musical devices like clocks, or natural objects like jewels, anything, in fact, that is disengaged from its mere actuality and used to impose meaning upon experience.

The conviction about the social and public character of thought and cognition can be seen already in the cosmogonies of the ŚB (Jurewicz 2012) and is continued and elaborated in early Smṛti thought. We could say that the early Hindu ICM of cognition includes its embodied and interpersonal nature. This fact should be taken into account in our understanding of the cosmogonies presented in the early Smṛti philosophy and of later classical philosophy. Viewed from this perspective, early Hindu cosmogonies see creation of the world as the creation of ‘significant symbols’ which, as Geertz suggests, triggers the highest cognitive agent to recognise itself through them. Hutchins (2005) uses the concept of ‘material anchors’ activating conceptual blends the content of which depends on the cultural models of a community. Thus, the material anchors, from the simplest (as a stone knife) to most complex (as a navigation system) belong to a larger cognitive context. The Golden Egg provides the context for subject-object cognition performed by the highest cognitive agent that manifests itself to itself in various material anchors which then are interpreted by it. Hutchins (2005: 1562) states that: ‘[a] physical structure is not a material anchor because of some intrinsic quality, but because of the way it is used’<sup>41</sup>. All the material anchors constituting the cosmos are the manifestation of one reality, but the way they are manifested depends on the perspective of a given subjective power. In this stage of creation there is one manifestation, Brahma, who interprets them in the way that enables him to confirm his unity with any objective manifestations. The situation will change when reality manifests in particular human beings.

The next stanza again confirms the unity of reality:

### MS 1.19

*teṣāṃ idaṃ tu saptānāṃ puruṣāṅnāṃ mahaujasām |  
sūkṣmābhyo mūrtimātrābhyaḥ sambhavaty avyayād vyayam ||*

From the subtle measures of the perceptible form of these seven males of great might the perishable comes to being from the imperishable.<sup>42</sup>

The concept of seven males (verses a–b) activates the Agnicayana cosmogony where reality manifests itself in seven seers also called ‘males’ or ‘men’ (*puruṣa*).<sup>43</sup> These cannot create as long as they do not unite themselves

<sup>41</sup> See also Malafouris (2009), Gosden (2009), Roepstorff (2009).

<sup>42</sup> Jurewicz’s translation on the basis of Olivelle’s ‘From the subtle particles of the physical frames of these seven males of great might, this world comes into being, the perishable from the imperishable.’ The same is repeated in 224.41–43, see chapter 1.2.2.

<sup>43</sup> In his explanation of the concept of the seven males Olivelle (2005) refers to RV 10.90 and states that ‘the meaning of ‘seven’ once again, is unclear. It probably refers to the six already



(ŚB 6.1.1.3–4, Jurewicz 2016/18). Their distinctive feature is breath which metonymically activates the concept of recitation elaborated in the cosmogony. It is possible that the Composer of the MS has in mind the concept of reciting seers and conceives the cognitive faculties of in these terms, in the same way as the seven men (*puruṣa*) constitute the parts of the body of Prajāpati (ritual and cosmic). These are the Great Self (*mahān ātman*) and the mind (*manas*), together with the five senses of reason (*buddhīndriya*) and five senses of action (*karmendriya*) which are counted as five.

Seven cognitive faculties are qualified as possessing the great energy (*mahaujas*, verse b). We can see that the term *ojas* is used very carefully by the Composer: in the description of the first manifestation of the cognitive power of reality (*ṛttaujas*, MS 1.6), after the description of appearance of the mind (*manas*), after the I-form (*ahaṃkāra*), after the Great Self (*mahān ātman*) and its category of class (*guṇa*) and now the appearance of the mind (*manas*) with its category of action (*karman*). We can assume then that this Vedic term *ojas* is used in the description of the crucial transfer between the levels of manifestation: from the unmanifest aspect of reality to its manifest aspect, from the unity within the Golden Egg into subject-object cognition with the aid of classes (*guṇa*) and now from the level of cognition with use of these categories to the level of cognition with the use of the category of actions (*karman*).

Cognition of the sensori-motor self of Brahma is conceived in a similar way to the cognition of his mental self that is described in MS 1.16: his cognitive faculties possess ‘subtle measures of the perceptible form’ (*sūkṣmābhyo mūrtimātrābhyā*, verse c) similar to the ‘subtle limbs’ (*avayavān sūkṣmān*). In this way it is again implied that the activity of Brahma is conceived as multiplication of limbs, although now the multiplied forms of cognitive

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mentioned, with the addition of the Creator, particles of whose body combines with those six to create the world (verses 16–17).’ However, reference to ŚB 6.1.1.3–4 leaves no doubts how to interpret ‘the seven men.’ As Srinivasan (1997: 66) writes ‘the reason why the fire altar is seven-layered and ‘constituted so as to measure seven man’s lengths square’ is because Prajāpati-Agni (i.e., the fire-altar) is composed of seven persons (i.e., *puruṣas*).’ Srinivasan uses the logic of cosmogony which explains the experience (i.e., the source domain) with the metaphysical theory (i.e., target domain). This logic is prevalent in the cosmogonies of the ŚB (Jurewicz 2016/18). However, is the experience which motivates thinking and the concepts of experience also used for conceptualisation of metaphysical thinking? *Puruṣa* (man) was a basic metric unit from which other units of measure have been derived (Nowicka 2014). *Saptapuruṣa* means literally ‘what measures seven men.’ Malamoud (1996: 328, footnote 61) expresses this explicitly: according to him comparison of sacrifice to a man ‘is grounded in the fact that the body of the sacrificer is used as the standard measure of length for several sacrificial constructions.’ The way of measuring ‘sacrificial constructions’ after the measure of man is already attested in *Taittirīya Saṃhitā*, 5.2.5 (*puruṣamātreṇa vi mimūte*).

faculties are evoked by the noun ‘measure’. If we agree that the noun *mātrā* refers to the names of the Veda, we will see the coherence with the Vedic conceptualisation of the cosmic and ritual body of Prajāpati in terms of seven seers and understand why the Composer has evoked it here.

Thanks to this cognitive activity what is perishable appears from what is perishable (*saṁbhavaty avyayād vyayam*, verse d). The Composer not only means the time sequence, but also the paradoxical situation when what is imperishable is also perishable in its manifest aspect. Such a way of thinking is attested already in the RV the Composers of which understood this paradoxical situation in terms of water which, at the same time, flows and does not flow (*tātaḥ ksarati ākṣaram*, Jurewicz 2010, 2012).

### MS 1.20

*ādyādyasya guṇaṁ tv eṣāṁ avāpnoti paraḥ paraḥ |  
yo yo yāvatithaś caiṣāṁ sa sa tāvadguṇaḥ smṛtaḥ ||*

Of these, each succeeding element acquires the quality specific to each preceding. Thus, each element, tradition tells us, possesses the same number of qualities as the number of its position in the series.

In his cognition, Brahma uses all categories created till now: time, name, three and five classes (*guṇa*) and five actions (*karman*). At each level of manifestation, the subsequent entities can be cognised with the aid of a category created earlier and with the new, specific categories thanks to which they have appeared. This fact is explicitly expressed in the description of the classes of five great beings (*mahābhūta*): space is cognised with the class of sound; wind is cognised with sound and its specific class of touching; the light is cognised with sound, touching and its specific class of form; water is cognised with sound, touching, form and its specific class of taste and the earth is cognised with sound, touching, form and its specific class of smelling. However, they can also be cognised with the aid of the category of time, of name, with the aid of three and five classes (*guṇa*) and with the aid of the category of action (*karman*).

It is argued that the stanza describes the influence of categories within the cosmos and they will necessarily apply to the next cosmic manifestations. If subject-object cognition is to be successfully performed by Brahma and constantly confirm the unity of reality, the way of its performance should remain the same. In this way, categories become rules of manifestation. In everyday perception, they acquire ontological meaning of features of the objects cognised by them. This issue will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.

### 1.1.6. The creation of the ritual self (*ātman*) of reality (MS 1.21–27)

#### MS 1.21

*sarveṣāṃ tu sa nāmāni karmāṇi ca pṛthak pṛthak |  
vedaśabdebhya evādau pṛthak saṃsthās ca nirmame ||*

In the beginning through the words of the Veda alone, he fashioned for all of them specific names and activities, as also specific stations.

In this stage of creation Brahma, in his cosmic mental and sensori-motor self, uses categories created earlier i.e., the category of name and of action (verses a–b). They are now specified because their use is qualified as taking place ‘separately’ or ‘differently’ (*pṛthak pṛthak*, verse b) which means, as Olivelle translates, they become ‘specific’. The category of name is also specified as the words of the Veda (verse c). The mind (*manas*) is again the most important mental faculty as has been the case with each transition from one level of manifestation to the next.

The Indian commentators referred to by Olivelle generally interpret the noun *saṃsthā* (‘station’, verse d) as expressing various kinds of living beings and the ritual activities of men that is connected to their caste occupations.<sup>44</sup> This conveys the meaning of place in the general hierarchy of beings accordingly to their activities (see also analysis of the next stanza). The specific use of categories of name and action allows Brahma to organise his cosmic sensori-motor self in the way that reflects the content of the Veda and makes it embodied as described in MS 1.16 when his mental self, expressed in the names of the Veda, becomes all the beings. This process is again conceived in terms of measuring either with steps or with a cord (verse d).

#### MS 1.22

*karmātmanām ca devānām so ‘sṛjat prāṇinām prabhuh |  
sādhyānām ca gaṇaṃ sūkṣmaṃ yajñam caiva sanātanam ||*

The Lord brought forth the group of gods who are endowed with breath and whose nature is to act, the subtle group of Sādhyas and the eternal sacrifice.<sup>45</sup>

<sup>44</sup> Olivelle (2005: 239) states that ‘the meaning of the term *saṃsthā* is unclear’, and having mentioned interpretation of the proposed by Bühler and Sanskrit commentators, writes: ‘I detect a contrast between ‘specific activities’ (*karmāṇi... pṛthak*) of pada-b and ‘specific stations’ (*pṛthak saṃsthāh*), and Govinda may be right in seeing ritual obligations in the first and ordinary worldly or professional activities in the second.’

<sup>45</sup> As far of the syntax of the stanza, Olivelle (2005: 239) writes that it is unclear. He quotes interpretation of Medhātithi changes the order of the padas (‘And for the sake of living beings devoted to rites, the Lord created the group of gods, the subtle group of Sādhyas, and the eternal sacrifice’). Then he writes: ‘the meaning of *karmātmanām* is unclear (see its parallel

With the use of the category of action Brahma creates the gods and those who realised their aim i.e., Sādhyas (verses a–c). The latter word had already appeared in RV 10.90.7 in the description of the primeval sacrifice in terms of which the final organisation of the cosmos is conceived: it is performed by the gods, by the Sādhyas and by the seers.<sup>46</sup> Thus the recipient understands that the cosmogony now presented is deeply grounded in tradition. The gods, the Sādhyas and the seers are interpreted here as the subjective powers of reality (Jurewicz 2016/18) and this will remain the interpretation here. It not only fits the cosmogonic model according to which the next subjective manifestation should appear but also sheds some light on the possible interpretation of the concept of *samsthā* used in the previous stanza. It might correspond to the earlier concept of the *āyatana* which in AU refers to the abodes of the subjective cognitive powers of the self (*ātman*) called the deities (*devatā*). Only then they can perform subject-object cognition.<sup>47</sup> It is worth mentioning that their dwellings are found in man (*puruṣa*) in terms of whom the cosmos and man are conceived.<sup>48</sup> If the recipient activates this description, he will understand that Brahma organises himself in the cosmos conceived in terms of man.

The gods are called ‘who are endowed with breath and whose nature is to act’ (*karmātmanāṃ... prāṇināṃ*, verses a–b). The concept of breath metonymically activates the concept of recitation which implies that the gods know and recite the Veda. Their qualification as ‘those whose nature is action’ highlights the fact that it is the main category the gods use in their cognition. It is also possible to interpret the Genitive forms *karmātmanāṃ* and *prāṇināṃ* as the Dative. In this case the gods are created for those who breath, so are alive and recite i.e., for men the creation of whom will be described below. Their category is action too. The recipient is expected to activate both meanings simultaneously and understand the relationship between the gods and men which will be realised with use of a new category i.e., sacrifice (*yajña*) the

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use at 1.53). Many commentators take this to mean that these gods are in some essential way connected with rites. Govinda, however, thinks that it refers to the gods being a subsidiary element (*aṅga*) of a rite, a very Mīmāṃsīc interpretation.’ Finally, he refers to *Āpastamba Dharmasutra* 1.11.3 where gods are seen as originally humans (*manuṣyaprakṛti*).

<sup>46</sup> RV 10.90.7: *tām yajñām barhiṣi praukṣan puruṣam jātām agratāḥ | éna devā ayajanta sādhiyā iṣayaś ca yé ||*

<sup>47</sup> Conceived there in terms of eating: AU 1.2.1: *tā enam abruvann āyatanaṃ naḥ prajānīhi | Yasmin pratiṣṭhitā annam adāmeti |* (Jurewicz 2016/2018). For *āyatana*, see Gonda (1975b).

<sup>48</sup> AU 1.2.4: *agnir vāg bhūtvā mukhaṃ prāviśat | vāyuh prāṇo bhūtvā nāsike prāviśat | ādityaś cakṣur bhūtvākṣiṇī prāviśat | diśaḥ śrotam bhūtvā karṇau prāviśan | oṣadhivanaspatayo lomāni bhūtvā tvāc aṃ prāviśan | candramā mano bhūtvā hṛdayaṃ prāviśat | mrtyur apāno bhūtvā nābhiṃ prāviśat | āpo reto bhūtvā śiśnaṃ prāviśan |*

creation of which is mentioned in verse d. We should bear in mind that its creation takes place in the process of sacrificing.

We can assume then that Brahma, in his new subjective form of gods and the Sādhyas, performs an activity categorised as sacrifice. If the recipient activates the Vedic description of the appearance of the gods he will understand that the sky, as the abode of the gods, is now created. It is especially explicit in ŚB 11.1.6 where gods are created when Prajāpati cognises; their name *deva* comes from the expression *dīvevāsa*<sup>49</sup> and Prajāpati places them in the sky (Jurewicz 2016/18). Appearance of the gods only after the cosmos is created is already expressed in ṚV 10.129 (Jurewicz 2010). The noun *sādhyā* literally means ‘one who has succeeded’ and the Sādhyas are the subjective manifestation of those who are on earth and successively took part in the creative activity.<sup>50</sup>

In the ŚB, sacrifice is the source domain to conceive the functioning of the world in which the highest cognitive agent (Prajāpati) can manifest without being threatened by death. In the early Upaniṣads the dramatic dimension of manifestation is not highlighted, however the concept of sacrifice as the source domain of functioning of the cosmos is preserved and is elaborated especially in the model of Five Fires (*pañcāgnividyā*, Jurewicz 2016/2018). The Smṛti philosophers inherited this conceptualisation.

### MS 1.23

*agnivāyuravibhyas tu trayam brahma sanātanam |  
dudoha yajñasiddhyartham ṛgyajuḥsāmalakṣaṇam ||*

From fire, wind, and the sun, he squeezed out the eternal triple Veda characterised by the Ṛg-verses, the Yajus-formulas, and the Sāman-chants, for the purpose of carrying out the sacrifice.

Brahma, in the form of the divine multiple subject, again recites the Veda which now is divided into its three parts. It will be used by men in their everyday sacrifices. The word *brahman* means not only Veda but also reality and this meaning is activated *via* the adjective ‘eternal’ (*sanātanam*, verse b). It implies the monistic character of creation. At the same time brahman, as the Veda, is eternal in that it is the manifestation of reality in sound and has been implicitly presented in the cosmogony as the first category used by reality. It is specified during the creative process: at first it is only implicitly activated

<sup>49</sup> ŚB 11.1.6.7: *tād vevā devānām devatvām yād asmaī sasṛjānāya dīvevāsa.*

<sup>50</sup> In ŚB 11.1.6, the gods are those who succeed, the asuras fail. One could wonder if the division of gods into two groups (those who breath and those who act) does not reflect in some way the Vedic division into gods and asuras.

via the verb *nir mā-* (MS 1.13b, 1.16d), then it is called Veda (MS 1.21d) to be finally organised in its triple form.

Creation of the Veda is conceived in terms of milking (*dudoha*, verse c).<sup>51</sup> In this way, the Composer again brings the recipient's mind back to the earliest stages of his tradition i.e., to the RV where the concept of milking a cow is a very important source domain. In these terms the pressing of somic juice and the appearance of rain is conceived. The former metaphor (PRESSING OF SOMA IS MILKING A COW) conveys the general meaning of obtaining the essence of something, in the case of soma this essence is called *rasa*. In its general meaning the metaphor has been used in the earlier thought to express the creation of the triple Veda.<sup>52</sup> The latter metaphor (RAINING IS MILKING A COW) activates the R̥gvedic general model of Reality Transformation. According to the model, when the sun reaches the zenith soma, which is present in the sun thanks to the morning sacrifice, is finally purified there and comes back to the earth in the form of rain. Thus, a recipient of MS is able to create a conceptual network in which the creation of gods placed in the sky, as presented in the previous stanza, is the sunrise. Creation of the triple Veda (the next input space) is raining. Conceptualisation of speech in terms of water gives coherence to the blend.

Moreover, the sun in the RV is conceived in terms of the udder and some stanzas it presents men exalted with soma who are close to the source of soma conceived in terms of its teats (RV 9.74.6, 9.89.5, see also Jurewicz 2010). In this way, the Composer of the MS could express that recitation of the Veda leads to the same results as drinking soma. This idea is already expressed in the RV 8.100.10 where speech is presented as milking four streams of nourishment to drink.<sup>53</sup>

It is also worth noting that in RV 10.90, creation of the Veda (Rk, Yajus and Sāman) takes place after the creation of animals.<sup>54</sup> Their creation is in

<sup>51</sup> As Olivelle (2005: 239) explains 'the term *dudoha* evokes the image of milking a cow. Each Veda is drawn out from each deity; the *R̥gveda* from fire, the *Yajurveda* from the wind and the *Sāmaveda* from the sun. This cosmological story is found in A[itareya]B[r̥ahmaṇa] 25.7.'

<sup>52</sup> E.g., JUB 3.15.4–9.

<sup>53</sup> RV 8.100.10: *yád vāg vādanti avicetanāni rāṣṭrī devānāṃ niṣasāda mandrá | cátasra ūrjaṃ duduhe páyāṃsi kúva svid asyāḥ paramám jagāma ||* The use of the logic of this source domain is remarkable: cow has four teats, so the streams of soma milked from the sun are also four. In verse a Speech is presented as speaking 'indistinguishable things' (Jamison, Brereton 2014) which implies that at the beginning of exaltation man cannot express his mental state. The concept of milking four (so measurable number) of streams implies man's ability to express his thoughts in words. Question in verse d implies that a part of speech is hidden, unmanifest (see also RV 1.164.45 where speech is divided into four).

<sup>54</sup> RV 10.90.8: *tásmād yajñāt sarvahútaḥ sámbhṛtam pṛṣadājīyám | paśún tāmś cakre vāyavyān āraṇyān grāmiyās ca yé ||*

turn conceived in terms of the transformation of ‘clotted butter’ (*prṣadājyá*) which flows from Man (*purusa*) in its form of oblation. As previously argued (Jurewicz 2010), *prṣadājyá* can also be interpreted as the fat which flows from the baked flesh of Man. Both meanings activate the general domain of Cleansing By Heat. Now, the concept of milking used in MS 1.23 also metonymically activates the source domain (THE FIRST PHASE OF THE PROCESS FOR THE WHOLE PROCESS). We can then see that the Composer of the MS follows the pattern of the cosmogony of the RV: firstly, the primeval ritual agents of sacrifice are created (and presumably those beings which will be the oblation), then the triple Veda creation of which is conceived in terms of the general domain of Cleansing By Heat. At the same time, his changes are probably caused by the circumstances in which he composed his text and which demanded a new expression of the ancient content.

The Veda comes from fire, wind and the sun (verse a). A recipient well-versed in the tradition will know that the RV comes from fire, the YV from the wind and the SV from the sun (Smith 1994). The concepts of fire, wind and the sun metonymically activate the concepts of the earth, the space between the sky and the earth and the sky. Thus, the cosmos is again arranged, now by multiple subjects (gods and Sādhyas) during sacrifice. We should note again that the names of the Veda fit the objective form of Brahma (see MS 1.12–13, 16). In verse d, Ṛk, Yajus and Sāman are the signs (*lakṣaṇa*) of brahman. If the recipient understands the noun *brahman* as referring to the Veda he will understand that the specific metres (*chandas*) of each of the Vedas are treated as the signs which allow the recipient to recognise each of them. If the recipient understands it as reality, he will understand that the cognitive nature of creation is conceived in terms of acquiring signs by unmanifest reality which has no signs.

The new category of sacrifice and the specified category of name allows Brahma to specify the category of time and for a more precise arrangement of space i.e., his objective manifestation:

#### MS 1.24

*kālaṃ kālavibhaktīś ca nakṣatrāṇi grahāṃs tathā |  
saritaḥ sāgarāñ śailān samāni viṣamāni ca ||*

Time, divisions of time, constellations, planets, rivers, oceans, mountains, flat and rough terrains.

The next three stanzas (25–27) present the next stage of creation of the beings similarly to MS 1.16 (when they are created in mental cognition) and to MS 1.19 (when they are created by sensori-motor cognition):

**MS 1.25**

*tapo vācaṃ ratiṃ caiva kāmaṃ ca krodham eva ca |  
sṛṣṭiṃ sasarja caivemāṃ sraṣṭum icchann imāḥ prajāḥ ||*

Heat,<sup>55</sup> speech, sexual pleasure, desire and anger – he brought forth this creation in his wish to bring forth these creatures.

The five concepts activated in verses a–b (*tapas*, *vāc*, *rati*, *kāma*, *krodha*) metonymically activate the scenario of the sacrifice and a recipient will understand that now Brahma categorises himself with the use of this category.

As already mentioned in the *Introduction* it is argued that, in the early Smṛti texts the word *tapas* is not used in the specific meaning of ‘austerity’ or ‘ascetic practices’ as it is usually translated. We will revert to this issue in the following chapters (4.3–5). For now, we will remain with the literal meaning of this word which is ‘heat’ and metonymically evokes practices which might be felt as heating or having the influence of heat. In the present context the noun *tapas* most probably refers to fasting which is necessary before sacrificing (HUNGER IS FIRE). The noun *vāc* (speech) metonymically evokes recitation which is the next stage of the ritual scenario. The next noun (*rati*) metonymically activates the final moment of the scenario when one is satisfied. As it is in case of euphemisms, the central moment of the process is not mentioned explicitly but metonymically evoked by its first and last phases (Radden, Kovecses 1999). Olivelle translates *rati* as ‘sexual pleasure’ activating thus the general domain of Procreation as the source domain of the creative process, but it also means the satisfaction one can feel from a well performed ritual. The concept of ritual is a new input space which enlarges the conceptual network created by the Composer: now creation is also conceived in these terms in the blend. We may speculate that the Composer did not explicitly mention the sacrificial process itself because he either assumed that it was obvious or he deliberately wanted to keep it secret. The last two words, desire (*kāma*) and anger (*krodha*), are the emotional results of the structure of the world which causes the satisfaction gained in the subject-object activity never to last.

If the recipient looks at this stanza from the perspective of Vedic thought he will also see that the nouns metonymically evoke the Vedic cosmogony. In the ŚB, Prajāpati is conventionally presented as toiling and heating himself (*sò ‘śrāmyat sá tápo ‘tapyata*). Speech (*vāc*) as the next manifestation of reality is presented in many cosmogonies (Levi 1989, Brown 1942, 1965, 1968, Patton 1990, Carpenter 1994, Holdrege 1994, Jurewicz 2012). It is

<sup>55</sup> Olivelle (2005: 88): ‘austerity.’



also presented in the abstract cosmogony of ŚB 10.5.3 where reality in the form of mind heats itself and becomes speech. The concept of satisfaction (*rati*) metonymically activates the general domain of Procreation in terms of which creation and cognition are conceived (LAST PHASE OF THE PROCESS FOR THE WHOLE PROCESS). Verbal expression of thoughts is conceived in terms of the sexual act (MIND IS A MAN, SPEECH IS A WOMAN, see Jurewicz 2012). The logic of this domain implies that, when thought is properly expressed in words, satisfaction comes.

However, the creation of speech implies a division into a speaking subject and a spoken object. And, whenever duality between subject and object occurs, positive and negative emotions arise: desire to cognise and be with the object and anger which is the result of fear of the object. This is expressed most explicitly in BU 1.4 (where fear is first and desire is second (Jurewicz 2016/2018). This cosmogony is also evoked by verses c–d of this stanza (*sṛṣṭim saśarja caivemāṃ sraṣṭum icchann imāḥ prajāḥ*). In BU 1.4.5 a very similar expression appears (*aham vāva sṛṣṭir asmy aham hīdām sāvam āsṛkṣīti tātaḥ sṛṣṭir abhavat*). In the BU, this sentence appears after a description of consecutive sexual acts of the highest cognitive agent within its manifest objects which are performed because of its need to feel satisfaction (BU 1.4.3: *sā vai naivā reme*). We can therefore see that the Composer of the MS continues the Vedic way of thinking of creation as not only the creation of the possibility of cognition, but also of the possibility of emotion.

### MS 1.26

*karmaṇām ca vivekārthaṃ dharmādharmau vyaveçayat |  
dvandvair ayojayac cemāḥ sukhaduḥkhādibhiḥ prajāḥ ||*

To establish distinctions among activities, moreover, he distinguished the Right (dharma) from the Wrong (adharma) and afflicted these creatures with the pairs of opposites such as pleasure and pain.

Dharma and adharma (translated by Olivelle as Right and Wrong, verse b) are the next categories which allow Brahma to understand his actions. His activity undertaken in the form of gods and Sādhyas is qualified as dharma. Lack of this activity is qualified as adharma. It is argued that here adharma does not have a negative moral value. The nature of subject-object cognition is such that the division into subject and object is needed. The subject is that part of reality which performs cognition within its manifest aspect while the object is that part of reality which does not cognise but it is cognised. If we refer to the etymology of the word *dharmā* (which comes from the verb *dhṛ-*) we understand it as a category that encompasses everything which

actively sustains the cosmos and that is cognitive action. Adharma qualifies the situation when Brahma manifests himself as the object which, *ex definitione*, cannot cognise. So category of dharma/adharma encompasses everything that enables Brahma to cognise and it allows Brahma to be cognised by himself on the level of ritual. In the ŚB, the same idea was expressed with the source domains of killing and of being able to be killed (Jurewicz 2016/18). In ŚB 11.1.6, it is expressed as a division of Prajāpati into gods (when he cognises) and asuras (when he does not cognise, see Jurewicz 2016/18). Cognition brings happiness and its lack, unhappiness (see chapter 2.3.2, 2.8.1, 4.1–2).

One is tempted to think that Brahma, conceived in terms of a grown man, cognises himself in the way that some young men do and tries everything that can be tried. He manifests himself in various acts, becomes either subject or object and experiences pleasure and pain. In the analysis of MS 1.16 and 1.19, the multiplication of Brahma's cognising faculties is the expressing of various cognitive actions which can be seen as the trying of different options. This interpretation is based on the cosmogonies of the ŚB, especially the earlier ones, where Prajāpati is always presented as committing a mistake in the beginning of creation which results in his death or threatens him with death. In the later parts of the ŚB, this mistake is more cognitive and does not endanger Prajāpati in the ontological sense. In the early Upaniṣads the concept of creative mistake is not elaborated and the highest cognitive power is more omnipotent in its cosmic transformations. The same is assumed by the Smṛti philosophers who ascribe the fatal mistake to men unable to cognise and act in the proper way (see chapters 2.5, 3). If we agree with the interpretation that Brahma is experimenting with himself in his various forms and acts, we may assume that it is manifestation in an adharmic form which brings unhappiness when the cosmos is arranged in the proper subject-object structure and it is not the result of a mistake.

### MS 1.27

*aṅvyo mātrāvināśinyo daśārdhānām tu yāḥ smṛtāḥ |  
tābhiḥ sārdham idaṃ sarvaṃ sambhavaty anupūrvaśaḥ ||*

Together with the imperishable minute measures<sup>56</sup> of those five<sup>57</sup> given in tradition, this whole world comes into being in an orderly sequence.

The word *aṅu* (verse a) does not necessarily refer to atoms in the context of this cosmogony. It can be interpreted as the adjective which qualifies 'measures' subtly qualified in other places as *sūkṣma*. This adjective is

<sup>56</sup> Olivelle (2005: 88): 'atomic particles.'

<sup>57</sup> Olivelle (2005: 88): 'of the five elements.'

used in MS 1.16 in reference to the mental faculties (the Great Self and its senses) conceived in terms of multiple subtle limbs (*avayava*) which are placed into ‘the measures of himself’ (*ātmamātra*). It is then used in MS 1.19 in reference to the multiple measures (*mātrā*) of mental and sensori-motor faculties (the mind, the Great Self and the senses). Here the subtle measures belong to a group of five. This is the group of five activities and emotions of Brahma mentioned in MS 1.25 (*tapas, vāc, rati, kāma* and *krodha*) which are components of sacrifice performed by Brahma through his multiple subjects. The group of the five also can be interpreted as the five senses (of reason and of action) which are active during performance of sacrifice. They are endowed with measures (*mātrā*)<sup>58</sup> which is the words of the Veda recited during sacrifice. In the description of this stage of creation, the meaning of a cord used in measuring an altar can also be activated. So, the multiple subjects are conceived in terms of a men who construct the fire altar. Through them Brahma performs sacrifice and categorises it as dharmic and adharmic. The measures are called imperishable (*avinaśinī*, verse a) because they are the manifestation of unmanifest reality. Thanks to that Brahma can further manifest himself as the cognising cosmos (verses c–d). The necessity of categories is expressed *via* the adverb *anupūrvaśaḥ* (‘in an orderly sequence’ verse d): the multiple subjects repeat the first creative act on the ritual level and apply the same categories as Brahma.<sup>59</sup>

### 1.1.7. The creation of the social self (*ātman*) of reality

#### MS 1.31

*lokānām tu vivṛddhyartham mukhabāhūrūpādataḥ |  
brāhmaṇaṃ kṣatriyaṃ vaiśyaṃ śūdraṃ ca niravartayat ||*

For the growth of these worlds, moreover, he produced from his mouth, arms, thighs, and feet, the Brahmin, the Kṣatriya, the Vaiśya, and the Śūdra.

The next subjective manifestation of Brahma is again multiple. It is humanity conceived in terms of man; this conceptualisation goes back to RV 10.90. The specific actions of the social states are conceived in terms of prototypical functions of parts of the human body: mouth speaks, arms defend the body,<sup>60</sup> thighs, or rather loins, are the source of reproduction and

<sup>58</sup> Similarly to ‘the seven males’ in MS 1.19.

<sup>59</sup> MS 1.28–30, see chapter 2.3.

<sup>60</sup> In AVŚ 10.2.5 ab, arms perform manly deeds which are characteristic for the Kṣatriyas: *kó asya bāhú sám abharad vīryāṃ karavād iti | ámsau kó asya tád devāḥ kúsinde ádhy ā dadhau ||*

feet support the body. In the target domain the Brahmin performs the activity of a mouth i.e., learns the Veda (orally), recites the Veda and teaches it. Moreover, since speech is conceived in terms of fire, the Brahmin sacrifices (sacrifice is prototypically pouring oblation into fire). The Kṣatriya defends society. The Vaiśya multiplies its richness. The Śūdra supports society with its services. The category of action (*karman*) in its specific realisation of the activity of the social states (*varṇa*) allows them to be recognised (MS 1.87–91, see also chapter 2.9.2).

The sequence of creation of the social states is motivated by the general domain of Procreation, more specifically in terms of the birth of a baby. Prototypically the head appears first then the rest of the body. Each part of the body, when it appears, begins to move and perform actions which are characteristic for them. Thus, one can reconstruct the creative process from the point of view of Brahma who recognises himself in his new social manifestation. When he speaks, he categorises himself as Brahmin, when he fights as Kṣatriya, when he produces as Vaiśya and, when he supports, as Śūdra.

The literal meaning of *varṇa* is ‘colour’ which implies its role in cognition as a sign on the basis of which one can infer conclusions about the object (see MDhP 181.5, 11–13, chapters 2.5.1, 2.9.2). It is worth noting, however, that another meaning is ‘sound, vowel syllable’ and this meaning is activated in the Vedic descriptions of society (Jurewicz 2012). If we apply it in reference to social states, we will see that this manifestation of Brahma is also conceived as the embodiment of the Veda. Within the frames of this conceptualisation, the state of Śūdra would embody falsely pronounced words.<sup>61</sup>

### 1.1.8. The creation of the human self (*ātman*) of reality

Then Brahma manifest himself as the first individual man, Manu:

#### MS 1.32

*dvidhā kṛtvātmano deham ardhena puruṣo ‘bhavat |  
ardhena nārī tasyāṃ sa virājam asṛjat prabhuh ||*

Dividing his body into two, he became a man with one half and a woman with the other. By that woman the Lord brought forth Virāj.

Olivelle (2005: 53, 239) argues that this part of the cosmogony (beginning with MS 1.32 up to MS 1.58) is an excursus. According to him it contains ‘a quite superfluous second account of creation’ that disturbs the logic of the

<sup>61</sup> In ŚB 14.1.1.3, Śūdra is called *anṛta*, ‘untruth.’

exposition.<sup>62</sup> It is not the aim to defend the coherence of the part excluded by Olivelle but its description of creation of the first man, who is a Brahmin, is fully at place. The perspective of the argument goes from general to particular and is motivated by the cognitive conviction according to which a more and more specific subject of cognition appear. The early Vedic cosmogonies do not describe the appearance of a particular prototypical man. One of the exceptions is the AU the Composer of which clearly describes man as a microcosmos which continues subject-object cognition of the self (*ātman*, Jurewicz 2016/18). Moreover, the Composer of the MS extolls the Brahmin (MS 1.93–101) as the best part of society (see chapter 2.7). This view is supported by the fact that the whole state (*varṇa*) is a manifestation of the best part of the social body of Brahma and by its members being the descendants of their ancestor Manu who was born directly from the highest cognitive agent. As we will see shortly, the description presented in MS 1.32–33 is deeply entrenched in tradition which has justified the highest position of Brahmin even since.

Brahma is presented as dividing his body into two parts, male and female (MS verses a–c). Thus, the Composer evokes the tradition, most explicitly expressed in BU 1.4, that the highest cognitive agent (the self in the form of man),<sup>63</sup> having realised that it has no satisfaction, desires a second and divides itself into husband (*pati*) and wife (*patnī*, see Jurewicz 2016/18). The concept of division into two halves not only reflects the conviction that reality is conceived as androgenic (reflected already above in MS 1.8–9). It also highlights the monistic vision of reality which is confirmed by conceptualisation of creation in terms of birth according to which the son is seen as the manifestation of his father (see above, MS 1.8–9). In verse d Brahma, in the form of man, inseminates his female form and thus his next manifestation appears called Virāj. As the son of Brahma, he is ontologically identical with him, in the same way as Brahma is ontologically identical with reality i.e., with *brahman*.

The concept of *virāj* activates RV 10.90. There, the first manifestation of reality in the cosmos is conceived in terms of the general domain of Procreation which is expressed in a concise way in the following stages: Puruṣa (the first manifestation of the cognitive power of reality) – Virāj (feminine) – Puruṣa (the highest cognitive agent manifest in the cosmos). In the MS this concept

<sup>62</sup> One tends to agree with Hildebeitel (2010: 20) who à propos Olivelle’s excurses writes: “Olivelle, despite still labeling numerous passages as ‘excurses’ by which he means interpolations, has discovered a ‘deep structure’ in Manu that yields a literary text in four main sections. I think what Olivelle calls ‘excurses’ may be thought of more profitably as segments where Manu resorts to topics that take it beyond the legal tradition preceding it, and that in such cases Manu may sometimes be drawing on other knowledge traditions or even sources.” The earlier Vedic tradition surely was among these sources.

<sup>63</sup> BU 1.4.1: *ātmaivèdām āgra āsīt pūruṣavidhaḥ*.

is masculine. In the next stanza *virāj* is called man, *puruṣa*, which again activates the cosmogonic schema of RV 10.90 and highlights the self-reflexive nature of creative activity conceived in terms of self-birth:

### MS 1.33

*tapas taptvāsrjad yaṃ tu sa svayaṃ puruṣo virāṭ |*  
*taṃ māṃ vittāsyā sarvasyā sraṣṭāraṃ dvijasattamāḥ ||*

By heating himself with heat<sup>64</sup> that man, Virāj, brought forth a being by himself – know, you best of the twice-born, that I am that being, the creator of this whole world.

In verse a, Virāj is presented as heating himself. In the same way Prajāpati is presented in the cosmogonies of the ŚB as toiling and heating (*śò 'śrāmyat śá tápo 'tapyata*). Here the noun *tapas* may activate its literal meaning of heating and shining and also refer to fasting and recitation with proper breathing. Thus, Virāj repeats in microscale the creative activity of reality the first manifestation of which is conceived in terms of the appearance of light and of recitation of the Veda. If the recipient highlights the meaning of fasting, he may activate the Vedic concept of the first stage of creation seen in terms of the creation of void conceived as hunger (BU 1.2.1 Jurewicz 2016/18).

The concept of heating also activates the general domain of Procreation (see Jurewicz 2016/18). Activation of this domain is justified here too. It is important to note that in the part of the MS analysed in in this chapter, the verb *srj-* is used only when the composer wants to activate this domain (MS 1.8, 1.25, see sections 1.1.3, 1.1.6).<sup>65</sup> Its activation allows the recipient to understand the nature of creation: in his creative activity Virāj manifests his female aspect and is thus able to conceive his son and to give birth to him. The conceptual network consists now of the following input spaces: 1) a woman giving birth, 2) a man reciting the Veda and 3) appearance of Manu (as in MS 1.25, see above, section 1.1.6). In the blend Manu is conceived in terms of a baby that came from a womb and as the manifestation of the Veda.

That Manu is conceived in terms of the son of reality itself is confirmed by his appellation as *svāyaṃbhava* (MS 1.102) which is called in its first creative act as *svayaṃbhu* (self-existent, MS 1.6, see section 1.1.2). Such a qualification might imply that Manu derives directly from the unmanifest aspect of reality as does Brahma. The self-reflexive nature of creation is also

<sup>64</sup> Olivelle (2005: 88): 'by heating himself with ascetic toil.'

<sup>65</sup> Although it is also activated in other descriptions which do not use this verb.

expressed with use of the pronoun *svayam* (MS 1.33b) which is used in MS 1 very consciously: in reference to the first manifestation of reality (MS 1.6), to the manifestation of Brahma in the Golden Egg (MS 1.9), to the division of the Golden Egg (1.12) and now to the manifestation of Virāj. This implies self-transformation conceived – in two latter cases – in terms of the general domain of Procreation.

### MS 1.34

*ahaṃ prajāḥ sisṛkṣus tu tapas taptvā suduścaram |  
patīn prajānām asṛjaṃ maharṣīn ādito daśa ||*

Desiring to bring forth creatures, I heated myself with the most arduous heat<sup>66</sup> and brought forth in the beginning the ten seers, the lord of creatures.

Manu is qualified as ‘desiring to bring forth creatures’ (*prajāḥ sisṛkṣur*, verse a) which evokes the description of reality when it creates its subjective power called Brahma (*sisṛkṣur vividhāḥ prajāḥ*, MS 1.8b) which again confirms his identity with reality and identity with creative activity. The recipient may also recall MS 1.25cd in which Brahma, endowed with mental and sensori-motor self, performs cognitive activity categorised as sacrifice, experiences various and thus creates creatures because of his desire to create creatures (*sṛṣṭim sasarja caivemāṃ sraṣṭum icchann imāḥ prajāḥ*). The noun *prajā*, used in the above-mentioned stanzas, is used in the Veda in the meaning of ‘offspring’ and if the recipient activates it, he will understand the creative activity of Manu in terms of the general domain of Procreation.

Creation performed by Manu is conceived in terms of heat (*tapas*) in the same way as creation is performed by Virāj. Manu not only repeats the earliest stages of creation (see analysis of the previous stanza) but the result of creation is the same as that from the creation of reality. Reality creates Brahma who is called Man (*puruṣa*, MS 1.11) which evokes the phrase *puruṣa prajāpati* used in the Brāhmaṇas to denote the highest cognitive agent. Here Manu creates the ten ‘lords of creatures’ (*patīn prajānām*, verse c). They are enumerated in MS 1.33 and presented as first creating seven Manus and then all other particular beings including men, atmospheric phenomena and immovable objects (MS 1.36–41).<sup>67</sup> They are created thanks to the power of heat (*tapoyoga*, MS 1.41c) so they are conceived as heating, fasting and reciting the Veda. They use the category of action (*yathākarma*, MS 1.41c),

<sup>66</sup> Olivelle (2005: 88): ‘with the most arduous ascetic toil.’

<sup>67</sup> The same is implied in case of seven Manus who are qualified as *bhūrītejas*, ‘of immense energy’ (MS 1.36b).

similarly to Brahma when he finally arranged his cosmic sensori-motor self (MS 1.21). The recipient understands that their hierarchy (*saṁsthā*) is then also settled. This is confirmed by the next part (MS 1.42–48), where the category of action (*karman*) is used to define various kinds of beings according to their birth which is the result of the past action (see chapters 2.1.4, 2.6.2, 3.2.2).

All these beings are presented as being overwhelmed by darkness (*tamasā bahurūpeṇa veṣṭitāḥ*, MS 1.49) which implies that they are manifestations of the objects of cognition, contrary to members of the social states, especially the Brahmins.<sup>68</sup> Their status as object is caused by the category of action and becomes the rule of their manifestation (*karmahetunā*, MS 1.49). In MS 1.49cd however the Composer states that they are not unconscious: they possess ‘inner awareness’<sup>69</sup> and are able to experience happiness and pain<sup>70</sup> which confirms that the manifest aspect is the manifestation of the cognitive process during which emotions are felt. In MS 1.50 the Composer activates the metaphor that the manifest aspect is ‘co-flowing’ (*saṁsāra*)<sup>71</sup> and calls it ‘dreadful’ (*ghora*) because it is such for those beings who are not able to realise ultimate freedom (see chapter 4.1). The range of the manifest aspect is from Brahma to those which are the lowest (MS 1.50).

Before concluding one would like to show briefly, that the next parts of the exposition seen by Olivelle as excursus are coherent with the whole description. As already mentioned above, MS 1.51–57 presents the cycle of creation and destruction of the cosmos in terms of a waking and a sleeping man. Bhṛgu begins his teaching with descriptions of the divisions of time experienced by living beings (men, fathers, gods, 1.61–75). Then he describes the creation of the mind which creates five great beings (1.76–79) as discussed above (see analysis of MS 1.15, section 1.1.4). In this way the Composer could describe separately the creation of the building blocks of the perceptible cosmic self of reality. The context of this description confirms this interpretation. In this part of his exposition the Composer concentrates on the existence of living

<sup>68</sup> For *tamas* as manifestation of object, see chapter 2.1.2.

<sup>69</sup> On ‘inner awareness’ Olivelle (2005: 240) writes: ‘In brief, this term is used by our author to explicitly reject another opinion prevalent at the time and expressed in Purāṇic texts that plants lack both external and internal awareness. See also G[autana] Dh[armasūtra] 8.2 where the same expression occurs.’

<sup>70</sup> MS 1.49cd: *antaḥsaṁjñā bhavanty ete sukhaduḥkhasamanvitāḥ*.

<sup>71</sup> The sources of this conceptualisation of the cosmos are already in the RV where the creation of the cosmos is conceived in terms of the releasing of waters by Vṛtra which is then abstracted in RV 1.164.42 in its formula *tātaḥ ksarati ākṣaram* (Jurewicz 2012). See also ŚB 11.1.6.6 where Prajāpati looks down to his feet as if he looked at the other shore of a river and sees the end of his life (*sā saḥāsrāyur jajñe | sā yāthā nadyai pārām parāpāśyed evaṁ svasyāyusaḥ pārām pārācakhyau |*, Jurewicz 2016/18).



beings whose perspective is limited to what is manifest. What they perceive is the material world which can be known through the senses. Hence, they are focused on the great beings which make reality perceptible. In order to describe how to live in such a world the Composer first elaborates the concept of the four ages in order to show men's duties during each of them (*yugas*, MS 1.61–73), then the duties of four social states (MS 1.81–87) and he ends with the excellence of the Brahmin (1.92–101, see chapter 2.7).

### 1.1.9. Conclusion

The Composer of the cosmogony presented in the MS conceives the cosmos as the manifestation of reality which cognises itself within its aspect. The subject-object model of creative process accepted in the Veda is elaborated and enlarged with the concept of embodied cognition and the possibility of experiencing emotions. At each level of manifestation, a subjective power of reality appears that creates its specific category and the object with its use, then the next subjective power appears.

The main sequence of creation is as follows:

1. Reality manifests its first cognitive power. It creates the object of its cognition (the Golden Egg) in the cognition performed by its mind. Within the object it manifests as the next subject (Brahma) with the aid of the category of name.
2. Brahma is the cosmic highest cognitive agent. With the use of the category of name (*nir mā-*) he creates the category of time (year). The creation of categories means the creation of the object of his cognition: it is Brahma in temporal and spatial divisions.
3. Brahma thinks (*manas*) about himself (*ahaṃkāra*) manifest in temporal and spatial divisions and becomes a new subject (*mahān ātman*) able to cognise the spatial object. In the form of this subject, he creates the new category of three and five classes (*guṇa*). Creation of classes is the creation of the object possible to be understood with aid of them: it is Brahma manifest as sattvic, rajasic and tamasic, and as sounding and being heard, touching and being touched, seeing and being seen, tasting and being tasted, smelling and being smelt. Then with aid of the category of name he categorises himself as composed of all beings. This is the mental self of reality (*mūrti*).
4. Brahma thinks about himself (*manas*) in his mental form and manifests as a new subject using a new category of action (*karman*). This is the moving subject which speaks, catches, walks, excretes and procreates. This

new subjective form allows him to categorise himself as giving space, distributing, cooking, conglomerating and supporting. Thus, he acquires a sensori-motor self. With the aid of the category of name (*Veda*) and the category of action (*karman*) Brahma again categorises its form as composed of all beings. The creation of senses of action with its category (*karman*) and the objects (the five great beings cognised in their activities) is presented as performed directly by the mind (*manas*). Thus, the sensori-motor self of reality is created.

5. Brahma thinks about himself in his sensori-motor manifestation, becomes the multiple subject (gods and the Sādhyas) and creates a new category which is sacrifice (*yajña*). In this subjective form, he uses the category of name which is now the triple Veda (Ṛk, Yajus, Sāman) with whose aid, in form of a multiple subject, he repeats his first cognitive action with the use of the category of time. Then he categorises himself with the category of sacrifice which allows him to understand his activity and emotions within the manifest aspect. Emotions felt during sacrificial activity allow him to create a new category of dharma/adharma connected with happiness and pain. In this way the ritual self of reality is created.
6. Having thought about his manifestation categorised with the aid of sacrifice and dharma/adharma, Brahma manifests as the next multiple subject which is society and specifies the category of action as social activity. Thus, reality manifests its social self.
7. The next subjective manifestation is Manu (the human self of reality) which is the result of his manifestation in the form of society. Manu has at his disposal all categories: name (triple Veda), time, classes (*guṇa*), action (*karman*), sacrifice (*yajña*), dharma/adharma and specified category of action (social activity). He creates the next subjective manifestations, lords of creatures and seers who, in their cognition, with the use of the category of name (the triple Veda) and action (*karman*) create the whole cosmos.
8. Then the perspective changes and cosmogony is described from within the manifest aspect. The cosmos is presented as it appears in everyday cognition.

Cognition is embodied, it is realised not only in thinking, but also in the action of the cosmos conceived in terms of the human body. Embodiment of cognition allows the Composer to continue the earlier ideas of creation seen as the creation of the self (*ātman*). Thus, the main Vedic ideal of possessing the self is preserved. Creation of the self is presented in stages which can be summarised as the creation of the cosmic self (MS 1.5–11), the creation of the

mental self (MS 1.12–17), the creation of the sensori-motor self (MS 1.18–21), the creation of the ritual self (MS 1.22–30), the creation of the social self (MS 1.31) and the creation of the human self (MS 1.32).

The general sequence of the descriptions of the stages of cosmogonies reflect earlier ones expressed already in RV 10.129. Firstly, reality manifests its creative power.<sup>72</sup> Then it outlines the space for the future world<sup>73</sup> or manifests as the outline of the future world.<sup>74</sup> In the next stage, it manifests its power within the cosmos<sup>75</sup> which in most cosmogonies can be called the highest cognitive agent. It organises the cosmos in subject-object frames. In Vedic cosmogonies the organisation of the cosmos is conceived in terms of sacrifice. Only in some of them (AU 1, BU 1.2, 1.4) is creation of sacrifice presented as a separate creative activity which takes place after the cosmos is organised. The Composer of the MS follows this pattern and elaborates each of the stages. The creation of society and/or man is presented as the next stage only in some Vedic cosmogonies (e.g., AU) while in the MS they are described at full length.

The self of the highest cognitive agent is immortal because it is the manifestation of immortal reality. Its immortality can also be seen in the concept of the cyclical existence of the cosmos. Moreover, its immortality in men is realised in their constant dying and being reborn. Thus, the concept of the ŚB, where the immortality of the highest cognitive agent (Prajāpati) in the cosmos is seen in this way, is transferred to the human dimension.

The concept of creation of the cosmos as creation of the second self identical with the Creator and yet different from it is most explicitly expressed in the ritual practice of the Brāhmaṇas especially in the Agnicayana, the building of fire altar. That the Composer of the MS follows this idea and, moreover, explicitly evokes the cosmogony of the ŚB suggests he was motivated by this experience which was theoretised in Vedic metaphysical models and practiced in ritual. The Composers of two Upaniṣads, of the KaU and the MaU, explicitly use this model in their descriptions of the cosmos and the role of man in it. While the Composer of the KaU presents liberating cognition, which goes beyond the cosmos conceived in these terms, the Composer of the MaU seems to enlarge the range of this model so that liberating cognition can be included within it. In this way, the MaU is closer to Vedic tradition. We should bear in mind that, in the Veda, ritual fire altar construction was not only the

<sup>72</sup> Which is one with the highest cognitive agent in the Veda: That One in RV 10.129, Prajāpati in the ŚB, the self (*ātman*) in the AU, BU 1.4.

<sup>73</sup> Darkness (*tamas*) in RV 10.129, fire/death in the ŚB and BU 1.2.

<sup>74</sup> The Golden Egg in ŚB 11.1.6, MS 1.

<sup>75</sup> Heat (*tapas*) in RV 10.129, resurrection of Prajāpati in the ŚB, Brahma in MS 1.

model of the way reality functioned but also reality itself in microscale. It is difficult to state (at least in the present state of research) to what extent this way of thinking is preserved in the KaU and MaU. The cosmogony of the MS (similarly to the earlier cosmogonies of the MDhP see section 1.2) is an example of the process of abstraction in that its exposition is focused on the target domain, which is that reality creates its second self in the process of self-cognition and thus creates the possibility of subject-object cognition. The logic of this process also comes from the model of fire altar construction about which the Composer of the MS is aware as he informs us explicitly by referring to the Agnicayana cosmogony of the ŚB. Interestingly, the later Hindu commentators of the MS interpret this according to the state of the knowledge of their times, without referring explicitly to Vedic tradition. This topic, however, needs further research.

The role of speech, understood as the Veda, is deeply grounded in tradition together with the assumption that it is cognition expressed in words which creates being. The fact that the role of the Veda is only implied in the beginning of the cosmogony is probably caused by the Composer of the MS treating it as obvious. Moreover, in this way he could express the process of the acquisition of perceptibility realised by reality: in its early stages it is implied (metonymically, *via* the verb *nir mā-*, MS 1.13b, 1.16d), then is called generally as ‘words of the Veda’ (*vedaśabda*, MS 1.21) and then it is finally specified as the triple Veda (MS 1.23).

It should also be noted that the noun *tapas*, so important in the Vedic cosmogonies, appears only at the lower levels of creations: in the description of the creation of the ritual scenario (MS 1.25), of the creation of Manu (1.33) and of creation performed by the first sons of Manu (MS 1.34). This confirms the general conclusion of this research which is that the concept of reality as Agni, the fire, is incorporated into the level of human. As will be shown, the projection of concepts connected with fire can be seen in the conceptualisations and descriptions of punishment (*daṇḍa*), of Brahmin status (see chapter 2.7) and of liberating practice (see chapter 4.3–5, 4.9.5). The fiery nature of the earlier creative activity is not always implied, but activation of this concept is not necessary to understand the logic of the creative stages and their nature. On the other hand, it seems that there was a belief in the ontological results of *tapas*, because manifestations which appear at the lower levels of creation are much more perceptible than those from the beginning. Thus, the concept of fire becomes invisible in early Smṛti thought as it is ascribed to the human level of.<sup>76</sup>

<sup>76</sup> In some way it is in accord with ŚB 10.5.3 where the last two manifestations of reality are action (*karman*) and then, fire.

## 1.2. Creation of the world in the early chapters of the *Mokṣadharmā* (175–176, 224)

This chapter will discuss the early cosmogonies of the MDhP (175–176, 240). It will retain the basic model coined in RV 10.129 according to which cognition is the motive for the manifestation of an aspect of one reality which creates the possibility for subject-object cognition.

### 1.2.1. The teaching of Bhṛgu to Bhāradvāja (MDhP 175, 176)<sup>77</sup>

The cosmogonies presented in these two chapters of the MDhP are of interest because their Composer explains the creation of the great beings in a way that is different to that presented in most cosmogonies (e.g., MS 1.75–78 see chapter 2.1.3, MDhP 224.35–38, see below, section 1.2.2). Moreover, the great beings are not called *mahābhūta*, but *dhātu*. These cosmogonies therefore shed some light on the history of this concept as it is attested in the early Smṛti texts. We will see that the sequence of their appearance is motivated by the experiential domain which is recitation. When the recipient activates Vedic thought the cognitive nature of creation is clear.

#### 1.2.1.a. *Mokṣadharmā* 175

The cosmogony begins in the following way:

##### MDhP 175.11

*mānaso nāma vikhyātaḥ śrutapūrvō maharṣibhiḥ |*  
*anādinidhano devas tathābhedyo 'jarāmaraḥ ||*

There is a god called the Mental One by the great seers in the beginning. It is without beginning and end, indivisible, beyond old age and death.<sup>78</sup>

*avyakta iti vikhyātaḥ śāśvato 'thākṣaro 'vyayaḥ |*  
*yataḥ sṛṣṭāni bhūtāni jāyante ca mriyanti ca ||*

It is eternal, unfailing and immutable, and is also called the 'unmanifest'. All creatures which are born and then die are its creation.

Contrary to Wynne (2009: 95), who interprets *mānasa* (MDhP 175.11a) as 'pure consciousness', here it is translated as 'the Mental One' in order to express (as in the Sanskrit original) the connection of this concept with

<sup>77</sup> MDhP 175–185 (*Bhṛgubhāradvājasamvāda*).

<sup>78</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

mind. Such a qualification of reality in the first manifestation of its cognitive power reflects Vedic thinking (attested also in the MS), that it is mind which is the most important cognitive faculty. Reality is conceived in terms of the mind (*manas*) in ŚB 10.5.3 (Jurewicz 2016/18). With the use of the adjective *mānasa* the Composer of the MDhP expresses the idea that thinking is the essence or most important attribute of reality.

Its other attributes are apophatically expressed in the usual way for this period (MDhP 175.11cd, 175.12ab, MS 1.7). This way of description is also well entrenched in the Vedic tradition, especially in the early Upaniṣads. Reality is without beginning and end, beyond old age and death, unmanifest, unfailing and immutable. It is the source and end of beings. In this way the paradoxical manifestation of the cognitive power of reality is presented which is unmanifest and manifest at the same time.

### MDhP 175.13

*so 'sṛjat prathamam devo mahāntam nāma nāmataḥ |<sup>79</sup>  
ākāśam iti vikhyātam sarvabhūtadharah prabhuh ||*

In the beginning, this god, the King and the upholder of all beings, created space called great.<sup>80</sup>

The sequence of the stages of creation is as follows. In the first stage, reality manifests itself in a form which can be measured as great (verse b). This form is conceived in terms of space (*ākāśa*). In the Vedic cosmogonies, the concept of space conceived in terms of a hungry belly often appears in the descriptions of the beginning of creation (Jurewicz 2016/18). In this way the Vedic Composers express the notion that reality denies an aspect of itself in order to define itself again as manifest. The Composer of the MDhP activates this concept: “the great space” is an aspect of reality where it does not exist as unmanifest, it becomes possible to be measured and experiences its specific absentia conceived in terms of the space.

### MDhP 175.14

*ākāśād abhavad vāri salilād agnimārutau |  
agnimārutasaṃyogāt tataḥ samabhavan mahī ||*

Water came into being from space. Fire and wind came into being from water, and the contact between them produced the earth.

<sup>79</sup> There is an additional verse in the critical apparatus (included by Wynne 2009): 12,175.013b\*0484\_01 *mahān sasarjāhaṃkāraṃ sa cāpi bhagavān atha*, ‘The Great created the I-form that is the Lord’ (Jurewicz’s translation).

<sup>80</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

The recipient may well imagine the next stage of creation in terms of a space which begins to be filled with water (verse a). Such a conceptualisation is grounded in tradition in many ways. For example, the creation of the world is conceived in terms of the exhaustible flow in the Veda (*tátah ksarati ákṣaram*, RV 1.164.42 *pūrṇāt pūrṇám úd acati*, AVŚ 10.8.29, *pūrṇāt pūrṇám údacyate*, BU 5.1.1, Jurewicz 2016/18). In RV 10.129 the second stage of creation is conceived in terms of water without any sign (*apraketám salilám*), while in RV 1.164.41 the pre-creative state of the world is conceived in terms of a female buffalo stamping in water. According to the general model of Reality Transformation, a fluidic manifestation of reality (soma in the RV, milk, sweat and water in the ŚB) is preceded by a fiery one. If the recipient activates this, he will understand the mind (*manas*) and its first manifestation (*mānasa*) as fiery as it is conceived in ŚB 10.5.3.

The idea of water also activates the general domain of Procreation explicitly elaborated in MS 1.8–9. Here, however, the Composer aims at an abstract description. The ability to create something new (which, in an Indian context, is the same as its parent) is projected from the general domain of Procreation into the target domain expressed by the verb *bhū-* ‘to come into being’.

The next stage of creation is conceived in terms of the appearance of fire and wind (verse b). Again, this is an abstract description, but the logic of the sequence of stages is provided by earlier thought. The recipient is triggered to activate the model of Child Of The Waters with fire as their child (Jurewicz 2010). This model expresses the appearance of the morning light (NOCTURNAL SKY IS A CONTAINER OF WATER) and of thinking (Jurewicz 2010). The fact that the wind appears with fire is grounded in the experience of kindling fire which requires the maker of the fire to blow and of a conflagration during which wind spreads fire. This co-occurrence of fire and wind has already been identified in the RV (metonymy CAUSE FOR EFFECT, EFFECT FOR CAUSE, Jurewicz 2010).

There is one more experience which can be taken into account here and that is recitation connected with breathing because breath and speech are also conceived in terms of fire (Jurewicz 2010, 2016/18). Again, the recipient is not expected to activate the earlier texts nor the experience. However, it is those that enable the recipient to accept the impossible logic of the sequence of the creative stages (fire appears from water) and see it as natural and not surprising.

Earth appears thanks to the contact of fire and wind (verses c–d). This way of thinking is also motivated by the Vedic concepts of the creation of the earth in terms of the general model of Cleansing By Heat. In ŚB 10.5.3 creation, explicitly understood as mental activity, is conceived in terms of

congealing (*mūrch-*) and, as previously mentioned, the word *mūrti* that is used to denote the perceptible form of reality derives from this verb. In BU 1.2.2, the Composer activates a specific realisation of this domain (production of cream under the influence of heat). Here the recipient is only expected to create the image of fire which is whipped up and enlarged by the wind but, thanks to the work of tradition, he knows that this process will lead to a state which can be conceived as the result of congealing. Thus, the earth is fire and wind transformed in the same way as fire and wind are transformation of water. Because of that Bhṛgu says later that everything is composed of water (MDhP 188.22).<sup>81</sup>

Water, in turn, is a form of space. This fact allows the recipient to activate the concept of speech conceived in terms of water in the Veda and thus to understand that creation is a cognitive act performed by the Mental One of reality. The concept of a man who opens his mouth and begins to recite is the source domain of this conceptualisation: the concept of the Mental One metonymically activates the concept of a thinking man, the concept of space corresponds to his open mouth and the concept of water to his speech. Fire and wind activate the concept of breathing and the next form of speech which is more and more precise and visible.<sup>82</sup> The concept of the transformation of milk into cream and butter is one of the specific realisations of the general domain of Cleansing By Heat which also expresses cognition. The final form of speech is conceived in terms of the earth which implies that it becomes its perceptible designate. A similar way of thinking is expressed in ŚB 6.1.3 where earth is conceived in terms of eight streams of liquid gold, the final form of water. At the same time, eight streams of gold are identified with eight syllables of the Gāyatrī-metre (Jurewicz 2016/18).

These metaphoric conceptualisations make the description of the Composer coherent and the recipient sees the logic between the creative stages evoked by concepts of the Mental One: space – water – fire and wind – earth.

### MDhP 175.15

*tatas tejomayaṃ divyaṃ padmaṃ sṛṣṭaṃ svayambhuvā |  
tasmāt padmāt samabhadraḥ brahmā vedamayo nidhiḥ ||*

Then the divine lotus full of glow was created by the self-existent.<sup>83</sup> From the lotus Brahma appeared, composed of the Veda and its receptacle.

<sup>81</sup> MDhP 180.22: *ammayam sarvam evedam āpo mūrṭiḥ śarīrīnām | tatrātmā mānaso brahmā sarvabhūteṣu lokakṛt ||*. For analysis of this stanza see below, section 1.2.1b.

<sup>82</sup> Which is conceived in terms of the visual appearance of Sarasvatī in MDhP 176.8 (section 1.2.1.b), MDhP 193.11 (chapter 4.5). In ŚB 10.5.3, mind transforms itself (through heating, tapas) into speech and speech into breath.

<sup>83</sup> Jurewicz's translation.



*ahaṃkāra iti khyātaḥ sarvabhūtātmabhūtakṛt |  
brahmā vai sumahātejā ya ete pañca dhātavaḥ ||*

He is called the I-form and he is the self of all beings and their creator. It is Brahma who possesses the immense glow to whom those five elements belong.<sup>84</sup>

The next stage is conceived in terms of the appearance of a lotus (MDhP 175.16ab). It corresponds to the appearance of the Golden Egg in MS 1.19. The concept of a lotus is used already in the AVŚ in reference to what is manifest (Jurewicz 2016/18). Its earliest sources are the Ṛgvedic images of a thunderbolt driven into the waters flooding Vṛtra, of the soma plant growing from the ocean, of a bronze pillar growing from the fertile (very wet) earth (Jurewicz 2010). In the ṚV, the sunrise is conceived in terms of the growth of a plant and a bronze pillar rising upwards, the sun is conceived in terms of the top of a plant and of a seat on the top of a bronze pillar (Jurewicz 2010). So, the recipient is triggered to create a conceptual network: its first input space are the Vedic images mentioned above, its second input space is their meaning which is the sunrise, while the third input space is the content of the present exposition. The generic space is movement upwards and the appearance of something new. This exposition, of the third input space of the blend, refers to the same creative situation as used for the first two input spaces. Identification of the lotus with the sun is confirmed as it is called ‘full of glow’ (*tejomaya*, 175.15a).

Brahma, the highest cognitive agent active in the cosmos, appears from the lotus (MDhP 175.15cd). He is called ‘as composed of all Vedas’ (*vedamaya*, MDhP 175.15.d) which implies that his form is the sound of his recitation. He is also called *nidhi*. This word generally means ‘receptacle’ and more specifically ‘treasury’. The latter meaning is used in ṚV 1.130.3 where the creation of the cosmos during the first sunrise is conceived in terms of Indra who finds a treasure in a treasury and an egg containing a nestling (Jurewicz 2010). If the recipient activates this meaning, he will understand that the Veda is conceived as something precious which has to be discovered.<sup>85</sup> As we will see the concept of finding a treasure is used in the description of the liberating practice (see chapter 4.6.2) so, when the Composer calls the Veda a treasure, he implies that the Veda is an important goal for future beings.

In MDhP 175.16a, Brahma is called the I-form (*ahaṃkāra*). It is in this metonymic way that the first self-cognition of the highest cognitive agent in the

<sup>84</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

<sup>85</sup> The Composers of the ṚV generally conceived creation in terms of processes here called the defining events and the basic scenario of which is the destruction of the obstacle hiding the precious objects.

cosmos is presented: Brahma discerns himself as the subject while he recites Vedas. Thus, the first cognitive activity of reality within the cosmos is also conceived in terms of recitation. Cognition becomes immediately embodied as the Composer states that Brahma is the creator of all beings and their self (*sarvabhūtātmabhūtakṛt*, 175.16b). The recipient understands that beings exist in Brahma in their potential form as sound (see MS 1.7, section 1.1.2).

MDhP 175.16cd seems to express the creative process. In MDhP 175.16c, Brahma is described as ‘possessing immense glow’ (*sumahātejas*). Since cognition is conceived in terms of seeing and illuminating one can presume that Brahma, thanks to his shining form (which one can presume he has gained thanks to recitation), begins to cognise and create the object which are the five elements (*pañca dhātavaḥ*). These elements are the five forms of the Mental One (space, water, fire and wind, earth). Brahma recognises his identity with them which is conceived in terms of possessing them. Since the creation of the cosmos is the creation of self, the relationship between Brahma and five elements can be conceived in terms of the relationship between cognising man and his body.

This interpretation is confirmed by the next stanza which describe the creation of the cosmos conceived as parts of the perceptible body of Brahma (MDhP 175.17–19): the mountains are his bones, the earth is his marrow and flesh, the oceans are his blood, the space is his belly.<sup>86</sup> The wind is his breath, fire is his energy, rivers are veins. The sun and the moon (*agni* and *soma*) are his eyes, the sky is the head, the earth is his feet, the directions are his arms.

Consider the identification of the space with a belly and of directions with arms. The former goes back to the cosmogonies of the ŚB mentioned above where the first state of the cosmos is conceived in terms of an empty space. The latter to the Ṛgvedic descriptions of Savitṛ presented in the morning as a man who stretches his arms and thus creates space (ṚV 2.38.2, 4.53.3–4, 6.71.1, 5, 7.45.2, Macdonell 1897). Brahma is difficult to be cognised even by the Sādhyas who are the subjective powers of reality and take part in the creative act (conceived in terms of sacrifice) during which reality in its manifest aspect transforms itself into the cosmos (ṚV 10.90, MS 1.22, see chapter 1.1.7). The reason why he is difficult to be cognised is his infinity (*anantatva*) which allows the recipient to understand that, although Brahma is manifest in the cosmos, he is also unmanifest.

In MDhP 175.20, the Composer calls reality manifest in the cosmos ‘Lord Viṣṇu’:<sup>87</sup>

<sup>86</sup> See BU 1.2.4 where the same conceptualisation of the space is attested.

<sup>87</sup> In this way, a religious perspective is introduced. For this process (on the example of the Nārāyaṇīya), see Hildebeitel (2006, 2011f).

**MDhP 175.20**

*sa eva bhagavān viṣṇur ananta iti viśrutah |  
sarvabhūtātmabhūtastho durvijñeyo 'kṛtātmabhiḥ ||*

He is the blessed Lord Viṣṇu, who is eulogised as ‘the limitless’. Incomplete men cannot perceive him, the one who abides within as the soul of all beings.

The qualification of Viṣṇu as infinite (*ananta*, verse b) implies his identity with the unmanifest aspect of reality.<sup>88</sup> He is also qualified as the self (*ātman*) of all beings (*sarvabhūtātmān*, verse c) and as present in all of them (*bhūtastha*, verse c). Viṣṇu is also difficult to cognise though not by Sādhyas, as in the case of Brahma, but by those whose self (*ātman*) is not created. That is by those who are immersed in everyday subject-object cognition and cannot cognise the highest cognitive agent present in themselves (see chapter 3.2).

**MDhP 175.21**

*ahaṁkārasya yaḥ sraṣṭā sarvabhūtabhavāya vai |  
yataḥ samabhavad viśvaṁ pṛṣṭo 'haṁ yad iha tvayā ||*

He is the one you asked me about – the source of the universe, the creator of the I-form<sup>89</sup> in order to bring all creatures into existence.

The Composer presents Viṣṇu in the same way as he describes Brahma: as the highest cognitive agent which, in its self-cognition, separates itself as the subject in order to bring all beings to existence. In this way, the Composer highlights the unity of manifestations of reality and the fact that the highest cognitive agent present in microscale is identical to the highest cognitive agent present in the macroscale.

**1.2.1.b. Mokṣadharmā 176**

The Cosmogony presented in the next chapter (MDhP 176) is focused on the appearance of five elements which are concisely described in MDhP 175.14. As previously mentioned, the sequence of their appearance is different from that presented in MS 1.75–78 and in other Smṛti cosmogonies. The aim here will be to show that this is motivated by earlier thinking and if recipient activates it, he will see the coherence of the whole process.

<sup>88</sup> It is difficult to state if the concept of the snake on which Viṣṇu lies is not activated here, however, it is worth noting that the concept of snake may activate the concept of the snake Vṛtra killed by Indra and pushed away from the manifest aspect (Jurewicz 2010).

<sup>89</sup> Wynne (2009: 97): ‘the one who ejaculated the utterance ‘I’.

**MDhP 176.2**

*prajāvisargaṃ vividhaṃ mānaso manasāsṛjat |  
saṃdhukṣaksanārthaṃ bhūtānāṃ sṛṣṭaṃ prathamato jalam ||*

The Mental One<sup>90</sup> created all the different creatures through mind. First of all, in order to enkindle<sup>91</sup> living beings is created water.

The mind (*manas*) is again presented as the most important cognitive and creative activity: reality in its first cognitive appearance is called *mānasa* ‘the Mental One’ (verse b) and it creates with aid of the mind (verse b). The noun *saṃdhukṣaṇa* (the first part of the compound *saṃdhukṣaṇārthaṃ*, verse c), literally means ‘inflaming, the act of kindling, inflammation’. Such a conceptualisation is grounded in tradition and activates the concept of reality which manifests its fiery essence during creation. As noted in the analysis of MDhP 175.14, if the recipient activates the general domain of Cleansing By Heat, he may understand the Mental One as fiery. Then its conceptualisation of creation in terms of kindling itself is justified. Let us recall the sequence of its transformation presented in 175.14: having manifest as non-existent (space) it manifests as water. This sequence agrees with the general model of Reality Transformation: reality manifests itself as fiery and then it manifest its opposing aspect which is soma in the RV, water, milk or sweat in the ŚB, and here it is water (*jala*, verse d, *vāri* in MDhP 175.14, see section 1.2.1.a). In this way the dangerous, fiery, aspect of reality is soothed and reality is manifested as beneficial and life-giving. In this context the creation of space could be motivated by the image of stopping the fire in terms of which the dangerous aspect of reality is conceived. The concept of water activates the general domain of Procreation the logic of which will be used to express creation in the next stanzas.

**MDhP 176.3**

*yat prāṇāḥ sarvabhūtānāṃ vardhante yena ca prajāḥ |  
parityaktās ca naśyanti tenedaṃ sarvam āvṛtam ||*

because water is the breath of all beings and that through which creatures flourish. Water develops the entire world – without it everything would be destroyed.

In verses a–c, water (*jala*) is identified with the breaths of all beings thanks to which they can grow and without which they vanish. Identification of breath with water goes back to the AVŚ 11.4.2, 5 where breath is seen as

<sup>90</sup> Wynne (2009: 101): ‘pure consciousness.’

<sup>91</sup> Wynne (2009: 101): ‘to protect’ (*saṃrakṣaksanārthaṃ* after Nilakanṭha Vulgate version).

rain (Jurewicz 2016/18). At the same time, since in everyday experience it is impossible to breath in water, this identification highlights the internally contradictory state of reality in its manifest aspect: it is conceived in terms of breathing water or someone who breaths in it. Recall that Agni, the fire, is conceived in terms of a wild goose breathing in water (within the frames of the Child Of The Water model, ṚV 2.35, Jurewicz 2010). At the same time, as it is in case of RV 10.129.2c where reality manifesting its cognitive power is called That One breathing without breath (*ānīd avātām*), the recipient may think about the embryo in the womb and conceive of this state of creation in those terms.

This interpretation is confirmed by verse d which presents the cosmos in its pre-creative state as being hidden by something (*tenedam sarvam avrtam*). This description activates the second stage of creation in RV 10.129.3a which presents this creative stage as darkness hidden by darkness (*tāma āsīt tāmasā gūlham āgre*). Moreover, to express this state the Composer uses the verb *vṛ-* (10.90.1: *sā bhūmim viśvato vṛtvā*). The verb *vṛ-* activates the concept of Vṛtra which is the abstract name for the enclosing power (Jurewicz 2010). In the RV, Vṛtra encloses and covers water, here water is presented as enclosing and covering the future cosmos. This conceptual change of meaning is motivated by metonymy based on the image schema of CONTAINER; water (the contents) becomes identified with its container (Vṛtra). Here the Composer also activates the cosmogony of Agnicayana (ŚB 1.1.1.9) where the definition of water is presented: its name *āpas* comes from the verb *āp-* ‘to reach, obtain, gain, take possession of,’ so the essence of water is its ability to reach everywhere.<sup>92</sup>

Water, identified with breath, is not dangerous and death-bringing as is Vṛtra but rather life-giving, and this confirms the possibility for the activation of the image of an embryo proposed above.

#### MDhP 176.4

*prthivī parvatā meghā mūrtimantaś ca ye pare |  
sarvaṃ tad vāruṇaṃ jñeyam āpas tastambhire punaḥ ||*

The earth, mountains, clouds and anything perceptible<sup>93</sup> should be understood as forms of water, for the water again became solid.<sup>94</sup>

The watery state of the cosmos is expressed by the derivative of the noun *varuṇa* (*vāruṇa*). Thus, the recipient may also think about the next

<sup>92</sup> ŚB 6.1.1.9: *sò 'pò 'srjata | vācā evā lokād vāg evāśya sāsrjyata sēdam sārvaṃ āpnod yād idāṃ kim ca yād āpnot tāsmād āpo yād āvṛnot tāsmād vāḥ |*

<sup>93</sup> Wynne (2009: 101): ‘of corporeal nature.’

<sup>94</sup> Wynne (2009: 101): ‘it was the water that became solid.’

stage of creation in terms of living peacefully under the rule of the god Varuṇa (RV 10.124, see also Oberlies 1998). At the same time its meaning of water is clear. In verse d it is stated that ‘the water again became solid’ (*āpas tastambhire punaḥ*). Thus, the Composer explicitly conceptualises the appearance of the earth as the result of solidification (see above, MDhP 175.14, section 1.2.1.a).

The verb *stamb-* highlights the abstract meaning of a solid support which also accords with the earlier conceptualisation of the earth as the support (*pratiṣṭhā* ŚB 6.1.1.8, 15, BU 1.3, Jurewicz 2016/18). The use of the adverb *punar* may also evoke ŚB 6.1.1.8–15 where creation is seen as dissolving in water and then solidifying. At the same time, it may evoke the Ṛgvedic cosmogonies the Composers of which conceive creation in terms of driving a pole into the ground; the pole supports the sky. In these cosmogonies various gods, including Varuṇa, are presented as the agents (Macdonell 1897). In the target domain it becomes the *axis mundi* which is called in the AVŚ (10.7–8) *skambha* (Jurewicz 2016/18). If the recipient activates these cosmogonies, he will understand that the sky appears together with the earth. The concept of the sky is the evoked by the concept of clouds (*megha*).

Bhāradvāja then asks Bhr̥gu how the five great beings were created and Bhr̥gu responds (MDhP 176.5). He begins with the description of the first seers who, *in illo tempore*, performed cognitive activity called *dhyāna* i.e., thoughtful concentration performed by the mind (see chapter 4.3–5, 4.9.2). The seers also undergo other deprivation practices like silence, lack of movement, and tapas (fasting and recitation). Then they hear the sound full of truth and order (dharma) conceived in terms of the divine Sarasvatī who manifests herself to them having descended from the misty cloud (*nabhas*, MDhP 176.6–8).

Then the cosmogony is presented and the recipient might presume that Bhr̥gu will explain how it is possible that everything is composed of water.

### MDhP 176.9

*purā stimitaniḥśabdam ākāśam acalopamam |*  
*naṣṭacandrārkapavanam prasuptam iva sambabhau ||*

In the beginning, there was the motionless space similar to the mountain, without moon, the sun and wind, as if deeply sleeping.<sup>95</sup>

The pre-creative state of cosmos is again conceived in terms of space (verse b see above, MDhP 175.13). Its similarity to a mountain (*acalopama*, verse b) might evoke the Ṛgvedic concept of the pre-creative state of the

<sup>95</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

cosmos conceived in terms of a mountain, often identified with Vṛtra (Jurewicz 2010, Kuiper 1983). At the same time, this simile activates the description of the second stage of creation in ṚV 10.129 (*tāma āsīt tāmasā gūḷhām āgre*) which will be activated more clearly in the next stanza. It might trigger the recipient to activate the image of a great mountain of existence of which he is conscious but which he cannot see because of the lack of light. The lack of the sun and the moon (verse c) might also activate the earliest layers of tradition, again ṚV 10.129 where the pre-creative state is described as devoid of the sign of day and night (*ná rātriyā āhna āsīt praketaḥ*).<sup>96</sup> The lack of wind (verse c) highlights the lack of any movement and the perfect immobility of space. The whole description also activates the Ṛgvedic concepts of the pre-creative state of the cosmos where neither cognition nor movement is possible.<sup>97</sup> This state is conceived in MS 1.5 in the same way (see chapter 1.1.1).

This similarity can also be seen in verse d where space is described as if deeply sleeping. The lack of any cognitive possibility is caused not only by the lack of light, but also by the fact that the subjective power is not yet cognising the objects. The fact that night is the state when cognition is impossible is already expressed in the ṚV (Jurewicz 2010).

Thus, the Composer activates the input spaces of the blend that he will elaborate in the next stanza. The first input space is the concept of the pre-creative state of the cosmos, the second is the concept of a sleeping and not cognising man and the third is the concept of a mountain identified with Vṛtra and of Indra who sleeps before his fight. The generic space is transformation and production of something new and precious.

### MDhP 176.10

*tataḥ salilam utpannaṃ tamasīvāparaṃ tamaḥ |*  
*tasmāc ca salilotpīḍād udatiṣṭhata mārutaḥ ||*

Then muddy water appeared like another darkness in darkness. From the pressure on the muddy water, the wind rose up.<sup>98</sup>

Verse b activates ṚV 10.129 where the second stage of creation is conceived as darkness hidden by darkness (*tāma āsīt tāmasā gūḷhām āgre*): the appearance of water is conceived in terms of the appearance of something darker in the darkness. The concept of this kind of water (*salilá*) is the source domain

<sup>96</sup> It is worth mentioning that the Ṛgvedic description is more abstract than the description of the MDhP.

<sup>97</sup> This situation is expressed by the abstract noun *āmhas* in the ṚV (Gonda 1975, Jurewicz 2013).

<sup>98</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

for conceptualisation of the third stage of creation in RV 10.129 (*apraketám salilám*), here both stages are compressed into one.

It is worth noting that the word *salilá* (verse a) is used in the RV to denote the pre-creative stage of the cosmos while in the RV 1.164.41 it denotes dark muddy water in which the female buffalo stamps. If the recipient activates this source image, he might identify, in the blend, the mountain with female buffalo. The formulation *tataḥ salilam utpannam* evokes the expression *tataḥ ksarati ákṣaram* which is used to denote creation in RV 1.164.41.

The wind appears as a result of the pressure of water (*salila*) within the space (verse c). In R̥gvedic cosmogonies the concept of pressure is activated by the image of Indra who, having drunk soma, begins to grow and press against the borders of the cosmos in its pre-creative state (Kuiper 1983, Jurewicz 2010). The concept of Indra has already been evoked but now its activation is more obvious; the Composer calls the wind using the form *māruta* which literally means ‘connected with Maruts’. The R̥gvedic Composers present the Maruts as those who help Indra (Macdonell 1897). Thus, if the recipient activates the earliest layers of tradition, he might understand the beginnings of creation in those terms: Indra becoming ready to fight. This interpretation is supported by the concept of pressure which evokes descriptions of the pressing of soma with the aid of stones, and the concept of soma is metonymically activated by the concept of Indra. Pressure is also necessary during the production of fire with the aid of sticks and this concept enriches the blend as its next input space.

In the context of the MBh the concept of transformation of water under pressure, together with the idea of the mountain, may also evoke the story of the churning of immortality (*amṛtamanthana*).<sup>99</sup> This story is the next input space of the blend. In all these cases the result of pressing is the appearance of the coveted riches: immortality and other desired objects which appear during churning. In this way, the Composer activates the R̥gvedic conceptualisation of creation in terms of the defining events where a precious object is obtained thanks to the destruction of an enclosure. Recall that, in the previous chapter (MDhP 175.15), Veda is conceived in terms of a treasure hidden in a treasury (*nidhi*).<sup>100</sup>

The concept of pressure also activates the scenario of recitation when the deep breath before speaking presses the diaphragm thanks to which the proper sound can be produced. If the recipient activates this input space, he could will understand the manifestation of the wind in terms of man now who wakes up and begins recitation (see MS 1.6, chapter 1.1.2). This scenario, elaborated in the next stanzas, allows the recipient to conceive of creation

<sup>99</sup> MBh 1.15–17. For a short discussion of this story, see *General Conclusion* 3.

<sup>100</sup> For the next possible source domain, see chapter 2.1.1, ad MS 1.51.



in terms of recitation. It is important to stress once more the way that the concept of Indra is used in the descriptions of liberating cognition in the Veda (ŚB 6.1.1.2, AU 1.3.13–14)<sup>101</sup>. Since recitation is crucial and since stages of creation take place in an opposite order to liberating cognition, one can argue that the concept of Indra is used here consciously to highlight the cognitive dimension of creation.

### MDhP 176.11

*yathā bhājanam acchidraṃ niḥśabdam iva lakṣyate |  
tac cāmbhasā pūryamāṇaṃ saśabdaṃ kurute 'nilaḥ ||*

It is like a pot that, if it is not cleft, is seen to be virtually noiseless. But when it is filled with water the air in it makes a noise,

Now the Composer activates the next input space: it is a vessel which is makes sound when filled with water. If the recipient understands *salila* as muddy water he might conceive of creation, presented in the previous stanza, in terms of making a clay pot with the use of a wheel. In the blend, the mountain becomes a pot filled with water. To remind the recipient that he is not talking about any real entity, the Composer uses another word for water *ambhas*. This word is used in ṚV 10.129 in reference to the pre-creative state of reality that only can be described in negative sentences and in questions (*āmbhaḥ kīm āsīd gāhanaṃ gabhīrām*).

### MDhP 176.12

*tathā salilasamruddhe nabhaso 'nte nirantare |  
bhittvārṇavatalaṃ vāyuh samutpatati ghoṣavān ||*

in the same way, when water was stopped at the strict border of the misty cloud, the sounding wind, having pierced the foaming surface, rose up.<sup>102</sup>

<sup>101</sup> Indra is defined as that who makes this cognition possible. In ŚB 6.1.1.2, cognition is conceived in terms of heating and is used in the description of the first stage of creation conceived in terms of liberating cognition of the seers: Indra is that who heats/cognises (*sā yò 'yām mādhye prāṇāḥ | eṣā evēndras tān eṣā prāṇān madhyatā indriyēṇainddha tāsmād indha indho ha vai tam indra ity ācakṣate paró 'kṣam paró 'kṣakāmā hi devās tā iddhāḥ sapta nānā pūruṣān asṣjantā* | In AU 1.3.13–14, cognition is conceived in terms of seeing and is used in description of the final stage of creation when the self (*ātman*) cognises its unity with everything what exists including the the unmanifest aspect (*brahman*): Indta is that who sees(cognises): *sa jāto bhūtāny abhivyaikhyat kim ihānyam vāvadiṣad iti | sa etam eva puruṣam brahmatatamam apaśyad idam adarśam itī3 | tasmād idandro nāmedandro ha vai nāma tam idandraṃ santam indra ity ācakṣate parokṣeṇa | parokṣapriyā iva hi devāḥ parokṣapriyā iva hi devāḥ* | See also footnote 76 in *Introduction* on page 60.

<sup>102</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

The recipient of this stanza is now triggered to elaborate the image of the pot filled with hot water which begins to boil. The experience tells us that in this moment steam begins to rise, emerges from the pot and we can feel a hot wind. The concept of boiling is activated by the next specific noun to denote water: the noun *arṇava* means ‘restless, foaming water’ (verse c). The concept of heat comes from the source domain of kindling fire which is activated by the concept of pressure (MDhP 176.10).

It is possible that the specific experiential motivation of this description is the ritual of Pravargya during which milk is heated in a clay pot (Houben 2000a,b), the sound of the wind is the sound of the boiling milk. Another possible experiential domain is the churning of butter. The blend which identifies water with milk appears already in the ŚB 6.1.3. In the MDhP it is elaborated in the story of the churning of immortality (*amṛtamanthana*, see *General Conclusion* 3). The recipient may be triggered to imagine milk in a vessel which is churned creating more and more foam as the churning continues. The sound which accompanies churning is the sound of the wind in the blend. The processes connected with the transformation of milk are the next input spaces of the blend.

If the recipient elaborates the input space of Indra who grows thanks to soma and roars under its influence (*vāyuh... ghoṣavān*, verse d), he will understand that the sky (*nabhas*, verse b) has been separated from the earth. At first the sky is tight to the surface of water in the vessel and then, thanks to wind, it is detached from the surface of the vessel. In the ṚV, the nocturnal state is conceived in terms of the sexual act of a cow (in terms of which the earth is conceived) and a bull (in terms of which the sky is conceived). In the morning the bull goes away as if carried up by the rising sun conceived in terms of fire (Jurewicz 2010). The sunrise is also conceived in terms of Indra’s growth, the sun is conceived in terms of his head in which soma is finally heated and purified. It is worth mentioning that the noun for water *arṇava* mentioned above is used to denote the appearance of the morning light in some hymns of the ṚV (5.59.1, 7.63.2).

Within the frames of the scenario of recitation, the concept of pressure (*pīḍa*, expressed explicitly in the next stanza) refers to the moment when a deep breath compresses the diaphragm. The recipient is triggered to conceive the head in terms of a vessel filled with foaming water (in terms of which speech is conceived). Now the breath, pressed by the diaphragm, comes up to the head and resonates filling the sinuses with a loud sound.<sup>103</sup> In the blend the ontic transformations of water are identified with the stages of recitation.

<sup>103</sup> It is worth noting that the divine Sarasvatī is also presented as being in the cloudy sky and as coming from its surface (*teṣāṃ dharmamayī vāṇī sarveṣāṃ śrotram āgamat | divyā sarasvatī*

**MDhP 176.13**

*sa eṣa carate vāyur arṇavotpīḍasambhavaḥ |  
ākāśasthānam āsādyā praśāntim nādhigacchati ||*

And this wind, produced by the pressure of the foamy water, having resorted to the space, could not be stilled.

The place of wind is space (*ākāśasthāna*) which activates the concept of the space between the earth and the sky and the concept of the open mouth. Breath, once produced goes on and on thanks to pressure and, with breath, sounds are produced. In the blend the cosmos is the manifestation of constant recitation. If the recipient activates the experience of the production of butter, or the Pravargya ritual, he will understand the existence of the world in terms of constantly churning milk or its boiling (see chapters 2.1.1, 4.11.3). Within the frames of this conceptualisation space (*ākāśa*) would refer to the space within the vessel.

**MDhP 176.14**

*tasmin vāyvambusaṅgharṣe dīptatejā mahābalaḥ |  
prādurbhavaty ūrdhvaśikhaḥ kṛtvā viimiraṃ nabhaḥ ||*

In the friction between wind and water a powerful, radiant flame rose. With its crest rising up this fire illuminated the misty cloud.<sup>104</sup>

It should be pointed out that the nouns denoting water are consciously chosen by the Composer. The noun *salila* is used to denote water in its first appearance when it covers the future cosmos. The noun *ambhas* denotes water enclosed in a vessel: in these terms the borders of the future cosmos are outlined. The noun *arṇava* denotes its foamy stage when it flows out from the vessel; most probably the recipient is triggered to break the logic of everyday experience and presume that water does not go beyond the borders of the vessel but flows within the vessel. Then the rare noun *ambu* is used. It expresses the state of water which, under the influence of wind, becomes fire. Thus, the model of Child Of The Waters is activated. The appellation of fire as *ūrdhvaśikhaḥ* (verse c) goes back to the RV and strengthens the coherence of this association.<sup>105</sup> The sequence of creation also agrees with the stages

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*tatra sambabhūva nabhastalāt || MDhP 176.8). The recipient may be triggered to create the blend in which head and the sky are identified.*

<sup>104</sup> Wynne (2009: 103): ‘lit the space.’

<sup>105</sup> *ūrdhvasōcis* (RV 6.15.2), see also RV 4.6.2cd (*ūrdhuvām bhānūm savitēva asren méteva dhūmām stabhāyad ūpa dyām*).

presented in the general model of Reality Transformation according to which reality manifests its opposing aspects: now the fiery aspect is again manifest.

Since speech is conceived in terms of water the recipient may understand that this stage of recitation is now conceived in terms of a burning fire, when speech becomes loud, vibrant and clear. The noun *saṃgharṣa* also means sexual excitement which accords with the conceptualisation of speech in terms of the sexual act (Jurewicz 2012). Within its frames, mind is a male and speech is female. If we apply this conceptualisation here, the mind would be conceived in terms of wind and speech in terms of water. Its expression in recitation is conceived in terms of fire burning from the mouth of the reciter. This image is entrenched in tradition: in ŚB 2.2.4.1 Prajāpati is conceived in these terms and it is also used to present recitation (*japa*, see chapter 4.5). The concept of fire might also express the physical experience of heating which accompanies recitation just as it accompanies somic exaltation (Jurewicz 2010, see chapter 4.5.).

If the recipient activates the input space of Pravargya, he could imagine this creative stage as the moment of pouring the water into hot milk when fire goes up in a huge flame. The source domain of churning butter does not seem to be useful here though there is one more experience which could motivate the thinking of the Composer. It is the refining of gold which is also a specific realisation of the general domain of Cleansing By Heat.<sup>106</sup> In ŚB 6.1.3, creation is conceived in terms of heating successive forms of an already heated Prajāpati of which the first is water (i.e. his sweat) and the second is foam. The next stage is clay (6.1.3.4) the concept of which is activated in the present cosmogony *via* the concept of a pot which is typically made of clay. Then other forms appear thanks to heating. The last form is ‘something similar to gold’ (6.1.3.5).

The concept of the refining of gold as understood in the ŚB is the next input space of the blend. One can refer here to the ancient practice of panning gold from the mud of rivers in some parts of India.<sup>107</sup> This makes the description of ŚB 6.1.3 much more reasonable. If the recipient activates this cosmogonic description, he would understand the appearance of fire thanks to the friction of water and wind in the panning of gold.<sup>108</sup> In the blend fire is gold.<sup>109</sup> Conceptualisation of Gāyatrī-metre in terms of the eight flows of gold strengthens the meaning of recitation.

<sup>106</sup> Already in RV 9.86.43 (Jurewicz 2010), especially used by the Buddha (Covill 2009).

<sup>107</sup> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cNFhN5DojWE>.

<sup>108</sup> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3Kc97EDFZD4>

<sup>109</sup> Gold is identified with fire in the Veda (ŚB 13.4.1.7). For the role of gold in the Veda, see Gonda (1991).

If the recipient activates the cosmogonic model presented in RV 10.129 he would understand that the Composer is now presenting the fourth stage of creation conceived in terms of the appearance of heat and shine (*tapas*).

### MDhP 176.15

*agnih̄ pavanasamyuktaḥ khāt samutpatate jalam |*  
*so 'gnir mārutasamyogād ghanatvam upapadyate ||*

Fire which is united with the wind rises up from the space into water. Thanks to union with wind this fire congeals.<sup>110</sup>

The noun *kha* can mean cosmic space but also any space; space of a mouth open during recitation or the aperture of a vessel and its interpretation depends on the input space elaborated in the blend. The concise meaning of verse b, *khāt samutpatate jalam*, expresses the movement of fire kindled by the wind. The preposition *ut-* of the verb *pat-* expresses the movement upwards, while the verb *pat-* means falling down strengthened by the Ablative form of *kha-*. Wynne chooses the version *samākṣipate* ‘it forced space and water together’. It is possible, however, that the Composer wants to highlight the movement of a fire upwards in its first stage (which accords to its description as *ūrdhvaśikha* ‘with its crest rising up’ in the previous stanza) and then falls as water. If the recipient understands the meaning of *kha* as space generally, he would understand the stage of creation presented in this verse as concisely expressing the transformation of fire into rain according to the general model of Reality Transformation which will take place in the cosmos from now on. Thanks to rain the earth can bear plants which is food for animals and people (RV 5.83.4, AVŚ 11.4.4–5) so, we could say, only then does it become itself. We can recall the cosmogony presented in CU 6.2.3–4 the Composer of which conceives of creation in terms of the transformation of being-truth (*sat*, Jurewicz 2016/18). Its first form is heat (*tapas*), heat transforms itself into water (*āpas*) and water into food (*anna*). This abstract cosmogony metonymically activates the general model of reality transformation: the sun conceived as a fiery container for soma (activated by the abstract noun *tapas*) creates rain (activated by the abstract noun *āpas*) which in turn creates the earth (activated by the abstract noun *anna*). So, the solidification of fire in water (verse d) can be understood as the beginning of the appearance of the earth; its final creation will be described in the next stanza.

This interpretation is confirmed if the recipient further elaborates the input space of the refining of gold and the way this concept is used in ŚB 6.1.3.

<sup>110</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

Gold becomes the earth that appears in eight acts of pouring gold. Within the frames of this conceptualisation, *kha* refers to the opening of a vessel from which fluid gold is poured; then it is cooled with water. It is worth noting that if one wants to pour anything from a vessel, it has to be lifted so that its contents flow down and this topology is expressed in verse b (*khāt samutpatate jalam*). The preposition of *sam-* highlights the process of solidification which begins the moment the gold stops being heated and the goldsmith takes the vessel off the fire.

In ŚB 6.1.1.6 the earth is identified with the Gāyatrī-metre which is justified by its appearance in the eightfold pouring of gold and in one verse of the Gāyatrī-metre consisting of eight syllables (Jurewicz 2016/18). So, the recipient of the present cosmogony can elaborate the input space of recitation and understand the creation of the earth as its result. In the blend, speech is conceived in terms of solid gold and the ontic results of recitation are conceived in these terms: words become their real designates.

If the recipient activates the input space of Indra, he might understand *ghana* (in *ghanatvam*, verse d) in its literal meaning which is ‘a striker, killer, destroyer’ and understand it as Indra’s thunderbolt (*vajra*) with which he has killed Vṛtra. Vajra is identified with soma in the RV and, as we have seen, the concept of its pressing and (metonymically) further transformation is activated *via* the concept of pressure. The earth appears when the vajra kills Vṛtra i.e., when the thunderbolt hits the water the water becomes earth. This interpretation is confirmed by the thunderbolt being fiery and the Composer describing the transformations of fire in this stanza.

### MDhP 176.16

*tasyākāṣe nipatitaḥ snehas tiṣṭhati yo ‘paraḥ |  
sa samghātavām āpanno bhūmitvam upagacchati ||*

Its grease which has fallen down in the space and which stands apart, become solidified and finally the earth.<sup>111</sup>

As we might presume, earth which is conceived in the previous stanza in terms of liquid and hot gold, now cools and becomes solid. The Composer evokes the concept of grease which solidifies. This conceptualisation activates the input space of churning butter and the Vedic cosmogonies which see the creation of the earth in terms of the production of cream (BU 1.2.3). It is worth noting, however, that the concept of grease (*pr̥ṣadājiyá*) is used in RV 10.90.8 to conceive the appearance of animals and, metonymically, the spaces

<sup>111</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

of the world in which they abide.<sup>112</sup> The Composer of this hymn conceives creation in terms of the cooking of the dead body of Prajāpati over a fire during which grease is produced by the heat of the fire. It is possible that the Composer of MDhP 175 now wants to activate a further input space which is the general domain of Cooking. Water, which becomes the earth, is presented as separating from the grease (verse b: *snehas tiṣṭhati yo 'paraḥ*). Such a conceptualisation agrees with the everyday experience of cooking and also with the experience of churning butter.

In the next stanza (176.17), the earth is presented as the source of all tastes, smells, fluids and sentient beings and is conceived in terms of the womb (*yoni*) from which everything appears.<sup>113</sup> In this way conceptualisation of the earth in terms of a beautiful woman is activated, as it is in ŚB 6.1.1.15 (Jurewicz 2016/18).

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Analysis of MDhP 175–176 shows how tradition and everyday experience are elaborated in the Smṛti texts and to what extent its knowledge allows us to get to their meaning. The general model of Reality Transformation still frames the main scenario of creation which is the alternate manifestation of fiery and liquid aspects of reality which is seen clearly in MDhP 176. Metaphoric conceptualisations, already established in the RV, allow the Composer to express the internal contradictions of reality and the cognitive nature of its manifestations. Further grounds for the conceptualisation of creation are found in everyday experiences like churning butter, the refining of gold, making a clay pot. Some of these experiential concepts are already used in the Veda (the general domain of Cleansing By Heat and the general domain of Cooking) while some are new and are connected with cultural changes (making a clay pot). When their scenario is activated, the logic of the creative sequences become clear and the whole description coherent.

The creation of the consecutive elements (*dhātu*) is conceived as the stages of recitation which are not mentioned but activated by the way of description and by the concepts used by the Composer. The meaning of recitation comes from the scenario of the morning activities of a Brahmin. Such a conceptualisation of the creation of elements allows the Composer to express the self-reflexive nature of this process because the great beings are

<sup>112</sup> *paśūn tāṃś cakre vāyavyān āraṇyān grāmiyās ca yé* (RV 10.90.8cd).

<sup>113</sup> *rasānām sarvagandhānām snehānām prāṇinām tathā | bhūmir yonir iha jñeyā yasyām sarvaṃ prasūyate ||*, The earth should be known as the source of all tastes, smells, fluids and sentient beings: everything is generated by it.

transformation of creative speech which becomes perceptible. The model of Indra's Fight With Vṛtra strengthens the meaning of the mental transformations which accompany recitation. As stated above, beginning with the ŚB, the concept of Indra and the basic scenario of his deeds has been used to conceive of the changes that take place during liberating practices.

Creation and the understanding of the meaning of the stanzas is possible thanks to fusing various concepts in blends. It should be noted that the scenarios of processes in the input spaces are activated *via* their crucial concepts which makes the description very abstract. The abstraction of the description is also a result of the Composer not highlighting the concept of the agent so that the whole process seems to be performed by itself.

### 1.2.2. The teaching of Vyāsa to Śuka (MDhP 224.33–51)<sup>114</sup>

This cosmogony is the answer to a question from the son about the divisions of time. Vyāsa begins by describing the destruction of the manifest aspect conceived in terms of a man who falls asleep. It is similar to the cosmogony of the MS especially as far as the terms and the concepts are concerned. The way its Composer activates the Vedic tradition is also similar.

#### MDhP 224.31

*pratibuddho vikurute brahmākṣayyaṃ kṣapākṣaye |  
srjate ca mahad bhūtaṃ tasmād vyaktātmakaṃ manaḥ ||*

When he wakes at the end of the night, he produces brahman impossible to be destroyed. Then he creates the great being from which the mind appears the nature of which is manifestation.<sup>115</sup>

In verses a–b reality is conceived in the same way as in MS 1 and MDhP 175–6: in terms of a man who wakes up in the morning and begins to see, cognise and expresses his cognition in the recitation of the Veda (which is activated by the noun *brahman*). Its qualification as immutable, *ākṣayya* (verse b), highlights the identity of reality with its form as sound. The play of words *brahmākṣayyaṃ kṣapākṣaye* highlights the internal contradictory state of reality in the first creative act: it is impossible to be destroyed (*ākṣayya*) but at the same time its aspect, conceived in terms of night (*kṣapā*), is destroyed (*kṣaya*). The logic of everyday experience implies that day comes after night

<sup>114</sup> MDhP 224–246 (*Śukānupraśna*). For analysis of this cosmogony and its similarities to MS 1, see Takahashi (2018–2019).

<sup>115</sup> Jurewicz's translation.



and thus the manifest aspect is conceived in terms of the transformation of days and nights. In this way the category of time is created.

Moreover, the expression *brahmākṣayya* allows the recipient to understand the first manifestation not only as *brāhman* i.e., reality and the Veda, but also as *brahmán* (Brahma) conceived in terms of man. When the recipient activates both meanings, he has to decompress them in the blend and understand the first compound as a man (Brahma) who is reality (brahman) expressing itself in sound (the Veda, brahman, see the next stanza). At the same time this expresses the ontic unity of the cosmos and reality and the fact that the cosmos is a manifestation of speech.

In verse c, the Composer expresses the cognition of the highest cognitive agent which recognises itself as the great being (*mahad bhūta*). The fact that the expression *mahad bhūta* is used here confirms the interpretation of the qualification of first highest cognitive agent in MS 1.6 as being *mahābhūtādi vṛttaujāḥ* (see chapter 1.1.2). It appears in the description of the same stage of creation: reality manifests its cognitive power (conceived in terms of waking up) and then recognises its greatness.

Manifestation as great involves further thinking, so the mind (*manas*) appears which will perform further creative cognition. The mind is qualified as *vyaktāmaka* ‘the nature of which is manifestation’ (verse d). In MS 1.14 the mind is called that whose nature is being/truth and non-being/untruth (*sadasadātmaka*). Here its range of cognition is narrowed to what is manifest. Since recitation involves activity of the mind it would seem that creation of the mind, conceived as creative thought able to cross the levels of manifestation, is implied in verses a–b.

Now the Composer decompresses the blend created by the meanings of the nouns *brāhman* and *brahmán* mentioned above:

### MDhP 224.32

*brahma tejomayaṃ śukraṃ yasya sarvaṃ idaṃ rasaḥ |*  
*ekasya bhūtaṃ bhūtasya dvayaṃ sthāvarajangamaṃ ||*

Brahman is a glowing seed. This world – both those who move and those who do not – is the essence of that one being.<sup>116</sup>

This sequence of nouns can be seen as reflecting the sequence of creation. The noun *brahman* metonymically activates the concept of unmanifest reality, the noun *śukra* the next stage which is manifestation of the agent who recites the Veda and the noun *rasa* is the manifestation of the cosmos.

<sup>116</sup> Jurewicz’s translation. This stanza appears in MDhP 232, see chapter 5.9.2.b).

In MDhP and MS, the word *śukra* is used in reference to male semen. In MDhP 207.21 it is used in a more general sense, as the life-giving essence of a man's body and its appearance conceived in terms of the production of butter from milk thanks to its churning which involves its heating.<sup>117</sup> The input spaces of the conceptual network are the concepts of a man who recites in the morning and the production of butter. However, if the recipient activates the literal meaning of *śukra*, he will metonymically activate the concept of a male with his penis full of semen. The image of a man in erection is the next input space of the network (erection is also conceived as the result of heating in the Veda).<sup>118</sup> In the blend the first stage of creation is conceived in terms of man in erection who recites and produces butter. As producing butter was typically a feminine activity, the recipient would conceive reality in this stage as androgynous and will activate the general domain of Procreation in order to conceive the first manifestation of reality in terms of the sexual act which takes place within one reality.<sup>119</sup> Since in these terms the expressing of thought in words is conceived in the Veda, (MIND IS A MALE, SPEECH IS A FEMALE, EXPRESSING OF THOUGHT IN WORDS IS A SEXUAL ACT) and *brahman* also means the Veda, the recipient creates the next input space which is recitation. Semen is qualified as *tejomaya* 'full of glow' (verse a). At the same time semen is liquid so creation is conceived as the appearance of heat (activated by the noun *tejas*) and fluid (activated by the noun *śukra*) aspects of reality.<sup>120</sup> However, the description of the first stage of creation (*brahma tejomayaṃ śukraṃ*) is very concise and the Vedic input spaces only project their basic logic into the target domain which is the creative recitation of the Veda.

The world is conceived in terms of the essence (*rasa*) of semen (*śukra*, verses b–d). In this way the general domain of Procreation is further elaborated

<sup>117</sup> This image is used in the story of birth of Śuka (MDhP 311, discussed in Hildebeitel 280–290, see *General Conclusion* 3.

<sup>118</sup> See e.g. ŚB 2.3.1.14 where brimming of heated milk ritually corresponds to erection (Jurewicz 2019b). Such hidden conceptualisations that logically derive from the description are explicitly expressed in Tantra.

<sup>119</sup> The same blend is run in ŚB 2.2.4 (Jurewicz 2016/18).

<sup>120</sup> In the source domain, it is a further elaboration of the stage of appearance of a liquid substance after toiling. It is elaborated in BAU 1.2. Here, the highest cognitive agent, conceived in terms of Death (*mṛtyu*) who wants to possess itself (*tān māno 'kurutātmanvī syām iti*) begins to heat/sing (arc-), and sweats (creates water). Then it churns the cream (*śāra*) which gathered on the surface of the water (so the concept of water is blended with the concept of milk), thus the earth appears (*tād yād apāṃ śāra āsū tāt sāmahanyata | sã pṛthivy ābhavat |*). Then the highest cognitive agent toils again and from him appears his essence (*tāsyaṃ aśrāmyat | tāsya śrāntāsya taptāsya tējo rāso nīravartatāgñiḥ |*). Thus the self (*ātman*) of death is created that is the cosmos.

and the recipient understands that the cosmos is conceived in terms of an offspring seen as the essence of its father. If he now comes back to the expression ‘semen full of glow’, *tejomayaṃ śukraṃ*, he could also understand it as referring to the Golden Egg.

At the same time, the concept of *rasa* activates conceptualisation of creation in terms of squeezing. As we have seen the concept of pressure has been used in MDhP 176. It activates the Ṛgvedic descriptions of the production of the juice of soma by pressing the plant between two stones. Conceptualisation of the creation of the cosmos in terms of squeezing essence (*rasa*) is also well entrenched in the Veda (e.g., JUB 1.1, 1.23), especially in reference to the creation of forms of speech (OM). If the recipient activates these meanings, he will understand that the world is the perceptible manifestation of speech.

In verses c–d, the Composer states that two kinds of beings, mobile and immobile are the creation of one reality. The concept of two kinds of beings can be understood metonymically as activating the basic time division between night (when nothing moves) and day (when beings move).

Now the Composer appears to go back in his description and highlights the cognitive nature of creation in the next stanza:

### MDhP 224.33

*ahar mukhe vibuddhaḥ san sṛjate vidyāyā jagat |  
agra eva mahābhūtam āśu vyaktātmakaṃ manaḥ ||*

At dawn he wakes up and creates the world with his knowledge: at first the great being, then quickly the mind.<sup>121</sup>

The structure of this stanza is similar to MDhP 224.31. The act of manifestation is conceived in terms of a man who wakes up in the morning (verse a) followed by the next manifestation conceived in terms of recitation (activated by the noun *brahman* in MDhP 224.31 and by the noun *vidyā* in MDhP 224.33, verse b).<sup>122</sup> Then the cognition of manifestation as great is presented (*mahābhūta*, verse c) followed by the appearance of mind (*manas*, verse d). Thus, the Composer highlights the cognitive nature of the creative process.

Now the creation performed by the mind is presented:

<sup>121</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

<sup>122</sup> It is worth adding that in some manuscripts (according to the critical edition) the cosmos is created by a lack of knowledge (*avidyayā*) which would activate the cosmogonies which describe the moment of losing omniscience and the beginning of subject-object cognition.

**MDhP 224.34**

*abhibhūyeha cārciṣmad vyaśṛjat sapta mānasān |  
dūraḡaṃ bahudhāḡāmi prārthanāsaṃśayātmakam ||*

Having overcome what is here, full of flame, it has created seven mental ones. It is far-reaching, it walks in many directions, its nature is wish and doubt.<sup>123</sup>

The mind is presented as overcoming everything that is here (*iha*) which means that it cognises the great manifest aspect of reality (COGNITION IS GRASPING, COGNITION IS CONQUERING). It is qualified as ‘full of flames’ (*arciṣmant*, verse a) which triggers the recipient to understand the mind in terms of fire and of cognition in terms of illumination.

In verse b, the mind is presented as creating seven ‘mental ones’ (*mānasa*). In this context, the form *mānasa* is a patronymic of *manas* and the seven seers are conceived in terms of the sons of the mind. At the same time this form expresses that their most important activity is cognition. In the same way the poets in RV 10.129 are equipped with thinking (*manīsā*) which they use to cognise reality. The seven mental forms are the next multiple subjects of cognition.

In the second hemistich the mind is presented as far-reaching (*dūraḡa*) and it walks in many directions (*bahudhāḡāmin*) which implies its omniscience (COGNITION IS WALKING TO REACH AN OBJECT). This qualification also evokes the concept of omnipresence which is conceived in Hindu thought as the ability to walk everywhere expressed by the compound *sarvagata* (literally: ‘he who has come everywhere’). In verse b the nature of the mind is described: it consists of wish and doubt (MDhP 187.36, see chapter 2.3.2.c). The recipient may presume that verses c–d describe the mind itself and that it is divided into the seven minds of the seers.

In the next stanzas the Composer presents the creation of five great beings (*mahābhūta*). They are created together with the class of the category ‘senses of reason’ which enables to them to be cognised (MDhP 224.35–38). According to the cosmogonic model presented in the MS, one may presume that they are the objects of cognition of the seven mental ones. The fact that the same compound is used to describe the first manifestation of reality (MDhP 224.33) strengthens its ontic unity and the reflexive nature of creation. The description of manifestation of reality in the form of the great beings is almost the same as in MS 1.75–78. The creation of the great beings is called the first creation (*pūrvaiṣā sṛṣṭir ucyate*, MDhP 224.38). The following creations are, we may

<sup>123</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

assume, the next transformations of the great beings with the classes with whose aid they are to be recognised (MDhP 224.39–40).

Then the Composer activates the tradition in the same way as the Composer of MS 1.19:

### MDhP 224.41–42

*ete tu sapta puruṣā nānāviryāḥ pṛthak pṛthak |  
nāśaknuvan prajāḥ sraṣṭum asamāgamyā sarvataḥ ||*

These seven men with diverse and manly power and being separated from one another could not create offspring without being fully united.<sup>124</sup>

Here the seven men (verse a) refer to the seven mental forms of the mind. Their description activates conceptualisation of the cognitive faculties conceived in terms of individual men (COGNITIVE FACULTY IS HUMAN BEING, Lakoff, Johnson 1999). They cognised separately and thus creation could not proceed. So, the cognizing subject is created.

### MDhP 224.42

*te sametya mahātmānam anyonyam abhisamśritāḥ |  
śarīrāśrayaṇam prāptās tataḥ puruṣa ucyate ||*

They, having recourse to each other, entered upon the Great Self and found their support in the body. Because of that it is called man.<sup>125</sup>

The creation of one cognising subject is conceived in terms of the image schema of CENTRE-PERIPHERY: seven mental manifestations gather themselves around the Great Self (*mahātman*, verse a). The expression *mahān ātman* is used in the cosmogony of the MS 1.15 to denote the first subjective manifestation within the temporal aspect. It is also created by the mind. Here the compound *mahātman* is used to denote the cognitive axis around which the cognitive faculties gather to create a cosmic organism (*śarīra*, see MS 1.17, chapter 1.1.4). In this way the identity of the cosmic subject and objects is confirmed. Such a view of consciousness is very close to our modern view which stresses the role of integration of its various levels and elements (Damasio 2010, Gazzaniga 2012).

Some Vedic sources of the description of union of seven men has already been discussed (see chapter 1.1.5). In his explanation of the meaning of the noun *puruṣa* (man), the Composer of MDhP 224.42 also activates the

<sup>124</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

<sup>125</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

Atharvavedic definition based on man (*puruṣa*) remaining in a stronghold (AVŚ 10.2.30,<sup>126</sup> Jurewicz 2016/18, see MDhP 203.35, chapter 2.1.4). In the target domain the self remains in the body in the same way. It is worth noting that, as with MS 1.17, this description has no meaning without reference to Vedic tradition. Moreover, activation of the cosmogony of Agnicayana presented in the ŚB also accords with conceptualisation of the cosmos in terms of the essence (*rasa*) of the Veda: in ŚB 6.1.1.4, the head of Prajāpati is conceived in terms of the essence (*rasa*) of the seven seers.<sup>127</sup> Here, the cosmos is the essence of the seven mental faculties of reality which creates one cosmic cognising agent.

### MDhP 224.43

*śrayaṇāc charīraṃ bhavati mūrtimat ṣoḍaśātmakam |  
tad āviśanti bhūtāni mahānti saha karmaṇā ||*

Because it became a support, it became body with perceptible form and composed of the sixteen. Then the great beings enter together with actions.<sup>128</sup>

In verses a–b, the Composer gives the definition of the body (*śarīra*) as the support (*śrayaṇa*, verse a) for the cognitive faculties which repeats the definition proposed in ŚB 1.1.3–4. Thus, the perceptible form (*mūrti*, verse b) of the highest cognitive agent in the cosmos is created. The sixteen elements of this body are, we may presume, the mind (*manas*), the five senses of reason, the five classes (*guṇa*) and the five great beings. Verses c–d of the cosmogony are almost identical with MS 1.18ab.<sup>129</sup> So it seems that now the senses of action are created together with their category (*karman*) and their objects that can be cognised with the category of action.

### MDhP 224.44–45

*sarvabhūtāni cādāya tapasā caraṇāya ca |  
ādikartā mahābhūtaṃ tam evāhuḥ prajāpatim ||*

The first creator of beings is that who has taken into himself all the beings in order to heat. This great being is called Prajāpati.<sup>130</sup>

<sup>126</sup> *nā vai tām cākṣur jahāti nā prāṇo jarāsaḥ purā | pūraṃ yō brāhmaṇo veda yāsyāḥ puruṣa ucyāte || (30)*

<sup>127</sup> See above, MDhP 224.32

<sup>128</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

<sup>129</sup> MS 1.18: *tad āviśanti bhūtāni mahānti saha karmabhiḥ |*

<sup>130</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

The Composer emphasises that the highest cognitive agent described above is Prajāpati (verse d). In this way he seems to want to convince his recipient that there is correspondence between his cosmogony and Brahmanic cosmogonies. It is identified with the great being (*mahad bhūtam/mahābhūta*) in terms of which reality is conceived after the first manifestation of its power (MDhP 224.31,33).

The Vedic cosmogonies are also activated *via* the concept of taking all beings into one self (verse a). In this way, the image schema of CONTAINER is elaborated to conceive cognition. The composer of the ŚB elaborates this image schema with the use of the general domain of Procreation. In order to create, Prajāpati has to eat the creatures (Jurewicz 2016/18). The noun *tapas* in the phrase *tapasaś caraṇāya* activates the concepts of fasting and recitation in terms of which the next stage of creation performed by the highest cognitive agent is conceived. The verb *car-* implies that the practice called *tapas* is connected with a kind of movement (as it is in Vedic cosmogonies).<sup>131</sup> This verb might also activate the concept of *brahmacārin* in its literal meaning as going for/to/with brahman (the Veda, see chapter 4.11.1).

### MDhP 224.45

*sa vai sijati bhūtāni sa eva puruṣaḥ paraḥ |  
ajo janayate brahmā devaṣipitrṃmānavān ||*

It is him who creates beings. It is him who is the highest man. Brahma who is not born, gives birth to the gods, seers, fathers and men.

Prajāpati is called by the Vedic name, *puruṣa* (verse b) which implies its conceptualisation in terms of man. The phrase *ajo janayate* expresses the paradoxical state of reality in its manifestation and activates the general domain of Procreation in terms of which creation of other sentient beings is conceived (MDhP 224.46).

### 1.2.3. Conclusion

The analysis presented in this chapter allows us to see the role of tradition and its vitality. We have seen that it is the mind (*manas*) which is the most important cognitive faculty and it is seen as having the power to manifest the transformation of an aspect of reality. Its conceptualisation, as fiery in MDhP 224, is also grounded in tradition similarly to the conceptualisation of creative activity as the alternative manifestation of the fiery and fluid aspects

<sup>131</sup> *só 'rcañ chrāmyan prajāpatir iḥṣāṃ cakre | (ŚB 2.5.1.3), só 'rcann acarat | (BU 1.2.1).*

of reality (MDhP 176). The Cosmogonies described in MDhP 175–176 present an earlier way of understanding the great beings before the final conventional way was established, which is attested in MS 1, MDhP 224 and later chapters. Its concise way of exposition is construed in such a way that it triggers the recipient to activate concepts of experience and of R̥gvedic models similar to those of the early Veda (RV, AVŚ). On the other hand, all the examples analysed here confirm that the early Smṛti Composers shared a common cosmogonic model and that the basic assumptions are rooted in tradition. The Composers of the MS and MDhP interpreted tradition in new ways and built on tradition new theories of reality, of the cosmos and of man according to their needs and the needs of their recipients.

That the concept of ‘the great (self, being)’ (*mahan ātman, mahad bhūtam, mahābhūta*) appears in the beginnings of cosmogony clearly derives from Vedic tradition. It does not mean that these cosmogonies are created by those who belonged to the ‘fluid, pluralistic *sāṃkhya-cum-yoga* environment’ nor that they ‘represent pre-philosophical threshold of speculation from which all of the later traditions of Hindu philosophy derive (Larson, Bhattacharya, Potter 2006: 116)’. Although it can be agreed that the early Smṛti philosophy is an important stage in the development of classical Hindu philosophy one cannot agree with a view that sees these texts as representing some ‘pre-philosophical threshold.’ In many cases the texts analysed here are as abstract as the sūtras of Darśanas which also need commentaries. If we want to reconstruct the history of Hindu philosophy, we should not look at the texts composed before the commentarial tradition of the Darśanas from that later perspective but from an earlier one. Sāṃkhya, Yoga and other Darśanas are rather more a superstructure over this early layer of thought and of preceding thought. Their ancestors left the later philosophers a general vision of the world, concepts which could explain the world and an ability to think in a rational and coherent way which had been initiated a thousand years earlier. This cultural background was critical for the later philosophers as it is that earlier tradition which gave them the background against which they could construct their own concepts and philosophical systems.



# Chapter Two

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## The manifest aspect of reality

This chapter is devoted to the implications of the theory of creation seen as a cognitive process where the cosmos and man are manifestation of one reality. The main assumptions are the same as in Vedic philosophy: the cosmos is the manifestation of subject-object cognition and man's role is to enable the highest cognitive agent to recognise itself from within himself. We will see how epistemological concepts are used as ontological and axiological concepts and how the full-fledged metaphysics are created. We will first consider the nature of cognitive categories and their ontologisation when they become rules for the next levels of manifestation. Then, the ambiguity of the manifest aspect will be discussed caused by the epistemic structure of the cosmos and the logic subject-object cognition which needs separation of the object from the subject and thus hides the ontological unity of reality. The next section is devoted to the concept of man. The philosophy of man is a new theory within early Hindu thought in that, in the Veda, the concept of man is analysed mainly in a ritual context. In the early Upaniṣads the problem of liberating cognition begins to be discussed. In the early Smṛti period it is elaborated which needs a detailed analysis of cognitive faculties and of everyday cognition in order to distinguish both kinds of cognition. We will then explore the concept of reason (*buddhi*)<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> For the analysis of the semantics of the noun *buddhi* in the MDhP, see Fitzgerald (2015, 2017a, b). The choice of 'reason' for translation derives from its basic activity which is decision making (*vyavasāya*, 'settled determination, resolve, purpose, intention to.') and this choice is relevant for the subsequent analysis of its role in the processes of bondage and liberation. For *buddhi* in the BhG, see Brassard (1997).

and the concept of the mind (*manas*)<sup>2</sup> and show that they are conceived differently than they are in the classical Darśanas (especially in Sāṃkhya and Yoga schools). The next section is devoted to the axiologisation of the categories when they become moral norms, which is possible only when there is a free agent able to decide. Finally, we discuss the role of emotions in the recognition of moral norms.

## 2.1. The categories

As mentioned in the analysis of the early Smṛti cosmogonies a category, created in one stage of creation, becomes a rule valid for the next stages of creation and necessarily applies to such a stage. Such a theory of categories can be expressed using Geertz's concepts of *model of* and *model for* (1973b). Categories, when settled for the first time, can be seen as the *model of* a given manifestation of reality and they then become a *model for* the further levels. Each stage of manifestation repeats the main cognitive structure of the first act, but, at the same time, it allows for the recognition of reality manifest in the cosmos in a better way thanks to new categories.

The assumption about the determining influence of categories allows the Smṛti Composers to express two aspects of the freedom of reality. One of them is the ability to do whatever one wants. The second is the ability for perfect submission to freely accepted rules. In Vedic thought, especially in the ŚB, the freedom of reality is conceived as the freedom to resign from all its attributes, even the attribute of its existence (ŚB 2.2.4, see Jurewicz 2016/18). In Smṛti thought the attribute of existence is never denied though other attributes are suspended. This suspension is understood as perfect submission to rules within the manifest aspect. Thus, freedom in the Smṛti texts is understood in a similar way to that in the Veda. As will be shown, these two aspects of freedom are realised during liberating cognition too (see chapter 4.11).

The first category is name (*nāman* often specified as the Veda) in which reality expresses itself all at once, beyond any further limits of its cognitive activity. The next categories are time, three and five classes (*guṇa*), action (*karman*), sacrifice (*yajña*) and dharma/adharma. Except for the category of

<sup>2</sup> The concept of mind (*manas*) in the early MDhP (and its connections with the Vedic thought) has been philologically and semantically analysed by Sellmer (2016b) and by Takahashi (2019a, 2019c.) As in the case the of the concept of reason (*buddhi*) it is the function of the mind in cognition leading to bondage and freedom that is the focus here and not the word's full reconstruction.

sacrifice which will be discussed in chapter 4.11.2–3, all these categories will be analysed in this chapter.

From this chapter on, in the analysis of metaphors and concepts, reference will be to the individual stanzas in which the metaphor or concept appears. There will be exceptions. Sometimes it will be necessary to explore context and analyse the whole exposition presented in a chapter or a teaching. However, a full analysis of the teachings presented in the MDhP go beyond the scope of the present study.

### 2.1.1. The category of time

As the analysis of the cosmogonies has shown, the cosmos is the manifestation of the subject-object cognition of reality. Since cognition is an action, dynamism is the main feature of the cosmos. Subjective manifestations are more dynamic than objective ones though objective manifestations do not remain without some movement. Reality in its *creation continua* constantly manifests as the subject and the object of its cognition in order to confirm its unity. A total lack of movement is characteristic only of the unmanifest aspect.

#### MDhP 12.199

*anāditvād amadhyatvād anantatvāc ca so 'vyayaḥ |  
atyeti sarvaduḥkhāni duḥkhaṃ hy antavad ucyate ||*

Because he lacks a beginning, middle and end he is immutable. He transcends all suffering, for suffering is said to be finite.

In the MS the creation of the category of time is presented as appearing when Brahma stays in the Golden Egg for one year. We have referred previously to the cosmogony presented in the ŚB 11.1.6 where the same concept is used and is expressed more explicitly: Prajāpati remains within the egg for one year and thus a year has been created which metonymically activates the concept of time (Jurewicz 2016/18?). The Composer of the MS evokes this conceptualisation. It is important to note that, in the source domain, the nestling undergoes changes within the egg. A year is the period of time which is needed for the nestling to become sufficiently mature to be able to live independently. The movement within the egg is the first movement in the cosmos. In the target domain, movement is measured by time.

As has been argued, the way the temporal structure of the world is created reflects its epistemic nature. Conceived as a growing child, Brahma divides the world into three parts and at the same time the movement up unites them.

In the same way, in self-cognition, the subject firstly separates itself from the object in order to cognise it and to restore unity. The cognitive nature of the arrangement of the cosmos is conceived in terms of measuring and we could say that the cosmos is as much of Brahma as can be measured with time. This interpretation allows us to see the ontological and epistemological identity of Brahma with the unmanifest aspect of reality. This is as much of Brahma as cannot be measured with the aid of time or with any other subject-object categories. Actually, in this aspect there is no Brahma because it is one with what is unmanifest. Temporal division involves spatial division.

The determinative influence of time is conceived metaphorically.<sup>3</sup> Let us begin with the metaphor which elaborates the source domain used for the conceptualisation of time that is attested already in the ṚV (1.164) and the AVŚ (19.53, Jurewicz 2016/18, 2018). This is the source domain of a moving chariot. Within its frames the cosmos is conceived in terms of a wheel, the beings are its spokes (see below, analysis of MDhP 204.8), the borderline sphere between two aspects is its seat and the power of time is a horse which drags a chariot. This conceptualisation is evoked in the following stanza:

### MDhP 203.11

*kālacakram anādyantaṃ bhāvābhāvasvalakṣaṇam |  
trailokyam sarvabhūteṣu cakravat parivartate ||*

The wheel of time without beginning and end which is characterised by being and non-being, which is three worlds revolving in all beings like a wheel.<sup>4</sup>

The conceptualisation of time in terms of a wheel is the result of a tendency for abstraction. During this process an impossible concept is formed: in

<sup>3</sup> Metaphoric conceptualisation of time is widespread, not to say, universal and much elaborated in cognitive research e.g., for metaphoric conceptualisation of time as space and more general research: Kranjec, Chatterjee (2010), Brdar, Omazic, Takac et al (2011), Nuñez, Cooperrider (2013), Gijssels, Casasanto (2017), Evans (2004), for comparative research: Radden (2011), Filipović, Jaszczolt (2012), for more specific studies, e.g.: Konnova, Babenko (2019, in English), Kapetanović (2017, in Old Croatian), Al-Abdullah (2020, in the Sonnets of Shakespeare). Hildebeitel and Kloetzli (2004) explain the meaning of the noun *yuga* as referring ‘to the union, joining, conjunction, or yoking together of two or more entities’ (in the spatial sense) and as ‘joints in time’ (in the temporal sense.) Following their interpretation, one can conjecture that the Ṛgvedic metaphor TIME IS A RIDING CHARIOT could be the reason why the divisions of time were called *yuga*: the motivating experience could be a long journey during which one has to change horses yoked to a chariot/wagon to make the journey successful. The survey of metaphoric conceptualisations of time in the early Hindu thinking can be found in Hildebeitel, Kloetzli (2004). For the appearance of the concept of *yuga* in the MBh, see Mitchiner (1990, 2002), Woods (2001), Gonzalez-Reimann (2002), Hildebeitel (2011a).

<sup>4</sup> Jurewicz’s translation. For the comparative analysis of the metaphoric use of the concept of chariot, see Forte, Smith (2016).

everyday experience a wheel which is not joined to a chariot does not move, as the source domain of time, it revolves. The process of formation of this concept is explained elsewhere (Jurewicz 2018), here we will limit ourselves to saying that the concept of a revolving wheel is the result of a metonymic blend the input spaces of which are two. The first, a chariot which moves and the second, a single wheel. The generic space is the concept of movement. In the blend the feature of a revolving movement is projected onto the concept of a wheel. In MDhP 203.11, the cosmos (the three worlds *trailokya*, verse c) is conceived in terms of a wheel subjected to a mysterious power, then in terms of a moving chariot in terms of which time is conceived. This metaphor is meaningful, not only thanks to its grounding in tradition, but also thanks to the fact that in Smṛti times it belongs to the general domain of Riding In A Chariot which has become an conceptually important frame especially for liberating cognition.

The influence of time is also expressed with use of a new source domain, connected with appearance of new technologies, the sesame oil press. We will first discuss an excerpt where the source domain is expressed explicitly although the concept of time and its influence (as the target domain) is only implied:

### MDhP 204.8

*avyaktanābham vyaktāraṃ vikāraparimaṇḍalam |  
kṣetrajñādhiṣṭhitam cakram snigdhākṣam vartate dhruvam ||*

Its nave is the unmanifest, the spokes the manifest, the felly is transformation of the wheel on which the Field Knower has mounted, its axis is oiled, revolves incessantly.<sup>5</sup>

Verses a–b activates the conceptualisation of the cosmos in terms of the revolving wheel of a chariot. This conceptualisation continues the way of thinking expressed in RV 1.164.2–3.<sup>6</sup> The topology of the source domain allows the Composer to express precisely the structure of the cosmos: the cosmos is conceived in terms of spokes and, as one might presume, the spaces between them are its spheres. In RV 1.164.2, the same conceptualisation is evoked, although profiled in a slightly different way: here the beings/worlds (*bhuvana*) are the spokes.

According to verses c–d, the unmanifest aspect is the hub of the wheel. In this way the presence of the hidden self of the cosmos and man is conceived.

<sup>5</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

<sup>6</sup> The main difference is that the chariot in the source domain in the RV 1.164 is conceived as impossible: it has one wheel and three axles (RV 1.164.2), seven wheels (RV 1.164.3).

The cosmos and man are conceived in terms of a revolving wheel while the transformations of the cosmos and of man's body are conceived in terms of the revolving outer rim (*parimaṇḍala*, see below the analysis of MDhP 231.25). The conceptual network consists of four input spaces: reality in its manifest aspect, the cosmos, man and a chariot. The generic space is the concept of movement. In the blend man and the cosmos are identical, parts of his body are the spheres of the world. The unmanifest aspect, called here the Field Knower (verse c), is within man as his self (*ātman*) and is conceived in terms of the hub of the wheel. The logic of the source domain allows the recipient to understand that the unmanifest aspect does not move because the hub at its centre is the only part of a wheel which does not move.

The compound *kṣetrajñādhiṣṭhita* (verse c) can be understood in two ways. Translating it literally activates the concept of a chariot on which the driver mounts (for elaboration of this metaphor see chapter 4.6.2), Wynne (2009: 339) translates it as 'presided over by the field-knower'. This interpretation highlights the cosmic dimension of the highest cognitive agent which rules the transformations of its manifest forms.

In verse d the axis of the wheel is presented as oiled. In RV 1.164.13 the axis is presented as never being heated although the burden the chariot carries is heavy and the Composer continues this way of thinking. At the same time, the concept of an oiled axis and the revolving movement of the wheel might evoke the general domain of Cleansing By Heat elaborated, as we have seen, in cosmogonies in its specific realisations of the churning of butter and the production of gold (see chapter 1.2.1). If the recipient activates this domain, he will understand the transformations of the cosmos as cognitive transformations. The influence of time is implied by the way the cosmos is conceived – as a dynamic, constantly moving aspect of reality.

Now the source domain of the sesame oil press is introduced:

### MDhP 204.9

*snigdhatvāt tilavat sarvaṃ cakre 'smin pīḍyate jagat |*  
*tilapīḍair ivākramya bhogair ajñānasambhavaiḥ ||*

The entire world is crushed in this wheel, by the pleasures that arise from ignorance, just as the sesame seeds are crushed because of their oiliness. It is as if the whole world is attacked by sesamum grinders.

The concept of the sesame oil press is the next source domain of the conceptual network. The traditional press consists of a thick pole placed in a container with the sesame seeds and the pole is rotated by oxen. The pole

crushes the seeds and the oil flows into a container.<sup>7</sup> The way it is produced is similar to the churning of butter or the kindling of fire, so the recipient may activate these concepts in his blend too. Production of the sesame oil can be seen as the next realisation of the general domain of Cleansing By Heat: pressing involves heating and the product is the same as the products of other source domains which are specific realisations of this domain: bright, clean, transparent oil. Moreover, the topology and scenario of pressing allows the Composer to express the subject-object nature of manifestation. The pressing pole is the subject, the sesame seeds are the object and their pressing is cognition of the object: for a moment, we could say, the press becomes one with sesame seeds and the oil that flows from them.

In the following stanza of the MS, the concept of the sesame oil press is activated by the verb *pīḍ-* to pressure:

### MS 1.51

*evam sarvaṃ sa sṛṣṭvedaṃ māṃ cācintyaparākramah |  
ātmany antardadhe bhūyah kālam kālena pīḍayan ||*

After bringing forth in this manner this whole world and me, that One of inconceivable prowess once again disappeared into himself, striking down time with time.<sup>8</sup>

Here the pressing pole, the power which moves it and the seeds are identified. In this way the Composer not only expresses the identity of the subject and the object realised in cognition but also the independence of the category of time which, once established, becomes the rule of further manifestations. These rules apply with necessity. It is possible that this source domain is also activated in the cosmogony described in MDhP 176 (see chapter 1.2.1b). Olivelle (2005: 89) chooses the meaning of *pīḍ-* as ‘to strike’ and thus loses the source domain in his translation.

The influence of time is also conceived in terms of the general domain of Cooking (for this metaphor in BhG 11 see chapter 4.12). As frequently stated, the general domain of Cooking is a very important domain in the ŚB. It can be activated in the source domain of a nestling growing in the egg, used to conceive the appearance of the category of time in MS 1.12 discussed above. Already in the Veda, transformations of the embryo in his mother’s womb are conceived in terms of its cooking (Kaelber 1990) and Brahma is conceived

<sup>7</sup> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cjVZE91PWog>, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KnzuXZIZ6fg>

<sup>8</sup> See also MDhP 204.4–11.

in terms a man too. Thus, even here, the appearance of the general domain of Cooking can be activated.

In the following stanza, this domain is activated explicitly:

### MDhP 231.25

*kālah pacati bhūtāni sarvāṅy evātmanātmani |  
yasmims tu pacyate kālas taṃ na vedeha kaś cana ||*

Time cooks all the beings in itself by itself. No one knows that in which time is cooked.<sup>9</sup>

In verses a–b the Composer states that time cooks all beings. Cooking is an intentional action and it can be argued that intentionality is also projected onto the target domain (i.e., time) which is conceived in terms of a cook. Since the rotating movement of a ladle is necessary to prevent burning of the food, the scenario and topology of cooking is similar to that of pressing sesame oil, churning butter or kindling fire. The result of this activity is similar too: cooking is transformation under the influence of heat of a product in order to make it clean, edible and tasty.

Activity of time is seen as self-reflexive (‘in itself by itself’ verse b) which agrees with the monistic assumption. The subject-object character of the activity is preserved: time as a cook is the subject, beings as the food are the object while the realisation of their unity is conceived in terms of eating and digesting.

In verses c–d the Composer states that time is cooked by something which is not known. In this way he says that time is dependent upon something else which is the unmanifest aspect of reality manifesting its cognitive power and cognising itself with the use of the category of time. The dependence of time is also conceived in terms of the general domain of Cooking. This way of thinking activates the early Vedic concepts of the borderline sphere between two aspects and it is here conceived as the sphere where time begins. Within the frames of the metaphor TIME IS A RIDING CHARIOT, this sphere is conceived in terms of the chariot’s wheel rim which constantly revolves. Within the frames of conceptualisation of TIME IS A COOK, this sphere might be conceived in terms of a spoon which revolves while it stirs the food and/or the borders of the pot (for this metaphor see also chapter 4.11, *General Conclusion* 3).

It is possible that the same idea is evoked in MDhP 204.9 where transformations of the cosmos and man are called *parimaṇḍala* (see above).

<sup>9</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.



If this interpretation is correct, then the blend created in MDhP 204.9 can be enlarged with the general domain of Cooking (for this kind of blend see below, analysis of MDhP 237.32). It is worth noting that the concept of heating is activated in the elaboration of the chariot metaphor in RV 1.164.13 where it stated that the axle of the wheel, in terms of which the world is conceived, does not overheat. These correspondences between the general domain of Cooking and the general domain of Riding In A Chariot might trigger the recipient to activate both of them as the source domains of time.

In the following example, the Composer creates a conceptual network in which the concept of the revolving wheel of a chariot and the general domain of Cooking are the input spaces and next the concepts of reality and the cosmos:

### MDhP 237.32

*āvartamānam ajaraṃ vivartanaṃ ṣaṅṅemikaṃ dvādaśāraṃ suparva |  
yasyedam āsye pariṃyāti viśvaṃ tat kālacakraṃ nihitaṃ guhāyām ||*

It comes back, ever young, revolves, with six axles and twelve spokes, with good joints. Know that in whose mouth everything goes round: it is the wheel of time, placed in a hiding place.<sup>10</sup>

Reality is conceived in terms of a man and of a riding chariot, its manifest aspect in terms of his open mouth and the wheel which are blended together. The wheel is as impossible as it is in the RV 1.164.3: it has six axles, but twelve spokes which correspond to the divisions of time but also to the spheres of the world. The mouth is open because the man, in terms of which reality is conceived, recites and/or eats. The former conceptualisation highlights the creative aspect of reality, the latter, its killing aspect and they activate the Vedic conceptualisation of the cosmos in terms of constant killing, eating and resurrection of Prajāpati. If the recipient activates the Vedic conceptualisations of the cosmos where the sun, in its movement, is the source domain of the borderline between two aspects, and, at the same time, the metonymic source domain of time he may activate the description of the sun as the ‘cooker of the cooked’ (*pakvāsya paktā*, ŚB 10.4.2.19 see chapter 4.11, Jurewicz 2016/2018).

The inevitability of the influence of time is also conceived in terms of its total rule over creatures.<sup>11</sup> For example:

<sup>10</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

<sup>11</sup> For connections between the concept of the rule and concept of cooking, see below, section 2.6.2.

**MDhP 220.35**

*kālena tvāham ajayaṃ kālenāhaṃ jitas tvayā |  
gantā gatimatām kālaḥ kālaḥ kālayati prajāḥ ||*

I once conquered you by means of time, and you have now conquered me by means of time. Time is the real mover within things that have motion, and is that which carries off all creatures.

**MDhP 220.72**

*kiṃ hi kṛtvā tvam indro 'dya kiṃ hi kṛtvā cyutā vayam |  
kālaḥ kartā vikartā ca sarvam anyad akāraṇam ||*

But what you have done to become Indra, and what have I done for this loss of status? Time is the creator and destroyer – everything else lacks efficacy.

Some scholars claim that such stanzas imply that time is the highest ontological reality and they attest the so-called ‘doctrine of time’ (*kālavāda*), which contended with the main philosophical stream proposed by the Brahmins and is attested in the MBh.<sup>12</sup> It is possible, however, that their introduction into the MBh aims at the redefinition of such doctrines and their incorporation into the main metaphysical frames presented by the Composers. MBh 220, which relates the dialogue between Indra and Bali, is the response to Yudhiṣṭhira who asks ‘what is best for a man beset by a terrible disaster such as the loss of his kinsmen or kingdoms (220.1)’.<sup>13</sup> The Asura Bali is seen by Indra as ‘the ultimately free, full of wisdom and compassion’. In his understanding he is focused on the power of time but he does not deny that the existence of things beyond time.

Hiltebeitel (2011a: 90) calls the sentence ‘time cooks’ (*kālaḥ pacati*) ‘a signature saying of the *Mahābhārata*.’ As far as the early MDhP and the MS are concerned, the general domain of Cooking is not often explicitly activated. As we have seen, it should be rather reconstructed. It should be noted, however, that the source domain of a rotating wheel and sesame oil press include the concept of heating and transformation under the influence of heat. This is the only cosmic concept in the early Smṛti texts motivated by the Vedic concept of fire and its logic. As we will see, in other cases, it can be reconstructed on the level of social and human activities.

<sup>12</sup> Malinar (1996), Vassilkov (1999). For analysis of concept of time in classical Indian culture see: Schayer (2012 [1938]), Malinar (2007b).

<sup>13</sup> MDhP 220.1: *magnasya vyaṣane kṛcchre kiṃ śreyāḥ puruṣasya hi | bandhunāṣe mahīpāla rājyanāṣe 'pi vā punaḥ ||*

\*

The necessity with which the category of time applies is presented in the Smṛti texts in metaphors. The Composers use Vedic source domains. These are the general domains of Riding In A Chariot and the general domain of Cooking. The Composers also introduce a new concept which is the production of sesame oil in a press. It is worth noting that the topology of all three source domains is the same: its main element is a wheel (the general domain of Riding In A Chariot, a sesame oil press) or a rotating movement (the general domain of Cooking). It allows the Composers to express the concept of the submission of beings to the category of time conceived as being on or under the wheel or subject to a rotating motion. However, all the source domains imply that the influence of time is, to some extent, limited: a wheel is part of a chariot in which a warrior or driver rides, there is a cook who stirs the ladle and there are oxen who move the press according to man's will. Thus, the recipient understands that time is the manifestation of something greater that is unmanifest.

Thus conceived, time becomes the rule for the next stages of manifestation. Once reality has manifested as possible to be categorised by time, it will manifest itself in this way until the universal dissolution (*pralaya*). The temporal sequence of the cosmos and its spatial structure never change because reality is totally free and can submit to its own categories. If it didn't do that, it would not fulfill the aim of its manifestation which is the division into subject and object in order to cognise itself.

### 2.1.2. The category of three and five classes (*guṇa*)

The act of establishing the category of three classes (*guṇa*) is presented in the MS as the creation of all things to which the category of three classes refers (*sarvāṇi triguṇāni*, MS 1.15, see chapter 1.1.4). The subject which performs this cognition is the Great Self (*mahān ātman*).<sup>14</sup> These classes are *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*.

The process of ontologisation of the three classes is most clearly described in MaU 5.2 which will be discussed in detail in the future research. Now only a résumé of its main stages is important for the present argument. The creative stages of reality are called according to their cognitive sequence: the first stage is categorised by the class *tamas* which refers to the pre-creative state of the world which is, in the moment of creation, the object of

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<sup>14</sup> See Buitenen (1964).

cognition.<sup>15</sup> The next stage, which involves movement, is categorised by the class *rajas* as it refers to the act of cognition. Then the state called *tamas* reappears which means that cognition fails and the highest cognitive agent recognises its unmanifest aspect which cannot be recognised with aid of the classes.<sup>16</sup> The final state is categorised by the *sattva* class which refers to the manifestation of the subjective power of reality i.e., the highest cognitive agent. The essence (*rasa*) of this power becomes a part (*aṃśa*) present in every man called the Field Knower (*kṣetrajñah*). It is the man's self (*ātman*) called by the Composers of the MaU 'Prajāpati'. Its signs (*liṅga*) are mental imagery, decision and presumption (*samkalpādhyavasāyābhimānaliṅgah prajāpatih*). The signs metonymically activate cognitive faculties: mental imagery is created by the mind (*manas*), decision by reason (*buddhi*) and presumption by the I-form (*ahaṃkāra*). The fact that the cognitive faculties are called 'the sign' (*liṅga*) confirms that reality performs creation in order to cognise itself. Thus, the classes (*guṇa*), describe the cognitive transformations of reality. Then, elements of subject-object cognition become bodies or selves (*tanu*) of reality; the object becomes Rudra, the act becomes Brahma and the subject becomes Viṣṇu.<sup>17</sup> From the perspective of the manifest aspect, the cognitive faculties, the classes used by them and the gods are ontological concepts.

In the MS the process of ontologisation of the three classes is described in the following way:

### MS 12.24

*sattvaṃ rajas tamaś caiva trīn vidyād ātmano guṇān |  
yair vyāpyemān sthito bhāvān mahān sarvān aśeṣataḥ ||*

Sattva, rajas and tamas should be understood as the three classes of the Self by which the Great is present having fully pervaded all these mental states.<sup>18</sup>

The highest cognitive agent is called here the Great (*mahān*, verse d). Thus, the Composer refers to the first manifestation of the highest cognitive agent (Brahma) in the cosmos after its arrangement with the use of the categories of time and space (see MS 1.15, see chapter 1.1.4). This manifestation is

<sup>15</sup> As it is in the BU 1.4.10 where perceived *ātman* is the object of cognition of brahman (*brāhma vā idān āgra āsīt | tād ātmānam evāved | ahāṃ brāhmāsmīti | tāsmāt tāt sarvān abhavat |*)

<sup>16</sup> There are two versions of this stage, according to another the state called *sattva* appears and it is accepted by van Buitenen (1962). The version chosen is closer to the Vedic thinking.

<sup>17</sup> MaU 5.2: *tasya proktā agryās tanavo brahmā rudro viṣṇur iti | atha yo ha khalu vāvāsya tamaso 'mśo 'sau sa yo 'yaṃ rudraḥ | atha yo ha khalu vāvāsya rajaso 'mśo 'sau sa yo 'yaṃ brahmā | atha yo ha khalu vāvāsya sāttviko 'mśo 'sau yo 'yaṃ viṣṇuḥ |*

<sup>18</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

called *mahān ātman* and is also evoked by the Genitive *ātmano* (verse b). On one hand the three classes are used by the Great Self while on the other they refer to it because it is the object of its self-cognition.

The word *bhāva* (verse d) denotes the mental images of the mind which cause emotional effects recognised as pleasant, unpleasant and neutral. These states are conceived as being pervaded or permeated (*vyāpya*, verse c) by three classes which are integral to the Great Self (verse b). The Great Self cognises its various emotional states with their aid and thus it is present (*sthita*, verse c) in the cosmos because cognition results in being. This is confirmed by the meaning of *bhāva* which also means ‘being, existence.’

### MS 12.25

*yo yadaiśāṃ guṇo dehe sākalyenātiricyate |  
sa tadā tadguṇaprāyaṃ taṃ karoti śarīriṇam ||*

When one of these classes<sup>19</sup> predominates in<sup>20</sup> the body, it makes the embodied one apply that class.<sup>21</sup>

In the previous stanza, the Composer states that the Great Self is present in mental states through its classes. Now, it is implied that the classes allow the subject to understand the object for which they have become the rules for its further manifestations. Thus, they become features of the object and are seen as such from the perspective of the manifest aspect.

The word *śarīrin* (verse d) refers to reality with a focus on the fact that it has endowed itself in the body, either cosmic or human (see chapter 3.3.1.b). In this way the self-reflective nature of the creative cognition is expressed: the classes, created by the Great Self, categorise it in an epistemological and ontological way. The last part of the compound *tadguṇaprāyaṃ* (verse c), i.e. *-prāya*, can be interpreted ontologically (‘chiefly consisting of or destined for or furnished with, rich or abounding in’) or epistemologically (‘frequently practising or applying or using’). If we accept the epistemological meaning then we highlight the fact that manifestations of reality are able to use the class which categorises them. The ontological meaning implies the ontological results of creative cognition: the object becomes composed of the class which is used to cognise it. Both meanings should be activated simultaneously.

<sup>19</sup> Olivelle (2005: 231): ‘attributes.’

<sup>20</sup> Olivelle (2005: 231): ‘suffuses.’

<sup>21</sup> Olivelle (2005: 231): ‘self-dominant in that attribute.’

**MS 12.26**

*sattvaṃ jñānaṃ tamo 'jñānaṃ rāgadveṣau rajaḥ smṛtam |  
etad vyāptimad eteṣāṃ sarvabhūtāśritaṃ vapuḥ ||*

Sattva<sup>22</sup> is cognition, tradition tells us; tamas<sup>23</sup> is ignorance; and rajas<sup>24</sup> is passion and hatred. It is their pervasive form that inheres in all beings.<sup>25</sup>

Here the epistemological frame of the three classes is clearly expressed: sattva classifies subjective activity which is metonymically evoked by cognition (*jñāna*), tamas classifies objective activity which is metonymically activate by ignorance (*ajñāna*) and rajas classifies two kinds of attitudes of the subject towards the object, positive and negative (see BU 1.4.1–3). In verses c–d, the Composer states that this cognitive frame is their form (*vapus*) in which they are present in all beings (*sarvabhūtāśritaṃ*) and thus highlights their ontological dimension. Their form is permeating (*vyāptimad*) because, as stated in MS 12.24, the Great Self permeates all mental states/beings (*bhāva*) with them.

Let us now look at the description of the three classes presented in the BhG:

**BhG 14.5–8**

*sattvaṃ rajas tama iti guṇāḥ prakṛtisambhavāḥ |  
nibadhnanti mahābāho dehe dehinam avyayam || (5)*

The classes<sup>26</sup> called sattva, rajas, and tamas are born from nature,<sup>27</sup> and they fetter the eternal embodied one<sup>28</sup> to their bodies, strong-armed one.

*tatra sattvaṃ nirmalatvāt prakāśakam anāmayam |  
sukhasaṅgena badhnāti jñānasaṅgena cānagha || (6)*

Among these classes,<sup>29</sup> sattva, which because of its spotlessness is illumining and salubrious, binds<sup>30</sup> by means of an attachment to joy and an attachment to cognition,<sup>31</sup> prince sans blame.

<sup>22</sup> Olivelle (2005: 231): ‘Goodness.’

<sup>23</sup> Olivelle (2005: 231): ‘Darkness.’

<sup>24</sup> Olivelle (2005: 231): ‘Vigor.’

<sup>25</sup> Olivelle (2005: 231): ‘These are their pervasive forms that inhere in all beings.’ See also BhG 14.17: *sattvāt saṃjāyate jñānaṃ rajaso lobha eva ca | pramādamohau tamaso bhavato 'jñānam eva ca ||*

<sup>26</sup> van Buitenen (1981: 127): ‘guṇas.’

<sup>27</sup> van Buitenen (1981: 127): ‘Prakṛti.’

<sup>28</sup> van Buitenen (1981: 127): ‘souls.’

<sup>29</sup> van Buitenen (1981: 127): ‘guṇas.’

<sup>30</sup> van Buitenen (1981: 127) adds ‘the soul.’

<sup>31</sup> van Buitenen (1981: 127): ‘knowledge.’

*rajo rāgātmakam viddhi tṛṣṇāsaṅgasamudbhavam |  
tan nibadhnāti kaunteya karmasaṅgena dehinam || (7)*

Know that rajas is characterised by passion and arises from an attachment to craving; it binds the embodied one<sup>32</sup> by an attachment to action, Kaunteya.

*tamas tv ajñānaṅgam viddhi mohanaṅ sarvadehinām |  
pramādālasyanidrābhis tan nibadhnāti bhārata || (8)*

Know, on the other hand, that tamas arises from ignorance and deludes the embodied ones;<sup>33</sup> it binds through absentmindedness, sloth, and sleep, Bhārata.

*sattvaṅ sukhe sañjayati rajaḥ karmaṇi bhārata |  
jñānam āvṛtya tu tamaḥ pramāde sañjayaty uta || (9)*

Sattva attaches one to joy, rajas to activity, Bhārata; tamas attaches one to negligence by obfuscating cognition.<sup>34</sup>

The features of the classes can be divided into epistemological/psychological and ontological. Epistemological features of the classes are: the connection of sattva with cognition and the connection of tamas with the lack of cognition. Desire and craving are more psychological features than cognitive but are necessary condition for cognition. In monistic theory rajas is the most important category among the classes because it expresses a relation between opposed elements which allows them preserve unity (see below 2.4).

The ontological features are as follows: the illuminating nature of sattva (6b), the connection of rajas with action (7cd) and the connection of tamas with sloth and sleep (8d). The source domain for conceptualisation of the ontological features is weight: sattva is the lightest and tamas the heaviest. The classes thus conceived describe the spatiotemporal structure of the manifest aspect. The highest cognitive agent, having recognised its self (*ātman*) as great, categorised the object: the sky is categorised by sattva as light and bright, the earth is categorised by tamas as heavy and dark. They stand in opposition. The movement in the space between them is categorised by rajas.

However, the Composer of the BhG uses the verb ‘to bind’ (*badh-*) in his explanation of the three classes. One refers here to RV 10.90.15cd where reality, manifested as world and conceived in terms of man, is presented as bounded.<sup>35</sup> This description can be interpreted as the source domain in terms of which

<sup>32</sup> van Buitenen (1981: 127): ‘soul.’

<sup>33</sup> van Buitenen (1981: 127): ‘souls.’

<sup>34</sup> van Buitenen (1981: 127): ‘knowledge.’

<sup>35</sup> RV 10.90.15cd: *devā yād yajñam tanvānā ābadhnan pūruṣam paśúm*. Note that binding is done with ropes which shows a conceptual connection between binding an animal in sacrifice and binding with classes in cognition.

creation is conceived as the process in which reality restrains itself (Jurewicz 2010). In the description of the BhG the idea of restraint is even more clear. The three classes are the modes of cognition but, at the same time, they become ontological phenomena in the way that reality manifests itself in the cosmos. Reality in the cosmos becomes bound by its own categories so that it can constantly cognise itself properly. The Composer states that classes bound the embodied one (*dehin*) which in its unmanifest aspect is unchanging (14.5c). This unchanging reality is also bound by its categories in men who are expected to repeat this recognition but, as will be shown (see chapter 3.3), in many cases it does not happen.

The three classes are also presented as inducing (*sam jan-*) various states (BhG 14.9) which even more implies their ontological aspect. Their influence is conceived in terms of the image schema of FORCE: they are conceived in terms of powers which make agents think, feel and act in a specific way which realises their specific attitudes either of the subject, or of the object or of the act (metaphor CAUSES ARE FORCES). Since categories become the rules for further manifestations, the three classes can be seen as inducing reality to manifest in an ordered way; as the subject, the object and the act of cognition. Sky, space and earth are always themselves as are other cosmic phenomena because this is the way reality can realise its desire to cognise itself. The same is for dawn, day, twilight and night. As we will see, on a human level, things look more complicated (see section 2.6) because men possess free will and the classes become norms which should be obeyed but often are not.

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The three classes allow for categorisation of the whole manifest aspect. They are created by the highest cognitive agent in such a way as to enable it to recognise elements of its subject-object self cognition. Their constant presence in the cosmos makes those who live within it think that they form the features of its objects, states and processes. It is the necessity with which they apply, that is the reason of their ontologisation. Thus, the Smṛti Composers introduce the two perspectives of their philosophical exposition. These are the perspective of the highest cognitive agent in its cosmic subject-object cognition and the perspective of everyday subject-object cognition performed by sentient beings. The former perspective is realised by men when they are free (chapter 4), the latter by men who are not (chapter 3).



### 2.1.3. The category of five classes (*guṇa*)

As previously stated, the five classes (called *guṇa* too) allow the highest cognitive agent to cognise five great beings (*mahābhūta*) which form its perceptible manifestation: sound allows it to categorise its manifestation as space, touch allows it to categorise its manifestation as wind, form allows it to categorise its manifestation as light, taste allows it to categorise its manifestation as water and smell allows it to categorise its manifestation as the earth. Once one kind of manifestation is categorised it is always categorised in the same way, the five classes determine further manifestations. The determinative nature of the five classes is explicitly expressed in MS 1.20 and in MDhP 224.39 (see chapter 1.1.5, 1.2.2). A class, used in recognition of one great being, is used to categorise the next. However, each great being to become itself, is categorised with aid of a class specific for it. So, sound (*śabda*) is the class that allows categorisation of all five great beings (*mahābhūta*). Touch (*sparsa*) is the class that allows categorisation of four great beings. Form (*rūpa*) is the class that allows categorisation of three great beings. Taste (*rasa*) is the class that allows categorisation of two great beings. Smell (*gandha*) is the class that allows categorisation of only one great being which is the earth. In other words, all the great beings make a sound, four great beings can be touched, three great beings can be seen, two great beings can be tasted and one can be smelt. The fact that all of the great beings make sound is based in the conviction that the cosmos is sound incarnated. At the same time, each one of them can be categorised with use of a specific class which makes it different from the others.

Once the highest cognitive agent has manifested as possible to be categorised with the aid of the sound, it will be categorised in this way as long as the manifest aspect exists. And the case is the same when it is possible to be categorised with touch, form, taste and smell. From the perspective of the manifest aspect, the classes acquire an ontological dimension: they can be seen as the features of the objects categorised by them.

The cognitive nature of the five classes (*guṇas*) and their ontologisation is also expressed in the following passage:

#### MDhP 203.32

*tadvat somaguṇā jihvā gandhas tu pṛthivīguṇaḥ |*  
*śrotraṃ śabdaguṇaṃ caiva cakṣur agner guṇas tathā ||*  
*sparsaṃ vāyuguṇaṃ vidyāt sarvabhūteṣu sarvadā ||*

In a similar manner one should understand the tongue as possessing the class of water, smell possessing as the class of the earth, the ear as possessing the class

of sound, vision as possessing the class of fire and touch as possessing the class of the wind. They are all found in all beings.<sup>36</sup>

Expressions such as *somaguṇā jihvā* and others can be interpreted epistemologically: the tongue possesses the class of water in the sense that it can categorise and recognise water with the use of its specific class which is taste. At the same time the tongue can be cognised with the aid of the class of taste. Both meanings should be activated simultaneously: once the subjective power of reality begins to use a category, it is possible for it to be cognised with the aid of that category and thus its self-cognition is fulfilled on a given level of manifestation.

The same is for other similar expressions. It is worth noting that their sequence is very ordered: the first highlights the concept of a sense (*somaguṇā jihvā*, verse a), the second the concept of a class used by a sense (*gandhas pṛthivīguṇas*, verse b) and the third highlights a sense with its class (*śrotram śabdaguṇam*, verse c). The sequence is then repeated. First, the concept of a sense is highlighted (*caḥsur agner guṇas*, verse d), and next the concept of a class used by a sense (*sparśam vāyuguṇam*, verse e). The arrangement of these blended expressions suggests that the general meaning of the stanza is to outline the process of cognition of the senses of reason, with the use of a particular class to cognise a given manifestation (a great being).

In his translation Wynne (2009: 333) understands ‘tongue as an evolvent of water, smell as a perceptible quality of the earth, the ear as an evolvent of space, vision as an evolvent of fire and touch as a perceptible quality of wind.’ The main objection to his translation is that, in some cases, he reverses the sequence of creation according to which (as has been shown) a cognitive faculty creates a category which creates an object.

At the same time these are construed in such a way that the recipient immediately understands their ontologisation (as Wynne has understood in his translation), because in two cases it is possible to understand them as ascribing ontic features to great beings (*gandhas pṛthivīguṇas* ‘smell is the feature of the earth’ and *sparśam vāyuguṇam* ‘touch is the feature of wind’). The ontologisation is strengthened in verse d where the Composer states that all of them are in living beings.

### MDhP 203.33

*manah sattvagunaṃ pṛāhuḥ sattvam avyaktajam tathā |*  
*sarvabhūtātmabhūtastham tasmād budhyeta buddhimān ||*

<sup>36</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

They say that the mind possesses the class of *sattva* and *sattva*<sup>37</sup> arises from unmanifest. Therefore, an intelligent man should understand that the unmanifest abides as the self in all creatures.<sup>38</sup>

The noun *sattva* (verse a) has several meanings in early Smṛti texts. Apart from meaning one of the three classes (*guṇa*), it also means the subjective power of reality categorised with the use of this class (synonym of reason, *buddhi*)<sup>39</sup> and an ontologic notion ‘a substance, being’. Here it is proposed to use the first meaning: it is a category used by the mind thanks to which it can cognise the unmanifest aspect from which this category appears (verse b). On the other hand, as it is in previous cases, *sattvagūṇa* also means that the mind can be cognised by category of *sattva* when it desires to cognise the unmanifest aspect of reality. This situation is realised in liberating cognition. We will come to the role of mind in this process below (see section 2.3.2d) and in chapter 4. For the present argument it is important that in verses c–d, the Composer explains the omnipresence of the unmanifest reality in its manifest aspect which consists on using categories (*guṇa*).

In the next stanza, the Composer continues this line of thinking:

#### MDhP 203.34

*ete bhāvā jagat sarvaṃ vahanti sacarācaram* |<sup>40</sup>  
*śrītā virajaṣaṃ devaṃ yam āhuḥ paramaṃ padam* ||

These mental states carry the entire world, with that which moves and that which does not. They abide in the spotless god that is called the highest abode.

As discussed below the word *bhāva* (verse a) denotes the mental images of the mind which cause three kinds of feelings categorised by the three classes (see below, section 2.3.2). They are presented as carrying or bearing the world (verses a–b) which may activate the general domain of Riding In A Chariot that is used to denote the activity of time. In this way, the Composer not only states the cognitive structure of the cosmos but also its connection with and dependence on time. In verses c–d the classes are presented as abiding in the spotless highest god called the highest abode. In this way, the Composer presents the dependence of the classes on the unmanifest aspect of reality.

The primarily cognitive nature of the five classes (*guṇa*) is very well seen in the descriptions of the destruction of the cosmos (*pralaya*): the great

<sup>37</sup> Wynne (2009: 333): ‘the mind as an evolvent of substance and the substance.’

<sup>38</sup> For a similar description see MDhP 180.24, chapter 3.3.2a.

<sup>39</sup> See MDhP 241.1 (section 2.1.5), 187.37 (section 2.3.2d).

<sup>40</sup> For the similar expression, see MDhP 187.26 (section 2.3.2).

elements disappear when their specific classes are annihilated (MDhP 228). Annihilation of a class means that it is no longer perceived by the subject. The highest cognitive agent stops to smell and thus its manifestation as the earth disappears. It stops to taste and thus its manifestation as the water disappears. It stops to see and thus its manifestation as the light disappears. It stops to touch and thus its manifestation as the wind disappears. It stops to speak and thus its manifestation as the space disappears. Then the highest cognitive agent transforms itself back to its mental form (*manas*).

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The five classes (*guṇa*) allow the highest cognitive agent to categorise its manifestation with the aid of the five senses of reason (*buddhīndriya*). Since categorisation takes place constantly, the classes are seen from within the manifest aspect as features of that which is cognised with the use of the five senses. In everyday cognition, men infer on the basis of features seen as ontologically present in the five great beings (*mahābhūta*). This ontologisation is however, the result of wrong cognition (see chapter 3).

#### 2.1.4. The category of action (*karman*)

Already in the Veda the relationship between two aspects of reality is conceived in terms of a man who possess a body. On one hand, the unmanifest aspect is presented as the whole body and the manifest aspect is its mouth (or head, see above section 2.1.1). On the other, the unmanifest aspect is conceived as being within the body (in terms of which the cosmos is conceived and which is also the body of men) as their unmanifest self (*ātman*). Within the frames of this conceptualisation the body is conceived in terms of a stronghold which possesses nine gates in terms of which the nine apertures of the male body are conceived (two eyes, two nostrils, two ears, mouth, penis and anus). As stated earlier, this conceptualisation appears already in the AVŚ 10.2.29–33 (Jurewicz 2016/18),<sup>41</sup> and is repeated in the stanza below which continues the description presented in 203.32–33 (see above section 2.1.3):

#### MDhP 203.35

*navadvāraṃ puraṃ puṇyam etair bhāvaiḥ samanvitam |  
vyāpya śete mahān ātmā tasmāt puruṣa ucyate ||*

<sup>41</sup> See also the definition of *puruṣa*, man, in MDhP 224.42 (chapter 1.2.2).

The Great Self<sup>42</sup> has pervaded with these mental states<sup>43</sup> the clean fortress with nine gates and lies within it. Because of that it is called man.

The recipient is triggered to create a conceptual network consisting of the following input spaces: a) the concept of reality, b) the concept of the cosmos, c) the concept of a fortress and d) the concept of the male body. The generic space is an image schema of CONTAINER. In the blend the cosmos is conceived in terms of a stronghold identified with the male body and unmanifest reality is conceived in terms of man present within it. Fortress, however, does not move, so the Composers used the concept of the Vedic concept of a moving human body to express the dynamism of the manifest aspect.

It should be noted that a detailed description of the cosmic self of reality is not often seen in the texts analysed in this study. One such examples however is a later chapter MDhP 271 where reality is identified with Viṣṇu called Hari Nārāyaṇa. The beginning of the description will also shed light on the difference between reality, its manifestation as the highest cognitive agent and the nature of its manifestation in the cosmos:<sup>44</sup>

### MDhP 271.19

*anādinidhanaḥ śrīmān harir nārāyaṇaḥ prabhuḥ |  
sa vai sṛjati bhūtāni sthāvarāṇi carāṇi ca ||*

Without beginning and end is the blessed Hari Nārāyaṇa, the lord. It is him who creates beings movable and immovable.

The content of the hemistichs concisely reflects the stages of creation. Reality in its unmanifest aspect is identified with Hari Nārāyaṇa. It is without beginning (verses a–b). In verses c–d it is presented as the creator of the cosmos metonymically activated *via* its inhabitants (the movable and immovable creatures). In its creative activity reality manifests as the highest cognitive agent. This form corresponds to Brahma in the cosmogony of the MS.

### MDhP 271.20

*eṣa sarveṣu bhūteṣu kṣaraś cākṣara eva ca |  
ekādaśavikārātmā jagat pibati rāsmibhiḥ ||*

It is him who is in all beings, he is perishable and imperishable. The self of eleven transformations drinks world with its rays/reins.

<sup>42</sup> Wynne (2009: 335): ‘the great self.’

<sup>43</sup> Wynne (2009: 335): ‘states.’

<sup>44</sup> MDhP 271.5cd: *brūhy asmai dānavendrāya viṣṇor mähātmyam uttamam.*

In verses a–b the next stage of creation is presented i.e., the recognition of the ontic unity of both aspects, conceived in terms of entering of the highest cognitive agent into its creation. This stage is clearly expressed in the ŚB 11.2.3, BU 1.4.7 and CU 6.3.2–3 where reality (here the division into reality and the highest cognitive agent is not expressed) having divided its manifest aspect with names and forms, enters it (Jurewicz 2016/18). The result is the presence of the highest cognitive agent in all beings (verse a) and thus it becomes perishable (*kṣara*) and imperishable (*akṣara*, verse b). Such a qualification refers to its presence in movable and immovable creatures, mentioned in 271.19cd, but it may also refer to its ambiguous nature: as identical with the unmanifest reality it is imperishable, as manifest it is perishable.

In verses c–d the cognitive nature of the manifestation of the highest cognitive agent in the cosmos is metaphorically expressed. In verse c reality, as the highest cognitive agent, is qualified as the self of eleven transformations (*ekādaśavikārātmā*).<sup>45</sup> The number eleven most probably refers to the sevenfold activity of mental faculties taken together as one (the Great Self, the mind and the I-form) and ten senses (five senses of reason and five senses of action) which cause its cognitive transformations. The recipient may presume that the self is not disturbed by these transformations, but uses them in order to cognise its ontic unity. This form corresponds to the Great Self (*mahān ātman*) in the cosmogony of the MS.

This interpretation is confirmed in verse d where the highest cognitive agent is presented as drinking the world with its rays which implies conceptualisation of the highest cognitive agent, in the form of the Great Self, in terms of the sun.<sup>46</sup> The concept of drinking with the aid of rays/reins is a blend the input spaces of which are the general domain of Cooking (in its specific realisation of drinking), the general domain of Riding In A Chariot, the concept of the sun in its everyday movement, the concept of subject-object cognition, the concept of reality and the concept of cosmos. The generic space is the concept of transformation. In the blend, the cosmos is the self of reality which performs self-cognition conceived in terms of drinking and riding in a chariot. In the ŚB, the sun is presented as eating beings on the earth and this conceptualisation is elaborated here although devoid of the cruelty that is characteristic of earlier thought. While in the ŚB, the concept of eating highlights the destroying aspect of the creative activity of reality which is death, in the early Smṛti texts eating is the source domain for conceptualisation of subject-object cognition. Within the frames of the metaphor COGNITION

<sup>45</sup> In MDhP 233.17 (see below) the same verse appears.

<sup>46</sup> This conceptualisation is also elaborated in the MaU 2.6 where the cosmic self-cognition is conceived as drinking with rays/reins.

IS RIDING IN A CHARIOT, the highest cognitive agent as the self of the cosmos is conceived in terms of the owner of the chariot (*rathin*, KaU 3.3, see chapter 4.6.2) or a driver, its cognitive faculties are its reins. Conceptualisation of the self of the cosmos and of man in terms of the sun goes back to the AVŚ (Jurewicz 2016/18).

The description of parts of the cosmos identified with the parts of the body which enable subject-object cognition is then presented. Only its first two stanzas are quoted here:

### MDhP 271.21–22

*pādaṁ tasya mahīm viddhi mūrdhānaṁ divam eva ca |  
bāhavas tu diśo daitya śrotram ākāśam eva ca || (21)*

Know that earth are his feet, sky is his head, directions are his arms, space is his hearing,

*tasya tejomayaḥ sūryo manaś candramasi sthitam |  
buddhir jñānagatā nityaṁ rasas tv apsu pravartate || (22)*

the sun is his shining [eye], the mind is within the moon, the understanding is always focused on cognition, taste active in waters.

The correspondence between parts of the cosmos and parts of the body generally accords to Vedic tradition (RV 10.90, AVŚ 10.2, 11.5, 8, Jurewicz 2016/18). We need to refer to verse c of MDhP 271.22: reason (*buddhi*) is presented as always focused on cognition. In this way the Composer states that cosmic subject-object cognition is always true.

The Composer of the cosmogony of the MS does not mention reason (*buddhi*) as the faculty of the highest cognitive agent: the manifestation that is cognised with the use of the three and five classes (*guṇa*) is called the Great Self (*mahān ātman*). However, as will be shown below (see section 2.3.2), the faculty which uses the category of classes in man is called reason (*buddhi*) and thus one can interpret manifestation in the form of the Great Self as corresponding to this faculty in the cosmic dimension. This is confirmed in MS 12.24 where the three classes are used by highest cognitive agent who called the same (the Great Self, see above section 2.1.2), and in MDhP 230.13 where the reason (*buddhi*) (seen as the first manifestation of the highest cognitive agent) is identified with the form called the ‘unchanging great’.<sup>47</sup> In MaU 5.2 (referred to above, see section 2.1.2) the first subjective manifestation of reality is categorised as sattva and in other texts (e.g., KaU 6.7) reason (*buddhi*) is also called sattva. Such a qualification metonymically evokes the concept of

<sup>47</sup> MDhP 212.13cd: *tam āhuḥ paramaṁ śukraṁ buddhir ity avyayaṁ mahāt.*

reason *via* its use of the concept of class (*sattva*) which again metonymically activate other classes (*rajas* and *tamas*, for this use see below, section 2.3.2).<sup>48</sup>

Manifestation in the cosmos, conceived in terms of human body, implies that the cosmos not only cognises but also moves. In MS 1.18 (see chapter 1.1.4) this movement is expressed by the concept of the five senses of action (*karmendriya*) together with their category (*karman*) and the object (the moving body of Brahma). In the following stanza the highest cognitive agent, manifest in the cosmic body, is called ‘possessing the perceptible form’ (*mūrtiman*) and the Composer evokes the three categories of this form namely time (*kāla*), classes (*guṇa*) and action (*karman*):

### MDhP 233.17

*ekādaśavikārātmā kalāsaṃbhārasaṃbhṛtaḥ |*  
*mūrtimān iti taṃ viddhi tāta karmaguṇātmakam ||*

Know that the Self with eleven transformations – a collection arranged of parts/moments, is called as possessing perceptible forms. Its essence are classes and actions.

In verse a, the highest cognitive agent is called the same as in MDhP 171.20c ‘the self with eleven transformations’ (*ekādaśavikārātmā*). As stated above eleven transformations is most probably the sevenfold activity of mental faculties compressed into one and ten senses. The way the categories are presented implies their determinative nature.

The noun *kalā-*, the first part of the compound *kalāsaṃbhārasaṃbhṛta* (verse b) implies that the highest cognitive agent is divided into spatially, but also temporally. The blended spatio-temporal concept is expressed in the meaning of *kalā* as ‘a digit or one-sixteenth of the moon’s diameter,’ because digits of the moon are realised in its transformations during time. If the recipient activates this meaning, he will understand the highest cognitive agent in terms of the moon which can be seen as a collection of its parts visible every night in a different but orderly way. Such a concept of the moon is a conceptual blend the input spaces of which are its parts (*kalā*). The categories of classes (*guṇa*) and of actions (*karman*, verse d) are the next input spaces of the conceptual network. In the blend, the sequence of its parts is seen as changes of the moon which transforms itself from its tamasic form to the sattvic one and back. The concept of movement comes from the input space of action

<sup>48</sup> In MaU 2.5, the highest cognitive agent is called as *saṃkalpādhyavasāyabhimāna*. The nouns in the compound evoke the activity of the mind, the reason and the I-form. This also confirms that the highest cognitive agent is conceived as endowed with reason (*buddhi*).



(*karman*). Without it, each part (*kalā*) of the moon would exist separately. The generic space is the image schema of WHOLE-PART.

The category of action (*karman*) also becomes the rule for the further manifestation. The highest cognitive agent cognises itself in the cosmos all the time: it speaks, walks so distributes itself, catches itself, cooks, eats, excretes and conglomerates its new form and sexually unites in it. In other words, if the highest cognitive agent wants to constantly manifest as space, wind, fire, water and earth, it has to behave in the same way all the time.

The Smṛti Composers usually describe the necessity of action (*karman*) in the context of the individual agent, first of all man (see section 2.1.3, chapter 3.2.3). However, at the end of the description of creation in the MS, before the four social states (*varṇa*) and the first man are created, the Composer states:

### MS 1.28–29

*yaṃ tu karmaṇi yasmin sa nyayūṅkta prathamam prabhuh |*  
*sa tad eva svayaṃ bheje sṛjyamānaḥ punaḥ punaḥ || (28)*

As they are brought again and again, each creature follows on its own the very activity in an orderly sequence.

*hiṃsrāhiṃsre mṛdukrūre dharmādharmaṃv ṛtāṅṛte |*  
*yad yasya so 'dadhāt sarge tat tasya svayam āviśat || (29)*

Violence or non-violence, gentleness or cruelty, dharma or adharma,<sup>49</sup> truthfulness or untruthfulness – whichever he assigned to each at the time of creation, it stuck automatically to that one.<sup>50</sup>

Since man is not yet created, the recipient understands that the Composer is describing the necessity of the category of action (*karman*) in reference to other agents like gods and the Sādhyass, but also to the world (with its evil beings like asuras and rakṣasas) which is a manifestation of the cognitive activity of reality and is in constant movement.

The use of the verb *yuj-* (*nyayūṅkta*, MS 1.28b) implies the necessity with which the category of action (*karman*) applies to further manifestations. This necessity is conceived in terms of yoking. Here the Composer of MS is activating the general domain of Riding In A Chariot. In these terms one can imagine the creative activity of Brahma: he goes on his journey the aim of which is self-cognition. In the same way, liberating practice is conceived (see chapter 4.6.2). In the source domain, the journey will be successful if

<sup>49</sup> Olivelle (2005: 88): 'righteousness or unrighteousness.'

<sup>50</sup> Olivelle (2005: 88): 'creature.'

the horses are obedient to the driver. In the target domain, if Brahma wants to constantly cognise itself, he needs to subdue his actions to this will and act in the same way throughout the time of existence of the cosmos. In order to express the necessity of the category of action the Composer also uses the concept of the changing seasons:

### MS 1.30

*yathā rtulīṅgāny ṛtavaḥ svayam eva rtuparyaye |  
svāni svāny abhipadyante tathā karmāṇi dehinaḥ ||*

As at the change of season each season automatically adopts its own distinctive marks, so do embodied ones<sup>51</sup> adopt their own distinctive acts.

Men recognise the change of the seasons on the basis of their signs (*liṅga*, verse a). It is a universal way of recognising seasons but it can be argued that one of the important experiences which motivate this metaphor is farming, because recognition of the right time is especially important for this activity. The logic of the source domain clearly implies that actions are the signs on the basis of which the manifestations of the highest cognitive agent can be recognised. Moreover, the concept of the change of seasons introduces the category of time and its necessary influence. In his translation Olivelle interprets *dehinas* (verse d) as the Nominative plur. ‘embodied ones. However, this form is ambiguous and it can also be understood as Ablative/ Genitive sing., ‘of the embodied one’. This ambiguity is intentional. The highest cognitive agent performs various actions which are then inevitably repeated by its manifestations.

The fact that the highest cognitive agent is cognitively active in its cosmic manifestation and the embodied character of its cognition is explicitly expressed in the following stanzas of the MDhP:<sup>52</sup>

### MDhP 203.37

*yathā dīpaḥ prakāśātmā hrasvo vā yadi vā mahān |  
jñānātmānaṃ tathā vidyāt puruṣaṃ sarvajantuṣu ||*

Just as the essence of a lamp, be it small or large, is illumination, so one should know that the essence of man<sup>53</sup> that abides within all creatures is cognition.<sup>54</sup>

<sup>51</sup> Olivelle (2005: 88): ‘beings.’

<sup>52</sup> Earlier stanzas of MDhP 203 are quoted above, see sections 2.1.3, 2.1.4.

<sup>53</sup> Wynne (2009: 335): ‘of the spirit.’

<sup>54</sup> Wynne (2009: 335): ‘consciousness.’

In verses a–b, the Composer activates the concept of the flame of a lamp the aim of which is to illuminate. In verses c–d, the highest cognitive agent is called ‘man’ (*puruṣa*) ‘whose essence is cognition’ (*jñānātman*). Thus, the composer activates the metaphor COGNITION IS SEEING. Within the frames of this metaphor, sentient beings are conceived in terms of the body of a lamp (for this conceptualisation see below, MDhP 187.44, section 2.3.2e). In the next stanza, the Composer explicitly expresses that it is the highest cognitive agent which performs cognition with the aid of men’s cognitive faculties and with the aid of their bodies:

### MDhP 203.38

*so ‘tra<sup>55</sup> vedayate vedyam sa śṛṇoti sa paśyati  
kāraṇam tasya deho ‘yam sa kartā sarvakarmanām*

It is him who feels what is to be felt, he hears and sees. The body is his instrument. He is the agent of all acts.<sup>56</sup>

### 2.1.5. The concept of one’s own state (*svabhāva*)

The determinative nature of categories allows the Smṛti Composers to preserve the independence of the unmanifest aspect of reality which is not concerned by anything that happens in its manifest aspect and does not mingle with it. It seems that when the early Upaniṣadic philosophers reached in their cognition beyond the borderline sphere of the cosmos (which was the limit of knowledge of earlier Vedic philosophers), the relationship between the two aspects became a philosophical problem which had to be solved.<sup>57</sup> In BU 4.4.22, the unmanifest aspect of reality is presented as untouched by good and bad deeds. In 4.2.22, CU 8.4 the concept of dike (*setu*) is used to express the fact that the two aspects, although they belong to one reality (called *ātman*), are separated.

The early Smṛti philosophers found the solution in the concept of categories which, once created, become the rules for further creation which work independently of the unmanifest aspect. The nature of categories is expressed in the concept of *svabhāva* ‘one’s own state’.<sup>58</sup> This concept needs a separate

<sup>55</sup> Wynne (2009: 335) chooses version *śrotam* instead of *so ‘tra*.

<sup>56</sup> Jurewicz’s translation. The highest cognitive agent is presented as the subject of cognition and action also in MDhP 195.6–7, 215.1–2.

<sup>57</sup> Philosophers of the Darśanas used logic of everyday cognition in their reasoning and could split the monistic whole to create pluralistic theories.

<sup>58</sup> Hildebeitel (2011a: 337–410, 517–568) translates *svabhāva* as ‘own nature,’ ‘inherent nature.’ Woods (2001: 4) defines it as ‘a term that suggests something inherent (*sva*) in the nature

investigation.<sup>59</sup> Therefore just one example of the use of this concept will be analysed. Its Composer introduces the source domain, the logic of which allows him to conceive the relationship between two aspects in a way that preserves the epistemic and ontic independence of the unmanifest one:

### MDhP 241.1

*srjate tu guṇān sattvaṃ kṣetrajñas tv anuṭiṣṭhati |  
guṇān vikriyataḥ sarvān udāsīnavad īśvaraḥ ||*

Sattva creates classes and the Field Knower governs all of them when they transform, like a king who sits apart.<sup>60</sup>

As mentioned above (analysis of MDhP 203.33 see section 2.1.3), the noun *sattva* means one of the classes (*guṇa*), the cognitive faculty able to use classes and the ontic result of cognition i.e. ‘substance, being’. Within the frames of the cosmogony presented in MaU 2.5, *sattva* expresses the stage where the subjective power is manifested (see above, section 2.1.2). In the cosmogony of the MS (see chapter 1.1.4), it is the Great Self (*mahān ātman*) which is able to use the three classes. In the human dimension, it is reason (*buddhi*, see below, section 2.3.2). The description of verse a is general enough to assume that both dimensions, cosmic and human, are activated here.

In verse b, the highest cognitive agent is called the Field Knower (*kṣetrajña*, verse b). This source domain is part of a larger set of metaphors which are motivated by the experience of measuring a field (see chapter 1.1.3, 1.1.5) and of farming. The cognitive relationship between the highest cognitive agent and everything perceived by it, is conceived in terms of the relationship between a farmer and his field. A farmer knows his field well but does not interfere with the actual process of growth and maturation of plants that need

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(*bhāva*) of a thing that makes it act as it does’. It can refer to the nature of cosmos, but also, to individual people Brodbeck (2004). Hildebeitel pays attention to the conceptual connection between *svabhāva* and *dharma* which, from the perspective of the present study, can be explained by the fact that both are categories of the highest cognitive agent which apply with necessity. This connection is attested in the early Buddhist texts where *svabhāva* is one of the features of *dhammas* which makes possible their differentiation (Hildebeitel 2011a: 104–179).

<sup>59</sup> The necessity of categories is also conceived in a personified, but in an abstract way, for example, as ‘the orderer, arranger’ (*dhātṛ*), and in reference to men as ‘belonging to or coming from the gods, divine’ (*daiva*). The latter terms reflect the idea that some things which happen to men cannot be explained as caused by his own earlier actions. We later discuss the problem of free will and responsibility (see section 2.6.2, chapter 5.4.9), but only from the perspective accepted in this study which is the relationship between reality and its manifestations. This problem is widely discussed e.g., by Woods (2001), Hill (2001), Brodbeck (2004), Minnema (2013, in comparative perspective).

<sup>60</sup> Jurewicz’s translation. For a similar stanza see MDhP 187.42, section 2.3.2d.

time. As a rich farmer has a manager who makes sure that the work is done well, in the same way the highest cognitive agent manifests its subjective faculty (*sattva*) to govern categories so that they work independently to the extent he needs it.

This relationship is also conceived in terms of the relationship between the king and his subjects (verse d).<sup>61</sup> Within the frames of this metaphor, the subjective faculty is conceived in terms of the chief minister of a king who executes the king's orders. The king rules his subjects, but he is not personally involved in the practical aspects of exercising authority which is the responsibility of his minister. In the target domain the highest cognitive agent acts *via* its main cognitive faculty; categories are conceived in terms of the king's subjects. The use of the word *sattva* also implies that its cognition is always true.

However, the king is not only the source of all authority; he also benefits from his rule. A similar beneficiary nature characterises the relationship between the owner of the field and the field. In the target domain, subject-object cognition performed with the use of categories benefits the highest cognitive agent which can cognise itself in this process.

### MDhP 241.2

*svabhāvayuktaṃ tat sarvaṃ yad imān sṛjate guṇān |*  
*ūrṇanābhīr yathā sūtraṃ sṛjate tantuvad guṇān ||*

When he creates these classes, everything is subjected to one's own state. The classes he creates are similar to threads. He creates them like a spider its thread.<sup>62</sup>

The Composer activates the Upaniṣadic conceptualisation of the relationship between the self (*ātman*) and its manifest aspect in terms of a spider weaving its thread.<sup>63</sup> The kind of relationship between them is the same as it is between the kind and his rules and the farmer and his field. Now, the unmanifest aspect is conceived in terms of a spider, the manifest, in terms of its thread. The Vedic Composers highlight the unity of reality which can divide itself into two. The thread is part of the spider, although distinct from it. The Composer of MDhP elaborates this metaphor in a very coherent way according to what

<sup>61</sup> The source domain of king and his subjects is used in BU 2.1.18–19 to conceive relationship between the highest the cognitive faculties. See also BU 2.5 where a blend is created which fuses the concept of the king and his servants, the self (*ātman*) and the beings and the hub of a wheel and its rim, see Black (2007). It is also used in MS 9.294–5.

<sup>62</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

<sup>63</sup> BU 2.1.20. In MaU 6.21 this source domain is used to express to conceive the recitation of the syllable OM.

he wants to say about the relationship between the highest cognitive agent and the categories. The coherence between the source and the target domain can be seen in that the word *guṇa* means also ‘a thread’. In the source domain, thread is part of the spider and it is not only distinct from it but also it is used by it to hunt and eats insects. In the target domain, categories are the creation of the highest cognitive agent. They are independent of it in the same way as thread is independent of the spider which catches insects by itself. They are used, however, by the highest cognitive agent to cognise itself (SUBJECT-OBJECT COGNITION IS EATING).

Everything which is cognised by the highest cognitive agent is yoked by one’s own state (*svabhāva*, verse a). As mentioned above, *bhāva* means mental creation of the mind and the three kinds of feelings categorised by the three classes. It also means their ontic result i.e., being. The inherent state (*svabhāva*) of men is derived from factors such as social status, age and gender which, in turn, derive from their thoughts and actions performed in previous lives. Whatever they do, their own state will be realised because it is the result of the necessity of the cosmic categories to which men submit willingly or not. Hence, *svabhāva* can be interpreted as the necessity with which categories apply when they are used by individual conscious beings, men included. In deformed cognition they still apply although the agent thinks that he has created them (see chapter 3.2). Thanks to *svabhāva*, the highest cognitive agent is not involved in everyday cognition of its sentient manifestations. In the same way a king is not involved personally in the activities of his subjects who know what he wants them to do, a farmer allows his field to bear fruit in accordance with the natural course of time and a spider creates its web and it is the web which catches insects not the spider. One could argue that this theory is motivated by the general conceptualisation of the cosmos in terms of a living organism the functions of which are performed automatically and unconsciously (Panksepp 2012, Gazzaniga 2012).

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The concept of karman as the cognitive category used by the highest cognitive agent derives from the main metaphoric concept of the cosmos, accepted already in the Veda, according to which the cosmos is conceived in terms of a man’s body. Composers of the ṚV and AVŚ elaborate the mutual metaphorical correspondences between the cosmos and human body in detail (see ṚV 10.90, AVŚ 10.2, 11.8, Jurewicz 2016/18). Conversely, the Composers of the ŚB do not focus on the metaphorical correspondences between parts

of the cosmos and parts of the human organism. They take this metaphor for granted and elaborate it within a ritual context metaphorically identifying the cosmos with the body of Prajāpati, the body of the sacrificer and the sacrificial altar in the Agnicayana.

The Smṛti Composers fuse both conceptualisations. They conceive parts of the cosmos in terms of parts of the human body. They also accept the concept of ritual activity (*karman*) from the Brāhmaṇas seen as the first action of Prajāpati which should be repeated by men. However, they enlarge the concept of *karman* towards various actions of a living body in terms of which the cosmos is conceived. These actions are categorised by the highest cognitive agent with the aid of the category also called *karman* which is used in the sense of action (*karman*). Once the highest cognitive agent has begun to move and categorise its movements, it constantly moves in order to cognise itself. On the level of everyday cognition, cosmic, social and individual processes are seen as necessary and necessarily possessing attributes which define their activity. It seems that the necessity of the application of categories is expressed by the concept of one's own state, *svabhāva* which applies to all moving parts of the cosmic body of the highest cognitive agent, men included.

## 2.2. The ambiguity of manifestation

The cognitive split of reality into two aspects results in its ambiguity. As stated, the same ambiguity is attested in earlier thought: already in the ṚV reality is conceived as composed of two aspects, fiery and somic (fluid) and it is then elaborated in the ŚB. In the early Upaniṣads reality in its unmanifest aspect is described in an apophatic way as opposed to its manifestation in its manifest aspect where it is described as possessing all its aspects (Jurewicz 2016/18).

The Composers of the early Smṛti texts continue this way of description. Here is an example of the apophatic description of reality:

### MDhP 12.195.3–4

*noṣṇaṃ na śītaṃ mṛdu nāpi tīkṣṇaṃ nāmlaṃ kaṣāyaṃ madhuraṃ na tiktam |  
na śabdavan nāpi ca gandhavat tan na rūpavat tat paramasvabhāvam ||*

The ultimate, self-existent state is neither hot, not cold, neither soft, not sharp, neither sour nor astringent, neither sweet not bitter, it is no sound, smell or visible form.

*sparśam tanur veda rasam tu jihvā; ghrāṇam ca gandhān śravane ca śabdān |  
rūpāni cakṣur na ca tatparaṃ yad; grhṇanti anadhyātmavido manuṣyāḥ ||*

The body perceives touch, the tongue perceives taste, the nose perceives smell, the ears perceive sounds and the eye perceives visible forms, but those who do not know the supreme self cannot grasp that which is beyond these.<sup>64</sup>

Reality manifested in the world is everything that exists. This is the content of the vision of Arjuna in BhG 11 where he sees all manifest aspects in their forms and colours in the body of Kṛṣṇa (*mama dehe*, BhG 11.7c, see chapter 4.12). If the recipient elaborates the source domain, he could conceive the cosmos in terms of food or embryo and see the internal contradictoriness of the manifest aspect (food is alive and embryo is an adult) and of the highest cognitive agent (conceived as man and woman, Jurewicz 2010; see also above, section 2.1.1).

Hence creation makes reality possible to be cognised by itself in subject-object cognition but it hides its ontological unity while doing so thus making true cognition impossible. The process of creation is also ambiguous: simultaneously revealing and hiding itself.<sup>65</sup>

### 2.2.1. The I-form (*ahaṃkāra*)

The ambivalence of the creation of reality is caused by the fact that self-cognition needs division into subject and object which is possible thanks to the I-form (*ahaṃkāra*). Already in the BU 1.4.1, the moment of separation of the subject from the object and naming it as ‘I’ *aham*, is the beginning of subject-object cognition (van Buitenen 1957, Jurewicz 2016/18).

However, in the texts analysed in this study, the concept of the I-form (*ahaṃkāra*) is rarely used in reference to cosmic processes (except for cosmogonies). As we have seen, the Composer of the MS presents the I-form as the first manifestation of the mind (*manas*) within the cosmos (see also MDhP 175.16, see chapter 1). The following stanzas is one of the rare examples which present the I-form as the important factor in the world’s existence:

#### MDhP 205.19

*mahābhūtānīndriyāṇi guṇāḥ sattvaṃ rajas tamaḥ |  
trailokyam seśvaraṃ sarvaṃ ahaṃkāre pratiṣṭhitam ||*

Great beings, the senses, the classes sattva, rajas and tamas, three worlds with its king – everything is based in the I-form.<sup>66</sup>

<sup>64</sup> See also BhG 2.23–25, MDhP 242.22.

<sup>65</sup> This concept is explicitly elaborated in the Vedānta (Potter 1981).

<sup>66</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.



The Composer states that the cognitive structure of the cosmos up to the highest cognitive agent (conceived in terms of a king, *īśvara*, verse c) are based on the I-form (*ahaṃkāra*). The cosmos is composed of the great beings (*mahābhūta*) which constitute the perceptible form of reality and of its subjective powers i.e., the senses which cognise the great beings and the three classes which metonymically activate the faculty which uses them.

### MDhP 205.20

*yatheha niyataṃ kālo darśayaty ārtavān guṇān |  
tadvad bhūteṣv ahaṃkāraṃ vidyād bhūtapravartakam ||*

As time necessarily presents features of the seasons, in the same way one should know the I-form as the factor which sets in motion being(s).<sup>67</sup>

The I-form (*ahaṃkāra*) is called the factor which sets in motion beings (verses c–d) which is in accord with the cosmogonical accounts. In verses a–b the concept of the change of seasons is introduced. It is conceived in terms of the results of an action performed by a personal agent (in these terms time, *kāla*, is conceived, verse a). So, the recipient is triggered to create a conceptual network. Its first input space is an agent who acts, the second input space is the change of seasons under the influence of time and the third is the highest cognitive agent performing subject-object cognition (described concisely in the previous stanza, MDhP 205.19). The generic space is change. In the blend, the I-form is identified with time. The necessity of the influence of the I-form on beings is identified with the necessity for the change of seasons. The signs of the seasons are called here *guṇa*, classes in their ontologised meaning as features. Let us note, however, that time is not a personal agent and that such thinking about it is our metaphoric conceptualisation of an otherwise inexpressible experience. Moreover, the concept of season is also our mental construct. Taking this into account, the concept of their features is also our mental creation, the way we categorise the passing of time. The input space of the highest cognitive agent allows the recipient to activate their epistemic meaning and understand that it uses classes in order to cognise itself.

Once the highest cognitive agent has divided itself into subject and object, it will do the same within the beings. The classes, as categories, will apply with necessity and this concept is projected into the blend and thus strengthens the necessity with which the I-form works in the cosmos and in men. This is why the Composer of the BhG 18.48 states that every action is covered

<sup>67</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

with fault just as fire is covered by the smoke.<sup>68</sup> Every action is motivated by the epistemic division of the highest cognitive agent which, in everyday cognition becomes the ontic one.

### 2.2.2. The concept of *māyā* in the *Bhagavadgītā*

The concept of *māyā* used in the BhG expresses this ambiguity well. Contrary to the later theology expressed in the Purāṇas and to classical Vedānta, it is not often used in the texts analysed here. However, its usage in the BhG tells us much about the way this concept was understood in that time and how it expressed the ambiguity of reality in manifestation.

In the cosmogonies of the ŚB, reality denies its attributes, first of all the attribute of existence and immortality which is a manifestation of its freedom and the starting point of creation (Jurewicz 2016/18). In Smṛti as in early Upaniṣadic thought, creation loses its dramatic dimension and is seen as taking place at the level of cognition: creation begins when it denies its attribute of omniscience and perceives itself as an object. The cosmogony of the MS uses the verb *nir mā-* to express the creation of space (1.13), the creation of the perceptible form (*mūrti*) of Brahma cognising with the five senses of reason (1.16) and in the description of Brahma who cognises with the aid of all cognitive faculties according to the Veda (1.21). We have discussed the experiential concept of measuring space with a step or thread and naming the measured parts which motivates the conceptualisation of cognition activated in these stanzas (see chapter 1.1.3, 1.1.5). The compound *ātmamātra* (measure of oneself) activate this conceptualisation as well: it expresses the ability to being measured so as to become an object. The denial of the subjective power in its objective form is a manifestation of the freedom of reality which can suspend its attributes of omniscience. In the following analysis *māyā* will be interpreted as literally as possible as ‘the power of being measured’ to highlight the way of thinking proposed above.

As noted many times the ambiguity of the creative process consists on the one hand of reality equipping itself with instruments and categories which make its self-cognition possible, while on the other it ‘temporally’ and ‘spatially’ abolishes its omniscience. It manifests as the subject which does not yet know itself, so omniscience is abolished not only in the object but also in the subject. Until the subject knows his identity with the object omniscience is abolished. This ambiguity of creation is expressed in the following stanza of the BhG:

<sup>68</sup> BhG18.48cd: *sarvārambhā hi doṣeṇa dhūmenāgnir ivāvṛtāḥ*.

**BhG 4.6**

*ajo 'pi sann avyayātmā bhūtānām īśvaro 'pi san |  
prakṛtiṃ svām adhiṣṭhāya sambhavāmy ātmamāyayā ||*

Although I am unborn, my self is unchanging, although I am the king of all beings, having stood upon my nature I come to being by my power of being measured.<sup>69</sup>

The sequence of nouns again reflects the sequence of creation. Before creation reality is unmanifest: unborn (*aja*) and unchanging (*avyaya*, verse a). As the highest cognitive agent, it is conceived in terms of a king (the first stage of creation, verse b). In the second stage, the outline of the future cosmos is presented (verse c). The verb *adhi ṣṭhā-*, literally ‘to stand upon,’ activates conceptualisation of the activity expressed by it in terms of the image schema of VERTICALITY. The stage expressed with word *prakṛti* corresponds to the stage conceived as establishing a foundation (*pratiṣṭhā*) thanks to which further creation can proceed (see Jurewicz 2016/18). In ŚB 6.1.1 it is conceived in terms of speech and in BU 1.2 in terms of the earth. The Composer of the BhG activates this conceptualisation and presents reality as creating a foundation on which the highest cognitive agent mounts to perform further creation.

The recipient may activate the most experiential meaning of the verb *adhi ṣṭhā-* which is ‘to mount’ e.g., a chariot and thus activate the general domain of Riding In A Chariot and to conceive the beginning of creation in these terms. It should be noted that a journey in the source domain can be conceived as a journey into the unknown (as it is in the RV) the aim of which is to conquer new territories, to ‘measure’ them and thus take possession of them. Qualification of the highest cognitive agent as the king (*īśvara*, verse b) justifies such interpretation. The king, having established his kingdom (activated by the noun *prakṛti*)<sup>70</sup> increases the scope of his power. Moreover, in the Veda, the sun is conceived in terms of a chariot and if recipient evokes this, he would understand the creation of the cosmos in terms of the sunrise (as it is in the RV).

The compound *ātmamāyā* (verse d) means ‘my own power of being measured’ because the subject and the object of creation are the same. The creation of the highest cognitive agent (Kṛṣṇa) is conceived in terms of measuring himself thanks to which he makes possible that which is impossible. It is the power which allows the unchangeable and immovable reality to constantly change and move. If we activate the experience of measuring new

<sup>69</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

<sup>70</sup> The subjects are called *prakṛti* in MS 9.294–5.

territories, fields or the place for the sacrificial altar we could say that the ground is still the same, but for those who measure it and thus divide it into parts, the ground has become something new: something that belongs to someone or something that is sacred. This source domain is elaborated in the next stanza:

### BhG 7.14

*daivī hy eṣā guṇamayī mama māyā duratyayā |  
mām eva ye prapadyante māyām etāṃ taranti te ||*

My divine power of being measured is made of three threads and is difficult to pass over. But those who resort to me can cross it.<sup>71</sup>

The literal of word *guṇa* i.e., ‘thread’, may make the recipient to think about a cloth and to activate the Ṛgvedic conceptualisation according to which creation (of light, cognition and the cosmos) is weaving a cloth.<sup>72</sup> It is also possible that the Composer builds the image of measuring with threads in the source domain. Let us remind ourselves that fields, kingdoms and places for ritual are confirmed in everyday social perception and activity. They are seen as someone’s property or as sacred places. After some time, no one sees that it is just an area that has been measured. In the same way, once the highest cognitive agent measures itself to become perceptible it is difficult to see it as not divided into different parts. One has to change one’s cognitive perspective and go beyond subject-object cognition in order to see the unity of reality. The Composer states this in the next stanza:

### BhG 7.25

*nāhaṃ prakāśaḥ sarvasya yogamāyāsamāvṛtaḥ |  
mūḍho ‘yaṃ nābhijānāti loko mām ajam avyayam ||*

Concealed by the yogic power of being measured, I am not visible to everyone. The world is deluded and does not cognise me who is unborn and unchanging.<sup>73</sup>

The power of being measured is called the yogic power (*yogamāyā*, verse b). Thus, the highest cognitive agent is conceived in terms of a yogin and its manifestations are conceived in terms of his miraculous powers (*vibhūti*). This metaphor is also elaborated in the tenth chapter of the BhG (called *vibhūti-yoga*) where manifestations of reality are conceived in these terms (BhG 10.7,17–19).

<sup>71</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

<sup>72</sup> Thus Thompson (2008: 37) who translates *māyā* as ‘veil of illusion.’

<sup>73</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

It is explicitly stated there that the aim of manifestations, thus conceived, is to make reality ‘possible to be thought of’ (*cintya*, BhG 10.17).

It is worth noting that in verse d, Kṛṣṇa uses the same adjectives as in 4.6a: he describes his unmanifest aspect as unborn (*aja*) and unchanging (*avyaya*). However, it is not cognised by those who are deluded because of ontologisation of categories within the manifest aspect. The highest cognitive agent is divided by measures which are treated as real in the same way as fields, kingdoms and sacred spaces are treated as real within a given social community.

In the last stanza, the Composer again describes the deluding nature of creation and the role of the highest cognitive agent:

### BhG 18.61

*īśvaraḥ sarvabhūtānāṃ hṛddeśe ‘rjuna tiṣṭhati |*  
*bhrāmayan sarvabhūtāni yantrārūḍhāni māyayā ||*

In the space of the heart of all beings there is their king who makes them revolve with his power to measure, Arjuna!<sup>74</sup>

The verb *bhram-* in its Causative form has two meanings. The first one is ‘to cause to move or turn round or revolve’.<sup>75</sup> Taking into account that verse a activates conceptualisation of the highest cognitive agent in terms of a king, its activity can therefore be conceived in terms of the king’s influence over his subjects who act according to his will. As we remember this conceptualisation is activated in MDhP 241.1 to express the indirect cognitive activity of the highest cognitive agent. The concept of revolving activates conceptualisation of time in terms of a revolving wheel (MDhP 204.8, see section 2.1.1). The highest cognitive agent, conceived in terms of a king, performs its subject-object cognition from within its creatures and its categories (time, classes etc) to create a world (*loka*) for each of them. This world is treated as true by them.

Here we come to the second meaning of the Causative form of the verb *bhram-* ‘to cause to err, confuse’. It is possible that this is this way it has been interpreted by Śaṅkara who, in his commentary, proposes the source domain of play in order to explain the meaning of this stanza: the highest cognitive agent is conceived in terms of a puppeteer who manipulates his puppets during a performance.<sup>76</sup> If the puppets were moved by strings, the recipient might think about the three classes conceived in terms of threads.

<sup>74</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

<sup>75</sup> In his translation, Thompson (2008: 87) activates the concept of moving paddles of the watermill.

<sup>76</sup> For play and the source domain of a puppeteer, see chapter 2.3.8.

The puppeteer deludes the audience and, in the same way, the highest cognitive agent deludes men by its division into subject and object. The power which allows the highest cognitive agent to sustain and delude the world is called *māyā*. The double meaning of the verb *bhram-* in Causative expresses the ambiguity of this power and its creation.

However, the word *yantra* (verse d) has the very general meaning of ‘any instrument for holding or restraining or fastening’. So, it is possible that the Composer had in mind any instrument which is moved by strings or ropes. It could be a fire-drill, a butter churn, a sesame oil press or the bellows used in gold production. Within the frames of this conceptualisation, the manifest aspect is conceived in terms of an instrument and the highest cognitive agent in terms of man who sets it moving with ropes. In the target domain living beings are inside the instrument and are not able to perceive the agent who moves them.<sup>77</sup> Since *yantra* can also mean ‘reins,’ the recipient may again activate the general domain of Riding In A Chariot and understand the meaning of the stanza in its terms. Then, the manifest aspect is conceived in terms of the wheel of a chariot and the highest cognitive agent in terms of the charioteer.

\*

The short analysis of the word *māyā* in the BhG shows that reference to the literal meaning of a concept allows one to understand more of the content of the text and of the thinking expressed by it. This is because concepts connected with experience give coherence to what is thought in their terms and to the way they are used by the Composers. It is possible that, in order to understand the meaning of the stanzas analysed above, the recipient does not have to activate all these source domains as we have done. He may merely understand *māyā* as a power to perform a contradictory activity which simultaneously enables cognition and makes it impossible. Reality is not limited by any attribute which excludes contradiction so reality can manifest in a contradictory way.

The literal meaning of *māyā* as ‘being possible to be measured’ gives coherence to the conviction that the classes (*guṇa*) are a factor in both cognition and delusion. As measuring with a thread allows one to cognise space it simultaneously allows space to be hidden, in the same way the classes (*guṇa*) allow the highest cognitive to cognise and hide itself at the same time. It is important to note that the basic experience which motivates the Composer’s thinking is social cognition and its power over the minds of members of a community. The role of performative acts would not be possible without

<sup>77</sup> See MDhP 12,206.3: *tasya māyāvidagdhāngā jñānabhraṣṭā nirāśiṣaḥ | mānavā jñānasammohāt tataḥ kāmam prayānti vai ||*

this power (Sweetser 2000). That the early Hindu Composers were aware of this can be seen already in CU 6.3.4–6 where transformation is defined as ‘grasping by words, giving a name’ (*vācārambhaṇam vikāro nāmadheyam*).<sup>78</sup> The Composer of the CU states that ‘by means of just one lump of clay one would perceive everything made of clay’, ‘by means of just one copper trinket one would perceive everything made of copper’ and ‘by means of just one nail-cutter one would perceive everything made of iron’<sup>79</sup> when actually there is only clay, copper and iron. It is social agreement that makes us think about someone’s field, kingdoms or sacred places when actually there is only ground. Measuring ground and thus transforming it into something else with the words: ‘It is my field/my kingdom’ or ‘It is the sacred place’ is a performative act. This experience is the basis for the conceptualisation of cognitive activity reality as measuring an object within itself and naming it. This cognitive activity is repeated by its subjective powers within the object. As long as a man does not change his cognitive perspective, he will see a divided world.

### 2.3. The concept of man

The idea that man is the microcosmos was very well entrenched in earlier thought (Jurewicz 2010, 2016/18) and is the foundation of philosophical anthropology in the Smṛti period too. Already in the ṚV, man is conceived as the manifestation of reality which realises its cognition within the cosmos in microscale. Under the influence of soma, Agni manifests itself in man and looks at its manifestations (Jurewicz 2010). In the later period, in the ŚB, man is the replica of Prajāpati who is the highest cognitive agent. In ritual man realises the activity of reality (Jurewicz 2016/18). In the AU, reality manifests itself as the self (*ātman*) of the cosmos and of man in order to look at itself from within its human manifestation. In BU 1.4, reality manifests itself in living beings in order to recognise itself and feel happiness (Jurewicz 2016/18, see chapter 4.2). In all cases reality creates a human self (*ātman*) for itself in the same way as it creates the cosmic self.

The Composers of the early Smṛti texts elaborate this idea. They are fully aware of the ambiguous nature of the manifest aspect and of the fact that proper cognition undertaken from within it is very difficult.

<sup>78</sup> For analysis of the concept of *vācārambhaṇam*, see an extensive note in Olivelle (1998: 558). See also Buitenen (1955, 1958).

<sup>79</sup> Translation by Olivelle (1998: 247).

### 2.3.1. Man, as a part of society

In the MS the creation of society, composed of the four social states (*varṇa*), precedes creation of the first particular man, Manu. Society is also conceived in terms of man and social states are seen as the manifestation of various parts of the body of Brahma. As previously stated, the activity of each social state (*varṇa*) is conceived in terms of the prototypical activity of each part of the body (see chapter 1.1). It is the activity of the different parts of the body which distinguishes them from each other. Hence, the difference between social states is the difference between the actions (*karman*) which categorises them. It is clearly expressed in the texts analysed in this study which ascribe specific actions to each state.<sup>80</sup>

Yet there is also a conviction that in the beginning there was no difference between the social states and that their division has been caused by the various actions (*karman*) undertaken by their members:

#### MDhP 181.10

*na viśeṣo 'sti varṇānām sarvaṃ brāhmanam idaṃ jagat |  
brahmaṇā pūrvasṛṣṭam hi karmabhir varṇatām gatam ||*

In so far as the entire world has the nature of *brahman*, there is no distinction between the classes. However, the creatures Brahma created in the beginning assume a particular class because of their deeds.<sup>81</sup>

As Brahma is the manifestation of the cognitive power of reality created by the category of name, so humanity (*brāhmaṇa* and other states) is the manifestation of its power created by the category of action. Brahma divides himself into subject and object (himself and the Golden Egg) and the space between them and the Brahmins (conceived in terms of his sons, *brāhmaṇas*) is divided into the head, the feet and the rest of the body. There is no moral evaluation of this differentiation.

In the next stanzas, the Composer continues the description of the creation of the four states. The three lower states appeared because their members began to feel various emotions (Kṣatriya) and perform various actions (farming – Vaiśya, violence – Śūdra). Then the Composer concludes:

<sup>80</sup> MDhP 181: *kāmabhogapriyās tīkṣṇāḥ krodhanāḥ priyasāhasāḥ | yaktasvadharmā raktāṅgās te dvijāḥ kṣatratām gatāḥ || (11) goṣu vṛttim samādhāya pītāḥ kṛṣyupajīvināḥ | svadharmam nānutiṣṭhanti te dvijā vaiśyatām gatāḥ || (12) hiṃsānṛtapriyā lubdhāḥ sarvakarmopajīvināḥ | kṛṣṇāḥ śaucaparibhraṣṭās te dvijāḥ śūdratām gatāḥ || (13).*

<sup>81</sup> This fragment is also analysed by Hildebeitel (2011a: 529–532) with focus on the problem of svadharma. For a moral evaluation of this description, see section 2.6.2.



**MDhP 181.14**

*ity etaiḥ karmabhir vyastā dvijā varṇāntaram gatāḥ |  
dharma yajñakriyā caiṣāṃ nityaṃ na pratiśidhyate ||*

Separated by these actions the twice born (brahmins) began to differ in terms of social state. But dharma and ritual activity is never prohibited for them.

So, the social states are the Brahmins who, in *illo tempore*, behaved in different ways. If one assumes identity of the highest cognitive agent with multiple human agents one may infer that it is the highest cognitive agent which behaves differently in its search for successive self cognition. From its perspective this differentiation is necessary. The cognitive pattern of manifestation results in the manifest aspect being composed of the relationship between the subject and the object. The subject cognises but the object does not. Within the social manifestation, the Brahmins are the embodiment of the subject, the Śūdras of the object while the Kṣatriyas and Vaiśyas are the embodiment of the desire to cognise and the act of cognition. The highest cognitive agent cognises itself in these particular manifestations with use of the category of action (*karman*), but also with use of other categories i.e., sacrifice (*yajña*) and dharma/adharma.

One should mention that the participle *vyasta* is used in RV 1.32.7 in reference to Vṛtra killed by Indra. If the recipient activates this meaning, he would see the frightful aspect of the creation of the social state, which is that it can be seen it as the tearing apart of a living body resulting in its death. Thus, he might see the R̥gvedic conceptualisation of the creation of the cosmos in terms of the killing and dismembering of man in the first sacrifice (RV 10.90). As in most cases in the early Smṛti cosmogonies, the Vedic cosmogonies ideas (such as the concept of Prajāpati, the role of heat, *tapas*, etc.) are brought to lower levels of manifestation (see below, section 2.7). Now the creation of society is conceived in these terms: as the sacrifice of man. Note that the creation of man in MS 1 is preceded by the creation of gods and of the Sādhyas (1.22), of the triple Veda (1.23), of ritual time and space (1.24), of the basic scenario of sacrifice (1.25) and of dharma/adharma (1.26). In RV 10.90, time is created in 7, animals in 8, triple Veda in 9, sacrificial animals in 10, then society is created as the division of the body (11–12). Although not all elements created before society are the same, the general scenario is similar (time and the triple Veda are in both descriptions, sacrifice is performed by gods and the Sādhyas). These similarities confirm the motivating influence of the cosmogonic models created in tradition. If we go a little bit further and recall the model of Indra Fight With Vṛtra, we

would understand the first form of society as internally contradictory: on the one hand it is composed of Brahmins, on the other it is conceived as Vṛtra which has to be killed and torn apart. While in the Veda the early stages of creation are conceived in this way, in early Smṛti thought they are used to conceive its later stages.

In verses c–d, the Composer states that dharma and the ritual actions are not prohibited to all social states. This conviction refers to the fact that members of each of them have their specific duties seen in terms of dharmic ritual action, which, although different, should be preserved by the members of society (vide below, section 2.6.2). The recipient may infer that for Śūdras adharmā (i.e., activity forbidden for other states) is their dharma.

### 2.3.2. Subject-object cognition in the cosmos and in man

In the ṚV, the cosmos is conceived in terms of man but the elaboration of the concept of man as the microcosmos begins in the AVŚ, then in the ŚB, and is visibly presented in the form of the ritual altar built during the Agnicayana (Jurewicz 2016/2018). In the AU, man is presented as the microcosmos consisting of the same cognitive powers as reality manifest in the world. This idea is realised in the Smṛti period and is also elaborated in many chapters of the MDhP. In order to confirm this assumption, we will discuss a chapter of the MDhP (187).<sup>82</sup>

This is one of three chapters of the MDhP (187, 239, 240) seen by Frauwallner (1973) as Proto-Sāṃkhyan.<sup>83</sup> It will be shown that its main topic is the categorisation which takes place during subject-object cognition performed by the highest cognitive agent and by free men. Their ontic identity is the ground for the fusion of macro and micro perspectives. At the end of the chapter, there is a polemic with Buddhism concerning the state of freedom.

It is worth noting that the terms used in this chapter are common for the MDhP and BhG. So we are allowed to assume that, even if these texts reflect thinking characteristic for a more analytic approach (such as for Sāṃkhya), the fact that the Composers decided to include them in their exposition implies that they agreed with them or they wanted to define concepts and terms so as to include them within the frames of tradition.

The chapter begins (stanza 1) with the question of Yudhiṣṭhira to Bhīṣma about the highest self of man (*adhyātmaṃ puruṣasya*). Bhīṣma agrees to

<sup>82</sup> Called *adhyātma/adhyātmakathana/adhyātmanirūpaṇa*.

<sup>83</sup> For a detailed summary of his interpretation, see Larson (1969). For revision of this thesis, see Bishop, Bakker (1999), Schreiner (1999), Wezler (1999).

teach him and promises that Yudhiṣṭhira, having known the truth, will gain happiness (stanza 2–3). Thus, the aim of the exposition is settled and the recipient understands that the argument to be presented will explain it.<sup>84</sup>

### 2.3.2.a. The cosmic and the human organism and its cognitive faculties (MDhP 187.4–15)

It is then stated (stanza 4) that five great beings (*mahābhūta*) are the origin and the end of all beings. Their appearance and disappearance from the creator of beings (*bhūtakṛt*) is compared to the waves of the ocean (stanza 5). This metaphor implies ontic unity between reality and its manifestation. The difference lies in that unmanifest reality is immovable (like the ocean at its bottom), and the five great beings move like the waves of the ocean's surface. The next source domain activated by Bhīṣma is that of a tortoise which extends and withdraws its limbs (stanza 6). This metaphor too, implies the ontic identity of reality and the difference between its aspects which lies in movement and the lack of movement. The recipient also recognises that reality should be understood as a living being although, we may presume, one that lives in a different way to the great beings themselves. It could be concluded that the Composer sees the great beings as the building blocks of all creatures from which their organisms are built until their death and begins his description from what is most perceptible.

In stanza 7 the concept of *bhūtakṛt* is introduced (verse b).<sup>85</sup> It is worth noting that this compound is rarely used in Sanskrit literature. According to DSC it occurs only once (so the present usage would be its second occurrence) in MBh 1.58.45 (*ādideśa tadā sarvān vibudhān bhūtakṛt svayam*). It is possible that the Composer thinks about the mind (*manas*), which is presented in the cosmogonies, as the direct creator of the great beings (see chapter 1). It is also possible that the Composer plays with the phonetic similarity between *mahābhūtāni*, *sarvabhūteṣu* and *bhūtakṛt*. In verse c it is stated that it has not evenly distributed the great beings among creatures. In stanzas 9–10, the Composer describes the distribution of the great beings (*mahābhūta*) in the body. The description is so general that it could be referring to the cosmic and human body at the same time.

<sup>84</sup> According to Frauwallner (1973: 228), these introductory verses are 'colourless and unimportant.' This surprising statement is caused by his way of seeing the pre-Darśanic thought according to which the only interesting statements are those which seem similar to the classical philosophy (see Introduction 8).

<sup>85</sup> MDhP 187.7: *mahābhūtāni pañcaiva sarvabhūteṣu bhūtakṛt | akarot teṣu vaiṣamyam tat tu jīvo 'nu paśyati ||* this stanza will also be discussed in chapter 3.6.2b and a tentative interpretation of this compound will be proposed.

Then the Composer presents the structure of man as identical with the cosmos:

### MDhP 187.10cd–187.11

*mahābhūtāni pañcaiva śaṣṭhaṃ tu mana ucyate ||*

These, then, are the five great beings;<sup>86</sup> the *manas* is said to be sixth.

*indriyāṇi manaś caiva vijñānāny asya bhārata |  
saptamī buddhir ity āhuḥ kṣetrajñāḥ punar aṣṭamaḥ ||*

These, then, are the five great beings;<sup>87</sup> the mind is called to be the sixth. The senses<sup>88</sup> and the mind are means of cognition,<sup>89</sup> Bhārata. They say that reason<sup>90</sup> is the seventh, and that the Field Knower<sup>91</sup> is the eighth.

The human organism is the body composed of the five great beings, of the ten senses (taken together as the sensual cognitive apparatus), the mind (*manas*), reason (*buddhi*) and the highest cognitive agent called here the Field-Knower (*kṣetrajñā* corresponding to Brahma in the cosmogony of the MS). The Composer evokes both kinds of senses, the senses of reason and of action, because they refer to the same objects i.e., great beings (*mahābhūta*). Although the Composer uses here the noun *buddhi*, the general character of his exposition triggers the recipient to think about the Great Self (*mahān ātman*) which corresponds to *buddhi* in the macroscale.

Then the activity of each cognitive element that together compose the cosmic and the human organism is presented:

### MDhP 187.12–13

*caḥsur ālokanāyaiva saṃśayaṃ kurute manaḥ |  
buddhir adhyavasāyāya kṣetrajñāḥ sākṣivat sthitaḥ ||*

The eye is for seeing. The mind creates doubt. The reason makes decisions. The Field Knower is present like a witness.<sup>92</sup>

<sup>86</sup> Wynne (2009: 173): ‘elements.’

<sup>87</sup> Wynne (2009: 175): ‘elements.’

<sup>88</sup> Wynne (2009: 175): ‘sense faculties.’

<sup>89</sup> Wynne (2009: 175): ‘a man’s means of cognition.’

<sup>90</sup> Wynne (2009: 175): ‘faculty of intelligence.’

<sup>91</sup> Wynne (2009: 175): ‘field knower.’

<sup>92</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

*ūrdhvaṃ pādatalābhyāṃ yad arvāg ūrdhvaṃ ca paśyati |  
etena sarvaṃ evedaṃ viddhy abhivyāptam antaram ||*

The Field Knower<sup>93</sup> sees what is below his head and above his feet. Know that he pervades the whole world from within.<sup>94</sup>

The function of the eye is seeing (12a) and the concept of this sense activates the other senses of reason and action. Mind (*manas*) creates doubt (12b), reason (*buddhi*) dispels it with its decision as to what to do (12c). The highest cognitive agent (the Field Knower) is conceived in terms of a witness (12d) i.e., someone who is aware of the subject-object cognition performed by the cognitive faculties but does not interfere with it.<sup>95</sup>

The Composer highlights the omniscience of the highest cognitive agent: it sees everything below his head and above his feet (13ab). His qualification as the Field Knower explains the nature of this relationship: the highest cognitive agent is like a farmer who, similarly to the witness, does not interfere with the growth of his plants but knows everything that happens in his fields.

At the same time, in 13cd, it is stated that the manifest aspect is pervaded by the highest cognitive agent from within. The verb *abhi vi āp-* activates the definition of water (*āpas*) given in the cosmogony in ŚB 6.1.1.9: the name expresses its essence which is reaching everything.<sup>96</sup> Moreover, the presence of the highest cognitive agent in the cosmos conceived in terms of man is expressed in BU 1.4.7 where it is stated that having divided the cosmos with names and forms, the highest cognitive agent pervades it up to the nail tips. Division into names and form may activate the concept of measuring. We can see then, that the description presented in stanza 13 evokes conceptualisations well-grounded in tradition and coherent with contemporary philosophical theories.

Taking into account that the description presented in stanzas 11–13 is very general, one can presume that the Composer now presents subject-object cognition simultaneously on the cosmic and the human scale. The use of the word *buddhi* implies that the Composer includes human cognition within the range of his description. Hence, in macroscale, the highest cognitive agent cognises everything that is outside the cosmos conceived in terms of man i.e.,

<sup>93</sup> Wynne (2009: 175): ‘field knower.’

<sup>94</sup> See MDhP 239.014–22, 267.18–22.

<sup>95</sup> The question if the Sanskrit ICM of the witness includes emotional involvement, remains open, at least for the moment.

<sup>96</sup> ŚB 6.1.1.9: *sò ‘pò ‘sṛjata | vācā evā lokād vāg evāsya sāsṛjyata sèdaṃ sārvaṃ āpnod yād idāṃ kīm ca yād āpnōt tasmād āpo yād āvṛṇōt tasmād vāh |*

it also cognises itself as unmanifest reality.<sup>97</sup> At the same time, the highest cognitive agent cognises itself within its cosmic manifestation with the aid of the cognitive faculties. In microscale the highest cognitive agent present in man cognises everything that is outside man with the use of the cognitive faculties enumerated in the stanzas. This is the highest self of man (*adhyātmā puruṣasya*) about which Yudhiṣṭhira asks Bhīṣma in the first stanza.

In the next two stanzas (14–15), the Composer summarises the further content of his exposition. He states that all cognitive faculties (called here by the general name *indriya*) which are in men, should be well known (14ab) and that the mental states (*bhāva*) categorised by the classes of *tamas*, *rajas* and *sattva* find their support in the senses (14cd) which use five classes in their cognition.<sup>98</sup> Thus the recipient understands that the Composer will describe subject-object cognition and categorisation with the aid of category of classes (*guṇa*).

In stanza 15 the Composer states that man, having cognised the appearance and disappearance of being with his reason and having reflected on them peacefully, will gain the highest peace.<sup>99</sup> Thus, liberating cognition which reflects cosmic cognition in its proper categorisation with classes will be the next topic of the exposition. However, the formulation *etāṃ buddhvā naro buddhyā* (15a) activates the next issue which will be discussed by the Composer: the phonetic resemblance of this formulation with the name Buddha foreshadows the polemics with Buddhism expressed at the end of the exposition (54, see section 2.3.2f).

### 2.3.2b. Everyday subject-object cognition (MDhP 187.16–22)

The Composer begins the section on subject-object cognition with the aid of the three classes by explaining the inextricable connection between reason (*buddhi*), other cognitive faculties and the three classes (*guṇa*):

<sup>97</sup> The same is already in CU 3.12.7–9 (Jurewicz 2016/18).

<sup>98</sup> MDhP 187.14: *puruṣe cendriyāṅṅha vedītavayāni kṛtsnaśaḥ | tamo rajaś ca sattvaṃ ca viddhi bhāvāms tadāśrayān ||*

<sup>99</sup> MDhP 187.15: *etāṃ buddhvā naro buddhyā bhūtānām āgatim gatim | samavekṣya śanaś caiva labhate śamam uttamam ||* Wynne (2009: 547) states that ‘this verse is out of place’ and then speculates about possible reasons of its insertion in this moment of exposition: the redactors ‘probably inserted it here because some sort of connection can be made between *buddhvā* and *buddhyā*.’ This kind of speculation shows how low he rates the intellectual abilities of the composers of our text. His argument that the stanza closes the first part of exposition the aim of which is to explain the *adhyātman*, the cognition of which leads to eternal happiness, is not at all convincing.

**MDhP 187.16**

*guṇān nenīyate buddhir buddhir evendriyāny api |  
manaḥśaṣṭhāni sarvāṇi buddhyabhāve kuto guṇāh ||*

Reason guides the classes and even the senses, with mind as their sixth. If reason did not exist what could be source of the classes?<sup>100</sup>

In verse a, it is stated that reason guides the classes. It will be shown that the senses and the mind are transformations of reason (see below, stanzas 18–19) and it will be argued that the verses express their identity.

Verse d of the stanza expresses the dependence of classes upon reason: when it disappears, they also disappear. From the point of view of creation this statement supports the thesis that the creation of the subject precedes the creation of the categories and the object: when the subject disappears, the categories disappear too. The same happens in liberating cognition and, as we will see, the Composer will come back to the problem of the existence of classes in liberating cognition at the end of his exposition on categorisation.

The next stanza expresses the ontic dimension of cognition:

**MDhP 187.17**

*iti tanmayam evaitat sarvaṃ sthāvarajaṅgamam |  
pralīyate cobbhavati tasmān nirdīśyate tathā ||*

Thus, the world with those who move and those who do not is made of reason. As it is proclaimed, it is dissolved in it and appears from it.<sup>101</sup>

The stanza expresses the conviction that the cosmos is the creation of reason which appears and vanishes in it. Again, the general character of this description refers to the creation of the highest cognitive agent and of individual man. We should remember the Vedic understanding of *loka* which in Smṛti texts means ‘world, cosmos’ as the space where one could freely move (Jurewicz 2010) and the space of experience created by cognising subjects (Jurewicz 2016/18). As the highest cognitive agent creates the world (*loka*) as the space of its new experience, in the same way each perceptual individual creates it for himself.

The conviction that the cosmos is created by reason (from both cosmic and human perspectives) is coherent with the assumption of the precedence of cognition before being: reason creates categories which, in turn, create their object. Moreover, as will be stated in the following stanzas (MDhP 187.18–19), all cognitive faculties are also the creation of reason. Thus, both subjective

<sup>100</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

<sup>101</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

and objective manifestations are creation of reason. Within the frames of the MS cosmogony, the cosmic cognitive faculties are transformations of the Great Self (*mahān ātman*).

Now the Composer explains transformations of reason:

### MDhP 187.18–19

*yena paśyati tac cakṣuḥ śṛṇoti śrotram ucyate |  
jighrati ghrāṇam ity āhū rasam jānāti jihvayā ||*

By which one sees, that it's eye; when one hears it is said to be the ear. They say it is the nose that smells,

*tvacā sprśati ca sparśān buddhir vikriyate śakṛt |  
yena samkalpayaty arthaṃ kiṃ cid bhavati tan manaḥ ||*

whereas one perceives tastes by means of the tongue and sensations by means of the skin. Thus, is reason<sup>102</sup> repeatedly modified, when a person imagines an object<sup>103</sup> it becomes the mind.<sup>104</sup>

The senses and the mind (*manas*) are transformation of reason: as it hears, touches, sees, tastes and smells it becomes the appropriate sense of reason (*buddhīndriya*).<sup>105</sup> When it imagines an object, it becomes the mind (*manas*). In his translation, Wynne chooses the form *prārthayate* ('desires something'). In MDhP 240.3, reason becomes mind when it creates mental states (*bhāva*).<sup>106</sup> All these activities of the mind will also be discussed below (see section 2.4).

The relationship between reason, the senses and the highest cognitive agent is described in the following way:

### MDhP 187.20

*adhiṣṭhānāni buddher hi prthag arthāni pañcadhā |  
pañcendriyāni yāny āhus tāny adṛśyo dhitiṣṭhati ||*

The places in which reason<sup>107</sup> settles are the five different sense objects; the unseeable self presides over the sense faculties, so they say.

<sup>102</sup> Wynne (2009: 177): 'faculty of intelligence.'

<sup>103</sup> Wynne (2009: 177): 'desires something' (he chooses the version *prārthayate*).

<sup>104</sup> See MDhP 239.17 where reason creates and withdraws cognitive faculties as a tortoise its limbs (*yathā kūrma ihāṅgāni prasārya viniyacchati | evam evendriyagrāmaṃ buddhiḥ sṛṣṭvā niyacchati ||*)

<sup>105</sup> The role of the mind will be discussed below, see section 2.4.

<sup>106</sup> MDhP 240.3cd: *yadā vikurute bhāvaṃ tadā bhavati sā manaḥ*.

<sup>107</sup> Wynne (2009: 177): 'faculty of intelligence.'



The objects of the five senses are called *adhiṣṭhāna* ‘a basis, position, site’ of reason (verses a–b). Their qualification is caused by the fact that reason functions as the mind and the senses only when subject-object cognition is performed i.e., objects are conditions of reason in some way. In verses c–d, the Composer states that the highest cognitive agent (called here ‘unseeable’ *adr̥śya*) presides over the five senses. It is worth noting that the noun *adhiṣṭhāna* is a derivative of the verb *adhi ṣṭhā-* which is used to denote the activity of the highest cognitive agent in verse d.<sup>108</sup> In this way, the Composer expresses its cognition. It governs (*adhitiṣṭhati*) reason and its mental and sensual transformations in order to create an objective basis of itself (*adhiṣṭhāna*) which are the objects cognised by the mind and the senses.

Now the Composer presents the nature of subject-object sensual cognition:

### MDhP 187.21–22

*puruṣādhiṣṭhitā buddhis triṣu bhāveṣu vartate |  
kadā cil labhate prītiṃ kadā cid anuśocati ||*

The reason<sup>109</sup> that abides in man exists in three different states. Sometimes it experiences joy, sometimes it experiences grief,

*na sukkena na duḥkhena kadā cid api vartate |  
evaṃ narāṇāṃ manasi triṣu bhāveṣv avasthitā ||*

and sometimes it experiences neither pleasure nor pain. Thus, reason<sup>110</sup> abides in the minds of men in three states.

The word *puruṣa* (in compound *puruṣādhiṣṭhitā* 21a) activates its two meanings: one metaphorical (the highest cognitive agent) and one literal (man). Let us begin with the former meaning because its activation is a logical continuation of thinking expressed in the previous stanza.

The Composer again uses the verb *adhi ṣṭhā-* (*adhiṣṭhita*, 21a), now in order to express the relationship between the highest cognitive agent and reason (*buddhi*): reason and its mental and sensual transformations (see the previous stanza) are used by the highest cognitive agent in its subject-object cognition. Three kinds of states of the mind (*bhāva*) appear during this cognition: pleasant, unpleasant and neutral. When these states are created, the relationship between the reason and the mind is conceived in terms of

<sup>108</sup> The verb *adhi ṣṭhā-* to express activity of the highest cognitive agent in subject-object cognition: MDhP 204.8, BhG 4.6 (sections 2.1.1, 2.2.2).

<sup>109</sup> Wynne (2009: 177): ‘intelligence.’

<sup>110</sup> Wynne (2009: 177): ‘faculty of intelligence.’

the image schema of CONTAINER: reason is placed (*avasthita*) within the mind (187.22cd). In MDhP 187.22c, the Composer activates the second meaning of *puruṣa* i.e., individual men (*nara*).

### 2.3.2.c. A change of perspective. The subject-object cognition of the highest cognitive agent and free men (MDhP 187.23–36)

In its cognitive activity, however, reason is also able to go beyond the mental states.

#### MDhP 187.23

*seyaṃ bhāvātmikā bhāvāṃs trīn etān ativartate |  
saritāṃ sāgaro bhartā mahāvelām ivormimān ||*

Reason consisting of mental states goes beyond them in the same way as the ocean, the lord of rivers, goes beyond the shore.<sup>111</sup>

Reason is called ‘consisting of mental states’ (*bhāvātmikā*, verse a). It is like this in everyday cognition when it constantly reacts to mental states created by the mind which in turn reacts to the activity of the senses. In verse b the Composer states that reason is able to get free of the mental states. He conceives of reason, when it goes beyond the three mental states which arise in subject-object cognition, in terms of the ocean the waves of which break against the shore (verses c–d). This source domain is motivated by the Vedic thinking where the relationship between the unmanifest and manifest aspect is conceived in terms of two containers of water separated by a dike (BU 4.4.22, CU 8.4.1, Jurewicz 2016/18). Here, reason is conceived in terms of billowing ocean which reflects its constant restlessness due to its subject-object cognition. The shore of the ocean is the borderline between two aspects which can be transcended in liberating act conceived in terms of the ocean breaking against the shore.

#### MDhP 187.24

*atibhāvagatā buddhir bhāve manasi vartate |  
pravartamānaṃ hi rajas tadbhāvam anuvartate ||*

In this transcendent condition, reason abides within the mind. But when passion is aroused, it follows this mental state.<sup>112</sup>

<sup>111</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

<sup>112</sup> Wynne (2009: 177): ‘it succeeds this transcendent state’.

In verses a–b, the Composer states that when reason has reached the state beyond mental states (*bhāva*) it remains in the mind (*manas*). The mind is therefore seen in two ways. In everyday subject-object cognition it creates the mental states. In liberating cognition, it corresponds to the concept of the borderline between the two aspects of reality elaborated in Vedic thought. This latter is seen in cosmogonies where the mind is the first manifestation of reality. The Composer blends here the concepts of creation and of cognition undertaken by free men.

Verses c–d present the beginning of cognitive desire and action; both are classified as *rajas* (as it is in MaU 2.5, see above, section 2.1.2). This means that reason again transforms into mind but now its cognition is described by the Composer as performed from the perspective of the highest cognitive agent present in man in the same way as it is performed in the cosmos.

### MDhP 187.25

*indriyāṇi hi sarvāṇi pradarsayati sā sadā |*  
*prītiḥ sattvaṃ rajaḥ śokaś tamo mohaś ca te trayāḥ ||*

It is reason which always displays all the senses. The three states are: *sattva* which is pleasure, *rajas* which is sorrow and *tamas* which is delusion.<sup>113</sup>

The next stage is the same as in everyday sensual cognition: the influence of reason on the senses is conceived in terms of illuminating<sup>114</sup> (verses a–b). The recipient may presume that, in this stage, it transforms into senses but the process is performed from a different perspective. The use of the pronoun *sarvāṇi* ‘all’ implies that the Composer has in mind not only the senses of reason (*buddhīndriya*) but also the senses of action (*karmendriya*). Subject-object cognition again causes three mental states (*bhāva*) which are categorised with the aid of the three classes: pleasure is categorised as *sattvic*, unpleasure as *rajasic* and delusion as *tamasic* (verses c–d).

### MDhP 187.26

*ye ye ca bhāvā loke ‘smin sarveṣv eteṣu te triṣu |*  
*iti buddhigatiḥ sarvā vyākhyātā tava bhārata ||*

Whatever mental state is created in this world, it refers to all these three classes. In this way the whole course of the reason has been described to you, *Bhārata*.<sup>115</sup>

<sup>113</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

<sup>114</sup> Wynne (2009: 177) chooses the version *pravartayati* which activates conceptualisation of influence of reason on the senses in terms of their moving.

<sup>115</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

The scope of categorisation with the use of classes encompasses all the mental states (*bhāva*, verses a–b). Thus, the Composer comes back to the idea that everything is a creation of reason (17) but now highlights its categorising ability. Proper categorisation can be performed only from the perspective of the highest cognitive agent.

The next agent able to do that is man who is freed thanks to his restraint of the senses:

### MDhP 187.27

*indriyāṇi ca sarvāṇi vijetavyāni dhīmatā |  
sattvaṃ rajas tamaś caiva prāṇināṃ saṃśritāḥ sadā ||*

All the senses should be subdued by the wise man. Sattva, rajas and tamas are always united with living beings.

If man masters his senses, he will be able to properly categorise with the aid of the three classes. The classes are described as united with living beings because they are categories of their cognitive faculties.

Now the Composer presents the proper categorisation of sensation experienced during subject-object cognition realised from the perspective of the highest cognitive agent:

### MDhP 187.28

*trividhā vedanā caiva satvasattveṣu dṛśyate |  
sāttvikī rājasī caiva tāmasī ceti bhārata ||*

There are three kinds of perception in all living beings. They are called sattvic, rajasic and tamasic, Bhārata.<sup>116</sup>

In 21–22, the Composer has described the three mental states of reason (*bhāva*) realised by it when it identifies with the mind in everyday subject-object cognition. He now describes the same kind of sensual cognition but in a different way. He states that living beings have threefold perception (*vedanā*) which can be categorised as sattvic, rajasic and tamasic. The noun *vedanā* is used to express the mental space (*bhāva*) categorised with use of classes. Thus, we can see that the activity of the mind and the reason is different and they do not merge into one as in the previous case. The mind creates a mental state (*bhāva*) and reason responds with its perception (*vedanā*).<sup>117</sup>

<sup>116</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

<sup>117</sup> This noun is rarely used in the MDhP. Apart from here it appears in MDhP 12.212 in the same context, in MDhP 232.31 and 284.33. It means perception of objects of senses but not connected with reason (*buddhi*).

**MDhP 187.29**

*sukhasparśaḥ sattvaguṇo duḥkhasparśo rajoguṇaḥ |  
tamoguṇena saṃyuktau bhavato 'vyāvahārikau ||*

A pleasant sensation is categorised by the class of sattva, an unpleasant sensation is categorised by the class of rajas. When these classes are connected with tamas, they become indistinct.<sup>118</sup>

Now categorisation performed by reason is presented. A pleasant sensation (*sparśa*) is categorised with the class of sattva, an unpleasant is categorised with the class of rajas, an impossibility to cognise, caused by the union of sattva and rajas, is categorised with aid of the class of tamas. The Composer elaborates this topic in the following way:

**MDhP 187.30–32**

*tatra yat prītisaṃyuktam kāye manasi vā bhavet |  
vartate sātṭviko bhāva ity avekṣeta tat tadā || (30)*

As regards sensations, that which is imbued with joy can arise in body or mind. One should regard that as a sattvic mental state<sup>119</sup> that has come into being.

*atha yad duḥkhasaṃyuktam atuṣṭikaram ātmanah |  
pravṛttam raja ity eva tann asaṃrabhya cintayet || (31)*

That which is imbued with suffering causes a person's pain. One should not be affected by such an experience but merely note that rajas begins,<sup>120</sup>

*atha yan mohasaṃyuktam avyaktam iva yad bhavet |  
apratarkyam avijñeyam tamas tad upadhārayet || (32)*

What is imbued with delusion, whose object may be unmanifest and incapable of being comprehended or cognised should be regarded as tamas.<sup>121</sup>

The description highlights the role of emotions and their proper categorisation. It is possible that the sequence of enumerating emotions reflects the sequence of creation. The recipient may presume that the first manifestation of the highest cognitive agent, as the subject of cognition (described in stanza 24, see above), is the manifestation of happiness and categorised by it as sattva. Then it tries to cognise but does not know how, so feels unwell and calls its state as rajasic. In the next stage it recognises

<sup>118</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

<sup>119</sup> Wynne (2009: 179): 'pure state of being.'

<sup>120</sup> Wynne (2009: 179): 'passion has been impelled into being.'

<sup>121</sup> Wynne (2009: 179): 'darkness.' The same definitions of the states cognised by three classes are in MDhP 212.29–31, MS 12.27–29.

itself as impossible to be categorised. In this state it does not feel anything and categorises this state as tamasic. That the Composer wants to activate cosmogonies can be seen in that the description of the tamasic perception (*apratarkyam avijñeyam*) is the same as the description of reality in its pre-creative state in MS 1.5 (see chapter 1.1.1).<sup>122</sup> Since the highest cognitive agent wants to feel happy it performs further subject-object cognition. Such a theory of creation is presented already in BU 1.4 though without the use of the category of classes (Jurewicz 2016/18). Man who wants to be free should categorise his mental states which are the results of the cognitive pattern of the cosmos in the same way: when he feels happy, he categorises this state as sattvic, when he feels unhappy, he categorises this state as rajasic and when he does not feel anything, he categorises this mental state as tamasic. In stanza 31d, it is stated that man should not be affected by the mental states he experiences (*tann asamrabhya*).

In the next stanzas (MDhP 187.33–35), the Composer enumerates various emotional states which are categorised by the appropriate class.<sup>123</sup> Emotional states like rapture, joy, bliss and happiness are categorised as belonging to the class of sattva. States like displeasure, torment, sorrow, greed and impatience belong to the class of rajas. States like accepting presumptions (*abhimāna*), delusion, carelessness, sleepiness, weariness and lassitude belong to the class of *tamas*. In stanza 34 the word *līnga*, the sign, is used in reference to emotions categorised as rajasic, which highlights the concept of cognition which is an inference from a sign. On the basis of signs and with aid of classes man can categorise his everyday emotional states.

The emotions allow men to categorise not only mental states but also actions. This is presented in MS 12.35–38.<sup>124</sup> It is stated there that when someone feels shame, having done something, doing it or being about to do it, he should categorise this action as tamasic. An act done because of a person's desire to achieve fame which is not then achieved, but does not disappoint that person, should be categorised as rajasic. When someone wants to know everything, is not ashamed during action and feels happy with himself, he should categorise this action as sattvic. Thus, three classes allow men to categorise all their mental states (*bhāva*) and all kinds of actions (*karman*).

<sup>122</sup> It is a conventional description of the tamasic mental state (see MDhP 212.029, MS 12.29).

<sup>123</sup> The same in MDhP 212.24–28.

<sup>124</sup> MS 12: *yat karma kṛtvā kurvaṃś ca kariṣyaṃś caiva lajjati | taj jñeyam viduṣā sarvaṃ tāmasaṃ guṇalakṣaṇam || (35) yenāsmiṃ karmanā loke khyātīm icchati puṣkalām | na ca śocaty asaṃpattau tad vijñeyam tu rājasam || (36) yat sarveṇecchati jñātuṃ yan na lajjati cācāran | yena tuṣyati cātmāsya tat sattvaguṇalakṣaṇam || (37) tamaso lakṣaṇam kāmo rajasas tv artha ucyate | sattvasya lakṣaṇam dharmah śraiṣṭhyam eṣāṃ yathottaram || (38)*

One should emphasise that the three classes mentioned here are descriptive and not evaluative.<sup>125</sup> All emotions are important because they arise from the cognitive structure of the world and are reaction to it. Moreover, they are an indicator of whether a person cognises and acts properly or not (see below, section 2.3.2c, 2.8.1, chapter 4.1–2). Interestingly, a similar role of emotions in cognition is seen in modern science, especially in Damasio’s work (1994, 1999, 2010, 2018).

Then the double role of the mind is described:

### MDhP 187.36

*dūragam bahudhāgāmi prārthanāsaṃśayātmakam |*  
*manaḥ suniyataṃ yasya sa sukhī pretya ceha ca ||*

When mind, far-reaching, walks in many directions, wish and doubt as its nature is well restrained, a man is happy here and after death.<sup>126</sup>

In verses a–b the mind is described in the same way as in the cosmogony of MDhP 224.34cd (see chapter 1.2.2)<sup>127</sup> which implies that the Composer wants to activate cosmogonic concepts. The present context allows us to better understand the creative activity of the seven mental forms of reality. The argument for its qualifications as *durāga* and *bahudhāgāmin* implies the omniscience of the mind seen as the bridge between the levels of manifestation. The fact that its nature is wish and doubt highlights its activity in subject-object cognition: the mind wishes objects and it creates doubts about them.

In verses c–d it is stated that happiness can be achieved only when the mind (*manas*) is well restrained (*suniyata*). The recipient might presume that the mind of the highest cognitive agent is always well restrained. The same is for the mental forms of reality in MDhP 224. In the present exposition the Composer refers to human cognition. If man’s mind is well controlled, he becomes happy in this life and after his death and the recipient understands that it is a different kind of happiness that is categorised as sattvic (see also chapter 4.9). When the highest cognitive agent manifests as the subject of cognition in the beginning of creation, it feels happiness which is possible to be felt within the frames of the subject-object cognition and because of that it can be classified as sattvic. The ultimate and eternal happiness which is realised in the unmanifest aspect cannot to be described by the three classes (see chapter 4.9.3).

<sup>125</sup> In MS 12.38, the Composer states that ‘each later one is superior to each proceeding’ but this is because he focuses then on their moral dimension in reference to men (see below section 2.6.1).

<sup>126</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

<sup>127</sup> MDhP 224.34cd: *dūragam bahudhāgāmi prārthanāsaṃśayātmakam*.

### 2.3.2.d. The relationship between the highest cognitive agent and reason (MDhP 187.37–43)

The next topic discussed by the Composer is the difference between the highest cognitive agent (called the Field Knower) and its manifestation called *sattva*:

#### MDhP 187.37

*sattvaḥṣetraññāyor etad antaram paśya sūkṣmayoḥ |  
srjate tu guṇān eka eko na srjate guṇān ||*

One must know this difference between *sattva*<sup>128</sup> and the Field Knower,<sup>129</sup> those subtle entities: one creates the classes<sup>130</sup> whereas the other one does not.

We have discussed a similar stanza (MDhP 241.1) above (see section 2.1.5). The noun *sattva* metonymically activates the Great Self which creates *sattva* and other classes. In microscale it is reason (*buddhi*). In both stanzas the highest cognitive agent is called the Field Knower (*ḥṣetraññā*). Thus, the Composer again activates the concept of a relationship between a farmer and his field to explain the relationship between the highest cognitive agent and its mental faculty. The difference between them lies in their activities: classes are not created by the highest cognitive agent but by its first subjective manifestation within the cosmos. We will remain with the general meaning of *sattva* as encompassing both the Great Self and reason.

In the next two stanzas, the Composer introduces other experiential concepts in order to explain this relationship. It is the relationship between a mosquito (*maśaka*) and an udumbara tree and the relationship between fish and water.<sup>131</sup>

<sup>128</sup> Wynne (2009: 181): ‘substance.’

<sup>129</sup> Wynne (2009: 181): ‘field-knower.’

<sup>130</sup> Wynne (2009: 181): ‘evolvents.’

<sup>131</sup> In MDhP 210.4-12, relationship between the highest cognitive agent (*puruṣa*) and cosmos in its pre-creative state (*avyakta*) is described in the following way. They are the same in that they are without beginning and the end (*anādyantāv ubhau*), without a sign (*aliṅgau*), permanent (*nityau*), very subtle (*sūkṣmatarau*) and greater from all great things (*mahādbhyaś ca mahāttarau*, 210.7–8). The difference between is cognitive: the manifest aspect uses category of classes (*guṇa*) and can be cognised with use of them, while the highest cognitive agent is also beyond them (210.9–10). In MDhP 210.11, its delusion in individual subject-object is described, then it (called the embodied one *dehin*) can be seen in terms of man who wears a turban, the classes are conceived in terms of its cloths (for interpretation of this metaphor, see also chapter 3.4.1a). There is nothing about their ontological difference. Moreover, before this explanation, the Composer states that one should cognise the difference between reality in its manifest aspect (the highest cognitive agent in its cosmic and human manifestations) and the unmanifest reality (which is called as greater, mahāttara, from its manifestations, MDhP 210.6–7). European researchers are prone to see any duality as an ontological duality, especially the duality between the mind and body (Wynne 2009: 373 translates *puruṣa* and



**MDhP 187.38**

*maśakodumbarau cāpi saṃprayuktau yathā sadā |  
anyonyam anyau ca yathā saṃprayogas tathā tayoh ||*

The connection between these two is just like that between a gnat and an udumbara tree which are always mutually connected.

Conceptualisation of the highest cognitive agent in terms of a tree may go back to the RV 10.81.4 where the first form of the cosmos is conceived in terms of tree/wood (Jurewicz 2019c). The Composer maps the feature of the inseparability of a gnat and the tree into the target domain. This inseparability is attested in the noun *maśakin* which literally means ‘swarming with mosquitoes’, as Monier Williams translates it and it refers to the *Ficus Glomerata*.<sup>132</sup> At the same time, he highlights their difference. The difference has been just explained in the previous stanza: it is a difference in activity. A gnat behaves differently to the tree in many ways in that it can move while a tree cannot. In the same way, the highest subjective faculty in the cosmos and man (*sattva*) moves using its categories, while the highest cognitive agent is not involved as a whole in this cognitive movement.

There is another possible experiential relationship between the elements in the source domain, a more specific one. The noun *udumbara* may metonymically refer to the figs, in this case *maśaka* would mean a fig wasp which breeds inside figs and *maśakin*, the fig. It is an example of obligate mutualism. This source domain is used to conceive the relationship between Kṛṣṇa and the worlds in the later *Bhagavatapurāṇa* (between 800 and 1000 CE) where the worlds are conceived in terms of ‘figs wasps in a fig’ (*udumbare vā maśakā*) rather than of gnats abiding a tree (if they really do that).<sup>133</sup> In the later *Kṛīḍākhaṇḍa* of the *Gaṇeśapurāṇa* (late medieval period, ca 13th–18th century) Gaṇeśa is presented as shining like ‘uncountable suns, attended by uncountable Indras, accompanied by uncountable Śeṣas and his bodily hairs were the many eggs of Brahmā, (2.11.21) similar to the figs found from the top to the bottom of a fig tree or the uncountable mosquitoes found on the fig’ (2.11.22).<sup>134</sup> Bailey

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*avyakta* as ‘spirit’ and ‘matter’). But, as the early Smṛti say, there is a difference between mind and body, but it is not ontological.

<sup>132</sup> The same meaning is in the *Nachtragswörterbuch des Sanskrit*.

<sup>133</sup> *Bhagavatapurāṇa* 10.40.15: *tvayy avyayātman puruṣe prakalpitā lokāḥ sa-pālā bahu-jīva-saṅkulāḥ | yathā jale sañjihate jalaukaso ‘py udumbare vā maśakā mano-maye ||* Let me note that the source domain of water and fish is also used here, as it is in the next stanza.

<sup>134</sup> Bailey’s translation (*āmūlāgrād yathā vṛkṣe bhavanty audumbarāṇi vai | audumbare vā maśakā saṃkhyātītā bhavanti hi ||*). For this metaphor, see also *Kṛīḍākhaṇḍa* 50.44: *rayastriṅśatkoṭidevā jīvā ye ca sahasraśaḥ audumbaragatā bhānti maśakā iva tadgatāḥ ||* It is also attested in Buddhist philosophy, see Thiên Châu (1999: 157): ‘If it were to be found in the aggregates,

(2008) translates the locative *audumbare* as ‘on the fig,’ but it can also mean ‘in the fig’ which is more in accord with experience. If the Composer of the MDhP 187.38 refers to it, then the relationship between *sattva* and the Field Knower is that of interdependence in the same way as wasps, although they are different from figs, are born in figs and cannot live without them in an obligate mutualistic relationship.

In many so-called Āyurvedic sources to be found on the internet the paste of the bark of the udumbara tree is used to heal mosquito bites.<sup>135</sup> If it was used in the same way at the time of composition of these texts analysed here, then the relationship between them can be seen in terms of the relationship between a poison and an antidote. On a more general level, it is the relation between two opposed elements which might activate the Vedic conceptualisation of reality as internally contradictory. The healing aspect of the udumbara tree highlights the fact that recognition of a man’s self brings man relief from the sorrow caused having his reason engaged, by the I-form (*ahaṃkāra*), in subject-object cognition conceived in terms of a mosquito which bites man.

### MDhP 187.39

*prthagbhūtau prakṛtyā tau samprayuktau ca sarvadā |*  
*yathā matsyo jalaṃ caiva samprayuktau tathaiva tau ||*

Their way of being is distinct by their nature but they are always connected in the same way as fish and water are connected.<sup>136</sup>

The Composer states that the difference between the highest cognitive agent and its subjective manifestation (*sattva*) lies in their nature (*prakṛti*, verses a–b) which highlights the general meaning of the characteristic nature of something. Conceptualisation of the highest cognitive agent in terms of water goes back to the Veda where the concept of water is used to conceive the first form of the cosmos. It structurally corresponds to the concept of a tree/wood (Jurewicz 2010). This conceptualisation also evokes metaphoric thinking of the manifest aspect of reality in terms of flowing river expressed in the noun *samsara* ‘co-flowing’. The topology of this metaphor is the same as in the case of the *udumbara-maśaka* metaphor: fish and the flowing river

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when the body is cut or opened, the person would be visible, just like a mosquito is found in an udumbara fruit: when an udumbara fruit is opened, the mosquito is visible.’ Here we can clearly see that the fig wasps are meant, but I did not find the original which could be more ambiguous.

<sup>135</sup> E.g. <https://www.naturalremediescenter.com/5122/ayurvedic-remedies-udumbara-for-wounds-boils-skin-ulcers-edema-mosquito-insect-bites-indian-herb/>; <https://www.hinduscriptures.in/vedic-lifestyle/food/trees/udumbara>. See also: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ficus\\_racemosa](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ficus_racemosa)

<sup>136</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

are different. Yet the fish cannot live without the river and it can use the movement of the river for its benefit.

Analysis of the metaphors used by the Composer show how crucial it is for our understanding of Indian philosophy to take into account the source domains and their features which are mapped on the target domains. Although a tree is ontologically different from a mosquito and water from fish (and farmer from his field, king from his subjects and spider from its web) it is not the feature which is projected onto the target domain. As we see the topic of this chapter is subject-object cognition and there is nothing which could imply a dualistic approach. However, it is possible to activate such an interpretation and it will be activated by philosophers of classical Sāṃkhya.

### MDhP 187.40

*na guṇā vidur ātmānaṃ sa guṇān vetti sarvaśaḥ |  
paridraṣṭā guṇānāṃ ca saṃsraṣṭā manyate sadā ||*

The classes<sup>137</sup> do not know the self but the self knows them thoroughly. The self sees the classes,<sup>138</sup> but thinks that he mingles with them.<sup>139</sup>

The word *ātman* (verse a) refers to the highest cognitive agent. Remember the chapter is an exposition on the highest self (*adhyātman*, stanza 1) about which Yudhiṣṭhira asks. So far it has been called the Field Knower, because the exposition of Bhīṣma has been presented from a theoretical point of view. The use of the noun *ātman* marks the next change of perspective. Now the Composer will discuss the cognitive situation of the highest cognitive agent manifest in man as his self. Its omniscience is expressed in its qualification as beholder (*paridraṣṭā*) of the classes (verse c).

However, in verse d, the highest cognitive agent (the self, *ātman*) is presented as thinking that it is mingled (*saṃsraṣṭā*) with them. This verb is used in BU 4.3.8 in a context which is helpful for understanding the Composer's thought. It is the exposition of Yājñavalkya who describes the highest cognitive agent conceived in terms of light present in the heart among the breaths.<sup>140</sup> Then the verb *sam sṛj-* is used to express its state when it is endowed with a body and unites with sins.<sup>141</sup> It highlights the fusion of the highest cognitive agent with its creation (Jurewicz 2016/18).

<sup>137</sup> Wynne (2009: 181): 'evolvents of matter.'

<sup>138</sup> Wynne (2009: 181): 'is the witness of evolvents.'

<sup>139</sup> Wynne (2009: 181): 'connected to him.'

<sup>140</sup> BU 4.3.7: *vijñānamayaḥ prāṇesu hṛdy antariyotih puruṣaḥ.*

<sup>141</sup> BU 4.3:7–8: *sā hi svāpno bhūtvemām lokām ātikrāmati mṛtyó rūpāni | (7) sā vā ayāṃ pūruṣo jāyamānaḥ śārīram abhisampādyamānaḥ pāpmābhiḥ sāmsṛjyate | sā utkrāman mriyamānaḥ (8)*

The Composer, motivated by tradition, presents the same cognitive situation. In cosmic cognition, the highest cognitive agent never mingles itself with its subjective manifestations. Putting this in the words of the cosmogony of the MS, Brahma never mingles with its Great Self. When, however, the highest cognitive agent manifests itself in man who does not cognise in a proper way, it is reduced to reason (*buddhi*). This is explicitly stated in MDhP 240.3 where reason is called the self of man although the self belongs only to itself.<sup>142</sup> We can call such an epistemic and ontic whole, which is constructed in wrong cognition by men, the amalgamate agent. The use of the verb *sam sṛj-* which expresses a close connection<sup>143</sup> justifies this interpretation. When the self (*ātman*) is fused with reason, the functional difference between them, explained in stanzas 37–39, disappears: the tree/the fig becomes mosquito, the water becomes a fish.

The Composer further elaborates the cognitive nature of the relationship between the highest cognitive agent (called now the highest self *paramātman*) and its mental faculties (called *indriya*):

#### MDhP 187.41

*indriyais tu pradīpārthaṃ kurute buddhisaptamaḥ |  
nirvīceṣṭair ajānadbhiḥ paramātmā pradīpavat ||*

The highest self uses the senses of which reason is the seventh, which do not move and cognise, in order to illuminate the object – like a lamp.<sup>144</sup>

The relationship between the highest cognitive agent and the cognitive faculties is seen in terms of the relationship between the light and someone who lights it (metaphor COGNITION IS ILLUMINATING). The author is talking about the light of a lamp (see MDhP 187.44, and 203.37 above, section 2.3.2e, 2.1.4). The highest cognitive agent is conceived in terms of a person who lights a lamp, its cognitive faculties in terms of flames which illuminate the

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When he falls asleep, he transcends this world, these visible forms of death. (7) When at birth this person takes on a body, he becomes united with bad things, and when at death he leaves it behind, he gets rid of those bad things (8), Olivelle's translation (1998).

<sup>142</sup> MDhP 240.: *buddhir ātmā manuṣyasya buddhir evātmano 'tmikā | yadā vikurute bhāvaṃ tadā bhavati sā manaḥ ||*

<sup>143</sup> The Composer of MaU 3.3, in his discussion of creation of the amalgamate agent, presents the cognitive situation of the highest cognitive agent (the self, *ātman*) who seems to lose its independence over the human agent in which it is enclosed. The Composer uses the source domain of forging iron to express the process of fusion of absolute consciousness and of subject-object consciousness.

<sup>144</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

objects. In the target domain, the highest cognitive agent endows the cognitive faculties of men with the ability to cognise. Their conceptualisation in terms of flame implies their movement.

All the cognitive faculties, including the mind and reason, are generally called senses (*indriya*). The recipient well versed in tradition might activate the definition of Indra as *iddha*, something that is lit (ŚB 6.1.1.2).<sup>145</sup> In this way the main breath is conceived which allows other cognitive faculties to cognise. This definition could be seen (together with the metaphor COGNITION IS ILLUMINATING) as one of the grounds why the term *indriya*, literally ‘something which is connected with Indra’ is used to denote all cognitive faculties in this stanza.<sup>146</sup>

In the next stanza, the Composer repeats the functional difference between the highest cognitive agent (the Field Knower) and its subjective manifestation (*sattva*):

#### MDhP 187.42

*srjate hi guṇān sattvaṃ kṣetrajñāḥ paripaśyati |  
samyogas tayor eṣa sattvakṣetrajñayor dhruvaḥ ||*

Sattva creates classes, the Field Knower perceives them. This is a permanent union between them.<sup>147</sup>

We can see again that it is inseparability of the highest cognitive agent and the *sattva* which is highlighted by the Composer, although their activity is different. The fact that the Composer repeats this statement implies that recognition of the functional difference between them is crucial. As stated earlier the concept of the difference between the aspects of reality must have been a serious metaphysical problem with the assumption of monism. Already in the ṚV, the difference between the unmanifest and manifest aspects has been seen in terms of difference between that which does not move (*akṣara*) and which moves (*kṣarati*, Jurewicz 2012). Now the difference is shifted onto the highest cognitive agent and its manifestations within which it remains although

<sup>145</sup> ŚB 6.1.1.2: *sá yò ‘yám mádhye prāṇáh | eṣá evéndras tán eṣá prāṇán madhyatá indriyénainddha tásmād indha indho ha vai tám indrá ity ácakṣate paró ‘kṣam paró ‘kṣakāmā hí devās tá iddháh sapta nānā píruṣān asrjantá |*

<sup>146</sup> It should be noted that the weapon of Indra is ‘equated poetically with lightning’ (Whitaker 2016: 58) and Indra’s activity is to cognise (one of the target domains of the killing Vṛtra concept, see Jurewicz 2010). So *indriya* could be understood as a fiery cognitive power. Its use to denote the senses in the Smṛti texts confirms the thesis that the concept of fire had been shifted to a lower human level.

<sup>147</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

they move.<sup>148</sup> In everyday cognition, there is no difference between them: both are fused into one. Theoretical recognition of the functional difference between them and of their ontic unity should be practically confirmed during liberating cognition. Here *sattva* (verse a) metonymically activates the concept of reason (*buddhi*) able to use this category.

### MDhP 187.43

*āśrayo nāsti sattvasya kṣetrajñasya ca kaś cana |*  
*sattvaṃ manaḥ saṃsrjati na guṇān vai kadā cana ||*

There is no support of the *sattva* and the Field Knower. *Sattva* is mingled with the mind, but never with classes.<sup>149</sup>

It seems that the intention of Composer is to highlight that the highest cognitive agent and reason (metonymically activated by the noun *sattva*) are both a creation of unmanifest reality (verses a–b). In that sense they have no support (*āśraya*) because they will finally disappear: in the microscale when liberating cognition is finally realised and man realises his identity with the unmanifest reality, in the macroscale at the time of the universal annihilation of the cosmos.

In verses c–d, it is stated that *sattva* (reason able to use the category of *sattva*) is mingled (*saṃsrjati*) with the mind but never with classes. The verb *saṃ srj-* has been used in stanza 40 where the construction of the amalgamate agent has been described. The Composer again describes the results of wrong cognition and claims that not only is the highest cognitive agent reduced by reason, but that reason is reduced to a mind engaged in subject-object cognition and that it is never able to use the categories. This wrong cognitive activity results in the creation of the amalgamate agent. In the proper cognition reason never mingles with the classes because it knows how to use them.

### 2.3.2.e. Liberating cognition is cognition of the highest cognitive agent (MDhP 187.44–48)

From now on the Composer focuses on liberating cognition which is identical with the cosmic cognition of the highest cognitive agent.

### MDhP 187.44

*raśmīṃs teṣāṃ sa manasā yadā samyañ niyacchati |*  
*tadā prakāśate 'syātmā ghaṭe dīpo jvalann iva ||*

<sup>148</sup> This is elaborated in MDhP 291–296 (*Vasiṣṭhakarālanakasaṃvāda*) which I hope to analyse in a future book.

<sup>149</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

When a man correctly controls the rays/reins of the senses with his mind, then his self shines forth like a light burning in a jar.<sup>150</sup>

The senses are conceived in terms of rays (for this metaphor, see above, MDhP 271.20, section 2.1.4).<sup>151</sup> If the recipient elaborates the source domain of the sun in its everyday movement, he will understand the self (*ātman*) in terms of the sun. The practice of restraining the senses is conceived in terms of sunset. Since the logic of the source domain implies that after sunset the sunrise comes, the recipient understand that a free man can again engage in subject-object cognition, now from the perspective of the highest cognitive agent. If the recipient activates the meaning of *raśmi* which is ‘reins,’ he will understand the liberating cognition in terms of the general domain of Riding In A Chariot. Conceptualisation of the sun in terms of a chariot makes the blend created by the Composer coherent.

In verse d, the Composer elaborates the concept of a light burning in a jar. Within its frames, the self is conceived in terms of light and man’s organism is conceived in terms of the body of a lamp (see also above, analysis of stanza 37.) It is worth noting that the concept of *ghaṭa* is also used as the source domain for the organism of man. For example, *Brahma Bindu Upaniṣad* (1.12–14) uses the same source domain of a jar to conceive man, but there the highest cognitive agent is conceived as the space that is never destroyed, contrary to the jar. The way to realise this state is control of the senses by the mind<sup>152</sup>.

The Composer of BU 4.3.7–9 mentioned above (see above, analysis of stanza 40), having described the fusion of the self (*ātman*) with the body, describes the possibility to go beyond the body and become self-shining or self-illuminating ‘*svayaṃjyotir*’ (Jurewicz 2016/18). The logic of the exposition presented in MDhP 187.43–44 is the same, although much more concise than the exposition of BU 4.3.7–9. In MDhP 187.43.c–d, the Composer presents the amalgamate agent while in MDhP 187.44, he presents the state of the highest cognitive agent in proper cognition when it can use its cognitive faculties.

In the next two stanzas, the Composer presents the mental state of a man who has cognised the highest cognitive agent present in himself. Such a man can move around people without being influenced by them in the same way as a water bird moves in water without being soaked by it. Remember that the feathers of water birds are covered with oil which protect them from

<sup>150</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

<sup>151</sup> The same idea of fusion of the highest cognitive agent with cognitive faculties is expressed in MaU 3.3 where the verb *upa sam śliṣ-* is used to and the concept of forging a metal.

<sup>152</sup> For further analysis of this stanza see chapter 4.10.1.

becoming wet and this feature of being untouched by water is mapped onto the target domain.

Man should behave according to his own state (*svabhāva*) by means of his own reason (*svabuddhyā*, 47ab).<sup>153</sup> If we agree that *svabhāva* expresses the necessity with which categories work in the cosmos, we will see that the free man should recognise with his reason all categories which establish his place in the cosmos and in society (categories of time, of classes, of actions, of sacrifice and dharma/adharma). He should also accept the limits imposed by them. Then, he will not feel emotions which arise from the subject-object cognition, like sorrow, happiness, or envy (47cd).

### MDhP 187.48

*svabhāvasiddhyā saṃsiddhān sa nityam srijate guṇān |  
 ṛṇanābhir yathā sraṣṭā vijñeyās tantuvad guṇāḥ ||*

Thanks to perfection of his own nature, it is he who always creates perfect classes. Classes are similar to threads which a spider creates.

Connected to his own state, the self always creates classes. One should understand that classes are just like the thread emitted by a spider. When he is successful in the realisation of his own state (*svabhāvasiddhyā*, verse a), it is he, identified with the highest cognitive agent, who creates the category of the three classes. This description of the free man is similar to the descriptions of the highest cognitive agent in stanzas 37, 40, 42. There is also a similarity between this stanza and MDhP 241.2 where everything in the cosmos is subjected to one's own state and the creation of classes is conceived in terms of the weaving of a web by a spider (verses c–d, see section 2.1.5). The literal meaning of the noun *guṇa* which is 'thread' strengthens the coherence between the source and the target domains. We remember that the same source domain is used to conceive the highest cognitive agent in MDhP 241.2.

The classes are called *saṃsiddha* (verse a). In this way the Composer implies that they are created in a proper way and they are effective. Thanks to that, the highest cognitive agent can recognise its manifestations because it uses classes from within man with whom identity has been recognised. It is worth noting that the participle *saṃsiddha* is used in reference to well prepared food. Since the word *guṇa* also means 'a secondary dish' which makes basic food made of rice (*anna*) different from other dishes, the recipient might activate conceptualisation of subject-object cognition in terms of eating

<sup>153</sup> MDhP 187.47: *evaṃsvabhāvam evaitat svabuddhyā viharen naraḥ | aśocann aprahr̥ṣyaṃś ca cared vigatamatsarah ||*



(a specific realisation of the general domain of Cooking). Conceptualisation of categorisation in terms of weaving a web by the spider also confirms the activation of this domain. As a spider creates its web in order to catch insects and consume them, in the same way reason under the rule of the highest cognitive agent, creates categories in order to cognise itself in subject-object cognition.

\*

The exposition of the MDhP 187 presents an overall theory of cognition and categorisation the aim of which is to explain what is the highest self (*adhyātman*) of men. The Composer begins with the most perceptible manifestation of the objective power of reality which are the great beings (*mahābhūta* 2.6.2.a). He presents their distribution in the cosmic and the human organism. He then explains the structure of cosmic and human faculties, all of them are seen as transformations of reason. The next part of the exposition is devoted to everyday sensual cognition performed by men (2.6.2.b). Since reason creates classes, and classes the objects, the whole cosmos can be seen as its creation. The highest cognitive agent is presented as perceiving the subject-object cognition which takes place in man. The result of this cognition is that reason identifies with the mind and as such creates mental states (*bhāva*) which can be pleasant, unpleasant and neutral.

Then the perspective of description changes and the Composer states that reason can go beyond the states of the mind (2.6.2.c). This is the perspective of the highest cognitive agent and free men. However, the subject-object cognition can be restarted and it looks similar to everyday cognition except that now three kinds of sensations which are registered by the mind can be categorised with the classes by reason. Sensations cause feelings which also become an important sign in the categorisation of cognition. At the end of this part of his exposition the Composer discusses two aspects of the mind namely it is the organ that facilitates contact with objects cognised in sensual cognition and it is also the organ which makes liberation possible.

The next part (2.6.2.d) is devoted to an explanation of the difference between the highest cognitive agent and reason which lies in their different cognitive activities: while the latter creates category of classes, the former does not. Despite of this fact, the highest cognitive agent present in man can think that it does and this is the case when reason mingles with the mind which is focused on external objects. The last part presents liberating cognition which is the same as the cosmic cognition of the highest cognitive agent (2.6.2.e).

### 2.3.2.f. The polemics against Buddhism (MDhP 187.49–60)

In the following two stanzas (49–50), the Composer discusses two theories of the status of the three classes when they are destroyed (*pradhvasta*, 49a). The logic of the previous stanza implies that the Composer has in mind the ultimate cognitive state reached in liberating cognition, when man fully identifies with the unmanifest aspect of reality and then the categories are not used by him. The problem of the status of classes, which has disappeared for such a man, can be interpreted as a problem if the classes are used by him again.

According to some the three classes do not disappear, which can be established by inference, because non-existence is impossible (187.49). According to others, they disappear (187.50ab). One should consider both arguments and decide for oneself which is the more convincing (187.50cd).

It follows that if the chapter presents a discussion with any other philosophical view, then the essence of the dispute is the existence of categories for the free man. This problem is conceived in terms of the knot of the heart (*hṛdayagranthi*) which causes a disturbance of reason (*buddhibheda*) literally ‘the split of reason’ (see BhG 3.26, chapter 4.11.3).<sup>154</sup> When it is resolved, doubt disappears and one does not feel any sorrow.

This seems to be a polemic against Buddhism. In the next two stanzas (187.52–53), the Composer uses the source domain of the river in terms of which the cosmos is conceived and which can be crossed by those who understand the oneness of the self. The metaphor LIBERATION IS CROSSING A RIVER is also used by the Buddha who negated the existence of the self (*ātman*). So, the recipient is prompted to create a conceptual network the input spaces of which are Brahminic and Buddhist teaching with their specific metaphors. It should be noted that the conceptualisation of the cosmos and of the whole of reality in terms of a container of water goes back to the AVŚ (Jurewicz 2010).

And then the Composer states:

#### MDhP 187.54

*etāṃ buddhvā naraḥ sarvāṃ bhūtānām āgatiṃ gatim |  
avekṣya ca śanair buddhyā labhate śaṃ paraṃ tataḥ ||*

A man, having understood how the living beings come and go away and having experienced step by step the coming and going of living, attains the highest peace.<sup>155</sup>

<sup>154</sup> MDhP 187.51a *iīmaṃ hṛdayagranthiṃ buddhibhedamayam dṛḍham | vimucya sukham āsīta na śocec chinnasaṃśayaḥ ||*

<sup>155</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

The repetitive use of the verb *budh-* (*buddhvā*, verse a) and its derivative *buddhi* (verse c) may metonymically, on the basis of phonetic similarity, activate the concept of the Buddha and his followers. This association is strengthened by the Composer describing the content of liberating cognition as the birth and death of living beings which activates the First Noble Truth according to which everything is transient. At the same time, the use of the noun *śam* to express the ultimate cognitive state activates the R̥gvedic ideal of freedom which is usually mentioned together with *yoḥ* (e.g., RV 1.93.7d, 3.17.3d, 4.12.5d, 5.47.7b, 7.35.1c, 10.182.1–3d). Thus, the Composer implies that the ultimate state proclaimed by Buddhism can be reached by Brahminic practice and can lead to the ideal described by tradition. This meaning comes from the blend of the input spaces which are Brahminic practice and Buddhist practice. The generic space is liberating cognition.

In the next stanza, the role of the mind as the faculty which is able to perform liberating cognition and its content is described:

### MDhP 187.55

*trivargo yasya viditāḥ prāḡjyotiḥ sa vimucyate |*  
*anviṣya manasā yuktaḥ tattvadarśī nirutsukaḥ ||*

Who knows the group of three, he becomes free before the light comes. He, the yoked one, having searched with his mind, sees the truth and is without anxiety.<sup>156</sup>

The set of three (*trivarga*) is not clear. It might refer to the three classes and everything which can be cognised by them i.e., the manifest aspect of reality.

The compound *prāḡjyotis* (verse a) needs a few words. According to Monier-Williams it means ‘lit from the front/ from the east’. It is also possible that the Composer uses this compound adverbially to express the time of practice which is early morning with one’s face directed towards the east. In this way, he would activate Vedic ritual teachings. In verse c, it is the mind which conveys both the cognitive (*anviṣya*) and the practice (activated *via* participle *yukta*) that leads to true cognition and freedom from unhappiness (verse d). Thus, the Vedic ritual practice is transformed into the psycho-physical practice described in the Smṛti texts.

According to the next stanza, this practice consists of the restraint of senses in order to recognise the self (*ātman*) because it cannot be cognised by the senses if they are involved in subject-object cognition and distracted by various objects:

<sup>156</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

**MDhP 187.56**

*na cātmā śakyate draṣṭum indriyeṣu vibhāgaśaḥ |  
tatra tatra viśṛṣṭeṣu durjayeṣv akṛtātmabhīḥ ||*

The self cannot be perceived separately by the senses which go here and there, and are difficult to be conquered by those whose self is not composed.<sup>157</sup>

The idea that the self cannot be perceived separately is expressed already in BU 1.4.7 according to which in everyday cognition men perceive only names and actions (or actions of names, *karmanāmāni*) of the self (*ātman*) which is then incomplete (*ākṛtsna hí śaḥ*). The compound *akṛtātman* (verse d) may also evoke this idea.

Having grounded his exposition in tradition, the Composer again seems to activate the concept of the Buddha and his followers with the repetitive use of the verb *budh-* and its derivatives:

**MDhP 187.57**

*etad buddhvā bhaved buddhaḥ kim anyad buddhalakṣaṇam |  
vijñāya tad dhi manyante kṛtakṛtyā manīṣiṇaḥ ||*

Having understood this, he wakes up. What else could be the sign of the awoken one?<sup>158</sup> Once the wise have understood it, they are thought to have done what they had to do.

A man can be called the awakened one (*buddha*, verse a) when he understands, with aid of his reason (*buddhvā*, verse a), reality in the way described above. In verse b, the Composer states that there is no other sign of the state being awakened (*buddhalakṣaṇam*). If the recipient activates the concept of Buddhism, he can understand the noun *buddha* literally, as referring to the Buddha himself or to one who is liberated according to Buddhist practice. Thus, this practice is taken over and assimilated by the Brahmins.

Moreover, people who have understood that are called ‘those who have done what they had to do’ (*kṛtakṛtya*, verse d). This compound is used in AU 2.4, in the description of the third birth of the self (*ātman*) which is death of a man before he comes back from the earth.<sup>159</sup> Thus, the recipient finally organises his blend: only a man who thinks in the way described above can be called the Buddha.

<sup>157</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

<sup>158</sup> Wynne (2009: 185): ‘When he has understood this, he becomes a wise man.’

<sup>159</sup> AU 2.4: *so ‘syāyam ātmā puṇyebhyaḥ karmebhyaḥ pratidhīyate | athāsyāyam itara ātmā kṛtakṛtyo vayoḡataḥ prāiti | sa itaḥ prayann eva punar jāyate | tad asya ṛtīyaṃ janma |*

The Composer activates the input space of the Buddhist teaching in the last stanza of the chapter. Having described the fact that the wise men do not fear and are not tormented by pleasure and pain (187.58–59) he states:

### MDhP 187.60

*loka āturaṅjanān virāviṅṅas tat tad eva bahu paśya śocataḥ |  
tatra paśya kuśalān aśocato ye vidus tad ubhayam padaṃ sadā ||*

Without becoming involved with the afflicted people of this world, look at how much they grieve over different things! But look at the skillful men who do not grieve, those always who know both states of the virtuous.<sup>160</sup>

In verses a–b, the Composer argues that the suffering of people and the experience of unhappiness is an important motive for liberation in Brahminic practice (see chapter 4.1). There is no doubt that this is the Buddhist influence. Moreover, wise men are called *kuśala*, ‘skillful’ (verse c). This word is very important in Buddhist discourse where it used to denote the Buddha’s clever way of teaching (Gombrich 1996). Now, this term is included into the blend to denote the Brahmins who are free thanks to the skillfulness of their practice (for *kuśala* and *kauśalya*, see chapter 4.11.2).

\*

Our analysis of MDhP 187 shows how important is to take into account the whole context of a given exposition. The concepts and terms which may be seen as characteristic for classical Sāṃkhya and Yoga do not betray its beginnings but are motivated by the aims of the Composer’s exposition and by the perspective from which he presents it. If we are correct in our analysis of MDhP 187.48–60, the Composer is arguing against Buddhist liberating practices and their metaphysical interpretation.

According to the teaching presented in MDhP 187, man is ontologically identical with reality and in microscale realises his manifestation in a macroscale in the form of the highest cognitive agent. Man is endowed with the same faculties as the cosmos conceived by the cognising and moving body of the highest cognitive agent which is present in man too. Recognition of this unity is the aim of liberating practice which allows man to perform subject-object cognition from the cosmic perspective of the highest cognitive agent.

<sup>160</sup> Wynne (2009: 185) chooses *satām* instead of *sadā* in verse d and translates it: ‘those who know both states of the virtuous.’

## 2.4. The concept of mind (*manas*)

The analysis of cosmogony presented in the MS has shown that the concept of mind (*manas*) appears in the descriptions of these stages of creation when there is a radical change in the way reality manifests itself. Mind is the first manifestation of reality within the cosmos conceived in terms of the Golden Egg: Brahma, having divided himself in the form of Golden Egg into space, manifests his mind (*manas*) thanks to which he begins to think and creates its subjective power (the Great Self) and categories (*guṇa*). The mind appears again when Brahma begins to manifest himself in action (*karman*) i.e., its cosmic form begins to move. In the first case, the mind mediates between the unmanifest and the manifest aspect. In the second case, it mediates between imperceptible thinking and perceptible movement. It follows that the mind can also transcend the stages of manifestation in liberating practice which reverses the order of creation. In the monistic vision mind, understood as above, is the most important faculty which makes unity of reality possible because it unites its opposing elements.

Mind as the mental faculty of man is conceived in the same way. We have just seen that in the analysis of MDhP 187 there are two cognitive situations in which reason identifies with the mind. One during everyday sensual cognition when reason identifies with the mind creating mental states (*bhāva*) of the objects (for this issue, see chapter 3.2). The second takes place when reason goes beyond the mental states and unites with the mind seen as the borderline between two aspects of reality (for this issue, see chapter 4.9–10).

Before we continue let us summarise the everyday process of cognition.<sup>161</sup> The senses of reason (*buddhīndriya*) and of action (*karmendriya*) cognise their objects and transfer the content of their cognition to the mind (*manas*). Its function is to create the image of the object, to desire it, to create doubt about it and evoke a mental state.<sup>162</sup> The role of reason (*buddhi*) is to react in reference to thoughts and emotions created by the mind (*manas*), to categorise them with the category of classes and to decide what to do with them. Decision-making (*adhyavasāya*) as its main function is accepted by all texts analysed in this study. Understood as above, the mind is the organ that mediates between reason and the senses and makes possible the work of the latter. Analysis of everyday subject-object cognition is a new issue discussed by the early Smṛti Composers.

<sup>161</sup> See also MDhP 267.17–22.

<sup>162</sup> MDhP 187.19cd: *yena saṃkalpayaty kiṃ cid bhavati tan manaḥ* (see above, section 2.3.2b); MDhP 239.015ab: *caḥṣur ālocanāyaiva saṃśayaṃ kurute manaḥ*, MDhP 240.3cd: *yadā vikurute bhāvaṃ tadā bhavati sā manaḥ*.

At the same time, it is the mind which is presented as the faculty that leads to the final recognition of reality. It has been mentioned in MDhP 187.24ab where it is stated that, when reason transcends the three emotional states, it remains in the mind (see above, section 2.3.2c).<sup>163</sup> One should mention that in the early Upaniṣads the stages of the liberating process are presented as taking place in reverse order to those of creation (Jurewicz 2016/18). This conviction is preserved in Smṛti thought. When reason becomes the mind, man reaches the penultimate state before final liberation. In this state, the world exists only in his mind, as it exists in the mind of reality in the first moment of creation (see ŚB 2.2.4.3: *tād evāśya mānasy āsa*). The final liberation will occur when the mind disappears.

Then, as the Composer of MDhP 187.24 implies, man may want to come back to subject-object cognition realised from the point of view of the highest cognitive agent. The first mental state is categorised as rajasic. In Vedic cosmogonies, this state is the will to have a second mental state and a fear of it (Jurewicz 2016/18).

In MDhP 212, which is a similar exposition to MDhP 187, 239–240,<sup>164</sup> the Composer, having explained proper and wrong cognition, states:

### MDhP 212.40

*evam āhuh samāhāraṃ kṣetram adhyātmacintakāh |*  
*sthito manasi yo bhāvaḥ sa vai kṣetrajña ucyate ||*

Those who contemplate the supreme self call this collection of things the ‘field’. The ‘Field knower’<sup>165</sup> is said to be the state<sup>166</sup> that abides within the mind.

The source domain of farming is again activated to express the relationship between the highest cognitive agent and its manifestation (verses a–b). The highest cognitive agent is presented as a state (*bhāva*) of the mind (*manas*), it ‘abides’ within it, verses c–d). One might presume that it can be cognised when the reason goes beyond the everyday states of the mind and remains in its one state (see again MDhP 187.24) which is the desire to cognise the self (*ātman*, see section 2.3.2c, chapter 4.2). The mind thus conceived encapsulates the subject-object division: the subject (*kṣetrajña*) and the thought and desire for the object. As has already been stated, this is the stage that appears in the

<sup>163</sup> MDhP 187.24ab: *atibhāvagatā buddhir bhāve manasi vartate |*

<sup>164</sup> Their similarity needs a new analysis not focused on the assumption of the Proto-Sāṃkhyan bias.

<sup>165</sup> Wynne (2009: 407): ‘field-knower.’

<sup>166</sup> Wynne (2009: 407): ‘essence.’

very beginnings of creation, when reality thinks about itself i.e., the future cosmos and manifests its first cognitive power.

The main role of the mind in liberating cognition is expressed in many places in the texts analysed in this study and will be discussed later (see chapter 4). Two fragments will be quoted here to present its role. The first comes from the early chapters of the MDhP:

### MDhP 197.17

*buddhiḥ karmaguṇair hīnā yadā manasi vartate |  
tadā sampadyate brahma tatraiva pralayaṃ gatam ||*

When the reason abides in the mind and is deprived of actions and attributes, one attains brahman and is dissolved there.<sup>167</sup>

The Composer states that the mind is the faculty into which reason (*buddhi*) merges during liberating cognition (verses a–b, image schema of CONTAINER). Reason should be devoid of all categories i.e., of the classes (*guṇa*) and of actions (*karman*, verse a) which means that there is no world (*loka*) outside it which could be perceived and experienced. Thanks to that it can be transformed into brahman which in this description means the Veda (verse c). The next stage is the dissolution of reason (verse d) and the recipient understands that *brahman* also means reality in its unmanifest aspect. In the next stanza, it is described as beyond touch, sound, taste, vision, smell and thought (MDhP 197.18).

The second, a longer description comes from a later chapter of the MDhP:

### MDhP 287.18

*yathāndhaḥ svagrhe yukto hy abhyāsād eva gacchati |  
tathā yuktena manasā prājño gacchati tāṃ gatim ||*

Like a blind man walks in his home thanks to practice, in the same way the wise man reaches the goal when he restrains his mind.<sup>168</sup>

The Composer activates the concept of a blind man who walks safely in his home thanks to practice and by controlling himself in a right way. In these terms the wise man is conceived who, thanks to work on his mind, is able to reach the highest goal. The image schema SOURCE-PATH-GOAL and the participle *yukta* which describes the blind man in the source domain and the

<sup>167</sup> Jurewicz's translation. For an analysis of the whole teaching (*Manubr̥haspatisaṃvāda*, MDhP 194–199), see Fitzgerald (2017a).

<sup>168</sup> Jurewicz's translation.



restraint of the mind in target domain, activates the general domain of Riding In A Chariot used to conceive and describe liberating practice (see chapter 4.6.2).

This general domain is also activated in the next stanza:

### MDhP 287.19

*maraṇaṃ janmani proktaṃ janma vai maraṇāśritam |  
avidvān mokṣadharmeṣu baddho bhramati cakravat ||*

They say that death is settled in birth and birth in death. One who does not know the norms of freedom, is bounded and revolves like a wheel.

If the recipient elaborates the general domain of Riding In A Chariot, he will conceive those who do not cognise the norms of freedom (verse c) as sitting on the spokes of the revolving wheel of a chariot; this source domain is already used in the ṚV (Jurewicz 2016/18, see also above, section 2.1.1). The mutual relationship between death and birth (verses a–b) is conceived in terms of the revolving movement of a wheel. The Composer creates a conceptual network the input spaces of which are the general domain of Riding In A Chariot, men who cognise properly and those who do not, the cosmos and reality. The next input space is the concept of a skilled blind man who finds his way thanks to the practice described in the previous stanza. In the blend, those who cognise properly are conceived in terms of charioteers. They are blind, because their everyday cognition is useless in this state, but thanks to mental practice they find their way to the place of their destination, the state of freedom from death. Those who do not cognise are stuck to the spokes of the riding chariot, in terms of which the manifest aspect of reality is conceived, and revolve between deaths and births.

### MDhP 287.20

*yathā mṛṅālo ‘nugatam āśu muñcati kardamam |  
tathātmā puruṣasyeha manasā parimucyate |  
manaḥ praṇayate ‘tmānaṃ sa enam abhiyujjati ||*

Like a stalk of lotus quickly frees from mud, in the same way the self of man frees thanks to mind. It is the mind that leads the self and the self yokes the mind.<sup>169</sup>

The next input space of the conceptual network is the concept of a lotus that emerges clean from the mud from which it grows. In the blend, the self (*ātman*) of man is conceived in terms of a lotus stalk (verses a–b). The

<sup>169</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

process of liberation is conceived in terms of the growth of the stalk and the mind is the power which makes the stalk grow (verses c–d).

In verse d it is stated that the self (*ātman*) leads and yokes the mind. In this way, the ultimate state of freedom is conceived when the self uses the human mind for its self-cognition. The mind is conceived in terms of a horse yoked to a chariot and fully obedient to the will of the charioteer or of a warrior who tells the charioteer where to ride.

It can therefore be seen that the concept of mind (*manas*) presented in the early Smṛti texts is different from the concept of *manas* in classical Sāṃkhya. It is not surprising that the Sāṃkhya philosophers decided to narrow the concept of mind. They proposed a radical ontological gap between the conscious subject (*puruṣa*) and non-conscious object (*prakṛti*) which correspond to the unmanifest and manifest aspects of reality in early Smṛti philosophy. Hence, they had to reject any concept which would link both aspects into an ontological whole. The mind (*manas*) seen as the mental power which cognitively encompasses both aspects of reality (in creation and in liberating practice) and thus ontologically unites them is one of the concepts that disappears in classical Sāṃkhya philosophy.

If one uses the category of the three classes (*guṇa*) to define the mind (*manas*) within the cognitive structure of the cosmos and of man proposed in early Smṛti thought, one would see that the mind should be defined as rajasic, while reason (*buddhi*) is sattvic and the senses are tamasic. Interestingly enough, the Composer of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* is only interested in the classification of reason (*buddhi*) as sattvic and of the I-form (*ahaṃkāra*) as tamasic. In dualistic theory, the class of rajas does not play any important role because it qualifies relations between aspects of reality. The exception is called *bhūtasarga* ‘creation of beings’ where rajas preserves its explanatory power as the describing link between two opposed elements (*Sāṃkhyakārikā* 57). This is because the concept of man is the same as in the early Smṛti thought: in microscale man can realise cognition of reality or can make it impossible. So, man is the embodiment of the relationship between liberation and bondage. In the Smṛti thought man can play this role because he is equipped with the mind (*manas*) understood as the link between the two aspects of reality (see section 2.4).

In the texts analysed in the present study the mind (*manas*), due to its role as the mediator between levels of manifestation of reality, has two aspects. The first results from its mediation between reason and the senses. The second from its mediation between the two aspects of reality. In the first case it enables everyday subject-object cognition. In the second case it enables liberating cognition. As previously stated in Vedic tradition, beginning with RV 10.129,

internal contradiction is interpreted as the feature of a free being (Jurewicz 2010, 2016/18). This way of thinking is preserved in the early Smṛti texts and the mind, defined as ‘having the nature of both the existent and the non-existent’ (*sadasadātmaka*, MS 1.14,74), can be seen as the manifestation of the freedom of reality on the cosmic and the individual level. On the cosmic level, it is the mind, the locus of will, thoughts and feelings which appear in reality in the first stage of creation and unite its two aspects. Then, the mind is the locus of will, thoughts and feelings of the highest cognitive agent (the Great Self in the MS) which unites the world in its existence thanks to constant subject-object cognition. On the human level, the mind plays two roles too. It allows everyday subject-object cognition to be performed which usually leads to the entanglement of the subject into objects with all its results for the highest cognitive agent (see chapter 3). It also allows man to perform liberating practice (see chapter 4). This role of the mind is explicitly expressed in the previously mentioned sentence of MaU 4.6 where the Composer calls it ‘the cause of bondage and release’: when it is attached to objects it leads to bondage, when it is without them it leads to release.<sup>170</sup>

Hence man has a choice. Either his mind directs its doubts, desires and thoughts towards his self (*ātman*) which is the unmanifest aspect of reality, or he directs them towards the cosmos which is the manifest aspect of reality perceived by the senses. In the first case, reason will make the decision to start liberating cognition. In the second case, the mind will follow the senses and will draw reason towards their objects.

## 2.5. The structure of the cosmos and of man as a manifestation of subject-object cognition

In this short section we will look at the models of cognition performed by the highest cognitive agent in the cosmos and in man and the wrong cognition of man.

In cosmic cognition the highest cognitive agent cognises itself with the cognitive faculties and their categories:

### MODEL OF COSMIC COGNITION

highest cognitive agent (*ātman*) → mind → the Great Self → mind → senses → body → cosmos

<sup>170</sup> MaU 4.6: *mana eva manuṣyānām kāraṇam bandhamokṣayoh | bandhāya viṣayāsaktam muktyai nirviṣayam smṛtam ||*

In everyday cognition, man wants to cognise the objects of his senses, reason decides to do so and man uses the cognitive faculties and their categories in order to cognise. The self (*ātman*) is fused with reason and the amalgamate agent is created (see chapter 3):

### MODEL OF WRONG COGNITION

the highest cognitive agent (*ātman*) = reason → mind → senses → body → cosmos

In the liberating cognition, man wants to cognise his self (*ātman*), reason decides to do so and man uses the cognitive faculties and their categories in order to cognise to fulfill this wish (see chapter 4):

### MODEL OF LIBERATING COGNITION

the highest cognitive agent (*ātman*) ← mind ← reason ← mind ← senses ← body (cosmos)

The result is that the highest cognitive agent present in man can use its cognitive faculties in order to cognise itself in the cosmos from the micro-perspective (see chapter 4):

### MODEL OF COGNITION OF THE HIGHEST COGNITIVE AGENT AND FREE MAN

the highest cognitive agent (*ātman*) → mind → reason → mind → senses → body → cosmos

## 2.6. The appearance of moral values and norms

The category of moral value appears in the situation when there is an agent free to choose and there is the possibility of choice. The manifest aspect of reality is a place where both conditions of the appearance of moral value are met. As Gazzaniga (2012) argues we can talk about moral concepts only when we live in a group of people when the embodied brains cooperate with each other. Morality is an emergent phenomenon and in early Hindu philosophy it is understood in this way, as relevant only when free thinking living beings appear. In other words, moral values appear when reality manifests as human multiple subjects.<sup>171</sup>

<sup>171</sup> Charles Taylor argues that that there is a close link between ‘identity and moral orientation. We have a sense of who we are through our sense of where we stand to the good.’ He is aware about existence of various ethical systems when writes that ‘this will mean that radically different senses of what is good go along with quite different conceptions of what a human agent is, different notions of the self.’ (1989: 105). It seems that the moral system proposed

In its creative act reality is free, while within its manifest aspect it submits to categories it has created with necessity and without exception. It wants to cognise itself in the subject-object processes and it does so continuously. If it ceased to manifest itself as subject and object, cognition would become impossible. As has been stated, the ability to submit to the limitations freely set by reality in the form of the highest cognitive agent, without any exception, constitutes the first dimension of the Hindu concept of freedom. Within the frames of this dimension value is not necessary, the process is performed because of the will of the highest cognitive agent. Categories are seen as rules of the further creation. The necessity of subjugation to categories is also implied by the conceptualisation of the cosmos in terms of the human body where all parts must work according to their purpose and for the good of the whole.

Man is expected to realise this will in microscale. Regardless of what part of the social body he is, whether the subject, the cognitive act, or the object, he should behave in accordance with the activity of that part. Man, however, is free and can choose between various options in the same way as the highest cognitive agent in the cosmos. For man, categories become moral norms. The norms are especially important in the world which is seen as the manifestation of reality which is not only free but also, in its creative act, is ambivalent: on one hand it reveals itself while on the other it hides itself. In terms of the general domain of Riding In A Chariot, the norms are signposts which show the way to ultimate freedom.

### 2.6.1. The normative and moral value of the three classes (*guṇa*)

As has been seen, the three classes (*guṇas*) describe the subject-object structure of the cosmos and the stanzas quoted till now present them in a non-evaluative way. They become evaluated when the human agent (*kartr*) appears. The three classes categorise the whole manifest aspect and also the way human agents cognise and acts.

BhG 17–39 categorises the elements of the scenario of action according to the three classes. These are faith (*śraddhā*, BhG 17.2–6), food (*āhāra*, BhG 17.7–10), sacrifice (*yajña*, BhG 17.11–14), heat (*tapas*, BhG 17.14–19), generosity (*dāna*, BhG 17.20–22), cognition (*jñāna*, BhG 18.20–22), action (*karman*, BhG 18.23–25), agent (BhG 18.24–28), reason (*buddhi*, BhG 29–32), perseverance (*dhṛti*, BhG 12.33–35), and happiness (*sukha*, BhG. 12.36–39). MS 12.30 also adds the result (*phala*).

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in the early Smṛti texts is an attempt to cope with the existence of many moral systems and many concepts of personhood within the complex societal situation.

Faith (*śraddhā*) is the starting point of any action. One should believe that an action is worthy to be done. In liberating practice, one should believe in the words of his master (guru) and in the basic ontological statements he teaches beginning with the statement that ‘brahman exists’ (*brahman asti*). The precedence of cognition over being assures the cognising person of the potential for real transformation.<sup>172</sup>

The role of the food (*āhāra*) is deeply grounded in Vedic tradition. As we remember, in the ŚB the concept of the general domain of Cooking is the source domain for understanding the functioning of the manifest aspect of reality. It is conceived in terms of constant killing and eating: the food becomes the body (*ātman*) of the highest cognitive agent (Prajāpati). This metaphoric conceptualisation is enacted in ritual fasting and in pouring oblations into fire, in the interplay between hunger and being full, because the sacrificer can partake the remnants of the food that is given to gods. Thus, the concept of food immediately evokes the concept of sacrifice (*yajña*) which creates frames for its proper use. The general domain of Cooking also endows the Smṛti Composers with the concept of building one’s body (*ātman*) which, in the target domain, is the immortal self.

The activity called *tapas* is a concept immediately evoked by the concept of sacrifice. If the recipient understands *tapas* as fasting, he might activate the Vedic cosmogonies and the concept of hunger felt by Prajāpati during creation. These imply that one reality, if it wants to create a second self, needs to compress itself in some way to create an empty space which can be filled with the second self (Jurewicz 2016/18). In the same way the sacrificer creates an empty space in his stomach for future food out of which he builds his ritual and human self. As it is argued, the second meaning of *tapas* in the early Smṛti texts analysed here is the recitation of the Veda which accompanies sacrifice (see section 4.4).

Generosity (*dāna*) activates the obligatory fee (*dakṣiṇā*) paid to the Brahmins at the end of sacrifice to ensure its efficacy, but also all kinds of alms given to those who ask for it. Its scenario consists in separating object from subject in order to retrieve the object in the form of the fulfilled wishes asked for in sacrifice. It is worth adding that the basic scenario of sacrifice also involves the separation of the object (oblation) from the subject in order to recover it. All three activities (sacrifice, *tapas* understood as fasting, and generosity) are done because of faith (*śraddhā*) that an object, from which a man has resigned, will come back to him in a more perfect form. Maybe,

<sup>172</sup> See e.g.: TU 2.6.1: *asann eva sa bhavati asad abrahmeti veda cet | asti brahmeti ced veda santam enaṃ tato vidur iti |*

because of that, sacrifice (*yajña*), heating (*tapas*) and gift (*dāna*) are three obligatory activities which should never be abandoned (BhG 18.5).

As will be shown, any action is based on cognition (*jñāna*) and the quality of the agent depends on it. At the same time the quality of the agent (*kartr*) also significantly affects the quality of action. Reason (*buddhi*) is the faculty that makes decisions and as such enables purposeful action. One of its features is perseverance (*dhṛti*) that allows reason to keep the desire of the mind stable. Perseverance allows reason to keep the desire of the mind in check and thus to make the action successful. Happiness (*sukha*) is the sign that one has cognised correctly. It is also the aim of any cognition be it subject-object cognition or liberating cognition.

As stated above, each of the elements of the scenario of action is evaluated according to the category of the three classes. They reflect the general subject-object frame: elements categorised as sattvic are the elements which enable cognition so they are subjective; elements categorised as tamasic are the elements which hinder cognition so they are objective; elements categorised as rajasic are the elements which are connected with the relation between the subject and the object (emotions and action) so they represent the cognitive act. The evaluation is done from the point of view of the ultimate aim being the existence of the cosmos which is self-cognition of reality. The Composer of the BhG, having presented the analysis of the elements of the scenario of action, states that everything in the manifest aspect can be categorised with the aid of the three classes.<sup>173</sup> The three classes are, for him, not only a description of the world but also a prescription for the world. Using Geertz's (1073b) model again, for men, categories are not only the *model of* but the *model for* in the moral and legal sense. They become moral and legal norms.

The following stanzas of the MS are a good example of the evaluative dimension of the three classes (*guṇa*). It is worth adding that they appear immediately after the value-neutral presentation of the three classes.

### MS 12.31–33

*vedābhyāsas tapo jñānaṃ śaucam indriyanigrahaḥ |*  
*dharmakriyātmacintā ca sāttvikam guṇalakṣaṇam || (31)*

Vedic recitation, heat,<sup>174</sup> cognition,<sup>175</sup> purification, the control of the organs, righteous activity, and contemplation of the self – these are signs of sattva class.<sup>176</sup>

<sup>173</sup> BhG 18.40: *na tad asti pṛthivyām vā divi deveṣu vā punaḥ | sattvaṃ prakṛtijair muktaṃ yad ebhiḥ syāt tribhīr guṇaiḥ ||*

<sup>174</sup> Olivelle (2005a: 231): 'ascetic toil.'

<sup>175</sup> Olivelle (2005a: 231): 'knowledge.'

<sup>176</sup> Olivelle (2005a: 231): 'mark the class with the of attribute of Goodness.'

*ārambharucitādhairyam asatkāryaparigrahaḥ |  
viṣayopasevā cājasraṃ rājasam guṇalakṣaṇam || (32)*

Delight in undertaking activities, determination, taking up improper tasks, and constant indulgence in sensual pleasures – these are signs of rajas class.<sup>177</sup>

*lobhaḥ svapno 'dhr̥tiḥ krauryam nāstikyam bhinnavṛttitā |  
yāciṣṇutā pramādaś ca tāmasam guṇalakṣaṇam || (33)*

Greed, sloth, lack of resolve, cruelty, infidelity, deviation from proper conduct, habitual begging, and carelessness – these are signs of tamas class.<sup>178</sup>

The psychical states and activities enumerated by the Composers are called the signs of a class (*guṇalakṣaṇa*). Elements categorised by the sattva class are thoughts and activities which lead to liberating cognition. Elements categorised by the rajas class are psychological and emotional states and are difficult to be evaluate: on one hand a delight in in undertaking activities (*arambharucitā*) can be seen as a positive feature (when it leads to freedom) yet on the other hand it can be seen as negative (when it is based on wrong cognition). Among the elements categorised by the tamas class, which are psychological and cognitive states, greed (*lobha*), sloth (*kraurya*) and infidelity (*nāstikya*) are great sins, while deviation from proper conduct (*bhinnavṛttitā*), habitual begging (*svapna*) and carelessness (*pramāda*) hinder cognition. Proper classification of emotions and activities allows man to draw moral conclusions and follow them. In this case, the classes become moral norms.

In the late chapter of the MDhP (335) the three classes are personified. Here the classes of rajas and tamas are personified as asuras who obstruct creative cognition of Brahma who is personified by the sattva class (see chapter 5.2.3). Personification of values is motivated by it being easier to develop the religious personal attitude towards such entities than towards abstract concepts.

## 2.6.2. The normative character of action, sacrifice and dharma/adharma

According to the cosmogony of the MS, categories of sacrifice and dharma/adharma are created before society appears. The prototypical sacrifice consists of pouring oblation into fire which expresses subject-object cognition: fire represents the subjective power, oblation the objective, its pouring into fire – the final recognition of their unity. On the level of social manifestation,

<sup>177</sup> Olivelle (2005a: 231): ‘mark the class with the of attribute of Vigor.’

<sup>178</sup> Olivelle (2005a: 231): ‘mark the class with the of attribute of Darkness.’



the highest cognitive agent categorises its cognition as sacrifice and since then sacrifice become the rule for his further manifestation and a norm for men. Those who are manifestation of the object are not allowed to sacrifice because they represent the object, which *ex definitione* does not cognise. The general category of sacrifice is specified as dharma and adharma: subjective activity ruled by the rule of sacrifice is categorised as dharma, objective as adharma. The noun *dharma* is a derivative of *dhr-* ‘to support,’<sup>179</sup> because it is subjective cognitive activity which supports the existence of the cosmos. However, this cognition would be impossible without the object.

The creation of society is seen as the next manifestation of the highest cognitive agent in the form of the human body. MDhP 181.11–13, quoted above (see section 2.3.1), describes its creation as a result of various kinds of activities performed by the Brahmins who in *illo tempore* behaved in various ways. From the perspective of the highest cognitive agent, it can be explained that, in its multiplied form it, it begins to think and speak, to catch and fight, to multiply itself and to give support to its social body and to recognises itself as various social states. Such a conceptualisation is presented already in ŚB 11.1.6.6–7 where Prajāpati creates his perceptible body the cognitive activity of which is the creation of the gods, the sky and the day and lack of cognition is the creation of asuras, the earth and the night (Jurewicz 2016/18?). Thus, the state of the Brahmins performs the activity of the subject, the state of the Śūdras perform the activity of the object and the states of the Kṣatriyas and Vaiśyas are manifestation of a desire to cognise and the act of cognition.

Since categories become rules according to which reality manifests itself, the recipient understands that the categories of sacrifice, dharma and adharma are applied when social manifestations appear. Society will be divided into those who perform sacrifice (the three upper classes) and those who do not (Śūdras). From the point of view of the three upper classes, performance of sacrifice is categorised as dharma, its non-performance as adharma. The non-performance of sacrifice is dharma for the Śūdras. Since the social body of the highest cognitive agent is composed of men who are free, the rules of further manifestation become the norms which are meant to force them to behave in a way so further subject-object cognition of the highest cognitive agent can take place.

The Composer of the BhG presents the specific actions of the four social states in the following way:

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<sup>179</sup> Bowles (2007: 81ff), Hildebeitel (2011a: 54ff).

**BhG 18.41**

*brāhmaṇakṣatriyaviśāṃ śūdrāṇāṃ ca paraṃtapa |  
karmāṇi pravibhaktāni svabhāvaprabhavair guṇaiḥ ||*

The actions of the Brahmins, Kṣatriyas, Vaiśyas and Śūdras are distinguished by the classes which arise according to their own state.<sup>180</sup>

In its social manifestation (similarly to its cosmic one), the highest cognitive agent constantly performs actions which are characteristic for each of its part conceived in terms of the body. Having manifested as head, it behaves like the head, having manifested as arms, it behaves like the arms, having manifested as thighs, it behaves like the thighs, having manifested as feet, it behaves like the feet. The actions of each social state are categories which allow the highest cognitive agent to cognise itself.

The actions are categorised by the three classes (*guṇa*) which arise from their own state (*svabhāva*, verse d). The own state (*svabhāva*) of each member of society is the result of his place in it conceived as the body of the highest cognitive agent. We see again that the concept of *svabhāva* can be interpreted as the necessity with which categories apply. One cannot deny who one is within the social frame. The highest cognitive agent, manifest in its social body, performs its self-cognition, so the social states are categorised as either a manifestation of the subject, or of desire and action or of the object. Thus, the actions of Brahmins are categorised as sattvic, the actions of the Kṣatriyas and Vaiśyas are categorised as rajasic and the actions of the Śūdras are categorised as tamasic.<sup>181</sup>

In the previous chapter we noted that the word *varṇa* also means ‘colour’ which is one of the bases for inference. MDhP 181.5, 11–13 (mentioned above, section 2.3.1) conceives agents, of the various activities typical for a social state, in terms of various colours: Brahmins are white, Kṣatriyas are red, Vaiśyas are yellow and Śūdras are black. Such conceptualisation betrays the cognitive role of the social states which are seen as signs (*lakṣya*, MS 182.8ab),<sup>182</sup> not only for other people, but also for the highest cognitive agent which performs its self-cognition through them.<sup>183</sup> At the same time, such a choice of colors suggests a moral evaluation: those who are white are better than those who are red, yellow or black (metaphors GOOD IS CLEAN, COOD IS WHITE, see below,

<sup>180</sup> See also BhG 18.42–44, MS 1.87–91.

<sup>181</sup> We should bear in mind that one’s place in society is created by oneself during one’s previous life.

<sup>182</sup> MDhP 12.182.8ab: *śūdre caitad bhavel lakṣyaṃdvije caitan na vidyate |*

<sup>183</sup> MDhP 181.5: *brāhmaṇānāṃ sito varṇaḥ kṣatriyāṇāṃ tu lohitaḥ | vaiśyānāṃ pītako varṇaḥ śūdrāṇāṃ asitas tathā ||*

section 2.7). This is confirmed by the activities they perform, especially the activities of the Śūdras who are presented in a very negative way, as those liking violence and falsehood, who take any action and have lost purity.<sup>184</sup>

The noun *varṇa* also means ‘sound’ (a letter, sound, vowel, syllable, word; musical sound or note, also applied to the voice of animals). Activation of this meaning in reference to the four social states makes the necessity to conform to categories crystal clear. If society is the embodiment of the Veda, and if the three upper social states produce sounds while the Śūdras embody pauses, their consonance should be devoid of any falsehood, of any breakdown in musical pace.

It means that the highest cognitive agent also performs actions which are evaluated negatively. This way of thinking is well entrenched in tradition especially in the ŚB where the highest cognitive agent (Prajāpati) is presented, in the source domain, as killing creatures and committing incest (Jurewicz 2016/18). In ŚB 11.1.6.1–7, Prajāpati is presented as creating the gods from the upper breath *prāṇa* (exhalation) and the asuras from the lower breath *āpāna* (inhalation). Creation of the asuras is evaluated as *pāpman*, death and evil, Prajāpati however, decides to manifest in their form (Jurewicz 2016/18). The actions, which are evaluated as bad, are as necessary as the actions which are evaluated as good because they are manifestation of the cognitive activity of reality. In the early Smṛti texts actions, which accord with the activity of the part of social body, are called *puṇya* ‘auspicious, propitious, fair, pleasant, good, right, virtuous, meritorious, pure, holy, sacred’ actions which are not are called *pāpa* ‘bad, vicious, wicked, evil, wretched, vile, low’.

The logic of the source domain, which is the concept of the body in terms of which society is conceived, implies that the refusal to participate in social obligations is conceived in terms of physical disorder which occur when e.g., part of mouth begins to behave like feet. This leads to the total destruction of the body. So, is not surprising that obedience to the moral norm is formulated very strongly. In BhG 3.35, 18.47 it is stated that *dharma* which derives from one’s state, even if it is without value, is better the *dharma* of other states. Rejection of one’s *dharma* is dreadful not only because it will lead the man who does this to an unhappy life and a bad rebirth. It is also dreadful for the whole of society conceived in terms of a man’s body. Moreover, since society is understood as the manifestation of the highest cognitive agent which is a manifestation of reality, so this disorder influences it. This is the reason why the Śūdras were punished so cruelly when they even approached anything

<sup>184</sup> See also MDhP 182.2–7.

connected with the Brahmins and ritual. The object of cognition must remain the object if cognition is to be performed.

The strong normative character of dharma is expressed by its metonymic identification with punishment given by society to a man who does not comply with norms. The term which expresses punishment literally means ‘a stick’ (*daṇḍa*). This meaning is metonymically motivated because a stick was (and still is) used to impose a penalty. The metaphysical role of punishment is described in the following stanzas of the MS:

### MS 7.14

*tasyārthe sarvabhūtānām goptāraṃ dharmam ātmajam |  
brahmatejomayaṃ daṇḍam asrjat pūrvam īśvaraḥ ||*

For the king’s sake, the Lord formerly created Punishment, his son – the Law and protector of all beings – made from the energy of Brahman.

The context for these stanzas is the duties of the king who should support the order of the cosmos and of society, and punishment (identified with dharma, verse b) is created for his sake. Since the highest cognitive agent is conceived in terms of a king (*īśvara*, verse d), the recipient understands that it is the ultimate beneficent of punishment. Punishment is metaphorically personified: is conceived as the cowherd of all beings (verses a–b) and the logic of this source domain triggers the recipient to conceive them in terms of herds of cattle.

Punishment is also conceived in terms of the son of the highest cognitive agent (*ātmaja*, verse b) which implies that it is identical in its cosmic, social and human manifestation. Their identity is implied by the literal meaning of the noun which means the ‘son’ which is ‘born from himself’.<sup>185</sup>

Punishment is described as ‘made of the energy of brahman’ (*brahmatejomaya*, verse c). Let us again refer to the literal meaning of the noun *tejas* which comes from the verb *tij-* ‘to sharpen’. *Tejas* therefore means ‘the sharp edge’ and metonymically (sharpening is putting a metal under the influence of fire), ‘point or top of a flame or ray’; then again metonymically ‘glow, glare, splendour, brilliance, light, fire’.<sup>186</sup> Hence, punishment is conceived not only in terms of a caring cowherd but also in terms of the fearful ‘glow of brahman’ where brahman can be seen as the ultimate unmanifest reality, impossible to be understood especially by people who are not free. Thus, it is as contradictory as reality itself. If the recipient activates tradition, he will imagine punishment

<sup>185</sup> In BU 1.4.14, dharma is *atīrṣṭi* ‘over-creation’ of brahman which is called its better form.

<sup>186</sup> For *tejas* see chapter 4.6.1.

in terms of fire which is the first manifestation of Prajāpati in the ŚB and which is dangerous even for himself (see ŚB 2.2.4, Jurewicz 2016/18). In the next stanza, it is stated that people obey their duties because of the fear of punishment and its fearful influence could also be seen in terms of fire:

### MS 7.15

*tasya sarvāṇi bhūtāni sthāvarāṇi carāṇi ca |  
bhayād bhogāya kalpante svadharmān na calanti ca ||*

It is the fear of it that makes all beings, both the mobile and the immobile, accede to being used and not deviate the Law proper to them.

It is fear of punishment which makes people resign from their freedom and behave in accordance to that part of the social body to which they belong. It is worth noting that the range of punishment is enlarged to all beings which move and which do not move. In this way, punishment becomes the embodiment of the cosmic necessity with which categories apply. In this interpretation, punishment seems to be the same as *svabhāva* (one's own state). However, there is crucial difference between these two concepts. They belong to different discourses. *Svabhāva* is a descriptive concept which expresses the necessity of the influence of categories created in the cognitive process performed by sentient beings. Punishment belongs to the moral discourse where the meaning of necessity includes the sanction faced by those who oppose it.

One could ask if the highest cognitive agent also submits to the rules of its manifestations because of fear. In KU 6.3, the cosmic processes are presented as occurring under the influence of fear. In BU 1.4, fear is one of the emotions felt by the highest cognitive agent (*ātman*). It could mean that, when the highest cognitive agent hides itself in the object, it realises that if it remains in that form it will never regain itself and so it feels fear. The only way to go back to unity is to cognise itself with the aid of the proper categories of subject-object cognition to which it has to submit. There is no other way back.

### MS 7.18

*daṇḍaḥ śāsti prajāḥ sarvā daṇḍa evābhirakṣati |  
daṇḍaḥ supteṣu jāgarti daṇḍaṃ dharmam vidur budhāḥ ||*

Punishment disciplines all the subjects, Punishment alone protects them, and Punishment watches over them as they sleep – Punishment is the Law, the wise declare.

In verses a–b, the influence of punishment is conceived in the same way as the influence of a king: it disciplines people on one hand and protects them on the other. It protects them not only from evil, but also from total annihilation which would take place if the social body splits asunder which threatens total annihilation of the cosmos (see chapter 4.11).

In verse c punishment is presented as always awake, even at night, when all beings are asleep. Such a conceptualisation goes back to the Ṛgvedic conceptualisation of fire in the same terms.<sup>187</sup> In the ŚB the destroying aspect of reality is conceived in terms of fire which, once released, is always present and threatens with death living beings and must be pacified with oblations (Jurewicz 2016/2016). These traditional conceptualisations of fire justify the qualification of punishment as ‘made of the glow of brahman’ (*brahmatejomaya*, see above, MS 7.14). As can be seen in early Smṛti philosophy, fire with its dreadful power hidden in the cosmic dimension, appears at the level of human existence.

Before we continue, we should refer to ŚB 10.4.2.19 which describes the results of the svādhyāya that is personal Vedic recitation or ‘recitation to oneself.’ One of them is an ‘intriguing phrase’, as Hiltebeitel (2011a: 87) puts it, i.e. *lokapakti*, ‘cooking the world’.<sup>188</sup> This concept has been discussed by Malamoud (1996a), Bowles (2007), Hiltebeitel (2011a). Malamoud has understood *lokapakti* as the result of sacrificial activity the crucial aspect of which is heating. Bowles and Hiltebeitel were interested in connection between the concept of cooking the world (*lokapakti*) and concept of dharma which was the main focus of their research. They explained how dharma became to be used in a social context, especially as a regulator of the social relationships between the Brahmins on one hand and kings and other people on the other.

We can enlarge the interpretation of the three scholars and show how the concept of fire shifted to the social and human level in the early Smṛti texts. The double meaning of the noun *loka* in the compound *lokapakti* which is ‘the world’ and ‘people’ simultaneously activates cosmic and social perspectives. The noun *pakti* activates the general domain of Cooking, the most important general domain in the ŚB. As has been shown (Jurewicz 2016/18), the functioning of the cosmos is conceived in its terms. In the ŚB, the conceptualisation of the functioning of the cosmos in terms of cooking is expressed in ritual which, as Malamoud (1996a) states, is constant effort and heating to sustain the manifest aspect of reality. In the Model of the Five Fires (*pañcāgnividyā*), this conceptualisation is explicitly expressed, in this model

<sup>187</sup> E.g., RV 5.11.1: *jānasya gopā ajaniṣṭa jāgrvir | agniḥ sudākṣaḥ suvitāya nāvyaṣe ||* See also RV 3.2.12, 3.3.7, 3.24.3.

<sup>188</sup> For discussion of this and other results, see chapter 4.4.

it is the cooking of the dead in a crematory fire which incites and sustains the functioning of the world (Jurewicz 2004, 2016/18)

The human level in ritual, activated by the meaning of *loka* as ‘people’ is also conceived in terms of the general domain of Cooking: ritual transformation of the sacrificer’s self (*ātman*) is conceived in these terms (see Jurewicz 2016/18). Moreover, power is conceived in the Brāhmaṇas: those who have power are conceived as the eaters and their subjects as those cooked and eaten. This conceptualisation is explicitly expressed in *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* 8.12–17 where the king is called ‘the eater of the people’ (*viśām attā*). It can be argued that the Vedic general domain of Cooking binds the understanding of time as a cook and a ruler at the same time: the sentence ‘time cooks’ (*kālah pacati*) activates both target domains: the influence of time and the execution of power.

We cannot delve further into the discussion on the history of the concept of dharma,<sup>189</sup> but links between it and the general domain of Cooking with its target domains being such significant analogies for time and power<sup>190</sup> makes conceptualisation of the punishment in terms of fire more coherent. The norms of society and of human behaviour are conceived according to the logic of this domain and its reconstruction allows us to see coherence between concepts which at the first glance seem not to have anything in common. This source domain is the Vedic heritage and it was still active enough to use it to explain social norms. At the same time, it is clearly seen that it is applied mostly to the human level.

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The Hindu concept of society shows what happens when a theoretically coherent philosophy is introduced into practice.<sup>191</sup> If reality is conceived as manifesting its aspect in the subject-object cognition and if society is conceived as such a manifestation it is obvious that it should be divided into parts which will enable cognition. From the perspective of the highest cognitive agent the division between people is purely cognitive. However, seen from the point of view of particular human beings who do not have this global perspective the division is ontological. Since society needs to be ordered rules should be introduced. To make them strong and unavoidable, they need to be treated as moral and charged with absolute sanction, if not

<sup>189</sup> See Olivelle (2006a, 2013b c), Bowles (2007), Brereton (2004), Hildebeitel (2011a).

<sup>190</sup> Already in *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* 8.12–17, the king is not only called ‘the eater of the people’ (*viśām attā*), but also ‘the guardian of dharma’ (*dharmasya goptā*, Olivelle (2011c)). It is the only usage of the term dharma in the whole *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*.

<sup>191</sup> Fortunately for the Greeks, this has never happened with Plato’s concept. Or maybe their love of democracy prevented this.

in this life, then in the next. Although the relentless character of the Hindu concept of punishment is relaxed by the concept of rebirth, people live here and now and for them the social divisions are /should be seen as absolute. According to the definition of Popper (2013), such a society is totalitarian in that it does not allow its members to decide for themselves. But we should remember that it is totalitarian only as long as man is not free. When a man identifies himself with the highest cognitive agent and cognises reality, from his perspective the social norms become for him cognitive categories thanks to which he can confirm his omnipresence.

## 2.7. The concept of the Brahmin

In this section we will analyse the concept of Brahmin as presented at the end of the cosmogony of the MS 1. The outcomes of this analysis are twofold. Firstly, we will see how the logic of the concept of the body, in terms of which society is conceived, influences thinking about Brahmins. Secondly the analysis will confirm that the concept of fire motivates thinking about human existence.

### MS 1.92

*ūrdhvaṃ nābher medhyataraḥ puruṣaḥ parikīrtitaḥ |  
tasmān medhyatamaṃ tv aśya mukhaṃ uktaṃ svayambhuvā ||*

A man is said to be purer above the navel. Therefore, the Self-existent One has declared, the mouth is its purest part.<sup>192</sup>

The Composer elaborates the source domain of the human body in terms of which society is conceived. He divides it into two parts, pure and impure: the pure part is above the navel and the impure is that which is below. This kind of thinking is motivated by very basic evolutionary reactions such as disgust and revulsion which reactions protects us from various pathogens (Curtis, de Barra 2018). Some moral psychologists and philosophers look for sources of ethics and law in this basic reaction and its rationalisation.<sup>193</sup>

<sup>192</sup> See also MS 5.132: *ūrdhvaṃ nābher yāni khāni tāni medhyāni sarvaśaḥ | yāny adhas tāny amedhyāni dehāc caiva malās cyutāḥ ||*

<sup>193</sup> Rozin, Haidt, McCauley (2008). According to Haidt (2012), among the six ‘moral foundations’ which allow people to evaluate actions morally (as right and wrong), the last pair (sanctity vs degradation) is based on the psychology of disgust and this pair seems especially important in ontology which assumes that society is the God incarnated. For a more general research on connection between disgust, social order and law see Nussbaum (2004), especially



Metaphoric thinking of good and evil in terms of pure and impure strengthens this rationalisation and makes it reliable and true (Johnson 1993, Lakoff 2000).

Curtis and de Barra (2018) identified ‘six common categories of disgust related to infectious disease: 1) Hygiene: displays of, or physical evidence of, unhygienic behaviour; 2) Animals/insects: such as mice and mosquitoes that represent disease vectors; 3) Sex: behaviour pertaining to promiscuous sexual activities; 4) Atypical appearance: infection cues in other people, including abnormal body shape, deformity, behaviour such as wheezing or coughing, and contextual cues related to high risk such as homelessness; 5) Lesions: stimuli related to signs of infection on the body surface such as blisters, boils, or pus; 6) Food: food items that show signs of spoilage.’ Close contact with most of them is morally evaluated by cultures. It seems that of categories mentioned hygiene, sex and food were the most important factors for social divisions in early Hindu thinking. This fascinating topic has been already analysed by scholarship.<sup>194</sup>

Recall the classification of emotions presented in MS 12.35–37 (see section 2.3.2c). The Composer categorises shame as tamasic, desire for fame as rajasic and happiness and lack of shame as sattvic. Shame is the sign of action against dharma, so forbidden. Since social divisions are based on emotional reaction to filthy objects, it is not surprising that it is shame which accompanies actions recognised as tamasic. In their most basic realisation they imply contact with what is filthy or socially conceived as filthy (e.g., forbidden sex). Shame appears because one is breaking moral norms which are socially sanctioned for which punishment is the consequence, but is also felt by men before they are confronted with society because they have committed an act which causes their disgust. As Nussbam (2004: 2) writes: ‘shame and disgust are prominent in the law, as they are in our daily lives.’ According to early Hindu moral theory, a lack of shame in personal and social perspectives is the sign of sattvic actions which derive from the basic universal norm to avoid anything that is filthy and dangerous.

The next stanza of the MS is a very good example of the rationalisation of disgust:

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pp. 71–171. For neurobiological foundations of human values, see Changeux, Damasio, Singer, Christen (2005). For anthropological research, see classical work by Douglas (1984), but also Obeyesekere (1981, 1990). For disgust in ancient Greek and Roman culture, see Lateiner, Spatharas (2017).

<sup>194</sup> For example, see fascinating papers by Olivelle (2011a, b, 2013e, f.)

**MS 1.93**

*uttamāṅgodbhavāḥ jyeṣṭhyād brahmaṇas caiva dhāraṇāt |  
sarvasyaivāsya sargasya dharmato brāhmaṇaḥ prabhuh ||*

Because he arose from the loftiest part of the body, because he is the eldest, and because he retains Veda, the Brahmin is by Law the lord of this whole creation.

Having analysed the source domain of the human body and divided it into a pure upper part of which the mouth is the purest (MS 1.92), the Composer presents the Brahmin as a part of the mouth (verse a). Since the compound *uttamāṅga* means ‘the loftiest part of the body’ which denotes the head and activates the image schema of verticality (BETTER IS UP), the positive evaluation of the Brahmin is obvious.

Moreover, the use of this word highlights another feature of the mouth which results from it being the loftiest part of the body. The Composer is hiding any link between the mouth and cleanliness evoked in the previous stanza. In verse b, he further elaborates the source domain and derives the evaluation of the Brahmin from its logic: since creation is conceived in terms of the general domain of Procreation and since prototypically, the head of the infant is the first to appear, Brahmin is the eldest. This explanation is based on social norms (the eldest brother is the best) but it also evokes the Vedic conceptualisation of fire. In the ṚV, society is also conceived in terms of human body. Its head is Agni, the fire, who leads Aryan troops towards freedom (Jurewicz 2010). Fire also appears in the morning preceding the dawns which follow him. According to the definition presented in ŚB 2.2.4.2, the real name of Agni (*agnī*) is Agri (*agri*), because Agni has been created as the first.<sup>195</sup> So, if the recipient activates tradition and elaborates the source domain of the body, he will better understand why Brahmin are the most important part of society. At the same time, he will activate Agni’s fiery nature. It is worth noting that, in the ṚV, Agni is also conceived in terms of the *hótr* the priest who calls the gods for sacrifice and in terms of the poet (*kavī*). If the recipient activates this way of thinking, he will again see the conceptual links between fire and the Brahmin. One must stress once again that in his rationalisation the Composer does not explicitly mentions purity of the mouth, but highlights its other features.

A further reason for the eminence of Brahmins (verse b) derives from the next feature of the mouth which is recitation of the Veda: Brahmin are conceived in terms of a support (*dhāraṇa*) for brahman. It has been already

<sup>195</sup> ŚB 2.2.4.2: *tād vā enam etād āgre devānām ajanayata tasmād agnir agrir ha vai nāmaitād yād agnir iti sā jātaḥ pūrvah prēyāya yō vai pūrva ety āgra eūti vai tām āhuḥ sō evāsyaṅgnitā |*

mentioned that in the Vedic cosmogonies, creation of a foundation that enables further creation, is a crucial stage. In ŚB 6.1.1.8, this foundation is the threefold knowledge (the Veda) recited by Prajāpati. Constantly recited the Veda becomes the foundation for the whole world and also for men; the Composer of the ŚB states that if one does not know the Veda, he has no foundation.<sup>196</sup> The logic of the concepts used as the source domains in the earlier thought, justifies and makes rational what the Composer of the MS says about the Brahmin. The noun *dhāraṇa* metonymically activates the concept of the Veda as supporting the cosmos and expresses that the Brahmin who keeps it in their memory and recites it also support the world. It is worth noting that the adjective *dhāraṇa* comes from the root *dhṛ-* from which the noun dharma comes too.<sup>197</sup> Quoting Olivelle's (2005: 242) comment on this issue:

the term *dhāraṇa* means both carrying and retaining in memory. This statement is more powerful than it may first appear, because at a time when the Veda did not exist externally in manuscript form it could exist in the world only within the memory of Brahmins who had learnt it. The Brahmin is thus the receptacle of the Veda in the world.

Taking this into account, the role of the Brahmins is not only metaphysical, but social: it is they who sustains Hindu society and preserves its identity.

The next reason for the superiority of the Brahmin is that a Brahmin is a lord of the whole of creation by dharma (verses c–d). It is possible that the Composer is led by the meaning of *dhāraṇa* mentioned in the previous stanza which implies that the Brahmin are the lords of the cosmos not only because it is settled by dharma but also because the Brahmin are ‘the support’ of the Veda. In the texts analysed in this study, the noun *prabhu* is used in reference to reality during creation or in reference to respected and dignified people like teachers or kings. The use of this word is intended to evoke high esteem towards Brahmins. No word about cleanness is implied in MS 1.92.

<sup>196</sup> ŚB 6.1.1.8: *sò 'yám píruṣaḥ prajāpatir akāmayata | bhūyānt syām prajāyeyéti sò 'śrāmyat sá tāpo 'tapyata sá śrāntás tepānó brāhmaivá prathamám asṛjata trayóm evá vidyām pratiṣṭhābhavāt tasmād āhur brāhmāsya sárvasya pratiṣṭhēti tasmād anūcya prátitiṣṭhati pratiṣṭhá hy eṣá yád brāhma tásyām pratiṣṭháyām prátitiṣṭhito 'tapyata |* The same is expressed in BU 1.2.3 where the highest cognitive agent, conceived in terms of Death (*mṛtyu*) finds support on the earth where it can further transform itself (the recitation Veda is not expressed explicitly, but activated by the verb *arc-*, ‘to shine and to sing’).

<sup>197</sup> See MDhP 183.1, section 2.8.1.

**MS 1.94**

*taṃ hi svayambhūḥ svād āsyāt tapas taptvādito 'srjat |  
havyakavyābhivāhyāya sarvasyāsyā ca guptaye ||*

For, in the beginning, the Self-existent One heated himself with heat<sup>198</sup> and brought him forth from his own mouth to convey divine and ancestral offering and to protect this whole world.<sup>199</sup>

As we have seen the noun *tapas* is used in cosmogony of the MS only on the lower levels of creation: in MS 1.25 (creation of ritual scenario), in 1.33 (creation of Manu) and in 1.34 (creation performed by the first sons of Manu, see chapter 1.1.7). Creation of the Brahmin is conceived in the same terms. Since the Brahmin is created from the mouth of the self-existent (*svayambhu*)<sup>200</sup> the recipient is triggered to understand *tapas* as recitation. Creation from the mouth also implies that the Brahmin are created directly from reality in its first creative act (in the same way as Virāj, see MS 1.32).

The image of creation by mouth evokes Vedic cosmogonies the Composers of which create the image of Prajāpati with fire released from his mouth (ŚB 2.2.4, see Jurewicz 106/18). Moreover, if the recipient activates the Vedic metaphor SPEECH IS FIRE, he may imagine the Brahman as fire incarnated. At the same time, Brahmin are the visible form of speech recited by the first form of reality. It turns out that the Brahmin can be treated as the next manifestation of the subjective powers of reality whose role is conceived similarly to that of Brahma: sustaining the world with recitation and rituals i.e., by categorising it with aid of the categories of name (the Veda) and action (*karman*).

In the next stanza the Brahmin are almost explicitly conceived in terms of fire which gives rational ground for their duty which is sacrificing:

**MS 1.95**

*yasyāsyena sadāśnanti havyāni tridivaukaṣaḥ |  
kavyāni caiva pitarāḥ kiṃ bhūtam adhikaṃ tataḥ ||*

What creature can surpass him through whose mouth the denizens of the triple heaven always eat their oblation, and the forefathers their offerings?

<sup>198</sup> Olivelle (2005: 91): 'ascetic toil.'

<sup>199</sup> Olivelle (2005: 242) pays attention to the similarity of role of the Brahmin and a king in that both protect the world (in its social and metaphysical meaning: '[a] king is born in a particular region to protect the treasures (property) of a particular people. A Brahmin, on the other hand, rules over all and the treasure he protects is dharma itself.'

<sup>200</sup> In this way reality in its first creative act is conceived in MS 1.6,7, MDhP 175.15 which again implies their identity (see chapter 1.2.1a).

In verses a–c the Brahmin are conceived as the mouth of gods and of ancestors which implies their conceptualisation in terms of sacrificial fire. This conceptualisation is deep in tradition. Agni is conceived in terms of the mouth of the gods already in the RV which is then elaborated in ŚB 2.2.4. Thus, the highest cognitive agent cognises himself as the head of his social manifestation in the same way as the highest cognitive agent in the ŚB, Prajāpati, cognises his head when he eats himself as oblation (Jurewicz 2016/18). The difference between these two descriptions is that in the ŚB, the highest cognitive agent does this constantly while now the cognition of the highest cognitive agent depends on its multiplied human manifestations which are free.<sup>201</sup> Moreover, the Composer of the MS enlarges the meaning of fire in terms of which the Brahmin are conceived: in MS 1.101cd it is said that ‘it is by the kindness of Brahmin that other people eat’.<sup>202</sup> Thus it is implied that they are conceived in terms of fire, not only for the gods and ancestors, but for all people.

In the next two stanzas, the hierarchy of beings is presented (MS 1.96–97). Living beings are better than non-living; among the living those that possess reason are better; among them men and among them Brahmins. Among Brahmins those who are learned are better; among them those who properly use their reason; among them those who undertake actions; among them those who know brahman (the Veda and unmanifest reality) are best (see also chapter 4.1–2).<sup>203</sup>

Then the Composer states:

### MS 1.98

*utpattir eva viprasya mūrtir dharmasya śāsvatī |  
sa hi dharmārtham utpanno brahmabhūyāya kalpate ||*

A Brahmin’s birth alone represents the everlasting physical frame of the Law; for, born on account of the Law, he is fit for becoming Brahman.

In verses a–b the birth of a Brahmin is called a manifestation of the perceptible form (*mūrti*) of *dharmā*.<sup>204</sup> If *dharmā* is identified with punishment (see above,

<sup>201</sup> Although most of them does not know this, they will know it thanks to liberating practice.

<sup>202</sup> MS 1.101: *svam eva brāhmaṇo bhunkte svam vaste svam dadāti ca | ānṛṣaṃsyād brāhmaṇasya bhuñjate hitare janāḥ ||*

<sup>203</sup> MS 1: *bhūtānām prāṇināḥ śreṣṭhāḥ prāṇinām buddhijīvināḥ | buddhimatsu narāḥ śreṣṭhā nareṣu brāhmaṇāḥ smṛtāḥ || (96) brāhmaṇeṣu ca vidvāṃso vidvatsu kṛtabuddhayaḥ | kṛtabuddhiṣu kartāraḥ kartṛṣu brahmavedināḥ || (97)*

<sup>204</sup> It worth noting that the adjective *dhārana* used in the description of the Brahmin in MS 1.93 (*brahmaṇaś caiva dhāraṇāt*) is also used in with noun in Genitive in the meaning of ‘assuming the shape of, resembling to.’ If the recipient activates this meaning too, he may understand *brahman* as referring to the unmanifest reality and the Brahmin as its perceptible manifestation similar to it. If the recipient activates the literal meaning of the verb *mūrch-*, ‘to congeal’, he will understand the difference between the unmanifest aspect of reality and the Brahmin in

MS 7.14, section 2.6.2) each birth of a Brahmin is also the birth of punishment. As has been shown in MS 7.14 punishment is conceived as composed of the glow of brahman (*brahmatejomaya*) so a Brahmin should be conceived in the same way. Moreover, a Brahmin is similarly ambiguous as punishment as he is both beneficial and dreadful at the same time. His beneficial aspect can be seen in that a Brahmin conceived in terms of the mouth of the gods, ancestors and people, enables ritual and everyday life. His dreadful aspect is only implicitly expressed here but KaU 1.7 expresses it explicitly. The Composer presents Death as being afraid of its Brahmin guest, Naciketas, who has not been drunk water for three nights:

### KaU 1.7

*vaiśvānaraḥ praviśati atithir brāhmaṇo grhān |*  
*tasyaitām śāntiṃ kurvanti hara vaivasvatodakam ||*

A Brahmin guest enters a house as the fire in all men. Bring water, O Vaivasvata, that is how they appease him.<sup>205</sup>

The Composer of the stanza creates a conceptual network. The first input space is the concept of burning fire which threatens the house with conflagration and has to be appeased with water. The second input space is the concept of a tired, heated and thirsty guest who needs water. The third is Naciketas who is a Brahmin. The generic space is the concept of danger. In the blend, Naciketas is a fiery guest who needs to be treated properly and, if not, he will burn down the house. Thus, Naciketas becomes the perceptible form of *dharma* and of punishment which is the result of offending a Brahmin guest. Even Death is afraid of him.

\*

The analysis of this short description of Brahmin, presented in the cosmogony of the MS, has shown that their superior position in society has been motivated by a universal human reaction against filthy objects that are potential dangers for the health and are disgusting and revolting. This motivation is coherent and within the frames of conceptualisation of society in terms of a human body, the lower part of which produces substances which evoke these reactions. However, in his explanation, the Composer rationalises them in a variety of ways, most of them rooted in tradition and aimed at the conceptualisation of the Brahmin in terms of Vedic fire. The Brahmin's immense and dreadful power is grounded

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terms of the difference between milk and butter: butter can be seen as the perceptible form (*mūrti*) of milk. This activation is possible, however, only if one activates Vedic cosmogonies.  
<sup>205</sup> Olivelles' translation (1998).

in this conceptualisation strengthened by his identity with punishment which, in turn, is seen as the embodiment of cosmic necessity and sanction for its rejection.

The conceptualisation of society in terms of the living body gives a theoretical explanation and justification for the concept of the untouchables. The logic of the source domain implies that the body not only thinks and moves but also produces waste. In the target domain there should be people who handle the waste which includes the dead. Those people are the metonymically visible sign of the waste of the social body of the highest cognitive agent (RESULT FOR ACTION, MAN FOR RESULT; WASTE FOR HANDLING WASTE, UNTOUCHABLE FOR WASTE). The metaphors GOOD IS PURITY, EVIL IS IMPURITY identify untouchables with evil. The gut reaction against filthy objects is the subconscious motive for social distance. To one's knowledge this implication is never explicitly expressed in the texts analysed by this book but fits the frames of thinking reconstructed here. On the other hand, as we have seen, the concept of the Brahmin is clearly construed on the basis of implications inferred from the logic of the source domain which is the human body.

## 2.8. The concept of truth

According to the correspondence theory of truth widely accepted in European philosophical tradition for centuries, truth is the conformity of thought and reality.<sup>206</sup> In Smṛti thought its scope can be enlarged in that truth can be understood as identity between thought, action, and reality. This is because action is seen as the externalisation of thought which is the result of an assumption about the precedence of cognition to being. This assumption is the cause of a further difference between European and the Smṛti philosophical traditions: in the former thought expressed in words does not become one with reality while in the latter it does, provided some conditions are fulfilled, such as who is the agent and when and where activity is performed.

BhG 3.6–7 can be seen as the definition of truth presented above:

### BhG 3.6

*karmendriyāni saṁyamya ya āste manasā smaran |  
indriyārthān vimūḍhātmā mithyācāraḥ sa ucyate ||*

Who, having restrained his senses sits and his mind remembers the objects of his senses, is called the one of the deluded self, the one whose behavior is false<sup>207</sup>

<sup>206</sup> The basic idea of the correspondence theory is that what we believe or say is true if it corresponds to the way things actually are – to the facts (Glanzberg 2018).

<sup>207</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

In verses a–b, a person is presented whose senses of action are restrained in a position necessary for liberating cognition yet his mind remains filled with thoughts arising from subject-object cognition. Such a person is called deluded (verse c). This compound can be interpreted as *bahuvrīhi* or as *tatpuruṣa*. In the first case, the self of such a person is deluded and the recipient may understand *ātman* as the whole organism of a man or as his unmanifest self. In the second case the ‘deluded self’ would be the subject of the whole stanza and its interpretation depends on interpretation of the noun *ātman*. We will come to the interpretation of such compounds later (see chapter 4.10.2.a). Let us just note that the mental state of the person is described with the aid of an epistemological notion which expresses the result of the wrong cognition. In verse d, the person is called *mithyācāra* ‘someone whose behavior is false’ (verse d). We can therefore see that incompatibility of actions with thought is described in epistemological terms.

### BhG 3.7

*yas tv indriyāṇi manasā niyamyārabhate 'rjuna |  
karmendriyaiḥ karmayogam asaktaḥ sa viśiṣyate ||*

But who restrains his senses with the aid of his mind and acts with his senses of actions, without attachment, he is distinguished<sup>208</sup>

Although it is not expressed explicitly, the context of the previous stanza allows us presume that the behaviour of a person who acts accordingly to his thoughts can be evaluated as true. A man, whose senses are restrained and who uses the category of action (*karman*) with his senses of action, realises the truth about reality which does not perform subject-object cognition in its unmanifest aspect but rather performs it in its manifest aspect.

People who are not consistent in their thoughts and actions are called ignorant:

### MDhP 227.31

*dharmam karomīti karoty adharmam adharmakāmaś ca karoti dharmam |  
ubhe bālaḥ karmaṇī na prajānan sa jāyate mriyate cāpi dehī ||*

One thinks ‘I am practicing dharma’ and practices adharmā. Another wishes adharmā and practices dharmā. Both are ignorant because they do not know actions. The embodied one is born and dies.<sup>209</sup>

<sup>208</sup> Jurewicz’s translation. A similar definition is in MDhP 297.10.

<sup>209</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.



Verses a–b presents people whose thoughts are inconsistent with their actions. In this situation either their thoughts or their actions are inconsistent with reality. In verse c, they are called ignorant and as those who do not know actions. Actions are categories which allow people to understand the nature of the manifest aspect which consists, as verse d states, of the constant birth and death of the embodied one i.e., the highest cognitive agent enclosed in the amalgamate agent. Birth and death apply only to his perceptible form to which the category of action (*karman*) applies. One has to know this category in order to distinguish the manifest aspect from the unmanifest aspect. Dharma and adharma are rules which lead to recognition on the mental level and of norms which lead one on the level of behavior.

We can see that although submission to categories is evaluated morally, those who do not submit to categories are described with the use of epistemological terms. Such of description is coherent with the general assumption of the precedence of cognition before being. It is also consistent with the reconstruction of the Smṛti philosophy presented here according to which ontology and axiology is built on epistemic concepts and processes.

### 2.8.1. Truth is pleasure

As it is presented by the MS, when the highest cognitive agent manifest in the cosmos begins to act, it creates a category which allows it to recognise itself in this action. This is the category of sacrifice (*yajña*, MS 1.21, see chapter 1.1.6). Then the category of dharma/adharma is created. Together with this category various dualities are created beginning with pleasure (*sukha*) and pain (*duḥkha*). The category of dharma describes the subjective activity of the highest cognitive agent and the category of adharma describes its objective activity. When the highest cognitive agent cognises itself it feels pleasure. When it does not recognise itself, it becomes the object and feels fear and pain. On one hand, the first division of reality into subject and object is the necessary condition for successful cognition. On the other hand, the stage in which reality does not recognise itself is painful which is expressed in the ŚB as the death of Prajāpati and as the experience of fear and loneliness (BU 1.4). On the level of the highest cognitive agent these emotions are necessary and it could be said that, in feeling them, reality is beginning to manifest itself (see chapter 4.2). They are not evaluated from any point of view. They are just the expected result of creative cognition splitting in two and are removed in order to split again.

On the level of men these emotions play important role in that on one hand, they are the signs of right and wrong cognition, on the other they entangle men in subject-object cognition and constant rebirth. The role of emotions as signs of one's choice of good categories (classes and actions) has already been discussed above (sections 2.3.2b,c, 2.6). Now we will consider the relationship between truth/untruth and happiness/unhappiness presented in the following passage of the MDhP. This passage is also interesting as it is a good example of how nominal sentences activate conceptual content and how it can be reconstructed with the use of cognitive tools.

### MDhP 183.1

*satyaṃ brahma tapaḥ satyaṃ satyaṃ sṛjati ca prajāḥ |  
satyena dhāryate lokāḥ svargaṃ satyena gacchati ||*

Truth is brahman, and heat<sup>210</sup> is truth; it is truth that creates all creatures. The world is maintained by truth, and it is through truth one attains heaven.

The Composer outlines here the ICM of truth (*satya*). In verses a–b he presents a concise cosmogony. The first manifestation of reality is its manifestation as truth (*satyaṃ brahma*, verse a).<sup>211</sup> Since the noun *brahman* means also the Veda, the recipient understand that *tapas* (heat) expresses its recitation in the next creative stage during which reality as truth is expressed and manifest (*tapaḥ satyam*, verse b). The recitation of the Veda creates creatures (verse b).

In verses c, the role of truth in the cosmos is presented. As stated above (see section 2.10), it is the constant recitation of the Veda i.e., the manifestation of truth which sustains the cosmos in its existence (verse c). Verse d presents the influence of truth on the afterlife and consequently its ontic results: it leads to heaven.

### MDhP 12.183.2

*anṛtaṃ tamaso rūpaṃ tamasā nīyate hy adhaḥ |  
tamograstā na paśyanti prakāśaṃ tamasāvṛtam ||*

Untruth is a form of darkness through which one is dragged down. Consumed and hemmed by darkness, people cannot see the light.<sup>212</sup>

Untruth is presented as a ‘form of darkness’ (*tamaso rūpaṃ*, verse a). As we remember, in cosmogonies, the noun *tamas* is used to denote the pre-

<sup>210</sup> Wynne (2009: 137): ‘ascetism.’

<sup>211</sup> See e.g.: TU 2.6.1: *asann eva sa bhavati asad abrahmeti veda cet | asti brahmeti ced veda santam enaṃ tato vidur iti |*

<sup>212</sup> Wynne (2009: 137) adds: ‘of truth.’

creative state of the cosmos and, understood as class (*guṇa*), all phenomena are manifestation of the object. The Composer metonymically evokes all these meanings here. In verse b he evaluates *tamas* with use of the image schema of VERTICALITY (BETTER IS UP, WORSE IS DOWN). This schema allows him to outline the structure of the cosmos where heaven is up and hell is down. The recipient understands that all objective manifestations go down and reach hell.

In verses c–d, the Composer describes those manifestations: they are presented as eaten by *tamas* and because of that they do not see the light which is hidden by darkness. The participle ‘eaten’ (*grasta*) in the compound *tamograsta* (verse c) activates the general domain of Cooking. According to its logic, it is better to be a cook or an eater than to be food. As will be shown, untrue cognition and action deprives an agent of his cognitive faculties (see chapter 3.2). Such agents cannot see the light in terms of which, on the basis of the metaphors COGNISING IS SEEING, COGNITION IS ILLUMINATING truth is conceived.

### MDhP 12.183.3

*svargaḥ prakāśa ity āhur narakam tama eva ca |  
satyānṛtāt tad ubhayaṃ prāpyate jagatīcaraiḥ ||*

They say that heaven is light, and that hell is just darkness. Those who live on earth acquire them (heaven and hell) because of truth and untruth.<sup>213</sup>

In verse a, the Composer metonymically identifies heaven with light. It is worth emphasising that the mental work which motivates this identification is quite complex. It is based on the conviction expressed above according to which the knowledge of truth, which is light, leads to heaven. Here the concept of truth is metonymically evoked *via* the concept of light which is motivated by metaphor TRUTH IS LIGHT. The image schema SOURCE-PATH-GOAL (activated in MDhP 183.1d: *gacchati* and 183.2b: *niyate*), which motivates thinking and realisation of the state thanks to cognition of truth, is evoked here *via* the noun *svarga* (heaven). Then it is compressed into identity of the concepts of light and heaven. This compression can be seen as a compression of the metonymy MEANS (LIGHT) FOR GOAL (SVARGA). or, in its reverse form, GOAL (SVARGA) FOR MEANS (LIGHT). In the same way, the Composer narrows the meaning of *tamas* to darkness experienced in the cosmos in terms of untruth and its ultimate consequence i.e., hell (verse b). Such compressions are important in oral tradition where words are cues retrieving a large conceptual content. They are also easy to remember and as such they are good educational devices which is especially important in ethic discourse. Even when they become

<sup>213</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

abstract concepts, their juxtaposition (heaven and light, hell and darkness) is meaningful thanks to the logic of experience embedded in the concepts of light and darkness.

In verses c–d, the Composer implicitly reminds the recipient of the conceptual connection between light and truth, darkness and untruth. It can be argued that the pronoun *tad* anaphorically refers to heaven and hell which are realised by sentient beings according to their state of consciousness.

#### MDhP 183.4

*tatra tv evaṃvidhā vṛttir loke satyānṛtā bhavet |  
dharmādharmau prakāśaś ca tamo duḥkhaṃ sukhaṃ tathā ||*

In this world a person's conduct is also of this kind: it can be either truthful or untruthful, righteous or unrighteous, light or dark, pleasant or painful.

In verses a–b the Composer states that there are two kinds of conduct based on truth and untruth. In verses c–d he introduces the moral concept of dharma/adharma. The nominal sentences are again a compression of the SOURCE-PATH-GOAL schema. The recipient understands that by using the category of dharma in thoughts and actions one finds light (metonymy LIGHT FOR TRUTH), by using the category of adharma one finds darkness (metonymy DARKNESS FOR UNTRUTH). In verse d he adds the next pair of concepts i.e., happiness (*sukha*) and unhappiness (*duḥkha*). The metonymic identification of happiness with heaven and unhappiness with hell (metonymy STATE OF FEELING FOR THE PLACE WHERE IT IS FELT) allows him to activate the concepts of heaven and hell mentioned in the previous stanzas.

According to the logic of the SOURCE-PATH-GOAL schema, emotions are results of the choices just described and can be seen as reward and punishment for the right or wrong use of categories. However, the compression of the concepts (*dharmā – prakāśa – sukha, adharma – tamo – duḥkha*) can also be understood as expressing the emotional states of the agent while he is engaged in action. Then the emotions are the signs of a man acting truly or not. It seems that the Composer wants to bring up this compressed meaning in the next stanza:

#### MDhP 183.5

*tatra yat satyaṃ sa dharmo yo dharmah sa prakāśo yaḥ prakāśas tat sukham iti |  
tatra yad anṛtaṃ so 'dharmo yo 'dharmas tat tamo yat tamo tad duḥkham iti ||*

Among these, truth is dharma, dharma is light and light is happiness. Conversely, untruth is adharma, adharma is darkness and darkness is unhappiness.<sup>214</sup>

<sup>214</sup> Wynne (2009: 137): 'Among these, truth is righteousness, which is light, and light is bliss. On the other hand, untruth is unrighteousness, which is darkness, and darkness is suffering.'

In verses a–b truth is identified with dharma, dharma with light and light with happiness. In verses c–d untruth is adharma, adharma is darkness and darkness is unhappiness. This way of expression highlight's identity and one can assume that happiness and unhappiness are the signs of right and wrong cognition.

Let us briefly consider Nagel's considerations on the role of pleasure and pain. In his book, *The View From Nowhere* (1986), he presents philosophical implications of his theory of mind according to which there is possible access to a centreless perspective, but this perspective always involves our individual psychophysical organism.<sup>215</sup> The centreless perspective is a perspective of the objective self. Physical pleasures and pains, as he states, together with 'our desires and aversions for them are immediate and unreflective' (1986: 156) which causes that they can be seen as a special category. There is no doubt that they have agent-relative value: each of us desires pleasures and avoids pains. Nagel also argues that it is possible to find their neutral reasons. According to him, the experience of pain for the objective is similarly unbearable as to the subjective individual. When one reaches the perspective of the objective self, one sees that pain is bad generally, not only for a specific person who now experiences self, but in a similar way for each suffering person. Nagel writes:

The pain can be detached in thought from the fact that it is mine without losing any of its dreadfulness. It has, so to speak, a life of its own. That is why it is natural to describe to it a value of its own.<sup>216</sup>

It is the subjective experience which is the basis for the proposition formulated from the perspective of the objective self: '*This experience* ought not to go on, *whoever* is having it' (1986: 161). And this proposition is the basis for ethics.

We cannot go deeper into Nagel's axiology, but there is convergence between his way of thinking and of the early Smṛti texts. According to the Smṛti philosophers, experience of pleasure and pain is objectively good or bad for any sentient being and each sentient being strives for pleasure and avoids pain in the same way as reality in its creative activity. And this very fact makes people to act accordingly to their dharma. It is experience of pleasure and pain that is the basis for our moral judgements.

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<sup>215</sup> For a more detailed explanation of Nagel's theory, see *General Conclusion 4*.

<sup>216</sup> Nagel (1986: 160).

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The activity of man can be evaluated in epistemological terms but also in moral terms. This fact is conditioned by two factors. The first one is the ambiguous nature of the manifest aspect where true and false cognition are possible. The next is the free nature of man. The activity of reality is free of any value. Moreover, cognition of reality, although it is free, is always true. The concepts of truth and falsehood and moral value can only be applied and realised by the activity of man who can choose. A free agent in this ambiguous world should be forced by norms to perform the activity which will continue the subject-object cognition of the highest cognitive agent in microscale.

The criterion which allows men to perform true actions is not only the proper cognition of reality and its categories. As stated above the emotion one feels during activity are signs that allow men to recognise if they are acting correctly. Pleasure and happiness are the sign that man is using the category of action (*karman*) in accord with categories of *sattva* and *dharma*.<sup>217</sup>

## 2.9. Conclusion

In this chapter we have looked at the manifest aspect of reality seen as the result of the creative self-cognition performed by the highest cognitive agent. Its description needs to take into account two perspectives (for this issue see also chapter 5.2.1): the first is the perspective of the highest cognitive agent as to the cognitive activity to which men should attune while the second is the perspective of everyday cognition. In both cases subject-object cognition is performed with aid of all cognitive faculties, senses of reason and action included, because self-cognition is the frame of the cosmos. The difference between particular agents lies in their ability to use categories in the correct way.

We have discussed how the *Smṛti* philosophers present the necessity of category influence (time, classes, action). They explain it metaphorically or explicitly, depending on the category. It has also been shown how the categories become ontologised in the perspective of everyday subject-object cognition and a tentative interpretation of the concept of *svabhāva* has been proposed as expressing the necessity with which categories apply to living beings.

The possibility of wrong cognition is inscribed in the manifest aspect because it is the manifestation of free reality and because its subject-object structure needs separation of the subject from an object. Because reality is one and the aim of its manifestation is self-cognition this separation is only

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<sup>217</sup> and sacrifice, see chapter 4.11.2.

cognitive, from the perspective of everyday cognition it is again ontologised. So, the act of separation of the subject from the object under the influence of the I-form (*ahaṃkāra*) causes the ambiguity of the manifest aspect. This ambiguity is expressed with the concept of *māyā* which is presented in the BhG.

We then analysed the concept of man, firstly as parts of society conceived in terms of a human body. This conceptualisation allows the Smṛti Composers to express the necessity of categories in a clear way: a member of social state (conceived in terms of a part of a body) should behave according to its movements. The next part of discussion presented in this chapter is an analysis of MDhP 187. The Composer of this stanza blends cosmic and human proper cognition to describe the proper categorisation of emotions with the use of classes. In this chapter, the Composer also presents all cognitive faculties (of the cosmos and of man) which are transformations of reason. In MDhP 187, reason is called *buddhi* in reference to cosmic and human cognition; in the cosmogony of the MS and in other texts it is called the Great Self (*mahān ātman*). The Composer discuss the difference between the highest cognitive agent (called the Field Knower) and reason (called *sattva* here) which is that the latter creates categories and the former does not. The difference between them is explained with the aid of conceptual metaphors (farmer and his field, king and his subjects, spider and its web, udumbara tree and a mosquito, water and fish). It is also proposed that the intention of the Composer of MDhP 187 is a polemic with Buddhist followers which is announced in one of the early stanzas and then elaborated at the end of the chapter.

The concept of the mind (*manas*) is the next topic discussed in this chapter. As presented in MDhP 187 (and in other texts, see chapter 4.9.2), it is an ambivalent cognitive faculty because of its role as an intermediary between aspects of reality. It mediates between the unmanifest and manifest aspects, between the mental and sensori-motor self of reality, between the cosmic (its mental and sensori-motor self) and the ritual self, and, we may presume, between ritual-social and social-human selves. Thus, it can entangle the human being in subject-object cognition which leads to death and rebirth or it enables him to liberate. A cognitive structure of the cosmic cognition performed by the highest cognitive agent and of possible cognitions (proper and wrong) performed by men is proposed.

Finally, we have discussed the process of axiologisation of categories namely, the process when the rules of manifestation become norms for men who are seen as endowed with mind so are as free as reality and can chose whatever they want. Freedom, in Smṛti thought, is conceived as possessing two aspects. One of them is the ability to do whatever one wants and the second is the ability for perfect subjugation to restrictions on one's self. The former aspect

of freedom is realised by reality in its first act of splitting into subject and object, the latter, when it continues creation. Man is expected to behave in the same way so needs norms which force him to do that. The category of classes is axiologised directly while the category of action (*karman*) is axiologised *via* categories of sacrifice and dharma/adharma. It is proposed that we understand the concept of punishment as the embodiment of the necessity for categories within the frames of the moral discourse, i.e. with sanctions for their rejection.

The discussion of the concept of the Brahmin as presented in the MS has allowed us to see a more universal basis for some aspects of moral axiologisation i.e., the rationalisation of the basic evolutionary reaction at repulsive objects which finds its expression in the metaphoric conceptualisation of good in terms of purity and evil in terms of impurity. The Composer of the MS builds his rational arguments for the superiority of the Brahmin on arguments derived from tradition, most of them are connected with the Vedic conceptualisation of fire. Thus, we find the hidden fire on the human level.

The last two sections are devoted to the concept of truth which is an ethical concept in Smṛti thought and can be defined as the conformity of thoughts and actions with reality. The basic sign that one behaves truly is a feeling of happiness.

It has also been shown how Vedic thought constitutes the basic frame and starting point for the thinking of the Smṛti philosophers. These are the basic assumptions of unity of reality, of the subject-object structure of its manifest aspect, of its conceptualisation in terms of the human body, of conceptualisation of man as microcosmos, of the mind as the intermediary between the aspects of reality (in its first manifestation it corresponds to the Vedic borderline sphere between the aspects of reality). Many of the source domains used by the Composers also derive from Vedic thought, first of all, the general domain of Cooking which now only expresses subject-object cognition. The general domain of Riding In A Chariot, which is so important for conceptualisation of liberating cognition in Smṛti philosophy (see chapter 4.6.2), also has its roots in the R̥gvedic conceptualisation of time and it is used in the same meaning.

It has also been shown that the analysis of fragments of the early Smṛti texts, seen as Proto-Sāṃkhyan by many scholars, is fruitful and inspiring when it is undertaken from the perspective of earlier and not later thought, and when all the context of a sentences is taken into account. Similar to Vedic thought, close reading of the text against the background of tradition reveals more of the meaning of their Composers who would not have been aware of future philosophical strands. The use of cognitive tools enhances the interpretative efforts significantly because it opens the way to the thinking that is hidden in metaphoric, metonymic and blended expressions motivated by experience and cultural conditions.



# Chapter Three

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## Bondage

In early Smṛti thought, although the general epistemological and ontological Vedic frames are inherited, philosophers focus on the role of man and, as we have seen in the previous chapter, discuss it from two perspectives. One is the perspective of the highest cognitive agent in the cosmos. The second one is the perspective of the individual. However, this perspective is complex and encompasses three perspectives: the perspective of a man who is not aware of his absolute essence, the perspective of a man who is aware of his absolute essence and the perspective of the highest cognitive agent present in man in both cases.

In this chapter, we will analyse the first of those two perspectives i.e., the process of wrong cognition which is performed by the human subject. The final result of this process is that the highest cognitive agent present in that man cannot cognise. In this way the Smṛti Composers elaborate earlier ideas of reality which denies its attributes in creation. In the microscale it loses its omniscience. The highest cognitive agent becomes closed in man and circulates in the next incarnation of the individual personality.

In the previous chapter, we looked at the notion of the amalgamate agent which is created through the fusion of the highest cognitive agent and reason engaged in subject-object cognition in a particular man. The concept of the amalgamate agent can be seen as a blend of two input spaces: the highest cognitive agent and a particular man. The generic space of this blend is subject-object cognition. A scenario of wrong cognition is projected into the blend and the highest cognitive agent is reduced to the cognitive frame of man. Such a blend is created in the minds of people who assumed the ontological

separation of themselves from the rest of the world. They are strengthened by everyday experience which confirms their belief in the ontic reality of their separateness from the cosmos and from the plurality of objects and events. The longer one cognises in this way, the stronger the blend. As we will see, liberating practice consists on the decompression of such blends which is very difficult (see chapter 4.9). We cannot claim that the self that is described by the Composers of the Smṛti texts actually exists but only that the composers state that, during liberating cognition, it can be experienced and that, from their point of view such a blend was ontologically real.

The result of wrong cognition is the same as the result of correct cognition: man acquires a self (*ātman*) which is immortal. Its immortality, however, consists on its constant dying and rebirth. The same is for the highest cognitive agent enclosed in human organism. One could say that it is the same kind of self (*ātman*) as the cosmic self of Prajāpati in the ŚB and the self of the highest cognitive agent realised by those who follow the path of fathers according to the model of the Five Fires (*pañcāgnividyā*). The Smṛti philosophers are clearly introducing Vedic concepts into their metaphysics.

As outlined in the previous chapter, the manifest aspect of reality is equivocal and ambivalent. Moreover, man is endowed with mind (*manas*) which ensures him freedom and consequently the ability to commit errors in his cognition. Since actions are the external manifestation of knowledge, wrong cognition leads to wrong actions which are evaluated as morally negative. In order to make cognition possible all members of all social states (*varṇa*) must perform actions appropriate to the part of the body to which they belong. Hence, to perform one's dharma is not only moral but is also an ontological obligation: if it broken the state of affairs will be ontologically changed. The members of all three states may hope that living their lives according to their dharma will give them a better life after death.

### 3.1. The lack of knowledge/cognition

The division of reality into two aspects requires that knowledge of the self (*ātman*), which is constantly realised in the cosmos, should be learnt by human subjects. The highest cognitive agent in his cosmic manifestation is never deluded in his cognition.<sup>1</sup> In other words, he always correctly uses his categories in order to recognise himself. However, men treat the subject-object structure of the manifest aspects and its scenario as ontologically real.

<sup>1</sup> It is expressed e.g., in BhG 4.5, 7.26.

The meaning of the Sanskrit noun *jñāna* expresses both the static state of the human mind<sup>2</sup> which can be translated as ‘knowledge’ and the dynamic process. The latter is cognition which is the result of knowledge in that it is realised within the frames outlined by one’s knowledge. Correct knowledge incites correct cognition, wrong knowledge incites wrong cognition which, in turn, deepens the state of wrong knowledge. The mental state characterised by wrong knowledge and cognition is classified by the BhG as tamasic:

### BhG 18.22

*yat tu kṛtsnavad ekasmin kārye saktam ahaitukam |  
atattvārthavad alpaṃ ca tat tāmasam udāhṛtam ||*

To *tamas* is assigned that knowledge which, though limited and devoid of substance, groundlessly fixes on one object as though it were all.

Tamasic knowledge does not give one a coherent basis for one’s actions (*ahaituka*, verse b), it does not reach the real object (*atattvārthavat*, verse c), so its scope is narrow (*alpa*, verse c). As such it makes man think that each of his actions is important although from the perspective of the highest cognitive agent it just causes the subject to move further away from what is real.

A lack of knowledge about the unity of reality triggers a sequence of events leading to an unsuccessful incarnation. Under its influence, the I-form (*ahamkāra*) begins to be active in that it makes the subject believe that he is ontologically separated from the object. This faculty, which is crucial for subject-object cognition, at the same time obscures the ontological unity of reality. A deluded man treats the I-form seriously and considers himself as an ontologically separated entity. These factors determine wrong cognition.

The influence of the I-form on a particular subject is not discussed widely in the texts analysed in this study. Most often it is mentioned as a faculty which should be rejected if someone wants to make himself free:

### MDhP 205.17–18

*sattvena rajasā caiva tamasā caiva mohitāḥ |  
cakravat parivartante hy ajñānāḥ jantavo bhṛśam ||*

People, deluded by *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* revolve violently like a wheel because of the lack of knowledge/cognition.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Here we mean the mind generally, not the specific cognitive faculty called *manas*.

<sup>3</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

*tasmāt samyak parīkṣeta doṣān ajñānasambhavān |  
ajñānaprabhavaṃ nityam ahaṃkāraṃ parityajet ||*

Because of that one has to examine, in a proper way, the faults that arise from the lack of knowledge and should always reject the I-form that is born from it.<sup>4</sup> The three classes (*guṇa*) are presented here as the source of delusion.

In BhG 7.14 the three classes are conceived as the creators of *māyā*, the power of being measured (see chapter 2.2.2). From the perspective of the highest cognitive agent, they allow it to manifest its freedom which consists of submission to its own categories. The lack of knowledge about the unity of reality causes a man to use them erroneously because he thinks that he, as the subject, is ontologically different from the objects.

The next stanza of the BhG explains the influence of the I-form (*ahaṃkāra*) in the following way:

### **BhG 3.27**

*prakṛteḥ kriyamāṇāni guṇaiḥ karmāṇi sarvaśaḥ |  
ahaṃkāravimūḍhātmā kartāham iti manyate ||*

At any rate, actions are performed by the three classes,<sup>5</sup> but, deluded by the I-form,<sup>6</sup> one thinks: ‘I did it!’

The manifest aspect (*prakṛti*) is presented as the creator of the classes (verses a–b). In this way the Composer presents the necessity of subject-object categories and the independence of reality from their influence. From the perspective of a man who does not possess true knowledge they seem to be ontological features. When a man treats the I-form and the classes as a means of knowledge about the whole of reality, and not only about its manifest aspect, his cognition becomes false. He thinks that he is the agent (verse d). Thus, he reduces the whole of reality to his own organism.

The meaning of the compound *ahaṃkāravimūḍhātmā* (verse c) depends on how much of the semantic range of the word *ātman* is activated. The recipient may activate only part of the meaning that refers to the external, physical and psychological part of man’s identity. He may also activate the Upaniṣadic descriptions of the liberating practice and understand *ātman* as the self in its waking and dreaming state (CU 8.7), or as the self that is composed of food and drink (*annarasamaya*) or as the self which breathes (*prāṇamaya*) and wants to get the object (*manomaya*, TU 2). This is the part of the self

<sup>4</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

<sup>5</sup> Buitenen (1981: 83): ‘forces of nature.’

<sup>6</sup> Buitenen (1981: 83): ‘self-attribution.’

(*ātman*) which is deluded and cannot understand his total self. However, the recipient can also activate all the meanings of the word *ātman*. In this case it is the highest cognitive agent who is deluded due to human lack of knowledge/cognition. We will return to this interpretation later (see section 3.3).

The crucial cognitive mistake caused by the lack of knowledge and influence of the I-form (*aḥamkāra*) is described in the following way:

### MDhP 212.14

*imaṃ guṇasamāhāram ātmabhāvena paśyataḥ |  
asamyag darśanair duḥkham anantaṃ nopasāmyati ||*

Unhappiness never ends for he who sees this collection of classes as the state of the self (*ātman*) because of incorrect convictions.<sup>7</sup>

In the stanza quoted above, a man is called a collection of classes (verse a) which highlights the fact that he appears in subject-object cognition, i.e. in which subject creates object. Hence, in wrong cognition, man commits the mistake *pars pro toto*. He reduces his self (*ātman*) to categories framing his perceptible organism. In this way, the amalgamate agent is created. Such a man is constantly unhappy because of his subject-object activity which in that case is meaningless. The result is that ‘unending unhappiness’ (verses c–d) is experienced by the amalgamate agent through consecutive incarnations.

When one sees one’s self as ontologically separate from everything else one begins to desire objects, to be afraid of them (see BU 1.4) and/or to hate them. One can see this cognitive attitude as the deformed desire which began creation: the desire to become the other and to possess it in order to cognise the unity of reality. If the recipient activates all meanings of the word *ātman*, both scenarios can be described in the same way: the self (*ātman*) wants to possess the self (*ātman*). However, desire undertaken on the basis of a belief that there is ontological difference between the self which wants to possess, and the self which is to be possessed, leads to a result opposite to that when the self knows its unity and only wants it confirmed. In the first case the desire of the self will never be fulfilled because there is an unlimited number of objects and the agent, having obtained one, very soon begins to crave for the next and so on. Thus, he becomes entangled in endless activities until his death. It is important to note that the fact the word *ātman* means both absolute reality and the human cognising organism, and that the opposite situations can be described in the same way, betrays a very high level of abstraction.

<sup>7</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

The context of MDhP 212.14 is the debate between King Janaka, known from tradition for his philosophical interests, and the Sage Pañcaśikha.<sup>8</sup> King Janaka is presented equivalently, as Yudhiṣṭhira in the MDhP and as Arjuna in the BhG<sup>9</sup>, as asking for relief from grief and death. This context is important in that prototypically kings are rich. Pañcaśikha begins his exposition about liberating cognition with the statement that one should see objects as ‘non-self’ (*anātmēti*) and without ‘I’ (*aham*) and as ‘not-mine’ (*na mama*, 213.15)<sup>10</sup> in order to explain his teaching on the highest abandonment (*tyāgaśāstram anuttamam*, 213.16).<sup>11</sup> In social life, the concept of self (*ātman*) encompasses more than one’s psycho-physical identity. It also includes one’s social role, reflected in clothes and things possessed. Desire to possess objects is also the desire to possess one’s self. A king who possesses much is a good example of a person who concentrates on gaining riches under the influence of his perverted desire to possess self (*ātman*).

This false cognitive and emotional state, incited by the lack of true knowledge, is presented in BhG 16. Its Composer evokes the Vedic frame of the fight between the gods and the asuras. This frame is used in the ŚB to discuss cosmogonical issues. In CU 8.7 it is used in the explanation of the notion of the four selves (*ātman*). In this way, the Composer can include new moral ideas within the frames of tradition.

Let us see how āsuric people are described:

### BhG 16.8

*asatyam apratiṣṭhaṃ te jagad āhur anīśvaram |  
aparaspārasambhūtaṃ kim anyat kāmahaitukam ||*

They maintain that this world has no true reality, or foundation, or God, and is not produced by the interdependence of causes. By what then? By mere desire.

According to āsuric people the world is not real (*asatya*, verse a) and devoid of any basis (*apratīṣṭha*, verse b). As already mentioned, in the Veda the word *pratiṣṭhā* (foundation, verse a) means the basis for future creation specifically conceived as the triple Veda (ŚB 6.1.1). The recipient understands that āsuric people reject it. In this way, the Composer triggers the recipient to create a conceptual network whose first input space is present thought and

<sup>8</sup> MDhP 211–212 (*Pañcaśikhavākya*). For analysis of chapter 212 see also below, section 3.3.2.d.

<sup>9</sup> and king Bṛhadhratha in MaU.

<sup>10</sup> MDhP 212.15: *anātmēti ca yad drṣṭaṃ tenāhaṃ na mamety api | vartate kim adhiṣṭhānā prasaktā duḥkhasaṃtatīḥ ||*

<sup>11</sup> MDhP 212.16: *tatra samyaṃ mano nāma tyāgaśāstram anuttamam śṛṇu yat tava mokṣāya bhāṣyamāṇaṃ bhaviṣyati ||*

whose second is tradition; the generic space is the concept of a theory. In the blend, āsuric people reject knowledge which comes from tradition.

The qualification of āsuric people as *anīśvara* (no God, verse c) expresses the lack of a concept of the highest cognitive agent conceived in terms of a king. As has been shown, this concept is used to explain the mutual relationship between the highest cognitive agent and its manifestations (MDhP 241.1, see chapter 2.1.5), so if this conceptualisation is rejected, the relationship is not realised.

The next qualification of āsuric people, as denying that the world appears through mutual causation (by the interdependence of causes, *aparaspasambhūta*, verse c), is an abstract and general summary of Brahminic cosmogonical theory in which the cosmos is created thanks to the mutual manifestation of the opposing aspects of reality: Agni versus soma in the RV, fire versus fluid aspect (milk, water, sweat etc.), in the ŚB, and, in the Upaniṣads, subject versus object in all of tradition. The āsuric people reject this concept of reality. The recipient may assume that the Composer of the BhG is thinking specifically about Buddhists because he presents the āsuric people as those who see the source of the world in desire (*kāmahaituka*). If the recipient activates the narrative frame of the notion of the four states of the self (*ātman*) as the next input space of the blend, he will understand that the Buddhists are like Virocana (CU 8.7) and his people who think that the self is the appearance of the external body.<sup>12</sup>

### BhG 16.10

*kāmam āśritya duṣpūraṃ dambhamānamadānvitāḥ |*  
*mohād grhītvāsadgrāhān pravartante 'śucivratāḥ ||*

Embracing this 'desire' which is insatiable, they go about, filled with the intoxication of vanity and self-pride, accepting false doctrines in their folly and following polluting life rules.

The āsuric beings become what they think: if they think desire is the only source of the world, they become desire. Their desire is impossible because it cannot be fulfilled in subject-object cognition. The emotional result of this state is pride (*dambhamāna*, verse b) and the cognitive result is delusion (*moha*, verse c). The Composer evaluates their activity as polluting (verse d).

<sup>12</sup> In the next stanza (BhG 10), they are called those whose self is lost (*naṣṭātmān*) and whose reason is limited (*alpabuddhi*). This implies lack of contact of possibility with their self (*ātman*) and a narrow range of their cognition due to low cognitive abilities (see below section 3.2). Because of that their actions are cruel and they are dangerous for the existence of the world. This stanza clearly explains the unavoidable connection between one's knowledge, one's cognition and one's actions.

In this way, he activates conceptualisation of morality in terms of cleanliness: the actions of āsuric beings are evaluated as morally negative.

Their regrettable emotional state is described in the following stanzas: their anxiety ends only with their death because they think that life can be reduced to the life they live now (BhG 16.11). They are full of hope for achieving worldly goals (which is conceived in terms of being trapped), they are full of desire and anger and their way of realisation of their desires is illegal (*anyāya*, BhG 16.12).

Then the Composer presents thinking under the influence of I-form (*ahaṃkāra*):

### BhG 16.13–15

*idam adya mayā labdham idaṃ prāpsyē manoratham |*  
*idam astīdam api me bhaviṣyati punar dhanam || (13)*

‘This I got today. That craving I still have to satisfy. This much I have as of now, but I’ll get more riches.

*asau mayā hataḥ śatrur haniṣyē cāparān api |*  
*īśvaro ‘ham ahaṃ bhogī siddho ‘haṃ balavān sukhī || (14)*

I have already killed that enemy others I still have to kill. I am a master. I enjoy.’  
I am successful, strong and happy.

*ādhyo ‘bhijanavān asmi ko ‘nyo ‘sti sadṛśo mayā |*  
*yakṣyē dāsyāmi modiṣya ity ajñānavimohitāḥ || (15)*

‘I am a rich man of high family; who can equal me? I shall sacrifice. I shall make donations. I shall enjoy myself’, so they think in the folly of their ignorance.

Āsuric people divide the world into what they had already gained and what they will gain, into what is theirs and what will be theirs. This mental attitude is totally against the teaching of Pañcaśikha who teaches that the concepts of ‘I’ and of ‘mine’ should be rejected (see above, MDhP 212.14, section 3.1). It seems that the Composer now has in mind people living within Brahminic society, especially members of the warrior class. We need to remember BhG 14.c where the āsuric man calls himself ‘king’ *īśvara*. Since the highest cognitive agent is conceived in these terms, āsuric people amalgamate their bodily self with it.

\*

The lack of the knowledge about the unity of reality leads a man to treat the I-form (*ahaṃkāra*) seriously and to think about himself as a subject ontologically separate from the objects cognised by the ten senses. The perverse



desire to cognise and create one's self leads them to look for it outside themselves. His mental attitude can be presented in the following way.

the highest cognitive (*ātman*) = reason → mind → senses → body | → cosmos

### 3.2. The chain of objectification

We now discuss the process in which a man, convinced about his ontic separation from the world, loses his subjective faculties and his ability to use categories in a proper way. He uses them to operate in the external world and to obtain as much of it as possible. As a result, he becomes the object devoid of any ability to cognise and will reincarnate in more and more objective forms. We can call this process the objectification of the amalgamate agent.

#### 3.2.1. The loss of reason and the inability to use the category of classes (*guṇa*)

The chain of consequences induced by the false cognition and performed under the influence of the I-form (*ahaṃkāra*) is described in the following way:<sup>13</sup>

##### BhG 2.62

*dhyāyato viṣayān puṃsaḥ saṅgas teṣūpajāyate |  
saṅgāt saṃjāyate kāmaḥ kāmāt krodho 'bhijāyate ||*

When a man thinks about sense objects, an interest in them develops. From this interest grows desire, from desire anger.

When the subject, on the basis of the false cognition, succumbs to the I-form (*ahaṃkāra*) his mind thinks about objects as separate from himself (verse a). It is worth noting that the activity of the mind is expressed by the same verb *dhyai-* as in the cosmogonic description of the MS e.g., in the description of the first cognitive power of reality when it manifests as the Golden Egg (MS 1.8., *abhidhyai-*) of Brahma when he divides himself as the Golden Egg (MS 1.12, *dhyāna*) and it is also used in the description of the activity of the first seers (*dhyāna*, MDhP 176.7, see chapter 1.2.1.b). This verb is also used in the descriptions of liberating cognition (see chapter 4.5, 4.9.2, 4.10.2.a). This shows the contradictory situation of a man who

<sup>13</sup> A similar chain is presented in MDhP 206.3–5. See also BhG 16.16.

uses his cognitive ability, which could allow him to become free in his search for his self (*ātman*), unable to do so under the belief that it is beyond him.

Having thought about the objects, he desires them. The word *saṅga* ('interest', verse b) describes the specific attitude of cognitive faculties, especially of the mind, but sometimes of reason when they are obsessed with mental images of external objects and desire them. In this moment the liberating aspect of the mind is lost. The result of this attitude is anger and fear (verses c–d).<sup>14</sup> In BU 1.4 negative emotion (fear) was the first result of the awareness that reality, manifest as the manifestation of the highest cognitive agent (the self, *ātman*, in the form of man), was alone. Only then did desire for someone else appear. In the deformed cognition described in BhG 2.62 desire is first and anger is second, most probably because of frustration that the desired object cannot be obtained immediately, or at all, or because someone else possesses it.

### BhG 2.63

*krodhād bhavati saṃmohaḥ saṃmohāt smṛtivibhramah |*  
*smṛtibhramśād buddhināśo buddhināśāt prañasyati ||*

from anger rises delusion, from delusion loss of memory, from loss of memory loss of reason,<sup>15</sup> and from loss of reason one perishes.

Anger is the cause of delusion (*saṃmoha*, verse a). Its appearance in this stage of cognition shows that the influence of the I-form (*ahaṃkāra*) deepens the initial ignorance. It accords with the assumption of the necessity for cognitive categories to apply. The initial ignorance makes the subject use categories in a wrong way and the subject separates himself from the object. In this state he still cognises but is no longer able to use categories properly.

Delusion causes deprivation of memory (*smṛtivibhrama*, verse b). This stage needs more attention. Memory is one of the most basic aspects of our personality and its continuity both in the individual and in the social dimension is critical. However, in the case of ancient India, it was also the memory of the Vedas which was crucial for man both as an individual and as a social being. As we know early Indian sacred texts were preserved orally for at least a thousand years and even in Smṛti times they were mostly preserved in this way. In Vedic

<sup>14</sup> Panksepp (2012) distinguishes seven basic affects SEEKING, RAGE, FEAR, PANIC, PLAY, LUST, CARE which constitute the basis for the Core Self and for emergent emotions. Let us note that their order reflects the order of emotions expressed in BhG 2.61 and the emotions felt by the self (*ātman*) during creation described in BU 1.4. The last two (LUST and CARE) are emotions felt by living beings in their everyday cognition.

<sup>15</sup> Buitenen (1981: 81): 'death of the spirit.'

time the memorised text was the sole cultural artifact as Vedic people did not build temples, palaces nor did they create images of gods and kings. Failure of memory threatened then with a total destruction of culture. However, one may presume that the loss of the Veda would have meant the same for the Composers of the Smṛti texts. As mentioned above, personal memory constitutes one's individuality that allows human beings to operate in the world. The value that ancient Indians attributed to personal memory is attested by the fact that its range is significantly increased in liberating cognition and that the free remembered all their previous incarnations. So, loss of memory means a loss of personal and cultural identity. Hence, it is not surprising that when memory fails, reason cannot work properly and is lost (verse c). It is worth noting that it is reason that prevents the loss of knowledge acquired in one's youth:

### MDhP 207.28

*taruṇādhigataṃ jñānaṃ jarādurbalatām gatam |  
paripakvabuddhiḥ kālena ādatte mānaśaṃ balam ||*

The knowledge a person acquires in youth is weakened by old age and poor health. But if a person cultivates his reason<sup>16</sup> for a long time, he acquires the power of the mind.<sup>17</sup>

Knowledge obtained in youth is the Veda that is preserved thanks to everyday recitation. Recitation should be repeated daily throughout the entire life of man belonging to the three upper social states. The influence of recitation over reason was seen in terms of the general domain of Cooking: under its influence reason is 'well cooked' (*paripakva*, verse c). The use of this domain allows the recipient to highlight the meaning of an intentional process and to understand recitation as such a process. Its final result is the power of the mind which is necessary for liberating cognition (verse d) and, hence, of the power of reason to categorise properly (see chapter 4.9). Thus, reason depends on memory and memory depends on reason. When memory is lost so is reason.

The difference between human being and other living beings is the memory and presence of the Veda, of reason and of the mind in its aspect that is able to activate liberating cognition.<sup>18</sup> The Composer of BhG 2.62–63 says nothing about this aspect of the mind though it is clear that that a loss of

<sup>16</sup> Wynne (2009: 361): 'intelligence.'

<sup>17</sup> Wynne (2009: 361): 'mental power.' For analysis of MDhP 16–29, see Takahashi (2019b).

<sup>18</sup> It is worth noting that the ability of thinking and reasoning ('tertiary-process cognition, Panksepp 2012) is realised in the newest parts of our brains (mainly in neocortex), so we could interpret the cognitive state described here as 'slipping down' to the lower cognitive abilities (secondary- and primary-process cognitions, see also Note 14, Conclusion).

memory and reason deprives man of his manhood and, because of that, he is lost (BhG 2.63d). Since man is the subjective power of reality in microscale, when he loses his cognitive faculties, he loses his power to be the subject and transforms himself into an object.

This process, incited by wrong cognition and performed under the influence of the I-form (*ahaṃkāra*), is a process the stages of which occur with necessity. It is increasingly difficult for the agent to control subsequent stages. There are two causes of this state of affairs. Firstly, the agent loses his cognitive and volitional empowerment over his actions. Secondly, the agent unconsciously<sup>19</sup> subsumes to the necessity of the rules of the cosmic manifestation of reality. We have already discussed the fatal results of loss of memory and reason and we will now enlarge the description of this process.

As stated in BhG 2.62, when man thinks about objects as separate from himself his cognitive faculties, reason and mind, become obsessed with their mental images and become emotionally attached to them. This emotional attachment is caused by the desire to obtain the objects. This cognitive situation is described in the MDhP:

### MDhP 199.21

*viṣayeṣu ca saṃsargāc chāśvatasya ca darśanāt |  
manasā cānyad ākāṅkṣan paraṃ na pratipadyate ||*

Who sees what is eternal and yet is attached to the objects of the senses, then he desires with his mind something else and does not reach that which is the highest<sup>20</sup>

The man who possesses true knowledge about the unmanifest, eternal aspect, may still be attached to objects of the senses (verses a–b). In this situation he cannot cognise ultimate reality (verse d) because his mind strongly desires something other than that which is external to the senses of man. In this cognitive state the liberating aspect of the mind is lost. The senses of reason and of action draw the mind towards their objects and the mind mentally and emotionally reacts to them. The mind in turn orientates reason, which makes decisions regarding the data of the mind, towards the objects of the senses. And since, as we have seen, the mind and the senses are transformation of reason (see chapter 2.3.2.b), it can be postulated that, in false cognition, reason is identified with the mind and the mind with the senses. Their activity is reduced to listening, touching, seeing, tasting and smelling and responding to them in such a way as to enable the subject to either gain the objects that are

<sup>19</sup> Not in the psychoanalytical sense but in the sense that he is not aware of this fact (as it is in everyday cognition), contrary to the free man.

<sup>20</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

the source of these sensations, avoid them or destroy them. In this way, the amalgamate form of the agent is strengthened: the highest cognitive agent, together with reason, is reduced to the subject-object faculties of man greedy for the self which is beyond him.

The amalgamate agent uses the category of classes only to cognise the manifest aspect and is not able to go beyond it because the faculties which are able to do that are destroyed. This is explicitly expressed in the next stanza of MDhP 199:

### MDhP 199.22

*guṇān yad iha paśyanti tad icchanty apare janāḥ |  
param naivābhikāṅkṣanti nirguṇatvād guṇārthinah ||*

Other people see classes and desire them. Those who focus on the classes do not desire that which is the highest because it is beyond classes.<sup>21</sup>

Motivated by the desire towards external objects, people use the classes in order to understand the world and achieve results of their actions. They think that classes are the ontic features of the objects they covet. Since their knowledge/cognition is based on false assumption, they are not able to cognise the ultimate reality.

In his classification of reason with the aid of the three classes (*guṇa*), the Composer of the BhG describes the class of tamasic in the following way:

### BhG 18.32

*adharamaṃ dharmam iti yā manyate tamasāvṛtā |  
sarvārthān viparītāṃś ca buddhiḥ sā pārtha tāmasī ||*

Reason, covered with darkness (*tamas*), which thinks that adharma is dharma and sees all objects in an opposite way, is tamasic.<sup>22</sup>

The Composer plays here with two meanings of the noun *tamas* which are darkness (verse b) and one of the classes (verse d). Using the first meaning, he activates the metaphors COGNITION IS SEEING, COGNITION IS ILLUMINATING and triggers the recipient to imagine a man during a dark night. The Composer then expresses the fact that reason in such a cognitive state is not able to use any other class in the same way as a man blinded by the darkness of the night cannot cognise anything.

The essence of false cognitive activity is cognising everything in the opposite way. To recognise adharma as dharma means that actions undertaken in

<sup>21</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

<sup>22</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

false cognition will also be false in that the subject will not behave accordingly to state to which it belongs. At the same time the concepts of dharma and adharna may metonymically activate the other categories (metonymy THE LAST PHASE OF THE PROCESS FOR THE WHOLE PROCESS) because they are created last according to the cosmogony of the MS. In this way, the Composer would imply that reason cannot use any of them.

When Arjuna rejects to fight, his reason is in the tamasic state. He is tormented by grief, the result of his wrong cognition which assumed ontological separateness between himself and his enemies. In this state his reason cannot make right decisions and it makes the wrong decision which is not to fight. He sees adharna as dharma. The emotional state of Arjuna is called *viṣāda* ‘despair, depression’. This noun comes from the root *vi sad-* which, on the most literal level, activates ‘to fall into pieces.’ It betrays a conceptualisation of despair in terms of losing one’s integrity which is bodily expressed in that Arjuna sits down and drops his bow and arrows which are elements of the ICM of warrior (BhG 1.47). He is regressing and might now be conceived in terms of a little child.

At the end of the BhG (18.73) he calls himself *sthita*, which literally means ‘standing’ which expresses the state opposed to that called *viṣāda*. There are two reasons for this interpretation. Firstly, the participle *sthita* activates the image schema of VERTICALITY with its general meaning BETTER IS UP, and more specifically SATTVIC IS UP, TAMASIC IS DOWN. The recipient well-versed in tradition might even activate the cosmogonic conceptualisation of the cosmos conceived in terms of the growth of a child (see chapter 1.1.3–5) and conceive Arjuna in terms of a grown man who can properly use his reason. It is worth remembering that the influence of time is conceived in terms of being cooked (see chapter 2.1.1), so the maturity of Arjuna can be understood in terms of the general domain of Cooking. In MDhP 207.28 (see above, section 3.2.1), the cultivation of reason thanks to recitation is conceived in terms of the general domain of Cooking. If the recipient elaborates this general domain in that direction, he will understand that Arjuna’s reason is now ready (literally ‘well cooked’ *paripakva*).<sup>23</sup>

Secondly, in order to stand it is necessary for a person to pull the parts of himself together. It is difficult to name this state of readiness to act without the use of this source domain. This idea is expressed by the verb *sam ā dhā-* used in the descriptions of the ultimate state of liberating cognition (*samādhi*, see chapter 4.4–5, 4.9.2). Again, tradition might be evoked: in ŚB 6.1.2.12, 7.1.2.1, Prajāpati is presented as falling asunder (*vi sraṃs-*) and then he is

<sup>23</sup> Conceptualisation of the right knowledge and cognition in terms of being cooked is attested in MDhP 222.12 in the description of free men (*pakvavidyā mahāprājñā jitakrodhā jitendriyāḥ | manasā karmaṇā vācā nāparādhyanti kasya cit ||*).

put back together by fire and stands up to become the cosmos. In the ŚB this phase of creation is also conceived in terms of the general domain of Cooking (Jurewicz 2016/18).

It should be noted that the metaphoric meaning of this domain implicitly gives coherence to the conceptualisation of Arjuna's state. If the recipient conceives him in terms of being well cooked, he will understand that Arjuna has overcome his depression thanks to the restoration of his well-educated reason and is now ready to fight. This interpretation is confirmed in BhG 18.62: Arjuna states that his delusion is lost (*naṣṭo mohah*), his memory comes back (*smṛtir labdhā*) and his doubt has been dispersed (*gatasamdeha*). Thus, the Composer activates the last links of the chain of bondage presented in BhG 2.62–63 (see section 3.2.1). Arjuna's memory comes back, his reason is regained and able to disperse doubt created by the mind. The recipient does not necessarily need to evoke the general domain of Cooking but its implicit influence gives coherence and, if evoked, enlarges the meaning of Arjuna's state.

The loss of reason has more results than just the lack of the ability to categorise properly. The amalgamate agent loses his power over categories in a more ontological sense. The categories begin to lead him without his awareness and he becomes subordinated or even addicted to them. The fact that the Composer of the MS 12 describes the three classes (*guṇa*) in his description of the afterlife suggests that he wants not only to classify various kinds of incarnations, but to imply their influence on the amalgamate agent. Deformed reason chooses the objects which belong to the tamasic class and the deformed mind draws reason towards the gaining of pleasant sounds, touches, forms, tastes and smells. The amalgamate agent sees the categories as inherent features of the objects separated from him and his wishes and decisions depend on their qualities: he wants to gain pleasant objects and avoid unpleasant objects. In this way, he loses his mental freedom of choice.

According to the assumption of the precedence of cognition over being, the power of categories over the amalgamate agent extends not only to one's life, but also to subsequent lives. The BhG explicitly presents the relationship between the thought and future form of being:

### BhG 8.6

*yaṃ yaṃ vāpi smaran bhāvaṃ tyajaty ante kalevaram |  
taṃ tam evaiti kaunteya sadā tadbhāvabhāvitaḥ ||*

Whatever the mental state one remembers when he leaves his body at the end of his life, he goes to this very state and will always become it, Kaunteya.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>24</sup> Jurewicz's translation. The idea that one is reborn accordingly to his mental state is expressed already in the BU 4.4.6, but here it is elaborated in details.

The word *bhāva* (verse a) expresses that the mental states created by the mind and in proper cognition are categorised with the aid of the three classes by reason (see chapter MDhP 187, chapter 2.3.2). In deformed cognition reason is not able to use categories but gives in to them. The state of mind is memorised in the moment of death and then conditions the future shape of man (*tadbhāvabhāvitaḥ*, verse d). The influence of the categories of the three classes is explicitly presented in the following stanza:

### MS 12.40–41

*devatvaṃ sātṭvikā yānti manuṣyatvaṃ ca rājasāḥ |*  
*tiryaktvaṃ tāmasā nityam ity eṣā trividhā gatiḥ || (40)*

Those who are sattvic become gods; those who are rajasic become men, those who are tamasic always become animals – this is the threefold path.<sup>25</sup>

*trividhā trividhaiṣā tu vijñeyā gauṇikī gatiḥ |*  
*adhamā madhyamāgryā ca karmavidyāviśeṣataḥ || (41)*

One should recognise that this threefold course based on classes<sup>26</sup> is itself threefold, namely, lowest, middle, and highest, depending on the specific type of action and knowledge within each.<sup>27</sup>

The Composer activates the image schema of VERTICALITY in terms of which the ontic influence of categories is conceived: SATTVIC IS UP, TAMASIC IS DOWN, RAJASIC IS THE MIDDLE. Man cognises according to his state of reason. If his reason is in the state recognised as sattvic he recognises everything in the cosmos thanks to the proper use of the three classes and is reborn in the sattvic state. If his reason is in the state recognised as rajasic, he uses the rajas and the tamas class and is reborn in the states corresponding to those classes. If his reason is in the state recognised as tamasic, he recognises only objects belonging to class of tamas and is reborn in the tamasic state.

It should be noted that the Composer classifies agents as sattvic, rajasic and tamasic. In this concise way he expresses that they use the specific classes but also that they are recognised as such which means that they are determined by the classes they use.

<sup>25</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

<sup>26</sup> Olivelle (2005: 232): 'attributes.'

<sup>27</sup> See also MDhP 291.46 and other places.



\*

The chain of objectification begins with the false assumption, caused by the influence of the I-form (*ahaṃkāra*), that one is an ontologically independent entity. In this moment, the mind loses its aspect as the locus of freedom and becomes obsessed with the mental states of external objects. Reason begins to be involved in this process and gradually loses its abilities which are necessary in the liberating cognition, especially the ability to use the category of classes properly. The loss of cognitive faculties is not total in the beginning of the process of objectification, it should rather be seen as their deformation. Since man thinks that the classes are features of the external world, he defines them in reference to himself (as desired or not) and reason makes decisions led by them (to get what is desired, to avoid what is not desired). Thus, man becomes unconsciously dependent on the classes because his choices and decisions are guided by the external world. It should be noted that the whole process of objectivisation is ultimately motivated by the same wish of creation of the self (*ātman*) as it is in cosmic cognition. However, the false assumption makes it perverse and deformed: the self (*ātman*) built by it will finally, after many rebirths, be completely bereft of any cognitive ability as an object.

### 3.2.2. The loss of the ability to use the category of action (*karman*)

The highest cognitive agent uses the category of *karman* in order to recognise the way it moves and its ontic identity with its moving part which can be called its sensori-motor self. Man is supposed to do the same. However, when he treats himself as an ontically separated entity, he treats all categories of the external objects as their features, the category of *karman* included. The deformed desire of self-cognition is the desire to have the objects according to the way they move and act. Thus, the loss of an ability to categorise in a proper way is not only a mental state but is also expressed in man's behaviour: he is led by the category of action (*karman*) instead of using it. It has been already stated in MS 12.41 where the afterlife path, determined by the classes, is similarly determined by the specific cognition and action of an agent (*karmavidyāviśeṣataḥ*). Activity of the senses of action (*karmendriya*) is the external expression of an agent's cognition which is focused on the objects and is attracted by them. The amalgamate agent cannot resist acting in a way that leads him to the realisation of his goals. Action recognised as tamasic is described in the following way:

**BhG 18.25**

*anubandhaṃ kṣayaṃ hiṃsām anapekṣya ca pauruṣam |  
mohād ārabhyate karma yat tat tāmasam ucyate ||*

When, because of his delusion, he begins to perform an action regardless of its results, its destructive nature, its violence and his manhood, this action is called tamasic.<sup>28</sup>

At the first glance this is the action Arjuna rejects: it is connected with destruction and violence and Arjuna has taken into account its terrible results. The noun *pauruṣa* (verse b) ‘manhood’ can be understood in two way depending on one’s perspective. From the perspective of the highest cognitive agent, manhood is those features which make a person human and which are his unique cognitive abilities. However, within the frames of the ICM of Kṣatriya, manhood is what makes a person a warrior which can be defined as adhering to a code of honor and heroism. From this perspective, killing one’s masters, relatives and friends is against this code. However, this is the way tamasic reason works: it sees everything in an opposite way (BhG 18.32, see section 3.2.1). The dharma of Kṣatriya involves violence but in his despair Arjuna is unable to understand this.

The inability to use the category of action (*karman*) deprives man of the freedom of thought and action. The Composer of the BhG explicitly expresses that if one succumbs to the influence of I-form (*ahaṃkāra*), one loses one’s power over the category of actions because one is subjected to two kinds of necessity – cosmic and personal:

**BhG 18.59–60**

*yad ahaṃkāram āśritya na yotsya iti manyase |  
mithyaiṣa vyavasāyas te prakṛtis tvām niyokṣyati || (59)*

If, having resorted to the I-form you will think ‘I will not fight’, your resolve will be false, because you will be yoked by nature.<sup>29</sup>

*svabhāvajena kaunteya nibaddhaḥ svena karmaṇā |  
kartuṃ necchasi yan mohād kariṣyasi avaśo ‘pi tat || (60)*

Bound by your action which arises from your own state you will do unwillingly what you do not want to do because of your delusion, Kaunteya!<sup>30</sup>

Under the influence of the I-form (*ahaṃkāra*, 59a) Arjuna thinks that he is ontologically separated from his enemies, so his cognitive faculties are

<sup>28</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

<sup>29</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

<sup>30</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

oriented towards them and he is afraid that he will have to kill them. And this is exactly what he wants to avoid.

The Composer states that Arjuna is yoked by the nature of the manifest aspect (*prakṛti*, 59d) and is bound to actions born from his own state (*svabhāva*, 60a). On the most literal level, this argument states that even if Arjuna resigns from fighting, his position between two armies will not prevent him from fighting: he is a Kṣatriya and trained in martial arts from his childhood. He will defend himself automatically without thinking. And he will kill his masters anyway.

However, the nouns *prakṛti* and *svabhāva* introduce the larger context of the whole manifest aspect. It is the result of the cognition undertaken by the highest cognitive agent. When it uses a category, this category becomes the rule for further creation. In the ŚB, the constant activity of the highest cognitive agent is conceived in terms of constant eating, a constant relationship between the eater and his food. This conceptualisation is elaborated in BhG 11 (see chapter 4.12). The cosmic category of *karman*, the rule of manifestation of reality, will force Arjuna to do what he does not want to do.

As suggested the noun *svabhāva* expresses the necessity with which cosmic categories apply in the personal dimension (see chapter 2.1.5). Arjuna's category of action (*karman*) is the result of belonging to the 'arms' of the social body of the highest cognitive agent. Since he is equipped with mind which can chose, he is not forced to use this category in the proper way as a manifestation of reality. However, his own category of action (*karman*) will force him do use it anyway although it will be wrong usage because it will be unconscious (see chapter 5.4.6). The necessity of categories, are here conceived in terms of yoking (see MS 1.28, chapter 2.1.4) and binding (see BhG 14.9, chapter 2.1.2).

It is worth adding that the Composer metonymically activates the process of wrong cognition, performed by the cognitive faculties, which was described above. The I-form (*ahaṃkāra*) influences the mind evoked by the verb *man-* (59b). It is the mind which desires not to fight. Then reason (activated by the noun *vyavasāya*, 59c) makes a wrong decision to realise the wish of the mind.

The agent recognised as tamasic is described as follows:

### BhG 18.28

*ayuktah prākṛtaḥ stabdhaḥ śaṭho naikṛtiko 'lasaḥ |*  
*viṣādī dīrghasūtrī ca kartā tāmasa ucyate ||*

An agent<sup>31</sup> is assigned to *tamas* when he is undisciplined, instinctive, insolent, crooked, deceitful, lazy, defeatist, and procrastinating.

<sup>31</sup> Buitenen (1981: 141): 'He.'

All qualifications, enumerated in the stanza, can apply to Arjuna in his despair. Qualification of ‘not yoked’ (*ayukta*, verse a) activates the general domain of Riding In A Chariot in terms of which liberating cognition is conceived (see chapter 4.6.2). Arjuna is ‘not yoked’ in that he does not cognises properly. The recipient may also understand this qualification more literally as the refusal to ride in a chariot and to fight.

The qualification of *prākṛta* (verse a) may also activate the general meaning of the word *prakṛti* as the manifest aspect of reality: then *prākṛta* would be someone who is enclosed within it. The next four qualifications (*stabdhahaḥ śaṭho naikṛtiko ‘lasaḥ*, verses a–b) activate the concept of a stubborn and lazy pupil who cheats his teacher and within these frames the relationship between Arjuna and Kṛṣṇa is conceived in the BhG. All these features belong to the features recognised as tamasic. The last two qualifications present the mental state of Arjuna in the beginning of the BhG: he is depressed and procrastinating (*viśādī dīrghasūtrī*, verse c).

Hence, the amalgamate agent loses not only his ability to think properly but his ability to act in a proper way. The category of action (*karman*), instead of being used by him, overpowers and shapes him. Like an addicted man he cannot refrain from actions which confirm his assumption about duality. And just as unhealthy living shapes the human face and the body, in the same way the category of action shapes the human organism.

The necessity of the application of the category of action has already been discussed in the analysis of cosmogony from the point of view of the highest cognitive agent. As far as the human perspective is concerned, this necessity is expressed in many places, usually in the context of rebirth:

### MDhP 168.37

*pūrvadehakṛtaṃ karma śubhaṃ vā yadi vāśubham |  
prājñāṃ mūḍhaṃ tathā śūraṃ bhajate yādrśaṃ kṛtam ||*

Action done in the previous body, good or bad, becomes part of the wise, the stupid and the hero accordingly to the way it has been done.<sup>32</sup>

It is important to note that the meaning of the Sanskrit noun *karman* encompasses the whole scenario of action together with its results and its influence on the agent. In various contexts one or other meaning is highlighted. This wide meaning is the result of its earlier use, as ritual action, that necessarily involves its result. The Buddha introduced its ethical and mental meaning (Gombrich 1996, 2009) and thus the semantic range of the word *karman*

<sup>32</sup> Jurewicz’s translation. See also e.g., MDhP 174.16, 287.28–29.

begins to include the meaning of moral responsibility too. This issue will be discussed more thoroughly in chapter 5.4. However, the concept of sacrifice remains in Smṛti thought, although reinterpreted. As we have seen, the sacrifice (*yajña*) is a category which expresses the self-cognitive activity of Brahma (see chapter 1.1.6, see also chapter 4.11.3). The influence of the category of action (*karman*) in its specific realisation of sacrifice on the cognising man is explicitly expressed in the BhG:

### BhG 9.25

*yānti devavratā devān pitṛn yānti pitṛvratāḥ |*  
*bhūtāni yānti bhūtejyā yānti madyājino 'pi mām ||*

To the Gods go they who are avowed to the Gods, to the ancestors go they who are avowed to the ancestors, to the ghouls<sup>33</sup> go they who are avowed to the ghouls, to me go they who sacrifice to me.

Thus, man ontologically becomes the object he has thought about and his actions he has been oriented towards. The cognitive faculties (reason, mind and senses) survive death and the amalgamate agent again builds up his body, composed of the results of his actions (*karman*) which confirm his ontological separateness from the cosmos. Viewed from the perspective of earlier thought, he creates his self (*ātman*) – a self that is reduced to a body that acts according to external stimuli. His self is immortal in that it constantly appears after its disappearance. The amalgamate agent also creates his own world (*loka*) that is his own space of experience separate from reality.

The ontological character of the self that is built in wrong cognition is expressed in the conceptualisation of the results of actions in terms of dirt. The experiential source domain used in this conceptualisation is the scenario of farming. Just as during ploughing man necessarily becomes dirty, in the same way man by his actions is visibly influenced by those actions. A man ploughs in order to sow plants and then, after some time, harvests their fruits to eat them. In the same way the results of actions can also appear later. As the form of an eater depends on what he eats, an agent assumes the form appropriate to his past deeds, either in the same life, or in the next one. The following stanza highlights the relationship between action and its result:

<sup>33</sup> Buitenen (1981: 166) adds the note: '[R]ites for gods and ancestors are orthodox, those for bhūtas are heterodox. Bhūtas are the ghosts of those deceased whose remains have not properly been disposed of by ceremonial cremation. One might in this context think of relic worship by the Buddhists.' A general meaning of living beings is also possible.

**MDhP 199.4**

*yena yena śarīreṇa yad yat karma karoty ayam |  
tena tena śarīreṇa tat tat phalam upāśnute ||*

Whatever action in whatever body one performs, he will get its fruit in this same body.<sup>34</sup>

A bit earlier the concept of dirt is used in an abstract way, as the feature of cognitive faculties of a wrong cognising agent:

**MDhP 197.4–5**

*abuddhir ajñānakṛtā abuddhyā duṣyate manaḥ |  
duṣṭasya manasaḥ pañca saṃpraduṣyanti mānasāḥ || (4)*

A lack of reason is caused by lack of knowledge. A lack of reason defiles the mind. When the mind is defiled its five senses are defiled.<sup>35</sup>

*ajñānatṛpto viṣayeṣv avagādho na dr̥śyate |  
adr̥ṣṭvaiva tu pūtātmā viṣayebhyo nivartate || (5)*

One who is satisfied by lack of knowledge merges into objects of senses and does not see. When he does not see, then the foul self comes back to the objects.<sup>36</sup>

The stages of the process of defilement of the cognitive faculties are the same as described above: lack of knowledge is conceived as defiling reason, reason defiles the mind, the mind defiles the five senses of reason (although here they are called the senses of the mind, 4). The next stanza (5) is very effectively composed because it expresses simultaneously two kind of cognitions, the wrong kind and the proper kind depending on the way the recipient understands the forms *pūta* and *nivartate* (verses c–d).

The translation of the stanza interprets the form *pūta* as coming from the verb *pūy-*. It not used in the early Smṛti texts<sup>37</sup> but it is used in BU 5.12.1 where it is stated that ‘food spoils in the absence of’<sup>38</sup> breath (*pūyati vā annam ṛte prāṇāt*). The concept of food (*anna*) metonymically evokes the concept of a dead body which may become food provided it is well cooked.<sup>39</sup> Within the frames of this interpretation, the compound *pūtātmā* activates this meaning, the noun *ātman* highlights its meaning as the body of a wrong cognising man (his cognition is conceived in terms of a lack of seeing) who

<sup>34</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

<sup>35</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

<sup>36</sup> Jurewicz’s translation. See also MDhP 285.32–34.

<sup>37</sup> According to DSC.

<sup>38</sup> Olivelle’s (1998) translation.

<sup>39</sup> RV 10.14.1 (Jurewicz 2010).

is reborn and thus comes back (*nivartate*) as an object of senses. His body is constantly dead and putrid in that even cremation fire cannot cleanse him as happens with those who cognise properly. The metaphor WRONG IS DIRT is elaborated: the source domain of dirt is specified as the dirt of a dead body. This elaboration allows for the expression of a very strong moral evaluation of wrong cognition. If the recipient highlights other meanings of the noun *ātman*, the self, he will see the grim results of wrong cognition which even affect the highest cognitive agent present in men (see below, section 3.3).

However, the participle *pūta* may mean ‘cleaned, purified, pure, clear, bright’ (as the past participle of *pū-*, ‘to make clean or clear or pure or bright.’) Then lack of seeing can be understood literally as the inability to see the objects. This causes the state of the self (*ātman*) conceived in terms of cleanness. Since the verb *ni vṛt-* also means ‘to turn away, retreat, flee, escape, abstain or desist from, get rid of’ when used with the noun in the Ablative, the meaning of verse d is that the self turns back from the objects and thus man becomes free. Taking into account the context of the previous stanza and verse a, it seems that the Composer creates a conceptual network the input spaces of which are these two meanings and, in the blend, the concept of proper cognition is seen as a potential and as expressing the possibility to escape the chain of objectification.

Since moral evil is conceived in terms of dirt, the objectified man is evaluated as morally corrupted. Viewed again from the perspective of the theory of conceptual blending, man is composed of many input spaces: an entity is a perceptible blend of its earlier lives each of which constitutes a separate input space. This blended form gives access to the input spaces and becomes the basis for moral evaluation.

The consistency of the Smṛti thought can be seen in that the ontological objectification of the amalgamate agent takes place within the cosmos seen as the object of cognition of reality. In the cosmogony of RV 10.129, the pre-creative form of the world is conceived in terms of darkness hiding the darkness. This image expresses the appearance of the outline of the future cosmos (conceived in terms of hidden darkness). From the point of view of reality in this moment and through following stages, until the manifestations of the highest cognitive agent appear within the manifest aspect, this aspect is the object of cognition.

The same is even more explicitly expressed in BU 1.4.10 where it is said that brahman which was alone, cognised itself (*ātmanam*) and thus became everything. Brahman is the name of all of reality, while its perceived aspect (*himself* perceived) is the object which is cognised. Then, within this object, the cognitive power (the highest cognitive power) appears which finally arranges the cosmic object. The particular objectified amalgamate agent will always

be reborn in the object, i.e., within the manifest aspect. Not only is he not mentally able to reach what is unmanifest, but also ontologically. In this way, his submission to the category of time is realised. He merges deeper into his objectiveness and loses more and more of his cognitive abilities in order to become an insignificant being like those who are described in CU 5.10.10. In this state, he not only unable to cognise his unmanifest self but is unable to cognise at all.

The perverse nature of wrong cognition can also be seen in that it is motivated by the desire for freedom which is the ultimate goal of liberating cognition. Man deprived of proper knowledge, under the influence of the I-form (*ahaṃkāra*), wants to become an independent agent capable of doing whatever he wishes. He treats himself as a separate agent whose freedom is unlimited and can be realised in his actions. Under the influence of the I-form man wants to realise the freedom of reality in its first act of creation. However, in the next act of creation reality manifests its freedom to be fully subject to its own rules and man should behave in the same way. Absolute freedom can be gained in liberating cognition, but, even then, man is not expected to realise it if he wants to manifest in the world. The negative examples of the wrong usage of freedom are the various asuras who threaten the cosmos and are killed by the gods (e.g., MDhP 335, see chapter 5.2.3).

\*

The process of objectification is the process during which man loses his human attributes i.e., his unique cognitive abilities and freedom. Because of the lack of proper knowledge, under the influence of the I-form (*ahaṃkāra*) man deprives himself of reason which enables man to decide properly and of the aspect the mind which is the manifestation of his freedom. Thus, he is not able to properly use categories and is unconsciously dependent of them due to cosmic necessity and the necessity which derives from his place in the social body of the highest cognitive agent. His cognitive faculties, obsessed with objects and entangled in their constant cognition and interaction with them, become objectified. Like the object they do not cognise what they should from the point of view of reality. The fewer human attributes he has, the less he can affect his life here and after death. He becomes enclosed in the object of cognition of reality i.e., in the manifest aspect.

### MODEL OF WRONG COGNITION OF MAN

the highest cognitive agent (*ātman*) = reason → mind → senses → body → cosmos



### 3.3. The results of objectification for reality

In MDhP 187.40, the self (*ātman*) is presented as being impossible to be perceived with the aid of classes (*guṇa*), but it sees them and thinks that it mingles with them (*paridraṣṭā guṇānām ca saṁsraṣṭā manyate sadā*). In this way the Composer expresses the fusion of the self with reason which is the basis for the amalgamate agent. So, the question appears what happens to the highest cognitive agent in this situation. Remind ourselves that the highest cognitive agent is the subjective manifestation of unmanifest reality in the cosmos, constantly aware of its unity. Its submission to the rules of subject-object cognition takes place according to its will and is overcome to confirm its identity with both aspects.

The highest cognitive agent bounded in a non-cognising object is not able to use its cognitive faculties in order to cognise itself. Objectified amalgamate agents are often called *anātman* ‘without self’ (*ātman*). It does not mean that they do not possess the self ontologically because the self is still present in them, but they think and behave as if they did not have it. From the point of view of the whole of reality, such men become a sign (*liṅga*) of duality between the subject and the object, a sign that leads to wrong cognition (for the meaning of *liṅga* in the early Smṛti texts, see below, section 3.4.1.b). Does this mean that unmanifest reality really loses its omniscience when it is enclosed in the amalgamate agent? Does this mean that it really loses its other attributes, like freedom and omnipresence? Does this mean that it feels unhappy?

The perennial question for early Indian philosophy, about what happens when the unmanifest becomes partly manifest, now appears on micro-level. As has been shown, the cosmogonies of the texts analysed in the present study describe creation as a process that goes smoothly, without moments which could be dangerous for reality which are so dramatically presented in the cosmogonies of the ŚB. In the ŚB, reality manifest in the cosmos as the highest cognitive agent, resigns from its attribute of immortality and dies in order to resurrect; its constant dyings and resurrections, conceived in terms of interaction between fire and oblation, constitute the existence of the cosmos.

In Smṛti thought, the situation of reality in the objectified subject, as analysed in the present study, can be interpreted as follows. One can accept that this situation is predicted by reality which is so free that it consciously resigns from its attributes of freedom and omniscience within human subjects. Resignation of its attributes would be the sign of its freedom. Alternatively, one can accept that this situation is not predicted by reality, it just happens

as the result of the freedom of man. This would also be an expression of its freedom. Free reality resigns from freedom in order to manifest as free within man only to repeat the act of resignation in microscale. When reality manifests in man, it actually does not know what will happen. Thus, both aspects of freedom are realised. Manifest in the cosmos, reality realises its freedom to subordinate itself to its own rules in a perfect and necessary way. Manifest in a human being, it realises its freedom to do whatever it wants. Its situation in a wrong cognising man can be presented as follows:

the highest cognitive agent (*ātman*) → reason → mind → senses → body → cosmos

It is suggested that the concept of a reality able to resign itself from its attributes, and even commit mistakes, is one of the reasons why the philosophers of the Darśanas postulated pluralistic assumptions. These allowed them to present in a clearer way the relationship between reality, the cosmos and the soul. However, the contradiction appears on other ontological levels.<sup>40</sup>

### 3.3.1. The embodied one (*dehin, śarīrin*)

The terms which mean the ‘the embodied one’ (*dehin, śarīrin*) are used in singular and plural forms in the texts analysed in this study. We will analyse their singular use as the plural use refers generally to sentient beings. The analysis will shed some light on the problem discussed above i.e., if the highest cognitive agent is influenced by the wrong cognition of man. It will also show the cognitive relationship between the highest cognitive agent and man seen as the relationship between a cognising subject and signs. Appearance of these concepts betrays a tendency to use a more analytical language to express various aspects of reality and the sphere between its two aspects, the unmanifest and manifest. We will refer to this as ‘the borderline sphere’ when discussing Vedic thought.

#### 3.3.1.a. The noun *dehin*

The word *dehin* denotes the highest cognitive agent in its unmanifest aspect, as eternal (BhG 2.30, MDhP 267.28).<sup>41</sup> Its presence in the body is seen in terms of the Atharvavedic metaphor of the stronghold (AVŚ 10.2.29–33 Jurewicz 2016/18). Within its frames, the embodied one is present in the

<sup>40</sup> I hope to discuss this issue in the next book.

<sup>41</sup> BhG 2.30ab: *dehī nityamavadhyo ‘yam dehe sarvasya bhārata*; MDhP 267.28cd: *teṣāṃ aṣṭādaśo dehī yaḥ śarīre sa śāśvataḥ*.

stronghold with nine doors in terms of which the apertures of the male body are conceived (BhG 5.13). Here the embodied one is presented as ‘neither doing nor causing acts.’<sup>42</sup>

BhG 2.22 presents the change of the bodies of the embodied one (*dehin*) in terms of changing old clothes and acquiring new ones. This metaphor is convincing because it is a clear scenario based in experience and because it also evokes, on the basis of metonymy, the concept of *guṇa* (which literally means ‘thread’, metonymy CLOTH FOR THREADS). Thus the recipient understands that the embodied one cyclically endows itself with the category of classes (conceived in terms of clothes on the basis of metonymy MATERIAL FOR OBJECT MADE OF IT) and then leaves them.<sup>43</sup> This is expressed in BhG 14.5 where the immutable embodied one is described as bounded by the classes (see chapter 2.1.2).<sup>44</sup> Thus, the Composer activates the idea of creation conceived as submission to cosmic categories though the recipient may also think about the highest cognitive agent present in man. The latter meaning would imply the influence of man’s cognition on the highest cognitive agent. The same double meaning is activated in BhG 3.40 where the embodied one is presented as being deluded by desire which uses reason, mind and the senses.<sup>45</sup> In BhG 2.59 and 14.20, the embodied one is presented as performing liberating cognition.<sup>46</sup> In two places, the word *dehin* is used in plural form (BhG 14.8, 17.2) and in this case it refers to the amalgamate agents.<sup>47</sup>

Connection of the embodied one with classes is also attested in the MDhP. In MDhP 205–206, the problem of the presence of the highest cognitive agent in human body is discussed, and the way it appears in it. In MDhP 205.28, the actions classified as rajasic, tamasic and sattvic are the cause of birth of the embodied ones (*dehinām*, in plural, which, as stated above, means sentient beings),<sup>48</sup> the same is repeated in MDhP 206.12–13 (analysed

<sup>42</sup> Buitenen’s translation. BhG 5.13cd: *navadvāre pure dehī naiva kurvanna kārayan*.

<sup>43</sup> BhG 2.22: *vāsāmsi jīrṇāni yathā vihāya; navāni gṛhṇāti naro ‘parāṇi | tathā śarīrāni vihāya jīrṇāny; anyāni saṃyāti navāni dehī ||*

<sup>44</sup> BhG 14.5cd: *nibadhnanti mahābāho dehe dehinam avyayam*; BhG 14.7cd: *tan nibadhnāti kaunteya karmasaṅgena dehinam*.

<sup>45</sup> BhG 3.40: *indriyāṇi mano buddhirasyādhiṣṭhānamucyate | etair vimohayaty eṣa jñānam āvṛtya dehinam ||*

<sup>46</sup> BhG 2.59cd: *viṣayā vinivartante nirāhārasya dehinah*; BhG 14.20ab: *guṇān etān atītya trīn dehī dehasamudbhavān*.

<sup>47</sup> BhG 14. 8ab: *tamastvajñānaṃ viddhi mohanaṃ sarvadehinām*; BhG 17.2ab: *trividhā bhavati śraddhā dehinām sā svabhāvajā*.

<sup>48</sup> MDhP 205.28: *rājasam tāmasam caiva śuddhātmākarmasaṃbhavam | tat sarvaṃ dehinām bījaṃ sarvaṃ ātmavataḥ samam ||*

below, see section 3.6.2.c).<sup>49</sup> Then, in MDhP 205.33 the word *dehin* is used in singular and the embodied one is described as using the *sattva* class.<sup>50</sup> In MDhP 206, the Composer describes the rebirth of the embodied one and the role of classes in this process:

### MDhP 206.13–14ab

*karmaṇā kālayuktena saṃsāraparivartakam |*  
*ramaty ayaṃ yathā svapne manasā dehavān iva || (13)*  
*karmagarbhair guṇair dehī garbhe tad upapadyate | (14)*

Because of action yoked by time, the embodied one finds pleasure with his mind in that which causes the co-flowing, as if in a dream, as if it possessed body. Because of the classes which are the wombs of action it finds itself in the womb.<sup>51</sup>

In MDhP 206.13a it is stated that actions are submitted to the category of time. Their submission is conceived in terms of their yoking. The embodied one seems to be submitting to this category too. It takes pleasure in its subject-object cognition in the cosmos and its cognition is conceived in terms of a dream (as in BU 2.1.18, 4.3. Jurewicz 2016/18, MDhP 206.13d–141b). The compound *karmagarbha* (MDhP 206.14c) can be interpreted in two ways: classes are either the ‘wombs of action’ or they are ‘those for whom action is the womb’. In the first case, the classes are reasons for action, in the second, they are the result of actions. It seems that the intention of the Composer is to activate both meanings in the minds of his recipients. Thanks to this blend, they will understand the mutual connection between categorisation and acting which causes the rebirth of the embodied one.

In the next stanzas (MDhP 206.14–20), its rebirth is described as caused by desire to experience the objects of senses.<sup>52</sup> At the end of description the Composer states that the embodied one (*dehin*), when it is without desire towards objects of senses and knows its cognitive actions, is not then reborn.<sup>53</sup>

In MDhP 209, the Composer explains why dreams are dangerous for a someone who wants to practice celibacy (*brahmacarya*).<sup>54</sup> He again links

<sup>49</sup> MDhP 206.12: *rajas tamasi paryastaṃ sattvaṃ tamasi saṃsthitam | jñānādhiṣṭhānam ajñānaṃ buddhyahaṃkāralakṣaṇam ||* MDhP 206.13ab: *tad bījaṃ dehīnām āhus tad bījaṃ jīvasaṃjñītam.*

<sup>50</sup> MDhP 205.33: *sattvastaḥ sātvikān bhāvān śuddhān paśyati saṃśritāḥ | sa dehī vimalaḥ śrīmān śuddho vidyāsamanvitaḥ ||*

<sup>51</sup> Jurewicz’s translation. For the earlier part of this chapter, see below, section 3.6.2.c.

<sup>52</sup> MDhP 12,206.13cd: *karmaṇā kālayuktena saṃsāraparivartakam; MDhP 206.14: ramaty ayaṃ yathā svapne manasā dehavān iva | karmagarbhair guṇair dehī garbhe tad upapadyate ||*

<sup>53</sup> MDhP 206.21: *jñānendriyāṇīndriyārthān nopasarpanty atarṣulam | jñātaiś ca kāraṇair dehī na dehaṃ punar arhati ||*

<sup>54</sup> For stanzas 12–20 see chapter 4.9.4.

the embodied one (*dehin*) with the classes and states that the embodied one is overwhelmed by the classes of *rajas* and *tamas*. This means that it is impossible for it to use the *sattva* class which would direct its thoughts towards the objects that would lead to freedom (see chapter 4.9.3).<sup>55</sup> In a dream, the states of mind (*bhāva*) are the same as during waking states and the embodied one, although its senses are suspended, acts as if it possessed the body (MDhP 209.4).<sup>56</sup> Thus it seems that the Composer allows some influence of the state of human mind over the highest cognitive agent. The nature of sleep and dreaming is further discussed: it is caused by the fatigue of the senses when the mind is still active (MDhP 209.6) and man sees in dream whatever he has experienced in the waking state (MDhP 209.7). Then it is stated:

### MDhP 209.8

*saṃsārāṇām asaṃkhyānām kāmātmā tad avāpnuyāt |  
manasy antarhitam sarvaṃ veda sottamapūruṣaḥ ||*

The person obsessed by sensual pleasure might realise these fancies (created by the mind in dream), after being reborn countless times; the supreme spirit knows all this that is hidden within the mind.

Wynne takes *kamātman* (verse b) and *uttamapūruṣa* (verse d) as referring to different concepts. However, it is possible that they both refer to the highest cognitive agent. Enclosed in the amalgamate agent, it is influenced by the dreams of man and becomes filled with desire for objects. Although it knows everything the mind creates, it cannot use it because it has no cognitive contact with the subject-object activity of the amalgamate agent and is incapacitated.<sup>57</sup> The noun *dehin* appears once again in this chapter to denote the agent of the liberating dream (MDhP 209.12, see chapter 4.9.3).

The word *dehin* also appears at the end of the discussion about the cognitive difference between the highest cognitive agent (conceived in terms of man, *puruṣa*) and the cosmos (called unmanifest, *avyakta*).<sup>58</sup> They become fused

<sup>55</sup> MDhP 209.1cd: *nidrā sarvātmanā tyājyā svapnadoṣān avekṣatā*; MDhP 209.2ab: *svapne hi rajasā dehī tamasā cābhibhūyate*.

<sup>56</sup> MDhP 209.4: *atrāha ko nv ayam bhāvaḥ svapne viṣayavān iva | pralīnair indriyair dehī variate dehavān iva ||* See also MDhP 267.24: *indriyāṇām vyuparame mano 'nuparatam yadi | sevate viṣayān eva tad vidyāt svapnadarśanam ||*

<sup>57</sup> The way the cognitive activity of *dehin* is conceived here is similar to that presented in BU 4.3.14ff. (Jurewicz 2016/18). In BU, the highest cognitive agent in all its manifestations is called *ātman*. The Composers of the early Smṛti thought are more analytical in their terminology.

<sup>58</sup> In the early Smṛti texts, the term *avyakta* is used in reference to the unmanifest aspect of reality and to its manifest aspect (cosmos), especially in its pre-creative state: when it is already outlined but not fully manifest. This state of the cosmos is conceived in RV 10.129

by the category of action (*karman*, in the cosmogonies qualified as *rajas*), then the highest cognitive agent can talk about its ostensible self with use of the pronouns ‘I’ and ‘he’ and as ‘that one’ which cannot be seen. The Composer describes this cognitive fusion in the following way:

### MDhP 210.12

*uṣṇīṣavān yathā vastrais tribhir bhavati saṃvṛtaḥ |*  
*saṃvṛto 'yaṃ tathā dehī sattvarājasatāmasaiḥ ||*

Just as a man wearing a turban swathes himself in three cloths, so too is the embodied one<sup>59</sup> enveloped by classes of sattva, rajas and tamas.<sup>60</sup>

The three classes are conceived in terms of the three cloths of a turban. This conceptualisation is grounded in the literal meaning of the word *guṇa*, thread, and its metonymic extension (THREAD FOR CLOTH). The same metonymic extension can be activated in the description of the embodied one presented as changing clothes in BhG 2.22 (see above). Conceptualisation of the embodied one in terms of a man who wears clothes allows the recipient to understand it in terms of men in public spaces where their social personality is expressed which is accepted by others. In this space the concepts of ‘I’ and ‘he’ refer more to their social role than to their personality. The whole context of the stanza, however, implies that the highest cognitive agent forgets about its unmanifest aspect which, within the frames of this conceptualisation, is conceived in terms of being at home.<sup>61</sup>

A little bit later (210.20–21), the noun *dehin* denotes the part of man which survives death and with aid of the wind leaves his body and becomes like a sound.<sup>62</sup> In MDhP 227.31, the embodied one is presented as being born and dying because of the stupidity of men whose thoughts and activities are not compatible.<sup>63</sup> In the following stanzas, the embodied one is presented as transmigrating:

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in terms of darkness hidden by darkness (*tāma āsīt tāmasā gūḥām āgre*). The term *avyakta* will be discussed in a forthcoming book.

<sup>59</sup> Wynne (2009: 373): ‘soul.’

<sup>60</sup> Wynne (2009: 373): ‘states of purity, passion and darkness.’

<sup>61</sup> Transmigration of the embodied one is also conceived in terms of changing homes (MDhP 267.33: *hitvā hitvā hy ayaṃ praiti dehād dehaṃ kṛtāśrayaḥ | kālasaṃcoditaḥ kṣetrī viśīrṇād vā grhād grham*).

<sup>62</sup> MDhP 210: *antakāle vayotkarṣāc chanaiḥ kuryād anāturaḥ evaṃ yuktena manasā jñānaṃ tad upapadyate || (20) rajasā cāpy ayaṃ dehī dehavāñ śabdavac caret | kāryair avyāhatamatir vairāgyāt prakṛtau sthītaḥ || (21)*

<sup>63</sup> MDhP 227.31: *dharmāṃ karomīti karoty adharmam; adharmakāmas ca karoti dharmam | ubhe bālaḥ karmaṇī na prajānan; sa jāyate mriyate cāpi dehī ||* This stanza is discussed in chapter 2.8.

**MDhP 270.8–10**

*īśo 'yaṃ satataṃ dehī nṛpate puṇyapāpayoh |  
tata eva samutthena tamasā rudhyate 'pi ca || (8)*

The embodied one, the eternal king, o lord, over good and bad is veiled by tamas which rises up.<sup>64</sup>

*yathāñjanamayo vāyuh punar mānaḥśilaṃ rajah |  
anupraviśya tadvarṇo dṛśyate rañjayan diśah || (9)*

And then, like wind, which is full of red dust and enters space, then assumes that colour, is visible and glows red,<sup>65</sup>

*tathā karmaphalair dehī rañjitas tamasāvṛtaḥ |  
vivarṇo varṇam āśṛitya deheṣu parivartate || (10)*

in the same way, the embodied one, without colour, reddened by the results of actions, veiled by tamas, assumes colour and circulates in bodies.<sup>66</sup>

The Composer creates a conceptual network which consists of the following input spaces. The first one is the abstract concept of rebirth. The second is the highest cognitive agent in its cosmic subject-object activity. The third is the concept of the cosmos conceived as a manifestation of cognition with the use of the three classes. The fourth is a wrong cognising human being. The fifth is the wind which assumes the color of the dust it raises. The generic space is transformation. In the blend, the double meanings of the nouns *tamas* and *rajas* clip together the contents of the input spaces. In 8a–b, the Composer presents the image of the highest cognitive agent with full agency over cognition and its moral results, conceived in terms of a king (*īśa*). In 8cd, it is presented as being veiled by tamas. The recipient conceives the influence of wrong cognition on the highest cognitive agent, with the use of the class of tamas in terms of it disappearing from sight due to an obstacle. In 9a, the concept of the wind which is already darkened by a dark dust is introduced (*yathāñjanamayo vāyuh*). In these terms the highest cognitive agent is reduced to what can be cognised by the class of tamas, literally darkness. In 9b–d, the dark wind is presented as entering a reddish space and assuming that colour. The reddish colour of space is caused by the reddish colour of the earth which is raised, most probably, by horses' hooves. Then the wind itself become reddish and makes the space red. In these terms, the highest cognitive agent is conceived as 'reddened by the results of actions, veiled by tamas' when it is reborn in bodies (10ab). Notice how

<sup>64</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

<sup>65</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

<sup>66</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

precisely the experiential concept is elaborated in order to conceive the abstract process in the blend. The concept of reddening dust (*mānaḥśila*) and the verb *rañj-* (9b, d) activate the concept of the class of rajas. The highest cognitive agent, reduced to ability to use the class of tamas, is conceived in terms of the wind coloured by dark pigment. When it begins to covet the objects, so using the class of rajas, it is conceived in terms of a wind coloured by red dust. Moreover, the input space of the wind assuming colour agrees with the general conceptualisation of wrong cognition and action in terms of being sullied. In this state the real nature of the highest cognitive agent is hidden in the same way as the real nature of the wind, which is without colour, is hidden when it is coloured by dust.<sup>67</sup> Stanzas 8 and 10d express the clash between the two situations of the highest cognitive agent: it is conceived in terms of a king, but it circulates in bodies, so is deprived of power.

On the other hand, in MDhP 243.9, 267.37 the embodied one is described getting free (as going to heaven/uniting with brahman).<sup>68</sup>

Most plural usages of the word *dehin* are in the last position, either of the hemistich or of the whole stanza in the MDhP and MS, and in such a case it means sentient beings.

### 3.3.1.b. The noun *śarīrin*

The noun *śarīrin* is used in the same plural form, position and meaning as the noun *śarīrin* almost everywhere in the BhG, MDhP and MS, except for some exceptions in the MDhP and one in BhG. In the MDhP, they mostly occur in the teaching of Manu to Bṛhaspati.<sup>69</sup> The context is the issue of the presence of the highest cognitive agent in men (called *śarīrin*) and the way it changes the body (194.9).<sup>70</sup> In MDhP 195.15, it is explained in the following way:

<sup>67</sup> This clear experiential domain can be helpful in translation of the classes of tamas and rajas i.e., as the class of darkness and class of space. Such a translation does not imply any moral evaluation and expresses the basic logic of the source domain incorporated to the target domain: darkness renders impossible subject-object cognition, space can be transparent or coloured depending on wind as emotions can lead to freedom or to bondage.

<sup>68</sup> MDhP 243.9: *āpūryamāṇam acalapratiṣṭham; samudram āpaḥ praviśanti yadvat || sa kāmākānto na tu kāmākāmah; sa vai lokāt svargam upaiti dehī ||*, MDhP 267.37: *puṇyapāpamayaṃ dehaṃ kṣapayan karmasaṃcayāt | kṣīṇadehaḥ punar dehī brahmatvam upagacchati ||*

<sup>69</sup> *Manubrhaspatisaṃvāda* (194–199). For an analysis of this whole teaching, see Fitzgerald (2017a) who focuses on the semantics of *buddhi*. For an analysis of MDhP 195.23 and the metaphor of the circle of fire (*alātacakra*) activated here according to Arjunamiśra, see Fitzgerald's fascinating paper (2012a).

<sup>70</sup> MDhP 194.9: *sa me bhavāñ śaṃsatu sarvam etaj; jñāne phalaṃ karmaṇi vā yad asti | yathā ca dehāc cyavate śarīrī; punaḥ śarīraṃ ca yathābhyupaiti ||*



**MDhP 195.15**

*utpattivṛddhikṣayasamnipātair; na yujyate 'sau paramaḥ śarīrī |  
anena liṅgena tu liṅgam anyad gacchaty adr̥ṣṭaḥ pratisam̐dhivyogāt ||*

The highest embodied one does not unite with birth, growth, old age and death. Invisible it goes with aid of this sign to another because of the power of reunion.<sup>71</sup>

Verses a–b state that the embodied one is not influenced by transformations of the manifest aspect. Verses c–d, however, imply its dependence on the results of the actions of the man in whom it is present. The necessity of categories used in wrong cognition is metonymically activated by the compound *pratisam̐dhivyoga*, ‘the power of reunion’. From the point of view of a wrong cognising man, reunion is with his self in a new body. It can be seen as a perverted form of the reunion with one’s own self in self-cognition that takes place in the cosmos. Thus, the embodied is conceived in a similarly ambivalent way as in the stanzas which use the noun *dehin*. The noun *liṅga* in the contexts of the early Smṛti texts highlights its literal meaning i.e., the sign through which the highest cognitive agent cognises itself. This sign is the human cognitive organism.<sup>72</sup> This should enable its cognition in microscale but wrong cognition makes that impossible. One can also presume that, in cosmic scale, various bodies of beings even those which cognise wrongly, are signs through which the highest cognitive agent cognises its countless manifestations.

The Composer begins the next chapter (MDhP 196) in the following way:

**MDhP 196.1–2**

*yad indriyais tūpakṛtān purastāt; prāptān guṇān saṁsamarate cirāya |  
indriyeṣūpahateṣu paścāt; sa buddhirūpaḥ paramaḥ svabhāvaḥ || (1)*

When one remembers for a longer time the classes one has used earlier which are provided to him by the senses, and then weakens their activity, then his highest own state assumes the form of reason.<sup>73</sup>

<sup>71</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

<sup>72</sup> This meaning is clear in MDhP 195.14: *yathātmāno 'ṅgaṁ patitaṁ pṛthivyām; svapnāntare paśyati cātmano 'nyat | śrotṛādiyuktaḥ sumanāḥ subuddhir; liṅgāt tathā gacchati liṅgam anyat ||* As in a dream one sees his own sign (body) lying on the ground as different from himself, in the same way the embodied one goes from one sign (body) to another endowed with hearing etc., with good mind and good reason (Jurewicz’s translation).

<sup>73</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

*yathendriyārthān yugapat samastān nāvekṣate kṛtsnam atulyakālam |  
yathābalaṃ saṃcarate sa vidvāms tasmāt sa ekaḥ paramaḥ śarīrī || (2)*

One becomes wise when one does not perceive all the objects of senses as a whole, but separately, as they appear, and according to his power roams around, then the highest embodied one becomes one.<sup>74</sup>

This translation is only tentative, but it seems that the stanzas describe the stages of liberating cognition. In the first stage (1ab) one is able to control mental subject-object activity performed with the aid of the classes. The concept of control activated *via* the concept of memory (*saṃsmarate*, 1b) can last for a long time. In the second stage, sensual activity is restrained and the highest own state (*svabhāva*) of man assumes the form of reason (1cd). It is proposed to understand the term *svabhāva* as the necessity with which categories apply (see chapter 2.1.5), so we can assume that in the state described by the Composer, man's reason becomes the embodiment of this necessity to which he freely submits.

In the second stanza, further stages of liberating cognition are presented. Man is able to decompress everyday subject-object cognition and see its complex nature (2ab). The image of roaming (2c) is used to conceive a mental state during which one freely cognises without being dependent on the objects of his cognition. In this state, man realises the unity of reality and his identity with the highest cognitive agent called here the embodied one (*śarīrin*, 2d).

The next stanza describes the cognitive agent returning towards subject-object from the perspective of the highest cognitive agent:

### MDhP 196.3

*rajas tamaḥ sattvam atho tṛtīyaṃ gacchaty asau jñānaguṇān virūpān |  
tathendriyāṇy āviśate śarīrī hutāśanaṃ vāyur ivendhanastham ||*

The embodied one moves towards various classes of cognition, rajas, tamas and sattva as the third. It enters the senses in the same way as the wind enters fire that is present in its kindling sticks.<sup>75</sup>

The sequence of the classes enumerated in verse a, reflects the first creative cognition. First the cognitive movement categorised as rajas takes place, then the object created is categorised as tamas and then subjective activity becomes active categorised as sattva. This allows the embodied one to begin sensual cognition from the point of view of a man in whom its presence is realised. Sensual activity is conceived in terms of entering (image schema of CONTAINER)

<sup>74</sup> Jurewicz's translation. For analysis of these stanzas, see also Fitzgerald (2017a).

<sup>75</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

and the embodied one is again conceived in terms of wind (MDhP 270.8–10, see section 3.4.1.a) which now is conceived as entering the kindle sticks where fire is hidden. Its presence makes fire appear. The logic of the source domain makes the recipient think about the body of man in terms of kindling sticks and his cognitive activity in terms of fire animated by the wind (or breath).<sup>76</sup>

In the next two stanzas (4–5), the Composer states that the highest cognitive agent cannot be cognised with the senses, but it cognises everything.<sup>77</sup>

Then the Composer evokes various examples of invisible things which exist (the northern side of Himalayas, the hare in the moon) and discusses the nature of liberating cognition. In MDhP 15–16, he comes back to the problem of the invisibility of the highest cognitive agent and elaborates the concept of the moon which waxes to its full and then wanes to completely disappear for one night (MDhP 196.15–16). With the use of this source domain, he explains how the embodied one (*śarīrin*) acquires its sign (*liṅga*) which is the body thanks to which it is perceptible and how, when it leaves the body, it becomes impossible to perceive:

### MDhP 196.15–17

*yathā candro hy amāvāsyām alingatvān na dṛśyate |  
na ca nāśo 'sya bhavati tathā viddhi śarīriṇam || (15)*

The new moon cannot be seen because it lacks a characteristic sign, but it does not fail to exist. You should understand the embodied soul in just the same way.

*kṣiṇakośo hy amāvāsyām candramā na prakāśate |  
tadvan mūrtiviyuktaḥ sañ śarīrī nopalabhyate || (16)*

When its veil has disappeared, the new moon does not shine forth, just as the embodied one<sup>78</sup> cannot be perceived when it is just released from the body.

*yathā kośāntaram praṇīya candramā bhrājate punaḥ |  
tadval liṅgāntaram praṇīya śarīrī bhrājate punaḥ || (17)*

The moon shines forth once more when it arrives at a different phase in its cycle of appearance, just as the embodied one<sup>79</sup> becomes visible again when it enters a new body.<sup>80</sup>

<sup>76</sup> Conceptualisation of the highest cognitive agent (as the embodied one) in terms of wind is also attested in MDhP 210.20–21.

<sup>77</sup> MDhP 196: *na cakṣuṣā paśyati rūpam ātmano; na paśyati sparśam indriyendriyam | na śrotraliṅgam śravaṇe nidarśanam; tathāgataṃ paśyati tad vinaśyati || (4) śrotrādīni na paśyanti svam svam ātmānam ātmānā | sarvajñāḥ sarvadarśī ca kṣetrjñāḥ tāni paśyati || (5)*

<sup>78</sup> Wynne (2009: 269): 'the soul.'

<sup>79</sup> Wynne (2009: 270): 'the soul.'

<sup>80</sup> The metaphor 'the embodied one is a moon' is further elaborated in MDhP 196.18–22.

In the same way as we know that the moon exists even when we do not see it, we know that the highest cognitive agent exists. It is called the embodied one (*śarīrin*) in order to highlight its presence in the body which is called the sign (*liṅga*) of its presence. It is worth noting the same fact (although without the use of the noun *liṅga* and with a different source domain) is expressed in MDhP 270.8–10 (see section 3.4.1.a).

In MDhP 286.16, the Composer states that when the embodied one (*śarīrin*) leaves the body it cannot move and cognise.<sup>81</sup> BhG 2.18 highlights the finiteness of the bodies of the eternal embodied one.<sup>82</sup>

\*

One can argue that the nouns *śarīrin* and *dehin* are used when the Composers want to highlight and explain the relationship between the highest cognitive agent and its bodily appearance and disappearance. This relationship is seen as cognitive: the human organism is called *liṅga*, a sign of the presence of the highest cognitive agents in men, but more importantly, as a sign which can be used by the highest cognitive agent in his subject-object cognition. The use of the noun *dehin* implies the influence of human cognition and action on the situation of the highest cognitive agent enclosed within wrong cognising men. The noun *śarīrin* is mostly used to denote the highest cognitive agent present in man and cognitively active. The use of cognitive linguistics tools demonstrates that, even when the verbal description is different, there is clear consistency in the conceptualisation of the revealing of the embodied one.

### 3.3.2. The concept of life (*jīva*)

The noun *jīva* is the next word which betrays the tendency to find a more analytical apparatus to describe various aspects of the manifestation of one reality and the sphere between what is manifest and unmanifest. Its full cognitive analysis needs a separate study, so what is proposed here is a tentative interpretation.

Its most literal meaning is ‘alive, living, life’.<sup>83</sup> In the Veda it is rarely used, though the cosmogony of the CU 6.3.2–3 is worth mentioning. It qualifies the

<sup>81</sup> MDhP 286.16: *śarīriṇā parityaktaṃ niśceṣṭaṃ gatacetanam | bhūtaiḥ prakṛtim āpannais tato bhūmau nimajjati ||*

<sup>82</sup> BhG 2.18ab: *antavanta ime dehā nityasyoktāḥ śarīriṇaḥ.*

<sup>83</sup> CU 6.3.11, 6.11.2–3, 8.3.2, MDhP 168.38, 254.41, 277.23.

self (*ātman*) of reality (called *sat*): reality pervades its manifestations with its living self (*jīvena ātmana*) and divides them with use of names and forms. Thus, generally speaking, reality (*sat*) is divided into itself which is living with names and forms (manifest aspect) and itself which is not divided in this way and not living (unmanifest aspect). In this way, the cosmos is conceived in the BU 1.4.3 where it is called the self (*ātman*) and identified with breath, *prāṇa* (Jurewicz 2016/18).

In the early Smṛti texts the word *jīva* is used in singular and plural forms. In the plural form it denotes living beings (as opposed to dead). We will briefly look at its singular use. In the texts analysed by this study this noun probably means ‘life’. It is suggested that in early Indian philosophy the concept of life was motivated by the monistic assumption and a concept of afterlife which included incarnation. In Vedic thought, the opposition between aspects of reality is seen as the opposition between non-breathing and breathing (already in RV 10.129). The concept of ‘non-breathing’ evokes the concept the dead but it also evokes the concept of something which is not alive and never will be. Something which is alive can die but it will be born again just as Prajāpati dies and resurrects in the cosmos. This basic division into two aspects of reality, together with the conceptualisation of the cosmos as a living entity<sup>84</sup> is inherited by the early Smṛti Composers. Moreover, they might have needed an explanation as to how the results of actions influence the agent and the concept of life as continuing throughout all incarnations of a particular amalgamate agent. Life which survives death, could give such explanation. Life, seen as a part of man which survives death because it constitutes the cosmos as a whole and is profiled in a particular amalgamate agent according to his cognition, could be seen as the link between his subsequent births. The highest cognitive agent could not be such a link, because, even if it were somehow submitted to man’s wrong cognition, is the same in all men. Such understanding of the word *jīva* could motivate its later meaning i.e., ‘the individual soul’.

### 3.3.2.a. The description of life (*jīva*) in MDhP 180 (Bṛṅgu and Bharadvāja)

The concept of life (*jīva*) is discussed in MDhP 180. In the beginning of his exposition, the Composer presents life (*jīva*) as the element of man which survives death:

<sup>84</sup> Already in the RV, cosmos is living fire (Jurewicz 2010).

**MDhP 180.1**

*na praṇāśo 'sti jīvānāṃ dattasya ca kṛtasya ca |  
yāti dehāntaraṃ prāṇī śarīraṃ tu viśīryate ||*

There is no loss of lives, no loss of what has been given and done. The breathing one acquires the end of his body, but it is body which is destroyed.<sup>85</sup>

Verses a–b, present a general statement according which the lives of men, together with the actions they had performed during their life, never disappear. The literal meaning of the phrase *yāti dehāntaraṃ prāṇī* (verse c ‘the breathing one enters the end of his body’) highlights the conceptualisation of death in terms of entering a container (image schema of CONTAINER) which, in the RV, is conceived in terms of a mountain (RV 10.14–2, Jurewicz 2010).

**MDhP 180.2**

*na śarīrāśrito jīvas tasmin naṣṭe praṇāśyati |  
yathā samitsu dagdhāsu na praṇāśyati pāvakah ||*

When the body is destroyed, the life which is in it does not perish in the same way as fire does not perish when logs are extinguished.<sup>86</sup>

The relationship of life (*jīva*) with the body is seen in terms of the relationship with fire and its fuel. Life (*jīva*) survives death and becomes invisible just as fire is invisible when it is hidden in wood. It should be noted that the same idea about life surviving death appears already in RV 1.164.30 where it is presented as moving according to its will (*jīvo mṛtāsya carati svadhābhis*). It is also worth remembering that the source domain of fire present in kindling sticks is used in MDhP 196.3 where the embodied one is conceived in terms of the wind which kindles fire which is the source domain for cognition. Here, life (*jīva*) is conceived in terms of fire. It may be speculated that this semantically blended target domain (cognition and life) is caused by the experience of recitation, because the concept of life activates the concept of breathing which is inseparably connected with recitation and recitation brings cognition.

Bharadvāja is not convinced by the arguments of Bhṛgu. He elaborates the source domain: for him, when fire is extinguished, the only conclusion is that it has disappeared because there are no means for its knowledge/cognition (*pramāṇa*) nor a place for the extinguished fire (MDhP 180.3–4).

<sup>85</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

<sup>86</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

Bṛghu explains that extinguished fire is invisible because it merges into space (*ākāśa*), it is without any support and because of that it is difficult to cognise (*durgraha*, COGNITION IS GRASPING (MDhP 180.5). The same happens with life (*jīva*):

### MDhP 180.6

*tathā śarīrasamtyāge jīvo hy ākāśavat sthitaḥ |  
grhyate susūkṣmatvād yathā jyotir na saṁśayah ||*

In the same way, when the body is abandoned, life is still present just like space. It cannot be grasped because of its intangibility similar to light. There is no doubt about it.<sup>87</sup>

Then it is stated:

### MDhP 180.7

*prāṇān dhārayate hy agniḥ sa jīva upadhāryatām |  
vāyusamdhāraṇo hy agnir naśyaty ucchvāsanimrahāt ||*

After all, fire sustains breaths. It should be known as the living one. And consider fire is sustained by the wind and perishes when breath is held back.<sup>88</sup>

In verse a, it is stated that fire sustains breaths. The conceptualisation of breath in terms of fire goes back to the RV (Jurewicz 2010) and is then elaborated in the cosmogonies of the ŚB (Jurewicz 2016/18). In verse b fire is identified with life (*jīva*). The experiential basis of this identification is the fact that a dead body is cold, contrary to a living body. The life-giving ability to digest has been seen in terms of fire burning in man and it is possible that the Composer of MDhP refers to this when he states that fire sustains breaths. However, the concept of breath also activates the concept of recitation and the Composer may refer to this experience too, because breath and speech are conceived in terms of fire.

In verse c, the Composer further elaborates the domain: fire is extinguished when the wind quietens down. This expression is based on the experience of kindling fire and its establishment with the aid of breath and of conflagration which is spread by wind (already in the RV, Jurewicz 2010). In the same way, fire in the body is extinguished when a living creature stops breathing. This would imply that the life (*jīva*) disappears. However, the recipient, having in mind the metaphor LIFE IS FIRE with the assumption that fire is invisibly

<sup>87</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

<sup>88</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

present in its fuel, is expected to understand that life does not disappear, but becomes invisible.

Then the Composer presents what happens to life (*jīva*) when breath is stopped. The unique cosmogony proposed by Bhṛgu in MDhP 176 (see chapter 1.2.1.b) has already been presented as has the specific conceptualisation of the great beings (*mahābhūta*). As we remember creation is conceived as the transformation of fire which is a form of space, water and wind. It has also been argued that the intention of the Composer is to see creation as the perceptible manifestation of recitation.

Now this specific way of understanding the great beings is the basis for explanation of life (*jīva*) after breaths are stopped:

### MDhP 180.8

*tasmin naṣṭe śarīrāgnau śarīraṃ tad acetanam |  
patitaṃ yāti bhūmitvam ayanam tasya hi kṣitih ||*

When the fire of the body disappears, the body loses consciousness, falls and becomes the earth. After all, this is its path and abode.<sup>89</sup>

Conceived in terms of fire of the body, life (*jīva*) is seen as the source of consciousness (verses a–b). It also enables a person to maintain a standing position: when consciousness disappears, man falls down (verse c). It should be noted that in this way the Composer again activates tradition: in the cosmogonies of the ŚB, Prajāpati falls down and dies (Jurewicz 2016/18). Then he is put into fire which enables him to stand upright. Here, the body becomes one with the earth.

### MDhP 180.9

*jaṅgamānām hi sarveṣāṃ sthāvarāṇām tathaiva ca |  
ākāśaṃ pavano 'bhyeti jyotis tam anugacchati |  
tatra trayāṇām ekatvaṃ dvayaṃ bhūmau pratiṣṭhitam ||*

The wind of all mobile and immobile creatures falls into space, light falls into the wind. This is the unity of these three. The pair finds its support in earth.<sup>90</sup>

The sequence of the process presented in verses a–d reverses the sequence of creation in (MDhP 176) and the recipient understands that Bhṛgu is describing what happens to life (*jīva*) which has survived the death of the body: it unites with the wind which, in turn, unites with space. This is their unity (verse e).

<sup>89</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

<sup>90</sup> Jurewicz's translation.



The pair (*dvayam*, verse f) are water and earth which are presented as finding support in the earth which might activate MDhP 176.15 where fire assumes the form of rain which falls on the earth (see chapter 1.2.1.b). In this way, the Composer implies that life (*jīva*) will return to the earth in the form of rain which is the belief attested already in RV 10.16.5 (Jurewicz 2010) and in the model of Five Fires in the CU and the BU (Jurewicz 2016/18).

### MDhP 180.10

*yatra khaṃ tatra pavanas tatrāgnir yatra mārutaḥ |  
amūrtayas te vijñeyā āpo mūrtās tathā kṣitih ||*

When space is, there is the wind, where there is the wind, there is fire. They should be known as imperceptible; water and the earth are embodied.<sup>91</sup>

While space, wind and fire are without perceptible form (*amūrti*), water and earth possess it. As we remember according to the cosmogony presented in MDhP 176, the earth is conceived in terms of congealed (*mūrta*) fire and water, as will be stated again in stanza 22 and is the perceptible form (*mūrti*) of all beings.

Bharadvāja remains with his understanding of fire as disappearing when extinguished and concludes that life (*jīva*) does not exist after death (11–18). He asks about its sign (*lakṣaṇa*, 11) and about the conscious element in the body which cognises and feels emotions like unhappiness, desire and hatred. Bhṛgu answers that it is the inner self (*antarātman*, 19–20).<sup>92</sup> When the fire of the body is extinguished, the body is destroyed (21).<sup>93</sup>

A bit later he describes the structure of the world:

### MDhP 180.22

*ammayam sarvam evedam āpo mūrtilḥ śarīriṇām |  
tatrātmā mānaso brahmā sarvabhūteṣu lokakṛt ||*

This whole world consists of water; water is the form of all embodied creatures. Within it is found the self which is the mental Brahma,<sup>94</sup> the world creator hidden in all beings.

<sup>91</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

<sup>92</sup> MDhP 180: *na pañcasādhāraṇam atra kiṃ cic; charīram eko vahate 'ntarātmā | sa vetti gandhāms ca rasāñ śrutim ca; sparśam ca rūpaṃ ca guṇās ca ye 'nye || (19) pañcātmake pañcaguṇapadarśī; sa sarvagātrānugato 'ntarātmā | sa vetti duḥkhāni sukhāni cātra; tadviprayogāt tu na vetti dehaḥ || (20).*

<sup>93</sup> MDhP 180.21: *yadā na rūpaṃ na sparśo noṣmabhāvas ca pāvake | tadā śānte śarīrāgnau dehaṃ tyaktvā sa naśyati ||*

<sup>94</sup> Wynne (2009: 125): 'pure consciousness identical to brahman.'

The cosmos is presented as composed of water (verse a). It is possible that in this way the Composer implicitly identifies water with life (*jīva*) because water is universally seen as the source of life. The fact that life (*jīva*) is conceived in the opposite terms (fire and water) agrees with the earliest tradition according to which the whole reality is conceived in terms of fire and soma. Life (*jīva*) as the first form of the future world is presented in MDhP 204.5 (see below) so he might be motivated by the same cosmogonical model.

In verse b, it is stated that water is the perceptible form of the embodied ones. It seems that the Composer understands *mūrti* in the same way as the Composer of the MS (see chapter 1.1.4) i.e., as the mental form of the highest cognitive agent because he states that, in the water, the self (*ātman*) is present which is the mental Brahma (*mānaso brahmā*) creator of the world (verses c–d). Most probably, the Composer is motivated by the common cosmogonical model according to which an egg or a lotus<sup>95</sup> appears, in water in which Brahma is born, as manifestation of the mind of reality and its self (*ātman*, see also cosmogony presented in MDhP 175, chapter 1.2.1.a).

### MDhP 180.23–24

*ātmānaṃ taṃ vijānīhi sarvalokahitātmakam |*  
*tasmin yaḥ saṃśrito dehe hy abbīndur iva puṣkare || (23)*

Know that it is the self which is devoted to the good of all worlds. Know that one who remains in this body, like a drop in a lotus,<sup>96</sup>

*kṣetrajñam taṃ vijānīhi nityaṃ lokahitātmakam |*  
*tamo rajas ca sattvaṃ ca viddhi jīvagaṇān imān || (24)*

is the eternal Field Knower devoted to the good of the world? Know that sattva, rajas and tamas are the classes of life.<sup>97</sup>

It seems that the Composer is using the word *ātman* to denote the self (*ātman*) of Brahma at macroscale and the self of man in microscale (23ab). In verses c–d the Composer activates the concept of a lotus (which is inside the self, *ātman*) and inside it is a drop (23cd). In terms of the drop, the highest cognitive agent, called the Field Knower, is conceived (24ab).<sup>98</sup> The source domain of a lotus allows the Composer to express the relationship between the highest cognitive agent and his mental self: within the body there is

<sup>95</sup> The source domain of lotus will be evoked in the next stanzas.

<sup>96</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

<sup>97</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

<sup>98</sup> Note that here Brahma is placed below the highest cognitive agent as it is in later parts of the MDhP (e.g. 335, see chapter 5.2).

a heart, conceived in terms of lotus, in the heart the highest cognitive agent is present conceived in terms of a drop.

The compound *jīvaguṇa* (24d), translated as ‘classes of life’ (*jīva*) can be understood in two ways. Firstly, they are classes which are used by life. Thus, the concept of life (*jīva*) seems to correspond to the concept of the Great Self/reason in other expositions which categorises with the aid of the classes. Here it is conceptually connected with the mental self of the highest cognitive agent i.e., Brahma. This assumption agrees with what is presented in the cosmogony of the MS where the Great Self (*mahān ātman*) is the first subjective faculty of Brahma (see chapter 1). Thus, we could understand that when Brahma manifests as the Great Self, he also manifests as the living self of reality (*vide* ‘living self’ which uses names and forms according to CU 6.3.2–3). On the other hand, they are the classes with whose aid life (*jīva*) can be cognised.<sup>99</sup> Once the highest cognitive agent manifests in his living self as Brahma and begins to use the classes he can be cognised, in this form, with the aid of these classes. Let us note that life is manifested in breathing and the concept of breathing metonymically activates the concept of recitation with proper breathing. The classes of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* are used by Brahma who recites the Veda and enable his self-cognition in his living cosmic form. The same happens in the microscale during liberating cognition.

The critical apparatus adds two more verses which clarify the status of life (*jīva*) and will be important for understanding the next stanza:

### MDhP 180.24ef

*jīvam ātmaguṇam vindyād ātmānaṃ paramātmanaḥ |*

He should find life (*jīva*) which is a class of the self. The self is the class of the highest self.<sup>100</sup>

The compound *ātmaguṇa* again means both that life (*jīva*) uses the class of the self (*ātman*) in its cognition and that life (*jīva*) can be cognised by the class of the self (*ātman*). Remind ourselves that, according to the interpretation we are using, life (*jīva*) corresponds to the Great Self of Brahma. Through it, Brahma, as the mental self of the highest cognitive agent (the Field Knower) cognises itself in creation and in liberating cognition. In other words, life (*jīva*) is the category which enables Brahma to cognise itself as alive in creation and which enables man’s cognition of the self in liberating cognition. Without life (*jīva*) self-cognition would be impossible.

<sup>99</sup> For the double meaning of such compounds see also analysis of MDhP 203.33 (chapter 2.1.3).

<sup>100</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

Then the highest self (*paramātman*, verse d) cognises itself through its category which is the self (*ātman*), be it in creation or in liberating cognition. One is aware that the last two sentences are a tautology but such is the nature of the self-cognition of reality which sustains the cosmos and the nature of which is described here (see also interpretation of MDhP 209.14 chapter 4.9.4). Within the topology presented by the Composer, the inner self (*antarātman*) corresponds to the highest cognitive agent (the Field Knower). The compound *antarātman* has been already mentioned in stanzas 19–20 where it has also been described as being conscious and feeling emotions. Dissociated from it, the body becomes unconscious.<sup>101</sup>

### MDhP 180.25

*sacetanaṃ jīvagunaṃ vadanti; sa ceṣṭate ceṣṭayate ca sarvam |*  
*tataḥ paraṃ kṣetravidyaṃ vadanti; prāvartayad yo bhuvanāni sapta ||*

That which possesses the class of life is conscious. It moves and makes everything to move. They claim that the Field Knower is higher than that it who has set in motion seven worlds.<sup>102</sup>

That which possess the class of life (*jīvaguna*, verse a) is conscious and is presented as moving and making everything move (verses a–b). As has been shown above, life (*jīva*) is used by the cosmic moving and reciting self of Brahma through which the highest cognitive agent, called the Field Knower manifests himself (verses c–d).

Now the Composer comes back to the problem of death and states that life survives death:

### MDhP 180.26

*na jīvanāśo 'sti hi dehabhede; mithyāitad āhur mṛta ity abuddhāḥ |*  
*jīvas tu dehāntarītaḥ prayāti; daśārdhataivāsya śarīrabhedaḥ ||*

Life<sup>103</sup> is not destroyed when the body breaks; it is ignorant men who claim, falsely, that it perishes. Life<sup>104</sup> moves on and finds another body; a person's death is simply dissolution of the body.

<sup>101</sup> MDhP 180: *na pañcasādhāraṇam atra kiṃ cic; charīram eko vahate 'ntarātmā | sa vetti gandhāś ca rasāñ śrutim ca; sparśam ca rūpaṃ ca guṇāś ca ye 'nye || (19) pañcātmake pañcaguṇapradarśī; sa sarvagātrānugato 'ntarātmā | sa vetti duḥkhāni sukhāni cātra; tadviprayogāt tu na vetti dehaḥ ||*

<sup>102</sup> Jurewicz's translation. See also MDhP: 233.20: *sacetanaṃ jīvagunaṃ vadanti; sa ceṣṭate ceṣṭayate ca sarvam | tataḥ paraṃ kṣetravido vadanti; prāvartayad yo bhuvanāni sapta ||*

<sup>103</sup> Wynne (2009: 127): 'the soul.'

<sup>104</sup> Wynne (2009: 127): 'the soul.'

Then the problem of the invisibility of life (*jīva*) is discussed:

### MDhP 180.27

*evaṃ sarveṣu bhūteṣu gūḍhaś carati samvṛtaḥ |  
drśyate tv agryayā buddhyā sūkṣmayā tattvadarśibhiḥ ||*

And so, it is hidden within living beings but its movement are concealed. But those who see the truth can perceive it by means of refined, subtle reason.<sup>105</sup>

One cannot perceive life (*jīva*) because it is hidden in living beings (verses a–b) and, as stated above, is invisible after the destruction of body like fire, wind and space (see 180.10). However, it can be perceived with aid of reason in liberating cognition. In the next two stanzas (28–29) the Composer describes the liberating practices which lead to recognition of the self, *ātman*. This topic is placed here because, as implied in the additional verses of stanza 24, the self (*ātman*) can be recognised through life (*jīva*) thanks to recitation connected with breathing.

At the end of his exposition the Composer comes back to his conceptualisation of life (*jīva*) in terms of fire:

### MDhP 180.30

*mānaso 'gñiḥ śarīreṣu jīva ity abhidhīyate |  
srṣṭiḥ prajāpater eṣā bhūtādhyātmaviniścaye ||*

The fire of consciousness found within all bodies is called the soul. According to this enquiry into the supreme self of a living being, it is the creation of Prajāpati, the lord of creatures.

Now the Composer expresses the relationship between bodies and life (*jīva*). It is called mental fire (verse a). As we remember the self (*ātman*) of the highest cognitive agent is called the mental Brahma (*mānaso brahma*). It can therefore be argued that the concept of fire in microscale corresponds to the concept of Brahma in macroscale. Further the qualification of life (*jīva*) as mental fire is experientially based on liberating cognition which consisted in recitation, on breathing and on work on the mind (see chapter 4). Thus, the Composer states that life (*jīva*) allows men to recognise the cosmic life of Brahma, then Brahma, then the self (*ātman*) and finally the Field Knower. Since liberating cognition is conceived in terms of the SOURCE-PATH-GOAL image schema (see chapter 4.6.2), the metonymic compression takes place

<sup>105</sup> Wynne (2009: 127): 'intelligence.'

within it (GOAL FOR PATH). This kind of compression is commonly attested in the semantics of the Sanskrit words (e.g., *gati*).

In verses c–d, Brahma is identified with Prajāpati. In this way, the Composer can include the earlier conceptualisation of the self, in terms of fire, into the frames of his analytical apparatus. This will epistemologically separate the different manifestations of reality and allow for their better cognition. The concept of life (*jīva*) is also profiled in this way by the Composer so that he can activate the concept of recitation and breathing which can then be seen as factors enabling cognition of the self in macro and microscale. Hence, life (*jīva*) is not only a factor which makes man alive, but also that which sustains man's ultimate identity during successive deaths and births. This identity is composed of words of the Veda which express and are ontologically the same as the self of man. Because of that life (*jīva*) can be seen as a factor which survives the death of the body.

### 3.3.2.b. The description of life (*jīva*) in MDhP 187.7 (Bhīṣma and Yudhiṣṭhira)<sup>106</sup>

The word *jīva* appears in MDhP 187.7 after the description of the great beings (*mahābhūta*):

#### MDhP 187.7

*mahābhūtāni pañcaiva sarvabhūteṣu bhūtakṛt |  
akarot teṣu vaiṣamyam tat tu jīvo 'nu paśyati ||*

There are five great beings and the creator of being arranged them unevenly in all beings. Life perceives that.<sup>107</sup>

The great beings are unevenly distributed in creatures and life (*jīva*) is presented a perceiving them. It should be taken into account that this stanza appears after the stanzas where the metaphor, the cosmos is a tortoise and the great beings are its limbs, is activated (MDhP 187.6). This implies the conceptualisation of the cosmos in terms of a living being. If one takes into account what is stated in MDhP 180.23–24, where life (*jīva*) is presented as being the three classes used by the self (*ātman*), one could interpret verse d as concisely expressing the fact that the self manifests itself as living and is thus able to cognise the distribution of the great beings with the use of the classes.

<sup>106</sup> 'Discourse on the highest self' (*adhyātmanirūpaṇa*).

<sup>107</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

### 3.3.2.c. A description of life (*jīva*) in MDhP 204 and 206 (Master and People)

The general context here is the issue of rebirth and the connection of the agents with their previous actions. The Composer states that beings appear from what is unmanifest (*avyakta*) and their end is unmanifest. It is the mind which has the nature of the unmanifest (*avyaktātmāmaka*, 204.1). He conceives the appearance, of the manifest from the unmanifest in terms of the appearance of the great Aśvattha tree from a minute seed. He then describes the necessity of cosmic cognition and its categories. The mental states which appear because of their inherent state (*svabhāva*) are conceived in terms of iron filings attracted by a magnet. In the same way in microscale, the mental states (*bhāva*) of a conscious agent born from the unmanifest, are characterised as causal, unconscious and attached to their objects because of their causal nature (204.4).<sup>108</sup>

Then the Composer presents the description of the pre-creative state of the cosmos identified with life (*jīva*):

#### MDhP 204.5

*na bhūḥ khaṃ dyaur na bhūtāni narṣayo na surāsurāḥ |*  
*nānyad āsīd rte jīvam āsedur na tu saṃhitam ||*

There was no earth, no sky, no beings, no seers, no gods and asuras, there was nothing except for life. The consolidation has not yet been undertaken.<sup>109</sup>

The Composer conceives the pre-creative state of the cosmos in terms of life. It is proposed to use the interpretation of the participle *saṃhitam* (or *saṃhatam*, as Wynne proposes, verse d) as activating the general domain of Cleansing By Heat in its specific realisation of churning butter. One can then assume that the Composer activates the conceptualisation of this state in terms of something fluid which is then solidified which is a conceptualisation often used in cosmogonies. It is possible that he thinks about water, because water is life-giving and its use is attested in this meaning in cosmogonies (MS 1.8–9, see chapter 1.1.3, MDhP 180.22, see section 3.3.2.a). Thus, he would trigger his recipients to activate a blend in which water is the form of life (*jīva*). The concept of life-giving is the generic space of this blend, the concepts of water and life are its input spaces.

<sup>108</sup> MDhP 204: *abhidravaty ayaskāntamayo niścetanāv ubhau | svabhāvahetuḥ bhāvā yadvad anyad apīdr̥sam ||* (3) *tadvad avyaktajā bhāvāḥ kartuḥ kāraṇalakṣaṇāḥ | acetanāś cetayituḥ kāraṇād abhisāṃhitāḥ ||* (4)

<sup>109</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

**MDhP 204.6–7**

*pūrvam nityam*<sup>110</sup> *sarvagataṃ manohetu salakṣaṇam |*  
*ajñānakarma nirdiṣṭam etat kāraṇalakṣaṇam || (6)*

It is primeval, eternal, omnipresent, the cause of mind and possesses a sign.  
 It is declared that the activity of this causal sign leads to ignorance.<sup>111</sup>

*tat kāraṇair hi samyuktaṃ kāryasamgrahakāraṇam |*  
*yenaitad vartate cakram anādinidhanaṃ mahat || (7)*

Because it is connected with cause, it creates and accumulates outcomes and the great wheel, without beginning and end, revolves thanks to it.<sup>112</sup>

In 204.6a, life (*jīva*) is presented as being primeval, eternal and omnipresent. Such qualifications highlight its ontic identity with unmanifest reality, of which it is the manifestation. The compound *manohetu* can be interpreted as the cause of the mind or caused by the mind (*manohetu*).<sup>113</sup> This double interpretation implies the reflexive nature of the creative process which is caused by the mind and in which the mind appears again: mind creates life (*jīva*) and life (*jīva*) creates mind. Qualification of life (*jīva*) as ‘possessing sign’ (*salakṣaṇa*) implies that now the Composer describes the beginnings of creation conceived as assuming sign. Remember that the concept of water, used to conceive the first form of the cosmos, is without any sign as expressed explicitly in RV 10.129.3 (*apraketāṃ salilāṃ sárvaṃ ā idám*). The concept of *salilá* in which the female buffalo in RV 10.164.41 stands and from which the lotus appears in the Smṛti texts also conveys the meaning of dark muddy water in which nothing can be seen. If water is the form of the life (*jīva*), as has been proposed, it is water without any sign.

In MDhP 204.6cd the sign is described. It is the sign of cause (*kāraṇalakṣaṇa*, verse d) which can be generally translated as causality. Its activity leads to ignorance because it is subjected to the subject-object scenario of cognition where ignorance is a manifestation of the object. Moreover, cause requires effect and this cause-and-effect sequence (MDhP 204.7ab) constitutes the manifestations of reality which is conceived in terms of a wheel in MDhP 204.7cd (see chapter 2.1.1). Thus, (*jīva*) is conceived as the link between the agents and their actions committed earlier.

<sup>110</sup> The critical edition proposes *sarvanītyā* and although one would like to adhere to this version, it has not been possible to find any meaning of this compound that would be appropriate in this context. Wynne’s choice (2009: 337) is therefore followed.

<sup>111</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

<sup>112</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

<sup>113</sup> See *mánaso rétas* in RV 10.129.4, Jurewicz (2010).



Life (*jīva*) is conceived in a similar way in MDhP 206. The Composer is presenting the role of the classes of rajas and tamas in the chain of objectification (206.1–2) and the chain itself (caused by Visnu’s *māyā*, the power to be measured (206.3–5). He then describes disgusting rebirth in women’s wombs, so recommends that one should discard the sons which are compared to vermin (6–11).

The next stanzas are as follows:

### MDhP 206.12–13ab

*rajas tamasi paryastam sattvam tamasi samsthitam |  
jñānādhiṣṭhānam ajñānam buddhyahaṁkāralakṣaṇam |  
tad bījaṁ dehinām āhus tad bījaṁ jīvasamjñitam ||*

Rajas is spread in tamas and sattva abides in tamas. Ignorance based on cognition characterised by reason and the I-form is the seed of the embodied ones and it is called life.<sup>114</sup>

In verse 12a the classes of rajas and sattva are presented as being within tamas. In this way the Composer expressed their cognitive range which is the object of the cognition of reality when man does not cognise properly. Then the Composer states that ignorance is based on cognition (12ab) which has been manifest in the beginning of creation when the highest cognitive agent separated itself as the subject with the aid of reason and the I-form (*ahaṁkāra*). This ignorance is the seed of men (called here the embodied ones, 13c) and it is called *jīva*. Life (*jīva*) is the potential lack of cognition which is realised when it becomes embodied in an agent (see 204.6–7).

### 3.3.2.d. A description of life (*jīva*) in MDhP 212 (Pañcaśikha and Janaka) and 228 (Vyāsa and Śuka)

In MDhP 212 and 228, the concept of life (*jīva*) is used in the context of liberating cognition. MDhP 212 is first part of the teaching given by Pañcaśikha to Janaka (for a short discussion of these narrative frames, see above, section 3.1). It is generally similar in its exposition to MBh 187 (see chapter 2.3.2).<sup>115</sup> In MDhP 212.40, the Composer describes the relationship between the body and the highest cognitive agent using the concepts of a field (*kṣetra*) and the Field Knower (*kṣetrajña*). Since the Composer is describing liberating cognition, the Field Knower is presented as a state of mind (*sthito manasi yo bhāva*).

<sup>114</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

<sup>115</sup> Pañcaśikha is presented as the follower of Kapila in MDhP 212.6.

In the next stanza, the Composer argues that it is impossible to talk about the annihilation or eternity of living beings who behave according to their inherent state (*svabhāva*) as it is determined by cause-effect links. He compares living beings to rivers which merge in the ocean and abandon their forms and names which is a Vedic metaphor used in the context of liberation (e.g., BU 2.4.11). Then he states:

### MDhP 212.43

*evam sati kutaḥ saṃjñā pretyabhāve punar bhavet |  
pratisaṃmiśrite jīve grhyamāṇe ca madhyataḥ ||*

This being so, how can consciousness again appear after death when life is completely blended and caught in the middle?<sup>116</sup>

This question is similar to the question of Maitreyī to her husband, Yājñavalkya (see BU 2.4.13, 4.5.14) who could not understand his statement that there is no consciousness (*saṃjñā*) after death. Lack of consciousness after death is caused by the fact that life (*jīva*) is ‘being completely blended’ (*pratisaṃmiśrita*) and caught ‘in the middle’ (*madhyatas*, verses c–d). Wynne interprets this description as referring to the state of freedom during which life identifies with the highest cognitive agent (it is assimilated and completely integrated into the absolute). If his interpretation is correct, consciousness would mean that which is active during subject-object cognition is suspended in liberating cognition. In his description of life (*jīva*) as ‘caught in the middle’ (*madhyatas*), the Composer metonymically activates the image schema of CONTAINER used in the description of liberating practice (see chapter 4.5, 4.9.2). This can be elaborated thanks to the wide meaning of the word *ātman* (the self) i.e., the body, the corpus, the highest cognitive agent and its unmanifest aspect present in the space of a man’s heart. Life, which is in the body, goes back through the corpus and unites with the highest cognitive agent and its unmanifest aspect. In this moment subject-object cognition disappears. It is possible that the recipient is expected to elaborate the concept of rivers disappearing in the ocean, evoked in the previous stanza, and conceive liberating cognition in this way. Within the frames of this metaphor life (*jīva*) is a river which disappears in the living self of reality conceived in terms of the ocean.

MDhP 228<sup>117</sup> is devoted to a description of yogic experience and the noun *jīva* appears in the description of the subtle mental state realised by the practitioner. The Composer elaborates the general domain of Riding In

<sup>116</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

<sup>117</sup> Part of the subparvan *Śukānupraśna*, ‘The question of Śuka’ (224–246).

A Chariot.<sup>118</sup> In MDhP 228.7–11, the Composer elaborates the metaphor that man is a chariot. Within the frames of this metaphor cognitive faculties, mental states, emotional states and breaths (*āpāna* and *prāṇa*) are conceived in terms of the parts of a riding chariot. The noun *jīva* is used here twice. In MDhP 228.8cd, life (*jīva*) is conceived in terms of a cord or tether (*bandhana*).<sup>119</sup>

It also appears in following stanza:

### MDhP 228.11

*tyāgavartmānugaḥ kṣemyaḥ śaucago dhyānagocaraḥ |*  
*jīvayukto ratho divyo brahmaloke virājate ||*

This chariot is harnessed by life, following the path of renunciation, peaceful, going to the pure state for which thoughtful concentration is the pasture, shines in the world of brahman.<sup>120</sup>

The chariot in terms of which the practitioner is conceived is presented as ‘harnessed by life’ (*jīvayukta*, verse c) which accords with its conceptualisation in terms of a cord or tether (*bandhana*, MDhP 228.8). Since in MDhP 228.11 the participle *yukta* is used, one may presume that *bandhana* refers to a tether used to restrain horses. Anyway, life (*jīva*) is conceived as something which connect the horses (in terms of which the senses of reason are conceived in MDhP 228.9) to the chariot and which keeps those horses on track. Hence life (*jīva*) enables practice.

If the recipient activates the Vedic conceptualisation of the sun in terms of a chariot (Jurewicz 2016/18) he will create a blend in which the concepts of man, of the chariot and the sun are the input spaces. The generic space is the concept of movement. In the blend, man and the sun are conceived in terms of a chariot and they are identified which implies that in his cognition man has reached the borderline sphere of the cosmos.<sup>121</sup> Thus the range of the concept of life (*jīva*) is enlarged and encompasses the sun in its movement.

In later chapters of MDhP (270–271) *jīva* is mostly used in plural form, in the description of rebirth (conceived in terms of acquiring six colors, MDhP 271). One could treat this exposition as an elaborated description of the afterlife in ṚV 1.164.30 where life (*jīva*) of the dead (*mṛtasya*) is

<sup>118</sup> MDhP 228.7: *evam hy etena yogena yuñjāno ‘py ekam antataḥ | api jijñāsamāno hi śabdabrahmātivartate ||*

<sup>119</sup> MDhP 228.8: *dharmopastho hrīvarūtha upāyāpāyakūbaraḥ | apānākṣaḥ prāṇayugaḥ prajñāyur jīvabandhanaḥ ||*

<sup>120</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

<sup>121</sup> This is only the first step of mental transformations described in MDhP 228. MDhP 228 describes further cognitive transformations of man which lead him beyond the manifest aspect.

presented as performing opposing activities in the same time thanks to its will (Jurewicz 2010).<sup>122</sup> Life that survives death is an internally contradictory concept and it would survive as the basic conceptual frame for later thinking. This way of thinking also continues the thinking of the early Upaniṣads in their descriptions of the path of fathers according to the model of the Five Fires (Jurewicz 2016/18).

### 3.3.2.e. A description of *jīva* in the *Bhagavadgītā* and *Manusmṛti*

The concept of *jīva* in the BhG can be reconstructed as follows.

#### BhG 7

In BhG 7.4 the Composer presents the way that Kṛṣṇa's manifest aspect (called *prakṛti*, nature) is divided into the subject-object structure: the mind, the reason and the I-form on the one hand and the five great beings on the other.<sup>123</sup> He then states:

#### BhG 7.5

*apareyam itas tv anyāṃ prakṛtiṃ viddhi me parām |  
jīvabhūtāṃ mahābāho yayedam dhāryate jagat ||*

This is my lower nature. Know my higher one. It has become life by which this world is supported.<sup>124</sup>

The subject-object elements of the cosmos enumerated in the previous stanza are supported by life (*jīva*). Since in the philosophical apparatus of the early Smṛti texts what is more invisible is conceived in terms of what is up (*adhyātman*), we can understand life (*jīva*) as an invisible substrate of the manifest aspect, it pervades it and is ontologically identical with Kṛṣṇa (which is also implied by the pronoun 'my' *mama*).

In the following stanza (BhG 7.6ab), life (*jīva*) is called the womb (*yoni*) of all beings similarly to MDhP 206.13 where it is called the seed of them (*bīja*, see section 3.4.1.a) which highlights its potentiality which is actualised when profiled in a particular man. Here, its connection with the lack of cognition is not highlighted. The highest cognitive agent (Kṛṣṇa) is the creator

<sup>122</sup> RV 1.164.30: *anāc chaye turāgātu jīvām éjad dhruvām mādhyā á pastīyānām | jīvo mṛtāsya carati svadhābhir āmartīyo mārtyenā sāyonih ||*

<sup>123</sup> BhG 7.4: *bhūmir āpo 'nalo vāyuḥ khaṃ mano buddhir eva ca | ahaṃkāra itīyaṃ me bhinnā prakṛtir aṣṭadhā ||*

<sup>124</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

and destroyer of the world (BhG 7.6cd) and there is nothing beyond him (BhG 7.7ab). In BhG 7.7cd, the Composer describes the connection between Kṛṣṇa and the manifest aspect in the following way:

### BhG 7.7cd

*mayi sarvam idaṃ protaṃ sūtre maṇigaṇā iva ||*

All this is strung on me as strands of pearls are strung on a string.

Within the frames of the metaphor activated here, the cosmos is conceived in terms of a string of pearls. The concept of thread is the source domain of both Kṛṣṇa and life (*jīva*) although its logic implies that Kṛṣṇa should be conceived in terms of someone who wears the necklace (or a cloth adorned with pearls). But it is suggested that the Composer triggers his recipient to create a conceptual network in order to precisely express the relationship between the highest cognitive agent (Kṛṣṇa, the first input space), life (*jīva*, the second input space) and the perceptible subject-object cosmos (the third input space). The fourth input space is a string of pearls. Moreover, the participle *protā* activates its Vedic usages, especially in BU 3.6, 3.8, together with the participle *ota* (e.g., 3.8.11: *etasmin nu khalv akṣare gārgy ākāśa otaś ca protaś ca*) and thereby activates the metaphor of weaving. In the blend the relationship between Kṛṣṇa, life and the cosmos, is seen not only in terms of the relationship between someone who wears a necklace/a cloth, a thread and pearls, but also in terms of a weaver, the frame of a weaving workshop and threads.<sup>125</sup> The frame of a weaving workshop creates a space (*ākāśa*) which is the place for the future world and is a support for the cloth. In the same way life (*jīva*) is an invisible substrate and support for the subject-object cosmos (*loka*).<sup>126</sup> It is worth adding that, in CU 2.11.1–2, the participle *protā* is used to express the relationship between the Gāyatra Sāman and breathing (*prāṇa*; *etad gāyatram prāṇesu protam*). If the recipient takes this usage into account, he will identify life (*jīva*) with breath and the cosmos with sacred sounds. The connection between life (*jīva*) and breath has been discussed in MDhP 180 (see above, section 3.3.2.a). The interpretation that the weaving metaphor motivates the thinking of the Composer is confirmed in BhG 7.14 where the

<sup>125</sup> Already in RV 10.130.2ab: *púmāṃ enaṃ tanuta út kṛṇatti púmān ví tatne ádhi náke asmín.*

<sup>126</sup> In BU 3.6, the cosmos is ‘woven back and forth’ (*otaṃ ca protaṃ ca*, Olivelle’s translation) on water, water on wind, and the names of the next stratum of the cosmos (which are cognised in liberating practice) always include the noun *loka* (*antarikṣalokā, gandharvalokā, ādityalokā, candralokā, nakṣatralokā, devalokā, indralokā, prajāpatilokā, brahmalokā*). The last stratum are *ākāśa* and *akṣara*.

Composer describes the concept of māyā as composed of three threads (*guṇa*) which cover Kṛṣṇa and make him impossible to be cognised by the ignorant in the same way as a cloth covers a person (see chapter 2.2.2).

### BhG 15

In BhG 15, Kṛṣṇa describes his manifestation in the cosmos in the following way:

#### BhG 15.7

*mamaivāṃśo jīvaloke jīvabhūtaḥ sanātanaḥ |  
manaḥśaṣṭhānīndriyāṇi prakṛtisthāni karṣati ||*

It is an eternal part of me which has become life in the world of life. It drags the mind and the five senses which are based in nature.<sup>127</sup>

In verses a–b, there are two compounds where the noun *jīva* is used: *jīvaloka* and *jīvabhūta*. *Jīvaloka* is the manifest aspect conceived as living self (*ātman*) of reality. It corresponds to the expression *jivena ātmana* in CU 6.3.2–3 with which reality enters its manifestation and animates it.

Manifestation is to become living (*jīvabhūta*). Within the cosmos and within a particular living being it is called the part (*aṃśa*) of Kṛṣṇa.<sup>128</sup> It is subject-object cognition (verses c–d) conceived in terms of pulling together the senses and the mind. This implies that it is cognition which binds the cognitive faculties together. It also seems that the use of the verb *karṣ-*, to draw, draw to one’s self, drag, pull, drag away’, but also ‘to draw or make furrows, plough’ is intentional and meant to activate conceptualisation of the relationship between life (*jīva*) and cognitive faculties with the use of a farming metaphor. Within its frames life (*jīva*), understood as above, is conceived in terms of a farmer (the Field Knower), cognitive faculties in terms of a plough and the manifest aspect (*prakṛti*) in terms of a field.<sup>129</sup>

The use of these two compounds highlights the fact that it is life (*jīva*) in terms of which the essence of the manifest aspect is conceived: the highest cognitive agent is conceived as part of omnipresent life profiled by individual subject-object cognition.

In the next stanza, the Composer explains the relationship between the highest cognitive agent and a particular cognising being:

<sup>127</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

<sup>128</sup> See MaU 2.5.

<sup>129</sup> For conceptualisation of the manifest aspect in terms of a field, see BhG 13.5–6.

**BhG 15.8**

*śarīraṃ yad avāpnoti yac cāpy utkrāmatīśvaraḥ |  
grhītvaitāni saṃyāti vāyur gandhān ivāśayāt ||*

When the lord enters a body and leaves it, he goes away, having taken them in the same way as the wind takes away the smells from flowers.<sup>130</sup>

The noun lord (*īśvara*, verse b) activates conceptualisation of the highest cognitive agent in terms of a king and the recipient may imagine him as traveling around his kingdom. Then the particular bodies would be conceived in terms of villages where the king stays at night. In verses c–d, the Composer evokes another source domain in terms of which the relationship between the highest cognitive agent and bodies are conceived: it is the concept of wind which spreads the smell of flowers. These two concepts are the two input spaces of the conceptual network created by the Composer. The third input space is the content of the previous stanza. In the blend, life (*jīva*) is conceived in terms of the wind and its state. The situation after the destruction of a body is conceived in terms of the spreading of the smell of a flower which remains even after the flower has faded. If the recipient elaborates the source domain of a king, one could imagine a place abandoned by a king and his entourage with only traces of his visit left which must now be cleared away. It is possible that the recipient is expected to evoke various emotions that were probably felt after the king’s departure (sadness, relief, etc.) and think about such emotions felt after someone’s death.

In the next stanza subject-object cognition performed by an individual agent is presented:

**BhG 15.9**

*śrotraṃ cakṣuḥ sparśanaṃ ca rasanāṃ ghrāṇaṃ eva ca |  
adhiṣṭhāya manaś cāyaṃ viṣayān upasevate ||*

Having ascended hearing, sight, touch, taste, smelling and the mind, it obsessively pursues the objects of senses.<sup>131</sup>

The participle *adhiṣṭhāya* (verse c) is translated as ‘having ascended’ because the recipient could be expected to activate the general domain of Riding In A Chariot in terms of which the relationship between the highest cognitive agent and cognitive faculties of man are conceived. Within its frames,

<sup>130</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

<sup>131</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

the highest cognitive agent is conceived in terms of a warrior who is guided by his charioteer, the cognitive faculties in terms of horses and reins and the object of senses in terms of the path. Here, the charioteer is not following a good path because the cognitive faculties are presented as obsessively pursuing (*upasevate*, verse d) the senses. In this way, the highest cognitive agent (life understood as a part of Kṛṣṇa) is enclosed in a particular body and constitutes the personal identity. It seems that the concept of life includes the fascination for elements of the cosmos which are to be gained or avoided.

However, the wide semantic range of the verb *adhi ṣṭhā-* allows the Composer to express the relationship between life as a part of Kṛṣṇa and the senses engaged in subject-object cognition: it abides in the cognitive faculties, governs them and depends upon them.

In the next stanza, the Composer expresses the same conviction as in MDhP 180 (see section 3.3.2.a) that life (*jīva*) is invisible but that it can be cognised in liberating cognition:

### BhG 15.10

*utkrāmantaṃ sthitaṃ vāpi bhuñjānaṃ vā guṇānvitam |  
vimūḍhā nānupaśyanti paśyanti jñānacakṣuṣaḥ ||*

They who are deluded do not see him when it goes away, when he is present, when he consumes or he follows the classes. Those whose eye is knowledge, they see him.<sup>132</sup>

The subject of the participles in verses a–b is that part (*aṃśa*) of Kṛṣṇa i.e., life (*jīva*) which is engaged in subject-object cognition within a particular man. The translation of the participles in verses b is again literal in order to activate the metaphors which frame the thinking of recipients. Subject-object cognition is conceived in terms of eating (*bhuj-* the general domain of Cooking). The verb *anu i-* (*anvita* in *guṇānvita*) literally expresses ‘to follow’, If the recipient activates this meaning, he will understand that the highest cognitive agent does not use the classes but follows them in its pursuit of sense objects. This would imply that individual cognition influences the highest cognitive agent. At the same time, subject-object cognition performed by life (*jīva*) within the individual frames determines the identity of a person.

<sup>132</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.



**MS 12.12–14**

In MS 12.12–14, the Composer presents some definitions of various aspects of the manifestation of one reality:

**MS 12.12**

*yo 'syātmanaḥ kārayitā taṃ kṣetrajñam pracakṣate |  
yaḥ karoti tu karmāṇi sa bhūtātmocyate budhaiḥ ||*

The one who makes the self<sup>133</sup> act is called Kṣetrajña, ‘the knower of the field’; the one who does the actions, on the other hand, the wise call Bhūtātman ‘the self of beings’.<sup>134</sup>

The noun *ātman* is used here in its meaning of the body which is the moving self of reality, cosmic and human. The term *kṣetrajña* (the Field Knower, verse b) refers to the manifestation of reality as the highest cognitive agent which makes its body move. Its manifestation in the bodies of living beings is called *bhūtātman* (the self of beings, verse d).<sup>135</sup> In MDhP 180.25, it is life (*jīva*) which makes everything move and the Field Knower is presented as setting in motion the whole cosmos (see section 3.3.2.a). Thus, we can see that the Composers used the terms denoting psycho-mental states slightly differently. This might be caused by the nature of their experience during which the difference between such states was, most probably, blurred.

**MS 12.13**

*jīvasaṃjño 'ntarātmānyaḥ sahajaḥ sarvadehinām |  
yena vedayate sarvaṃ sukhaṃ duḥkhaṃ ca janmasu ||*

Another inner self innate to all embodied beings bears the name Jīva ‘life’<sup>136</sup> by whom are experienced all the pleasures and pains in succeeding births.<sup>137</sup>

The word *jīva* is used to denote the aspect of the self that is called, ‘the inner self’ (*antarātman*) which is present during consecutive births and deaths

<sup>133</sup> Olivelle (2005: 230): ‘this body.’

<sup>134</sup> Olivelle (2005: 230): ‘elemental self.’

<sup>135</sup> See MDhP 231.21cd, chapter. 4.10.2.b.

<sup>136</sup> Olivelle (2005: 230): ‘individual self.’

<sup>137</sup> In his notes, Olivelle (2005: 348) writes: ‘The one who ... succeeding births: these verses contain several technical terms: *kṣetrajña* refers to the spirit that observes the body and its activities as if they were a field (kṣetra); *bhūtātman* is a term that is less clear (see also 5.109), but probably refers to a self that is made of material elements but which acts as a center of consciousness; *jīva* generally refers to the individual self within the body and identical with *kṣetrajña*. Here Manu appears to be making a distinction between the two.’ One can understand the distinction as both cognitive and ontological.

of man and feels emotions.<sup>138</sup> Olivelle translates *yena* (verse c) as ‘instrument of action’. That meaning is probably present here. It is thanks to life (*jīva*) that one can experience happiness and unhappiness during succeeding births. In MDhP 180.19–20, the agent which experiences emotions is also called ‘the inner self’ (*antarātman*) but it is distinguished from life (*jīva*): life is seen as the class used by it (see above, section 3.3.2.a). Here, they are identified, thus the connections between life (*jīva*) and emotions are explicitly stated. As a vehicle for emotions, life ensures the identity of the agent through time. Since emotions influence thinking and actions, *jīva* is the causal link between actions and their results which are necessarily experienced by the agent as in MDhP 204 and 206 (see above, section 3.6.2.c). At the same time, the connection of life and emotions arising from subject-object cognition seems obvious: one can experience them when one is alive. They stop when subject-object cognition stops which is described in MDhP 212.43 as the complete fusion of life with unmanifest reality (see section 3.6.2.d).

It should be noted that in MDhP 242.10 and MDhP 244.42 the compound *antarātman* is used in reference to the highest cognitive agent which can be cognised in liberating cognition (as in MDhP 238.5, 276.32). It can also refer to the whole cognising body (MDhP 192.92, 198.11, 221.83, 259.1, MS 4.161). The fact that the compound *antarātman* is used in reference to various mental realities implies that the Composer of the MS does not necessarily treat life (*jīva*) as ontologically separate from the highest cognitive agent. The difference between them is rather functional: *jīva* names the cosmic aspect of reality which transmigrates contrary to its cosmic aspect which does not. This is confirmed in the next stanza:

### MS 12.14

*tāv ubhau bhūtasampr̥ktau mahān kṣetrajañña eva ca |  
uccāvaceṣu bhūteṣu sthitam taṃ vyāpya tiṣṭhataḥ ||*

These two – Mahat, ‘the Great’, and Ksetrajña, ‘the knower of the field’ – united with the elements, remain pervading the one who abides in creatures both great and small.

This description is similar to other descriptions where the difference between the highest cognitive agent (*kṣetrajañña*) and the Great Self (activated in verse b by the adjective *mahat*, as in MS 12.24, see chapter 2.1.2). They are presented as mingled together (*sampr̥kta*, verse a) which activates two perspectives of cognition: the cosmic perspective when the highest cognitive

<sup>138</sup> *Antarātman* is understood in the same way in MDhP 199.5, 197.14–15, MS 6.63, 73.

agent uses his mental self in self-cognition, and the human perspective, often wrong, during which the highest cognitive agent is reduced to reason. Both pervade ‘that one’ which is present in beings (verses c–d). It seems that it is life (*jīva*, life) which is pervaded by them as mentioned in the previous stanza. Life is the manifestation of the highest cognitive agent and its cognitive faculties when it is embodied in creatures. It could be called their vehicle. Then the Composer presents various forms of incarnations according to the categories of classes and actions (as it is stated in MS 12.24).

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The discussion presented above shows changes in the way the concept of life (*jīva*) has been understood. In MDhP 180, 187, the concept of *jīva* is an important cosmological concept, understood as the immortal living manifestation of the Great Self of Brahma, the source of movement and consciousness. In MDhP 204, 206 it is an important cosmogonical concept, responsible for subject-object cognition and thus for a lack of knowledge, wrong cognition and rebirth. In MDhP 212, 228, *jīva* is presented in a liberating context. In the BhG, *jīva* is seen as a part of Kṛṣṇa, the highest cognitive agent engaged in subject-object cognition. It is the invisible support of the manifest aspect and can be seen in liberating cognition. The Composer of MS 12 is the most analytical and sees *jīva* as the locus of emotions, functionally different from the highest cognitive agent and the Great Self and, at the same time, their vehicle. In all texts it is that element of man which survives his death.

This interpretation of the concept of *jīva* as life in the early Smṛti has the following implications. If the Composers created philosophical concepts on the basis of their experience the fact that they conceived life in an abstract way, as a factor which allows reality to manifest and man to liberate, is natural. As man has to be alive to be able to cognise, in the same way reality becomes alive when it manifests itself as the cosmos. Life however, is a manifestation of reality that never really dies so it survives the death of particular bodies.

The cosmos is full of life that, when not embodied, is like space (*ākāśa*, see MDhP 180.6).<sup>139</sup> When it is embodied it acquires perceptible forms that are determined by the categories of the classes and action. Death of a particular agent is not annihilation of life because life is the manifestation of never dying reality; it is the vehicle which unites the cosmic faculties and their

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<sup>139</sup> The similarity between the concept of *jīva* and *ākāśa* is also expressed *via* the metaphor of weaving: in the source domain the frame of the weaving workshop creates a space (*ākāśa*) for the future cloth, in the target *jīva* is a supporting substrate of the cosmos (*loka*), see above, BhG 7.4–7.

cognition with the highest cognitive agent, and the results of actions with particular agents, and thus ensures a personal identity that is built during subject-object cognition.

Such an understanding of life accords with the Vedic idea that the sacrificial victim is not really killed and the category of sacrifice is still used to conceive the functioning of the cosmos.<sup>140</sup> In the same way, the dead are conceived in the model of the Five Fires. Ritual cremation is called *antyeṣṭi*, the last sacrifice, during which life is saved. It is, therefore, strongly argued that there are grounds to assume that the Vedic way of thinking about the form of the dead has been preserved.

### 3.4. Conclusion

This chapter shows the results of wrong cognition. Its basis is the decision to treat oneself as ontologically separated from the world. Such a decision is taken under the influence of the I-form (*ahaṃkāra*) because of a lack of proper knowledge/cognition. The result of this decision is a chain of objectification during which man gradually loses his cognitive abilities. The mind (*manas*) is focused on the object of the ten senses and creates their mental images (*bhāva*). In this way, it loses its aspect as the faculty which enables freedom. Reason, under the influence of the mind, uses the classes according to the mental images created by the mind and it makes decisions which lead to actions that aim at achieving or avoiding external objects. Thus, it loses its ability to cognise properly. This attitude leads to the subservience of the amalgamate agent to categories of classes and action: he is led by them according to the influences coming from the outside. Thus, he loses the human attributes which are the cognitive abilities and freedom.

The results of this chain of objectification effect his subsequent incarnations. Since the amalgamate agent thinks that he is different from reality, he becomes so. The results of his actions construct his personal individuality. This is preserved in subsequent incarnations in which he gradually loses his cognitive abilities and freedom. His objectification is also realised in that he becomes subservient to the category of time and is enclosed in the cosmos which is the object of the creative cognition of reality. However, the chain of objectification can be seen as the process of creating one's self (*ātman*). It is a solid self, as perceivable as possible, which manifests itself in various forms, human and then animal.

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<sup>140</sup> MS also attests that animal sacrifices were allowed (5.22, 31).

The situation of the highest cognitive agent present in the amalgamate agent is not described clearly. The logic of the process of objectification implies that it is enclosed in him seen as the ontological whole separated from reality. So, it cannot perform subject-object cognition from within man. This analysis interprets this cognitive situation of the highest cognitive agent as being the price paid for manifestation. It is a notion that is exhaustively elaborated in Vedic thought: if reality wants to manifest itself, it should resign from some of its attributes. In the Smṛti thought it is omniscience within the frames of a particular man.

The situation of the highest cognitive agent becomes a bit clearer thanks to the analysis of the concept of the embodied one (*dehin, śarīrin*). As shown, some of these descriptions imply the influence of the cognition of the amalgamate agent onto the highest cognitive agent. Thus, in microscale, reality would be deprived not only of its omniscience, but also of freedom which is its most important attribute since the RV.

It has also been proposed that we understand the concept of *jīva*, in early Smṛti thought, as life seen as the all-pervading living essence of the manifest aspect which is opposed to the unmanifest aspect conceived as not-living. Such a conceptualisation of the manifest aspect is entrenched in tradition where the cosmos is conceived as the living self (*ātman*) of reality. It also accords with the model of Five Fires where, following the path of the fathers, death transforms the way people live in the cosmos. Life pervades all living beings and is profiled in the amalgamate agents according to their cognition. Everything that is manifest is somehow living. We can therefore see clearly that what distinguishes man from other beings are his unique cognitive faculties.

In his book *The Archeology of Mind*, the neurologist Jaak Panksepp with his collaborator (Panksepp, Biven 2012) investigated various strata of the brain according to their appearance. According to him, the oldest stratum of the human brain which is shared by all mammals and birds (and maybe even less developed animals, at least in some cases) is the basic affects which he groups in seven systems (SEEKING, RAGE, FEAR, LUST, CARE, GRIEF/PANIC, and PLAY). Above them are other strata of the brain, called by him secondary and tertiary. The secondary stratum is the source of emotions: empathy, trust, blame, pride, shame, guilt. In the tertiary stratum the ability to name emotions, to mentalisation, to containment, mindfulness and social distancing is located (Panksepp, Biven 2012: 35). Tertiary processing (Panksepp, Biven 2012: 114–115) allows for subtle cognitive activities such as noetic (factual knowing) and auto-noetic (autobiographical time-travel) forms of emotional experiences (Panksepp, Biven 2012: 142). If we apply Panksepp's theory to the analysis of states of cognition in Smṛti thought, we could say that the amalgamate

agent is descending to the lower depths in his brain and will reach the stratum of basic affects where he can only react compulsively to external impulses. Panksepp hypothesises that it is in this stratum of basic affects we must look for the Core Self which is the animal self we share with other mammals. What is characteristic for this this area of the brain is that:

Affects provide an ongoing evaluation of the external and the internal world. Further, because of their evolutionary design characteristics, primary-process affects always evaluate the internal and external world in relation to the survival of the individual and the species. Thus, the midline systems that generate and regulate emotionality are continuously involved in self-related (what's in it for me?) and (for me?) type processing of external information. In this way we can again envision how all mammals are 'active' information-seeking creatures rather than just 'passive' information-integrating ones.<sup>141</sup>

This is the kind of self the amalgamate agent creates by concentrating on his survival and that of his relatives with the constant asking of 'what's in it for me?'. It recalls the statements of āsuric people (see section 3.1). One is not saying that the early Smṛti Composers understood the structure of brain in the way understood by modern science. What one can say is that their strenuous and persistent work on the mind since the earliest times gave them a good understanding of its deep structures and the effect of human action on the psyche. Research done by Panksepp on the mutual connections between the mind and the brain leads him to conclude they should be seen as a unity which he calls MindBrain or BrainMind. This could appear to confirm the underlying hypothesis of this analysis which is that that the focus by early Hindu philosophers, on the interaction of mind and reason, meant they understand mind and behaviour far better than could be expected with their limited tools.

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<sup>141</sup> Panksepp, Biven (2012: 421).

# Chapter Four

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## Freedom

This chapter is devoted to an analysis of liberating cognition which leads to ultimate freedom. In discussing this issue, we must again take into account two perspectives, that of man and that of the highest cognitive agent which manifests in him. The perspective of the highest cognitive agent allows us to postulate that the words *mokṣa/mukti* refer to its liberation in that it is the highest cognitive agent which liberates itself during liberating practice. However, the only sentient beings able to make its liberation possible, are men who are can perform, in micro-scale, the cognitive activity of reality. In MS 12.96–96, these are the wise Brahmins who know the Veda (*brahmavedinas*). In MS 12.103, it is those who remember texts, have knowledge and know how to use reason to make correct decisions (*vyavasāyinas*). In MDhP 286.20–21, it is those who are wise and are not proud (*amāninas*). It follows then that it is not enough to be born as man. The appropriate man is one who belongs to the head of the social body i.e., Brahmin. Birth alone is not a necessary and sufficient condition for the realisation of ultimate freedom in micro-scale. It can only occur when a man possesses proper knowledge and acts accordingly.

The unique role of man among other sentient beings is granted by his mind (*manas*) thanks to which he can realise absolute freedom by his reason (*buddhi*) that allows him to make proper decisions.<sup>1</sup> Thus viewed, man can be seen as a manifestation of the relationship between freedom and its absence, between the subject and the object. The relational character of man is expressed in two emotions, he is capable of suffering and of desire for happiness.

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<sup>1</sup> But in MDhP 173, there is a story of a jackal who, in its previous life was a skeptic who despised the Vedas and now, in its animal form, it is handicapped because it does not have hands as humans do.

### 4.1. Suffering (*duḥkha*)

It should be noted that both chapters of the MBh analysed in this study, the BhG and the MDhP, are answers to a suffering man. Arjuna's suffering arises from the fear that he will have to commit appalling crimes during the battle. Yudhiṣṭhira has lost everything, although he has won the battle. Their suffering is the motive for their search to liberate themselves from that suffering.

In the initial chapters of the MDhP, Yudhiṣṭhira asks how one's suffering can be appeased when one's closest relatives are lost (MDhP 168.6). Then Bhīṣma tells him of the discourses between the king Senajit and the Brahmin (MDhP 168) and of the discourse between a son and his father (MDhP 169) where the misery of human life and the suffering arising from it is described at length.<sup>2</sup> For the present analysis it is important to note that suffering is an emotion that is experienced only by those who are in the middle of the threefold hierarchy of beings:

#### MDhP 168.24

*ye ca mūḍhatamā loke ye ca buddheḥ param gatāḥ |  
te narāḥ sukham edhante kliṣyaty antarito janāḥ ||*

Only those men who are most ignorant in the world and those who go higher than reason can attain happiness. Men who are in between suffer.<sup>3</sup>

Within the frames of the subject-object structure of the cosmos it can be said that free men are manifestation of the subjective power of reality in that they always cognise objects correctly and feel eternal happiness (verses c–d). On the other hand, those most ignorant (*mūḍhatama*, verse a) are manifestation of the objective power. They do not cognise reality at all and focus only on their own narrow human purposes and goals and are happy when they achieve them.<sup>4</sup> Neither those with purely subjective manifestation or those with purely objective manifestation have the motivation for liberating cognition. Only those who have the intermediate (*madhya*, verse d) position can do that.

The relational character of suffering is expressed as belonging to emotions recognised as rajasic. As previously shown, the class of rajas categorises phenomena that are in the middle of the hierarchy and it therefore brings into relation the two opposed spheres recognised as sattvic and tamasic. We have already considered the influence of the category of classes on the

<sup>2</sup> See also MaU 1.

<sup>3</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

<sup>4</sup> See also MDhP 173.36.



afterlife form of man (MS 12.40–41, see chapter 2.1.2). Those who use the category of *sattva* in their cognition are reborn as gods, those who use the category of *rajas* are reborn as men while those who use the category of *tamas* are reborn as animals. According to BhG 14.14–15, death in the state categorised as *sattvic* leads to the highest and purest world. Death in the state categorised as *rajasic* leads to the world of those who cling to action. Death in the state categorised as *tamasic* leads to the worlds of those who are ignorant. A man's future life also depends on the results of the actions he has performed during his life, that shaped its form. It is also categorised by classes: the result (*phala*) of an action performed well (*sukṛta*) is categorised as *sattvic*, suffering is the result of action categorised as *rajasic* and lack of knowledge is the result of action categorised as *tamasic* (BhG 14.16). This structure of rebirth is presented with the aid of the image schema of VERTICALITY: those who are in the state categorised as *sattvic* go upwards, those who are in the state categorised as *rajasic* remain in between, those who are in the state categorised as *tamasic* go downwards (BhG 14.18, MS 12.42). Suffering is intertwined with being human.

Arjuna's suffering described in the BhG is so unbearable that it is conceived in terms of burning fire (BhG 2.8)<sup>5</sup>. This conceptualisation is not only motivated by the general human conceptualisation of suffering in terms of fire but also by its relational character which is expressed by the specific ICM of fire. Since the ṚV, fire has been conceived as moving between earth and sky and between men and gods thus uniting the opposing spheres. This ICM seems to be the reason why, in Smṛti thought, light/fire (*jyotis/agni*) is in the middle of the hierarchy of the great beings (*mahābhūta*). Conceptualisation of suffering in terms of fire expresses the relational nature of the position of man categorised as *rajasic*. As stated in the Veda, happiness is the motivation for creation so suffering is an unwanted experience. On the other hand, if it did not happen, no agent would undertake liberating cognition during which the unity of reality is realised. Thus, suffering plays an important and positive role in the micro-scale. Its conceptualisation in terms of fire also reflects its ambivalent role which is well grounded in tradition, as fire can kill and can also give life.

In macro-scale suffering plays a positive role too. It is the emotion that appears immediately after reality is manifested when the highest cognitive agent realises that it is alone. This fact is only implied by the ŚB, in its descriptions of Prajāpati who is only one and wants to multiply himself. The recipient can evoke the experience of personal suffering felt when one is

<sup>5</sup> BhG 2.8ab: *na hi prapaśyāmi mamāpanudyād yac chokam ucchoṣaṇam indriyāṇām.*

alone, especially in ancient cultures where being alone meant being beyond society and could lead to death. In BU 1.4, suffering is implied by another emotion which is fear. The highest cognitive agent can overcome suffering thanks to the continuation of creation that involves going deeper and deeper into subject-object cognition. In the case of man, suffering can be overcome by liberating cognition during which the creative stages are reversed and man goes beyond subject-object cognition and experiences the unity of reality.

The focus on suffering could be the Buddhist influence and early Smṛti Composers understand its appeasement in a similar vein. Suffering could only be appeased by the radical transformation of consciousness. However, the early Smṛti composers understood this transformation in Vedic terms as the creation of a self (*ātman*): in the case of reality, it is the manifest living self while in case of man it is the unmanifest self. In Buddhism the self is negated while, in Brahminic philosophy, the search for the self (*ātman*) is the antidote for suffering. The Composer of MDhP, having described the omnipresence of suffering, presents the way out in the pure Vedic terms, as the search for a self which is hidden in a cave (Jurewicz 2010):

### MDhP 169.36

*kiṃ te dhanair bāndhavair vāpi kiṃ te; kiṃ te dārain brāhmaṇa yo mariṣyasi |  
ātmanam anviccha guhām praviṣṭam; pitāmahas te kva gataḥ pitā ca ||*

If you are going to die, Brahmin, what is the point of your wealth, kinsmen and wives? Search for the self which lies hidden in the cave of the heart. Where have your grand-fathers and your father gone?

The last question activates the Ṛgvedic descriptions of the afterlife where the dead follow their fathers who have found the way to the afterlife happiness conceived in terms of a free place within the mountain (Jurewicz 2010). The Composer activates the same source domain in order to express the new practice and, at the same time, anchor it in tradition.

## 4.2. Desire (*kāma*) and happiness (*sukha*)

In the early Smṛti texts analysed in this study, not all desire is rejected. The composer of the MS 2.2–5, in the beginning of his description of the four *āśrāmas*, the stages of life, notes that any action needs desire. Olivelle (2005: 243) thinks that this section is ‘out of place here’ and is ‘parenthetical within the larger discourse on the sources of the Law’ but arguably it does

fit the context. The chapter begins with a description of the four stages of life which could be called ‘the proper management of desire.’

In MS 2.2,4 the Composer states that, on one hand, it is not recommended to be motivated by desire, on the other hand no action in this world is performed without desire including Vedic studies and the performance of Vedic rites. Desire comes from mental images (*saṃkalpa*) of objects that are given by actions: sacrifices (*yajña*), religious observance (*vrata*) and rules of restraint (*yamadharmā*, MS 2.3). Thus, man should engage in them properly as he will then fulfill his desires in this world and attain the world of the immortals (MS 2.5).<sup>6</sup> The clue is hidden in the adverb *samyag* ‘properly’ which qualifies the way desire for happiness should be realised.

People are at various levels of their spiritual development, but all want to escape from suffering. Fulfillment of one’s desire makes one happy and happiness, which was the aim in the creation of the cosmos, should be the aim of one’s life. It is not happiness, and desire for it, that are wrong but the way of their realisation. If it comes thanks to actions that are in accordance with the prescriptions of the Veda and with one’s dharma, it is not condemned, just the opposite. It is called the root of dharma, together with the tradition and practice of those who know the Veda and the conduct of good people, MS 2.6)<sup>7</sup>, and is its visible mark (*lakṣaṇa*), MS 2.12<sup>8</sup> Feeling happy is a sign that one is in accord with dharma, so people are urged to perform actions that bring them happiness.<sup>9</sup>

In BhG 7, where Kṛṣṇa is described as the best element of various categories, he is presented as the desire of beings and that this desire is not against dharma (BhG 7.11: *dharmāvīruddho bhūteṣu kāmo ‘smi*). Hence, it is not desire in itself that is wrong but desire that leads to obsessive attachment to external objects (*saṅga*) as described in the previous chapter.

One could say that initially, Manu does not set the moral bar too high similarly to other Smṛti teachers like Kṛṣṇa in the BhG. Both teachers say that everyday desire for happiness is right and that it is enough to practice one’s dharma which makes one happy here and thereafter. In this way, they place Vedic thought and ritual practice in new philosophical and ethical frames that can be seen as an answer to Buddhist propositions. Desire to create the

<sup>6</sup> MS 2.5: *teṣu samyag vartamāno gacchaty amaralokatām | yathā saṃkalpitāmś ceha sarvān kāmān samaśnute ||*

<sup>7</sup> MS 2.6: *vedo ‘khilo dharmamūlaṃ smṛtiśīle ca tadvidām | ācāraś caiva sādḥnām ātmanas tuṣṭir eva ca ||*

<sup>8</sup> MS 2.12: *vedaḥ smṛtiḥ sadācāraḥ svasya ca priyam ātmanaḥ | etac caturvidhaṃ prāhuḥ sāḥśād dharmasya lakṣaṇam ||*

<sup>9</sup> MS 4.161: *yat karma kurvato ‘sya syāt paritoṣo ‘ntarātmanaḥ | tat prayatnena kurvīta viparītaṃ tu varjayet ||*

self (*ātman*) had motivated Vedic thinkers and this desire, together with its metaphysical aim which is the creation of an immortal self, was still valid. Some build their selves in ritual, others in liberating practice, but all of them repeat the first creative will of reality which, in its cognitive act, created its second self only in order to cognise it and recover epistemic unity. Two emotions, enumerated by the first two Noble Truths, suffering (*dukkha*) and craving (*taṇhā*), are accepted here as a positive trigger to practice *dharma* and to look for freedom. It should be noted that both Manu and Kṛṣṇa begin to teach liberating practice almost immediately after their approbation for any thought and action that are in accord with *dharma*.

Before we look at the general model of liberating practice and the way it was performed, we need to focus on some specific issues connected with this topic. In the following sections we will therefore discuss the role of recitation in liberating cognition and its connection with *tapas* understood as heat. As we have seen, in the cosmogony of the MS, the concept of *tapas* is used in the descriptions of the creation of the first man (Manu), in creation performed by his descendants (see chapter 1.1.8) and in the description of the creation of the Brahmin (see chapter 2.7) The concept of fire is a concept which motivates thinking in descriptions of human supernatural activity and in conceptualisation of the Brahmin as the embodiment of the Veda (*brahman*). Now we will examine this issue in a more detail.

We will first discuss the liberating role of recitation as it is presented in the MS (4.3). Then the concept of *tapas* as it is understood in the Smṛti texts analysed here (4.4). In the next section we examine the problems of *sāṃhkyā* and *yoga* as they are seen in the early MDhP and the way they are identified with soft recitation conceived as fiery (*japa*, 4.5). Finally, we analyse two basic metaphors of *yoga* used in the Smṛti texts, YOGA IS KINDLING FIRE and YOGA IS RIDING IN A CHARIOT (4.6). The tentative hypothesis is that in the early Smṛti texts, the noun *tapas* means transformative heat gained in recitation which requires proper breathing. This practice, thus understood, continues earlier Vedic practices. It should be noted that while the concept of heating (*tapas*) seems to be a crucial part of the practices in times of the Brāhmaṇas (which may be reconstructed on the basis of cosmogonies), it is practically absent in the Upaniṣadic descriptions which mostly focus on mental states and on the role of proper breathing during recitation (Jurewicz 2016/18). The Smṛti concept of liberating practice, where heating is so often mentioned, revives the earlier Vedic ideas and fuses them with the Upaniṣadic ones. It is impossible to state if the Smṛti descriptions of recitation and *tapas* reflect a real experience of heating during this process or if their concept was a theoretical construct built on a tradition which the Composers wanted to revive. What can

be shown is the extent to which their thinking is motivated by the logic of the Vedic source concepts, such as ICM of fire with its prototypical features (purification and destruction), by the general domains, especially of Cooking and Cleansing By Heat and by metaphors in which fire is the source domain (first of all BREATH IS FIRE, SPEECH IS FIRE, HUNGER IS FIRE). However, one cannot exclude the possibility that long recitation with proper breathing could make people hot.

### 4.3. The liberating role of recitation

The Composer of the MS describes the liberating role of recitation in the second chapter where he describes the duties of the Vedic pupil (*brahmacārin*) in connection with the oral learning of the Veda (Scharfe 2002). Let us follow his line of thinking.

He begins with the statement that the syllable OM should be always recited in the beginning and at the end of Vedic recitation (MS 2.74).<sup>10</sup> To explain the fundamental role of recitation of the syllable, he activates the image of a flowing stream of water that should be enclosed from both sides. Otherwise, it will flow away and disappear. OM is conceived in terms of a dike and recitation in terms of stream. Such a conceptualisation of the recitation of the Veda is attested already in the ŚB and JB (Jurewicz 2012b). If the recipient activates the verb *kṣar-*, synonymous to the verb *sru-* used in the MS, he will see the coherence of this metaphor. The syllable OM is called in Sanskrit *a-kṣara* ‘something that does not flow’, so its conceptualisation in terms of a dike is justified because a dike does not flow. When the recipient activates the metaphor, COSMOS IS A FLOWING RIVER,<sup>11</sup> the syllable OM, conceived in terms of a dike, would correspond to the borderline sphere between aspects of reality. There is a similar metaphor in BU 4.4.22, CU 8.4.1 (Jurewicz 2016/18). The borderline sphere between the two aspects is contradictory and the syllable OM is contradictory too: it does not flow (*a-kṣara*), but it is a sound, so it flows (*kṣarati*) because speech is conceived in terms of flowing water. The play with this double meaning of the verb *kṣar-* and its derivatives can be found already in the RV (1.164.42) and is elaborated in later Vedic texts (Jurewicz 2012b).

<sup>10</sup> MS 2.74: *brahmanaḥ praṇavaṃ kuryād ādāv ante ca sarvadā | sravaty anomaḥkrtaṃ pūrvaṃ parastāc ca viśīryati ||*

<sup>11</sup> Which motivates the conceptualisation of situation of living beings in terms of co-flowing, *saṃsāra*, it is also used as the general term for the cosmos.

In MS 2.75, the preparation of the place where recitation should be performed is presented:

### MS 2.75

*prākkūlān paryupāsīnaḥ pavitraiś caiva pāvitaḥ |  
prāṇāyāmais tribhiḥ pūtas tata omkāram arhati ||*

When he is seated on sacred grass with the tips toward the east, cleansed by the purificatory blades of grass, and purified by controlling his breath three times – then he becomes competent to recite OM.

The meaning of the word *pavitra* (verse b) is ‘means of purification’ and is variously interpreted by the commentators (Olivelle 2005: 249). However, the word *pavitra* is commonly used in the ṚV to denote the filter used in the preparation of soma. The recipient who knows the ṚV by heart may activate this meaning too and thus will see the continuity of liberating practice although the means are different.

In verse c the pupil should cleanse himself by, as Olivelle translates, ‘controlling his breath three times’. In classical Yoga, the word *prāṇāyāma* means the control of breath seen as a separate practice from recitation (*svādhyāya*). In the context of the teaching of the MS, *prāṇāyāmais tribhiḥ* it rather refers to the three conscious and deep breaths using the diaphragm that calm one’s breath before recitation. The word *prāṇāyāma* in reference to breathing during recitation of the syllable OM and Great Calls appears in MS 6.70 and in MS 11.249.<sup>12</sup> In his note to MS 6.70, Olivelle (2005: 291) refers to *Vasiṣṭha Dharmasūtra* where the definition of *prāṇāyāma* is presented: it is a recitation of the Sāvitrī-mantra and the Great Calls (*vyāhṛti*) with the syllable OM and the *Śīras* formula for proper breathing.<sup>13</sup>

In some places of the MS, controlled breathing is described separately from recitation (6.69, 70,72, 11.142,200). This attests the beginnings of the process of their separation that is characteristic for classical Yoga tradition. The process of the separation requires a separate and thorough study.

Three controlled breaths not only prepare the pupil for proper recitation but also cleanse him. The conviction of the cleansing power of breath is based on the metaphor BREATH IS FIRE.<sup>14</sup> It can also be motivated by the experience of being heated during breathing. This metaphor is explicitly activated in MS 6.71 where the source domain, of the activity of the blacksmith and the burning away of impurities in metallic ore, is used to conceive the faults of

<sup>12</sup> The numeration of stanzas in Chapter 11 is according to Olivelle (2005).

<sup>13</sup> For the sources of yoga in the Vedic recitation of OM, see Gerety (2021).

<sup>14</sup> For purification during liberating cognition, see below, section 4.9.5.

the senses that disappear thanks to the breath of a *saṃnyāsin* (here probably without recitation because he should be silent).<sup>15</sup>

Now the Composer of the MS leaves the topic of recitation of the syllable OM, the Great Calls and the Sāvitrī-mantra in order to present their creation. In MS 2.76, the creation of the three sounds of the syllable OM (*a*, *u* and nasal *m*) and of the three Great Calls (*bhūr*, *bhuvas*, *sva*) is conceived in terms of milk from the three Vedas.<sup>16</sup> This source domain appears in MS 1.23 where the three Vedas are conceived as milked from fire, wind and the sun (see chapter 1.1.6). The concept of milking projects, onto the target domain, the concept of extracting the essence of an object in the same way as milk is the essence of the cow. Let us note that, from the perspective of a cowherd, a barren cow is not a cow because it is useless for him so milk can be seen as the definitional essence of a cow.<sup>17</sup> The present description accords with the Vedic scenario of the creation of the Great Calls, and the syllable OM, which Prajāpati is presented as squeezing from part of the cosmos (JUB 1.24). The metonymic link is based on the image schema of CONTAINER in terms of which the relationship between the cosmos, the Great Calls and the syllable OM is conceived: a cow is conceived as a container and its essence, milk, is that which is squeezed from it. The reciter understands that, when one recites OM and the Great Calls, one recites the triple Veda and, finally, one ‘recites’ parts of the cosmos and thus creates them as Prajāpati did in *illo tempore*.<sup>18</sup>

In the next stanza, the Composer describes the creation of the Sāvitrī-mantra:

### MS 2.77

*tribhya eva tu vedebhyaḥ pādaṃ pādam adūduhat |*  
*tad ity rco ‘syāḥ sāvitrīyāḥ parameṣṭhī prajāpatiḥ ||*

Also, from the three Vedas, Prajāpati, the Supreme Lord, squeezed out foot by foot the Sāvitrī verse: ‘That....’

In his description of the creation of the Sāvitrī-mantra, the Composer of the MS activates not only the concept of milking but also the concept of receiving the delivery of a cow. The word *pāda* also means ‘leg’ and the verses (*pāda*)

<sup>15</sup> For the purificatory role of work of breath, see MS 6.71, 69, 72, 11.142, 200, 202.

<sup>16</sup> See MS 2.76: *akāraṃ cāpy ukāraṃ ca makāraṃ ca prajāpatiḥ | vedatrayān niraduhad bhūr bhuvāḥ svar itīti ca ||*

<sup>17</sup> And this is the case in the RV where milk is metonymically called with the word which means ‘cow’ (*go*, WHOLE FOR PART, COW FOR MILK, ENTITY FOR ITS ESSENCE), see Introduction 6.2.

<sup>18</sup> In the same way we say ‘I’ve drunk the whole bottle’ when what we are referring to is its content.

of Sāvitrī are taken one after another (*pādam pādam*, verse b) from the Veda. Thus, the Composer creates a conceptual network that consists of the following input spaces: 1) the concept of a cowherd who milks a cow, 2) the concept of a cowherd who takes a calf from a cow, 3) the recitation of the Sāvitrī-mantra by Prajāpati, and 4) the creation of the cosmos by Prajāpati. In the blend only three verses (*pāda*) of the Sāvitrī-mantra are recited conceived in terms of the three legs (*pāda*) of a calf that emerge from its mother. The fourth remains imperceptible in the same way as one leg of the highest cognitive agent is conceived in terms of the blended concept of a man (*puruṣa*) and a bull<sup>19</sup> in RV 10.90. The content of Sāvitrī-mantra is metonymically activated by the first word *tat* ‘That’ in the same way as the word *Credo* activates the whole prayer of a Christian (Radden-Kovecses 1999).

In the next stanza (2.78), the Composer states that if one softly recites the syllable OM, the Great Calls and Sāvitrī-mantra, one receives merit that is equal to the merit from the recitation of the whole Veda. The relationship between the whole Veda on one hand and the syllable OM, the Calls and Sāvitrī-mantra on the other is conceived in terms of the relationship between a cow and its milk/calf (see above, MS 2.76). Metonymies ESSENCE FOR ENTITY, CONTENT FOR CONTAINER justify this way of thinking. Moreover, as previously stated, in the RV, there is an established metonymy COW FOR MILK that motivates the use of the noun *go* ‘cow’ in reference to milk. The same metonymy is active here although in its reverse form: MILK FOR COW. These three metonymies give conceptual coherence to the conviction as to the efficacy of recitation of OM, the I-form and the Sāvitrī-mantra.

Recitation described by the Composer is soft recitation (*japa*). This kind of recitation indicates further changes in liberating practices, based on recitation with breathing. It can be assumed that recitation of the Veda had been performed loudly and resulted in a change of consciousness (Jurewicz 2016/18). Now, it seems, this change of consciousness can be realised even during soft recitation (for *japa* and its power, see also below, section 4.5).

According to the next stanza (MS 2.79), soft recitation frees the reciter from sin within one month i.e., transforms the ontic state of the reciter.<sup>20</sup> The process of purification will be discussed below (see section 4.9.5). The conviction about the purificatory power of recitation is based on the Vedic metaphors BREATH IS FIRE, SPEECH IS FIRE, and on the conviction of the purificatory nature of fire. This source domain is not activated here and only one its feature (purification)

<sup>19</sup> It has four legs and not two.

<sup>20</sup> MS 2.79: *sahasrakṛtvas tv abhyasya bahir etat trikaṃ dvijaḥ | mahato 'py enaso māsāt tvacevāhir vimucyate ||*



is projected into the target domain. The Composer activates another concept to describe the change of the reciter: he is conceived in terms of a snake that is liberated from its old skin. This source domain allows him to highlight the radical transformation of the reciter in the same way as a snake with a new skin is radically transformed. Those who do not recite the Sāvitrī-mantra are blamed by other people (MS 2.80). Thus, it is implied that the social status of men, who should recite it, changes if they do not do so.

Now the Composer explains why recitation of OM, the Great Calls and the Sāvitrī-mantra have such great power:

### MS 2.81

*oṃkārapūrvikās tisro mahāvyaḥrtayo 'vyayāḥ |*  
*tripadā caiva sāvitṛī vijñeyaṃ brahmaṇo mukham ||*

The three inexhaustible Great Calls preceded by OM and the three-footed Sāvitrī verse should be recognised as the mouth of the Veda.

The Great Calls preceded by OM are qualified as imperishable (*avyaya*, verse b). This explanation again activates earlier descriptions of the creation of speech in the form of a Sāvitrī-stanza based on the play of the words *a-kṣara* and *kṣara* that come from the root *kṣar-*. Speech is conceived in terms of flowing water that implies its impermanence but the Great Calls and OM, although they are realised in speech, are imperishable. As mentioned above, this play of words is elaborated in the Veda up to JB 1.24 where *akṣara* is understood as *akṣaya* which has the same meaning (Jurewicz 2012b). To call elements of speech that are by nature perishable, as imperishable, is to express the earlier contradiction.

The syllable OM, the Calls and the Sāvitrī-mantra are also called the mouth of the brahman (*brahmaṇo mukham*, verse d). Olivelle interprets *brahman* as the Veda but its meaning as reality should also be activated. Within the frames of this interpretation, the Vedic conceptualisation of the cosmos as the open mouth of reality, conceived in terms of a man, is activated.<sup>21</sup> Recitation of the Veda (*brahman*) creates the cosmos (vide BhG sacrifices *vitata brahmano mukhe*, see section 4.11.2). Thus, in reverse order the sacrifice, who recites the OM and the Calls, activates the whole Veda (*brahman*) that is the mouth of reality manifest in the cosmos i.e., the highest cognitive agent who constantly recites the Veda and its unmanifest aspect (*brahman*).

This is expressed in the next stanza:

<sup>21</sup> For this metaphor see chapter 2.1.1, and section 4.12.

**MS 2.82**

*yo 'dhīte 'hany ahany etāṃ trīṇi varṣāṇy atandritaḥ |  
sa brahma param abhyeti vāyubhūtaḥ khamūrtimān ||*

When a man recites this verse tirelessly for three years, becoming wind and assuming an ethereal form, he reaches the highest Brahman.

The reciter is presented as *vāyubhūta* ('becoming wind' verse d) and *khamūrtimān* (literally: 'whose perceptible form is space' verse d). The former expression activates the Vedic descriptions of the transformation of consciousness: it is conceived in terms of the wind. The latter activates the Vedic conceptualisation of the early creative stage when reality creates an empty space which is the first outline of the cosmos (Jurewicz 2016/18). Taking into account that the cosmos is conceived in terms of an open mouth constantly reciting the Veda (see above, MS 2.81), the recipient might also activate this image and conceive the reciter in these terms. Within the frames of this conceptualisation the reciter becomes reality (*brahman*) which, at the beginning of creation, recited itself in the words of the Veda (*brahman*).

**MS 2.83**

*ekākṣaram paraṃ brahma prāṇāyāmaḥ paraṃ tapaḥ |  
sāvitrīyaḥ tu paraṃ nāsti maunāt satyaṃ viśiṣyate ||*

The highest Brahman is the monosyllable OM; the highest heat<sup>22</sup> is the control of breath; nothing is higher than the Sāvitrī; and truth is better than ascetic silence.

*Ekākṣara* (verse a) is the monosyllable OM i.e., its three sounds that were pronounced together at the beginning of creation. Because of that it is identified with the highest brahman (metonymy SPEECH FOR THE SPEAKER, ACTIVITY FOR AN AGENT). In verse b, breath control (*prāṇāyāma*) is called the highest heat (*tapas*). That breath control accompanies recitation can be seen in verses c–d where the Composer states that nothing is higher than the Sāvitrī-mantra and that truth is better than silence. Truth can only exist when it is recited. Thus, the Composer expresses his conviction that the Brahminic practice of recitation with proper breathing is more efficient than those proposed by other philosophical and religious strands that recommend silence.

**MS 2.84**

*kṣaranti sarvā vaidikyo juhōtiyajatikriyāḥ |  
akṣaram duṣkaram jñeyaṃ brahma caiva prajāpatih ||*

<sup>22</sup> Olivelle (2005: 99): 'ascetic toil'.

Offering ghee while seated, offering oblations while standing – all such Vedic rites perish. The syllable (*akṣara*) OM should be recognised as imperishable (*akṣara*); it is Brahman, it is Prajāpati.

The Composer again plays with the meaning of the verb *kṣar-* and its derivatives. The feature of being perishable (*kṣaranti*) is ascribed to Vedic sacrifices. As stated many, Vedic thought and ritual is limited to the manifest aspect together with the borderline sphere between the two aspects. This has changed in the early Upaniṣads and this change of consciousness has been caused (at least partly) by the practice of recitation with proper breathing. This practice was continued in Smṛti times and MS 2.84 expresses this explicitly: it is recitation of OM that leads to *brahman* (the Veda and reality) and to the highest cognitive agent (Prajāpati, verse d). The literal meaning of verse c (*akṣaram duṣkaram jñeyam*) is: ‘what is imperishable, (recitation of) syllable OM, should be known as difficult to perform’. In the minds of the recipients, the blended double meaning of *akṣara* is immediately evoked. It seems obvious that both the proper recitation of OM and the mental reaching of the unmanifest aspect is difficult (*duṣkara*).

In the MDhP (224.53–54), heat (*tapas*) is conceived in the same way: as the origin of beings, as a means to fulfill one’s desires, to reach reality in its creative manifestation and to become one with it.<sup>23</sup> It is next stated that the seers looked after the Vedas with heat (*tapas*) and then speech without beginning and end appeared to them thanks to the Self-existent (MDhP 224.55).<sup>24</sup> Here, the meaning of recitation is clear and the recipient can enlarge it into the previous stanzas.

#### 4.4. Looking for fire. Tapas as transformative heat

The translators of Smṛti texts usually translate *tapas* as ascetic effort/toil, austerities etc. However, it is difficult to state what kind of austerities they could have in mind. True, there are descriptions of practices which imply *tapas* is accompanied by some physical exertion.<sup>25</sup> The tiresome and difficult nature of *tapas* is highlighted by its adjectives such as *ugra*, *suduścara* (e.g. MDhP 210.14, 250.16–17). However, other activities that could be treated

<sup>23</sup> MDhP 224: *tapo niḥśreyasaṃ jantōs tasya mūlaṃ damaḥ śamaḥ | tena sarvān avāpnoti yān kāmān manasecchati || (53) tapasā tad avāpnoti yad bhūtaṃ sṛjate jagat | sa tadbhūtaś ca sarveṣāṃ bhūtānāṃ bhavati prabhuh || (54)*

<sup>24</sup> MDhP 224.55: *ṛṣayas tapasā vedān adhyaiṣanta divāniṣam | anādinidhanā nityā vāg utsṛṣṭā svayambhuvā ||*

<sup>25</sup> E.g. MU 1.2: *paramam tapa āsthāya... ādityam īksamāna urdhvabāhus tiṣṭhati.*

as ascetic toil include restrictions on food, living on alms, celibacy, isolation and a specific position of the body are not usually identified with *tapas* in the Smṛti texts analysed here they often accompany it and tend to be prescribed for the final stages of life (e.g., MDhP 234.6–9, 236.8–15, MS 6). Moreover, *tapas* undertaken in order to harm oneself or another is categorised as tamasic (BhG 17.19) and in European and Christian tradition the meaning of self-torture is present within the semantic range of the word *ascesis*.

It is therefore argued that in early Smṛti texts the noun *tapas* activates the general meaning of transformation under the influence of heat and that this meaning is motivated by the general domains of Cleansing By Heat and Cooking. This argument is based on the general conviction, confirmed in earlier studies (Jurewicz 2016/18) that the post-Rgvedic texts attest the efforts to gain altered states of consciousness without soma. These efforts patterned the physical symptoms of somic influence which is being hot. It seems that, while the Composers of the Brāhmaṇas looked to the supernatural mental state as achieved by physical effort (*śrama*) which led to heat (*tapas*),<sup>26</sup> the Āraṇyakas and the early Upaniṣads present the increasing role of recitation in this process (Jurewicz 2016/18). It was, however, conceptually and/or experientially connected with heating. According to ŚB 11.5.7.1, the results of personal recitation, *svādhyāya*, are presented in a context in which the state called *lokapakti*, ‘cooking the world,’ is mentioned.<sup>27</sup> Malamoud (1996a) understands it as the source domain<sup>28</sup> for all sacrificial activities which transform the sacrificer and make him perfect and which realised, in microscale, the activity of the sun.<sup>29</sup> One could speculate that the conventional name of the sun in the Brāhmaṇas, *yá eṣa tāpati*, ‘that one who heats’ might also express the fact that the sun (ostensively presented by the speaker with his hand, as we may presume) is an example for the practitioners who should repeat its activity conceived in terms of heating (or maybe will experience it as such).

This idea is continued in the the early Smṛti texts, at least in case of Brahmins for whom *tapas* is recitation (*svādhyāya*).<sup>30</sup> The Vedas are still remembered and repeated orally. It should be noted that recitation, which takes place for a long time, is connected with physical effort, proper breathing included. The posture of the body should be relaxed and firm at the same

<sup>26</sup> Expressed in cosmogonic formula: *sò śrāmyat sá tāpo tāpyata*.

<sup>27</sup> See also Hildebeitel’s (2011 dharma: 88–89) analysis of this concept in connection with the concept of dharma. For *lokapakti* see also chapter 2.6.2.

<sup>28</sup> Malamoud does not use this term.

<sup>29</sup> My studies in Jurewicz 2016/18 confirm and enlarge this interpretation.

<sup>30</sup> See MS 2.166 (section 4.4.1). As Hildebeitel writes ‘[s]vādhyāya has by now become ‘a hallmark, if never quite the monopoly, of the Brahmin class.’ (2011a: 87).

time while the muscles of the belly need to work to move the diaphragm properly. One should also move properly the muscles of one's vocal apparatus, especially of larynx, tongue and lips. It is therefore possible that the physical exertion which is mentioned together with *tapas* in some stanzas (see below, MDhP 210.14) refer to these physical efforts. A long recitation (be it loud or soft) is demanding and some Smṛti texts prescribe that the mantras be recited a thousand times (e.g., MS 2.85). So, it is probable that the reciters felt exhausted and very hot.

Although the Composers of the early Smṛti texts do not use the concept of fire or its prototypical feature, which is heating, to conceive the creation and existence of the world, there are passages that explicitly conceive the existence of the world in terms of heating. They appear in the descriptions of human activity. In the following passage of the MDhP the metaphor, EXISTENCE OF THE COSMOS IS HEATING (TAPAS), is the ground for the heating practice of men:

#### MDhP 210.14

*śriyaṃ divyāṃ abhiprepsur brahma vānmanasā śuciḥ |*  
*śārīrair niyamair ugraiś caren niṣkalmaṣaṃ tapaḥ ||*

A man pure in his speech and mind, who wants to reach divine fame and brahman, should practice heat without any taint, accompanied by fierce restraints of the body.<sup>31</sup>

The noun *śrī* (verse a) activates the R̥gvedic concept of somic exaltation understood in terms of reaching the sun. It metonymically activates the conceptual cluster of *śrī*, *śrávas*, *yáśas* and *kṣatrá* (Jurewicz 2010) which expresses the exaltation of soma conceived as being on the sun. Here, *śrī*, brahman (verse b), the Veda and reality in its unmanifest aspect, is achieved. The noun *śrī* is used consciously to activate tradition and to blend the results, gained thanks to soma, with results that are gained by contemporaneous practices. These practices, called 'heat without any taint' (*niskalmasam tapas*, verse c), need to be accompanied by fierce physical restraints. It is argued that interpretation of *tapas* as recitation is most probable here. The above description may also activate the efforts (expressed by the word *śram-*, *sò 'śrāmyat*) of Prajāpati mentioned in the beginning of cosmogonies of the ŚB which result in heating (*sá tápo 'tapyata*).

Now the Composer places man's activity in a broader cosmic context:

<sup>31</sup> Jurewicz's translation

**MDhP 210.15**

*trailokyam tapasā vyāptam antarbhūtena bhāsvatā |  
sūryas ca candramās caiva bhāsatas tapasā divi ||*

The triple world is permeated by this hidden, resplendent heat;<sup>32</sup> it is because of this heat<sup>33</sup> that the sun and the moon shine in the heaven.

The world is the creation of reality conceived as fiery which manifests itself thanks to toiling and heating, just as in the RV and ŚB (verses a–b). Its visible signs are the sun and the moon (verses c–d). If we recall the earlier interpretation of the concept of *jīva* as life, we will see the coherence in thinking: according to everyday experience an alive person is warm so the heat of the cosmos is a manifestation of the living self of reality. So, the activities prescribed for men, called *tapas*, are realisation in micro-scale of the creative activity.

Then the Composer describes liberating cognitive activity which is identified with heat:

**MDhP 210.16**

*pratāpas tapaso jñānam loke samśabditam tapaḥ |  
rajastamoghaṇam yat karma tapasas tat svalakṣaṇam ||*

Glowing heat is cognition which arises from heat. Heat is praised in the world. Any action that destroys rajas and tamas is a specific sign of the heat.<sup>34</sup>

Verse a (*pratāpas tapaso jñānam*) can be interpreted in two ways. The first interpretation, proposed in the translation above is that heat (*tapas*) leads to cognition of more advanced (as we may presume) practices called ‘strong/glowing heat’ (*pratāpa*). The second one, which is complementary, is that the ‘strong/glowing heat’ (*pratāpa*) is cognition which arises from the heat (*tapas*). The suggestion is that the process described here is reciprocal: the practice called *tapas* leads to cognition of the practice called *pratāpa* and *pratāpa* leads to cognition of *tapas*. This reciprocity is expressed in the source domain of heat, the growth of which makes it grow.

Recitation is not mentioned in this stanza but the fact that *tapas* is specifically manifested in actions that destroy unwanted categories, like the classes of rajas and tamas, and thus enables man to use the category of sattva (see below, section 4.9.3) implies that various liberating activities are mentioned

<sup>32</sup> Wynne (2009: 275): ‘asceticism.’

<sup>33</sup> Wynne (2009: 275): ‘ascetic power.’

<sup>34</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

here, recitation included.<sup>35</sup> Proper cognition is realisation of the knowledge of the Veda and Veda is to be recited in order to exist and influence the reciter.

At the same time the semantic range of the word *tapas* is enlarged in the early Smṛti texts beyond the meaning of recitation.<sup>36</sup> This is motivated in many cases by the general domains of Cleansing By Heat and Cooking (e.g. growth of plants, see below, section 4.4.2). In other cases, this is activated by the process of perfection especially in cases when *tapas* means duties other than those required by the social status of Brahmins. On the other hand, the extension of semantic range of *tapas* foreshadows the later separation of the practices called by this word from recitation.<sup>37</sup>

#### 4.4.1. The fiery nature of *tapas* and its connection with recitation in MS 2.166–167

MS 2.166 explicitly identifies *tapas* with recitation:

##### MS 2.166

*vedam eva sadābhyasyet tapas tapsyan dvijottamaḥ |*  
*vedābhyāso hi viprasya tapaḥ param ihocyate ||*

A Brahmin planning on heating with heat<sup>38</sup> should simply recite the Veda constantly; for Vedic recitation is recognised here as the highest heat<sup>39</sup> for a Brahmin.

Taking into account that the verb *tap-* in tradition is used to denote heating, we may assume that this meaning was also active in the minds of the recipients in the early Smṛti times. It should be noted that most of the usages of this verb in the MS in contexts other than the context of practice attest its meaning ‘to heat’ a fluid substance.<sup>40</sup> This meaning especially corresponds with the

<sup>35</sup> For connection between recitation and cognition (*jñāna*) see also MS 11.246–247.

<sup>36</sup> In MDhP 210.17, BhG 17.14–16.

<sup>37</sup> As it is in classical Yoga where *tapas* and *svādhyāya* are separate *niyamas* (necessary observances which should be performed before the practice of the higher stages).

<sup>38</sup> Olivelle (2005: 103): ‘undergoing ascetic toil.’

<sup>39</sup> Olivelle (2005: 103): ‘ascetic toil.’

<sup>40</sup> Except for MS 7.6 where the king heats and shines like the sun (*tapaty ādityavac*). In MS 8.272, it refers to heated oil which should be poured into the mouth and ears of a person who ‘arrogantly gives instruction on the Law to Brahmins’ (MS 8.272cd: *taptam āsecayet tailaṃ vaktre śrotre ca pārthivaḥ*; in MS 8.372, 11.104, it refers to the heated iron bed in which criminal should lie (MS 8.372cd: *pumāṃsaṃ dāhayet pāpaṃ śayane tapta āyase*; MS 11.104cd: *gurutalpy abhibhāṣyainas tapte svapyād ayomaye*), in MS 11.126 it qualifies barley gruel one should drink for expiation (*malinīkaraṇīyeṣu taptaḥ syād yāvakais tryaham*).

R̥gvedic descriptions of the influence of soma, of a person filled with soma becoming hot (Jurewicz 2010). In the MS, the influence of this heated (*tapta*) substance is unpleasant, but leads to transformation of a person (either under punishment or thanks to expiation). As will be shown, the practice described by the texts analysed here, is difficult and could be unpleasant but it finally leads to eternal happiness.<sup>41</sup> So the argument is that the recipient of MS could understand verses a–b as recommending recitation as the means thanks to which one acquires the state of transformative heat. Verses c–d metonymically identify them (metonymy CAUSE FOR EFFECT).

Then the Composer describes transformation of the reciter:

### MS 2.167

*ā haiva sa nakhāgrebhyah paramaṃ tapyate tapaḥ |  
yah sragvy api dvijo 'dhīte svādhyāyaṃ śaktito 'nvaham ||*

When a twice-born, even while wearing a garland, performs his Vedic recitation every day according to his ability, he is surely heats himself in the highest heat<sup>42</sup> down to the very tips of his nails.

The phrase *ā haiva sa nakhāgrebhyah* (verse a) activates BU 1.4.7 where the self (*ātman*, the highest cognitive agent in this cosmogony) cognises himself as divided by names and forms. The manifest self is conceived in terms of man and self-cognition is conceived in terms of entering to the nail tips (*eṣā ihā prāviṣṭa ā nakhāgrēbhyo*).<sup>43</sup> Because of that the self (*ātman*) is invisible in the cosmos and is conceived in terms of a razor in its holder and the fire in kindling sticks. A man who recites Veda is conceived in the same way. The recited text fills him totally in the same way as the self (*ātman*) fills the cosmos.

It is worth noting that *ātman* in BU 1.4.1 is conceived as having the form of a man (*puruṣavidha*). Here, a definition of *puruṣa* is given: it is one who burns (*oṣati*) everything that is before him (*purā*).<sup>44</sup> This definition goes back to the R̥gvedic conceptualisation of fire, the essence of which is conceived in it being in front (*purā*) of everything in the temporal, spatial and ritual dimensions (Jurewicz 2016). In ŚB 2.2.4.2 this essence is expressed in the

<sup>41</sup> Such is definition of sattvic happiness in the BhG 18.37: *yat tadagre viṣam iva pariṇāme mṛtopamam | tat sukhaṃ sāttvikam proktam ātmabuddhiprasādam ||*

<sup>42</sup> Olivelle (2005: 103): 'he is surely practicing the fiercest ascetic.'

<sup>43</sup> BU 1.4.7: *ād dhedām tārhy āvyākṛtam āsīt | tán nāmarūpābhyām evā vyākriyatāsaū nāmāyām idāmṛpa iti | tād idām āpy etārhi nāmarūpābhyām evā vyākriyata asaū nāmāyām idāmṛpa iti | eṣā ihā prāviṣṭa ā nakhāgrēbhyo*

<sup>44</sup> *sā yāt pūrvo 'smāt sārvasmāt sārvaṇ pāpmāna aūṣat tāsmāt pūruṣa |*



secret name of fire (*agni*) which is *agri*. This is ‘fireness of the fire’ (*agner agnitā*).<sup>45</sup> If the recipient activates this traditional thinking, he will understand a reciting man (*puruṣa*) as someone who is filled with fire. Then the meaning of the word *tapas*, which is recitation of the Veda, will highlight its literal meaning of heat.

In verse c the reciter, presented as wearing a garland, is a reference to the early stage of a householder. In this way, the Composer recommends reciting the Veda during this stage of life too. Thanks to that, man can properly cognise and create his space of experience (*loka*) as the householder.

#### 4.4.2. The fiery nature of *tapas* and its connection with recitation in MS 11.234–266

The practice called *tapas* is exhaustively described in MS 11 (where the Composer discusses the expiation practices). Let us analyse its description in order to reconstruct the rich meaning of this word. It seems that it is motivated by the general domains of Cleansing By Heat and Cooking which make it coherent in its general meaning of making perfect under the influence of heat. Activities which lead towards this perfect state can vary, they depend on the social state or place in the hierarchy of beings. In early Smṛti times the literal meaning of *tapas* which is ‘heat’ was still active enough to metonymically activate these general domains as the source domain of various activities called with this noun: the concept of heat begins any transformation expressed by them (THE FIRST PART OF THE PROCESS FOR THE WHOLE PROCESS).

The Composer begins with a general statement about the activity called *tapas*:

##### MS 11.234

*yasmīn karmaṇy asya kṛte manasaḥ syād alāghavam |*  
*tasmīṃs tāvat tapaḥ kuryād yāvat tuṣṭikaram bhavet ||*

If someone’s mind is not at ease with respect to a particular act he has committed, he should heat himself<sup>46</sup> for it until his mind is assuaged.

Olivelle, following the exegesis, translates *tuṣṭikara* (verse d) as the state of mind that is at ease. He writes (2005: 346):

<sup>45</sup> *tād vā enam etād āgre devānām aṇayata tasmād agnir agrir ha vai nāmaitād yād agnir iti sā jātaḥ pūrvah prēyāya yō vai pūrvā ety āgra etīti vai tām āhuḥ sō evāsyāgnitā*

<sup>46</sup> Olivelle (2005: 227): ‘practice ascetic toil.’

*If someone's mind... assuaged:* the meaning is somewhat unclear. The commentators, rightly I think, explain that if after someone has performed a penance for a particular sin, he still has a heavy heart, he may continue to perform the same penance until his mind is at ease.

However, the literal meaning of this compound which is 'causing satisfaction' is more likely to be correct. As discussed below, the states of mind and actions that lead to freedom are categorised as sattvic and states and actions undertaken under such sattvic influence bring happiness. Man can recognise that he follows the right path on the basis of his positive emotional state. The word *lāghava* means not only 'lightness, ease, relief' but also 'alacrity, versatility, dexterity, skill' and we should interpret *alāghava* (verse b) as a lack of skill.<sup>47</sup> Having skill, expressed by a synonymous word *kauśala* in the BhG (see section 4.11.2), is the feature of a man who acts in a perfect way without mentally clinging to objects. So, when a man feels difficulties while performing an action, he should practice it until he feels the pleasure one feels when it is finally mastered. The logic of the source domain, which is heating and which activates the general domains of Cleansing By Heat and Cooking expressed by the noun *tapas*, makes this argument coherent: man perfects himself in his activity thanks to *tapas* in the same way as a substance (e.g. gold or iron) is purified in fire. *Tapas* is understood here very widely, as any activity which transforms men.

In the next stanza (235), it is stated that activity called *tapas* is the source of happiness of gods and men, it is its middle and its end.<sup>48</sup> Its role in the middle has been declared by the wise men (*budha*), its role in the end by those who directly know the Veda (*vedadarśin*, metaphor COGNITION IS SEEING). One can presume that the idea that of *tapas* as the source of happiness was known from tradition. If the recipient activates the three kinds of happiness presented in BhG 18.37–39, he will understand that those who know the Veda know best what happiness is. The happiness categorised as sattvic in the beginning seems to be a poison yet at the end is like a draught of immortality (*amṛta*, 18.37). The meaning of perfection under the influence of heat is suitable here. In the beginning the concept of heat activates its negative meaning (SUFFERING IS HEAT (*TAPAS*), at the end, its positive one. It is worth noting that, in hot weather, greater internal heat causes more sweat which, as it evaporates from

<sup>47</sup> *lāghava* in the adverbial use is used to express skillfulness of warriors, e.g. MBh 6.42, 45, 54, *passim*.

<sup>48</sup> MS 11.235: *tapomūlam idaṃ sarvaṃ daivamānuṣakaṃ sukham | tapomadhyam budhaiḥ proktaṃ tapo'ntaṃ vedadarśibhiḥ ||*

the skin, cools one down.<sup>49</sup> This experience could motivate the beneficial influence of *tapas*.

In the following stanzas (236–238), the Composer specifies the meaning of *tapas*. In 236, he identifies it with the duties of each social state: cognition is *tapas* for a Brahmin; protection for a Kṣatriya; trade for a Vaiśya and service for a Śūdra.<sup>50</sup> The activities prescribed to all social states are *tapas* in that, for their proper performance, one has to toil which transforms them into better persons. It is possible that the Vedic images of Prajāpati who toils and heats himself in order to transform himself into the cosmos motivates identification of various social duties in terms of *tapas*. Here, the general meaning of *tapas*, as making perfect under the influence of toil and heat, can be activated.

In 237, the well-disciplined seers, who subsisted only on fruits, roots, and air, have seen the manifest aspect thanks to *tapas*.<sup>51</sup> It may be assumed that here *tapas* means the recitation of the Veda which is the prototypical activity of the seers. This activity is the means of achieving super-natural cognition.<sup>52</sup> It should be noted also that limits in food incite hunger which is also conceived in terms of fire. Hence, it can be included within the range of the target domains of the general domains of Cleansing By Heat and Cooking.

Then (238) the Composer states that *tapas* makes, ‘medicines, antidotes, spells, and the various divine conditions’ effective.<sup>53</sup> Olivelle (2005: 326) interprets these various means (various medicines, spells and the like employed in ritual settings) as becoming effective only if those who employ them perform the appropriate austerities. He does not explain here, or elsewhere, what kind of austerities are meant. It seems more likely that here the word *tapas* highlights again its meaning of heat. The growth of plants and their maturation is conceived in terms of burning in the RV 10.88.10. We have also seen that the influence of time is conceived in terms of the general domain of Cooking (see chapter 2.1.1). It is when plants are matured under the influence of heat that they gain their healing power.

In the next stanza (239), *tapas* is described as an activity that allows one to overcome all difficulties: ‘what is difficult to cross, what is difficult to obtain, what is difficult to enter, what is difficult to do – all that is accomplished by

<sup>49</sup> Attested already in BU 1.1 where the source domain of a heated person who then sweats and feels pleasure (*kam*) because of that is used to conceive creative transformations of reality.

<sup>50</sup> MS 11.236: *brāhmaṇasya tapo jñānaṃ tapaḥ kṣatrasya rakṣaṇam | vaiśyasya tu tapo vārtā tapaḥ śūdrasya sevānam ||*

<sup>51</sup> MS 11.237: *ṛṣayah samyatātmānaḥ phalamūlānilāśanāḥ | tapasaiva prapaśyanti trailokyam sacarācaram ||*

<sup>52</sup> RV 8.59.6: *yāni sthānāni asṛjanta dhīrā | yajñam tanvānās tāpasābhy āpaśyam.*

<sup>53</sup> MS 11.238: *auśadhāny agado vidyā daivī ca vividhā sthitiḥ | tapasaiva prasidhyanti tapas teṣāṃ hi sādhanam ||*

tapas'.<sup>54</sup> As mentioned, in Vedic cosmogonies it is tapas that allows the highest cognitive agent (Prajāpati in the ŚB, Death in BU 1.2) to solve problems in creation which is radically transformed thanks to his toiling and heating (*śò 'śrāmyat sá tāpo 'tapyata*). This idea goes even deeper in tradition because, in the RV, it was fire (Agni) which allowed men to overcome all difficulties, external and internal (Jurewicz 2010).<sup>55</sup> So, if the recipient activates tradition, he will again understand *tapas* as heating. At the same time, the meaning of positive transformation is also active.

In the following stanzas (240–241), the Composer focuses on the purificatory role of tapas. Thanks to tapas, even great sinners can be freed from their sins (240).<sup>56</sup> The cleansing power of tapas is conceived in terms of burning (*tat sarvaṃ nirdahanty āśu tapasaiva*, 11.240) that clearly activates its literal meaning of heating and activates the general domains of Cleansing By Heat and Cooking. The kind of activity called *tapas* is not specified here, but the recipient might understand that these are activities prescribed for the members of the four states.

Next, the Composer states that even the most miserable living creatures and the immobile ones can reach the sky thanks to the power of tapas:

### MS 11.241

*kūtās cāhipataṃgās ca paśavaś ca vayāṃsi ca |  
sthāvarāṇi ca bhūtāni divaṃ yānti tapobalāt ||*

Insects, snakes, moths, animals, birds, and immobile creatures attain heaven by the power of heat.<sup>57</sup>

If we accept Ollivelle's interpretation of *tapas* as 'ascetic toil' we face two problems. Firstly, we do not know what kind of the ascetic toil the Composer had in mind and, secondly, it is hard to imagine that animals and immobile creatures would perform any sort of ascetic toil. Here tapas is rather a transformative power that can change beings during their consecutive rebirths. We do not know what kind of activities the Composer has in mind but it is possible that he means their subjugation to the influence of time.

<sup>54</sup> MS 11.239: *yad dustaraṃ yad durāpaṃ yad durgam yac ca duṣkaram | tat sarvaṃ tapasā sādhyam tapo hi duratikramam ||*

<sup>55</sup> RV 6.5.4: *tam ajarebhir vṛṣabhis tava svais tapā tapiṣṭha tapasā tapasvān*; RV 7.1.7: *viśvā agne 'pa dahārātīr yebhis tapobhir adaho jarūtham*; RV 8.60.16: *bhinatsy adriṃ tapasā vi śociṣā prāgne tiṣṭha janām ati*.

<sup>56</sup> MS 11.240: *mahāpātakinaś caiva śeṣāś cākāryakāriṇaḥ | tapasaiva sutaptaena mucyante kilbiṣāt tataḥ ||*

<sup>57</sup> Olivelle (2005: 228): 'ascetic toil.'

Since this influence is conceived in terms of the general domains of Cleansing By Heat/Cooking, the recipient may understand the power of tapas as the power that transforms during their successive incarnations until they achieve human form. It is worth adding that maturing of an embryo in a womb has also been conceived in terms of heating which strengthens the logic of the target domain.

In the next stanza (242), the Composer comes back to the purificatory role of tapas: all sins are destroyed by it. Its purificatory influence is again conceived in terms of burning (*nirdahanty āśu tapasaiva tapodhanāḥ*).<sup>58</sup> The meaning of perfection under the influence of heat is also clear in the next stanza (243) where states that the gods accept oblations given by a Brahmin cleansed by tapas (*tapasaiva viśuddhasya*).<sup>59</sup> Here the meaning of recitation is easily activated.

Now, the Composer gives cosmogonic justification, for the practice called tapas, grounded in tradition: it was Prajāpati who created sacred treatise (*śāstra*) thanks to heat and the seers obtain the Vedas thanks to it (244).<sup>60</sup> Thus the Composer identifies *tapas* with recitation. Since the concept of Prajāpati is activated the recipient understands recitation as heating thanks to toiling (245). The gods too extoll the high excellence of *tapas* because they saw (and presumably understood) the beneficial beginnings of the world from it (245).<sup>61</sup> These two stanzas activate the Vedic order of creation seen as recitation: first the highest cognitive agent expresses himself in words,<sup>62</sup> then the seers recite the Veda, and then the gods appear with their supernatural cognition. Note the concept of heat *tapas* is used in the RV 8.59.6 to express supernatural cognition the content of which, in this context, are the beginnings of the world and the role of the seers (called *dhīrā*).<sup>63</sup> The next stanza continues the cosmogony and presents the role of recitation of the Veda performed by men and its purificatory role:

<sup>58</sup> MS 11.242: *yat kiṃ cid enaḥ kurvanti manovāṅgūrtibhir janāḥ | tat sarvaṃ nirdahanty āśu tapasaiva tapodhanāḥ ||*

<sup>59</sup> MS 11.243: *tapasaiva viśuddhasya brāhmaṇasya divaukasaḥ | ijyās ca pratigrhṇanti kāmān samvardhayanti ca ||*

<sup>60</sup> MS 11.244: *prajāpatir idam śāstram tapasaivāsrjat prabhuḥ | tathaiva vedān ṛṣayas tapasā pratipedire ||*

<sup>61</sup> MS 11.245: *ity etat tapaso devā mahābhāgyam pracakṣate | sarvasyāsya prapaśyantas tapasaḥ puṇyam uttamam ||*

<sup>62</sup> The used of the word *śāstra* may imply that the Composer conceives the first manifestation of reality in terms of the MS itself.

<sup>63</sup> 8.59.6 *indrāvaruṇā yād ṛṣibhyo manīṣāṃ vācō matim śrutām adattam āgre | yāni sthānāni asṛjanta dhīrā yajñam tanvānās tāpasābhy āpaśyam ||*

**MS 11.246**

*vedābhyāso 'nvahaṃ śaktyā mahāyajñakriyā kṣamā |  
nāśayanty āśu pāpāni mahāpātakajāny api ||*

Reciting the Veda daily to the best of one's ability, performing the great sacrifices, and forbearance quickly destroy sins, even those rising from grievous acts causing loss of caste.

The earlier context makes the recipient identify the activity of Prajāpati and the seers (conceived in terms of heat, tapas) with recitation. The next stanza explains why the purificatory power of cognition (*jñāna*) is realised thanks to recitation:

**MS 11.247**

*yathaidhas tejasā vahnih prāptaṃ nirdahati kṣaṇāt |  
tathā jñānāgninā pāpaṃ sarvaṃ dahati vedavit ||*

As a fire by its energy burns up in an instant a piece of kindling placed in it, so a man who knows the Veda burns up all sins by the fire of his cognition.<sup>64</sup>

In verses a–b, the Composer explicitly evokes the source domain which is fire which burns its fuel. He conceives the purificatory influence of cognition in these terms: it destroys sins the same way. The context clearly shows a relationship between recitation (described in the previous stanza) and cognition as being realised during or thanks to recitation. It should be noted that, in all descriptions of purification from sin that are presented above, the image of fire is activated. The motivating influence of the general domains of Cleansing By Heat and Cooking is clear: thanks to recitation and knowledge man become perfect.<sup>65</sup>

In the next stanza (248), the Composer states that having presented the ways of expiation for sins, he will now describe expiation for the secret sins.<sup>66</sup> Olivelle (2005) omits this stanza in his critical edition but it is important stanza taking into account the content of the stanzas that follow. In this part, the Composer argues that recitation can liberate one from the most heinous crimes. Recitation is not called *tapas* here but the earlier context makes it clear that its influence is conceived in terms of heating.

He begins with the recitation of the syllable OM and the Great Calls (discussed above, MS 2.75–84, section 4.3). If one recites them while

<sup>64</sup> For concept of tapas as burning sin, see also MDhP 210.25–26.

<sup>65</sup> For purification under the influence of cognition, see section 4.9.5.

<sup>66</sup> MS 11.248: *ity etad enasām uktaṃ prāyaścittaṃ yathāvidhi | ata ūrdhvaṃ rahasyānām prāyaścittaṃ nibodhata ||*

controlling one's breath sixteen times every day, after a month, the reciter will be purified even if one has murdered a learned Brahmin (249). In the next stanzas, the recitation of proper verses and hymns are prescribed for those who drunk liquor (250), steal gold (251), have sex with an elder's wife (252) or commit other grave sins (253–257). Even sins which cause the loss of caste can be removed thanks to recitation.

Although other means of expiation are also recommended by Composer such as living off alms-food (256, 258), oblations of clarified butter (257), bathing in a river (255, 260), it is recitation of various mantras and hymns that has the greatest purificatory power. Before proceeding with the argument, we should analyse the stanza which introduces the topic of expiation for the sins which cause a loss of caste (described in 258–261):<sup>67</sup>

### MS 11.258

*mahāpātakaśamyukto 'nugacched gāḥ samāhitah |  
abhyasyābdaṃ pāvamānīr bhaikṣāhāro viśudhyati ||*

A man guilty of a grievous sin causing loss of caste should follow cows with a collected mind; he comes purified by subsisting on alms-food and reciting the Pavamānī verses for one year.

In his translation Olivelle (2005: 229) refers to MS 11.109–117 where following cows is one of activities prescribed for someone who has killed a cow. However, it is very improbable that the Composer would revert to this particular sin in a section describing expiation for the gravest sins where this expiation is mainly recitation. Here we have the general concept of the great sin (*mahāpātaka*) which can be interpreted as the five great sins enumerated in MS 11.54 (and also mentioned in MS 11.246) and killing a cow is only one of them.<sup>68</sup> It would be strange if the Composer in his descriptions would revert to one specific great sin the expiation of which has already been explained in great detail in MS 11.109–117. It is more reasonable to interpret the concept of following a cow not in its literal sense but as a source domain to conceive a mental activity. The recipient is triggered to think in this way *via* the participle *samāhita* (verse b) which is used in the early Smṛti to express the state of mind that is fully focused in liberating cognition. Here the tradition is again helpful. In the RV, supernatural cognition gained under the influence of soma is conceived in terms of herds of cows which are released from their enclosure and quickly run (RV 4.1, 58, Jurewicz 2010). It is clear that

<sup>67</sup> As Olivelle (2005: 228–229) interprets them.

<sup>68</sup> MS 11.54: *brahmahatyā surāpānaṃ steyaṃ gurvaṅganāgamaḥ | mahānti pātakāny āhuḥ saṃsargaś cāpi taiḥ saha ||*

it is the same source domain that is being activated here to conceive a state of mind. Since somic cognition was expressed in words and since speech is conceived in terms of cow in the RV, the image of quickly running cows verbalises one's state of mind. The man described as following cows with his mind focused (*anugacched gāḥ samāhitaḥ*) is a man who recites in focused concentration (*samādhi*) and thus removes the greatest sins.

Note that in the description of the expiation for the killing of cows it is recommended that man should restrain his senses (*niyatendriya*, MS 11.110) and the state of mind called *samādhi* is the next stage of liberating practice that was probably available to fewer people than the restraint of the senses. Although the stanza omitted by Olivelle in his critical edition talks about the 'secret sins,'<sup>69</sup> one could speculate that the part which follows is actually secret teaching for those who are advanced in liberating practice.<sup>70</sup>

In the conclusion of his description of the purifying role of recitation, the Composer highlights the role of memory of the triple Veda:

### MS 11.262

*hatvā lokān apīmāms trīn aśnann api yatas tataḥ |*  
*rgvedaṃ dhārayan vipra nainaḥ prāpnoti kiṃ cana ||*

Even if he has slaughtered these three worlds and even if he has eaten food of anyone at all, no sin taints a Brahmin who retains the Rg-veda in his memory.

As previously stated, a Brahmin (called *vipra* here) is the perceptible form of the Veda (MS 1.98, see chapter 2.7)<sup>71</sup> which permeates him and is conceived as fiery. The recipient may activate a conceptual network with the two input spaces: the concept of the Veda which is when it is recited and the concept of fire. In the blend, a Brahmin is constantly purified by his recitation.

### MS 11.263

*rksamhitāṃ trir abhyasya yajuṣāṃ vā samāhitaḥ |*  
*sāmnāṃ vā sarahasyānāṃ sarvapāpaiḥ pramucyate ||*

<sup>69</sup> *ata ūrdhvaṃ rahasyānāṃ prāyaścittaṃ nibodhata.*

<sup>70</sup> This interpretation is motivated by metonymy PART OF ICM FOR ANOTHER PART OF ICM (Radden, Kövecses 1999). The whole ICM is expiation for sins, the specific metonymy is SIN FOR EXPIATION (see also below, analysis of MS 11.263).

<sup>71</sup> MS 1.98: *utpattir eva viprasya mūrtir dharmasya śāśvatī | sa hi dharmārtham utpanno brahmabhūyāya kalpate ||* The meaning of *vipra* used as an adjective is, according to EWA (II: 558): 'zitternd, (rauschhaft) erregt, begeistert' activating the ecstatic influence of soma (at least in the RV). It is also used in its nominal form, as singer, seer, especially in the Smṛti texts. However, it is possible that the Rgvedic meaning was also active in the minds of their recipients.



If a man recites three times with a collected mind the Collection of the Rg-veda, the Yajurveda, or the Sāma-veda along with the secret texts, he is freed from all sins.

The state of mind of the reciter is again called *samāhita*, focused (verse b). It is possible that the Composer is still motivated by the metaphor that thoughts/ words are cows and it is this metaphor that is activated in MS 11.258 and that the various texts enumerated in the stanza are conceived in these terms. The noun *rahasya* (verse c) are interpreted by Olivelle (2005: 251, in reference to 2.140) as the Upaniṣads and perhaps also the Āraṇyakas. It is tempting to think however, that this noun is triggering the same noun as is mentioned in the stanza omitted by Olivelle (which mentions the secret sins) and which, it is argued, metonymically evokes secret teaching.

In 264, the Composer activates conceptualisation of purification in terms of dissolving a clod of clay in water.<sup>72</sup> Within the frames of this conceptualisation the triple Veda is a large lake and sin is that clod. Conceptualisation of the Veda in terms of water agrees with the conceptualisation of speech in these terms (see MDhP 232.14, MS 2.99, see section 4.9.2.b–c). The fact that the speech can be conceived in terms of the contradictory source domains of fire and water highlights its mysterious nature as a manifestation of what is not manifest. Thus, the central R̥gvedic concept of Agni as simultaneously fiery and fluid (somic) is activated.<sup>73</sup>

In the last two stanzas of chapter 11, the Composer defines what is Veda. These are: ‘the Rg verses, the primary Yajus formulas, and the diverse Saman chants’ (265),<sup>74</sup> and the syllable OM called ‘primary tri-syllabic Veda’ (*ādyam tryakṣaram brahma*, 266).<sup>75</sup> The Composer states that this is the secret foundation of the triple Veda and he who knows it knows the Veda.<sup>76</sup> Thus, in a concise way, he evokes the stages of creation: in the beginning the syllable OM has been uttered by reality that evolves into the triple Veda and the triple world (see section 4.3). The fact that the Composer uses the noun *brahman*

<sup>72</sup> MS 11.264: *yathā mahāhradam prāpya kṣiptam loṣtam vinaśyati | tathā duṣcaritam sarvaṃ vede trivṛti majjati ||*

<sup>73</sup> In the same way desire (*kāma*) is conceived in the R̥V (see Jurewicz 2004b). The recipient could also evoke the Upaniṣadic metaphor of salt dissolving in water elaborated especially in CU 6.3.13, BU 2.4.12, 4.513 (Slaje 2001b, 2002). Here, however, the meaning of the substance dissolving in water is not a manifestation of reality but sin.

<sup>74</sup> MS 11.265: *ṛco yajūṃṣi cānyāni sāmāni vividhāni ca | eṣa jñeyas trivṛdvedo yo vedainam sa vedavit ||*

<sup>75</sup> MS 11.266: *ādyam yat tryakṣaram brahma trayī yasmin pratiṣṭhitā | sa guhyo ‘nyas trivṛdvedo yas tam veda sa vedavit ||*

<sup>76</sup> MS 11.266: *ādyam yat tryakṣaram brahma trayī yasmin pratiṣṭhitā | sa guhyo ‘nyas trivṛdvedo yas tam veda sa vedavit ||*

(*tryakṣaram brahman*) may lead the recipient's mind towards the unmanifest aspect of reality, the source of everything that exists. This is the hidden secret of the syllable OM which in turn is the hidden secret of the Veda. Metonymy CAUSE FOR EFFECT justifies the conviction that knowledge of the syllable is knowledge of the whole Veda. This metonymy has an ontological dimension thanks to the blend in which OM is the Veda. Most probably, the recipients, who knew the MS by heart, also activated other reasons for the identity of the OM and the Veda presented in MS 2.76–81 (see section 4.3).

\*

From what has been said above, we can reconstruct the meaning of *tapas* in the early Smṛti texts analysed by this study. Its general meaning is of a transformative and purificatory power which allows the practitioner to build his perfect self (*ātman*). This meaning is based on the literal meaning of *tapas* which is heating (thanks to soma or toiling) and on the meaning of the general domains of Cooking and Cleansing By Heat. As argued above, in case of Brahmins, *tapas* is recitation of the Veda. Its qualification as *ghora* or *ugra* may be connected with the physical effort needed during long recitation which will heat the reciter. Its meaning also connects to its fiery nature. A man filled with *tapas* 'up to the nail tips' is dangerous in the same way as fire can be dangerous. Fire became invisible in the cosmic dimension but it is still preserved at micro-scale.

The noun *tapas* is also used to denote various activities which are prescribed for the members of the social states, to activities of other living beings and to natural processes such as plant maturation.

#### **4.5. Looking for fire. Sāṃhkyā, yoga, soft recitation (*japa*) and its connection with fire**

As mentioned previously, the problem of the meaning of the terms *sāṃhkyā* and *yoga* in the early Smṛti texts and to what extent they reflect new philosophical strands has been discussed by many scholars (see *Introduction* 8, chapter 2.3.2). Since this present work is a diachronic research study on the influence of that earlier tradition this problem remains for a future work (Jurewicz forthcoming). Generally speaking, when *sāṃhkyā* and *yoga* are used in the early MDhP and BhG, the term *sāṃhkyā* refers to theoretical investigation, the term *yoga* to its practical application. The conviction about the necessity for practical application of theoretical knowledge (without using

those specific terms) is well entrenched in Vedic tradition. As previously discussed, the final questions in RV 10.129 expect the recipient of the hymn to check for himself if the cosmogony described in the previous stanza is true (Jurewicz 2010). The concepts characteristic for classical Sāṃhkyā and Yoga (such as *puruṣa*, *prakṛti*, *guṇa*) are still used within the frames of the monistic philosophy and it is argued that their aim is to discern the functional aspects of reality.

We will now discuss the early chapters of the MBh (189–193)<sup>77</sup> where the effects of sām̐hkyā and yoga are identified with the effects of soft recitation (*japa*) and are seen as the result of heating and manifestation of the internal fire. In MS 2.85–87, the Composer extolls the eminence of soft recitation (*japa*) seen as better than the prescribed rituals. In BhG and MDhP it is seen as sacrifice (*japayajña*). In BhG 10.25c Kṛṣṇa presents himself as a soft-recitation-sacrifice among all the sacrifices (*yajñānām japayajño 'smi*). In MDhP 230.12, soft-recitation-sacrifice is prescribed to Brahmins as their specific action.<sup>78</sup> All this indicates its important role. The fact that this word is not often used in the texts (MS five times, BhG only once in the śloka mentioned above, four times apart from the śloka mentioned above according to the DSC) leads one to the conclusion that this is a new kind of practice within the frames of liberating cognition.<sup>79</sup>

The discussion on the issue of the soft recitation, sām̐hkyā and yoga begins with a question of Yudhiṣṭhira:

#### MDhP 189.4

*japasya ca vidhiṃ kṛtsnam vaktum arhasi me 'nagha |*  
*jāpakā iti kiṃ caitat sām̐khyayogakriyāvidhiḥ ||*

You should explain to me the entire method of soft<sup>80</sup> recitation, faultless one. What is meant by the word 'reciter'? Is this method equivalent to the practice of Sām̐hkyā and Yoga followers?

<sup>77</sup> *Japakopakhyāna*. Brockington (2012) analyses this upakhyāna thoroughly, with focus on its textual history and links with religious strands (especially Pāñcarātra). In this analysis, the focus is on the way recitation is described and conceived. Bronkhorst notices that the noun *japa* is mostly used in used in this upakhyāna and in the *Nārāyaṇīya*. It should be noted that *Japakopakhyāna* belongs to the early part of the MDhP while the *Nārāyaṇīya* constitutes its last part. It is hypothesised that the Composers of the MDhP wanted to highlight a specific role of *japa* by such a ring construction: thus, the MDhP begins and ends with this issue which frames the minds of this recipients as if *japa* and *Nārāyaṇa* (the concept of which is evoked in the last stanza of *Japakopakhyāna*) were the topic of the whole MDhP.

<sup>78</sup> MDhP 230.12: *ārambhayajñāḥ kṣatrasya haviryajñā viśaḥ smṛtāḥ | paricārayajñāḥ śūdrās ca japayajñā dvijātayaḥ ||*

<sup>79</sup> MS 2.85, 86; 3.74; 10.111; 11.34, 201; MDhP 189.4; 230.12; 323.32; MBh 13.102.8; 13.107.3

<sup>80</sup> Wynne (2009: 197): 'quiet.'

Bhīṣma answers that in order to explain this he will tell Yudhiṣṭhira an old story about a discussion between Yama, Time and a Brahmin (189.6). He begins with the statement that the full renunciation (*saṃnyāsa*) described in the *vedānta* is connected with soft recitation (*japana*). The peace that comes from words of the Veda is grounded in brahman that, in this context, means reality (189.7ad). Sāṃhkyā and Yoga are also grounded in reality but at the same time they are not (189.7ef).<sup>81</sup> Then Bhīṣma states that he will describe the cause or means (*kāraṇa*) as presented in the Śruti.<sup>82</sup> From the previous context, the recipient understands that Bhīṣma refers to the cause or the means of Sāṃhkyā and Yoga but also of soft recitation (*japa*). It is concentration of the mind and mastery of the senses.<sup>83</sup>

Then Bhīṣma enumerates elements of the sacrifice of those who are engaged in life (*pravartaka yajña*) that is the sacrifice of the householders. These are truth, tending the sacred fires, living in isolated places, thoughtful concentration (*dhyāna*), heat (*tapas*), restraint, forbearance, freedom from spite, moderation in eating, withdrawal of the senses from their objects, controlled speech and peace (189.9–10).<sup>84</sup> Apart from tending fires, the other recommendations do not differ from recommendations for those who are not engaged in the householder's life. This is because, according to the Smṛti philosophers, the mental attitude of those who engage in action is the same as the mental attitude of those who do not (see below, section 4.11.3). It is everyday action (activated here metonymically by tending the sacred fires, *agniparīcāra*) that distinguishes the former from the latter.

Then Bhīṣma states that he will explain the sacrifice of those who are not engaged in the householder's life (*nivartaka yajña*). Thanks to this sacrificial activity the results of their previous action will be extinguished. It is called *trividha mārga*, a threefold path (189.11).<sup>85</sup> Wynne (2009: 198) accepts the version *nivṛtta mārga*, but it is possible that the Composer wants to activate here the concept of the threefold practice (*tapas*, *vidyā*, *cintā*) which is described in details in MaU 4.4.4 ff. It 'encompasses what manifest and unmanifest and is without support' (*vyaktāvyaktam anāśrayam*, 189.11e). Thus, Bhīṣma implies that the activity he is going to explain will lead through the

<sup>81</sup> MDhP 189.7: *saṃnyāsa eva vedānte vartate japanaṃ prati | vedavādābhinirvṛttā śāntir brahmaṇy avasthitau | mārgau tāv apy ubhāv etau saṃśritau na ca saṃśritau |*

<sup>82</sup> MDhP 189.8ab: *yathā saṃśrūyate rājan kāraṇaṃ cātra vakṣyate.*

<sup>83</sup> MDhP 189.8cd: *manaḥsamādhīr atrāpi tathendriyajayah smṛtaḥ.*

<sup>84</sup> MDhP 189: *satyam agniparīcāro viviktānām ca sevanam | dhyānaṃ tapo damaḥ kṣāntir anasūyā mitāśanam || (9) viśayapratisaṃhāro mitajalpas tathā śamaḥ | eṣa pravṛttako dharmo nivṛttakam atho śṛṇu || (10)*

<sup>85</sup> MDhP 189.11: *yathā nivartate karma japato brahmacāriṇaḥ | etat sarvam aśeṣeṇa yathoktaṃ parivarjayet | trividhaṃ mārgam āsādyā vyaktāvyaktam anāśrayam ||*

manifest aspect to the unmanifest aspect. The word *brahmacārin* (189.11b) used here does not necessarily means ‘the Vedic pupil’ but may also have the general meaning of someone who lives in chastity and wants to finally liberate himself.

Then the description of practice begins. The reciter should sit on *kuśa* grass, keep it in his hand and topknot and be surrounded by it (189.12).<sup>86</sup> A similar recommendation is in MS 2.75 (although grass is not specified)<sup>87</sup> and in BhG 6.11.<sup>88</sup> He should mentally keep away from objects of senses and realise the state of equanimity. His mind (*manas*) should be focused within itself (*manasy eva mano dadhat*, 189.13d).<sup>89</sup> This state is conceived in terms of image schema of CONTAINER the content of which is the same as the container.

In the next stanza, the Composer describes the work of the mind:

#### MDhP 189.14

*tad dhyā dhyāyati brahma japan vai saṃhitām hitām |  
saṃnyasyaty atha vā tāṃ vai samādhau paryavasthitāḥ ||*

In his thought he should thoughtfully concentrate<sup>90</sup> on brahman by softly<sup>91</sup> reciting the Vedas, which are suitable for this purpose. Alternatively, if he is well established in thoughtful concentration,<sup>92</sup> he can renounce them.

The mental activity that accompanies the soft recitation of the Vedas (*brahman*)<sup>93</sup> is literally expressed as ‘thinking with thought’ (*dhyā dhyāyati*). Since the verb *dhī-* is used in the early Smṛti to denote activity of the mind (as already mentioned), the recipient understands that this mental activity requires the mind to focus on itself within itself as mentioned in the previous stanza. The use of the noun *dhī-* as in reference to creation of the mind activates its Ṛgvedic use in reference to inspired thought under the influence of soma.<sup>94</sup>

<sup>86</sup> MDhP 189.12: *kuśocchayaniṣaṇṇaḥ san kuśahastaḥ kuśaiḥ śikhī | parivṛtas tasmin madhye channaḥ kuśais tathā ||*

<sup>87</sup> See above, section 4.3.

<sup>88</sup> See below, section 4.10.2.a.

<sup>89</sup> MDhP 189.13: *viṣayebhyo namaskuryād viṣayān na ca bhāvayet | sāmyam utpādyā manaso manasy eva mano dadhat ||*

<sup>90</sup> Wynne (2009: 199): ‘meditate.’

<sup>91</sup> Wynne (2009: 199): ‘quietly.’

<sup>92</sup> Wynne (2009: 199): ‘meditation.’

<sup>93</sup> In his translation, Ganguli (1883–1886) understands *saṃhitām hitām* literally, ‘what is put together and beneficial’ and interprets it as the Sāvitrī-mantra.

<sup>94</sup> Gonda (1963).

**MDhP 189.15**

*dhyānam utpādayaty atra saṃhitābalasaṃśrayāt |  
suddhātmā tapasā dānto nirvṛttadveṣakāmavān ||*

By resorting to the powers of the Vedas, he brings about the state of thoughtful concentration<sup>95</sup> Being internally pure through his heat<sup>96</sup>, and restrained, he desists from aversion and desire.

The state of mind is called thoughtful concentration (*dhyāna*, verse a). It is brought about by ‘thinking with thought’ (*dhiyā dhyāyati*) described in the previous stanza accompanied with recitation of the Veda (verse b). The reciter that finds support in it in a way similar to Prajāpati, is presented in ŚB 6.1.1.8. It is worth noting that the participle *saṃhitā* which, in its feminine form means the Veda (or, as Ganguli 1883–1886 proposes, the Sāvitrī-mantra), derives from the verb *sam dhā-* which literally means ‘to put or gather together’ and with the additional preposition *ā* (*sam ā dhā-*) is the verbal basis for the noun *samādhi* (focused concentration). Such a conceptualisation of mental activity is motivated by the image schema CENTRE-PERIPHERY thanks to which thinking is conceived in terms of gathering to the centre of a person which is the self (*ātman*). So, the recipient may also activate the literal meaning of the participle *saṃhitā* and create an additional meaning of verse b (*saṃhitābalasaṃśrayāt*) as ‘thanks to support in focused power’. This meaning is built not on grammatical correctness, but on the basis of phonetic similarity. Such a device, to create a blended meaning for a phrase, is often used in tradition especially in the RV (Jurewicz 2010).

The self of the reciter is purified by heat (*tapas*, verse c). The noun *ātman* activates here its widest meaning, of the whole organism. There is no doubt that here this word means recitation because no other practices are mentioned and the power of the Veda is explicitly expressed. Thanks to that, the reciter becomes restrained and free from hatred and desire (verse d), from passion and delusion, he is beyond the concept of ‘my-ness’ (*mamatva*), feels no sorrow and no attachment (189.16ab).<sup>97</sup> He is not the agent of anything that does not have to be done or has to be done (189.16cd). His mind is not under the influence of the I-form, he does not take anything for himself, he is not contemptuous but not inactive (189.17).<sup>98</sup>

<sup>95</sup> Wynne (2009: 199): ‘meditation.’

<sup>96</sup> Wynne (2009: 199): ‘asceticism.’

<sup>97</sup> MDhP 189.16: *arāgamoho nirdvaṃdvo na śocati na sajjate | na kartākaraṇīyānām na kāryānām iti sthitiḥ ||*

<sup>98</sup> MDhP 189.17: *na cāhaṃkārayogena manaḥ prasthāpayet kva cit | na cātmagrahaṇe yukto nāvamānī na cākriyāḥ ||*

Then the last stage of this mental process is described:

### MDhP 189.18

*dhyānakriyāparo yukto dhyānavān dhyānaniścayaḥ |  
dhyāne samādhim utpādya tad api tyajati kramāt ||*

Devoted to the activity of thoughtful concentration, yoked, filled with thoughtful concentration, resolved on thoughtful concentration, having reached, in thoughtful concentration, the state of focused concentration, he should gradually abandon even this state.<sup>99</sup>

Verses a–b describes the state of mind which is totally immersed in thoughtful concentration which is expressed by the repetitive use of the verb *dhyāna*. As state above, the noun *samādhi* betrays its conceptualisation: it is conceived in terms of gathering or putting together and it can be conceived in terms of image schema of CENTRE-PERIPHERY: in thoughtful concentration, the mind focuses on its very centre. Then, the reciter should gradually abandon even this state (verse d).

Having done that he has a choice, because he is free as reality itself. The first option is as follows:

### MDhP 189.19

*sa vai tasyām avasthāyām sarvatyāgakṛtaḥ sukhī |  
nirīhas tyajati prāṇān brāhmīm samśrayate tanum ||*

In that state<sup>100</sup> he lets go of everything quite easily: being without desire he relinquishes his breaths and enters into a divine body.

One option is to leave one's breaths and enter 'the self/body (*tanu*) of brahman' (verse d). The word *brahman* highlights here its meaning of the Veda which was uttered by reality in the beginning of creation. Since the mind in its liberating aspect corresponds to the Vedic borderline sphere between two aspects which is the first manifest form of reality, we can see the coherence of the Composer's thinking: assuming the self/body of *brahman*, the reciter identifies himself with the manifestation of reality in sound and thus remains in the potential state from which he may return to the cosmos.

The second option is as follows:

<sup>99</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

<sup>100</sup> Wynne (2009: 201) adds: 'of meditation.'

**MDhP 189.20**

*atha vā necchate tatra brahmakāyaṇiṣevanam |  
utkrāmati ca mārgastho naiva kva cana jāyate ||*

Alternatively, if the wayfarer has not such desire to inhabit a divine body, he rises up and is not reborn anywhere.

If the reciter does not want to manifest, he does not have to. He can rise further up and reach the state from which he will never manifest again. The realisation of ultimate freedom is conceived in terms of the image schemas of VERTICALITY (*utkrāmati*, verse c) and of SOURCE-PATH-GOAL (*mārgastho*, verse c).

Let us remain for a moment with the description of the state of potentiality for return expressed in verse b (*brahmakāyaṇiṣevanam*). Contrary to Wynne it is argued that the nouns *brahman* and *kāya* refer to *brāhmī* and *tanu* in the previous stanza, and express the form of the reciter as identified with the first form of reality when it manifests its mind (*manas*) in recitation of the Veda (*brahman*). If he does not want to remain in this state he may leave it and ultimately unite with unmanifest reality.

**MDhP 189.21**

*ātmabuddhiṃ samāsthāya śāntībhūto nirāmayaḥ |  
amṛtaṃ virajaḥ śuddham ātmānaṃ pratipadyate ||*

Once he had accomplished his practice through self-understanding, so becoming peaceful and free from disease, he attains the self, which is immortal, spotless and pure.

In the MDhP, the phrase *buddhiṃ āsthāya* is used to express the process of decision making, usually about knowing oneself.<sup>101</sup> So we can interpret verse a (*ātmabuddhiṃ samāsthāya*) as ‘having made decision about oneself’ i.e., about knowing oneself. If the reciter so decides, he will realise his own self (*ātman*) that is immortal, spotless and pure. The qualification of the free man as ‘free from disease’ (*nirāmaya*, verse b) is grounded in the Ṛgvedic descriptions of somic exaltation where a lack of physical imperfection and illness is often highlighted (Jurewicz 2010). Thus, the Composer would imply

<sup>101</sup> E.g., MDhP 242: *uttamāṃ buddhiṃ āsthāya brahmabhūyaṃ gamiṣyasi | saṃtīrṇaḥ sarvasaṃkleśān prasannātmā vikalmaṣaḥ ||* (17) *bhūmiṣṭhānīva bhūtāni parvatastho niśāmaya | akruḍhyann aprahr̥ṣyaṃś ca nan̥ṣaṃsamatis tathā | tato drakṣyasi bhūtānāṃ sarveṣāṃ prabhavāpyayau ||* (18) *evam vai sarvadharmebhyo viśiṣṭaṃ menire budhāḥ | dharmāṃ dharmabhṛtāṃ śreṣṭha munayas tattvadarśinaḥ ||* (19)



that the state gained thanks to soft recitation (*japa*) is the same as that achieved after soma. It also expresses the physical results of recitation.

In MDhP 190, the Composer describes the lot of those soft reciters (*jāpaka*) who are not well restrained or perform the practice motivated by personal reasons: all of them go to hell or to the place where their passion (*rāga*) leads them.

In the next chapter, he describes the heaven reached by them. This sphere is described as full of happiness, beyond all categories (MDhP 191.7–8), even beyond time:

### MDhP 191.9

*kālaḥ sampacyate tatra na kālas tatra vai prabhuh |  
sa kālasya prabhū rājan svargasyāpi tathēśvaraḥ*

Time is cooked there, but does not rule there. He is the ruler of time, O lord, and the king of heaven.<sup>102</sup>

The influence of time is conceived in terms of the general domain of Cooking (see chapter 2.1.1). It is suggested that the form *pacyate* should be interpreted as Passive. This is implied by verse b: where the reciter is in the state where it is him who ‘cooks’ i.e., has power over time. If the recipient conceives the world in terms of a pot in which beings are cooked, he will understand its edges are the borderline sphere between the two aspects of reality and the reciter is the cook who causes movement inside the pot. Conceptualisation of the reciter in terms of the king (*īśvara*, verse d) activates the conceptualisation of the highest cognitive agent in these terms and implies identity between it and the Brahmin.

Then Yudhiṣṭhira comes back to the dialogue between Time, Yama and a Brahmin mentioned earlier by Bhīṣma (192.1);<sup>103</sup> in his answer Bhīṣma adds two more participants which are Death and the king Ikṣvāku (192.2–3).<sup>104</sup> Bhīṣma begins with the description of a Brahmin who performs soft recitation (*brāhmaṇo jāpakaḥ kaś cid*, 192.4). The Brahmin comes from the Kuśika family, he is the son of Pippalada and is very well versed in the six Vedic (*aṅga*) disciplines (192.4–5).<sup>105</sup>

<sup>102</sup> Jurewicz’s translation. For the same metaphor, see MDhP 231.25, chapter 2.1.1.

<sup>103</sup> 12,192.001a *kālamṛtyuyamānām ca brāhmaṇasya ca sattama | vivādo vyāhṛtaḥ pūrvam tad bhavān vaktum arhati ||*

<sup>104</sup> MDhP 192: *atrāpy udāharantīmam itihāsam purātanam | ikṣvākoḥ sūryaputrasya yad vṛttam brāhmaṇasya ca || (2) kālasya mṛtyoś ca tathā yad vṛttam tan nibodha me | yathā sa teṣām samvādo yasmin sthāne ‘pi cābhavat || (3)*

<sup>105</sup> MDhP 192: *brāhmaṇo jāpakaḥ kaś cid dharmavṛtto mahāyaśāḥ | ṣaḍaṅgavin mahāprājñāḥ paippalādīḥ sa kauśikāḥ || (4) tasyāparokṣam vijñānam ṣaḍaṅgeṣu tathaiva ca | vedeṣu caiva niṣṇāto himavatpādasamśrayaḥ || (5)*

**MDhP 192.6**

*so 'ntyam brāhmaṇ tapas tepe saṃhitām saṃyato japan |  
tasya varṣasahasraṃ tu niyamena tathā gatam ||*

He heated himself in the ultimate heat of *brahman*, softly reciting the Veda, well restrained. A thousand years passed while he has been restraining himself in this way.<sup>106</sup>

If we interpret *tapas tepe* (verse a) literally, we will see the results of heating through recitation: the activity expressed in verse a takes place when the reciter recites the Veda (verse b). The phrase *tapas tepe* activates the Vedic formulaic descriptions of Prajāpati who toils and heats himself (*sá tápo 'tapyata*) in order to manifest as the cosmos and there the meaning of heat is clear. Wynne's (2009: 206) emendation in verse a (*adya* for *antya*) seems to be appropriate here and could refer to the fact that the Brahmin performs the first creative activity and that this activity has been earlier described in the Veda.

Ganguli (1883–1886) again interprets *saṃhitām* (verse b) as the Sāvitrī-mantra (in the same way as in 189.14–15). This is justified as, in the next stanza, the goddess Sāvitrī appears before the eyes of the reciter (192.7).<sup>107</sup> This vision can be seen as the result of the practice of the Brahmin who recites Sāvitrī-mantra so excellently that he calls out its divine designate and perceives the goddess with his mind's eye.

In the first moment when Sāvitrī appears before the reciter, he does not speak to her, because he is immersed in his soft recitation (*japa*, 192.7c). When Sāvitrī asks what boon he chooses, he answers that he wants to augment his recitation and the focused concentration of his mind (*manasaś ca samādhis*, 192.13).<sup>108</sup> The goddess agrees and promises that he will reach the unmanifest state without sign (*animitta*) and irreproachable (*anindita*, MDhP 192.15).<sup>109</sup> But, before that happens, he will meet Dharma, Time, Death and Yama. And he will engage in debate about *dharma* (MDhP 192.16).<sup>110</sup> Then the Brahmin practices soft recitation for the next hundred celestial years.

<sup>106</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

<sup>107</sup> MDhP 192.7: *a sa devyā darśitaḥ sākṣāt prītāsmīti tadā kila | japyam āvartayams tūṣṇīm na ca tāṃ kiṃ cid abravīt ||*

<sup>108</sup> MDhP 192: *ity uktaḥ sa tadā devyā viprah provāca dharmavit | japyam prati mameccheyam vardhatv itī punaḥ punaḥ || (12) manasaś ca samādhir me vardhetāhar ahaḥ śubhe | tat tatheti tato devī madhuraṃ pratyabhāṣata || (13)*

<sup>109</sup> MDhP 192: *idaṃ caivāparaṃ prāha devī tatprijakāmyayā | nirayam naiva yātasi yatra yātā dvijarṣabhāḥ || (14) yāsyasi brahmaṇaḥ sthānam animittam aninditam | sādhave bhavitā caitad yat tvayāham ihārthitā || (15)*

<sup>110</sup> MDhP 192.16: *niyato japa caikāgro dharmas tvām samupaiṣyatikālo mṛtyur yamaś caiva samāyāsyanti te 'ntikam | bhavitā ca vivādo 'tra tava teṣām ca dharmataḥ ||*

After that time, Dharma appears and tells the Brahmin that he should die and go whatever he wants (MDhP 192.18ff). Time, Death and Yama also appear in front of the Brahmin to confirm the words of Dharma. We should note that the appearance of Time, Death and Yama implies that the Brahmin is still at the borderline sphere between aspects of reality. In Vedic thought it is marked by the sun. In the descriptions of the afterlife, the dead person is presented as reaching the sun and having a conversation with it (Jurewicz 2016/18). The concept of the sun is activated in the story in that the Brahmin calls Yama Vaivasvata ‘the son of the sun’ (*sūryaputra*, MDhP 192.28).

Brahmin does not want to go anywhere without his body, he does not want to die, because he wants to continue his soft recitation (192.24ff). If he loses his body, he will not be able to do that. This discussion might reflect the fact that there were different convictions about how the state of ultimate freedom was conceived or experienced.

Then the king Ikṣvāku appears (192.34) and the debate about *dharma* takes place: Brahmin wants to give the king the results of his soft recitation, the king does not want to accept because he is supposed to give gifts and it is for the Brahmin to accept. Since the present aim is to reconstruct the process of liberating cognition we will leave this fascinating discussion and its social implications for another study.<sup>111</sup> The final decision (*vyavasāya*, MDhP 193.9) of the king and the Brahmin is to practice together in order for both to secure its result.<sup>112</sup> As a result of this decision the king of thirty gods accompanied by the guardians of the cosmos approaches the king and the Brahmin.<sup>113</sup> Together with them other divinities and semi-divinities appear (192.10–12).<sup>114</sup> The Composer seems to be describing the consecutive stages of liberating cognition. In BU 4.3.33 and TU 2.8.1–5 the stages of liberating cognition are described as consecutive stages of experience of increasing bliss (*ānanda*) of worlds (*loka*) gained during this process.<sup>115</sup> If this interpretation

<sup>111</sup> See Brockington (2011).

<sup>112</sup> MDhP 193: *rājovāca: yady evam aphaḷā siddhiḥ śraddhā ca japitum tava | gaccha vipra mayā sārḍham jāpakam phalam āpnuhi || (7) brāhmaṇa uvāca” kṛtaḥ prayatnaḥ sumahān sarveṣāṃ samnidhāv iha | saha tulyaphalau cāvāṃ gacchāvo yatra nau gatiḥ || (8)*

<sup>113</sup> MDhP 193.9: *vyavasāyam tayos tatra viditvā tridaśeśvaraḥ | saha devair upayayau lokapālais tathaiva ca ||*

<sup>114</sup> MDhP 193: *sādhyā viśve ‘tha maruto jyotīṃṣi sumahānti ca | nadyaḥ śailāḥ samudrās ca tīrthāni vīvidhāni ca || (10) tapāṃsi saṃyogavidhir vedāḥ stobhāḥ sarasvatī | nāradaḥ parvataś caiva viśvāvasur hahā huhūḥ || (11) gandharvaś citrasenaś ca parivāraṇair yutaḥ | nāgāḥ siddhāś ca munayo devadevaḥ prajāpatiḥ | viṣṇuḥ sahasraśīrṣaś ca devo ‘cintyaḥ samāgamat || (12)*

<sup>115</sup> BU 4. 3. 33: *atha ye śataṃ manuṣyānāṃ ānandāḥ sa ekaḥ pitṛñāṃ jitalokānāṃ ānandah | atha ye śataṃ manuṣyānāṃ ānandāḥ sa ekaḥ pitṛñāṃ jitalokānāṃ ānandah | atha ye śataṃ pitṛñāṃ jitalokānāṃ ānandāḥ sa eko gandharvaloka ānandah | atha ye śataṃ pitṛñāṃ jitalokānāṃ*

is correct the appearance of various divinities would mean experience of the worlds (*loka*) perceived by them. Although the word *ānanda* is not used in this description, the mental state of the Brahmin and the king is described in the next stanzas as heavenly happiness with dancing apsaras, sounds of drums and rains of heavenly flowers (192.13–14).

We will now consider the meaning of the divinities which appear as the first and as the last. The first are the Sādhyas and this concept might activate RV 10.90 where they are presented as the first men who, together with gods and the seers, took part in creation conceived in terms of sacrifice (Jurewicz 2016/18). They are presented in the same way in MS 1.22 (see section 1.1.6). Thus, the king and the Brahmin identify themselves with the first human creators of the cosmos. The next are the Maruts, the concept of which metonymically activates the concept of wind in terms of which radical mental transformation is conceived in the Veda (Jurewicz 2016/18). It also metonymically activates the concept of Indra which is used to conceive the moment of the beginning of creation (ŚB 6.1.2.3)<sup>116</sup> and successful cognition (AU 1.313–140.)<sup>117</sup> The last deities Prajāpati and Viṣṇu. The concept of Prajāpati activates the cosmogonies of the ŚB with their highest cognitive agent. Viṣṇu is presented as impossible to be thought of (*acintya*) and as having thousands of heads (193.12 *sahasraśīrṣa*). This qualification of Viṣṇu again activates the description of RV 10.90. and the description of the highest cognitive agent in RV 10.90.1 (*sahasraśīrṣa puruṣa*). In this way it is implied that the king and the Brahmin have realised their identity with the highest cognitive agent.

The next stage of cognition is conceived in terms of the appearance of Heaven in its embodied form, the Brahmin as completely accomplished (*samsiddha*) and very fortunate (*mahābhāga*); taking into account the earlier context of the description, the latter qualification can also be understood literally, as ‘one to whom a great portion or lot has fallen.’ The Heaven calls

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*ānandāḥ sa eko gandharvaloka ānandāḥ | atha ye śataṃ gandharvaloka ānandāḥ sa ekaḥ karmadevānām ānando ye karmaṇā devatvam abhisampadyante | atha ye śataṃ gandharvaloka ānandāḥ sa ekaḥ karmadevānām ānando ye karmaṇā devatvam abhisampadyante | atha ye śataṃ karmadevānām ānandāḥ sa eka ājānadevānām ānandāḥ | atha ye śataṃ karmadevānām ānandāḥ sa eka ājānadevānām ānandāḥ | atha ye śataṃ ājānadevānām ānandāḥ sa ekaḥ prajāpatiloka ānandāḥ | atha ye śataṃ ājānadevānām ānandāḥ sa ekaḥ prajāpatiloka ānandāḥ | atha ye śataṃ prajāpatiloka ānandāḥ sa eko brahmaloka ānandāḥ | atha ye śataṃ prajāpatiloka ānandāḥ sa eko brahmaloka ānandāḥ | athaiṣa eva parama ānandāḥ | evaṃ sarveṣām ānandānām upastha ekāyanam |*

<sup>116</sup> *sá yò 'yám mádhye prāṇāḥ | eṣá evēndras tān eṣá prāṇān madhyatá indriyēṇaindha tásmad indha indho ha vai tám indrā ity ācakṣate paró 'kṣam paró 'kṣakāmā hí devās*

<sup>117</sup> *sa jāto bhūtāny abhivyaikhyat kim ihānyaṃ vāvadiṣad iti | sa etam eva puruṣaṃ brahmatatamam apaśyad idam adarśam itī3 | tasmād idandro nāmedandro ha vai nāma tam idandraṃ santam indra ity ācakṣate parokṣeṇa | parokṣapriyā iva hi devāḥ parokṣapriyā iva hi devāḥ |*

the king ‘accomplished’ (*siddha*) too.<sup>118</sup> Thus it is implied that the Brahmin and the king identify in their cognition with the primeval multiple subjects of the highest cognitive agent and take part in its cosmic vision which includes Heaven which is beyond the range of everyday perception. If the recipient refers to MS 1.22, he will understand that the Composer conceives their mental activity as sacrifice which, according to the Veda, leads men to heaven during their life and after death (Jurewicz 2010, 2016/18).

The Brahmin and the king, however, further continue their practice. Its next stage is the joint suspension of the perception of the senses (*viṣayapratīsamhāra*) according to the rules (*vidhānatas*, 193.15).<sup>119</sup> The recipient understand that the sense objects are all the wonderful sights and sounds of the heavenly sphere which are now rejected by the practitioners.

The suspension of the sensual perception is accompanied with breathing:

### MDhP 193.16

*prāṇāpānautathodānaṃ samānaṃ vyānaṃ eva ca |  
evam tān manasi sthāpya dadhatuḥ prāṇayor manah ||*

Having placed the five breaths – *prāṇa*, *āpāna*, *udāna*, *samāna* and *vyāna* in the mind in this way, they kept the mind between two breaths.<sup>120</sup>

The Brahmin and the king place their five breaths in the mind ‘in this way’ (*evam*, verse c) which leaves us uncertain as to how. Concentration of the breaths is conceived in terms of their placing or fixing (*sthāpya*, verse c) in the mind which implies that a new kind of activity begins. This is additional to everyday activity which consists on making the body to work properly. In the next step of practice, they place the mind between two breaths (verse d). These breaths might be *prāṇā* (exhalation) and *āpāna* (inhalation) which now work in a different way than in everyday breathing.

### MDhP 193.17

*upasthītakṛtau tatra nāsikāgram adho bhruvau |  
bhrukutyā<sup>121</sup> caiva manasā śanair dhārayataḥ sma tau ||*

They focus these two closely on the tip of the nose and gradually, concentrating to the brows with frown, managed to hold the breaths just below the brows.

<sup>118</sup> MDhP 193.14: *atha svargas tathā rūpī brāhmaṇaṃ vākyam abravīt | 12,193.014c samsiddhas tvaṃ mahābhāga tvaṃ ca siddhas tathā nṛpa ||*

<sup>119</sup> MDhP 193.15: *atha tau sahitau rājann anyonyena vidhānataḥ | viṣayapratīsamhāram ubhāv eva pracakratuḥ ||*

<sup>120</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

<sup>121</sup> The critical edition proposes: *kuṅkuṇyāṃ* which is a difficult word interpreted by Arjunamiśra as *brahmanādī yām āhuḥ suṣmneti*. Since this word is not used in the early Smṛti texts, the version of the Vulgate is followed similarly to Wynne (2005: 242).

Two breaths are directed up to the tip of nose, below the brows which are contracted (verses a–c). It is possible that what is meant here is a special kind of breathing with alternative use of the nostrils with the aid of mind which gently monitors the breathing between the two of them. This description seems to reflect a breathing which opens the nasal cavity and sinuses.<sup>122</sup>

### MDhP 193.18

*niśceṣṭābhyāṃ śarīrābhyāṃ sthiradr̥ṣṭī samāhitau |  
jitāsanau tathādhāya mūrdhany ātmānam eva ca ||*

Their bodies are motionless, their sight is immovable, in focused concentration, having mastered their posture, they placed their self in their heads.<sup>123</sup>

Now the posture of the Brahmin and the king is presented. They sit motionless, their gaze is fixed and they are ‘gathered up’ (*samāhitau*) with their mind fully focused on the two breaths (verses a–b). Having mastered their fixed position, they place their self (*ātman*) in their heads (verses c–d). It seems that in this way the Composer presents the activation of the head resonator: the reciters most probably feel themselves in their heads. At the same time, this description may refer to the moment of liberating cognition when the self (*ātman*) is recognised. This interpretation seems to be confirmed by the fact that in the next stanza the Brahmin is called *mahātman* i.e., someone whose self is great which evokes the concept of the Great Self (*mahan ātman*). The Brahmin experiences himself as encompassing with his self the whole manifest aspect. Most probably, the king’s experience is the same.

### MDhP 193.19

*tāludeśam athoddālya brāhmaṇasya mahātmanah |  
jyotirjvālā sumahatī jagāma tridivam tadā ||*

In this moment, she with burning flame, very great, having split the palate of the Brahmin, whose self became great, blew off to the highest heaven.<sup>124</sup>

This stanza can be interpreted as expressing the beginning of recitation; the first recitation of reality being the beginning of creation. The compound *jyotirjvālā* (verse c) is interpreted as referring to speech (*vāc*) which is conceived

<sup>122</sup> Ganguli (1883–1886) interprets *upasthi* as *upastha* and the whole activity presented here as placing two breaths ‘in the abdomen.’ If his interpretation is right, the description would reflect the moment before recitation when the breath is fixed in the lower part of the belly, under the diaphragm:

<sup>123</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

<sup>124</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

as female in the Veda. One should also remember the boon that the goddess Sāvitrī promised to fulfill, that the Brahmin will reach the unmanifest aspect (see 192.14–15). Remember also that Ganguli (1883–1886) interprets *samhitā* as Sāvitrī-mantra (see above, analysis of 192.6). So, it is suggested that ‘she with burning flame’ is the embodied Sāvitrī-mantra which is now recited by the Brahmin. Its qualification as *sumahatī* (verse c) is meant to activate the concept of being great as used in cosmogonical descriptions. The speech of the Brahmin with the great self is reality in its initial state of manifestation.

This omnipresent speech of the Brahmin reaches the highest heaven (verse d, *tridiva*) which activates the metaphor ‘COGNITION OF SOMETHING IS ENTERING IT’ which is based on the image schemas of SOURCE-PATH-GOAL and CONTAINER. This noun is not often used in early Smṛti texts.<sup>125</sup> It is used in RV 9.113.9 (*yātrānukāmam caraṇam trināké tridivé divāḥ*) where the results of somic cognition are expressed. The place is called *trinākā* and *tridivā* and the freedom gained thanks to somic cognition is conceived in terms of the ability to walk freely. If the recipient activates this rare term, he will understand that the Composer conceives the results of soft recitation (*japa*) in the same way as it has been conceived in the roots of tradition. This experience takes place, according to the RV, at the borderline sphere of the cosmos which accords with the present description: the Brahmin is at the sphere where reality manifests itself in speech.

Conceived in terms of fire, speech is presented as cracking open the pate of the Brahmin (verse a). This description might reflect the feeling that sound goes through the place between the brows on which the two breaths are concentrated.

### MDhP 193.20

*hāhākāras tato dikṣu sarvāsu sumahān abhūt |*  
*taj jyotiḥ stūyamānaṃ sma brahmānaṃ prāviśat tadā ||*

All the living beings in different world regions made the magnificent sound of ‘Ha, ha!’ as that flame was praised and entered into the god Brahma.

The speech of the Brahmin, accompanied by the cries of the amazed living beings, enters brahman (verse d). The whole context implies that the Accusative form *brahmānaṃ* is masculine and the recipient will understand that the Brahmin now cognises the god who is the highest cognitive agent

<sup>125</sup> In the *Śāntiparvan* it is used five times (according to DSC), in most cases to describe a happy or free state (MBh 12.11.26; 34.15; 12.351.3, the same meaning is in MS 9.249). In MDh 12.39.11 it denotes or heaven of Indra.

conceived as abiding in the highest heaven.<sup>126</sup> In this cognitive act the Brahmin experiences his identity with him which is conceived in terms of entering into him.

### MDhP 193.21

*tataḥ svāgatam ity āha tat tejaḥ sa pitāmahaḥ |  
prādeśamātraṃ puruṣaṃ pratyudgamyā viśāṃ pate ||*

Brahma – the great grandfather – advanced towards that flame, which was a person as big as the span between the thumb and forefinger and said ‘Welcome’ my Lord.

The compound *prādeśamātrā* (verse c) is used in ŚB 10.6.1.10 and in CU 5.18.1 to describe *ātman* in his potentiality to expand and manifest himself (Jurewicz 2016/18). Wynne (2009: 243) interprets that the form of man, as big as the span between the thumb and forefinger, is the flame. If we accept this interpretation, we would understand that speech is the self (*ātman*) of the Brahmin conceived in terms of man as big as the span between the thumb and forefinger. However, taking into account that speech (conceived in terms of flame) has already entered Brahma (see the previous stanza), a more probable interpretation is that Brahma, having accepted the speech of the Brahmin, now approaches his self (*ātman*) which is conceived in terms of *prādeśamātra puruṣa* and which is, as we remember, the unmanifest aspect of reality present in man. Thus, the moment of realisation of unity of reality is expressed from the perspective of the highest cognitive agent: Brahma, having recognised the self (*ātman*) of the Brahmin in the form of speech, now recognises its unmanifest aspect. In this way, the highest cognitive agent can perform his cognition from within man, with the use of his cognitive faculties. Let us remember that, according to AU 1.3.13–14, this is why reality (called *ātman* there) manifests itself in man.<sup>127</sup>

The self of the Brahmin is conceived as a glow (*tejas*, verse a) so is as fiery as in Vedic tradition (Jurewicz 1997). Its qualification as *prādeśamātra puruṣa* implies its potentiality to expand. Moreover, the use of Vedic concept of *prādeśamātra puruṣa* in the description makes the recipient understand that soft recitation (*japa*) allows the reciter to cognise and create the same self (*ātman*) as is described in earlier tradition.

In the next two stanzas, Brahma states that the reciters of soft recitation gain the same result as the yogins which is direct vision of himself, but he

<sup>126</sup> The participle *stūyamāna* (verse c) may also qualify the god Brahma who is revered by the Brahmin in his extolling recitation (*stuti*).

<sup>127</sup> *a jāto bhūtāny abhivyaikhyat kim ihānyaṃ vāvadiṣad iti | sa etam eva puruṣaṃ brahmatatamam apaśyad idam adarśam itī3 |* (Jurewicz 2016/18).



especially greets the former (MDhP 193.22–23).<sup>128</sup> In this way, Yudhiṣṭhira gets the answer to his initial question about the results of yoga and *japa*. One might presume that *sāṃhkyā* is implicitly meant together with yoga. The same will be repeated in MDhP 193.27,29.<sup>129</sup>

The last moment of realisation of the unity of reality is conceived in terms of eating as the Brahmin and the king enter the mouth of Brahma:

### MDhP 193.24–25

*uṣyatām mayi cety uktvācetaṣat sa tataḥ punaḥ |*  
*athāsya praviveśāsyaṃ brāhmaṇo vigatajvaraḥ || (24)*

As soon as Brahma said ‘Abide in me’ he returned to his perpetual contemplation, and then the Brahmin, being free from all affliction, entered his mouth.

*rājāpy etena vidhinā bhagavantaṃ pitāmahaṃ |*  
*yathaiva dvijaśārdūlas tathaiva prāviśat tadā || (25)*

The king too, by the same method, found himself in front of the blessed grandfather. And just like the tigerish Brahmin, he entered the mouth of Brahma.

The image of entering the mouth of Brahma evokes the Vedic conceptualisation of the cosmos in terms of an open mouth. It has been already evoked in MDhP 191.9 where the Composer states that the reciter is above time. Reality, in its creative activity, is conceived in terms of a man who opens his mouth in order to speak and eat (see 2.1.1, 4.11.3). The circle made by the open mouth is the source domain for the borderline between the two aspects which is the location of the activity of the highest agent. The Brahmin and the king pass it and unite with what is unmanifest. Realisation of full unity is conceived in terms of eating and, as the scenario of the source domain implies digesting. The logic of the source domain implies that the Brahmin and the king became reality in the same way as food, when eaten, becomes the eater. This metaphor is elaborated in the same way in the ŚB and in the model of the Five Fires (Jurewicz 2016/18).

The logic of the general domain of Cooking allows us to better understand the mental state of the Brahmin and the king. It implies two phases: the first is cooking food, the second is its eating. Within the frames of this logic, the cosmos is the pot, its edges the borderline sphere between two aspects of

<sup>128</sup> MDhP 193: *bhūyaś caivāparaṃ prāha vacanaṃ madhuraṃ sma saḥ | jāpakais tulyaphalatā yogānāṃ nātra saṃśayaḥ || (22) yogasya tāvad etebhyaḥ phalaṃ pratyakṣadarśanam | jāpakānāṃ viśiṣṭaṃ tu pratyutthānaṃ samādhikam || (23)*

<sup>129</sup> MDhP 193.27: *ṛtapūjāv imau tulyaṃ tvayā tulyaphalāv imau | yogajāpakayor drṣṭaṃ phalaṃ sumahad adya vai || MDhP 193.29: yaś ca yoge bhaved bhaktaḥ so ‘pi nāsty atra saṃśayaḥ | vidhinānena dehānte mama lokān avāpnuyāt ||*

reality. For those who are not free, it is time which is conceived in terms of a cook who mixes the food (in terms of which living beings are conceived). One who is free goes further. Having reached the borderline sphere between the two aspects, conceived in terms of the edges of a pot, he cognises that beyond it there is something else and now conceives the highest cognitive agent (with whom he has identity) in terms of a cook.

However, cooking is an intentional activity, one cooks food in order to eat it. Thus, man enters the next phase of his cognition conceived now in terms of eating. We could imagine this state in the same way as it is conceived in the BhG 11 (see below, section 4.12): a man faces the open mouth of reality which not only recites but eats. Now the next aspect of the borderline between two aspects can be seen. This is the one between the potential state of reality in the beginning of creation and unmanifest reality. This borderline is conceived in terms of the open mouth during recitation and eating. The reciter has to enter it and realise his unity with the whole reality. If this interpretation is correct, we see how much more detailed liberating cognition has become by comparison to Vedic thought.

\*

The analysis of the practice of soft recitation shows several issues. Firstly, the conceptual continuity of tradition as far as the aim of religious practice is concerned: it is cognition of the self (*ātman*) understood as its ontological realisation. Secondly, continuity of tradition in the way practice is conceived: the creation of the self is conceived in terms of heating. The metaphors BREATH IS FIRE, SPEECH IS FIRE are still active (at least implicitly) which allows for the conceptualisation of recitation with breathing as heating. Fire (as a concept and as experience) again appears at the human level as the source domain to conceive man's supernatural power.

Since the description of the Brahminic practice of soft recitation and its results are presented as the answer about the questions of the nature of *sāṃhkyā* and *yoga*, we can see that, even if these terms refer to some separate philosophical strands, they are redefined and incorporated into Brahmanic thought. On the other hand, the fact that Brahma prefers the results of *japa* more than the results of *yoga* is evidence of a dispute among the Brahmins on which ways lead to liberation. It could be assumed that the followers of *yoga* (and *sāṃhkyā*) did not pay much attention to recitation of the Veda which was the core of the Brahminic practice.

Finally, this analysis shows how much of the meaning can be reconstructed by close reading of the text and by cognitive analysis of the source domains

used in the conceptualisation of very abstract concepts and mental processes that are impossible to be expressed literally. The logic of the general domain of Cooking which is used, often implicitly, and is inherited from tradition frames the Composers' thinking and motivates the words and expressions they use. It is worth noting that the concept of cooking is hardly used in reflection as to the nature of cognition and being in Western philosophy. If we want to understand early Smṛti philosophy, we must not only refer to its tradition, but also learn to think in its terms. Then the texts will reveal to us the precision and consistency of thinking of their Composers.

## 4.6. Metaphors of yoga. Fire and journey to freedom

In this section we discuss the two main source domains used to conceive the liberating process called *yoga*: fire kindling and the general domain of Riding In A Chariot. It will show their grounding in tradition and how tradition is redefined in order to express contemporary practices.

### 4.6.1. YOGA IS KINDLING OF FIRE

Metaphor YOGA IS KINDLING OF FIRE is activated in the following stanza:

#### MDhP 203.39

*agnir dāruḡato yadvad bhinne dārau na dṛśyate |  
tathaiivātmā śarīrastho yogenaivātra dṛśyate ||*

As fire that is the log of wood cannot be seen when the log is split, in the same way the self who is in the body can be here seen thanks to proper means/yoga.<sup>130</sup>

The experience of kindling fire is used to conceive the process that reveals the hidden self (*ātman*). Fire is believed to be present in wood, yet one must know how to make it appear.<sup>131</sup> It is a difficult process that needs knowledge and skill, takes time and is tiresome. All its features are mapped onto the target domain. Vedic conceptualisation of the self in terms of fire gives rational ground to this metaphor. The word *yoga* has double meaning here: the method of kindling fire and the liberating practice.

<sup>130</sup> Jurewicz's translation. The same metaphor is activated in MDhP 195.12–13, 228.16.

<sup>131</sup> As we have seen this metaphor is also used to express the presence of life (*jīva*), see chapter 3.3.2.

There are also accounts in the MDhP which suggest that yoga is understood as the process of heating. In chapters 232, 266 and 290 five faults of yoga are enumerated: these are desire, anger, lust, fear and sleep.<sup>132</sup> They are removed with use of positive mental and physical states. These states also enlarge the glow (*tejas*) and remove sins. Thanks to them, all wishes of man are fulfilled and true knowledge is gained (232.11, 266.16).<sup>133</sup> The noun *tejasvin*, used in reference to the wise men, literally means ‘possessing glow’. The word *tejas* means the heat of fire (MS 11.246, used as the source domain to conceive the purificatory energy of cognition),<sup>134</sup> it is also seen as a kind of internal state that can be gained or lost (MS 4.41–42,189).<sup>135</sup> We should bear in mind that the Sanskrit concept of light (like *tejas*) included the concept of heat.<sup>136</sup> It is implied that the inherent energy which is increased, thanks to yoga, is conceived or experienced as fiery.

Conceptualisation of yoga in terms of burning fire is clearly activated in a later chapter of MDhP (289), which describes the immense power of yoga with the use of various metaphors, the Composer also uses the source domain of fire. He compares a weak yogin to fire which is extinguished by large logs of timber placed upon it (MDhP 289.19).<sup>137</sup> But, when a fire is strong, it can burn the whole earth (MDhP 289.20).<sup>138</sup> In the same way, a strong yogin can burn the whole earth just as the sun burns it during cosmic destruction at the end of time.<sup>139</sup> Such a yogin is filled with a burning glow (*diptatejas*) and

<sup>132</sup> MDhP 232.4: *yogadoṣān samucchidya pañca yān kavayo viduḥ | kāmam krodham ca lobham ca bhayam svapnam ca pañcamam ||* MDhP 266.4: *pūrve samudre yaḥ panthā na sa gacchati paścimam | ekaḥ panthā hi mokṣasya tan me vistarataḥ śṛṇu || pañca doṣān prabho dehe pravadanti mañiṣinah | mārgajñāḥ kāpilāḥ sāmkyāḥ śṛṇu tān arisūdana ||* (53) *kāmakrodhau bhayam nidrā pañcamah śvāsa ucyate | ete doṣāḥ śarīreṣu dṛśyante sarvadehinām ||* (54) *chindanti kṣamayā krodham kāmam saṃkalpavarjanāt | sattvasaṃśīlanān nidrām apramādād bhayam tathā | chindanti pañcamam śvāsam laghvāhāratayā nṛpa ||* (55)

<sup>133</sup> MDhP 232.11: *etaiv vivardhate tejaḥ pāpmānam cāpakaṣati | sidhyanti cāsya sarvārthā vijñānam ca pravartate ||* MDhP 266.16: *etaiv vivardhate tejaḥ pāpmānam apahanti ca | sidhyanti cāsya saṃkalpā vijñānam ca pravartate ||*

<sup>134</sup> MS 11.247: *yathaidhas tejasā vahniḥ prāptam nirdahati kṣaṇāt | tathā jñānāgninā pāpam sarvaṃ dahati vedavit ||* (see section 4.9.5).

<sup>135</sup> MS 4: *rajasābhiplutām nārīm narasya hy upagacchataḥ | prajñā tejo balaṃ cakṣur āyus caiva prahīyate ||* (41) *tām vivarjayatas tasya rajasā samabhiplutām | prajñā tejo balaṃ cakṣur āyus caiva pravardhate ||* (42), MS 4.189: *hiranyam āyur annam ca bhūr gauś cāpy oṣatas tanum | aśvas cakṣus tvacam vāso ghrtaṃ tejas tilāḥ prajāḥ ||*

<sup>136</sup> In classical Sanskrit literature only light of the moon is cooling. We will return to this connection between shining and heating below.

<sup>137</sup> MDhP 289.19: *alpakaś ca yathā rājan vahniḥ sāmyati durbalaḥ | ākrānta indhanaiḥ sthūlais tadvad yogo 'balaḥ prabho ||*

<sup>138</sup> MDhP 289.20: *sa eva ca yadā rājan vahnir jātabalaḥ punaḥ | samīraṇayutaḥ kṛtsnām dahet kṣipram mahīm api ||*

<sup>139</sup> MDhP 289.21: *tadvaj jātabalo yogī diptatejā mahābalaḥ | antakāla ivādityaḥ kṛtsnam saṃśoṣaye jagat ||*

such a qualification activates the Vedic cosmogonies where Prajāpati creates fire from his mouth in the first act of creation (ŚB 2.2.4). The Brahmin who practices soft recitation is described in the same way (see section 4.5).<sup>140</sup>

Conceptualisation of yoga in terms of kindling fire is grounded in the earliest concepts of mental transformation, caused by soma (RV)<sup>141</sup> and then by effort (ŚB). Heat that accompanied them is a physical experience. It is difficult to state to what extent the descriptions of yogins as filled with fire were seen as metaphorical or as describing real heat, but the concept of fire is clearly used. This confirms the thesis of the long line of efforts made by the Brahmins to reproduce the experience of their seers. The Vedic concept of fire is now shifted to express human supernatural power.

#### 4.6.2. YOGA IS RIDING IN A CHARIOT

The second source domain used in the descriptions of yoga is the general domain of Riding in a Chariot. This conceptualisation is also grounded in the RV where *yoga* means a journey to gain the free space where movement and living is possible (Oberlies 1998, Jurewicz 2018).<sup>142</sup> The use of the word *yoga* in reference to a journey is a metonymic extension of the literal meaning of yoke that is put on the draught animals before a journey (THE FIRST PHASE OF THE PROCESS FOR THE WHOLE PROCESS).

The concept of a journey was crucial for the R̥gvedic Composers. In profiling its ICM, they were focused on its goals which are the various desired riches and the state that was conceived in their terms. The prototypical feature of the ICM was that it led to freedom conceived in terms of free movement (Jurewicz 2019). For this a wide space (*urú loká*) was necessary and it was the main goal of a journey. This basic concept established the framework for understanding cosmic, social and cognitive processes which were conceived in these terms. In Jurewicz 2010, it is called the defining event.

In the later Upaniṣads and in the Smṛti texts, the general domain of Riding In A Chariot begins to be elaborated by the Composers to express all aspects of the liberating process (see White 2009: 61–67). The cognitive faculties and difficulty of their restraint are conceived in terms of restraining reins and horses, the objects of senses are conceived in terms of road or pastures, and

<sup>140</sup> In MDhP 287.12 the concept of cleansing the precious stone is the source domain for the practice of yoga which activates the R̥gvedic general domain of Cleansing By Heat (MDhP 287.12: *yathā bhānugataṃ tejo maṇiḥ śuddhaḥ samādhinā | ādatte rājasārdūla tathā yogaḥ pravartate ||*).

<sup>141</sup> RV 8.48.6a: *agnīm ná mā mathitām sám didīpaḥ*.

<sup>142</sup> White (2009: 44–45, 60) interprets the sources of use of the concept of yoga in a similar way.

the skill of the practitioner is conceived in terms of the skill of the driver (see below). There are other implications of this source domain. In a journey one has to restrain oneself and focus on reaching a destination but when it is reached one becomes free. In the same way as a journey needs time to reach a destination liberating practice needs time to become successful. Practice consists of self-restraint and requires the total focus of the agent but, finally, it leads to ultimate freedom. It should also be noted that journeys in the times of Smṛti must have been dangerous for many reasons, so one had to know the right path and focus on it. If we take into account that chariots were used in battles, the dangerous aspect of riding in them is even stronger (see White 2009: 67–71).

The Smṛti Composers metonymically activate various elements of the scenario of a journey in a chariot and call it *yoga* to express the meaning they want to highlight in a specific context. In its literal meaning of a yoke, *yoga* is used in the following stanza:

### MDhP 12.228.3ab

*chinnadoṣo munir yogān yukto yuñjīta dvādaśa |*

The silent-one who has abandoned faults, himself yoked, should yoke yokes twelve times.<sup>143</sup>

Here, the practitioner is conceived in terms of a draught animal harnessed to the yoke. In the target domain, the necessity of being disciplined is highlighted.<sup>144</sup> In the next example (which comes from a later chapter of the MDhP), the practitioner is also conceived in terms of a draught animal but he is named by the reflexive pronoun *ātman* and thereby expresses the meaning of *yoga* as a self-reflexive activity:

### MDhP 289.35

*tadvad ātmasamādhānaṃ yuktvā yogena tattvavit |*  
*durgamaṃ sthānam āpnoti hitvā deham imaṃ nṛpa ||*

In this way, having yoked himself in order to gather himself with a yoke, he, who knows the truth, arrives to a state that is difficult to reach, having abandoned this body, O king.<sup>145</sup>

<sup>143</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

<sup>144</sup> This conceptualisation is also reflected in the Ātmanepāda form *yuñjāna*, e.g., MDhP 228.7: *evaṃ hy etena yogena yuñjāno 'py ekam antataḥ | api jijñāsamāno hi śabdabrahmātivartate ||*

<sup>145</sup> Jurewicz's translation. See also: MDhP 289.33: *yuktvā tathāyam ātmānaṃ yogaḥ pārthiva niścalam | karoty amalātmānaṃ bhāskaropamadārśanam ||*

It should be noted that in this stanza the Composer further elaborates the scenario of the general domain of Riding In A Chariot in terms of which yoga is conceived: having yoked himself (in the similar way as a draught animal is yoked) the practitioner will reach the difficult aim he wants to reach (in the similar way as a place that is difficult to reach is reached at the end of a journey).

In the following stanza, the word *yoga* is used in reference to the practice, the driver and his chariot:<sup>146</sup>

### MDhP 202.20

*devādidevaḥ sa yogātmā yogasārathih  
yogam āsthāya bhagavāms tadā Bhāratasattama ||*

Then the foremost from the gods, himself under a yoke (yoga) and with yoga as his driver, mounted on a chariot (yoga), O the best of the Bhāratas.<sup>147</sup>

Such a use of the word *yoga* allows the Composer to express that the idea that practice is a self-reflective activity.<sup>148</sup> *Yoga* also refers to a chariot in the following example, here the verb *ā ruh-* is used:

### BhG 6.3

*āruruṣor muner yogaṃ karma kāraṇam ucyate |  
yogārūḍhasya tasyaiva śamaḥ kāraṇam ucyate ||*

When a sage wishes to rise to this discipline, action is called his means; when he has risen to this discipline, serenity is called his means.<sup>149</sup>

The Composer elaborates another aspect of a journey which is movement (in terms of which liberating practice is conceived) and the lack of movement (*śama*) when the desired place is reached. The use of the verb *ā ruh-*, with its image schematic meaning of VERTICALITY, allows him to activate the concept of a journey upwards. In verses c–d, the word *yoga* activates the blended meaning of a chariot and a mountain, its generic space is the schema mentioned

<sup>146</sup> One mounts yoga (*yogam ā sthā-*) in the same way as one mounts a chariot (e.g., MDhP 273.5: *tatas taṃ ratham āsthāya devāpyāyitam āhave | vajrodyatakarah śakras taṃ daityaṃ pratyavaikṣata ||*).

<sup>147</sup> Jurewicz's translation. The word *yoga* is also metonymically used in reference to man who practices (e.g., MDhP 289.33: *yuktvā tathāyam ātmānaṃ yogaḥ pārthiva niścalam | karoty amalām ātmānaṃ bhāskaropamadarśanam ||*).

<sup>148</sup> Such expressions are possible thanks to metonymy ELEMENT OF SCENARIO FOR ANOTHER ELEMENT OF SCENARIO.

<sup>149</sup> See also BhG 4.42d: *yogam ātiṣṭhottīṣṭha bhārata*, MDhP 12.289.41c: *uttamaṃ yogam āsthāya yadīcchati vimucyate*.

above. In the blend, practice is conceived in terms of riding a chariot up the mountain, its culmination in terms of reaching its top. This is a blend used already in the ṚV to conceive the sunrise (Jurewicz 2010).<sup>150</sup> Somic exaltation is conceived in these terms too and this conceptualisation may enrich the meaning of the verses c–d. The tiresome journey upwards ends with *śama* rest. Practice is similarly tiresome, but it ends with ultimate peace. When finally, one arrived at his destination one could rest.

Conceptualisation of the human organism in terms of a chariot is motivated by the metaphor YOGA IS A RIDING IN A CHARIOT. This metaphor is activated in KaU 3.3–4 where the self (*ātman*) is the person who possesses the chariot, reason is the driver, the mind is the reins, the senses are the horses and the objects of senses are the pastures. The Composers of the MDhP activate this metaphor in a shorter version:

### MDhP 12.231

*indriyāṇi mano yuñkte vaśyān yanteva vājinaḥ |*  
*manaś cāpi sadā yuñkte bhūtātmā hṛdayāśritaḥ ||*

The mind yokes senses like the driver the obedient horses. The mind is yoked by the self of the beings<sup>151</sup> present in the heart.<sup>152</sup>

In MDhP 228.8–12, where the effects of yoga are described, the various mental states of man engaged in the liberating cognition are conceived in terms of parts of a chariot (see White 2009: 73–75). The description is very detailed as far as the source and the target domain is concerned and it allows the Composer to express the complex and vague concept of mental transformations with a clear hierarchy of elements and the way they can be used in order to attain final freedom. The metaphor YOGA IS A RIDING IN A CHARIOT is also elaborated in MDhP 289.50–55. Here the source domain is a journey across a river (in terms of which the manifest aspect is conceived) and across a dangerous wood and the aspects of this scenario is used to highlight the difficulties of the process.<sup>153</sup>

There is one more implication of the conceptualisation of yoga in terms of the general domain of Riding In A Chariot. As will be shown, the early Smṛti Composers try to convince their recipients that their contemporary liberating practices are the same as the most ancient. In those times, the roads were

<sup>150</sup> The sunrise is conceived in these terms and the first seers are presented as yoking the reins in order to create cosmos in ṚV 10.129 (Jurewicz 1995, 2010, see also Jurewicz 2018b).

<sup>151</sup> For *bhūtātmā* see chapter 3.3.2.d.

<sup>152</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

<sup>153</sup> For its analysis see Jurewicz (2018b).



made by following the footsteps of those who have already traveled it. A well-trodden track was formed by ruts made by the wheels of carts. Even if later the roads were built of wooden logs or stones and this way of thinking was preserved in the ICM of a path/road. It was this feature of the ICM that made referring to tradition and emphasizing its continuation meaningful for the recipient. The relationship between tradition and the next generations was understood in terms of following the footsteps of those who had gone earlier and who managed to reach their destination, who became ‘the successful ones’ (*sādhya*).

Taking this into account yoga not is only self-discipline as implied by the meaning of yoking. Its conceptualisation in terms of the general domain of Journey In A Chariot reveals its overall concept as a process that is dangerous, that needs deep knowledge, skill, perseverance and courage to perform. It needs a guide but it is possible for it to be learnt. It highlights a strong desire to achieve results and its final result which is freedom. These meanings, mapped from the source domain onto the target domain, allow the Composers to express an important feature of this process. The thesis suggested is that the R̥gvedic meaning of *yoga* which is ‘journey’ and the ICM of journey, according to which a journey is an activity that leads to freedom, motivated the use of this noun in reference to liberating practice in the post-Vedic tradition. One can speculate that this is the meaning of *yoga* in Pali texts too, but this issue needs a separate analysis.

#### 4.7. Liberating cognition

In the rest of this chapter, we discuss the basic model of the activity of a man who wants to become ultimately free. It will focus on those aspects that are continuation of tradition and the way these are redefined against the new strands and practices.

Just as a lack of knowledge is the starting point of the chain of objectification, liberating cognition begins with right knowledge. Arjuna and Yudhiṣṭhira both lose it. They do not know what to do to appease their suffering.

Thanks to knowledge, man becomes able to use categories in a proper way and will be able to choose elements recognised as sattvic as sacrificial and in accordance with dharma. In wrong cognition and action, a person chooses elements recognised as tamasic which causes an inevitable sequence of events leading him to reincarnate, while in liberating cognition man turns in the opposite direction. In contrast to the former process the subsequent stages of which take place with necessity and without the conscious will of

the agent, in the second a conscious effort is necessary. This effort consists in cooperation of the mind (*manas*) and reason (*buddhi*).

The early Smṛti texts do not recommend the full renunciation of action but one should choose only those actions that are necessary (*nitya, kārya*). In the BhG these are heat (*tapas*), sacrifice (*yajña*) and generosity (*dāna*).<sup>154</sup> The only reason for their performing is the fact that they should be performed. Actions performed because of that are recognised as sattvic:

### BhG 18.23

*niyataṃ saṅgarahitam arāgadveṣataḥ kṛtam |  
aphalaprepsunā karma yat tat sātṭvikam ucyate ||*

An action which is necessary, devoid of attachment performed without passion and hatred by someone who does not want to obtain its fruits is called sattvic.<sup>155</sup>

### BhG 18.26

*muktasaṅgo 'nahaṃvādī dhṛtyutsāhasamanvitaḥ |  
siddhyasiddhyor nirvikāraḥ kartā sātṭvika ucyate ||*

The agent who is free from attachment, who does not use the word 'I', is full of determination and energy, who is unchanged in success and defeat, is called sattvic.

The final result is to go beyond subject-object categories, beyond the categories of action (*karman*), classes (*guṇa*) and, finally, beyond time (*kāla*) and name (*nāman*). Then man can either finally unite with the unmanifest aspect or he may participate in the manifest aspect but mentally encompass two perspectives of the highest cognitive agent: that of macro-scale (the cosmic perspective) and that of micro-scale (the perspective of a particular man).<sup>156</sup>

Hence the liberating process consists of two or rather three stages. In the first man recognises his self (*ātman*). In the second man lives according to his knowledge and either remains beyond society (the second stage) or takes part in the activity of society (the third stage which option is recommended by Kṛṣṇa to Arjuna and by Bhīṣma to Yudhiṣṭhira). Since this process is the gradual empowerment of man as a subject, human and absolute, we can call this process subjectivisation.

As stated, reality realises its freedom in two ways: in the first act of creation, it manifests its freedom to do whatever it wants and then it manifests

<sup>154</sup> BhG 18.5: *yajñadānatapaḥkarma na tyājyaṃ kāryaṃ eva tat | yajño dānaṃ tapaś caiva pāvanāni manīṣiṇām ||*

<sup>155</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

<sup>156</sup> For the explanation of this mental state, see also section 4.11.3.

its freedom to subject itself to its own rules in a perfect way. The subjectivised agent is able to realise both dimensions of freedom. When the agent first begins to undertake liberating cognition, he realises his freedom to act according to his will. Then he is expected to manifest his freedom realised in perfect subjugation to the rules. The next free act takes place when man realises his unity with reality. If he decides to again engage in action, he has to restrain himself in order not to destroy the cosmos (*lokasaṃgraha*, see below, section 4.11.3). As has also been shown mind (*manas*), in the early Smṛti texts, is seen as having two aspects: as enabling the realisation of freedom and as managing the senses. We will see that while its latter function is suppressed thanks to the restraint of the senses, it is active in its former function during the process of subjectivisation. Remember, according to the cosmogony of MS 1, it is the mind that allows reality to change the levels of its manifestation: from the unmanifest aspect to the manifest aspect, from the mental level to the perceptible sensori-motor level (see chapter 1.1). It plays the same role in subjectivisation although, in this process, the stages of creation are reversed: it is a transition from one level of manifestation to another, from the perceptible level to the mental level and then to the unmanifest aspect. Moreover, since this process requires conscious effort it is possible for it to be realised by the will, which appears in the mind, and which finally liberates the self from suffering. The perseverance (*dhṛti*) that characterises reason helps man to keep the will of the mind in the correct direction so that it does not diverge to sense objects.

Since the aim of this chapter is to recognise the theoretical model of liberating practice presented in early Smṛti thought, and to show the work of tradition, we will not consider its various practical realisations which could be reconstructed on the basis of the texts analysed in this study. We are looking more at the past than at the future and, it is emphasised again, the reader will not find here any discussions on the possible existence of the various philosophical strands attested in the Smṛti texts that are developing or will soon develop under the label of Darśanas. This problem should be investigated separately and it is intended to analyse some of its aspects in my next book.

#### **4.8. The general model of liberating cognition**

As stated above the liberating process, which we are calling subjectivisation, consists of three stages. The first allows man to create the only proper desire of the mind which is cognition of the self, to suspend subject-object cognition

and to enable reason to use classes in a proper way so that man can chose subjective manifestations of reality leading to cognition of the self. We will call this ‘primary subjectivisation’.

### **The model of primary subjectivisation**

the highest cognitive agent (*ātman*) = reason ← → mind ← senses ← body (cosmos)

The second stage is cognition of the self (*ātman*) and cognition of the world from its perspective. We will call this ‘higher subjectivisation’ when man realises that it is the self which is the real subject of subject-object cognition that takes place in the cosmos. At the same time, man cognises the unmanifest aspect of the self and is thus able to perform another kind of cognition not based on a division into subject and object. In order to do that he has to activate his mind in its liberating aspect.

### **The model of higher subjectivisation**

the highest cognitive agent (*ātman*) ← mind ← reason ← mind ← senses ← body (cosmos)

The third stage of subjectivisation, particularly attested by the BhG, is to perform subject-object activity and unite the perspectives of the unmanifest aspect and the manifest aspect in micro-scale. We will call this ‘expanded subjectivisation’.

### **The model of expanded subjectivisation**

the highest cognitive agent (*ātman*) → mind → reason → mind → senses → body → cosmos

## **4.9. Primary subjectivisation**

In this section we will discuss primary subjectivisation. The work on mind leads man to become independent from the influence of I-form and from the results of past actions. During this process man is expected to give up mental habits created during many rebirths and to learn how to use the class of *sattva* correctly.

### 4.9.1. Right knowledge, cognition and desire

Proper knowledge and cognition is the foundation of subjectivisation in the same way as its lack is the foundation of objectification.<sup>157</sup> This is knowledge about existence and the unity of reality.<sup>158</sup> In the BhG such knowledge is recognised as sattvic:

#### BhG 18.20

*sarvabhūteṣu yenaikaṃ bhāvam avyayam īkṣate |  
avibhaktaṃ vibhakteṣu taj jñānaṃ viddhi sātṭvikam ||*

Know that such cognition is sattvic thanks to which one sees one imperishable being in all creatures, both not divided and divided.<sup>159</sup>

It is worth noting that the influence of knowledge in the MDhP 208.23 is conceived in terms of the kindling of fire (yogic practice is conceived similarly see above, section 4.6.1):

#### MDhP 208.23

*pravṛttaṃ noparundheta śanair agnim ivendhayet |  
jñānendhitaṃ tato jñānam arkavat saṃprakāśate ||*

Just as one would kindle a fire gradually, and not obstruct it when it has been produced, so does one's cognition kindled by cognition shines like the sun.<sup>160</sup>

As mentioned above, the kindling of fire is a process that requires patience, calm, attention and skill and these features are projected onto the target domain which allows the recipient to understand that man is consciously active when he recalls the knowledge he has learned from his master. At the same time, such a conceptualisation implies that liberating cognition was conceived or experienced in terms of heating. The same is implied in verse d where cognition is conceived in terms of the sun called by the Vedic name *arka* which sets

<sup>157</sup> MDhP 210.20: *antakāle vayotkarṣāc chanaiḥ kuryād anāturaḥ | evaṃ yuktena manasā jñānaṃ tad upapadyate ||* For the general description of yoga in the MBh, see Fitzgerald (2012b), in the MDhP see Bedekar (1968–1969). However, I abstain from the general term *yoga* in relation to the practices introduced in the earlier chapters of the MDhP, as it is not used as consistently to describe a liberating practice as it is in, for example, BhG 6 (see section 4.10.2.a).

<sup>158</sup> TU 2.6.1: *asann eva sa bhavati asad abrahmeti veda cet | asti brahmeti ced veda santam enaṃ tato vidur iti |*

<sup>159</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

<sup>160</sup> Wynne (2009: 365): 'consciousness shines like the sun when has been intensified by gnosis.'

the present practice in a background of tradition. Verse c expresses the self-reflexive nature of the liberating process: cognition is activated by cognition.

The man who knows about the unity of reality desires to realise it in practice. In his mind, the only proper desire is created. This means that the mind should not concentrate on the objects of senses and should not create their mental images (*saṃkalpa*) which is the source of the desire for them. This is explicitly stated in the following stanza:

### MDhP 171.25

*kāma jānāmi te mūlaṃ saṃkalpāt kila jāyase |  
na tvāṃ saṃkalpayiṣyāmi samūlo na bhaviṣyasi ||*

I know your root, Desire! You are born from mental images. I will not create mental image of you, then you will lose your root.<sup>161</sup>

When the mind (*manas*) creates desire to cognise the self (*ātman*), reason (*buddhi*) can make the correct decisions that will allow man to realise his desire. In order to do that, reason has to properly recognise elements of the cosmos and chose those that facilitate liberating cognition. Such a reason is recognised as sattvic:

### BhG 18.30

*pravṛtṭiṃ ca nivṛtṭiṃ ca kāryākārye bhayābhaye |  
bandhaṃ mokṣaṃ ca yā vetti buddhiḥ sā pārtha sāttvikī ||*

The reason which recognises activity and its cessation, what should be done and what should not be done, fear and the lack of fear, bondage and freedom, is sattvic, Pārtha.<sup>162</sup>

The main feature of sattvic reason is the ability to discern between opposed categories and values. As discussed in the previous chapter (chapter 3.2.1), this is the ability that tamasic reason lacks: it takes adharma as dharma and cognises everything the other way round. The manifest aspect is ambivalent because it is the perceptible form of one reality which cognises itself and epistemologically divides itself into subject and object. Ontologically however, it is still one. In this case, the ability to discern one's dharma is especially important. A man with sattvic reason recognises when he should be engaged in activity (as the householder, *pravṛtṭi*) and when he should not (as the student

<sup>161</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

<sup>162</sup> Jurewicz's translation. The Asuric people cognise in the opposite way, BhG 16.7ab: *pravṛtṭiṃ ca nivṛtṭiṃ ca janā na vidur āsurāḥ*.

and the recluse, *nivṛtti*), which actions are necessary (*kārya*) and which are not (*akārya*). He also knows about fear and the lack of fear (*bhayābhaya*), fear appears when one is focused on the objects of one's senses and it disappears when one cognises one's self (*ātman*). Finally, he discerns freedom from bondage. As previously stated, motivation for action under the influence of the I-form (*ahaṃkāra*) is the gaining of absolute freedom, but such action results in the loss of any freedom. A man who has sattvic reason is able to categorise the elements of the manifest aspect that will guide him to real and ultimate freedom.

When a man has learnt that knowledge, he is free to decide if he wants to confirm it in his practice or if he does not. It is the explicitly stated by Kṛṣṇa at the end of the BhG:

### BhG 18.63

*iti te jñānam ākhyātaṃ guhyād guhyataraṃ mayā |  
vimṛśyaitad aśeṣeṇa yathecchasi tathā kuru ||*

Reflect upon this knowledge I have propounded to you, this mystery of mysteries, in its entirety, and then do as you are pleased to do.

The free act of choice takes place in the mind. In a free act of ones will, man desires to know the self (*ātman*) and not be bound in objects.<sup>163</sup> The process of objectivisation takes place automatically and thus deprives man of freedom. The process of subjectivisation is a constant conscious effort of will made possible by the mind and by rationality and perseverance made possible by reason.

In the early books of the MDhP, the correct decision of reason is expressed by phrase *buddhim āsthāya*, literally 'mounting on reason'; this expression activates the general domain of Riding In A Chariot where reason is conceived in terms of a chariot.<sup>164</sup> The later books enlarge this conceptualisation to express the appearance of states like *dhṛti* (MDhP 270.27), *yatna* (MDhP 281.4), *vrata* (MDhP 284.15). This decision of reason is the first sign of man's empowerment. The basic outline of the process is described in the following stanza:

<sup>163</sup> This desire to cognise truth about oneself is expressed already in the early Upaniṣads (Janaka asks Yājñavalkya to tell him more in the BU, Śvetaketu wants the same from his father in the CU), this wish explicitly is expressed in CU 7.16.1 *satyaṃ bhagavo vijijñāsa iti* (Nārada asks Sanatkumāra).

<sup>164</sup> MDhP 168.39; 171.53; 189.2012,242.017; 242.17; 262.11; 270.14s, see also section 4.5.

**MDhP 208.17**

*dhṛtimān ātmavān buddhiṃ nigrhṇīyād asaṃśayam |*  
*mano buddhyā nigrhṇīyād viśayān manasātmanaḥ ||*

One who is persistent and possesses self, should restrain his reason and have no doubt. He should restrain his mind with his reason and, with his mind, restrain himself from the objects of senses.<sup>165</sup>

When a man's reason makes the right decision, he should be persistent and not change. Only then can he stop the mind and thus impose restrictions on freedom in a similar way as reality imposes them in creation. And only then can the mind suspend sensory perception and keep itself away from the objects of senses. In verse a, the agent is called *ātmavant* which means that he is conscious of his self (*ātman*) and wants to cognise it. This makes him different from those who are called *anātman* 'without the self' and who live as if they did not possess it.

**4.9.2. Primary subjectivisation. The suspension of sensual cognition**

Control over the senses is a free choice of the mind. Reason has to control the mind so that mind does not go astray and force reason to use the wrong categories. In early Smṛti texts, control over the senses is the crucial moment in practice and it is enough for the final recognition of the self (*ātman*). Let me refer, however, to the early Upaniṣads where liberating cognition is described by the theories of the four/five states of the self (*ātman*, Jurewicz 2016/18). The stages in the four states are: the waking state when subject-object consciousness is active, the dream state when the mind remembers the objects although sensual cognition is suspended, the state without dreams when subject-object cognition is suspended but the liberating cognition has not yet appeared and the fourth state which is ultimate freedom. The practice envisaged by the theory of the five states of the self is similar, although more detailed. After the waking state of the self (*annarasamaya*), the state of the breathing self appears which might be accompanied by recitation (*prāṇamaya*), then the state of activity of the mind arrives (*manomaya*), then the state of recognition (*vijñānamaya*) and then the state of bliss (*ānandamaya*). In both practices, suspension of sensual cognition is crucial in order to begin the higher states of consciousness. And the same is attested in the early books of the MDhP, the BhG and the MS.

<sup>165</sup> Jurewicz's translation.



We will first look at the three descriptions of practice presented in MDhP 188, 232 and in MS 2.88–97. The description that is presented in BhG 6, will be analysed in section 4.10.2.a. As we will see they are similar both to each other, and to the descriptions presented above (sections 4.3–5). There is no doubt that a common model of liberating practice was shared by the early Smṛti Composers.

#### 4.9.2.a. Mokṣadharmā 188 (Bhīṣma and Yudhiṣṭhira)

The practice presented in MDhP 188.1 is called the fourfold yoga of thoughtful concentration (*dhyānayoga caturvidha*). The practice of concentration of mind is performed by the yogins, the great seers (*maharṣayas*), who are filled with knowledge and have reached *nirvāṇa* with their mind (2). Such a formulation seems to unite the practice of yogins (if they represented a separate school) and the Buddhists (activated *via* the noun *nirvāṇa* which is not used in the Veda) with the Vedic tradition as composed by the seers.<sup>166</sup>

The first recommendation is the suspension of the activity of the senses of reason (*buddhīndriya*) and the senses of action (*karmendriya*):

#### MDhP 188.5

*tatra svādhyāyasamśliṣṭam ekāgraṃ dhārayen manaḥ |  
piṇḍīkṛtyendriyagrāmam āsīnaḥ kāṣṭhavan munīḥ ||*

There, he should keep his mind one-pointed, embracing Vedic recitation. Having suppressed the group of senses, the silent sage should sit as a log of wood.<sup>167</sup>

In verse a, the Composer expresses the role of recitation in this process: the mind is presented as being clasped by recitation or being embraced by it (*samśliṣṭa*, verse a).<sup>168</sup> The activities in the source domain need effort as well and the recipient may generally conceive of the mental concentration presented here in terms of squeezing.

<sup>166</sup> MDhP 188.2: *yathā svanuṣṭhitam dhyānam tathā kurvanti yoginaḥ | maharṣayo jñānatṛptā nirvāṇagatamānasāḥ ||*

<sup>167</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

<sup>168</sup> Wynne (2009: 189) changes the phrase *svādhyāyasamśliṣṭam* into *dhyānena samślistam* losing in this way the meaning of recitation. The verb *sam śliṣ-* is used in the same context with the same source domain in MDhP 308. 98 (*śabdaḥ sparśo raso rūpaṃ gandhaḥ pañcendriyāni ca | pṛthag ātmā daśātmānaḥ samśliṣṭā jatukāṣṭhavat ||*) and 100 (*na veda cakṣuś cakṣuṣṭvaṃ śrotraṃ nātmani vartate | tathaiḥ vyabhicāreṇa na vartante parasparam | samśliṣṭā nābhijāyante yathāpa iha pāmsavaḥ ||*) This use confirms that there was a common model of liberating cognition.

When the mind is fixed on one thought (*ekāgra*, verse b), it can suspend the activity of the senses of reason. The senses of action are suspended thanks to the immobility of the body. The suspension of sensual cognition is conceived in terms of pressing or clapping the senses in the same way as an oil press presses sesame grains to extract oil (*piṇḍīkr̥tya*, verse c, see chapter 2.1.1). This conceptualisation implies the great effort that are needed by this endeavor.

In 6–7, the Composer describes how sensual perception looks thanks to thoughtful concentration of the mind (*dhyāna*). Man should not perceive any stimulus that comes through the five senses of reason: he should not hear any sound with his ears, not feel any touch with his skin, not see any form with his eye, not taste with his tongue nor smell with his smelling. The mind should not desire objects of senses which means that it should not produce mental images of any external object.<sup>169</sup>

Then the further work on the mind is described:

### MDhP 188.8

*tato manasi saṃsajya pañcavargaṃ vicakṣaṇaḥ |*  
*samādadhyaṇ mano bhrāntam indriyaiḥ saha pañcabhiḥ ||*

Then, the wise man, having put harnessed the group of five into his mind, should hold the wandering mind together with its five senses.<sup>170</sup>

The verb *sañj-* (verse a), used to express mental activity described in this stanza, again highlights the effort required: it is conceived in terms of harnessing or placing the senses within the mind.<sup>171</sup> The Composer is activating the image schema of CONTAINER in terms of which the mind is conceived and the recipient might imagine it as a close container into which it is difficult to place content. The recipient may again think about the concept of squeezing evoked in the previous stanza which highlights the difficulty of the process.

In verse c, mind is presented as roaming about which might activate the concept of a horse which is difficult to control or tame. It is worth adding that another meaning of the verb *sañj-* is ‘to attach to a yoke, harness’ which can also be activated. The difficulty of taming or controlling horses is projected onto the target domain which is the restraint of the mind during thoughtful concentration.

<sup>169</sup> MDhP 188: *śabdāṃ na vindec chrotreṇa sparśaṃ tvacā na vedayet | rūpaṃ na cakṣuṣā vidyāḥ jihvayā na rasāṃs tathā ||* (6) *ghreyāny api ca sarvāni jahyād dhyānena yogavit | pañcavargapramāthīni necchech caitāni vīryavān ||* (7).

<sup>170</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

<sup>171</sup> E.g., MBh 12.5.3.

**MDhP 188.9**

*viṣaṃcāri nirālambaṃ pañcadvāraṃ calācalam |  
pūrve dhyānapathe dhīraḥ samādadhyān mano 'ntaram ||*

The mind roams, has no foundation but five doors, is very unsteady. The wise man should gather it within in the first stage of thoughtful concentration.<sup>172</sup>

The Composer conceptualises the mind in terms of an object or an animal that wanders around (*viṣaṃcārin*), because in everyday cognition it lacks a stable foundation (*nirālamba*, verse a). The senses are doors (verse c) through which the mind can escape. A similar conceptualisation is attested in MDhP 232.14 and MS 2.99 where wisdom gained, thanks to liberating practice, is conceived in terms of water in a gourd and its loss is conceived in terms of an outflow of water (see section 4.9.2.b–c). This confirms a common and shared model of liberating cognition.

In verse c, the mind is called *calācala*. This expression can be understood in two ways. On one hand the mind is ever-moving while on the other *calācala* also mean ‘movable and immovable’. This double meaning highlights its ambiguous nature. When the mind engages in subject-object cognition it is moving (*cala*). When it leads to what is unmanifest, it becomes immovable (*acala*). Keeping the mind in control is conceived in terms of gathering it together, into its centre (CENTRE-PERIPHERY image schema).

The whole process described by the Composer is called *dhyānapatha*, ‘the path of thoughtful concentration’ (verse c), which activates conceptualisation of liberating cognition in terms of the general domain of Riding In A Chariot. In the next stanza (188.10), the Composer states that he has described its first stage that consists in suspension of subject-object cognition conceived in terms of pressing (*piṇḍī kṛ-*) of the mind and the senses.<sup>173</sup> Thus again the difficulty of the process is expressed.

Then, he begins to describe what happens on the highest states of the thoughtful concentration.

**MDhP 188.11**

*tasya tat pūrvasaṃruddhaṃ manaḥsaṣṭham anantaram |  
sphuriṣyati samudbhrāntaṃ vidyud ambudhare yathā ||*

When the group of senses with the mind as the sixth, has been restrained then it whirls upwards and bursts forth like lightning in a cloud.<sup>174</sup>

<sup>172</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

<sup>173</sup> MDhP 188.10: *indriyāṇi manaś caiva yadā piṇḍīkaroty ayam | eṣa dhyānapathaḥ pūrvo mayā samanuvāṛṇitaḥ ||*

<sup>174</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

The mental state which comes after complete blockage of sensual cognition is presented as whirling up and bursting forth similarly to lightning that bursts from a cloud. This description brings into mind the Ṛgvedic descriptions of somic exaltation which is presented in a similar way: as a sudden jet of heat and light (Jurewicz 2010). It is presented in RV 4.58.1 in terms of a somic wave that rises up. In later Vedic thought, the concept of lightning appears in descriptions of liberating cognition, usually in the moment when a radical change of consciousness takes place or the final recognition of the self (*ātman*) takes place (e.g., CU 8.12.2, Jurewicz 2016/18). The Composer is apparently describing a similar change of consciousness. It is difficult to reconstruct its content because it is a mental state which is not experienced in everyday cognition.

In the next stanza, the Composer describes how difficult it is to keep the mind in a state of concentration:

### MDhP 188.12

*jalabindur yathā lolaḥ paṇasthaḥ sarvataś calaḥ |  
evam evāsyā tac cittaṃ bhavati dhyānavartmani ||*

The mind of a person who follows the path of thoughtful concentration<sup>175</sup> is like a drop of water which rolls about on a leaf, moving in all directions.

The mind (*citta*, verse d)<sup>176</sup> is conceived in terms of a drop of a water which rolls about on a leaf. The compound *dhyānavartman* (path of thoughtful concentration, verse d) activates the general domain of Riding In A Chariot. Within its frames, the mind is conceived in terms of a horse trotting on a path. Thus, the Composer creates a blend in which mental activity is conceived in terms of the general domain of Riding In A Chariot and a drop of water on a leaf. Its generic space is a rapid movement that is hard-to-control.

### MDhP 188.13

*samāhitaṃ kṣaṇaṃ kiṃ cid dhyānavartmani tiṣṭhati |  
punar vāyupathaṃ bhrāntaṃ mano bhavati vāyuvat ||*

When the mind is focused and remains still for some moments on the path of thoughtful concentration, then again it roams on the path of wind and becomes wind.<sup>177</sup>

<sup>175</sup> Wynne (2009: 191): ‘meditation.’

<sup>176</sup> In descriptions of liberating practice *citta* is used synonymously with *manas* (see section 4.10.2.a). See Motegi (1999).

<sup>177</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

This stanza can be interpreted in two ways depending on the interpretation of verses c–d. On one hand, the concept of wind can activate the meaning of the mind’s instability. In this case, the fact that the mind can be kept only for a moment would highlight the difficulty of controlling it. On the other, the concept of wind is used to express a successful process of liberating cognition. Thus, roaming of the mind will refer to the powerful influence of liberating cognition. In this case, the Composer would imply that in the moment when the mind is in control, man is able to transform it further and this transformation is conceived in terms of wind.

The one who knows thoughtful concentration should continue his practice regardless (MDhP 14). He should not be despondent (*anirvedo*), not be tormented by pain (*gatakleśo*); he should be constantly awake (*gatatandrin*) and not be too exhilarated about his results but continue to work on his mind gathering it together by thoughtful concentration (*dhyānena*).<sup>178</sup>

When the mind is properly gathered together, the first results of his practice are reflection (*vicāra*), investigation (*vitarka*) and discrimination (*viveka*, MDhP 188.15).<sup>179</sup> These mental states are not easy to define especially since the words are not frequently used in early Smṛti texts.<sup>180</sup> One may assume however that a higher cognitive task is now performed.

### MDhP 188.16

*manasā kliśyamānas tu samādhānaṃ ca kārayet |  
na nirvedaṃ munir gacchet kuryād evātmano hitam ||*

When the activity of his mind torments him, he should once again bring about the state of focused concentration<sup>181</sup>. The silent sage should not become despondent, but should do that which benefits him.

In verses a, man is described as being (*kliśyamāna*) by the mind, so it is again clear that work on the mind is very difficult. One has to constantly focus (conceived in terms of gathering) on and on, without becoming despondent. (verses b–c).

The prescription that one should do what benefits him (*kuryād evātmano hitam*, verse d) is worth attention. If one understands the word *ātman* as referring to the whole organism of man then one will see that, although work on mind

<sup>178</sup> MDhP 188.14: *anirvedo gatakleśo gatatandrīr amatsaraḥ | samādadhyāt punaś ceto dhyānena dhyānayogavit ||*

<sup>179</sup> MDhP 188.15: *vicāraś ca vitarkaś ca vivekaś copajāyate | muneḥ samādadhānasya prathamam dhyānam āditaḥ ||*

<sup>180</sup> In MaU 6.18 *tarka* denotes the penultimate stage before *samādhi*.

<sup>181</sup> Wynne (2009: 191) adds ‘inner.’

is very difficult, it should not bring any harm to the practitioner. The word *ātman* also refers to the highest cognitive agent present in man because the aim of this process is to become fully subjectivised and to experience happiness.

In the next stanzas (17–18), the gradual nature of this process is emphasised, it requires patience and perseverance (which is guaranteed by reason).<sup>182</sup> In order to explain the process the Composer uses the image of a heap of soil, ash and dung as the source domain. It will not become one substance just by pouring water on the heap. But when a little bit of oil is poured onto dry sandal powder it gradually transforms into one substance. In the same way, one has to gently and gradually unite one's senses within the mind. Then man will find complete peace (19).<sup>183</sup> Conceptualisation of mental transformation in terms of cohesion agrees with the literal meaning of the verb *sam ā dhā-* that expresses the collection of elements of a dispersed whole so that it becomes one.

In the last stanzas, the Composer describes the unique happiness that is experienced thanks to mental concentration (20–22).<sup>184</sup> Such a description of this practice, as being difficult in the beginning and then bringing happiness, agrees with the description of happiness qualified as sattvic in BhG 18.37. It also attests that happiness is the aim of liberating practice according to the philosophers of the early Smṛti texts. In 22, the word *nirvāṇa* again appears to name this ultimate state, full of happiness.<sup>185</sup> In this way, the Composer implies that the aim of the Buddhist practices can be realised within the Brahminic tradition.

If we understand the practice described above in more general cognitive terms, we will understand why this process is so difficult. We have called a man who performs wrong cognition 'the amalgamate agent' and propose to see this term not as purely technical but as expressing the mental state of such a man in whom the highest cognitive agent is fused with reason and then with other cognitive faculties. Conceptual blends are neurally entrenched and their decompression is difficult if not impossible. The mental work needed to succeed is demanding. It is therefore proposed to see liberating cognition in the process of the primary subjectivisation as a conscious decompression of this blend.

<sup>182</sup> MDhP 188: *pāṃsubhasmakarīṣānāṃ yathā vai rāśayaś citāḥ | sahasā vāriṇā siktā na yānti paribhāvanām || (17) kiṃ cit snigdhaṃ yathā ca syāc chuṣkacūrnam abhāvitam | kramaśas tu śanair gacchet sarvaṃ tat paribhāvanam || (18)*

<sup>183</sup> MDhP 188.19: *evam evendriyagrāmaṃ śanaiḥ saṃparibhāvayet | saṃharet kramaśas caiva sa samyak praśamiṣyati ||*

<sup>184</sup> MDhP 188: *svayam eva manas caiva pañcavargaś ca bhārata | pūrvaṃ dhyānapathaṃ prāpya nityayogena śāmyati || (20) na tat puruṣakāreṇa na ca daivena kena cit | sukham eṣyati tat tasya yad evaṃ saṃyatātmanah || (21)*

<sup>185</sup> MDhP 188.22: *sukhena tena saṃyukto raṃsyate dhyānakarmaṇi | gacchanti yogino hy evaṃ nirvāṇam tan nirāmayam ||*

#### 4.9.2.b. *Mokṣadharmā* 232.3–18 (Vyāsa and Śuka)

This description comes after the description of *sāṃhkyā* and is called the activity of yoga (*yogakṛtyā*).<sup>186</sup> As in the description presented above, its focus is the restraint of the senses. The Composer does not elaborate the higher mental states as does the Composer of MDhP 188 but he does highlight the self-reflexive nature of the process.

He begins with the statement that the highest knowledge is ‘the unity of the reason, mind and all the senses, and the concentrated self’ (MDhP 232.2).<sup>187</sup> The concentrated self (*ātman*) is the ultimate agent of liberating practice and the ability to use man’s cognitive faculties is seen in terms of their unity with it. As previously mentioned, the Smṛti Composers assume that, when everyday subject-object cognition is performed, reason becomes the mind and the senses of reason (see chapter 2.3.2.b). In liberating cognition, the reverse process takes place: the mind and the senses become one with reason and, finally, they become one with the self (*ātman*) which can use it them as wanted.

#### MDhP 232.3

*tad etad upaśāntena dāntenādhyātmaśīlinā |*  
*ātmārāmeṇa buddhena boddhavyaṃ śucikarmaṇā ||*

It should be cognised by one who is tranquil, who is restrained, whose way of living is the highest self, who finds pleasure in the self, who is an awakened one and whose actions are pure.<sup>188</sup>

The practitioner should be tranquil and restrained (verses a–b) and his actions should be pure (verse d) thanks to the proper use of the class of *sattva*. The compound *adhyātmaśīlin* (verse b) highlights not only a mental focus on the highest self but also the natural way of the practice performed. The compound *ātmārāma* ‘who finds pleasure in the self,’ (verse c) highlights the self-reflexive nature of liberating cognition and the fact that it also consists of the creation of one’s self, this time eternal and ever happy.

The practitioner is called the awakened one (*buddha*, verse c) which again might suggest reference to Buddhist practices. The necessitative form *boddhavyam* ‘what should be cognised’ (verse d) highlights that it is the Brahminic teaching which should be known and not Buddhist teaching.

<sup>186</sup> MDhP 232.1: *prcchatas tava satputra yathāvad iha tattvataḥ | sāṃkhyanāyāyena saṃyuktaṃ yad etat kīrtitaṃ mayā ||*

<sup>187</sup> MDhP 232.2: *ekatvaṃ buddhimanasor indriyāṅgāṃ ca sarvaśaḥ | ātmano dhyāyinas tāta jñānam etad anuttamam ||*

<sup>188</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

In the next stanzas (4–7), the way of ridding oneself of the five faults of yoga is presented as thanks to the arousal of positive feelings (for the same idea see above, section 4.6.1). The practitioner should also keep his fires, venerate the gods and should not speak offending speech connected with violence or which arises under the influence of mental images created in the mind (MDhP 232.8).

Then the Composer presents the aim of practice:

### MDhP 232.9

*brahma tejomayaṃ śukraṃ yasya sarvam idaṃ rasaḥ |  
ekasya bhūtaṃ bhūtasya dvayaṃ sthāvarajaṅgamam ||*

Brahman is a glowing seed. This world – both those who move and those who do not – is the essence of that one being.<sup>189</sup>

The same stanza appears in MDhP 224.32 where it describes the first manifestation of reality (brahman) conceived in terms of a man (Brahma) who recites the Veda (*brahman*, see chapter 1.2.2). Within the frames of conceptualisation presented here, the manifest aspect is conceived in terms of the essence (*rasa*) of the semen of reality (*brahman*), in terms of semen its manifestation in sound is conceived. The presence of the same stanza in the description of liberating practice confirms that its aim is to mentally reach the earliest stages of creation and ultimate reality.

Then the practice is described which consists of restraint of the senses and the mind:

### MDhP 232.13

*manasā cendriyāṅgāṃ ca kṛtvaikāgryaṃ samāhitaḥ |  
prāḡ rātrāpararātreṣu dhārayen mana ātmanā ||*

The focused one should keep the mind and the senses in the state when they are one-pointed and he should keep the mind with his self at twilight and at dawn.<sup>190</sup>

Pay attention to verse d where the Composer states that one should keep his mind with his self (*ātman*) which means that the whole organism should focus on its way to freedom. At the same time, if the recipient understands *ātman* as the highest cognitive agent, he will recognise that it is the ultimate subject of liberating cognition (see section 4.10.2).

<sup>189</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

<sup>190</sup> Jurewicz's translation.



In order to explain the full concentration of the senses, the Composer uses the image of a gourd filled with water (see above, MDhP 232.14 and below, MS 2.99):

### MDhP 232.14

*jantoh pañcendriyasyāsyā yad ekaṃ chidram indriyam |  
tato 'sya sravati prajñā dṛteḥ pādād ivodakam ||*

If even one of the five senses of a human being be kept unrestrained, all his wisdom may be seen to escape through it like water through an unstopped hole at the bottom of a leathern bag.<sup>191</sup>

The state of mind the practitioner aims at is called *prajñā* (verse c), recognition, understanding or wisdom. It is conceived in terms of water, which may flow out if any of the senses are engaged in subject-object cognition.

In his translation of MS 2.99 where the same metaphor appears (see section 4.9.2.c) Olivelle explains that the Composer has in mind ‘a water bag made of an animal skin. If any one of its feet is not properly sealed, water will spill through it’ (2005: 249–250). This source domain is especially coherent with the target domain: the senses are conceived in terms of the legs of the animal, while the mind is the animal. In this way not only their activity in terms of moving legs is conceived, but also the unity of the mind and the senses. The word *dṛti* is not often used in the Smṛti texts but it does have a specific metaphorical meaning in the Veda where a living entity is conceived in terms of a waterskin filled with water (Jurewicz 2010). Further the cosmos in its pre-creative state is conceived in terms of a living entity without legs, its evolution, in terms of their appearance (Jurewicz 2010). If these metaphors are taken into account, the concept of the mind with the senses inside it, conceived in terms of a well closed waterskin, activates the meaning of the pre-creative state of the cosmos. This meaning is coherent with the understanding of liberating practice as reversing the order of creation. The same meaning might be activated *via* the concept of a tortoise that hides its legs. This is used as the source domain in the conceptualisation of creation of the cosmos on one hand (MDhP 187.6, see chapter 2.3.2.a) and of restraining one’s senses on the other (BhG 2.58).

Within the frames of conceptualisation of a living body in terms of a waterskin (*dṛti*) filled with water, death is conceived in terms of the outflow of water (see ŚB 1.6.3.16). If the recipient activates this conceptualisation, he will see the dangerous aspect of liberating practice. Taking into account

<sup>191</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

the way the source domain is elaborated in the next stanza it seems that the Composer wants to highlight the difficulty in keeping the senses under the control of the mind.

### MDhP 232.15

*manas tu pūrvam ādadyāt kumīnān iva matsyahā |  
tataḥ śrotraṃ tataś cakṣur jihvām ghrāṇam ca yogavit ||*

He should firstly take back his mind, like a fisherman takes back fish. The one who knows yoga, should then take back his ears, then his eyes, then his tongue and then his nose.<sup>192</sup>

The concept of a fishermen is probably motivated by the concept of a waterskin full of water (the concept of water is the associative link). It is possible that the Composer is elaborating this source domain in terms of fish in water. The different senses and the mind are conceived in terms of living fish that are difficult to take from a container or from a river. They can easily escape the unskilled hand and a fisherman's skill is needed if fish are to be caught. In the same way it is difficult to restrain the mind and the senses and one has to have the skill first to restrain the mind and then the senses.

### MDhP 12.232.16

*tata etāni saṃyamyā manasi sthāpayed yatih |  
tathāivāpohya saṃkalpān mano hy ātmani dhārayet ||*

Having put all them under control, one has to keep them in the mind. And having pushed away the mental images, one has to keep the mind in the self.<sup>193</sup>

The Composer again conceives the liberating practice in terms of the image schema of CONTAINER: the senses are placed in the mind, the mind, when it is free from any thought about the external world, is placed in the self (*ātman*). The recipient understands that the mind is identified with the senses and fully focused on the self. In this way the mental images of the external objects are blocked (verse c).

### MDhP 232.17

*pañca jñānena saṃdhāya manasi sthāpayed yatih |  
yadaitāny avatiṣṭhante manaḥṣaṣṭhāni cātmani |  
prasīdanti ca saṃsthāya tadā brahma prakāśate ||*

<sup>192</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

<sup>193</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

When the one striving has focused five senses and fixed them in the mind and when they are all with the mind and the sixth remains in the self, and when they, having become tranquil, stay together, brahman becomes visible.<sup>194</sup>

The Composer again elaborates the image schema of CONTAINER to express the unity of the cognising faculties with the self and their gradual mergence: the senses merge into the mind, the mind into the self. In verse f, the moment of cognition of reality called *brahman* is presented with use of the verb *prakāś-* the semantic range of which (to become visible, appear, shine) includes the scenario of everyday experience: something is visible when it shines (Jurewicz 2010). The fact that cognition of brahman is conceived or experienced as the appearance of light (and heat) is confirmed in the next stanza:

### MDhP 232.18

*vidhūma iva dīptārcir āditya iva dīptimān*  
*vaidyuto 'gnir ivākāṣe paśyaty ātmānam ātmanā*  
*sarvaṃ ca tatra sarvatra vyāpakatvāc ca drśyate*

Like a burning fire without smoke, like the sun full of shine, like a flash of lightning in space he sees himself with himself. And then everything everywhere is visible thanks to his pervasion.<sup>195</sup>

The sources domains are the light and heat of fire and the sun and the flash of lightning (verses a–c), the target domain is self-cognition (versed d). The concept of fire without smoke evokes the Vedic model of Child Of The Water with its image of smokeless fire burning in the water. This model is evoked in the descriptions of somic vision (Jurewicz 2010). The concept of the shining and heating sun is used in the Veda (beginning with the AV, Jurewicz 2016/18) to conceive the cosmos in its first manifestation. The concept of a flash of lightning, used as the source domain for a radical change of consciousness, has already been discussed.<sup>196</sup> We can see that the results of practice described by the Composer are presented in the same way as the results of cognition described in tradition. This also accords with what has been said in MDhP 232.9 where brahman is qualified as full of glow, *tejomaya*. Moreover, conceptualisation of final cognition in these terms may also imply that it was connected with an experience of heat as fire and the sun give heat and lightning can cause conflagration. In ultimate cognition the

<sup>194</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

<sup>195</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

<sup>196</sup> See MDhP 188.11, section 4.9.1.2, MDhP 232.18, section 4.9.1.b.

subject and the object become the same: one sees one's self (*ātman*) with one's self (*ātman*, verse d, see also below, section 4.10.2).

Verses e–f describe the omniscience of a free man as due to the fact that it is he who pervades now everything. It is worth paying attention to the verb *vyāp-* which is used to express the omnipresence of the highest cognitive agent in the cosmos in its cognition with the aid of the three classes (*guṇa*, MS 12.24, see chapter 2.1.2, see also MS 12.14, chapter 3.3.2.e).

Let us again return to MDhP 232.9 where creation is conceived in terms of producing semen the essence of which becomes the cosmos. Such a conceptualisation of the cosmos, as a manifestation of something liquid (*rasa*), with which free man identifies, strengthens the meaning of his omnipresence: he becomes this liquid essence. Such a conceptualisation of free man may trigger the recipient to activate the Vedic conceptualisation of liberating cognition in terms of the sucking of soma or honey (Jurewicz 2010, 2016/18). Thus, he understands that the present practice can be conceived in traditional terms and leads to the same results.

#### 4.9.2.c. MS 2.88–100

The Composer of the MS describes mastering of the senses in a similar way as the practices described above but with fewer details as far as the deeper mental states are concerned. He nevertheless shows clearly that mastering the senses leads to the creation a new self (*ātman*) of man. This description appears before the description of recitation of the syllable OM, the Great Calls and the Sāvitrī-mantra (MS 2.101–107, see above, section 4.3) and before more detailed instructions about recitation. Olivelle (2005) treats it as an 'excursus' devoted to control of the organs. Yet this description follows logically from the earlier topic. The Composer wants to highlight that recitation should be accompanied by work on the mind.

In the beginning of his description (88), the Composer activates the general domain metaphor of Riding In A Chariot: a man should control his senses like a charioteer his horses (*yanteva vājīnām*).<sup>197</sup> Then he enumerates the five senses of reason (*buddhīndriya*) and the five senses of action (*karmendriya*, 89–92). He calls the mind, in its function of managing the senses, the eleventh sense. Its mastering allows man to master the other senses (92).<sup>198</sup>

<sup>197</sup> MS 2.88: *indriyānām vicaratām viṣayeṣv apahāriṣu | saṃyame yatnam ātiṣṭhed vidvān yanteva vājīnām ||*

<sup>198</sup> MS 2.92: *ekādaśaṃ mano jñeyam svaguṇenobhayātmakam | yasmin jite jitāv etau bhavataḥ pañcakau gaṇau ||*

In the following stanzas (93–97), the Composer states that one should abandon all desires that come from subject-object cognition. Only then he will succeed in liberation (98).<sup>199</sup> In the next stanza (99), the Composer activates the image of a waterskin (*ḍṛti*) full of water in order to present how difficult it is to keep the mind in a state of concentration.<sup>200</sup> This conceptualisation has been discussed above (see MDhP 232.14). He then describes the results of concentration:

### MS 2.100

*vaśe kṛtvendriyagrāmaṃ saṃyamya ca manas tathā |  
sarvān saṃsādhayed arthān akṣiṇvan yogatas tanum ||*

By bringing the full range of his organs under control and by restraining his mind, a man will achieve all his goals without having to shrivel up his body through yoga.

As Olivelle translates when a man keeps his mind and senses in this fully united state, he can achieve all his goals (verses a–c). *Artha* also means the objects of senses and this meaning should also be activated here: having mastered his senses, man can use them again from a different perspective realised in higher subjectivisation (see below, section 4.10).

Olivelle translates verse d (*akṣiṇvan yogatas tanum*): ‘without having to shrivel up his body through yoga’. Doniger and Smith (1991: 28) translate it similarly, they activate the literal meaning of yoga here: ‘without wasting away his body through harnessing (his energies)’. It is worth noting however, that in early Smṛti texts the noun *tanu* does not always mean the physical body. In MaU 5.2, it means the form under which reality manifests its cognitive powers (*tasya proktā agryās tanavo brahmā rudro viṣṇur iti*). The same use of this noun is attested in the BhG.<sup>201</sup> On the other hand, in MS 2.28, it is stated that the body/self of brahman is composed thanks to ‘Vedic recitations, religious observances, fire offerings, study of the triple Veda, ritual offerings, sons, the five great sacrifices, and sacrifices’ (*brāhmīyaṃ kriyate tanuḥ*).<sup>202</sup> Composition of one’s immortal self is the aim of the ritual performed in the

<sup>199</sup> MS 2.98: *śrutvā sprṣṭvā ca dṛṣṭvā ca bhuktvā ghrātvā ca yo narah | na hrṣyati glāyati vā sa vijñeyo jitendriyah ||*

<sup>200</sup> MS 2.99: *indriyāṇāṃ tu sarveṣāṃ yady ekaṃ kṣaratīndriyam | tenāsya kṣarati prajñā dṛteḥ pādād ivodakam ||*

<sup>201</sup> BhG 7.21: *yo yo yāṃ yāṃ tanuṃ bhaktaḥ śraddhayārcitum icchati | tasya tasyācalāṃ śraddhāṃ tām eva vidadhāmy aham ||* BhG 9.11: *avajānanti māṃ mūḍhā mānuṣiṃ tanum āśritam | paraṃ bhāvam ajānanto mama bhūtamahēśvaram ||*

<sup>202</sup> MS 2.28: *svādhyāyena vratair homais traividyaṅjayaṃ sutaiḥ | mahāyajñaiś ca yajñaiś ca brāhmīyaṃ kriyate tanuḥ ||*

Veda and it not only continued in Smṛti times, but is also seen as a result of liberating practice. In MDhP 237.34, the finally free man is presented as going to the infinite worlds with his glowing eternal body/self (*tejomayo nityatanuḥ*).<sup>203</sup> That the body/self 'tanu' is immortal is confirmed in MDhP 189.19 where a dying free person is presented as joining with his self of brahman (*brāhmīm saṁśrayate tanum*).

Thus, the Composer of MS 2.100 may have in mind not a physical body which is in danger because of liberating practice, but the mental body realised when one cognises identity with reality which, as we have seen, is very difficult. If we agree with this interpretation of verse c, the phrase *akṣiṅvan yogatas tanum* can also be interpreted as a man having mastered his senses and having recognised his self (*ātman*), can come back to the perception of the objects of senses without destroying the eternal self he has created thanks to yoga. But it is also worth noting that the noun *tanu* can also be interpreted more concretely, as a son (*putraḥ svakā tanuḥ*, MS 4.184, MDhP 237.34).<sup>204</sup> Then the phrase would mean that such a man will attain all his objects together with sons who will not be lost because of his practice of yoga.

#### 4.9.3. Primary subjectivisation. The relationship between the mind (*manas*) and reason (*buddhi*)

As shown above, in liberating cognition, the mind of the agent suspends all activity directed externally. This suspension is either permanent or temporary in which latter case the mind is used by the highest cognitive agent in micro-scale i.e. from the perspective of a particular man (see below, section 4.11.3). The voluntary aspect of the mind is preserved in liberating cognition. As previously discussed (see section 4.2), it is the desire to cognise the self (*ātman*) and the experience of eternal happiness that is its deepest motivation.

Reason is the source of the decision (*vyavasāya*) and perseverance (*dhṛti*) is based on the knowledge of the Veda. It is important to note that the Veda is conceived not only as the sound of reality, but as its tangible presence in the agent that will totally transforms him if he allows it to. Filled with knowledge reason can make the right decision and its perseverance keeps the will of the mind directed towards self so that it does not deviate. It also seems that it is reason which works on the mind in order to close the agent to external stimuli

<sup>203</sup> MDhP 237.34: *tejomayo nityatanuḥ purāṇo; lokān anantān abhayān upaiti | bhūtāni yasmān na trasante kadā cit; sa bhūtebhyo na trasate kadā cit ||*

<sup>204</sup> MS 4.184: *ākāśeśās tu vijñeyā bālavṛddhakarśāturāḥ | bhrātā jyeṣṭhaḥ samaḥ pitrā bhāryā putraḥ svakā tanuḥ ||* MDhP 235.18: *bhrātā jyeṣṭhaḥ samaḥ pitrā bhāryā putraḥ svakā tanuḥ | chāyā svā dāśavargas tu duhitā kṛpaṇaṃ param ||*

and which finally wakes up the self (*ātman*) though, in the texts analysed here, it is not explicitly stated. At the end of this process the agent is fully subjectivised in that his subject is his self (*ātman*) and not reason.

As also shown, the Smṛti Composers imply that in final recognition reason disappears (see chapter 2.3.2.d). The following analysis of MDhP 198.1–10 will show the relationship between reason and the mind during liberating cognition. It will also show some aspects of the mental practice presented in the early Smṛti texts which have not been described by scholars who usually see them through the lens of classical Sāṃhkyā and Yoga.

### MDhP 198.1

*jñānaṃ jñeyābhinirvṛtaṃ vidhi jñānaguṇaṃ manaḥ |  
prajñākaraṇasamyuktaṃ tato buddhiḥ pravartate ||*

Know that cognition arises from what should be known and the mind has cognition as its class and is united with the cause of wisdom. Then reason appears.<sup>205</sup>

In verse a, it is stated that the presence of the object is the reason for subject-object cognition. This is in accord with Vedic cosmogonies where the beginning of the cosmos is presented as the appearance of the object (ṚV 10.129, BU 1.4). In verse b, the mind is described as having the cognition as its class. In MDhP 203.33, the mind is presented as having the class of *sattva* (see chapter 2.1.3). Since cognition is realised thanks to this category, the coherence of the Smṛti Composers is again seen. The metonymic identification of the cognitive faculty (*manas*) and its activity (cognition, *jñāna*) or a category used in that cognition motivates these compounds. The cause of wisdom (*prajñākaraṇa*, verse c) which appears in the mind (verse c) can be interpreted as its wish to cognise the self (*ātman*). Only then can reason act effectively. It makes the correct decision and, moreover, is able to select a proper category (*sattva*) that will fulfill the desire of the mind (see below, section 4.9.3).

### MDhP 198.2

*yadākarmaṅopetā buddhir manasi vartate |  
tadā prajñāyate brahma dhyānayogasamādhinā ||*

When reason stays in the mind, without the class of action, then brahman is cognised thanks to focused concentration under the yoke of thoughtful concentration.<sup>206</sup>

<sup>205</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

<sup>206</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

The Composer describes the aim of liberating cognition when brahman is recognised (verse c). In verses a–b, he states that it is realised when reason merges into the mind. We should fully accept Wynne’s (2009) and Fitzgerald’s (2017a) reading of the initial verse *yadākarmaguṇopetā*, which is also supported by MDhP 197.17. Its Composer states that reason is deprived of the class of action i.e., does not use it, which is in accord with other descriptions of liberation (*buddhiḥ karmaguṇair hīnā yadā manasi vartate*).<sup>207</sup> However, the verb *vṛt-* implies that reason is still active in the mind, so one might suppose that the compound *karmaguṇa* ‘class of action’ refers to this specific activity which leads to the cognition of reality with the use of the specific category of action.

This interpretation is confirmed by the compound *dhyānayogasamādhi* (verse d) which, as one may presume, qualifies the state of the mind into which reason has merged. Mind is in the state of focused concentration (*samādhi*) thanks to the ‘yoke of thoughtful concentration’ (*dhyānayoga*). The concept of a yoke activates the general domain of Riding In A Chariot and thus the state of the mind is conceived in terms of a journey. Within the frames of this conceptualisation, reason is a driver and mind is a riding chariot pulled by horses. In terms of horses the senses are conceived which are now fully united with reason. So, the recipient is triggered to imagine a chariot that drives by itself. Such a concept appears already in RV 10.27.<sup>208</sup> The image schema of a CONTAINER structures the relationship between the driver and the riding chariot: the driver is within the chariot as its ‘content’.<sup>209</sup> In the same way reason is within the mind and the wish of mind is directed by reason. In the source domain the driver knows how to direct a chariot that drives itself in order to get to the goal. In the target domain, reason knows how to use the specific class of action and it knows how to use thoughtful concentration (*dhyāna*) to achieve the next stage which is focused concentration (*samādhi*).

In the next stanza the everyday activity of reason is described:

<sup>207</sup> Then the Composer describes the reason which, devoid of class of action is active in the mind; then, the mind dissolves in brahman (MDhP 197.17cd: *tadā sampadyate brahma tatraiva pralayam gatam*). In the next stanza, an apophatic description of reality recognised in liberating cognition appears (MDhP 197.18: *asparśanam aśṛṅvānam anāsvādam adarśanam | aghrānam avitarkaṃ ca sattvaṃ praviśate param ||*). It is worth adding that *avitarka* appears in the descriptions of the pre-creative state of reality (see MS 1.6, see chapter 1.1.2). The context in which the description of reason that enters the mind confirms the thesis that it is the mind that finally recognises reality.

<sup>208</sup> RV 10.27.19ab: *āpaśyaṃ grāmaṃ vāhamānam ārād acakrāyā svadhāyā vārtamānam* (Jurewicz 2010).

<sup>209</sup> The body of the chariot is called *kośa* which shows its conceptualisation in terms of a container.



**MDhP 198.3**

*seyam guṇavatī buddhir guṇeṣv evābhivartate |  
avatārābhiniḥsrotam gireḥ śrṅgād ivodakam ||*

It is the same reason which is endowed with classes and goes towards them like water which flows down from a peak of a mountain.<sup>210</sup>

This source domain maps onto the target domain some important features of cognition. Firstly, rivers which flow from a mountain are rapid and difficult to constrain which is like the thoughts of reason in everyday cognition. Secondly, a rivers flow in its bed and this feature of the source domain maps, onto the target domain, the idea of narrowness and stability. The cognition of reason flows in one direction automatically that makes it very difficult to redirect in liberating cognition.

Now the Composer presents the state of reason in liberating cognition:

**MDhP 198.4**

*yadā nirguṇam āpnoti dhyānaṃ manasi pūrvajam |  
tadā prajñāyate brahma nikaṣyam nikaṣe yathā ||*

When reason attains thoughtful concentration characterised by a lack of classes and born earlier in the mind, then brahman is cognised, like something that is polished by a touchstone.<sup>211</sup>

In liberating cognition, reason goes beyond classes and realises the mental state created by the mind (*dhyāna*, verses a–b). Then it cognises reality (*brahman*, verse c).

The source domain of polishing (verse d) is a specific realisation of the general domain of Cleansing By Heat. In the RV, it is activated *via* the verb *mṛj-* and is used in the experiential meaning of grooming a horse's back, but also metaphorically to express the kindling of fire, the pressing of soma and cognition under its influence (Jurewicz 2010). Wynne accepts the interpretation of the Vulgate and translates the phrase *nikaṣyam nikaṣe yathā* as 'like a streak of gold on a touchstone'. If the recipient activates this meaning, he would remember ŚB 6.1.1.13–14 where the appearance of the metre Gāyatrī (identified with the earth) is conceived in terms of the eightfold pouring of streams of purified gold.<sup>212</sup>

<sup>210</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

<sup>211</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

<sup>212</sup> This would imply that recitation of Sāvitrī-mantra takes place during the process. For a similar source domain (cleansing of a metal ore under the influence of fire) see MS 6.71.

Such a conceptualisation of cognition implies that it is a long, difficult process which needs patience, attention and skill and that the self (*ātman*) is present within the mind in the same way as the end product of polishing is present within itself. At the same time, the use of this source domain allows the Composer to express that the cognition he describes is the same as the cognition described in tradition.

Now the Composer again describes a situation when liberating cognition is impossible – this is the situation of everyday cognition when the mind, under the influence of reason, is directed towards the objects of senses:

### MDhP 198.5

*manas tv apahr̥taṃ buddhyā<sup>213</sup> indriyārthanidarśanam |*  
*na samakṣaṃ guṇāvekṣi nirguṇasya nidarśanam ||*

But when the mind which observes the objects of senses is carried away by reason, it cannot perceive the classes directly and does not see what is beyond them.<sup>214</sup>

When the reason focuses on everyday objects, it carries away the mind and thus destroys its will to cognise self: the mind focuses on the objects of senses (see chapter 3.2.1). Then reason cannot use the classes properly and cannot cognise the self which is beyond them. Because of that man has to suspend subject-object cognition.

Then the Composer returns to liberating cognition and describes the suspension of sensual cognition:

### MDhP 198.6

*sarvāṅy etāni saṃvārya dvārāṇi manasi sthitaḥ |*  
*manasy ekāgratāṃ kṛtvā tat paraṃ pratipadyate ||*

When a person closes all his sense doors and rests in the mind, because he has made the mind one-pointed, he attains the transcendent.

Suspension is conceived in terms of closing doors which are present in the mind (verses a–b).<sup>215</sup> The mind should be fully concentrated at one object which is the self (*ātman*).

<sup>213</sup> Wynne (2009: 279): proposes *pūrvam* instead of *buddhyā*. Fitzgerald (2017a) accepts *buddhim*, that it, is the mind which is lost and shows the objects of senses to reason which cannot then cognise properly. The question is open: Fitzgerald's interpretation is more in accord with later concept of reason as it is in later books of the MDhP and in the Sāṃkhya and less probable in the context of the early Smṛti texts.

<sup>214</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

<sup>215</sup> For the source domain of door, see MDhP 188.9, 209.13.

**MDhP 198.7**

*yathā mahānti bhūtāni nivartante guṇakṣaye |  
tathendriyāny upādāya buddhir manasi vartate ||*

As the great beings disappear when their classes are not used, in the same way reason, having taken hold of the senses, abides within the mind.<sup>216</sup>

Verses a–b activates the concept of destruction of the cosmos which consists in the suspension of cognition of the specific class (*guṇa*) of the great beings (see chapter 2.1.3). Each of the great elements is categorised with the aid of a class (*guṇa*): that element categorised by the class of smelling is the earth etc.<sup>217</sup> Their destruction consists in the suspension of their cognition: when the highest cognitive agent stops using the class of smelling the earth disappears and so on.

In micro-scale reason stops using the category of classes thanks to suspension of sensual cognition. Then it disappears as a cognitive faculty cognising external objects with aid of classes. It then merges into the mind and becomes its content. This state is further described in the next stanza:

**MDhP 198.8**

*yadā manasi sā buddhir vartate 'ntaracāriṇī |  
vyavasāyagūṇopetā tadā sampadyate manah ||*

When the reason is present in the mind, active from within, with decision as its class, then it is absorbed into the mind.<sup>218</sup>

The stanza presents two stages of liberating cognition. The first is described in verses a–c. The relationship between reason and mind is conceived in terms of the image schema of CONTAINER: reason is inside the mind but still active, which is implied by the verb *vṛt-*. The nature of this activity has been described in MDhP 198.2.

In verse c, reason is described as performing its defining activity which is decision making. Here its decision is presented as its class (*guṇa*) which implies that it is now able to use it. Its decision is to cognise the self. Thanks to that it can keep the mind away from the sensual objects and concentrate it on the desire to cognise self which is now within the cognitive range of man. However subject-object cognition still takes place and this is why the concept of class (*guṇa*) is used.

Verse d can be interpreted in two ways. Either reason becomes the mind or the mind is born. In the former the Composer implies that the next stage

<sup>216</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

<sup>217</sup> These five classes are used by the reason too (see chapter 2.1.2–3).

<sup>218</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

of liberating cognition is performed solely by the mind. If the latter, the appearance of the mind would imply that reason still is active while the mind manifests its characteristic feature which is necessary for the realisation of ultimate freedom i.e., its wish to cognise self (*ātman*). It is possible that this verse also expresses the idea that this wish is an act of free will.

The next stanza confirms that it is the mind which leads to liberation:

### MDhP 198.9

*guṇavadbhir guṇopetaṃ yadā dhyānaguṇaṃ manaḥ |  
tadā sarvagūṇān hitvā nirguṇaṃ pratipadyate ||*

When the mind follows the classes thanks to those which possess the classes, is characterised by the class of thoughtful concentration then, having abandoned all classes, it attains that which is beyond them.<sup>219</sup>

Verses a–b describe activity of the mind in which reason is active from within (see MDhP 198.8ab). As implied by verse a, it is the mind which now uses classes (*guṇa*) which is conceived in terms of following them. Since it is almost the final state of liberating cognition, one may presume that the mind follows them from the perspective of the highest cognitive agent, in the same way as it does in the cosmos. Most probably the form *guṇavadbhir* (verse a) refers to the senses which perform their cognition with the aid of five classes in a correct way, accordingly to the will of the mind. Since the will of the mind is to cognise the self, it just recognises the kind of experience caused by them as it is described in MDhP 187.19–32 (see chapter 2.3.2.c–d) without reacting to them: it neither creates their mental images nor does it becomes emotionally attached to them.

Taking this into account, one can interpret compound *dhyānaguṇa* ‘the class of thoughtful concentration’ (verse b) as referring to the cognitive situation of a man who performs liberating cognition. He is using the class of thoughtful concentration to categorise his mental state. He might think ‘I am thoughtfully concentrated’ and thus know that he is on the right way.

However, another interpretation of the phrase *dhyānaguṇa* can be proposed which can be seen as complementary. The mind remains in the state of thoughtful concentration which is called its class (verse c). The meaning of *guṇa* here is the same as in case of the ‘kingly class’ *aiśvara guṇa* (MDhP 209.15, below, section 4.9.4). Thoughtful concentration (*dhyāna*) can therefore be seen as a broad category which allows the mind to cognise the self in the same way as it allows reality in the beginning of creation (see chapter 1.1.3).

<sup>219</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

Verse c describes the moment when all the classes are abandoned and in verse d ultimate cognition of the unmanifest aspect of reality is described which is beyond any class, because it is not subject-object cognition (verse d).

Then the ultimate free state is described. It is a cognitive state incomparable to anything man can experience in everyday cognition:

### MS 198.10

*avyaktasyeha vijñāne nāsti tulyaṃ nidarśanam |  
yatra nāsti padanyāsaḥ kas taṃ viśayam āpnuyāt ||*

No perception in the world is equal to the realisation of the unmanifest. Who could attain that sphere where there is not track?

The concept of path and the lack of a path goes back to the ṚV where the general domain of Finding The Hidden is used to express men's ritual activity like kindling fire and recitation (Jurewicz 2010). The main experience which motivates it is following the tracks of lost/stolen cattle and following the tracks of the cow.<sup>220</sup> Successive tracks make the way followed by man. The concept of the former experience is mostly used to conceive kindling fire (fire is a lost/stole calf/horse, kindling is following a path), the concept of the latter is used to conceived recitation and behaviour consistent with the order of the world<sup>221</sup> (SPEECH IS COW, RECITATION IS FOLLOWING COW'S TRACKS, RTÁ IS COW, BEHAVIOUR CONSISTENT WITH RTÁ IS FOLLOWING COW'S TRACKS). The Composer of the MDhP activates these metaphors in his description of the free state. He conceives it in terms of reaching the desired object. In this moment, the road ends forever and one does not need any track. The recipient is also triggered to activate the Epic metaphor LIBERATING COGNITION IS RIDING IN A CHARIOT.

In the Epic texts there are places where it is stated that the reason is not able to cognise the unmanifest aspect of reality (as in MDhP 196.14, 197.20).<sup>222</sup> In some places however, it is stated that it is reason that finally cognises it (later MDhP, e.g. 238.5, BhG 6.21)<sup>223</sup> but such references are not frequent. Further, even in the chapters just mentioned, the practice is focused on the mind which is able to led to ultimate cognition.

<sup>220</sup> The image schema elaborated here is SOURCE-PATH-GOAL.

<sup>221</sup> Jurewicz (2016b).

<sup>222</sup> MDhP 196.14: *notsahante yathā vettum indriyair indriyāny api | tathaiveha parā buddhiḥ paraṃ buddhyā na paśyati ||* MDhP 197.20: *indriyair manasaḥ siddhir na buddhiṃ budhyate manaḥ | na buddhir budhyate 'vyaktaṃ sūkṣmas tv etāni paśyati ||*

<sup>223</sup> MDhP 238.5: *evaṃ sarveṣu bhūteṣu gūḍho 'tmā na prakāśate | dr̥śyate tvagryayā buddhyā sūkṣmayā tattvadarśibhiḥ ||* BhG 6.21: *sukham ātyantikam yat tad buddhigrāhyam atīndriyam | vetti yatra na caivāyam sthitas calati tattvataḥ ||*

\*

It can be concluded that for the Smṛti Composers the most important part of the liberating process was work on the mind in its two aspects. Firstly, one had to suspend its sensual cognition. Secondly one had to direct it towards the self (*ātman*). The role of reason (*buddhi*) is to keep the mind on its work. Close reading of the early Smṛti texts shows that their concepts were different from those proposed in classical Sāṃhkyā and Yoga. This again shows that the practice proposed by the Brahmins was different. The fact that the terms used in its description are the same as those used in classical Darśanas does not imply their influence. Just the opposite, their meaning and role (especially of the mind) is deeply rooted in the Vedic tradition and motivated by the Brahminic monistic ontology.

The analysis shows that the Composers shared the same basic model of liberating cognition as far as its stages and its metaphoric conceptualisation are concerned (this will also be confirmed by the analysis of the BhG 6, see section 4.10.2.a). Its main source domain is the general domain of Riding In A Chariot which is based on the image schema of SOURCE-PATH-GOAL. Other image schemas are as follows. The image schema of CONTAINER facilitates conceptualisation of the process in terms of entering: the senses enter the mind, the mind the self (*ātman*). The image schema of CENTRE-PERIPHERY is the source domain for conceptualisation of liberating cognition in terms of ‘gathering up’ into the centre which is, ultimately, the self. Finally, the image schema of VERTICALITY is the basis for metaphoric conceptualisation of the liberating cognition which is going upwards. All these metaphoric conceptualisations together motivate thinking about a process which is impossible to be explicitly expressed.

It is also proposed that this work on the mind has to be seen as a radical transformation of cognitive habits and as a conscious decompression of a blend created by people in their everyday cognition. It requires the fusing of the highest cognitive agent and reason. Since blends are created unconsciously and automatically, work on the mind is extremely difficult and needs a lot of effort which is expressed by the use of concepts of pressing and squeezing or enclosing.

#### **4.9.4. Primary subjectivisation. The use of the class of sattva**

Sattvic reason is able to use all three classes (*guṇa*) properly and discern sattvic phenomena from both rajasic and tamasic phenomena. It is therefore able to choose those categorised as sattvic which are connected with the activity of the subject that is all those phenomena and actions that lead to freedom. He will not choose anything which is categorised as rajasic or tamasic:

**MDhP 205.29**

*tasmād ātmavatā varjyaṃ rajas ca tama eva ca |  
rajastamobhyāṃ nirmuktaṃ sattvaṃ nirmalatām iyāt ||*

Therefore, a self-controlled man ought to avoid passion and darkness. Released from their grip, he will arrive at an untainted state of sattva.<sup>224</sup>

The effects of the transformation of consciousness that results in the conscious use of the class of sattva are described in the following way:

**MDhP 205.33**

*sattvasthaḥ sāttvikān bhāvāñ śuddhān paśyati saṃśritaḥ |  
sa dehī vimalaḥ śrīmāñ śuddho vidyāsamanvitaḥ ||*

One who is grounded in sattva perceives pure states which are sattvic and resorts to them. He is the embodied one without any taint, full of fame, pure and endowed with faith and knowledge.<sup>225</sup>

A man who uses the class of sattva is conceived as standing in it (verse a) which implies that he is persistent in his cognition: the recipient might conceive sattva in terms of his foundation. Such a man is able to recognise pure states, most probably inaccessible in everyday cognition (verse b). The final result of subjectivisation is ontic: man is the embodiment of the highest cognitive agent, as pure as the states he perceives (verses c–d). His appellation as *śrīmānt* (verse c) might again activate the Ṛgvedic concept of somic exaltation conceived in terms of being in the sun where the state of fame (*śrávas*, *yásas*), beauty and light (*śrī́*) and rulership (*kṣatrá*) is realised (Jurewicz 2010). Thus, the result of correct cognition turns out to be the same as the results of soma.

The following fragment of the MDhP (209.12–16) will allow us to see the role of the sattva class in the larger context of liberating cognition. In the earlier part of this chapter, the Composer discusses the bad influence of sleep on a person who wants to live a life of celibacy. In the following part which will be discussed here, he presents liberating cognition which leads man to a state of identification with reality in the beginning of creation. In this state, there is only reality and its cognitive power (the highest cognitive agent) thinking about the cosmos. In order to mentally reach this state man needs a special category (class, *guṇa*) used by reality in this primeval state. The description of the sattva class which follows then (MDhP 17–20) suggests

<sup>224</sup> Wynne (2009: 147): ‘purity.’ See also MDhP 207.027, 208.14.

<sup>225</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

that the obtaining of this special category must be preceded by cognition performed with use of sattva only.

### MDhP 209.12

*prasannair indriyair yad yat samkalpayati mānasam |  
tat tat svapne 'py uparate manodrṣṭir nirīkṣate ||*

Whatever image mental image he creates, with his tranquil senses, when sleep stops, his mental vision begins to perceive.<sup>226</sup>

The phrase *prasannair indriyair* (verse a) can be interpreted in two ways. Firstly, the recipient may understand that the Composer refers to bad dreams described in the previous part of the chapter when the sensual cognition is suspended but the mind still creates mental images. He can also be referring to the stage of liberating cognition when sensual perception is suspended. This interpretation is confirmed, not only by the content of the following stanzas, but also by the fact that the participle *prasanna* can mean 'pure, bright' and it is possible that in this way their properly suspended activity is conceived. Moreover, in verse c, it is stated that this stage occurs when sleep ceases and we may presume that the Composer had in mind ordinary sleep that happens every night.

In verse b, the role of the mind in liberating cognition is expressed: it is exactly the same as in everyday cognition because it consists on creating mental images, here however, the mental image is seen with the cognitive power of the mind (verse d). In this way, the Composer activates the descriptions of liberating cognition and presents it as a process during which the mind focuses on itself.

It may be argued that the ambiguous meaning of verses a–b is meant to shift the recipient's attention from the issue of dreams, which lead to reincarnation, to that of liberating cognition. It is described in the following way:

### MDhP 209.13

*vyāpakaṃ sarvabhūteṣu vartate 'pratighaṃ manaḥ |  
manasy antarhitam dvāraṃ deham āsthāya mānasam ||*

The mind pervading all beings operates without any obstruction. When man enters the door, which is inside his mind, his mental body,<sup>227</sup>

<sup>226</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

<sup>227</sup> Jurewicz's translation.



The mind is present in all beings (verse a) and can be used in a proper way (verse b). Its activation is conceived in terms of opening a hidden door (verse c). It could be presumed that the mental body (verse d) the practitioner assumes is metonymically identified with the door.<sup>228</sup> The mental activity is conceived in terms of entering a door and the transformation of the agent. This reminds one of the Vedic conceptualisation of the creation of a self that is strong enough to enter the sun after death (Jurewicz 2016/18). As we remember, in the description of the results of soft recitation (*japa*) presented above (see section 4.5), the state of freedom is also conceived in terms of assuming the body of brahman (*brāhmīṃ saṃśrayate tanum*, 189.19).

### MDhP 209.14

*yat tat sadasad avyaktam svapity asmin nidarśanam |  
sarvabhūtātmaabhūtastham tad adhyātmagunaṃ viduḥ ||*

then he perceives what is existent and non-existent, what is unmanifest and sleeps in this – the self of all beings, existent in beings. They know it as the class of the self.<sup>229</sup>

The logic of the source domain implies that the door can be opened and man can see what is behind it. This image can be seen as elaboration of the general domain of Riding In A Chariot: the rider finally comes to a place where the treasure is hidden (for example the cave which is elaborated in the RV within the general domain of Finding The Hidden (Jurewicz 2010)).<sup>230</sup>

The state now realised is called the class of the highest self *adhyātmaguna* (verse d). A similar description is found in the added verse of MDhP 180.24.<sup>231</sup> The interpretation of *guna* in this context is of a general category that enables reality to cognise itself through its second self which is now realised by man. The content of his cognition is as follows. By use of the class which categorises the highest self, man is able to see being and non-being *sadasat* (verse a). Recall that the mind is qualified in MS 1.14 in the same way. This again shows the coherence of thinking of the Smṛti Composers and the fact that they shared a common model of creation and liberating cognition. The Composer implies then, that man has mentally reached the borderline sphere between two aspects of reality. The content of cognition is qualified as unmanifest

<sup>228</sup> An elaboration of metonymy LOCATION FOR INHABITANT.

<sup>229</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

<sup>230</sup> The work on the mind is conceived in terms of entering a container which is reminiscent of a more specific realisation of this image schema such as entering a cave (MaU 6.28).

<sup>231</sup> MDhP 180.24ef: 12,180.024d\*0495\_01 *jīvam ātmagunaṃ vindyād ātmānaṃ paramātmanaḥ* (see chapter 3.3.2.a).

(*avyakta*, MDhP 209.14.a), which reflects its next step which is when man reaches beyond the borderline sphere to reality in its unmanifest aspect.

In this state, reality is presented as ‘sleeping in this’ *svapity asmin* (verse b) which evokes the image schema of CONTAINER where the unmanifest aspect is present in the mental body of the practitioner. The concept of sleep is used in creation to conceive reality in its pre-creative state (MS 1.5, chapter 1.1.1). However, from the point of view of liberating cognition it is used to conceive its penultimate state which is when a man reaches the state of the beginnings of creation: there is unmanifest reality and its first thought about its future cosmic self. However, the world still exists and man recognises the presence of reality in all creatures as their self (verse c). Wynne (2009: 399) interprets it as a man who sleeps. It is possible that both interpretations are complementary and that this state of mind is conceived as a kind of sleep (see BU 3–4, Jurewicz 2016/18).

### MDhP 209.15

*lipseta manasā yaś ca saṃkalpād aiśvaraṃ guṇam |  
ātmaprabhāvāt taṃ vidyāt sarvā hy ātmani devatāḥ ||*

If someone would desire to cognise this kingly class that appears from the mental image, he should know that it comes from the appearance of the self, because all the deities are in the self.<sup>232</sup>

Since the highest cognitive agent is conceived in terms of a king (*iśvara*), the recipient may presume that ‘the kingly class’ (*aiśvara guṇa*) expresses the category that the highest cognitive agent uses in his cosmic cognition in which it constantly recognises its identity with the cosmos and its unmanifest aspect. This cognitive state seems to be the further realisation of the state called *adhyātmagūṇa* in the previous stanza as man not only cognises his self (*ātman*) as omnipresent, but also actively participates in cosmic cognition and has power over it in the same way as the king has power over his subjects.

One can presume it is the same class as the class called *dhyānagūṇa* ‘the class of thoughtful concentration’ in MDhP 189.9 (see above, section 4.5). We remember that, in MDhP 203.33, the compound *sattvagūṇa* is used to qualify the mind (chapter 2.1.3) and in the additional verse of MDhP 186.24 life (*jīva*) is qualified as *ātmagūṇa*. The consistent use of such compounds (with *gūṇa* as its second part) in descriptions of very advanced cognitive states just before final liberation, shows that there was a common model of liberating cognition. This also suggests that *gūṇa* means not only the three classes used

<sup>232</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

by reason, but is also a general class used by reality in the moment when it begins to think about itself.

According to verses a–b, this is achieved thanks to the mind which creates a mental image (*saṃkalpa*). Thus, we can see that it is not the mental images which are wrong but their content. In this mental stage, the mind and its content are identical which allows man to see what is inside.

In verses c–d it is stated that ‘the kingly class’ can be reached when man understands that it comes from appearance of the self (*ātmaprabhāvāt*). This confirms the interpretation of it as a category which allows reality to cognise itself when it creates its second self (*ātman*) which contains all the deities (verse d). In the AU the word *devatā* is used in the meaning of cosmic and human cognitive powers and the recipient may understand, that in this state, he has access to all subjectivity that is manifest in the cosmos (Jurewicz 2016/18).

### MDhP 209.16

*evam hi tapasā yuktam arkavat tamasaḥ param |*  
*trailokyaprakṛtir dehī tapasā taṃ maheśvaram ||*

In this way it is yoked with heat, like the sun, beyond darkness. The embodied one whose nature are three worlds through heat reaches that great king.<sup>233</sup>

Verses a–b further describe the content of cognition with use of ‘the kingly class’ which is the state of reality in the very beginnings of creation. The phrase *tapasā yuktam* (verse a) can be interpreted in two ways. It can mean that this content is shining like the sun (verse b). Such a conceptualisation of this state is well entrenched in tradition according to which the first form of the world is the sun (Jurewicz 2016/18). Alternatively, as Wynne (2009: 371) proposes, it can also mean as being connected with practice. We would suggest that this is a reference to recitation the transforming power of which has been discussed above (*japa*, section 4.5).

In verse c, the noun *dehin* ‘the embodied one’ is used to express the state when the highest cognitive agent performs its self-cognition from within the human self who has realised his identity with all the cosmos (*trailokyaprakṛti*, verse c) thanks to heat (*tapas*). In verse d, this state is conceived in terms of the great king (*maheśvara*). The concept of greatness (*mahā-*) activates the concept of the first manifestation of reality as great, the concept of the king (*-īśvara*) activates the concept of the highest cognitive agent and the class he uses in its cognition in the beginnings of creation is now used from within a man.

<sup>233</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

In the next stanza (MDhP 209.17) the Composer elaborates the opposition between *tapas* and *tamas*:

### MDhP 209.17

*tapo hy adhiṣṭhitam devais tapoghnam asurais tamah |*  
*etad devāsurair guptaṃ tad āhur jñānalakṣaṇam ||*

The gods stand upon heat, the asuras stand upon darkness that kills heat. This is protected by the gods and the asuras. They say that cognition is its sign.<sup>234</sup>

The Composer activates the story of a fight between the gods and the asuras elaborated in the cosmogonies of the ŚB and other Brāhmaṇas to describe the creation of values and to explain them. In verses a–b, the nouns *tapas* and *tamas* activate their general meaning of heat/light and darkness: the former is the activity of the gods which should be followed by men, the latter is the state of the asuras and destined for the beings lower than man. In verse c, the Composer expresses the fact that both *tapas* and *tamas* are protected by the gods and asuras. *etad* is here interpreted as referring generally to the state of affairs described in the first hemistich.<sup>235</sup> This interpretation follows the line of reasoning presented in the ŚB, namely the existence of the opposing values represented by the gods and the asuras is an indispensable condition of the existence of the cosmos. It is based on cognitive divisions into subject (represented by the gods) and the object (represented by the asuras, see ŚB 11.1.6). This necessity of this division is conceived in terms of a treasury which is protected by the gods and the asuras and is hidden from men who are supposed to look for it.<sup>236</sup> The cognitive nature of this division is expressed in verse d where it is stated that this state of affairs is sign of cognition (*jñānalakṣaṇam*).<sup>237</sup> In this way, the Composer anchors contemporary practice in tradition and thus legitimates it. Within the frames of the present conceptualisation, the state of the cosmos is internally contradictory, the fight of the gods and the asuras is their cooperation to make subject-object cognition possible.<sup>238</sup>

<sup>234</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

<sup>235</sup> Wynne (2009: 374) refers *etad* to *tapas* which is protected by the gods against the asuras ('They say that the demons protect this asceticism characterised by gnosis from the demons').

<sup>236</sup> The general domain of Finding The Hidden is again activated.

<sup>237</sup> Cognitive nature of this division is expressed in ŚB 11.1.1.

<sup>238</sup> This meaning of the fight between the gods and the asuras is already present in ŚB 11.1.6 where their hostile coexistence is at the same time an agreement (Jurewicz 2016/18).

The Composer further elaborates the story of the gods and asuras and highlights the meaning of *tamas* which is one of the classes (*guṇa*) used in subjective-objective cognition:

### MDhP 209.18

*sattvaṃ rajas tamaś ceti devāsuraguṇān viduḥ |  
sattvaṃ devaguṇaṃ vidyād itarāv āsurau guṇau ||*

Sattva, rajas and tamas are known as the classes which belong to the gods and the asuras. But one should know that sattva is the class of the gods the other two are the class of asuras.<sup>239</sup>

Man should follow the subjective activity of the gods: in his cognition, he should use the class of sattva and chose the elements of the cosmos that he categorises as sattvic. Thus, the way towards ultimate freedom is understood in terms of the earlier tradition. At the same time, it is clear that in order to realise liberating cognition man should interpret the coexistence of the gods and the asuras in terms of a fight, because, as has been shown above, he should radically reject the āsuric classes. He will see the cooperative aspect of this coexistence only when he becomes free.

### MDhP 209.19

*brahma tat paramaṃ vedyam amṛtaṃ jyotir akṣaram |  
ye vidur bhāvitātmānas teyānti paramāṃ gatim ||*

It is the highest brahman which should be known, immortal light, imperishable. Those whose self is realised go to the highest destiny.<sup>240</sup>

The goal is *brahman* (verse a), the Veda and reality which is immortal and conceived in terms of light (verse b). As we remember, it is the sattva class which categorises the bright elements of the cosmos and everything that is conceived in terms of light (see chapter 2.1.2). Brahman is also called *akṣara* which evokes the syllable OM and reality (verse b, see above, section 4.3). In verse c, people who know it are called *bhāvitātmānas*, those whose self has been created, obtained or realised. This compound is synonymous with *ātmavant* and means the state when one is conscious about one's self and wants to cognise it.

<sup>239</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

<sup>240</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

In the last stanza, the Composer emphasises the role of work on mind and its superiority to rational argumentation:

### MDhP 209.20

*hetumac chakyam ākhyātum etāvaj jñānacakṣuṣā |  
pratyāhāreṇa vā śakyam avyaktaṃ brahma veditum ||*

It is possible to pronounce this much rationally, provided one possesses the eye of knowledge. But by withdrawing the senses from their objects, it is possible to realise the imperishable brahman.

\*

It is clear that the ability to use the class of sattva requires very arduous mental work: one has to change one's mental habits and force one's reason to change the way has been cognised till now. In other words, man should be focused only on the class of sattva and look at the world with its use. Thanks to that man accesses supernatural cognition. Taking into account the whole exposition of MDhP 209.12–20, it could be inferred that the use of the sattva class enlarges man's cognitive abilities to such an extent that he is able to use the class that was first used by reality when it began to create its second self *aiśvara guṇa*. When reason decides to do that, it will be able to change the mental images created by the mind in order to create the only one recognised as the self (*ātman*). The recipient may also elaborate the source domain of clarity, that is implied by the concept of sattva, and understand that the use of this class allows man to see clearly and distinctly and thereby cognise his self (*ātman*). The source domain of clarity is further strengthened as liberating cognition has purifying effects which will be discussed in the next section.

### 4.9.5. Primary subjectivisation. Purification

An important result of liberating cognition is purification from the results of earlier actions (see also chapter 5.4). We have already discussed the purifying results of recitation conceived in terms of burning sins and motivated by the general domains of Cleansing By Heat and Cooking (see sections 4.3–4). The Composers of the early Smṛti texts often discuss the purificatory influence of knowledge/cognition (*jñāna*). We should always bear in mind that knowledge, learnt and memorised during recitation, exists in the reciter and between him and other reciters as a kind of tangible phenomenon, so the conviction of its influence on man is not surprising. Its purifying power comes from conceptualisation/experience of recitation as heating (*tapas*) when liberating

cognition is realised. It is suggested that when the Smṛti Composers talk about purification by knowledge/cognition, they think about its realisation in recitation.

As proposed above the basic model of liberating cognition, when the mind begins to wish to cognise the self, is as follows: reason decides to fulfill the wish of the mind and keeps it in check and the mind restrains the senses. In MDhP 199.25, this process is presented as purification by knowledge: knowledge purifies reason, reason purifies the mind and the mind purifies senses.<sup>241</sup> Knowledge fills the reciter and transforms his cognitive faculties during recitation in such a way that he will be able to use them when he becomes free. Purification can be seen as the source domain to conceive this radical transformation of cognitive faculties.

Within the frames of this metaphor a man should be cleansed of the results of actions he performed in his previous life in the same way as dirt objects are cleansed under the influence of fire. In the beginning of the liberating process, man is an amalgamate agent composed of his desires, decisions and actions and this process could have continued for many lifetimes. As stated in the previous chapter, a man who cognises wrongly acts automatically, without reflection, in response to stimuli. In liberating cognition, man has to break this dependence on the category of action.

In the following stanza this process is conceived within the blended frames of the scenarios of farming and burning:

### MDhP 204.16

*bījāny agnyupadagdhāni na rohanti yathā punaḥ |*  
*jñānadagdhais tathā kleśair nātmā sambadhyate punaḥ ||*

Just as seeds burned by fire will not sprout again, so too will the self not be bounded<sup>242</sup> when its defilements are burned with cognition.<sup>243</sup>

In the source domain, the image of a farmer who sows seeds burnt in fire is presented. In the target domain the purificatory influence of cognition is conceived so that even if a man performs actions, they do not produce any result. The activity presented in the source domain is against everyday activity, normally no one sows burnt seed because he wants seeds to grow. The broken logic in the source domain informs the recipient that the activity performed in the target domain is paradoxical (see chapter 5.4.5).

<sup>241</sup> MDhP 199.25: *jñānena nirmalīkṛtya buddhiṃ buddhyā tathā manaḥ | manasā cendriyagrāmam anantaṃ pratipadyate ||*

<sup>242</sup> Wynne (2009: 341): ‘reborn.’

<sup>243</sup> Wynne (2009: 341): ‘gnosis.’

It is worth noting that the noun *ātman* (verse d) can be interpreted in two way, as meaning man as a whole and as the highest cognitive agent present in man. In the latter meaning the idea that the highest cognitive agent is influenced by a human agent's activity in micro-scale is expressed (see chapter 3.3). The highest cognitive agent present in such a man, is enclosed within his organism and cannot use his cognitive faculties. When the cognitive faculties of man are pure, the highest cognitive agent can cognise with the use of that man's faculties and act without entangling himself in its manifest forms.

Another description of purification used as the source domain is the cleansing of objects under the influence of fire. Within the frames of this metaphor, cognition/knowledge is conceived in terms of fire and results of actions in terms of dirt:

### MDhP 208.16

*jñānadagdhaparikleśaḥ prayogaratir ātmavān |  
niṣpracāreṇa manasā paraṃ tad adhigacchati ||*

One, attaching the highest with his concentrated mind, when his defilements are burnt by knowledge finds pleasure in practice, when he possesses himself.<sup>244</sup>

Let us note that an agent whose cognition/knowledge destroys the results of his previous actions and who is described as finding pleasure in practice *prayogaratir* (verse b) supports the general view that practice, conceived in terms of yoking, is not painful (see above, section 4.4). He is also presented as possessing himself *ātmavānt* (verse b) which means that he has activated the highest cognitive agent present in himself and is aware of it. Finally, his mind is focused and not diffracted by sense objects. This state of mind is conceived in terms of a horse which goes straight to the goal without taking a wrong paths *niṣpracāra*.

In the earlier chapter, the metaphor MORAL EVIL IS DIRT was activated and the destruction of the results of previous actions is presented as burning the sins by cognition/knowledge:

### MDhP 12.207.14

*pāpmānaṃ nirdahed evam antarbhūtaṃ rajomayam |  
jñānayuktena manasā saṃtatena vicakṣaṇaḥ ||*

Let the wise burn the evil that is inside him and built by passion, by objects classified as rajasic, with his mind continually yoked to cognition.<sup>245</sup>

<sup>244</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

<sup>245</sup> Jurewicz's translation. See also MDhP 207.24: *ye vai śukragatiṃ vidyur bhūtasamkarakārikām | virāgā dagdhadośās te nāpnuyur dehasambhavam ||*



Let us note that the words *pāpman* (verse a) and *vicakṣaṇa* (verse d) activate tradition. We begin with the latter. This participle is used in the RV in more than half of all references to soma which is a cause of exultation (see 9.86.35, 9.97.2, 9.106.5, 9.107.3). Thus, the influence of cognition conceived in terms of burning is grounded in tradition. Soma physically heats man and transforms him in such a way that he becomes immortal and free of any deficiency. Liberating cognition also leads to immortality which is highlighted by the noun *pāpman* used in the Veda to denote evil identified with death (see BU 1.3.10–11, JUB 1.6.3, 18.3.2, 18.10.3, 18.11.1). Thus, it turns out that contemporary practice is just the continuation of the practices of the earliest seers.

The second factor of purification are proper actions. Their purificatory role will be discussed more thoroughly later (see section 4.9.5), here we quote just one stanza:

### MDhP 207.27

*tasmāt tad avighātāya karma kuryād akalmaṣam |  
rajas tamaś ca hitveha na tiryaggatim āpnuyāt ||*

Consequently, if one wants it to run without hindrance, he should perform spotless actions. Having discarded the classes of rajas and tamas, he will not reach birth in animal form.<sup>246</sup>

A man should not only radically change his mental habits performed by his cognitive faculties and the senses of reason. He has also to radically change his activities performed by the senses of actions. He should recognise which actions are sattvic, which are rajasic and which are tamasic and perform only those categorised by the sattva class. Such actions are conceived as spotless (*akalmaṣa*, verse b). This adjective activates the concept of dirt in terms of which wrong cognition and activity is conceived. When actions are spotless, they destroy the results of the previous actions but do not in themselves bring results in terms of liberating cognition. It sets the scene, so to speak, for subsequent practice as they do not bound the highest cognitive agent present in man.

The following stanza describes the mental and physical state of a person who is to use only the category of sattva and can choose elements of the world categorised by it and which are qualified as pure:

<sup>246</sup> Jurewicz's translation. See also BhG 4.19: *yasya sarve samārambhāḥ kāmasaṃkalpavarjitāḥ | jñānāgnidagdhakarmāṇaṃ tam āhuḥ paṇḍitaṃ budhāḥ ||*

**MDhP 271.55**

*śuddhāṃ gatiṃ tām paramāṃ paraiti śuddhena nityaṃ manasā vicinvan |  
tato 'vyayaṃ sthānam upaiti brahma duṣprāpam abhyeti sa śāśvataṃ vai ||*

He goes the highest clear path with mind always clear. Then he comes to the imperishable state, to brahman, difficult to be reached and eternal.<sup>247</sup>

The Composer has activated the general domain of Riding In A Chariot. A clear path has no unexpected obstacles which could prevent one from travelling onwards. It has been well prepared by what has gone before. In the same way, practice chosen well will not hide difficulties. When the mind is clear, it is able to guide man in a proper way. As the Composer states, the mind is always clear *nityam* (verse b) thanks to its focus on the goal which is the self *ātman*. It is able to discern phenomena which are sattvic and conceived as pure.

The concept of physical purity, used as a source domain to conceive the state of the practitioner, facilitates the understanding of the situation of the highest cognitive agent present in a man who performs liberating cognition. In an amalgamate agent, the highest cognitive agent is hidden under the thick dark cover of his organism built from the results of his previous actions. The highest cognitive agent is invisible. Not only is it not perceivable by a wrong cognising man, and by other people, but it cannot use man's cognitive faculty to continue cognition. It is as if blindfolded. Liberating cognition conceived in terms of cleansing makes it possible to understand it as a process of manifestation of the highest cognitive agent, to make it visible to the cognising man and to itself. The metaphors COGNITION IS SEEING, COGNITION IS ILLUMINATING make this way of thinking even more coherent. During liberating cognition, man becomes more and more transparent and thus his self can cognise and be cognised.

The metaphor LIBERATING COGNITION IS PURIFICATION can be seen as the elaboration of the Rgvedic general domain of Cleansing By Heat. This conceptualisation is coherent with conceptualisation of yoga in terms of kindling fire and of recitation as heating (*tapas*). In the target domain, a free man is conceived as being filled with burning fire. It is argued that this conceptualisation is, at least partially, based on the tangible nature of knowledge expressed in the Veda and the experience of being filled with it realised during recitation and conceived or experienced as generating internal heat. Here are the roots of the recommendation that yogins be not burnt in a cremation pyre. They have already cremated themselves with their internal heat. In this way, the Vedic concept of fire remains important for Smṛti thought on a micro-level.

<sup>247</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

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Primary subjectivisation is based on a proper knowledge about the self (*ātman*) which should be put into practice. Its beginning is the correct desire of cognition of the self that is created by the mind (*manas*). Man should constantly keep the mind focused on the self which is aided by reason (*buddhi*) which can then realise its abilities such as decision making (*vyavasāya*), perseverance (*dhṛti*) and the proper use of classes (*guṇa*). A man therefore changes his mental habits and learns how to use only the sattva class. He chooses proper elements from the world not only theoretically but also practically such as the place where he stays, food he eats,<sup>248</sup> movements he does or does not and the people he meets. During this cognitive process the I-form ceases to affect him. This proper work on the mind changes the man's organism which is conceived in terms of its purification. It should be noted that this process consists on recitation and breathing and that its purificatory influence is motivated by this fact. Thus again 'the hidden fire' emerges at the human level.

Thanks to this practice, man becomes the subject of his thoughts and his actions. One could say that now he has decompressed himself into himself as an empowerment agent and as a self for cognition for which he is now ready. Let us consider the process.

#### 4.10. Higher subjectivisation

The process of higher subjectivisation consists on recognition of the highest cognitive agent, that is, of his self (*ātman*) in himself. It is the process which goes beyond language because it goes beyond subject-object cognition so the Composers express it with use of metaphors. This process is conceived in terms of the appearance of shining/heating reality conceived in terms of burning fire, the glow of the sun or of lightning (see CU 8.12.2, Jurewicz 2016/18). In this section, we will discuss some more examples of metaphors which allow the Composers to conceptually and verbally frame an experience which is actually impossible to be expressed. We begin with the analysis of three more examples of the use of the concept of light/heat. Then we look at the use of the general domain of Cooking.

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<sup>248</sup> MDhP 238.12: *evaṃ pūrvāpare rātre yuñjann ātmānam ātmānā | sattvāhāravisuddhātmā paśyaty ātmānam ātmani ||*

### 4.10.1. Higher subjectivisation. Metaphors of cognition of the self (*ātman*)

In the following stanza, the Composer activates the metaphor SENSES ARE RAYS OF THE SUN/REINS OF A CHARIOT:

#### MDhP 187.44

*raśmīms teṣām sa manasā yadā samyañ niyacchati |  
tadā prakāśate 'syātmā ghaṭe dīpo jvalann iva ||*

When a man correctly controls the rays of the senses with his mind, then his self shines forth like a light burning in a jar.<sup>249</sup>

The double meaning of the word *raśmi*, ‘rays of the sun’ and ‘reins’, activates two input spaces of the conceptual network created in this stanza (verses a–b). The first is the rising sun, the second is the general domain of Riding In A Chariot. In the blend, the mind is conceived in terms of a driver and the senses in terms of reins which are restrained by the driver. Within the frames of this conceptualisation, man is conceived in terms of a person who rides a chariot (e.g., a warrior). Restraint of the senses leads to recognition of the self. One should of course remember that this analytic description refers to what is happening inside the mind of a man.

The Composer conceives the final recognition of the self (*ātman*) in terms of the image schema of CONTAINER: the self is conceived in terms of flames of light burning in the mind conceived in terms of a jar. This concept is the next input space of the blend. As previously mentioned, (see chapter 2.3.2.e.), the concept of a jar (*ghaṭa*) is also used as the source domain for the organism that is man.<sup>250</sup> It is worth noting that body of a chariot is called *kośa*, and this word also means ‘a bucket, a jar’.<sup>251</sup> In the blend it is either the body of man or his mind, that is conceived in terms of a jar/body of a chariot. Cognition of the self is conceived in terms of a burning flame. It should be stressed again that in most cases the appearance of light involves the appearance of heat. So, conceptualisation of cognition of the self in terms of the flame of a lamp is not only visual but a result of heat. It is enough to imagine

<sup>249</sup> The same stanza: MDhP 240.15: *teṣām tu manasā raśmīn yadā samyañ niyacchati | tadā prakāśate hy ātmā ghaṭe dīpa iva jvalan ||* Such a conceptualisation of senses is also attested in MDhP 197.13, MaU 5.2 (in cosmogonic context).

<sup>250</sup> *Brahmabindu Upaniṣad* 1.13–14.

<sup>251</sup> For metaphoric use of the word *kośa* and elaboration of its meanings see Jurewicz 2010, 2016.

a burning oil lamp inside one's body to grasp the meaning of the metaphor. The generic space of the blend is the image schema of CONTAINER that contains fire.

In the following stanza, it is the mind that is conceived in terms of a burning light thanks to which the self becomes visible:

### MDhP 231.15

*na hy ayam cakṣuṣā dr̥śyo na ca sarvair apīndriyaiḥ |  
manasā sampradīptena mahān ātmā prakāśate ||*

It cannot be perceived by the eye, even by all senses. The Great Self becomes visible with the aid of a kindled mind.<sup>252</sup>

The Composer elaborates the metaphors COGNITION IS SEEING, COGNITION IS ILLUMINATING. The self cannot be cognised with the aid of senses but only with aid of a mind which is qualified as *sampradīpta* 'kindled, inflamed, burning, shining' (verse c). Thus, the mind is conceived in terms of a burning flame which illuminates the highest cognitive agent in his cosmic cognition as the sun (it is called the Great Self, verse d). Conceptualisation of the mind as fiery has already been attested in MDhP 176.2 (see chapter 1.2.1.a). The logic of the source domain also implies heating of the mind or of the whole cognising agent. At the same time, as already mentioned (see analysis of MDhP 232.17–18, section 4.9.2.b), the semantic range of the verb *pra kāś-* includes being visible and shining. So, the visibility of the self is also granted by its shining. Now, if shining involves heating, it follows that the self is heated too. The blend created here consists of the following input spaces: the concept of a shining flame (of a lamp or of fire), the concept of man who cognises with the aid of his mind, the concept of the highest cognitive agent. In the blend, both the mind and the highest cognitive agent shine and are heated which builds the meaning of a self-reflexive cognitive process. The generic space is the concept of a process.

The following stanza uses the general domain of Cleansing By Heat (in its specific realisation of the refining of gold)<sup>253</sup> to explain why realisation of liberating cognition cannot be gained without purification:

<sup>252</sup> Jurewicz's translation. Compare MDhP 231.15: *evam saptadaśam dehe vṛtaṃ ṣoḍaśabhir guṇaiḥ | manīṣī manasā viprah paśyaty ātmānam ātmani ||*

<sup>253</sup> See also MDhP 198.4, section 4.9.3.

**MDhP 205.6**

*lohayuktaṃ yathā hema vipakvaṃ na virājate |  
tathāpakvakaṣāyākhyam vijñānam na prakāśate ||*

When gold is mixed with iron the end product will not gleam. In the same way a person's consciousness will not shine forth if its defilements have not been burned away.

In verses a–b, the Composer describes the source domain: gold, even if it is purified under the influence of fire (literally ‘well cooked’ *vipakva*, verse b), will not shine if it is still mixed with iron. In verses c–d the target domain is presented. Man's consciousness (*vijñāna*, verse d) is conceived in terms of gold. It will not be effective (which is conceived in terms of shining) if a man's mind is filled with the mental states (*bhāva*) of external objects or a memory of them and is led by the results of previous actions. This state is conceived in terms of dirt which is not burnt (*apakva*). Conceptualisation of purification in terms of burning gives coherence to the metaphor. Coherence is strengthened when the recipient activates the concept of recitation conceived/ experienced as heat (*tapas*).

The final moment of realisation of the self is described in the BhG and MDhP with use of the general domain of Cooking in its specific realisation of eating, in terms of which subject-object cognition is conceived.<sup>254</sup> This metaphor derives from tradition but the Composer elaborates it in a new way. It is worth emphasising that within the frames of the general domain of Cooking the concept of eating implies the influence of heat as food needs to be cooked before it can be eaten.

In BhG 2.54–2.61. Arjuna asks Kṛṣṇa how to recognise a person with full cognition. Actually, he asks about his external signs, about the way he speaks, sits and walks, as if he wanted to recognise such a person. In his answer, Kṛṣṇa describes his internal features as if he wanted Arjuna to recognise them in himself. Such a person is free from external desires, realises happiness in experiencing his identity with his self and does not desire anything from outside. And he does not desire because he is the whole of reality so possesses everything because he is everything (see section 4.10.2). Then Kṛṣṇa describes the mental peace of such a person who is not moved by any external stimuli or by any emotion. He compares his mental restraint to a tortoise that draws its legs into its shell. And then he says:

<sup>254</sup> Metonymy LAST PHASE OF THE PROCESS FOR THE WHOLE PROCESS, EATING FOR COOKING.

**BhG 2.59**

*viṣayā vinivartante nirāhārasya dehinaḥ |  
rasavarjaṃ raso 'py asya paraṃ dṛṣtvā nivartate ||*

The objects of senses disappear for the embodied one who does not eat them except for their taste. But even taste disappears when he sees the highest.<sup>255</sup>

The metaphor that motivates this stanza is SUBJECT-OBJECT COGNITION IS EATING. In the source domain, the image of a person who has eaten food is presented, now he remembers it thanks to its taste and relishes it. In the target domain man, having successfully restrained his senses, still remembers how it was when he was engaged in the subject-object cognition. Just as the taste for food diminishes, so does the memory of subject-object cognition.

The same stanza appears in MDhP 197.16. In his translation, Wynne focuses on the target domain.<sup>256</sup> Thompson tries to preserve the source domain too but understands it literally, as referring to a fasting man.<sup>257</sup> Although it is possible that the Composer expected his recipient to activate this meaning it is inadequate for understanding this stanza. The activation of the metaphor SUBJECT-OBJECT COGNITION IS EATING allows the recipient to understand the stanza and see its coherence. The use of the noun *dehin* ‘the embodied one’, implies that it is the highest cognitive agent that stops the subject-object cognition of man.

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The common use of the source domain of the appearance of light to express cognition of the self reveals the concept of fire as the motivating conceptualisation for liberating cognition. It also shows the importance of having a knowledge of the ICMs as concepts used by the source domain; as in case of the Sanskrit ICM of light which also involves heating. We could say that the Composers elaborate the metaphors COGNITION IS SEEING, COGNITION IS ILLUMINATING in a way that is consistent with their ICM of light: it not only gives the possibility to see something but also makes the agent hot. Other descriptions analysed above clearly evoke the concept of being heated. ‘The hidden fire’ again reveals itself in the activity of men.

<sup>255</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

<sup>256</sup> Wynne (2009: 275): ‘Although objects disappear when the embodied soul is deprived of sustenance, desire does not disappear. But that also ceases, when one sees the transcendent.’

<sup>257</sup> Buitenen (1981: 79) and Thompson (2008: 14): ‘For an embodied man who does not eat, the sense objects fade away.’; ‘The fascination of the sense objects withdraws from the embodied one who gives up food.’

### 4.10.2. Higher subjectivisation. The Self cognises the Self

The Smṛti composers talk about freedom being realised during liberating cognition. As in the case of wrong cognition, on the ground of the monistic assumption it is not clear about whose freedom is realised during such liberating cognition. Is it the liberation of man or of a part of reality that is present in man as his self (*ātman*)? If yes, does this mean that a part of a totally free absolute reality can be bounded in its creation?

In some places it is implied that it is the highest cognitive agent who liberates itself. For example, in MDhP 204.16 (quoted above, section 4.8.6) it stated that when defilements are burnt by knowledge, the self (*ātman*) is not bounded again.<sup>258</sup> In this section, we will discuss the sixth chapter of the BhG and some fragments of MDhP to see if the ultimate aim of liberating cognition is the empowerment of the highest cognitive agent manifest as the self (*ātman*) in a particular man. This conviction is expressed primarily thanks to the polysemy of the noun *ātman* and the creation of a context in such a way that a recipient can activate all its meanings at once

#### 4.10.2.a. The Self cognises Self according to *Bhagavadgītā* 6

The title of the BhG 6, is *dhyānayoga*. Though we do need to be aware that *dhyāna* in these texts does not refer to the mental activity called Yoga in the classical approach. It is the activity of the mind (*manas*) which consists of suspending sensual cognition. The word *manas* is used in this chapter interchangeably with the word *citta* as it is in other descriptions of this kind.<sup>259</sup>

Generally speaking, the practice presented in BhG 6 does not differ from the practices discussed above (see sections 4.3, 4.9.2, chapter 2.3.2). What makes it stand out is the frequent use of the word *ātman*. It is as if the Composer wanted to highlight the reflexive nature of the process of higher subjectivisation and convince his recipients that it is the self which is the real subject of this process. Since the accents that distinguish the compounds in Smṛti times are lost, we cannot say with certainty if a compound with *ātman* as its last member are *bahuvrīhi* (as usually interpreted in the translations of this chapter) or *tatpuruṣa*. If they are interpreted as *bahuvrīhi*, they refer to a man who performs liberating practice and is conceived as possessing self. If they are interpreted as *tatpuruṣa*, they refer to the self which liberates during this practice. Most probably, the Composer wanted to express the fact that

<sup>258</sup> MDhP 204.16: *bījāny agnyupadagdhāni na rohanti yathā punaḥ | jñānadagdhais tathā kleśair nāmā sambadhyate punaḥ ||*

<sup>259</sup> See above, section 4.9.2.a.



liberating process takes place on a human level and on the level of reality present in man as the highest cognitive agent. Both levels are within the range of the meaning of *ātman* and this polysemy has also been used by the Vedic philosophers (Jurewicz 1997). In other words, we can assume that the intention of the early Smṛti Composers is to trigger their recipients to create a blend consisting of two input spaces: a particular man and the highest cognitive agent. The generic space is the concept of liberating cognition.

One can argue that this conceptual blending also takes place in the mind of the practitioner. The moment when the highest cognitive agent is recognised by man is the moment when he, having decompressed the amalgamate agent, creates a new blend the input spaces of which are himself and the highest cognitive agent. In this blend he does not reduce the highest cognitive agent to his cognitive faculties but, on the contrary, realises that he himself is the highest cognitive agent and that he can use his cognitive faculties from its perspective.

In BhG 6.5–6, the Composer presents the nature of liberating cognition seen as the self-reflexive activity of the self (*ātman*):

### **BhG 6.5–6**

*uddhared ātmanātmānaṃ nātmānam avasādayet |*  
*ātmaiva hy ātmano bandhur ātmaiva ripur ātmanaḥ || (5)*

One should lift self up with self. One should not destroy self for the self is the friend of the self and, at the same time, the enemy of the self.<sup>260</sup>

*bandhur ātmātmanas tasya yenātmaivātmanā jitaḥ |*  
*anātmanas tu śatrutve vartetātmaiva śatruvat ||*

The self is the friend of self when one has conquered the self with self. But the self of that without the self, behaves like an enemy.<sup>261</sup>

These two stanzas present the basic assumption for those who want to begin liberating practice. The subject, object and the means with which an act is performed is one: it is the self (*ātman*). This meaning can be expressed thanks to the use of the word *ātman* which is simultaneously interpreted as noun and reflexive pronoun. It was similarly used in BU 2.4 where Yājñavalkya states that the duality of subject and object is superficial, the love we feel to other people, objects and states is love towards oneself (*ātman*, Jurewicz 2016/18).<sup>262</sup> The recipient creates in his mind a blend consisting of these two meanings

<sup>260</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

<sup>261</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

<sup>262</sup> For the Buddhist interpretation of this concept, see Gombrich (1996).

of the word *ātman*. The input space of *ātman* as a noun is the concept of the highest cognitive agent. In the blend, man is the highest cognitive agent who acts on him/itself. The generic space is self-reflexive activity.

In 5.a, it is stated that one should lift self up with self. Liberating cognition is also conceived in terms of the image schema of VERTICALITY and this image schema is the next input space of the blend (5a–b). Verse b describes the creation of the amalgamate agent when man reduces the self to his cognitive faculties which is conceived in terms of a movement downwards. The concept of wrong cognition is the next input space of the blend. In 6c–d, it is stated that man is his own friend and his own foe. Man is a friend to himself if he realises that he is everything (6a–b). This recognition is conceived in terms of a fight: man must conquer himself with himself. Such a conceptualisation is appropriate taking into account that the recipient of Kṛṣṇa’s teaching is a warrior going to war. It might also highlight the difficulty of liberating practice. If man does not do that, he will behave towards himself as a foe (6c–d).

The use of the concept of battle (the next input space of the blend) to conceive liberating cognition and the wrong cognition can also be explained by the Composer wanting to appeal to the emotions of his recipients. When one is surrounded by enemies, one feels fear. In the RV, the concept of being surrounded by enemies is one of the motivating factors of the meaning of the word *āṃhas* ‘narrowness’, a claustrophobic physical and mental state of being trapped, without ability to move, cognise and live, an awful state for the Rgvedic poets (Jurewicz 2013). When one is among friends, one feels safe and happy. This concept is used again to conceive the abstract concept of the liberated state (as in the earlier thought, for example CU 8.12.3). The recipient may refer to tradition, but the situation described by the Composer of the BhG is universal enough to be convincing. Hence, the emotions are the motivators of liberation. Moreover, we should bear in mind that the general domain of Riding In A Chariot activates not only a common journey from a source to a goal, but also a specific journey of warrior and his charioteer during battle. The kind of journey is elaborated in the BhG.

The exposition of the 6.5–6 triggers the recipient’s mind to recall tradition. In BU 1.4, the first feeling felt by the highest cognitive agent (presented as the self in the form of man, *ātman puruṣavidha*) is fear when it realises that it is alone. But the Composer then states that, when it realises that there is no one except itself, fear disappears because one is only afraid of others. Then it wants to be happy and the happiness it wants can only be fulfilled in unity with the other, because the fear was the result of the division into subject and object. The mental state presented in the BhG is opposite to the creative state. The highest cognitive agent, manifest in man as his self (*ātman*), leaves

the world of subject-object cognition and realises that it is alone. This can bring fear, but it is followed by the relief of being alone and the happiness of experiencing the unity of reality.<sup>263</sup>

### BhG 6.7

*jitātmanaḥ praśāntasya paramātmā samāhitaḥ |  
sītoṣṇasukhaduḥkheṣu tathā mānāvamānayoḥ ||*

The highest self of that peaceful one whose self is conquered is focused whether he feels cold or heat, pleasure or pain, praise or humiliation.<sup>264</sup>

Here the subject is called *paramātman*, the highest cognitive agent, and is differentiated from the self (*ātman*), the amalgamate agent that should be decompressed. The fulfillment of liberating cognition is conceived in terms of victory in a battle (*jitātman*, verse a). Man is conceived in terms of a victorious king who, having won the war, becomes peaceful (*praśānta*, verse a). The highest cognitive agent is called *samāhita* ‘focused’ (literally ‘gathered up’). If the recipient takes into account that the verb *sam ā dhā-* is used to denote the liberating activity of the mind, its use in reference to the highest cognitive agent might make him think that, at the ultimate stages of liberating process, it is the self which begins to act.

When the highest cognitive agent is activated, it is independent of experiencing those opposing and impermanent feelings characteristic for those who are under the I-form (verses c–d).

### BhG 6.8

*jñānavijñānatṛptātmā kūṭastho vijitendriyah |  
yukta ity ucyate yogī samaloṣṭāśmakāñcanaḥ ||*

Contented in his insight and knowledge, firm on his peak, master of his senses, looking with the same eyes on a lump of clay, a rock, or a piece of gold, he is called a yogin who is truly ‘yoked.’

In stanza 8, a definition of yogin is given. It is someone who possess certain features (verses a–b). The compound *jñānavijñānatṛptātmā* (verse a) can be interpreted as someone whose self is satiated with knowledge and

<sup>263</sup> The further implication of cosmogony BU 1.4 is that there is possible another kind of happiness, that it the happiness conceived in terms of hide-and-seek play as when one hides against itself (divides itself into subject and object) and then realises its unity. This kind of happiness is realised when the free man, united with its highest cognitive agent, resumes subject-object cognition.

<sup>264</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

discrimination or the self satiated with those cognitive states. The epithet ‘standing on the mountain top’ *kūṭastha* (verse b) activates the Ṛgvedic concepts of the state after soma conceived in terms of the state after a long ride in an ascending chariot; this image accords with the Smṛti conceptualisation of yoga in terms of the general domain of Riding In A Chariot.<sup>265</sup> *Vijitendriya* (verse b) it is someone who has conquered his senses, here again conceptualisation LIBERATING COGNITION IS A RIDING IN A CHARIOT DURING BATTLE is activated. The final verse of this stanza presents man as thinking in the same way about a clod of earth, a rock, a piece of gold. In this way, the Composer metonymically implies that such a person (or the highest cognitive agent manifest in a person) is free from the desire to possess. This is because his subject-object cognition is performed from the perspective of reality in which he attests his ontological unity.

In verse c, it is stated that someone who is yoked can be called yogin (*yukta ity ucyate yogī*). As we have seen, within the frames of use of the general domain of Riding In A Chariot, a yogin is sometimes conceived in terms of the horses (see section 4.6.2). In the context of the whole BhG, Arjuna (and a recipient) is urged to create a blend. The first input space of the blend is a battle and the second is liberating cognition conceived in terms of a way to freedom. The generic space is the general domain of Riding In A Chariot. In the blend, a battle is about to commence and Arjuna does not want to fight. Yet fighting in the battle is the means of liberation. In order to fight, Arjuna should yoke himself like a horse to a chariot. He should not act to realise freedom from the point of view of an amalgamate agent but should rather constrain himself to the norms in the same way as reality constrains itself to its categories.

In the next stanza (9) the Composer describes the free person who thinks, in the same way, about people who are close to him, who are neutral, who hate him, who are good or bad. Thus, he expresses that the liberated person is free from emotional relationships and evaluative attitudes and, generally speaking, from his social self which a very important factor in creation of the self by an amalgamate agent. Let us note that the arguments of Arjuna against fighting derive from his concerns about his social situation. However, man should be *samabuddhi* ‘whose reason is the same’ towards everyone. This attitude is only possible when the mind does not create mental images of the external objects, and the emotions connected with them, and only wills cognising the self.

<sup>265</sup> Thompson (2008: 31) translates the source domain literally: ‘He stands on the mountain top.’

Having described the ideal mental state to be realised during liberating cognition, the Composer begins to describe the practice itself (8–9).<sup>266</sup> The practice is again conceived in terms of yoking oneself (*yogī yuñjīta satatam ātmānam*) which highlights the necessity to conform to the rules of liberating cognition. The conditions for practice are enumerated (seclusion, cleanness of the place, a comfortable seat covered with kuśa grass). The mental state of the yogin is described as *yatacittātmā* (one who restrains his mind and himself or the self with a restrained mind), *nirāśīś* (without hope for a result, because the cognition he undertakes is not that of subject-object), and *aparigraha* (without any possessions).

### BhG 6.12

*tatraikāgraṃ manaḥ kṛtvā yatacittendriyakriyaḥ |  
upaviśyāsane yuñjyād yogam ātmaviśuddhaye ||*

As he sits on his seat. let him pinpoint his mind, so that the workings of mind and senses are under control. and yoke himself to yoga for the cleansing of his self.

Verses a–b describes liberating cognition in a way consistent with that presented above: the mind is focused and sensual cognition is suspended (see section 4.9.1–2). Verses c–d might activate the source domain of Riding In A Chariot. In the same way as the rider of a chariot having occupied the seat restrains his horses a man, having assumed the proper position for liberating cognition, restrains the senses of hearing, touching, seeing, tasting and smelling. The right position also allows man to restrain the senses of action (*karmendriya*). This is explained in the next stanza (13).<sup>267</sup> Man should keep his body, neck and head even, straight and motionless. He should not move his eyes that should be focused on the tip of his nose.<sup>268</sup>

<sup>266</sup> BhG 6: *yogī yuñjīta satatam ātmānam rahasi sthitaḥ | ekāki yatacittātmā nirāśīr aparigrahaḥ || (10) śucau deśe pratiṣṭhāpya sthīram āsanam ātmanaḥ | nātyucchritaṃ nātinīcaṃ cailājīnakuśottaram || (11)*

<sup>267</sup> BhG 6.13: *samaṃ kāyaśirogrīvaṃ dhārayann acalaṃ sthiraḥ | samprekṣya nāsikāgraṃ svaṃ dīśāś cānavalokayan ||*

<sup>268</sup> The next two stanzas (14–15) presents the result of yogic effort as unification with Kṛṣṇa which is not the topic of the present study, for that see Szczurek (2005). However, they agree with the results with practices described above. According to stanza 14, man has to restrain his mind (*manaḥ saṃyamya*) and he should be *maccitta*, i.e., ‘with the mind focused on me.’ According to stanza 15, a free state is conceived in terms of reaching a place which belongs to Kṛṣṇa (*matsamsthām adhigacchati*). The experience of peace realised in this state is ‘beyond *nirvāṇa*’ (as Buitenen 1981 translates). The noun *nirvāṇa* is not known in the Vedic thought and there is no doubt that the Composer wants to convince his recipients that the liberating practice proposed by Kṛṣṇa is better than that of the Buddhists (for polemics of the Composers of the early chapters of the BhG with Buddhism, see Szczurek 2008). The

Then the Composer explains what it means to be *yukta* literally ‘yoked’ (which has been introduced in stanza 8).<sup>269</sup> It is a state when the mind is restrained and stays (literally ‘goes down’) in the self (*cittam ātmany evāvatiṣṭhate*, 18). We can see the coherence of this description of practice with others analysed above: in the final state of cognition, the mind unites with the self which is conceived in terms of the image schema of CONTAINER. Thanks to that such a person does not feel any wish to fulfill desires which come from the outside.<sup>270</sup> Such a person is compared in stanza 19 to a lamp:

### BhG 6.19

*yathā dīpo nivāstho neṅgate sopamā smṛtā |  
yogino yatacittasya yuñjato yogam ātmanah ||*

There is a comparison, in tradition, of a yogin whose mind is restrained and who yokes his own yoke: he is like a lamp that stands in a still place, without wind, it does not flicker.<sup>271</sup>

We have already seen that the concept of a lamp is used to conceive of a person in the higher states of the liberating process. The Composer of BhG conceives of external influences in terms of wind that moves the flame of a lamp (as it is in MDhP 187.44, see chapter 2.3.2.e). The body of yogin with his sensual faculties closed is like an airtight jar. His mind is concentrated on the self conceived in terms of a still flame burning inside a man. It is fully independent from external stimuli. If the recipient elaborates this source domain, he would understand sensual distractions in terms the bursting of fire present in a man’s body through the apertures of his senses. This may be dangerous for those who cause the distraction.<sup>272</sup>

We should pay attention to verse d (*yuñjato yogam ātmanah*). The literal analysis (who yokes his own yoke) based on the general domain of Riding In A Chariot, allows the Composer to highlight the self-reflexive nature of the process where the driver and the horse are one.

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essence of practice is still the same: the yogin has to constantly yoke himself (*yuñjann evaṃ sadātmānaṃ yogī niyatamānasah | śāntiṃ nirvāṇaparamāṃ matsaṃsthām adhigacchati ||*). In the next two stanzas (14–15), the Composer presents general recommendations for a yogin: he can realise the aim of the practice that aims at destruction of suffering only when he is moderate in eating and sleeping. This prescription is reminiscent of the Buddhist Middle Way.

<sup>269</sup> *yukta ity ucyate yogī.*

<sup>270</sup> BhG 6.18: *yadā viniyataṃ cittam ātmany evāvatiṣṭhate | niḥsprhaḥ sarvakāmebhyo yukta ity ucyate tadā ||*

<sup>271</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

<sup>272</sup> As for the god Kāma who was burnt by Śiva.

**BhG 6.20–21**

*yatroparamate cittaṃ niruddhaṃ yogasevayā |  
yatra caivātmanātmānaṃ paśyann ātmani tuṣyati || (20)*

When the mind stops held back by the practice of yoga and when he recognises himself with himself and finds pleasure in himself.<sup>273</sup>

*sukham ātyantikam yat tad buddhigrāhyam atīndriyam |  
vetti yatra na caivāyaṃ sthitaś calati tattvataḥ || (21)*

when he knows the endless happiness, which can be caught by reason and is beyond the senses, then he never will never get off this truth.<sup>274</sup>

The mental calmness of man described in stanza 19 is caused by the fact that his mind is restrained thanks to the practice of yoga and thanks to that he sees himself in himself and finds pleasure in himself (20). In this way, the state when the object and the instrument of cognition are the same is expressed. The subject is not mentioned, but the recipient most probably understands that it is man identified with his highest cognitive agent.

In this state, man realises the endless and incomparable happiness that is possible to be recognised by reason (*buddhigrāhyam*) and not by the senses (*atīndriyam*, 21b). This is one of the rare stanzas where it is reason, not the mind, which is presented as being able to cognise the highest cognitive agent in man (see also below, section 4.10.2.a). It is possible that the Composer has in mind the specific activity of reason that is perseverance in the decision that has been made.

The Composer emphasises that man whose reason cognises in this way ‘will never get off this truth’. This description activates the conceptualisation of liberating practice in terms of the SOURCE-PATH-GOAL image schema. It might imply that, in this state, activity is still involved. Though in such a case the logic of the experience would be violated because the path, the traveller and the goal are the same in the target domain.

In the next stanza (22) the Composer presents this state as the highest a man can attain so he will never want anything else. If a man is in this state even the greatest misfortune would will not shake him. The Composer still elaborates the SOURCE-PATH-GOAL schema, because he states literally that even ‘the heaviest unhappiness will not swerve him’ from his path (*na duḥkhena guruṇāpi vicālyate*). It is also clear that the state of ultimate freedom is the state of happiness.

<sup>273</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

<sup>274</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

**BhG 6.23**

*taṃ vidyād duḥkhasaṃyogaviyogaṃ yogasaṃjñitam |*  
*sa niścayena yuktavyo yogo 'nirviṇṇacetasā ||*

He should know that yoga (yoke) is unyoking the yoke of unhappiness. It should be yoked with determination and with not a despondent mind.<sup>275</sup>

The literal translation of verses a–b aims at highlighting the Composer’s play with the derivatives of the noun *yoga* (*saṃyoga* and *viyoga*) in order to define the process called yoga: it is a dissociation from any association with suffering. Thus, the noun *yoga* highlights its meaning of union and appears to be paradoxical, because it is defined as union with disunion. If the recipient activates the general domain of Riding In A Chariot, he may understand the liberating process in terms of changing horses when the worse are replaced by better. This interpretation is strengthened in verses c–d where the Composer literally states that this yoke should be put on. The concept of determination (*niścaya*, verse c) with which one has practice activates the concept of reason in its role of keeping the mind in its desire for freedom. The mind should not be despondent (verse d) which again implies the difficulty of the process.

The following stanzas could be interpreted as a repetition of the practice described previously but they can be interpreted as a description of the next stage of liberating practice. Having cast off all desires that come from mental images created by the mind, and having restrained all the senses thanks to the mind, now man should make it even more hushed with the perseverance born of reason (*buddhyā dhṛtigrhīṭayā*). The mind should be directed to the self which is again conceived in terms of the image schema of CONTAINER: the mind should be within the self (*ātmasaṃsthaṃ manaḥ kṛtvā*, BhG 6.26c). Man should think of nothing that could be an object of thought. And wherever the mind goes astray, he should again bring it back by the power of the self (*ātmany eva vaśaṃ nayet*, BhG 6.26d). In this way, the agency of the highest cognitive agent in the liberating man is expressed.

The next stanzas describe the ultimate cognition of brahman namely, the unmanifest aspect of reality. Man is presented as entering the ‘being of brahman’ (*upaiti brahmabhūtam*) which means that he identifies with brahman. Realisation of this identity is conceived in terms of reaching a place which accords with the general domain of Riding In A Chariot which is used as the source domain. As a traveller comes to a city and can rest and feel happiness, in the same way a man enters the state of brahman. It should be noted that this conceptualisation is grounded in the Atharvavedic descriptions of

<sup>275</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.



liberation cognition conceived in terms of entering the stronghold of brahman (Jurewicz 2016/18).

The ultimate experience is conceived in terms of touching:

### BhG 6.28

*yuñjann evaṃ sadātmānaṃ yogī vigatakalmaṣaḥ |  
sukhena brahmasaṃsparśam atyantam sukham āsnute ||*

The yogin, constantly yoking himself, free from stain easily attains the touch of brahman – the endless happiness.<sup>276</sup>

In verse a, the self-reflexive nature of the liberating process is expressed. In order to understand the conceptualisation of recognition of brahman in terms of touching, the recipient may further elaborate the general domain of a Riding In A Chariot. As mentioned above, this domain is elaborated in detail: the place reached in the journey is a cave in which there is a treasury. Man is conceived in terms of both the charioteer and the draught animal who should be yoked all the time, only then the treasury can be reached. According to the logic of the source domain, a treasury is first reached, then opened and then the treasure which is inside is taken as one's own (see MaU 6.28). This logic is elaborated by the Composer of the BhG, because the previous stage is conceived in terms of entering 'the being of brahman' (*brahmabhūta*, 27).

The content of cognition realised in this state is expressed in the next stanza:

### BhG 6.29

*sarvabhūtastham ātmānaṃ sarvabhūtāni cātmani |  
īkṣate yogayuktātmā sarvatra samadarśanaḥ ||*

Having yoked himself with yoga (yoke) he sees everything in the same way: himself present in all beings and all beings in himself.<sup>277</sup>

Now man is in the state described in the beginning of the description of liberating process (stanzas 5–6). He sees himself in everything and everything in himself. In this moment, there is no difference between him and the highest cognitive agent who performs cosmic cognition. The same is stated in the last stanza of Kṛṣṇa's exposition (32): the highest yogin is a person who sees everything by comparison with himself (*ātmaupamyena*) notwithstanding if it is happiness or suffering. The recipient understands that the happiness

<sup>276</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

<sup>277</sup> Jurewicz's translation. Stanzas 30–31 again identify the state of ultimate freedom with being one with Kṛṣṇa.

(*sukha*) mentioned here is the result of subject-object cognition and is totally different from the ultimate happiness felt by a person who experiences the unity of his self.

In his response to the question of Arjuna about the destiny of those who have failed in yoga, Kṛṣṇa states:

### **BhG 6.36**

*asaṃyatātmanā yogo duṣprāpa iti me matiḥ |*  
*vaśyātmanā tu yatatā śakyo 'vāptum upāyataḥ ||*

I think that yoga is difficult to be gained by someone who has not restrained himself. But it can be gained by someone whose self is subdued and who makes the effort with right means.<sup>278</sup>

The compound *asaṃyatātman* (verse a) can also mean ‘the self which is not controlled’. The compound *vaśyātman* (verse c) can also be interpreted as ‘one who is under control of the self’. Thanks to this ambiguity, these compounds express the reflexive nature of the process in which the self (*ātman*) is subjected to man’s subject-object cognition and the self is empowered thanks to liberating cognition.<sup>279</sup>

#### **4.10.2.b. The self cognises self according to Mokṣadharmā**

The use of the noun *ātman* to express the self-referent nature of liberating cognition and the fact that in its highest stage it is the self that is the agent of the process is expressed in many places of the MDhP. We will analyse three examples of such descriptions.

### **MDhP 169.34**

*ātmany evātmanā jāta ātmaniṣṭho 'prajo 'pi vā |*  
*ātmany eva bhaviṣyāmi na mām tārayati prajā ||*

I am born in myself thanks to myself. I rest in myself even though I do not have offspring. I will appear in myself. ‘Offspring with not save me!’<sup>280</sup>

The Composer presents two ways of constructing the self. The first one is possible when man undertakes subject-object cognition and wants to live his

<sup>278</sup> Jurewicz’s translation. Stanzas 30–31 again identify the state of ultimate freedom with being one with Kṛṣṇa.

<sup>279</sup> The same ambiguity appears in BhG 2.64: *rāgadveṣaviyuktaiḥ tu viṣayān indriyaiḥ caran |*  
*ātmavaśyair vidheyātmā prasādam adhigacchati ||*

<sup>280</sup> Jurewicz’s translation except for verse d: ‘Offspring with not save me!’

life according to *dharma*. When he begets offspring, he pays his debt towards his fathers. At the same time, since the son is seen as the self (*ātman*) of his father, he creates in this way his self which will survive his death. Hence, the son can be called the immortal self of his father. But he will also die. The man who realises the unity of reality does not need to beget offspring. He knows that it is himself who is born and dies in manifest aspect of reality, but his self is as immortal as the unmanifest aspect of reality.

### MDhP 231.20

*sa hi sarveṣu bhūteṣu jaṅgameṣu dhruveṣu ca |  
vasaty eko mahān ātmā yena sarvam idaṃ tatam ||*

This great self abides in all beings, moving and not-moving. By it everything is extended.<sup>281</sup>

The Great Self (*mahan ātman*, verse c) is the first manifestation of the highest cognitive agent (Brahma) within the Golden Egg in cosmogony described in the MS 1.14 (see chapter 1.1.4). Its manifestation in the cosmos is conceived in terms of living at home (*vas-*). Its subject-object activity creates the cosmos. It is worth mentioning that the participle *tan-*, literally ‘to weave’ (verse d), is used in the RV as the source domain in terms of which the creation of the cosmos, the creation of light, cognition and sacrifice are conceived (Jurewicz 2010). In the source domain, the space between those who weave (RV 10.130.1) is filled with a cloth created by threads. In these terms, creation of the non-existent cosmos (together with light, cognition and sacrifice) is conceived. In Smṛti thought however this source domain is not active as only one feature, the creation of something new, is projected onto the target domain.<sup>282</sup>

### MDhP 231.21

*sarvabhūteṣu cātmānaṃ sarvabhūtāni cātmani |  
yadā paśyati bhūtātmā brahma saṃpadyate tadā ||*

When the self of beings sees itself in all beings and all beings in itself, then it becomes brahman.<sup>283</sup>

In this context the compound *bhūtātman* (verse c) can be understood as the self, which is composed of the great beings, which implies the senses that cognise them and the higher cognitive faculties (mind and reason). In other

<sup>281</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

<sup>282</sup> The metaphor creating is weaving is not active here, as it seems, and the verb *tan-* ‘to weave’, means here creation by extending.

<sup>283</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

words, it is the human organism.<sup>284</sup> The highest cognitive agent present in man sees its ontic presence in all beings and their presence in it (verses a–b). Then it realises its unity with the unmanifest aspect of reality.

The cognitive nature of this process together with its ontic results is described in the following stanza:

### MDhP 231.22

*yāvān ātmani vedātmā tāvān ātmā parātmani |  
ya evaṃ satataṃ veda so 'mṛtatvāya kalpate ||*

As much the self knows itself, this much knows the self in its highest self. Who knows this all the time, becomes immortal<sup>285</sup>

The range of self-knowledge encompasses the range of the highest self (verse a–b). The sequence of the verses reflects the sequence of liberating cognition. Firstly, one knows one's own self which is the highest cognitive agent present in oneself. Then one realises that his self is the highest self i.e., the highest cognitive agent in its cosmic manifestation. When this cognition is stable and interrupted (verse c), one becomes immortal, because one identifies with the unmanifest aspect of reality.

### MDhP 242.5–10

The Composer of this fragment also expresses various manifestation of the highest cognitive agent by different use of the compounds (*sarvātman*, *mahātman*, 7, *nirātman*, 10) and by the polysemy of this word. In 5–6, he describes the results of liberating cognition. Man, having suspended sensual cognition, is satiated with the self (*ātmatṛpta*) and then he will be able to see his higher, eternal self with his self (6: *tadā tvam ātmanātmānaṃ paraṃ draṅsyasi śāśvatam*).<sup>286</sup> Then it is stated:

### MDhP 242.7

*sarvātmānaṃ mahātmānaṃ vidhūmam iva pāvakam |  
taṃ paśyanti mahātmāno brāhmaṇā ye maṇiṣiṇaḥ ||*

The self of everything, who has great self similar to a smokeless fire. The wise Brahmin, who has great self, sees it.<sup>287</sup>

<sup>284</sup> In this way it is used in MaU 3.2. See also MS 12.12 (chapter 3.3.2.e).

<sup>285</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

<sup>286</sup> MDhP 242: *tāni sarvāṇi saṃdhāya manaḥṣaṣṭhāni medhayā | ātmatṛpta ivāsīta bahu cintyam acintayan ||* (5) *gocarebhyo nivṛttāni yadā sthāsyanti veśmani | tadā tvam ātmanātmānaṃ paraṃ draṅsyasi śāśvatam ||* (6)

<sup>287</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

The identity of the subject and the object is expressed by the same qualification of the self as seen in liberating cognition and men who see it: both are qualified as ‘having great self’ (*mahātman*, verses a–c). In this way it is implied that, in their cognition, men identify themselves with reality in its first ‘great’ manifestation and so they become the highest cognitive agent in the beginning of creation. Let us note that the self is conceived in terms of a smokeless fire which is a further example of use of the concept of light/heat to conceive the moment of cognising one’s self. This image goes back to the Ṛgvedic model of Child Of The Waters where the manifest aspect of reality is conceived in these terms (Jurewicz 2010).

The next two stanzas present entanglement of the self in subject-object cognition performed in micro-scale:

### MDhP 242.8–9

*yathā puṣpaphalopeto bahuśākho mahādrumah |  
ātmano nābhijānīte kva me puṣpaṃ kva me phalam || (8)*

As a large tree with many branches, flowers and fruits does not know itself, where is flower, where is fruit,<sup>288</sup>

*evam ātmā na jānīte kva gamiṣye kuto nv aham |  
anyo hy atrāntar ātmāsti yaḥ sarvam anupaśyati || (9)*

in the same way the self does not know where it will go and from where it comes. But there is here, inside, another self which sees everything.<sup>289</sup>

In MDhP 242.8–9ab, the amalgamate agent is called *ātman* and is conceived in terms of a great tree with many branches, full of flowers and fruits, which is not aware of itself. In the target domain, the amalgamate agent does not know from where it has come and where it is to go. In MDhP 242.9cd, the highest cognitive agent in man is described: it is also called self (*ātman*) and is qualified as seeing everything. The difference between them is cognitive: in one of its aspect the self (*ātman*) does not know what will happen, in another aspect it knows everything. Then the Composer states:

### MDhP 242.10

*jñānadīpena dīptena paśyaty ātmānam ātmanā |  
dṛṣṭvā tvam ātmanātmānaṃ nirātmā bhava sarvavit ||*

With the burning lamp of knowledge, it sees itself with itself. Beholding, therefore, the self with the self, be without the self and attain omniscience.<sup>290</sup>

<sup>288</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

<sup>289</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

<sup>290</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

Since the subject of the second hemistich of the previous stanza (242.9cd) is the self which is inside self i.e., man, one can assume that it is also the subject of MDhP 242.10ab: it is the highest cognitive agent who can see itself with itself i.e., his human body. This fact constitutes the ontological and epistemological ground of liberating cognition: a man who realises his ontic unity with the self (*ātman*) is expected to realise the self-cognition of reality. Thanks to that, the self that is present in him can see itself with itself. It is worth noting that the Composer again uses the concept of the flame of a lamp in terms of which knowledge is conceived (verse a).

The compound *nirātman* ‘one who is without self’ (verse d) expresses the ultimate stage of liberating cognition when reality in its pre-creative state is realised: it does not cognise itself so is beyond subject-object cognition. Then man becomes ‘all-knowing’ (*sarvavit*, verse d) and will see everything as his internal self (MDhP 242.9) with which he has realised ontic unity.

\*

The analysis presented in this section shows that according to the early Smṛti Composers the ultimate subject of liberating cognition is the highest cognitive agent (the self, *ātman*) manifest in a particular man. Higher subjectivisation consists in the recognition by a man that it is the self (*ātman*) which becomes free thanks to his liberating cognition. In this process, the highest cognitive agent becomes empowered in micro-scale and man becomes empowered in macro-scale. The Composer expresses this conviction with the use of the polysemy of the noun *ātman* and with the use of metaphors the source domains of which activate the concept of light/heat/fire. It is argued that the source domain of these metaphors projects not only the concepts of illumination and the possibility of seeing onto the target domains, but also the concept of heating.

During this stage of liberating cognition, man, having decompressed the main factor of the amalgamate agent, the self and reason, creates a new blend in which he is one with the self from the input space of the decompressed blend. In this state he begins to cognise from its perspective and realises its unity with the unmanifest reality. Then the self can choose freely: either it engages in subject-object cognition performed from within the body of a man (without cessation of its cosmic cognition) or it can finally unite with its unmanifest aspect and stops its cognition from the perspective of that particular viewpoint.

## 4.11. Expanded subjectivisation

Expanded subjectivisation is most extensively discussed in the BhG in chapters 1–12. The aim of the Composers is to present the activity of free man in the world as the activity of the highest cognitive agent in micro-scale. They provide the philosophical background for this theory, which unites contemporary thought and earlier thought.

The main differences between the process of higher subjectivisation and of expanded subjectivisation are as follows. During the former man recognises the highest cognitive agent, his self (*ātman*), in himself. During the latter, the highest cognitive agent begins to perform cognition from within a man. The former recognition is recognition that goes beyond subject-object processes. The latter takes subject-object cognition from the perspective of the highest cognitive agent. The former reverses the order of creation. The latter is the creation of the world (*loka*) in micro-scale – a new space of experience from the perspective of a particular man. The former has been already described in the early Upaniṣads. The latter is elaborated in the early Smṛti texts.

### 4.11.1 LIFE IS A JOURNEY – the four stages of life

The idea that man should confirm his theoretical knowledge in practice is expressed in the concept of the four stages of life (*āśrāma*).<sup>291</sup> These are the stage of a pupil (*brahmacārin*), of a householder (*gṛhastha*), of a hermit (*vānaprastha*) and of a wandering mendicant (*samnyāsin*). The stages of life are called *āśrāma*, literally ‘a resting place’ that betrays the conceptualisation of life in terms of a journey. It should be noted that this conceptualisation is widely attested in human thinking (Kövecses 2010). It is explicitly expressed in BhG 3.8 where Kṛṣṇa states that the journey of life (*śarīrayātrā*) cannot be fulfilled without action (see below, section 4.11.3). Within the frames of this conceptualisation, each stage is conceived in terms of a resting place and human life is a journey from one to another. This kind of journey can be seen as the prototypical journey for those who lead a good life and it is not surprising that it became the source domain for conceptualisation of a good life generally. In the following stanza life is also conceived in terms of movement but now in terms of climbing a ladder:

<sup>291</sup> See first of all Olivelle (1994, 2011, 2018ab, 2019), Lubin (2018), Jamison (2018).

**MDhP 234.14–15**

*eko ya āśramān etān anutiṣṭhed yathāvidhi |  
akāmadveśasaṃyuktaḥ sa paratra mahīyate || (14)*

If one man proceeds through these stages of life according to the rules without desire and hatred, he finds happiness in the future life.<sup>292</sup>

*catuṣpadī hi niḥśreṇī brahmany eṣā pratiṣṭhitā |  
etām āśritya niḥśreṇīm brahmaloke mahīyate || (15)*

The stages of life are a ladder which consists of four steps. A man who ascends this ladder finds happiness in the world of Brahma.<sup>293</sup>

The image of climbing a ladder, in the source domain, allows the Composer to highlight the difficulty of this process and to trigger the image schema of VERTICALITY as the basic structure for the conceptualisation of practice of the four stages of life. In terms of this schema, the liberating nature of such a life is expressed (LIBERATING PRACTICE IS UP).

The concept of movement is also present in the names of the first and third stages. The name of the first stage *brahmacārin*, literally means a person who moves, walks with or after brahman.<sup>294</sup> It therefore implies activity. The word *-prastha* (the second part of the compound *vānaprastha*) literally means ‘going on a march or journey, going to’ so the literal meaning of *vānaprastha* is ‘a person who has gone to a forest’. On the other hand, the compound *grhastha* expresses a static situation as it means a person who stays in his house. There is no meaning of movement in the word *saṃnyāsin* which literally means ‘someone who has thrown down’ and which, in case of *saṃnyāsin*, are bonds to the manifest aspect of reality. This is probably because this stage is the embodiment of unmanifest reality and a man’s paradoxical condition goes beyond subject-object concepts, including movement and the lack of movement.

It can be argued that these names express the whole theory about the four stages of life according to which the first and the third stages are characterised by striving for a specific mental condition while the second and the fourth confirm this state. Putting this in terms of BhG 6.3 (see section 4.10.2.a) within the frames of the metaphor YOGA IS RIDING IN A CHARIOT, the first and the third stages are those who want to mount on yoga (*āruruṣu yogam*), while the second and fourth stages are for those who have already mounted (*yogarudha*). In the light of this interpretation, the redefinition of action without attachment as non-action is crucial for the coherence of the argument. It is the

<sup>292</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

<sup>293</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

<sup>294</sup> Kajihara (2002).



lack of action (*sama*) that is the instrument of those who ‘have mounted on yoga’ while those in the stage of *grhastha* must be active in the world. That man’s position in this latter stage is internally contradictory is expressed by its name which conveys the meaning of staying at home which is static condition yet other requirements that are imposed on him require active participation in the world (see below, section 4.11.3).

In the first stage of life man learns how to live the second stage of life and become a householder who acts in the world but without attachment. The verb *car-* is used in the Veda to denote an activity that allows the highest cognitive agent (as in ŚB 11.1.6.7 *sò ‘rcañ crāmyamś cacāra*; BU 1.2.1: *sò ‘rcann acarat*) or his subjective manifestations (gods as in ŚB 11.5.9.4: *tāto devāḥ ārcantaḥ śrāmyantaś cerus*) to solve problems in creation and is connected with heating. It is possible then that the earlier meaning of this word expressed the activity which enabled them to get results in liberating cognition: they performed an activity accompanied by recitation of the Veda (*brahman*). One could presume that the rigorous life the pupil has to live would lead him to the moment when he realises his identity with the highest cognitive agent. He does not, however, finally liberates himself but begins to act in the cosmos in the same way as the highest cognitive agent and thus begins the stage of householder. Man, in a free act, decides to subordinate himself to the rules established by himself. He realises in micro-scale the activity of the highest cognitive agent engaged in subject-object cognition in which the highest cognitive agent cognises itself. This is the core of the teaching of Kṛṣṇa in the BhG.

Having seen sons of his own son’s (MS 6.2), man should withdraw from the world and go to where he can focus on practice that should lead him to ultimate freedom and identity with the unmanifest aspect. He goes to a forest and becomes *vānaprastha*.

In the stage of *saṃnyāsin*, man throws away all his relationships with the manifest aspect which is expressed in his last sacrifice which is placing fire into himself (MS 6.38).<sup>295</sup> The fact that the rite of final renunciation is called ‘a sacrifice to Prajāpati’ (*prājāpatya*) evokes Vedic cosmogonies during which Prajāpati creates the cosmos, conceived in terms of fire, out of his body: now man has to reverse the creative act in microscale and symbolically take his own cosmos (*loka*), visually represented by three fires, into himself. Thus, as stated above, he become the living embodiment of the unmanifest aspect of reality without any relationship with subject-object cognition.

<sup>295</sup> MS 6.38: *prājāpatyaṃ nirupyeṣṭiṃ sarvavedasadakṣiṇām | ātmany agnīn samāropya brāhmaṇaḥ pravrajed grhāt ||*

As mentioned in Chapter 2.8, in early Smṛti philosophy truth is understood as consistency of thought and of action with reality. A human's behavior is evaluated from an epistemological point of view: it can be false or true. Commendable behavior is that of a person who controls his senses of reason (*buddhīndriya*) and without attachment engages in actions with his senses of action (*karmendriya*, BhG 3.7). Falseness of human behavior consists in there being a discrepancy between his thinking and his actions. As said above, it is the highest cognitive agent that becomes free during liberating practice. If there is discrepancy between thinking and the actions of man the highest cognitive agent present in man is deluded, it cannot perform subject-object cognition as it does it on macro-scale. If a man lives his life according to the four stages, the highest cognitive agent can experience in micro-scale the process of creation of the cosmos (*brahmacārin*), its existence (*gṛhastha*), its destruction (*vānaprastha*) and the unmanifest state (*saṁnyāsīn*).<sup>296</sup> The role of man is to be the visible sign (*nimitta*, see below, section 4.12) of its cognition in human scale.

We have already discussed how the senses of reason (*buddhīndriya*) are restrained thanks to liberating practice. Their restriction gives man power over the category of classes (*guṇa*). The senses of action (*karman*) are restricted thanks to specific behaviour during practice (lack of movement, fasting, celibacy).

Now, we will discuss how the category of action (*karman*) can be restrained, although in a different way, thanks the practice described above. When man succeeds in his efforts, he will be able to use this category instead of submitting to it. The proper category of action which should be learned and used is sacrifice (*yajña*).

In order to do that, the Composers of the Smṛti texts had to turn to tradition as their source and refresh the concept of sacrifice so much undermined by Buddhists.

#### 4.11.2. The philosophy of action in the BhG and its Vedic grounds

Although the context of the BhG is well known, we will outline it here once again. Arjuna, with his charioteer Kṛṣṇa, stand between two armies ready for battle. Many of the warriors on the opposing side are his close relatives and Arjuna is depressed because he will have to kill them and his masters. He

<sup>296</sup> The same is for the four social states: if man lives accordingly to his state, the highest cognitive agent can experience himself as a Brahmin, a Kṣatriya, a Vaiśya and a Śūdra, see chapter 2.3.1.

sits down in his chariot and casts down his bow with its arrows. The image schema of VERTICALITY (UNHAPPINESS IS DOWN) is very clearly elaborated here, especially when one takes into account the final description of Arjuna who states that he is ready to fight. This is expressed with the participle from the verb *stha-* (*sthito' smi*, see also chapter 3.2.1). Arjuna is in a moral dilemma. On one hand his dharma as a warrior requires him to fight, on the other his dharma prohibits him killing his relatives.

In the beginning, Kṛṣṇa treats Arjuna as a simple warrior and angrily tells him to pull himself together and stand up (BhG 2.2–3). When, however, Arjuna expresses his despair in elaborate *trīṣṭubh* metre (BhG 2.5–8) and states that he prefers to die rather than kill his relatives Kṛṣṇa sees that the situation is serious and that Arjuna needs special attention. In the beginning he tries to persuade him to fight with use of simple arguments and by appealing to the warrior's ethic of honour but then, seeing Arjuna's eyes tearful and filled with unspoken questions and despair, Kṛṣṇa enters into issues of morality and metaphysics.

Within the mega-blend created by the Composer of the BhG, the cosmos is conceived in terms of a battle between two opposing armies. This metaphor allows him to express the dramatic character of the choice to be made by Arjuna and by other protagonists of the MBh (especially Yudhiṣṭhira) who have to decide about their participation in the forthcoming battle. Arjuna is between two armies and the battle will begin whatever he decides. If he does not stand up, he will be killed by his enemies or may even be killed accidentally by a wounded elephant or a stray arrow. Most probably, he would defend himself. After all, he has been learning how to fight and kill throughout all his life like any well-trained warrior. His freedom can manifest in his mental state: if he awakes the highest cognitive agent, his self, he will decide to fight in the same way as reality decides to manifest itself.<sup>297</sup>

As stated above the Brahmanical philosophers, especially those who composed the BhG, were in a difficult position. On one hand, they could see that the strict Vedic ritual, as presented in the Brahmanas, had been losing its high position due to the appearance of various movements both within the Brahminic tradition and beyond (like Buddhism and Jainism). A way to freedom and immortality had been found thanks to one's mental effort and

<sup>297</sup> 'The second volume of her autobiography, *La Force de l'Âge* (*The Prime of Life*, 1960) is often considered to be the richest of all the volumes. Like *Memoirs of a Dutiful Daughter*, it was commercially and critically well received. Taking up the years from 1929–1944, Beauvoir portrays her transition from student to adult and the discovery of personal responsibility in war and peace' (<https://www.iep.utm.edu/beauvoir/>). I want to thank my BA student, Agnieszka Drotkiewicz, for paying attention to this similarity.

without sacrifice. On the other hand, since Vedic ritual gave practical meaning to the Vedas that were still repeated daily and constituted the core of their tradition, they wanted to preserve as much of it as possible. Because of that, the Composers of the BhG attest both criticism of the Vedas and ritual and, at the same time, praise it together with their redefinition. Often the point of departure of such redefinitions is the suffering of a man who asks how can he recover from his suffering (see above, section 4.1). Such men are perplexed because of the contradiction in their experience. They are told that happiness is the final aim of living yet, at the same time, they suffer and do not know how to diminish their unhappiness.

The Composer of the BhG does not criticise the Vedas themselves but those who interpret them narrowly. Their criticisms are presented in BhG 2.41–46 in an exposition of yoga understood as a cognitive practice that will give Arjuna independence from the category of action (*karman*, BhG 2.39).<sup>298</sup> This practice is called dharma in the next stanza (BhG 2.40). Nothing is wasted in this process and even its smallest part saves one from the great fear now felt by Arjuna.<sup>299</sup> The proper function of reason, which is decision making, can be realised in only one way (*vyavasāyātmikā buddhir ekeha*, BhG 2.41ab). Without firm reasoning when confronted with various opinions (BhG 2.41cd),<sup>300</sup> decision making is impossible. The compound *bahuśākhā* which qualifies reason in such a cognitive situation activates the meaning of *śākhā* (branch) which is the name of a Brahminic school of recitation of the Veda.<sup>301</sup> If this supposition is right, the Composer is referring to the debates that took place among Brahmins of various schools which, according to him, are futile and lead to nothing because they lack proper reasoning. Very strong criticism of those people is then expressed. They are presented as stupid (*avipaścitas*), speaking secret words and so devoted to the words of the Veda that they see nothing further (BhG 2.42).<sup>302</sup> They see the borderline between two aspects of reality as the highest aim and because of that they desire the results of their actions (BhG 2.43).<sup>303</sup> Their mind is lost, their reason loses its

<sup>298</sup> BhG 2.39: *eṣā te 'bhīhitā sāmṅhye buddhir yoge tv imāṃ śṛṇu | buddhyā yukto yayā pārtha karmabandhaṃ prahāsyasi ||*

<sup>299</sup> BhG 2.40: *nehābhīkramanāśo 'sti pratyavāyo na vidyate | svalpam apy asya dharmasya trāyate mahato bhayāt ||*

<sup>300</sup> BhG 2.41: *vyavasāyātmikā buddhir ekeha kurunandana | bahuśākhā hy anantāś ca buddhayo 'vyavasāyinām ||*

<sup>301</sup> The conceptualisation of the RV in terms of a branch goes back to RV 1.164 (Jurewicz 2016/2018).

<sup>302</sup> BhG 2.42: *yām imāṃ puṣpitām vācam pravadyanty avipaścitaḥ | vedavādaratāḥ pārtha nānyad astīti vādināḥ ||*

<sup>303</sup> BhG 2.43: *kāmātmānaḥ svargaparā janmakarmaphalapradām | kriyāvīṣeṣabahulām bhogaīśvryagatiṃ prati ||*

power over the mind and it cannot reach the state of focused concentration (*samadhau na vidhiyate*, BhG 2.44).<sup>304</sup>

Then the main topic of Kṛṣṇa's teaching is presented:

### BhG 2.45

*traigunyaṁviśayā vedā nistraigunyo bhavārjuna |  
nirdvandvo nityasattvastho niryogaḥśema ātmavān ||*

The object of the Vedas is three classes. Be above three classes, Arjuna, without duality, always remaining in sattva, without exertion-and-repose, possessing self!<sup>305</sup>

The scope of the Vedas is everything that can be categorised by the three classes (*traigunya*, verse a) so it is limited to the manifest aspect of reality. But mentally one has to go beyond this object (*nistraigunya*, verse b). To reach a state that is beyond the duality (*nirdvandva*, verse c) characteristic of subject-object cognition. The way to this state is constant use of the class of sattva (*nityasattvastha*, verse c). During this process one should be without exertion-and-repose (*yogaḥśema*, verse d) which implies that liberating cognition is different from the everyday exhausting pursuit of such goals.<sup>306</sup> It is worth noting that the compound *yogaḥśema* appears in the RV only once (RV 10.166.5ab) in the hymn in which 'the extremely aggressive 1st-person speaker of this hymn proclaims his triumph over his rivals and their utter humiliation' (Jamison, Brereton 2014: 1647). He presents himself as taking away from his enemy his 'cognition' (*citta*), his 'commandment' (*vrata*), his 'assembled company' (*samiti*),<sup>307</sup> his 'yoking up' and his 'peace' (*yogaḥśema*).<sup>308</sup> Jamison, Brereton (2014) identifies yoga with war in this context. If the Composer of the BhG had this hymn in his mind, abandonment of *yogaḥśema* highlights the similarity between the everyday activity of a Kṣatriya and liberating cognition which requires the same mental attitude towards friends and enemies and everything that one's enemies represent and possess (BhG 6.5–6, see section 4.10.2.a). The goal of liberating cognition is activation of the highest cognitive agent in man (*ātmanvant*, verse d).

At the end of his criticism, Kṛṣṇa uses the metaphor of an ocean and a well. For cognising Brahmin, the Vedas have as much meaning as does

<sup>304</sup> BhG 2.44: *bhogaśvāyāprasaktānām tayāpahṛtacetāsām | vyavasāyātmikā buddhiḥ samādhau na vidhiyate ||*

<sup>305</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

<sup>306</sup> For *yogaḥśema* in the RV, see Oberlies (1998), in Pāli Canon and the early Smṛti texts, see Pontillo, Neri (2019).

<sup>307</sup> RV 10.166.4: *abhibhūr ahām āgamaṁ viśvākarmaṇa dhāmanā | ā vaś citām ā vo vratām ā vo hām sāmitim dade ||*

<sup>308</sup> RV 10.166.5: *yogaḥśemām va ādāya*. For the whole stanza, see below, footnote 309.

a well filled with water in the middle of water.<sup>309</sup> One is tempted to think that the Composer wants to activate the Ṛgvedic metaphor of Brahmins as croaking frogs (RV 7.103), because the noun *udapāna* literally means any watering place, like a pond or puddle where frogs like to gather. We may like to note that in RV 10.166.5 c–f discussed above, the concept of frogs in water is used in the following verses of the stanza after the description of the taking of *yogakṣemá* from the enemy.<sup>310</sup> The lyrical subject presents himself as trampling on the head of his enemy whose speech is compared to the croaking of frogs in the water beneath his feet. It may be speculated that the Composer was led by this line of thinking of the Ṛgvedic poet and that the *udapāna* he thought about was not a well but just a puddle from which one could hear the croaking of frogs. It seems he did not project the concept of a physical fight with an enemy onto the target domain but by projecting the image schema of VERTICALITY,<sup>311</sup> conceived of the squabbling Brahmins as being below the ideal man described by Kṛṣṇa. The ideal man is higher than the winner of a fight because he abandons his own *yogakṣema*. Anyway, the similarities with RV seem so clear that it is worth looking for possible conceptual connections with it.

Then two definition of yoga are then presented (which will be discussed later) and the Composer states:

### BhG 2.52

*yadā te mohakalilaṃ buddhir vyatitarisyati |  
tadā gantāsi nirvedaṃ śrotavyasya śrutasya ca ||*

When your reason goes through the jungle of delusion, then you will become indifferent to what should be heard and what has been heard.<sup>312</sup>

Using his reason Arjuna should pass through ignorance (conceived in terms of transcending a jungle in accord with the METAPHOR YOGA IS RIDING IN A CHARIOT, verse a).<sup>313</sup> The state realised in this state is described as *nirvedaṃ śrotavyasya śrutasya ca* (verse d).<sup>314</sup> *Nirveda* means indifference but also a lack

<sup>309</sup> BhG 2.46: *yāvān artha udapāne sarvataḥ samplutodake | tāvān sarveṣu vedeṣu brāhmaṇasya vijānataḥ ||*

<sup>310</sup> RV 10.166.5: *yogakṣemāṃ va ādāya | ahām bhūyāsam uttamā | ā vo mūrdhānam akramīm | adhaspadān ma úd vadata | maṇḍūkā iva udakān | maṇḍūkā udakād iva ||*

<sup>311</sup> See Jamison, Brereton (2014: 1647): ‘Using the well-nigh universal tropes of high and low, he repeatedly emphasizes the spatial (and thus conceptual) position of his defeated enemies, who are literally beneath his feet.’

<sup>312</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

<sup>313</sup> The metaphor YOGA IS A JOURNEY THROUGH A JUNGLE is activated in MDhP 289.50–53.

<sup>314</sup> The expression *gantāsi nirvedaṃ* activates the metaphor CHANGE OF STATE IS CHANGE OF CONTAINER.

of the Veda. This second meaning might be a response to non-Vedic traditions and the suggestion is that even within Brahminic tradition it is possible for Arjuna to realise the state beyond the Veda that he has learnt and is now in his memory. Arjuna's reason is perplexed in reference to the teaching of tradition (*śrutivipratipanna*, 2.53a)<sup>315</sup> and it cannot focus on the proper object. His reason should become motionless (*niścala*, *acala*) thanks to the focused concentration of the mind (*samādhāu*). This means a radical transformation of his way of thinking. Arjuna should force his cognitive faculties to cognise in a totally new way, from the perspective of the highest cognitive agent which is his true self (*ātman*).

So, the conclusion is not that something is wrong with Vedic tradition but with its understanding and interpretation. As stated in BhG 4.16, even the poets (*kavi*) are confused about what is action and non-action (4.16).<sup>316</sup> If the tradition is to survive in new times it had to be thoroughly thought out and redefined. And this is exactly what the Composer of the BhG does.

Having presented his criticism of narrow-minded Brahmins, the Composer states that man has power over the action itself and never over its results (2.47):

### BhG 2.47

*karmaṇy evādhikāras te mā phaleṣu kadā cana |*  
*mā karmaphalahetur bhūr mā te saṅgo 'stv akarmaṇi ||*

You have power over action and never over its fruit. Do not be motivated by the fruits of actions. But do not be attached to non-action.<sup>317</sup>

As proposed in the analysis of the cosmogony of the MS, action (*karman*) is a category that enables the highest cognitive agent to continue his self-cognition on the level of perceptibility (see chapters 1.1.5, 2.1.3). Man is expected to use this category for the same reason, to recognise one's identity with reality and this is the range of his real power (*adhikāra*). In wrong cognition, categories are treated ontologically as features of the objects one desires or of which one is afraid. Men are led by them to be totally dependent on them. When a man uses categories properly, he is not interested in results of his actions at all because he knows that he, as the highest cognitive agent, is everything so possesses everything.

<sup>315</sup> BhG 2.53: *śrutivipratipannā te yadā sthāsyati niścalā | samādhāv acalā buddhis tadā yogam avāpsyasi ||*

<sup>316</sup> BhG 6.26: *kiṃ karma kim akarmeti kavayo 'py atra mohitāḥ | tat te karma pravakṣyāmi yaj jñātvā mokṣyase 'śubhāt ||*

<sup>317</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

Having stated this, the Composer presents his first definition of yoga:

### BhG 2.48

*yogasthaḥ kuru karmāṇi saṅgaṃ tyaktvā dhanamjaya |  
siddhyasiddhyoḥ samo bhūtvā samatvaṃ yoga ucyate ||*

Standing in yoga, perform actions without attachment, o Dhanamjaya, having become the same in success and failure. Equanimity is called yoga.<sup>318</sup>

Yoga is defined as equanimity of mental faculties towards success and failure (verses c–d). This duality reflects the subject-object structure of the cosmos. He who has cognised that his self (*ātman*) is the highest cognitive agent, understands that this duality should be used by him and that he has power over it, even when he acts within the manifest aspect. The equanimity is gained thanks to mastery over the senses which are inside the mind which is emotionally focused on the self (*ātman*) and kept in this state by reason. The compound *yogastha* (verse a) has been translated literally as ‘standing in yoga’ which highlights the meaning of yoga in this particular context as a chariot (similarly BhG 6.3, see above, section 4.10.2.a).

### BhG 2.49

*dūreṇa hy avaram karma buddhiyogād dhanamjaya |  
buddhau śaraṇam anviccha kṛpaṇāḥ phalahetavaḥ ||*

Action is far inferior to the yoke of reason, O Dhanamjaya. Seek refuge in reason. Those motivated by the fruits are miserable!<sup>319</sup>

Taking into account that Kṛṣṇa has just urged Arjuna to act, it is improbable that he now rejects acting (Arjuna will be misled by this saying, see BhG 3.1–3). So, the noun *karman* (verse a) is used here in its Vedic meaning, which is ritual action motivated by the desire for a quick result.<sup>320</sup> Such action is far inferior to what Kṛṣṇa proposes, which is action under the guidance (conceived in terms of a yoke) of reason (*buddhiyoga*, verse b). Reason, which makes the right decision on the basis of the will of a mind which wants to cognise self (*ātman*), is the only refuge for Arjuna.<sup>321</sup> Recall that Arjuna is in a state

<sup>318</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

<sup>319</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

<sup>320</sup> BhG 4.12: *kāṅkṣantaḥ karmaṇām siddhiṃ yajanta iha devatāḥ | kṣipraṃ hi mānuṣe loka siddhir bhavati karmajā ||*

<sup>321</sup> The expression *buddhau śaraṇam anviccha* evokes the Buddhist saying *buddhaṃ saraṇam gacchāmi* and again betrays an attempt of the Composer to convince his recipients that the real shelter (*śaraṇa*) can be found not in the Buddha, but in buddhi, reason, which makes right decision to follow Brahminic liberating practice.



where he not only fails to recognise his self, but does not even want to fulfill his duties as a warrior. His reason is lost because of the despair of his mind.

Then comes the second definition of yoga:

### BhG 2.50

*buddhiyukto jahātīha ubhe sukṛtaduṣkṛte |  
tasmād yogāya yujyasva yogaḥ karmasu kauśalam ||*

A man who is yoked by reason leaves behind good and bad actions. Because of that yoke yourself to yoga. Yoga is skillfulness in actions.<sup>322</sup>

As we remember values are instrumental in Smṛti thought as they are limited to the manifest aspect (see chapter 2.6). Within the frames of the metaphor YOGA IS RIDING IN A CHARIOT (activated *via buddhiyukto*, verse a, and *yogāya yujyasva*, verse c), values are signs on the road for the driver (specific places, objects, curves of the road etc.) who now knows where to direct his horses. When the driver reaches his destination, he no longer needs these signs. In the target domain, a man who has realised his identity with the highest cognitive agent does not need value: he has created it.

In verse d, yoga is defined as skillfulness in actions (*karmasu kauśala*).<sup>323</sup> Skill is a sign of action without attachment (see above, section 4.4.2, 4.6.2). The logic of the source domain implies that the driver has to be skilled, he should know how to harness the horses, how to read the road, how to find the correct road at a crossroads, etc. He should be so skilled that he can use his practical knowledge without thinking. Only then can he focus his mind on the aim, which is his destination. In the target domain, man should learn to use his senses of action in a perfect way so that his reason can keep the mind restrained.

The compound *buddhiyukta* and the expression *yogāya yujyasva* activate conceptualisation of man in terms of a horse and reason in terms of a yoke. In this way, the Composer expresses both kinds of freedom realised by man: the one that consists of free restraint and the one that consists of free action. One can argue that the skill of a practitioner is not disturbed by any stimulus coming from the world or his body and yet is disciplined by rules applied through his will. This corresponds to the necessity with which cosmic rules are applied. Man attunes to the cosmic pulse but does so because he wants to do so and not because he is forced by any external power.

<sup>322</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

<sup>323</sup> This definition again echoes the Buddhist concept of the 'skill in means' (*upāyakausalāya*, Gombrich 1996).

### 4.11.3. The category of sacrifice used in expanded subjectivisation

In the cosmogony presented in the MS, sacrifice (*yajña*) is the category which allows Brahma to recognise the kind of action that leads to self-cognition (see chapter 1.1.7). The scenario of sacrifice is based on the prototypical ICM according to which oblation (prototypically soma) is poured into fire. Thus, understood sacrifice realises the structure of self-cognition that, in the first stage, requires a division into subject and object. This opposition is expressed not only in the initial division of fire and oblation but also in the division between men and gods: men give something to them in order to get something back in another, often better form. In Vedic times ritual action and its result were encapsulated in the holistic concept of *karman*.

It was the Buddha who redefined action (*karman*) as intention (*cetanā*, Gombrich 1996). It should be noticed that it was not the focus on the mental state of the acting man which was new. According to the philosophers of the Brahmanas a sacrifice can be successful only for those who know the meaning of ritual ‘in this way’ (*evam*), in the way it is explained in the exegesis. Only those people called ‘those who understand in this way’ (*evamvid*) will gain the results of the sacrifice. At a deeper level, the content of their knowledge was that they participated in the cosmic transformations of reality performed by the manifestation of its cognitive powers that is, by the highest cognitive agent called Prajāpati. This led to the deepest meaning of ritual action (*karman*) which is the creation of the immortal self (*ātman*) of the sacrificer, especially seen in the exegesis of the Agyadhana, Agnihotra and Agnicayana (Jurewicz 2016/18, 2019b).

Hence, the novelty brought about by the Buddha, as far as the meaning of the concept of *karman* is concerned, is that he decompressed its semantic components. He separated the mental attitude which accompanies actions from the whole scenario of action which includes thoughts and intentions of the agent, the action itself and its results. This betrays his analytical reasoning abilities that are attested in many other cases (Jurewicz 2005). The obvious conclusion was to reject ritual (*karman*) understood as an external activity.

The fact that ritual action did not bring immediate or perceptible results could be easily noticed not only by the Buddha and his followers but also by the later Brahminic philosophers active during the time of composition of the Smṛti texts. They began to develop a rational analysis of the outside world which can be attested by their analysis of everyday cognition, and their development of the classical formulation of the cognitive means necessary to bring reliable knowledge (*pramāṇa*). On the other hand the problem of the relationship between the agent, his mental attitude, his action and its

results remained and now begins to be framed in an elaborated eschatological perspective of rebirth.<sup>324</sup>

The Smṛti Composers could refer to their own tradition from which they derived the proper mental attitude for ritual activity and its result, which is the creation of one's immortal self. Following their Brahminic predecessors and Buddhist thought, they agreed that one's mental state is the most important component of ritual action. The novelty introduced by them is that this does not necessarily mean sacrifices should be abandoned. Their ability to create and understand internally contradictory concepts, dating from the times of the RV, allowed them to construe a concept of activity which is not action.

The principle of the primary character of cognition over being, allowed them to see actions as categories, as means of cognition that facilitates understanding of the self. As in everyday life they could recognise themselves on the basis of what they did (activity is the discerning mark of the social states). In the same way, Brahma could recognise himself in the manifest aspect on the basis of his movements. When one looks for the self (*ātman*) in external objects, one will find oneself in them and will be reborn among them under the necessity of categories. When one looks for one's self inside oneself, one will be liberated from this necessity. In the latter case, action ceases to be action in the analytical meaning, because the agent, action and result are again compressed in that they are the same. In this way the Smṛti philosophers came back to the roots of their tradition when the concept of action (*karman*) was a holistic concept, yajña was identified with karman as the action which should be performed and during which man creates his immortal self. Paradoxically, the Buddhist decompression of the holistic concept of action (*karman*) into its elements (the agent, his desires and his knowledge, action and its result) allowed the Smṛti Composers to refresh their ICM of action and highlight the mental state of the agent (and not his external activities) as the defining feature of action. The new ICM of action is a blend consisting of three input spaces. The first is an analytical concept of everyday action: a man acts on objects which he considers to be ontologically different from himself in order to achieve a future goal. The second input space is the holistic concept of action according to which the agent knows that he is identical with the objects and the targets. The third input space is the concept of a lack of action. In the blend, the analytical scenario of action is compressed into a unity (the agent, his desires and his knowledge, action and its result) to become only action (see section 4.11.3, chapter 5.4.5). Moreover, such action is non-action (the meaning of negation comes from the third input space).

<sup>324</sup> This does not mean that concept of rebirth was new, just the opposite, there are traces of this belief already in the tenth mandala of the RV (Jurewicz 2008, 2010).

The theory of action presented in the BhG is mostly in the third and the fourth chapters. Here we will focus on some stanzas of the third chapter where tradition is evoked and redefined.

### BhG 3.5

*na hi kaś cit kṣaṇam api jātu tiṣṭhaty akarmakṛt |  
kāryate hy avaśaḥ karma sarvaḥ prakṛtijair guṇaiḥ ||*

For no one lives even for a moment without doing some act, for the classes<sup>325</sup> of nature cause everyone to act, willynilly.

The cosmos is a manifestation of subject-object activity of the highest cognitive agent and its dynamics are categorised by the three classes (*guṇa*). As in many places, classes are presented as appearing from the manifest aspect (*prakṛti*, verse d). Because they are created within the manifest aspect, they refer to it and are seen as ontic features of the cosmos in everyday cognition. Together with the category of action (*karman*) they are used all the time by the highest cognitive agent. Thanks to its activity the cosmos exists and people can think and act.

### BhG 3.8

*niyataṃ kuru karma tvam karma jyāyo hy akarmanāḥ |  
śarīrayātrāpi ca te na prasidhyed akarmanāḥ ||*

Do what is necessary to do. Action is better than non-action. The journey of your body would not be successful without action.<sup>326</sup>

The life of Arjuna, conceived in terms of a journey, will not succeed without action (verses c–d). The logic of the source domain strengthens the necessity of action in the target domain: it is obvious that any journey can succeed only when one moves on. Each man has an action to perform that accords to one's social state and age. From the perspective of the highest cognitive agent, men are particles of his social body that is in constant movement. This means that each particle should behave according to its place in the body. A particle of an arm cannot behave like a particle of a mouth. A Kṣatriya cannot behave like a Brahmin. Identified with the highest cognitive agent present in him as his self (*ātman*), man sees himself from its perspective. And clearly sees which action is necessary and knows how to use action in order to confirm his identity with reality.

<sup>325</sup> Buitenen (1981: 81): 'three forces.'

<sup>326</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

Then the Composer states that the only action which does not create results that lead to rebirth is sacrifice, provided it is performed without desiring or thinking about external objects (3.9).<sup>327</sup> In the next stanza he evokes Vedic thought (3.10). He introduces the concept of Prajāpati who, having created the creatures (*prajā*) together with sacrifice, told them that they will multiply and fulfill their wishes thanks to it.<sup>328</sup> Sacrifice is seen in terms of mutual feeding: men feed the gods and the gods feed men, then all their desires will be fulfilled (3.11–12). The conceptualisation of the processes of the cosmos in terms of feeding is widely accepted in the Brahmanas (Jurewicz 2016/18). Thus, the Composers of the BhG not only refresh the Vedic injunction to perform ritual but also its conceptualisation in terms of the general domain of Cooking. On the other hand, the Composer of the BhG MS 1.22 describes creation in the same way as the Composer of the BhG: Brahma manifests as gods and the Sadhyas, the first multiple subject living on earth who succeeded in their cognition thanks to their use of the category of sacrifice (see chapter 1.1.7). Their cognition is repeated by men.

In the next two stanzas, a cosmogony is presented in order to express how reality manifests itself in ritual:

### BhG 3.14–15

*annād bhavanti bhūtāni parjanyaḍ annasambhavaḥ |  
yajñād bhavati parjanyo yajñāḥ karmasamudbhavaḥ || (14)*

And sacrifice grows because of action. Creatures exist by food, food grows from rain, rain springs from sacrifice,

*karma brahmodbhavaḥ viddhi brahmākṣarasamudbhavam |  
tasmāt sarvagataḥ brahma nityaḥ yajñe pratiṣṭhitam || (15)*

sacrifice,<sup>329</sup> you must know, originates from the brahman of the Vedas and this brahman itself issues from the Syllable OM. Therefore, the ubiquitous brahman is forever based upon sacrifice.

The sequence of nouns metonymically activates, although in inverted order, the sequence of the creative stages. *Akṣara* (15.b) can mean both ‘the imperishable’ and the syllable OM and these two meanings, when they are decompressed, trigger the recipient to understand that imperishable reality is manifested in sound. It expresses the future cosmos which is the syllable OM.

<sup>327</sup> BhG 3.9: *yajñārthāt karmaṇo ‘nyatra loko ‘yaḥ karmabandhanaḥ | tadarthaḥ karma kaunteya muktasaṅgaḥ samācara ||*

<sup>328</sup> BhG 3.10: *sahayajñāḥ prajāḥ sṛṣṭvā purovāca prajāpatiḥ | anena prasaviṣyadhvam eṣa vo ‘stv iṣṭakāmadhuk ||*

<sup>329</sup> Buitenen (1981: 83): ‘This ritual action.’

The word *akṣara* activates Vedic speculation about the contradictory nature of the first manifestation conceived in terms of flowing of that which does not flow (*tatah kṣarati akṣaram*).

The word *brahman* (15ab) has the two meanings of reality and the Veda. The recipient who decompresses the concise meaning of this word understands that the syllable OM becomes the Veda (*brahman*) which is the embodiment of that which is unmanifest (*brahman*). From the Veda action (*karman*, 15a) appears: the text is recited by reality and its words become their designates i.e., the perceptible and dynamic manifest aspect.<sup>330</sup>

Then correct action that leads to self-cognition becomes specified as sacrifice (*yajña*, 3.14d). The appearance of rain (metonymically evoked by the noun *parjanya*), food and the beings (3.14a–c) is motivated by the general model of Reality Transformation that comes from the RV (Jurewicz 2010) and is preserved in later layers of tradition up to Smṛti times: oblations go to the sun and from the sun comes rain.<sup>331</sup>

The recipient may also evoke the model of the Five Fires (*pañcāgnividyā* JB 1.45, BU 6.2.9–16 and CU 5.4–10) where the same theory of the cosmos is presented. According to this model the functioning of the cosmos is conceived in terms of five sacrifices. The first is the sun as fire into which faith<sup>332</sup> is poured and from which king Soma appears. Parjanya is fire into which Soma is poured and rain appears. Rain is poured into the earth out of which food appears. Food is poured into the fire of man out of whom semen is born which is then poured into a woman. So, it can be seen that the concepts of *parjanya*, rain and food in 3.14a–c concisely evoke the last three sacrifices of the model of the Five Fires.

The last two verses of BhG 15 (*tasmāt sarvagataṃ brahma nityaṃ yajñe pratiṣṭhitam*) are a conclusion that is meaningful only if the recipient decompresses the concise cosmogonical description. Qualification of brahman as *sarvagata* ‘omnipresent’ activates the description of the highest cognitive agent in RV 10.90 where its omnipresence is metonymically conceived in terms of its manifold feet (*sahásrapāt*). It begins to speak and move, dividing itself into subject and object and cognising their unity in the cosmos. This cognitive activity is categorised as sacrifice (MS 1.22) and thanks to that men can participate in brahman’s activity *via* their rituals. Whoever performs ritual has access to the unmanifest aspect of reality. Sacrifice is the visible sign of

<sup>330</sup> See ŚB 10.5.3 where action (*karman*) is the penultimate manifestation of the mind (*manas*, the ultimate is fire, *agni*).

<sup>331</sup> See e.g. MaU 6.37: *atrodāharanti – yad dhavir agnau hūyate tad ādityam gamayati tat sūryo raśmibhir varṣati tena anna bhavati asmād bhūtānām utpattir iti*.

<sup>332</sup> This issue is discussed in Jurewicz (2004).

the dynamism of the cosmos and its cognitive nature. Moreover, since beings (*bhūtāni*) have appeared from brahman, their participation in the sacrifice allows them to cognise their self.

The same idea about the presence of brahman in ritual is expressed in the following stanza where it is identified with all the elements of sacrifice:

#### **BhG 4.24**

*brahmārpaṇaṃ brahmahavir brahmāgnau brahmaṇā hutam |  
brahmaiva tena gantavyaṃ brahmakarmasamādhinā ||*

Brahman is the offering, brahman is the oblation that is poured into the brahman fire by brahman: he who thus contemplates the act as nothing but brahman must reach brahman.

As we remember, the same identification of all elements of the subject-object activity takes place in BhG 6.5–6 where they are identified with the self (*ātman*). Here, brahman is seen as the subject, object, instrument and act of sacrifice. In the next stanzas of this chapter (4.25–31), the Composer describes various kinds of sacrifices, those with tangible oblations and those that are performed in one's body, and finally concludes:

#### **BhG 4.32**

*evaṃ bahuvīdhā yajñā vitatā brahmaṇo mukhe |  
karmajān viddhi tān sarvān evaṃ jñātvā vimokṣyase ||*

Thus, sacrifices of many kinds are strung in the mouth of brahman: know that they all spring from action, and knowing this you shall be free.

It is suggested that the Composer is activating the Vedic conceptualisation of the cosmos in terms of an open mouth (verses a–b). The recipient may activate ŚB 2.2.4 where the future cosmos is conceived in terms of fire emerging from Prajāpati's mouth (Jurewicz 2016/18). Brahman again means reality now conceived in terms of a man who moves his jaws in recitation and eating. This movement is categorised as sacrifice. The general domain of Cooking, in terms of which the influence of time and ritual action are conceived (see above, BhG 3.10–12, see chapter 2.1.1), makes the statement even more coherent. The ultimate recipient of sacrifices (conceived in terms of the eater) is brahman, reality in its unmanifest aspect.<sup>333</sup> In verse c, the

<sup>333</sup> In his translation of verses, a–b, Thompson understands them as referring to actual sacrifices when a tangible oblation is given to brahman: 'In this way many forms of sacrifice are spread out as an offering before Brahman.' His interpretation would be is a second input space of the blend created by the Composer which are actual sacrifices performed by an actual man.

Composer states that all sacrifices are born from action. Sacrifice is a specific category of a more general category which is action (*karman*) and man can have power over action and use it in a proper way. The conviction of the Composer is that if this is known by Arjuna he will be free. This evokes the Vedic concept of the man who understands in this way (*evamvid*) and is successful in his actions.

Let us come back to BhG 3. Having described the presence of reality (brahman) in sacrifice (3.14–15), the Composer expresses the functioning of the manifest aspect in terms of a wheel that is set in motion:

### BhG 3.16

*evam pravartitaṃ cakraṃ nānuvartayatītha yaḥ |  
aghāyur indriyārāmo moghaṃ pārtha sa jīvati ||*

He who does not keep rolling the wheel that has been set in motion, indulging his senses in a lifespan of evil, lives for nothing, Pārtha.<sup>334</sup>

Conceptualisation of the cosmos in terms of a revolving wheel has been discussed (see chapter 2.1.1).<sup>335</sup> If the recipient activates BhG 4.32, he may blend the concept of the wheel with the concept of the open mouth (see above, see section 4.11.2) In the present context, the recipient may imagine the wheel as being pushed upwards by men who sacrifice and downwards by gods who receive oblations and send the desired goods to men.<sup>336</sup>

People who do not sacrifice are evaluated as morally negatively: their life is sinful (verse c) and meaningless (verse d). In earlier stanzas, they are called thieves (3.12) and sinners (3.13). Moral evaluation is necessary in order to discern right action from wrong (see chapter 2.6). In BhG 3.16, the moral results of rejection of participation in cosmic processes are seen in terms of the general domain of Cooking too: the sinners are presented as those who cook for themselves. This conceptualisation is attested in ŚB 11.1.8–15 where the asuras are presented as feeding themselves and the gods as feeding each other (Jurewicz 2016/18). The Composer of the BhG creates a blend consisting of the input space of a man who cooks for others, a man who cooks for himself, a man who sacrifices and a man who does not. In the blend, sacrifice is conceived in terms of feeding and is evaluated morally; the man who does

<sup>334</sup> Such a sacrifice is called sattvic in BhG 17.11: *aphalākāṅkṣibhir yajño vidhidrṣṭo ya ijjate | yaṣṭavyam eveti manaḥ samādhāya sa sātṭvikaḥ ||*

<sup>335</sup> However, after *Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta* it is difficult not to think about the Buddhist wheel of Dhamma. The use of adverb *evam* emphasises that this is the wheel that should be set in motion. In the target domain, there is a clear emphasis on performing the ritual.

<sup>336</sup> See Sachse (1988).



not sacrifice is a thief and his stolen food becomes sin. This way of thinking becomes even more coherent if the recipient conceptualises the experience of the results of previous actions in terms of eating fruit. Thus, the blend compresses the sinful behaviour of the present life with the sinful activity of one's previous lives when sacrificing was rejected i.e., the improper use of the category of karman. The generic space of this blend is subject-object activity. If the recipient activates the Vedic identification of evil with death (*mṛtyu-pāpman*) and hunger (*aśanāyā*, BU 1.2.1), he will understand that such people do not eat, they are always hungry and they do not build their self.

This conceptualisation is coherent with the blend of a wheel and mouth mentioned above. Within its frames, each action of men is conceived as cooking. Those who sacrifice cook food in order to feed the gods but principally cook food to feed the constantly open mouth in terms of which the manifest aspect of reality is conceived. They eat only the remnants of the food given to it. But when they become free, they will see that they have fed themselves and that their self is as great as the whole of reality. Because of that, it is stated that those who eat the remnants become free from sins (3.13) and unite with eternal brahman (4.31).

In the ŚB 2.2.4, the destructive fire, once released, burns forever and needs to be appeased. In the target domain the sacrificer saves himself from death each time he pours oblation into the sacrificial fire, the visible manifestation of the cosmic fire. In this way, the sacrificer builds his immortal self. This way of thinking is preserved in Smṛti philosophy: the food of those who sacrifice is called 'immortality of the sacrificial remnants' (*yajñāśiṣṭāmṛta*, BhG 4.31). The word *amṛta* activates the concept of soma, often qualified in this way in the RV. The state of exaltation is seen in terms of a flight to the sun to meet the gods and the fathers. In the Veda, the immortal self that is created during ritual should be so well toughened that it can survive the heat of the sun and properly answer the questions of the sun guardians (Jurewicz 2016/18). In Smṛti times, those who have not built their self will die and be born again until suffering forces them to begin liberating practice.

Man, who has realised his identity with the highest cognitive agent, has no obligations at all:

### BhG 3.17

*yas tv ātmaratir eva syād ātmatṛptaś ca mānavaḥ |  
ātmany eva ca saṃtuṣṭas tasya kāryaṃ na vidyate ||*

On the other hand, a man who delights in the self, is satiated with the self, is completely contented with the self alone, has nothing left to do.

It should be noted that the state of freedom does not mean a lack of emotion but, as implied in this description, the only emotions felt are positive.<sup>337</sup> When the division between loving subject and loved object is suspended, one knows that one is everything and thus possess everything. Any external motivation for action disappears. It could be speculated that the sequence of the compounds in verses a–b (*ātmarati, ātmatr̥pta*) and the description in verse c (*ātmany eva ca samtuṣṭas*) imply the sequence of the sexual act: man takes pleasure in a woman (having seen her beauty and charm), then he is sexually satisfied with her and feels happy. However, in a free act (see BhG 18.63, section 4.9.1), the free man accepts the necessity of actions he performs in the cosmos as a part of the social body of the highest cognitive agent (BhG 3.19). He should perform his ritual activity without attachment (*asakta*) and only that which is obligatory (*kārya*). Then he acts as the highest cognitive agent acts which uses the category of sacrifice to recognise its unity.

In his argument for this thesis, the Composer of the BhG also evokes ancient kings, like Janaka, who attained success thanks to actions (BhG 3.20). They are recalled to serve as exemplars (3.21), but also to ground contemporaneous liberating practice in tradition. The most important example is the activity of the highest cognitive agent who has nothing to do in the cosmos, and nothing to gain that is not already gained, and yet is engaged in action (BhG 3.22). If he doesn't act, the world would be destroyed (3.23–24). Existence of the world is not the aim of its action because it has no aim. The aim of this action is realised only in the performance of the action (see chapter 5.4.5). In that moment the result of the action appears which is *lokasamgraha*, literally 'holding together of the world'. At the cosmic level, the concept of action is again compressed and all elements of its scenario (the agent, his mental state, action, goal and result) become one. Since one of the meanings of the verb *samgrah-* is 'to hold in, restrain, check, govern', the recipient may activate the general domain of Riding In A Chariot and understand the existence of the cosmos in terms of the revolving wheel of a chariot restrained by the highest cognitive agent and by free men so that it is not driven too fast or too slow. In the same way the R̥gvedic poets conceived the role of the seers and those who are exalted with soma in RV 1.164 (Jurewicz 2018a). The goal of the drive is fulfilled in the driving.

The noun *samgraha* also means 'apprehension' on the basis of metaphor COGNITION IS GRASPING. If the recipient activates this meaning, he will understand that the world is held together thanks to the cognitive activity of

<sup>337</sup> The state of freedom is described in a similar way in CU 7.25.2, see chapter 5.3.7.c.

Krṣṇa. If it were not perceived by him, it would fall apart and beings would cease to exist. For the highest cognitive agent, the world is *loka*, the space of his experience realised in subject-object cognition. When it is liberated in a man it also creates his *loka*, its space of experience from a different perspective from that of the cosmic perspective.

If the recipient activates the conceptualisation of reality in terms of the open mouth of a man (see above, analysis of BhG 4.32) as the next input space of the blend and elaborates its scenario, he will conceive the circular movement in terms of the circular movement of a spoon within a pot which is the source domain for the cosmos. In the pot beings are cooked to be, ultimately, the food of the unmanifest aspect. Men have a choice: they can be just cooked or they can move the spoon. In the blend, this image is fused with the image of a revolving wheel.

It can be seen again how much of the meaning comes from concepts connected with experience. The abstract concept of reality which performs subject-object cognition in order to recognise itself is structured by a concept of an action with a clear scenario and topology the logic of which is projected in some respects (COSMOS IS A WHEEL/A POT, KRṢṆA IS A CHARIOTEER/A COOK WHO STIRS THE SPOON, FREE MEN ARE CHARIOTEERS/COOKS WHO STIR THE SPOON), but violated in others (in the target domain of the cosmos Krṣṇa and free men are one reality).

The definition of *yoga* as skill in actions, presented in BhG 2.50 (see section 4.11.2), imposes on the free man the need to act in the best possible way. In BhG 3.25, the decent but not free yet people who act according to their dharma are the example. A free man should act with the same intensity as they, though without attachment. If the recipient activates conceptualisation of the cosmos in terms of the revolving wheel presented in BhG 3.16 (see section 4.11.2) and activates the whole image of a chariot, as it is in the RV 1.164 (Jurewicz 2016/18, 2018a, see chapter 2.1.1), he will clearly see the difference between those who are free and those who act according to their dharma. Movement is the essence of the wheel and its aim is fulfilled in its movement as it is movement that enables the chariot to proceed. Decent people are those who push the wheel. It should be noted that they are much more empowered than those described in the RV where they are conceived in terms of sitting helplessly on the spokes. Within the frames of metaphor COSMOS IS A POT, they can be imagined as climbing up the handle of the spoon.

From the point of view of beings immersed in subject-object cognition, the concept of karman is decompressed into the elements of its scenario. They

desire to gain their everyday goals and those who are better educated desire the preservation of the cosmos. Because of that a free man should not confuse people who act with attachment, on the contrary, they should continue to act but enjoy their actions (BhG 3.26). Necessary actions purify men from the results of previous actions. Moreover, a man matures during successive lives and some concepts and practices which are too difficult for him in one life, become easy and obvious in the next.

This is explained in BhG 6.37–45. Arjuna asks what happens to a yogin who has failed in liberating cognition. The use of the expression *yogāc calita* to describe the situation of such a yogin again activates the metaphor YOGA IS RIDING IN A CHARIOT: here yoga is conceived in terms of a path, man is conceived in terms of a charioteer who has lost the path. As Kṛṣṇa explains, nothing lost in this effort (see also BhG 2.40, see section 4.11.2). In the next life the man will be born into a good family (BhG 6.40–42) who will help him in his efforts (provides him with good education, finds a wife from a good home etc.). And when he gets into contact with his reason from his previous life, he will again want to cognise himself and then his previous practice comes to him without effort (6.43–44). Like any other skill, the skill of liberating practice is not forgotten. Since nothing is lost in this effort, proper activity performed during subsequent incarnations purifies him from the results of actions performed earlier. One can therefore presume that such a man is endowed with an organism that is able to finalise the liberating process.

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Expanded subjectivisation takes place when the highest cognitive agent, present in man as his self, performs subject-object cognition with the use of the cognitive faculties of man and his body. The cosmic and the particular perspective disappears in this state. A free man allows the highest cognitive agent that is manifest in him to create a new world, a new space of experience (*loka*) from the perspective of an individual human subject. Man, identified with the highest cognitive agent (thanks to the conceptual and experiential blend), also creates a new world for himself which is now viewed from a cosmic perspective.

According to the BhG, the category used by a free man is a specific category of action. This specific category is sacrifice redefined in Smṛti philosophy as any action which is necessary, which means that it is performed according to one's dharma defined by one's place in the social state and one's stage of

life. It should not be motivated by any external goal. Such a performance is possible when man understands and experiences his self. Then he is able to use this category of action properly. Moreover, the performance of sacrifice (necessary actions) with attachment is also valuable because it sustains cosmic processes. Since man is identified with the highest cognitive agent conceived in man, the cosmos becomes a man's self (*ātman*) which should be sustained.

In order to explain the role of sacrifice the Composer of the BhG activates not only the Vedic concept of sacrifice, but also the general domain of Cooking and the Vedic conceptualisations of the cosmos in terms of a revolving wheel and an open mouth. All the living beings are in it but man has three choices. He can just submit to the circular movement of the cosmos. He can take part in it which is conceived in terms of pushing the wheel or moving a spoon. Finally, he can realise its identity with reality which is conceived in terms of being someone who rides in a chariot and eats the food. These metaphors allow us to see the cognitive role of sacrifice as a category of cognition. As a rider in a chariot uses reins and as a cook uses a spoon and thereby realise their aims of riding and cooking, in the same way a man performs sacrifice and thus realise his aim which is recognition and creation of his self (*ātman*). Within the dynamic cosmos, it is the process which counts not the goal or the final result.

We have looked at the semantic changes of the noun *karman*. In the Vedic thought, it meant ritual activity performed with full awareness of its meaning. The Buddha had rejected external ritual activity and redefined action (*karman*, *kamma*) as a mental process (*cetana*). He has also added the moral dimension to mental processes and the actions motivated by them. The Smṛti Composers (especially in the BhG and MS) further redefined this concept. They highlighted the role of the proper mental state to such an extent that bodily activity, even the cruelest, provided it was performed according to one's dharma was irrelevant from a moral point of view. In everyday cognition, the scenario of action (*karman*) is decompressed into the agent, the action and the goal which are treated as ontologically separate entities. This decompression is expressed in sacrifice which assumes a division between the subject and the object, conceived in terms of fire and oblation. However, the final aim of sacrifice is their unification and this is realised in liberating cognition when all elements of scenario of action (*karman*) become one. Then only action remains and the agent uses it in order to recognise itself. Self (*ātman*), created in expanded subjectivisation, is reality in both its cosmic and human aspects.

#### 4.12. Arjuna at the borderline. The final explanation of the role of man in BhG 11

The final explanation of the role of man is presented in BhG 11. In this chapter, Kṛṣṇa presents himself in his kingly form (*rūpam aiśvaram*, 11.3) i.e., the form of the highest cognitive agent conceived in terms of a king. The aim of this section is to show how the Composer of the BhG revives the Vedic tradition within the new frames. Activation of tradition is based on enriching the blend created in discourse with new input spaces which allow the recipient to understand the content of the blend in a novel way.

In the BhG 11.8, the metaphor COGNITION IS SEEING is activated: Arjuna gets a divine eye from Kṛṣṇa. In the later chapters of MDhP, the ability to perceive the highest cognitive agent in its cosmic form comes from yogic experience. The previous chapter of the BhG (BhG 10) is called yoga of *vibhūti*, supernatural power. In this chapter, Arjuna is presented as cognising Kṛṣṇa separately in many aspects of the world: Kṛṣṇa is the best part of each of them. Putting this in cognitive terms, Kṛṣṇa is the prototypical example of each category that Arjuna visualises. Since the elements of the cosmos are understood as manifestation of Kṛṣṇa's yogic power, the recipient understands that he is conceived in terms of a yogin.<sup>338</sup>

Now Arjuna wants to unite the separate prototypes and see them simultaneously, beyond time and space. At the same time, Arjuna becomes aware of the unmanifest aspect of reality. The conceptual network the Composer creates consists of eight input spaces. The content of the first two are the concepts of Arjuna who is afraid to fight and Kṛṣṇa, as Arjuna's charioteer, who teaches him to fight. The content of the third is the concept of a battle which is about to begin. The content of the fourth is the concept of society. The content of the fifth is the concept of the cosmos. The content of the sixth is the concept of the highest cognitive agent in its cosmic cognitive activity. The seventh is the concept of reality in its totality and the eighth input space is the content of tradition. The generic space is a human being (in these terms society, the cosmos, reality and the Veda are conceived). Generally speaking, in the blend, Kṛṣṇa is the highest cognitive agent who acts in the cosmos and in society as a manifestation of reality which is now accessible to Arjuna. In this section we look at the role of blending as enabling the redefinition of tradition. A further analysis of the blend created in this chapter will be discussed in chapter 5.1.

<sup>338</sup> This conceptualisation is explicitly activated in BhG 10.17. It is also activated in MDhP 202.29–30.

At first Arjuna visualises Kṛṣṇa as a king: as a shining figure with a crown, a club and a disc, multi-armed, with many lips, eyes, hands and bellies, with garlands and robes, anointed with heavenly balms, carrying various ornaments and weapons. The whole manifest aspect is within Kṛṣṇa together with Brahma on his lotus seat, the gods and the seers. Arjuna sees the glorious aspect of the highest cognitive agent. The way Kṛṣṇa is described evokes the next input space which is the concept of a king who it is difficult to watch<sup>339</sup> and who is prototypically conceived as a good and just ruler and protector of his people (10–17).<sup>340</sup> The content of Arjuna’s vision goes beyond subject-object categories: Arjuna cannot see Kṛṣṇa’s beginning, middle or end (16: *nāntaṃ na madhyaṃ na punas tavādiṃ*) and sees him everywhere. Because of this Kṛṣṇa is difficult to see (11.17: *durnirīkṣyaṃ samantād*). He is also difficult to see because his powerful light, which is described earlier as being like the light of a thousand suns (12), is blinding Arjuna.

Then he describes Kṛṣṇa in the following way:

### BhG 11.18

*tvam akṣaram paramaṃ veditavyaṃ; tvam asya viśvasya paraṃ nidhānam |  
tvam avyayaḥ śāśvatadharmagoptā; sanātanas tvam puruṣo mato me ||*

You are Akṣara, highest of truths to be known, the highest foundation of all this world, Undying protector of dharma<sup>341</sup> sempiternal. The Person Eternal I hold you to be.

The word *akṣara*, means ‘imperishable’ and the syllable OM and the recipient might understand that the vision has a phonic aspect: Arjuna hears the syllable OM spoken at the beginning of creation even before observing the perceptible form of the highest cognitive agent, when the manifest aspect has the form of the sound. We could say then that he is at the very borderline between the two aspects of reality.

The word *nidhāna* (verse b) means ‘a place for depositing anything, receptacle’ so the recipient might evoke the concept of a treasury (see section 4.10.2.a). As shown previously, within the frames of the specific realisation of the general domain of Riding In A Chariot, the unmanifest aspect is conceived in terms of a treasure and the moment immediately before its final recognition is conceived in terms of touching the treasury and seeing the hidden treasure.<sup>342</sup>

<sup>339</sup> See MS 7.6: | *na cainaṃ bhuvī śaknoti kaś cid apy abhivīkṣitum* || (6)

<sup>340</sup> For relationship between Kṛṣṇa and the concept of kingship in the BhG, see Malinar (2007).

<sup>341</sup> Buitenen (1981: 113): ‘Law.’

<sup>342</sup> This moment is described in MaU 6.28.

Activation of this conceptualisation confirms that in his vision Arjuna reaches the penultimate stage of cognition which is at the very beginnings of creation.

In verse c, Kṛṣṇa is qualified as the ‘undying protector of dharma sempiternal’ (*tvam avyayaḥ śāśvatadharmagoptā*). The word *goptṛ*, that literally means ‘a cowherd’ (MS 11.79), is rarely used in these Smṛti texts.<sup>343</sup> In MS 7.14, it refers to the personification of punishment (*daṇḍa*) that is presented in the same way, as the cowherd of dharma,<sup>344</sup> so the recipient may activate this meaning and identify Kṛṣṇa with it. However, this word is often used in the ṚV, in reference to Agni and other gods and the recipient may understand *śāśvata-* in the first part of the compound *śāśvatadharmā* as referring not only to the ontological status of dharma (it is eternal), but everlasting in that it is transmitted since the beginning of time.

In the same way verse d activates tradition (*sanātanas tvam puruṣo mato me*): Arjuna thinks that Kṛṣṇa is the ancient man (*puruṣa*) that has been described in ṚV 10.90. This is confirmed by Kṛṣṇa being presented as possessing many mouths and eyes, arms, and bellies which corresponds to the image of the highest cognitive agent conceived in terms of man (*puruṣa*) with a thousand heads, eyes and feet.<sup>345</sup>

The shining form of Kṛṣṇa not only activates conceptualisation of king in terms of fire (MS 7.6–9),<sup>346</sup> but also the Ṛgvedic conceptualisation of fire in similar terms (Jurewicz 2010). The concept of fire is evoked in the next stanza where Kṛṣṇa is presented with blazing fire in his mouth shining and burning everything with his own glow.<sup>347</sup> The recipient may evoke the Ṛgvedic concept of the sun seen as cosmic fire filled with soma. His interpretation is confirmed in the next stanza where linguistically the archaic dual form

<sup>343</sup> MDhP uses it twice, in the late books (not analysed here), once in reference to the king (309.27) and once in reference to Nārāyaṇa, qualified similarly to Kṛṣṇa in BhG 11.18c, as *sātvatadharmagoptā* (322.6c). MDhP 309.27: *rājā dharmaparaḥ sadā śubhagoptā; samīkṣya sukṛtīnāṃ dadhāti lokān | bahuvīdham api carataḥ pradīṣati; sukham anupagataṃ niravadyam ||* MDhP 322.5: *tat pārameṣṭhyasya vaco nīsamya; nārāyaṇaḥ sātvatadharmagoptā | gacchati taṃ nāradaṃ uktavān sa; saṃpūjayitvātmavidhīkriyābhīḥ ||*

<sup>344</sup> MS 7.14: *tasyārthe sarvabhūtānāṃ goptāraṃ dharmam ātmajam | brahmatejomayaṃ daṇḍam asṛjat pūrvam īśvaraḥ ||*

<sup>345</sup> ṚV 10.90.1ab: *sahāsraśīrṣā pūruṣaḥ sahasrākṣāḥ sahasrapāt.*

<sup>346</sup> MS 7: *tapaty ādityavac caīṣa cakṣūṃṣi ca manāṃsi ca | na cainaṃ bhuvī śaknoti kaś cid apy abhivikṣitum ||* (6) so ‘gnir bhavati vāyuś ca so ‘rkaḥ somaḥ sa dharmarāt sa kuberaḥ sa varuṇaḥ sa mahendraḥ prabhāvataḥ || (7) bālo ‘pi nāvamāntavyo manuṣya iti bhūmipah | mahatī devatā hy eṣā nararūpeṇa tiṣṭhati || (8) ekam eva dahaty agnir naraṃ durupasarpiṇam | kulam dahati rājāgniḥ sapaśūdravyasamcayam || (9)

<sup>347</sup> BhG 11.9 cd: *paśyāmi tvāṃ dīptahūtāśavaktraṃ; svatejasā viśvam idaṃ tapantam.*



(*dyāvāprthivyor idam antaram hi*, BhG 11.20) is used to describe the sun in the sky that pervades the space between the sky and the earth. We can find almost the same expression in RV 1.35.9.<sup>348</sup> It is worth noting that the Composers of the RV highlight its beneficial nature as it is thanks to the Sun that the darkness of night is destroyed and men are able to cognise and act.<sup>349</sup> In the blend, Arjuna understands that the content of present vision is the same as the content of the vision of the R̥gvedic poets who are exalted with soma. Thus, Arjuna is at the borderline sphere not only between two aspects but also at the borderline between the past, as expressed by tradition, and the present.

Arjuna further runs his blend and sees the gods who extoll Kṛṣṇa and enter his cosmic body (11.21–22). As shown previously, the image schemas of SOURCE-PATH-GOAL and of CONTAINER are used to conceive cognition during which the unity of the traveller and place or of content and container is confirmed. The state of the gods is expressed by the word *vismita*, ‘amazed’, the same word is used to express the state of Arjuna in BhG 11.14. Arjuna sees the R̥gvedic gods: the Rudras, the Ādityas, the Vasus, the Aśvins, the Maruts, fathers and those men who succeeded in the first act of creation (see RV 10.90.7, 16, MS 1.22, chapter 1.1.7, here evoked by the word *siddha*), together with the gandharvas, the yakṣas and the asuras. In this context, the nouns *gandharva* and *yakṣa* highlight the meaning of mysterious beings as in the RV, AVŚ and the Brāhmaṇas (Kuiper 1992, 1996, 1997) and AVŚ (10.2.33, 10.7.38, 10.8.15, 43) rather than celestial musicians and demi-gods. It is also possible that the names of the gods evoke their worlds (*loka*) visualised by Arjuna.<sup>350</sup>

The blend is run in the following direction:

<sup>348</sup> In all cases it is in reference to the sun or fire in its solar form: RV 1.35.9ab: *hīraṇyapāṇih savitā vicarṣaṇir ubhé dyāvāprthivī antār t̥yate*; RV 1.115.1cd: *āprā dyāvāprthivī antāriṣaṃ sūrya ātmā jāgatas tasthūsa ca* ||; RV 4.14.2: *ūrdhvam ketum savitā devó aśrej jyótir vísvasmai bhūvanāya kṛṇvān | āprā dyāvāprthivī antāriṣaṃ ví sūriyo rāsmibhīś cēkitānaḥ* || RV 3.6.4ab: *mahān sadhāsthe dhruvā ā niṣatto antār dyāvā māhine háryamānaḥ* (Agni).

<sup>349</sup> RV 1.35.9cd: *āpāmivām bād hate véti sūriyam abhi kṛṣṇēna rājasā dyām ṛnoti*.

<sup>350</sup> See BU 4.3.3. KaU 6.3.5 suggests identification of four states of the self (*ātman*) with consecutive worlds: *yathādarśe tathātmani yathā svapne tathā pitṛloke | yathāpsu parīva dadṛśe tathā gandharvaloke chāyātapayor iva brahmaloke* || The form of the self in the mirror is the waking state. The form of the self in dream is the dreaming state understood the world (*loka*) the fathers. The form of the self in water, when the reflexion is multiplied and moving irregularly, is the state of deep sleep understood as the world (*loka*) of the Gandharvas. The paradoxical form composed of shadow/coolness and light/heat is the world (*loka*) of brahman. However, this issue needs more study.

**BhG 11.23**

*rūpaṃ mahat te bahuvaktranetraṃ; mahābāho bahubāhūrupādam |  
bahūdaraṃ bahudamṣṭrākarālaṃ; dṛṣṭvā lokāḥ pravayathitās tathāham ||*

At the sight of your mass with its eyes and mouths, multitudinous arms, thighs, bellies, and feet,  
Strong-armed One, and maws that are spiky with tusks the worlds are in panic and so am I!

The form of the highest cognitive agent is called great (*mahat*) that agrees with conceptualisation of the first form of reality in these terms. This qualification again confirms that Arjuna is at the borderline between aspects. Then, Arjuna sees the human form with a head (evoked metonymically by mouth and eyes), with arms, thighs and feet (verses a–b). Let us note that he sees the lower part of Kṛṣṇa’s body for the first time as up to then he had concentrated on Kṛṣṇa’s upper body.<sup>351</sup> Thus he evokes the next layer of tradition. In the descriptions of the cosmos conceived in terms of the human body presented in the ŚB, the higher part of the body is immortal, the lower is mortal (Jurewicz 2016/19). Arjuna, having focused on the lower parts of Kṛṣṇa’s body, then begins to tremble because he realises that Kṛṣṇa has a killing aspect too. Thus, he activates the concept of death as it is understood in the ŚB, as the power to kill is conceptualised as located in the sun and the ability to die is conceptualised as located on the earth (Jurewicz 2016/2018). He understands the killing power in terms of eating: this is why Kṛṣṇa possesses many bellies and many terrible tusks (verse c).

At the same time, Arjuna enriches his blend with a contemporaneous theory of society. Kṛṣṇa is conceived in terms of a human body and as identical with the highest cognitive agent. Within the frames of this conceptualisation, Brahmins are the mouth, Kṣatriyas are the arms, Vaiśyas are the thighs and Śūdras are his feet. Arjuna then begins to see the role of human beings as manifestations of reality and the necessity for their death. Within the frames of the earlier conceptualisation presented in the ŚB, the lower parts of the cosmic body are a manifestation of the ability to die which is reality manifest in creation. Within the frames of the Smṛti conceptualisation of society, the lowest social class (the Śūdras) are thus represented, so they are destined for death (see chapter 2.3.1). Within the frames of conceptualisation presented in the MBh, those who are destined to death are the Kauravas.

<sup>351</sup> BhG 11.6ab: *anekabāhūdaravaktranetraṃ; paśyāmi tvā sarvato ‘nantarūpaṃ ||*

The next stanzas have a nightmarish quality. Kṛṣṇa is presented as reaching the sky and shining with various colours, having an open mouth and wide shining eyes (24).<sup>352</sup> Now this vision brings fear, because the input space of tradition (the ŚB) is active in the blend. Arjuna's self trembles (*pravyathitāntarātman*) and he finds neither resolve (*dhṛti*) nor peace (*śama*). As we remember, these are the mental states that Kṛṣṇa wants him to find. Since the terrible form is everywhere the recipient may imagine that, wherever Arjuna looks, he sees this form so he loses a sense of direction (25c: *diśo na jāne*) and does not see a shelter (BhG 25c: *na labhe ca śarma*). The tusks and the mouths are presented as burning with the fire of time (*kālānalasaṃnibhāni*, 25).<sup>353</sup> The death of living beings under the influence of time is conceived in terms of their burning. In this moment, Arjuna is in the same situation as Prajāpati in the beginning of creation presented in ŚB 2.2.4: in danger of total annihilation. The recipient may again activate a deeper layer of tradition and understand the claustrophobic situation of Arjuna as evoking the Ṛgvedic concept of *āmhas*, literally 'narrowness' a state when cognition and life are impossible (Jurewicz 2010). The concept of a shelter (*śarman*) is conceived in the RV as a wide space where movement and life are possible.<sup>354</sup>

The Composers of the ŚB elaborate the general domain of Cooking (searching for food, killing a victim, cutting it, cooking, eating and digesting) in order to conceive creation and the functioning of the cosmos (Jurewicz 2016/18). The concept of hunger expresses the most dramatic and most mysterious moment of creation, in which the highest cognitive agent experiences fear that he has failed in his creation and that he will be annihilated because

<sup>352</sup> BhG 11.24: *nabhaḥspr̥śam dīptam anekavarṇam; vyātītanam dīptaviśālanetram | dr̥ṣṭvā hi tvām pravyathitāntarātma; dhṛtim na vindāmi śamam ca viṣno ||*

<sup>353</sup> BhG 11.25: *daṃṣṭrākarālāni ca te mukhāni; dr̥ṣṭvaiva kālānalasaṃnibhāni | diśo na jāne na labhe ca śarma; prasīda deveśa jagannivāsa ||*

<sup>354</sup> I quote almost all instances in order to show the positive meaning of the ICM of *śarman* in the RV. 1.93.8: *tāsya vratam rakṣatam pātām āmhasoviśe jānāya māhi śarma yachatam; 3.13.4ab: sā naḥ śarmāni vītaye agnir yachatu śamtamā; 4.25.4ab: tasmā agnir bhārataḥ śarma yaṃsaj jiyōk paśyāt sūriyam uccārantam; 5.55.9ab: mīlāta no maruto mā vadhiṣṭana asmābhyam śarma bahulām vi yantana; 6.16.33ab: bhārādvājāya saprāthaḥ śarma yacha sahanāya; 6.51.5cd: viśva ādityā adite sajōśā asmābhyam śarma bahulām vi yanta; 7.82.1ab: indrāvaruṇā yuvām adhvarāya no viśe jānāya māhi śarma yachatam; 7.83.10ab: asmē indro vāruṇo mitrō aryamā dyumnām yachantu māhi śarma saprāthaḥ; 8.18.3: tāt sū naḥ savitā bhāgo vāruṇo mitrō aryamā | śarma yachantu saprātho yād īmahe; 8.18.12ab: tāt sū naḥ śarma yachata ādityā yān mūmocati; 8.30.4cd: asmābhyam śarma saprātho gāve āśvāya yachata; 8.47.9ab: āditir na uruṣyatu āditiḥ śarma yachatu; 10.63.12cd: āre devā dvēšo asmād yuyotana urū naḥ śarma yachataḥ suastāye; 10.126.7cd: śarma yachantu saprātha ādityāšo yād īmahe āti dvīṣaḥ; 10.152.5cd: vi manyōḥ śarma yacha vārīyo yavayā vadhām.*

of that.<sup>355</sup> The solution to this situation is conceived in terms of eating<sup>356</sup> and the primeval act of eating becomes the pattern for the functioning of the cosmos and for men's ritual activity. In the target domain, the highest cognitive agent endows himself with a body enabling him to manifest as the cosmos. Yet at the same time the beings eaten by it are not annihilated but, on the contrary, they constitute its cosmic body and live within it.<sup>357</sup> The immortality of the highest cognitive agent manifests its ability to die and resurrect constantly.

The general domain of Cooking is elaborated in the following stanzas (26–29): Arjuna sees that all the warriors in the battle are being eaten by Kṛṣṇa. However, the Composer activates other source domains to highlight different aspects of the process: the warriors are conceived in terms of fast flowing rivers that flow into the ocean and in terms of moths that fly into flame. Thus, the necessity of their death is highlighted. Rivers and moths aim at their destination because of the necessity of categories of the highest cognitive agent that cognises himself in his cosmic manifestation; from the point of view of the manifest aspect this necessity is seen as part of their nature. Men are subjected to the cosmic cognitive with the same necessity. The conceptualisation of warriors in terms of rivers activates conceptualisation of the cosmos in terms of flowing together, helplessly and necessarily (which is expressed in the noun *saṃsāra*). The logic of these source domains implies that the mouth of Kṛṣṇa is conceived in terms of the ocean and of a flame. Such a contradictory source domain is used in the ṚV to express the contradictory nature of fire that has its fluid (somic) aspect (Jurewicz 2010). The image of a meat-eater crushing heads with its tusks while the bodies are stuck between them must have been especially terrifying and disgusting for Brahmins and those who were vegetarians in Smṛti times.<sup>358</sup> In BhG 11.30, Kṛṣṇa is presented as licking whole worlds with his flaming mouths, as filling the world with his glow and burning it with his flames:

### BhG 11.30

*lelihyase grasamānaḥ samantāl; lokān samagrān vadanair jvaladbhiḥ |  
tejobhir āpūrya jagat samagraṃ; bhāsas tavogrāḥ pratapanti viṣṇo ||*

<sup>355</sup> ŚB 10.4.2.2: *só 'yám saṃvatsarāḥ prajāpatiḥ | sárvaṇi bhūtāni sasṛje yác ca práṇi yác cāprāṇám ubháyaṇ devamanuṣyānt sá sárvaṇi bhūtāni sṛṣṭvā riricāná iva mene sá mṛtyór bibhayám cakāra |*

<sup>356</sup> ŚB 10.4.2.3: *sá hekṣám cakre | kathám nv áhám imāni sárvaṇi bhūtāni púnar ātmánn āvapeya púnar ātmán dadhīya kathám nv áhám evaiṣám sárveṣám bhūtānām púnar ātmā syām iti | (3)*

<sup>357</sup> This idea is continued in the model of Five Fires (Jurewicz 2016/18).

<sup>358</sup> For the origins of ahimsā and vegetarianism, see Tull (1996), Schmidt (1968, 1997), Smith (1990).

You lick whole worlds eating them with your burning mouths. Your terrible flames burn, having filled the whole world with your glow, Visnu!<sup>359</sup>

Let us refer to a R̥gvedic stanza where fire is presented in a similar way:

#### **R̥V 10.45.4**

*ákrandad agni stanáyann iva dyauḥ kṣāmā rérihad vīrúdhah samāñján |  
sadyó jajñānó ví hīm iddhó ákhyad á ródasī bhānúnā bhāti antáh ||*

Agni roared like the thundering sky, licking the earth, anointing plants. As soon as he was born, kindled, he looked at them. He shines with light between the two halves of the world.<sup>360</sup>

The metaphor BURNING IS LICKING is the same in both stanzas though elaborated in an opposite way. In the R̥V, the moisturising aspect of licking is highlighted (in these terms the appearance of rain is conceived, Jurewicz 2010). In most cases, when the concept of licking appears in the descriptions of the source domain, which is a cow licking its calf, it is used to conceive beneficial transformations (like preparation of soma and cognition, Jurewicz 2010).<sup>361</sup> The Composer of the BhG activates the destroying aspect of the flame of fire conceiving it as licking.<sup>362</sup> Both descriptions activate, in the source domain, the fact that fire fills the world, in the R̥V it is a life-giving process, in the BhG it kills. The killing aspect of fire is the heritage of the ŚB which is now elaborated in the blend created by Arjuna. The desperate request of Arjuna for the fire to have mercy on him (25)<sup>363</sup> evokes the R̥gvedic request to fire also expressed at the end of the vision in R̥V 6.9 (Jurewicz 2010):

#### **R̥V 6.9.7**

*vísve devā anamasyan bhīyānās tuvām agne tāmasi tashivāmsam |  
vaiśvānaré avatu ūtāye no ámartīyo avatu ūtāye nah ||*

All the gods, in fear, offered homage to you, Agni, while you were (still) standing in the darkness. Let Vaiśvānara give help to aid us; let the immortal one give help to aid us.<sup>364</sup>

<sup>359</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

<sup>360</sup> Jurewicz's translation. For metaphor BURNING IS LICKING, see also R̥V 1.140.9, 10.4.4, 10.162.4. Here, however, the destructive aspect of burning is not highlighted.

<sup>361</sup> One of the specific realisations of the general domain of Cleansing By Heat.

<sup>362</sup> According to DSC the verb *lih-* is used in the MBh only three times (1.30.20, 3.175.14, 8.30.38).

<sup>363</sup> BhG 11.25d: *prasīda deveśa jagannivāsa*.

<sup>364</sup> Jamison, Brereton's (2014) translation.

Unlike the R̥gvedic poets, Arjuna is completely lost as far as the nature of reality is concerned and asks Kṛṣṇa to reveal to him who he is:

### BhG 11.31

*ākhyāhi me ko bhavān ugrarūpo; namo 'stu te devavara prasīda |  
vijñātum icchāmi bhavantam ādyaṃ na hi prajānāmi tava pravṛttim ||*

Reveal to me, who are you so dread? Obeisance to you, have mercy, good God!  
I seek to encompass you who are primeval, for I comprehend not the course  
you are taking.

It is worth noting that in the first stanza of this chapter Arjuna states that his previous understanding has gone (*moho 'yaṃ vigato mama*). Now, he has no categories to understand and describe what he sees. It is as if he is returning to his state described in the beginning of the BhG. Everything he has learned turns out to be useless.

The qualification of Kṛṣṇa as *ādya* (verse c) has two meanings. On the philosophical level, it expresses the eternity of reality and the beginning of everything that exists. However, this adjective evokes tradition as does the description of the reality presented there. Arjuna knows the categories for the description of reality in the Śruti. In the first part of the vision, he had begun to understand the core of reality in terms of fire that is identical with the sun but now cannot understand its killing aspect, especially its moral meaning.

Kṛṣṇa answers in the following way:

### BhG 11.32

*kālo 'smi lokakṣayakṛt pravṛddho; lokān samāhartum iha pravṛttaḥ |  
ṛte 'pi tvā na bhaviṣyanti sarve; ye 'vasthitāḥ pratyānīkeṣu yodhāḥ ||*

I am Time grown old to destroy the world, embarked on the course of world  
annihilation:

Even without you all of these will die<sup>365</sup> these warriors arrayed in opposite armies.

Identification of Kṛṣṇa with time activates the Vedic conceptualisation of time in terms of a cook which is preserved in early Smṛti philosophy (see chapter 2.1.1, section 4.5, 4.11.3). The visible manifestation of time is the daily and yearly movement of the sun in the sky. In the ŚB, as stated above, the sun is the manifestation of the destructive power of reality, of its ability to kill, while the beings living on earth are a manifestation of its ability to die. Day by day living beings are getting older conceived in terms of their being

<sup>365</sup> Buitenen's (1981: 117): 'Except for yourself none of these will survive' is less probable.

cooked. Their final destruction is conceived in terms of being eaten. Kṛṣṇa emphasises that the warriors will die anyway and that they have already been killed by him (11.33, 34).<sup>366</sup> Their first death took place during the creation of the cosmos. The same idea is expressed in the following fragment of the ŚB 10.4.2.19 using the general domain of Cooking (Jurewicz 2016/18):

### ŚB 10.4.2.19

*eṣā vā idāṃ sārvaṃ pacati | ahorātraīr ardhmāsair māsair ṛtūbhiḥ saṃvatsarēṇa  
tād amūnā pakvām ayāṃ pacati pakvāsya paktēti ha smāha bhāradvājo 'gnim  
amūnā hī pakvām ayāṃ pācatīti |*

That one, who cooks all this with the use of days and nights, half-months, months, season, year – he cooks what has been cooked by that one. ‘A cook of what has already been cooked’ – thus Bhāradvāja calls Agni, the fire – for he cooks what has been cooked by that one.<sup>367</sup>

The blend created by the Composer of this passage of the ŚB consists of the following input spaces. Its first input space is the general domain of Cooking. The second input space is the concept of the movement of the sun in the sky. The third is the concept of time divisions (days, nights, half-moons, moons, the seasons and the year). The generic space is the concept of transformation under the influence of heat. In the blend, the divisions of time are conceived in terms of fuel<sup>368</sup> and/or teeth because it is said that the sun cooks everything with their aid. If the divisions of time are fuel, the influence of time is conceived in terms of cooking. If divisions of time are teeth, the passage of time is conceived in terms of eating and digesting. The sacrificial fire transforms what has been already transformed by time. Because of that it is called ‘a cook of what has been cooked (*pakvāsya paktī*)’.

In the blend of the BhG, Kṛṣṇa is the sun which kills living beings while it moves around the sky. His activity is called *pravṛtti* (11.31d) and Kṛṣṇa acting in cosmos is called *pravṛtta* (11.32b). The verb *pra vṛt-* is used to denote the rotating movement of a wheel in terms of which the world’s functioning is conceived in BhG 3.16 (see section 4.11.2) and activation of this meaning strengthens the identification of Kṛṣṇa with the sun.

In verse a, Kṛṣṇa is qualified as *pravṛddha*. This participle means ‘grown up, fully developed, increased, augmented’ and is also used to denote someone who is ‘advanced in age, grown old’. The expression *kālo... pravṛddho* activates a blend in which the highest cognitive agent (Kṛṣṇa) is identified with his

<sup>366</sup> BhG 11.33c: *mayaivaite nihataḥ pūrvam eva*, BhG 11.34c: *mayā hatāms tvaṃ jahi*.

<sup>367</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

<sup>368</sup> RV 10.90.3cd: *vasantō asyāsīd ājyaṃ grīsmā idhmāḥ śarād dhaviḥ*.

category (time). As the MS shows, time is first within the manifest aspect of reality conceived in terms of the Golden Egg: its appearance is conceived in terms of the growth of a nestling within the egg. Time is a measure of the cognitive movement (*pravṛtti*) of the highest cognitive agent and this movement is conceived in terms of the moving of a wheel in terms of which the movement of the sun in the sky is conceived. Activation of Vedic thought gives coherence to the description in the BhG.

Moreover, the use of the participle *pravṛddha* in reference to Kṛṣṇa in BhG 11.32a has other implications. He is also subjected to categories, time included. As the highest cognitive agent, Kṛṣṇa is a manifestation of reality which now decides that it should change the form of its self-cognition. Within the frames of the general domain of Cooking, the time needed to prepare food has passed and now is the moment when it should be eaten. As stated above, Arjuna's vision presents the initial state of creation when the cosmos appears in the form of sound and all its forms are visually contained in it. It is the state when time is suspended. In other words, Arjuna realises that Kṛṣṇa, identified with time, is dependent on something else and that is reality as a whole. Let us refer to MDhP 191.9, 231.25 where dependence of time upon the unmanifest reality is conceived in terms of being cooked (see section 4.5, chapter 2.1.1). Using the terms of the general domain of Cooking, time is also cooked by reality, it finally matures (*pravṛddha*) and is ready to be eaten. This is a new concept based on new achievements in liberating cognition which allows men to reach beyond the borderline sphere between the two aspects of reality.

The next novelty introduced by the Composers of the BhG is that the blend is enlarged by the situation of a particular man (Arjuna) who sees the nature of the cosmos and has to take part in it. The alternatives facing Arjuna in terms of the general domain of Cooking are that he will be the eater or the food. Putting this alternative in terms of self-cognition, he will be either the subject or the object. Notwithstanding what man decides, the cosmos will exist thanks to the constant cosmic activity of the highest cognitive agent who uses the category of time in its cognition. The role of Arjuna is the same as the role of sacrificial fire in ŚB 10.4.2.19 quoted above: he should be the cook of what has been cooked. He should kill those who are conceived as oblation and transform them so that they become part of the cosmic and social body of the highest cognitive agent which is in Arjuna. The statement that the warriors are already killed by Kṛṣṇa (*mayai vaite nihatāḥ pūrvam eva*, 11.33c) is strengthened by the concept of transmigration that assumes that beings repeat their births and deaths endlessly.



As stated above, on the human level – both social and individual – the category which should be used is action is specified as sacrifice. The manifestation of devouring power is sacrificial fire and manifestation of food's ability to be killed is oblation. This is the main topic of the ŚB: how to take part in cosmic transformation and the meaning of killing others and not being killed. Man can realise this aim thanks to ritual. In this respect, the Composer of the BhG says the same. Each action that is prescribed by the social state of man and his stage of life, performed without attachment for the coherence of the world (*lokasaṃgrāha*), is sacrifice (see above, section 4.11.3). Arjuna is supposed to fight and in this way, he will confirm the functioning of the cosmos seen as the manifestation of what is unmanifest. His thoughts and actions will be ontologically true and he will be a sign (*nimitta*, BhG 11.33) of the unmanifest reality present in him as the highest cognitive agent which is, his self (*ātman*). As stated earlier, it is suggested that the conceptualisation of the human organism in terms of sign (*liṅga*)<sup>369</sup> is based on the same conviction that man is the sign of subject-object cognition performed by the highest cognitive agent in micro-scale. Arjuna should allow the highest cognitive agent to act through him. Then his reason (*buddhi*) will find firmness (*dhṛti*) and calm (*śama*) and Arjuna will be able to focus the will of his mind on the self, restrain his senses and act without attachment.

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Activation of tradition allows Arjuna to become aware of its continuity and that the contemporaneous form of religion is, in fact, the faith of his fathers. He realises that contemporary moral dilemmas can be described in the language of the Veda. Then the existential puzzle he faces, which is the meaning of killing, is solved. In the blend, Arjuna belongs to the eating forms, his opponents to the eatable forms. Reality will constantly manifest in the world regardless of Arjuna's personal participation in it. That is why Arjuna's opponents will die anyway. Man's freedom is not about choosing the type of manifestation but about whether a man willingly agrees to participate in it. And it is in this decision to participate in the world – in the affirmation of such a world – that freedom is realised, no matter to which part of the highest cognitive a man belongs, the surviving form or the dying form. Each are the expression of freedom and the omnipotence of reality. And it is tradition that sanctifies the here and the now and makes it meaningful.

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<sup>369</sup> As in MDhP 195.14–15, see chapter 3, footnote 71.

Kṛṣṇa therefore appears to Arjuna as primeval reality as described in the Śruti. Arjuna himself, by participating in the fight, will participate in the metaphysical transformation of Agni, the fire – just like the first seers who created the world (Jurewicz 2010). This is, we can think, the highest possible sanctification of Arjuna's situation in both the social and metaphysical dimensions. A specific, concrete, historical situation becomes a situation from the beginning of the world and culture: Arjuna is reality which not only obeys its rules of manifestations, but also constitutes them.

In his vision, Arjuna goes through all the textual stages of his own culture, experiencing their vitality and universality. These conceptual and linguistic operations would not have been possible without perfect cultural self-awareness, cultivated by generations of philosophers since the time of RV whose poets were the first to make an effort to process the language and build its new meanings.

### 4.13. Conclusion

In this chapter, we have discussed liberating cognition which leads man to ultimate freedom thanks to his identification with his self (*ātman*). It has been proposed to divide this process into three stages which we are calling primary subjectivisation, higher subjectivisation and expanded subjectivisation. Thus, the process of liberation is seen as the gradual empowerment of man until his agency reaches the whole reality.

The basic motive for liberation is unbearable suffering which creates the desire to be freed from it. This in turns makes a man's mind desire self-cognition, to use his knowledge about the unity of reality and experience it in practice. In primary subjectivisation, man tends to suspend sensual cognition which means the work of the mind. We have shown the crucial role of recitation for this process. The role of reason in this process is to keep the mind on the correct path. Generally, this process is conceived, or experienced in terms of heat (*tapas*) and images of heat and light are used in its descriptions. Thus, the thesis that the Vedic concept of fire has been moved to a human level is again confirmed.

In higher subjectivisation, man cognises the self (*ātman*, the highest cognitive agent) which is also described by the use of metaphors activated by images of heat and light. In most descriptions it is implied that it is the highest cognitive agent which cognises itself in this stage. It has been argued that in this stage man is expected to create a new blend which allows him to identify with the highest cognitive agent. One cannot reconstruct the further

content of this blend, because it goes beyond subject-object cognition, so beyond any categorisation. We can only know as much as the Smṛti Composers have told us, mostly thanks to their play with ambiguity in the use of the word *ātman*, the noun and the reflexive pronoun, and with the use of metaphors. Reconstruction of the experience evoked in the source domains gives us some insight into its content.

In expanded subjectivisation, it is the highest cognitive agent liberated in man which performs its cognition with the use of all the cognitive faculties of man. In order to express this, which is impossible from the perspective of everyday life experience, the Smṛti Composers refresh the concept of sacrifice seen as the only category which allows man to realise the self-cognition of reality, especially in the MS and the BhG. They build on the frames inherited from Vedic tradition and continue the Vedic theory of the cosmos seen in terms of the general domain of Cooking (especially in the BhG). Man is faced with the same choice as Prajāpati in the Vedic cosmogonies: either he will be constantly transformed by fire as food, or he regains his agency and will participate in cosmic cooking in order to finally become the unmanifest eater. Putting this in terms of the target domain, man either becomes a non-cognising subject enclosed in the cosmic object, without any ability to change his state, or he becomes the subject finally realising the unmanifest state beyond subject-object cognition. This Vedic general domain of Cooking is also elaborated in BhG 11 which presents the moment when Arjuna cognises the highest cognitive agent (Kṛṣṇa) in his cosmic subject-object cognition conceived in these terms. The battle at Kurukṣetra is conceived in terms of sacrifice (Wood 2001: 12–13) in which one can be either be the embodiment of the fiery subject or the embodiment of the oblation. In the former activity, man becomes the sign (*nimitta*, *liṅga*) of the self-cognition of reality in the cosmos.

Before we continue, a tentative interpretation is proposed as to why the chapters of the BhG are called *yoga*. The view put forward is that it is motivated by the conceptualisation of yoga in terms of the general domain of Riding In A Chariot. We could imagine the whole BhG in terms of a long journey during which horses have to be changed. The change of horses is activated *via* the concept of yoke (*yoga*) which is taken off from tired horses and put on the fresh ones. Through subsequent chapters of the BhG conceived in terms of stages of a journey Kṛṣṇa leads Arjuna to recognition of his self (*ātman*) in the same way as a driver, in a battle, drives the archer to his desired location. In chapter eleven Arjuna identifies himself with Kṛṣṇa, his charioteer, who manifests himself in his cosmic form as the highest cognitive agent. Thus, Arjuna becomes able to drive the chariot himself and, at the same

time, to stand back as the archer. Thanks to that he is able to perform the activity in the manifest aspect (conceived in terms of a being in a chariot as a charioteer), while the unmanifest aspect that is present in him is conceived in terms of standing in the back of the chariot as the archer.

Viewed in this way, the practices explained in consecutive chapters, such as *karmayoga*, *jñānanayoga*, *dhyānanayoga* can be seen as the stages of a journey, sometimes lasting many lifetimes. During this journey those who are exhausted stay longer or shorter in a given place while only a few, determined to know themselves, reach their destination. In the target domain, some people are able to realise their ultimate freedom in this life, some are not. But the journey does not end for latter for when their life becomes unbearable, they too will journey on.

# Chapter Five

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## Early Smṛti thought the lens of the humanities

In this chapter we will see how the content of Smṛti philosophy can be analysed using theories present in the humanities. There are several advantages of such an analysis. It will equip us with the necessary conceptual and linguistic apparatus to clarify some of aspects of the thinking of the composers of that philosophy. Its use will also show that it is possible to talk about early Hindu thought in terms accepted by scholarly research in the humanities. Thanks to this early Hindu thought can be seen as a part of the universal human intellectual endeavour and heritage. Moreover, because the specific apparatus of contemporary research in humanities highlights aspects hidden till now, its use opens new fields for its future investigation into that thought.

In the first section, we again analyse Arjuna's vision presented in BhG 11 but with the use of blending theory. We will focus on some aspects of the mystic experience and argue that it can be seen as a process of compression of vital conceptual relations which connect input spaces. In the second section we will look at early Smṛti metaphysics through the lens of the concept of perspective. This is used in cognitive linguistics to analyse some aspects of literary narratives by adopting perspectives of the narrator and the protagonists. This will be helpful in understanding the Hindu theory of the two perspectives, cosmic and human. The third chapter is devoted to the concept of play seen as an implicit (and sometimes explicit) motivation for early Smṛti cosmogony and its metaphysical implications. We will also explore some Western contemporary theories of play and show how their applications

enlarges our understanding of the metaphysics analysed in the texts analysed in this study. The last chapter discusses the concept of karman within the framework of theory of responsibility proposed by Roman Ingarden which will reveal the moral dimension of this concept.

## 5.1. Compression and mystic experience in *Bhagavadgītā* 11

As we have in the previous chapter, the successive images of Kṛṣṇa can be seen as successive input spaces of the conceptual network created by Arjuna in his vision. Thanks to the blend he creates, he obtains global insight into reality, its manifestations and into the history of his own culture. This chapter will focus on the nature of the mystic experience itself. What will be argued is that the ability to consciously compress various input spaces is characteristic for Hindu mysticism, at least that presented in the BhG. This research proposal is only tentative and should be treated as a starting point for further research into the relevant early Smṛti material through the use of blending theory. In this analysis we will use the name Arjuna to refer to the mystic experience as it is described in BhG 11.

As Fauconnier and Turner write, some elements of the input spaces are often connected with conceptual relations, such as CHANGE, IDENTITY, DISANALOGY, TIME, SPACE, CAUSE-EFFECT, ROLE, PART-WHOLE, etc. (Fauconnier, Turner 2000, 2003ab, Turner 2006). They call these relations ‘vital relations’ while those that link input spaces are called ‘outer-space’ vital relations. In the blend they are compressed, maximised and intensified to become inner-space relations. Their compression is an important factor in the creation of the emergent meaning and contributes to the achievement of global insight and human-scale understanding.

We can see the crucial role of compression of vital relations by an example given by Sweetser (2000) in her analysis of a ritual performed in rural Greece during which a new born baby is carried up the stairs in front of its family. The aim of ritual is to ensure a happy future for the child. The conceptual network created in the minds of its participants consists of two input spaces, that of the present ritual and that of the future of the baby. The generic space is the image schema of VERTICALITY (on the basis of the metaphor BETTER IS UP). In the blend, the ritual is the cause of the future happiness of the baby. The power of ritual lies in a simply enacted story integrated with the complexity of life. The outer-space vital relations which link the elements of the input spaces are: TIME and SPACE which distance the present activity and the future life and CHANGE because the child will grow up and one can see

the CAUSE-EFFECT connection between them. All these relations are compressed into the inter-space relations and life of the child that happens in front of the audience. Thanks to that, the participants have insight into the future of the baby and can influence that future. So, when the blend is run, everything is meaningful: a sudden rain, the appearance of the rainbow or of a black bird or the stumbling of a person who carries the baby. Thanks to compression of the vital relations, the whole life of a child, as complex as it will be in reality, is now seen by participants in one moment, it is understood by them and emotionally experienced.<sup>1</sup> This compression takes place automatically and unconsciously and participants are unaware of it. Thanks to that, the participants are convinced that what happens during the ritual is real. Moreover, thanks to compression, the common ability of the human mind in ritual thinking is understood as objectively existing in the external world.

As previously argued, liberating cognition can also be seen as the process of decompression of the blend of the amalgamate agent the input spaces of which are the self (*ātman*) of a man and his reason. Then compression takes place again and the man's self is compressed with the whole reality. This process radically transforms the way one perceives and experiences the world. Already the theory of four selves (*ātman*) presented in CU 8.7 can be interpreted in this way. The first stage of the process is the decompression of the holistic meaning of the word *ātman* and the way one experiences one's organism as a unified whole different from everything which is external to it. In the CU Virocana and other asuras are not able to do that while Indra, in his patient and determined effort, succeeds. He consecutively decompresses his organism (*ātman*) into four strata: the waking self, the dreaming self, the self which is sound asleep and the fourth self.<sup>2</sup> Thus the vital relation of UNITY is decompressed into relations of ANALOGY (the selves are similar to each other) and DISANALOGY (the selves differ between themselves as far as their activity is connected). When the blend is decompressed and the man identifies himself with his deepest self, then he can create the blend again and compress the vital relations into UNIQUENESS from this new perspective.

The argument that is put forward is that we can interpret the mystic vision, as it is seen in the BhG, in the same way; as the result of conscious compression of vital relations that connect the input spaces activated in the vision. It is also argued that this is the ability could be gained and learned

<sup>1</sup> For blending and emotions, see Cánovas (2010), Wilson, Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk (2012), Herzberg (2012), Tissari (2012).

<sup>2</sup> In the TU 2, the relationship between them is conceived in terms of containers containing one another like Russian dolls (*matrioshkas*), within the monistic assumption, they are connected by PART-WHOLE vital relation.

during long studies and practice performed under the guidance of a teacher. Then the processes of decompression and compression become conscious and a man can perform it himself.

Mystic experience, its nature and the ways it is obtained, has been the subject of many discussions and it is beyond the scope of the present paper to describe it in detail (see Andresen 2001). We should recall here the research of Ann Taves (2009) on religion which will allow one to be more specific about the definition of mysticism proposed here. She defines religious phenomenon as a ‘special kind of thing’ which is set apart from other things. She writes (2009: 162):

Things that strike people as special are (among) the basic building blocks of religion. Ascriptions of specialness may take place below the threshold of awareness; when this happens, it tends to make things seem inherently special. People can decide, upon reflection, that things that seem special are more or less special than they initially seemed. In the process of reflection, special things may be caught up in pre-existing systems of belief and practice, may generate new or modified beliefs and practices, or may lose their specialness and become ordinary. Whether people consider a special thing as (say) ‘religious’, ‘mystical’, ‘magical’, ‘superstitious’, ‘spiritual’, ‘ideological’ or ‘secular’ will depend on the pre-existing systems of belief and practice, the web of concepts related to specialness, and the way that people position themselves in a given context.

Taves proposes to study the experience of a ‘thing which is set apart’ from interdisciplinary angles to understand its neurobiological basis, the psycho-mental experience which occurs when people think that they perceive a ‘special thing’, its expression in cultural practices and its description in texts of a culture. In this chapter, we will treat the description in BhG 11 as the description of the experience of mental contact with a special thing, which is conceived as absolute reality manifesting in the cosmos.<sup>3</sup> As Wulff argues, such descriptions are usually treated by scholars as presenting mystic experience which can be generally defined as a mental state which goes beyond everyday perception and is impossible to be described literally:

Whereas commentators thus continue to disagree on the definition and nature of mysticism, there is more or less a consensus that any experience appropriately qualified as mystical diverges in fundamental ways from ordinary conscious awareness and leaves a strong impression of having encountered a reality radically different from the sensory-based world of everyday experience. Rare and fleeting

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<sup>3</sup> It may be argued that the visual forms of the gods also represent the vision obtained during mystic experience.



though they usually are, such experiences often stand out as joyous, defining moments in the lives of those who have them.<sup>4</sup>

Such an experience may be caused by various practices, but also it may come all of the sudden – then it is often interpreted as obtained thanks to God’s grace.<sup>5</sup> In case of Arjuna, it comes as the result of love Kṛṣṇa feels towards Arjuna who, as his charioteer, takes him on a mental journey.

### 5.1.1. The compression of vital relations in the mystic experience of Arjuna

Let us recapitulate briefly the process of compression of the input spaces of the vision presented in BhG 11. As stated in the previous chapter (4.11), the conceptual network consists of eight input spaces:

- 1) the concept of Arjuna who is afraid of fighting,
- 2) the concept of Kṛṣṇa as Arjuna’s charioteer, who teaches him how to fight,
- 3) the concept of a battle which is about to begin,
- 4) the concept of society,
- 5) the concept of the cosmos with the sun as its centre,
- 6) the concept of the highest cognitive agent in its cosmic cognitive activity,
- 7) the concept of reality in its totality,
- 8) the content of tradition.

The generic space of the network is the concept of a human being. It is a common feature of all input spaces. Arjuna (1) and Kṛṣṇa as charioteer (2) are human beings. Human beings take part in battle (3). Society (4), the cosmos (5), the highest cognitive agent (6) and reality (7) are conceived in terms of man. Finally, tradition (8) that is transferred orally is embodied in speech conceived in terms of a woman in the Veda.<sup>6</sup> So we should be aware that the generic space conveys the meaning of both realisations of human beings as man and woman, and thus it is a highly abstract internally contradictory concept.

The main outer-space vital relations are as follows. Between the input spaces of Arjuna (1) and Kṛṣṇa (2) on one hand and the input of society (4) on

<sup>4</sup> Wulff (2014: 370), see Taves (2009: 28 ff.)

<sup>5</sup> Taves (2009), Sargant (1973), Caciola (2004). For more general neuroscientific approaches, see Persinger (1987), D’Aquili, Newberg (1999), Joseph (2001), Hood (2005), Feit (2003), Hick (2010), McNamara (2006, 2009). See also Rose (2016: mysticism in Yoga), Flanagan (2011: mysticism in Buddhism), Bäumer (1997: mysticism in Śaivism and Christianity), Starr (2008: Jewish mysticism), Razy, Idel (2015: mysticism in Kaballah).

<sup>6</sup> Beginning with ṚV 10.125.

the other there is the vital relation of **ROLE** and **VALUE**: both are Kṣatriyas fighting in the same chariot, take part in the same war and have the same goal, but they are specific individuals. Let me note that in the beginning of the BhG Arjuna does not want to compress this vital relation: he refuses to take part in the future battle. The input spaces of Arjuna (1) and Kṛṣṇa (2) are linked by vital relations of **ANALOGY** (because of their role) and **DISANALOGY** because they are as different as two human beings can be. The input spaces of the battle (3) on one hand and of Arjuna (1) and Kṛṣṇa (2) on the other are linked by the vital relation of **TIME**. The battle that is about to be happen is still in the future. The input spaces of reality (7), the highest cognitive agent (6), the cosmos (5), society (4) and Kṛṣṇa (2) are linked by the **CAUSE-EFFECT** vital relation: society and the cosmos are the result of the activity of the highest cognitive agent which in turn is a result of the activity of reality. The input space of tradition (8) and the other input spaces are linked by the vital relation of **CHANGE, TIME, SPACE, and CAUSE-EFFECT**. The Vedic texts were composed by a different people in a different place many years before, yet Smṛti thought is seen as the effect of tradition. The vital relations described above are seen from an everyday perspective which is the starting point of the vision. During it, Arjuna should compress them in order to reach the perspective of highest cognitive agent.

In the first phase of the vision, the vital relations between the input space of Kṛṣṇa (2), of the cosmos (5) and of the highest cognitive agent (6), which are the **CAUSE-EFFECT**, are compressed into **UNIQUENESS** and Arjuna understands that Kṛṣṇa is the creator of the cosmos, ontologically one with it and is the highest cognitive agent (conceived in terms of a glorious king). Arjuna also projects a part of the content of the input space of tradition, which is the Ṛgvedic concept of the sun as benevolent, and sees Kṛṣṇa in these terms. This means that the vital relations of **CHANGE, TIME, SPACE, and CAUSE-EFFECT** are compressed into **UNIQUENESS**. Arjuna understands that he now contemplates the vision of the Ṛgvedic poets with Kṛṣṇa as fiery reality manifesting in the cosmos.

The first turning point of the vision takes place when Arjuna visualises the whole form of the body of Kṛṣṇa, together with its lower parts, thighs and feet (see chapter 4.12). Thus, the input space of society becomes active in the blend and the vital relation of **CAUSE-EFFECT** between Kṛṣṇa (2), the highest cognitive agent (6), and society (6) are compressed into **UNIQUENESS**: Arjuna understands that society is a manifestation of Kṛṣṇa. At that moment the next layer of tradition (8), that of the tradition of the Brāhmaṇas, is projected into the blend and compressed and Arjuna realises what the mouth is for. In the blend Kṛṣṇa not only protects living beings but also kills them. Thanks to the compression of the vital relations of **CHANGE, TIME, SPACE, and CAUSE-EFFECT**,

Arjuna understands that the content of his vision is the terrifying ontology of the Brāhmaṇas. He might also realise that the Ṛgvedic image of a man with a thousand heads, eyes and feet (RV 10.90.1) is an image of a terrifying behemoth and that it is now manifested before him.

In this moment, Arjuna also projects into blend the input space of the future battle (3) and himself (1) as one of its participants. In the blend, the battle has already taken place (thanks to compression of vital relation of TIME into UNIQUENESS and Arjuna sees that all the warriors are eaten by Kṛṣṇa). Arjuna can now understand the cosmic activity of Kṛṣṇa as the highest cognitive agent by reference to his own specific situation and realises that the battle is a cosmic process in which he must actively take place. He compresses the vital relation of ROLE and VALUE too.

BhG 11 was one of the sources analysed by Otto (1917) in his theory of *numinous*. The phases of Arjuna's vision develop from the phase of *misterium fascinans* when the positive aspect of the numinous is experienced to the phase of the *misterium tremens* when the negative aspects are experienced. The tension between these two phases can be understood in terms of the ambivalent fire that manifests in the sun which is a projection from the input space of the cosmos (5): it is life-giving when it appears in the morning (as the Ṛgvedic Composers see it) and kills with its heat (as it is conceived in the Brāhmaṇas). In this moment of his vision, Arjuna knows that Kṛṣṇa is the same reality as described in the ṚV and Brāhmaṇas, the man (*puruṣa*) from RV 10.90 and Prajāpati. In the blend Arjuna's efforts are the efforts of ancient seers and gods, conceived as subjective manifestations of reality, who took part in the creation of the manifest aspect of reality and finally arranged it. Their activity has been conceived in terms of bloody sacrifice and the forthcoming battle is this primordial sacrifice in the blend. This global insight Arjuna obtains is possible thanks to the compression of the vital relations which link the disparate input space into UNIQUENESS.

The next crucial moment of this stage is the moment when Arjuna begins to run his blend in a new direction. He elaborates the input space of Kṛṣṇa as a charioteer (2) and projects it into the blend. Thanks to the compression of the vital relations of CAUSE-EFFECT into UNIQUENESS (which connect the input spaces (2), (4), (5), (6) and (8)), he realises that his beloved friend is the whole reality (7) and its manifestations (the highest cognitive agent (6), the cosmos (5) and society (4)).<sup>7</sup> Within the blend, Arjuna is reminded

<sup>7</sup> BhG 11: *sakheti matvā prasabhaṃ yad uktaṃ; he kṛṣṇa he yādava he sakheti | ajānatā mahimānaṃ tavedaṃ; mayā pramādāt praṇayena vāpi || (41) yac cāvahāsārtham asatkṛto 'si; vihāraśayyāsanaḥojaneṣu | eko 'tha vāpy acyuta tatsamakṣaṃ; tat kṣāmāye tvām aham aprameyam || (42)*

of their everyday life as soldiers. He asks Kṛṣṇa to forgive him any offence committed when he treated him like an ordinary man, like a friend from the army, like a simple charioteer, and not as the incarnation of reality. Thus, Arjuna minimalises the vital relation of *DISANALOGY* and maximalises vital relation of *ANALOGY* which allows him to create a new input space (9), that of close human relationships between a child and its parents, between friends and between lovers (BhG 11.44).

It is difficult to state if any kind of vital relation could connect the concept of a friend and the concepts of society (4), cosmos (5) and the highest cognitive agent (6). Vedic philosophy is not helpful here as it was in earlier cases when it gave us the theoretical background for compression. It can be argued that the background for the compression is emotional: Arjuna loves Kṛṣṇa. The Composer of the BhG refers to the deep nature of human love. Someone in love sees the whole world in the one person loved. One is completely defenceless in the hands of the person who is loved and on whom one depends. One feels that one would die if left by that person. Devotion to the will of the other is total. These are the emotions a child feels towards its parent. They also should be felt by a good wife towards her husband. Probably deep friendship is also characterised by an such emotional attitude.

When the concept of personal human relationships is included into the blend, the abstract highest cognitive agent becomes God whom man can love in the same way as a man loves his close relatives and friends. Here we can find the earliest emotional sources of the bhakti movement.<sup>8</sup> This is the greatest novelty in reference to the Vedic thought.

When Arjuna compresses the vital relations of *CAUSE-EFFECT* which connect the input space of Kṛṣṇa as a charioteer (2) on one hand, and input spaces of society (4), cosmos (5), the highest cognitive agent (6) and the whole reality (7) into relation of *UNIQUENESS*, he discovers the ontological truth about the unity of reality. Putting this moment of Arjuna's vision into Tave's words according to whom the sacred is a 'special kind of thing' set apart from other things, we could say that the more Arjuna runs the blend the more he understands that there is nothing which can be seen as set apart from other things. All things become one in loving unity.

As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, Arjuna should reach the perspective of the highest cognitive agent. This means that one more input space should be projected into the blend: it is Arjuna himself (1). His position as a warrior who stands in the back of the chariot would allow him to recognise

<sup>8</sup> For history of bhakti and its meaning in the MBh, see Biardeau (2002), Hildebeitel (2004, 2011a: 569–624, 2011b: 49–72, 315–331), Mahadevan (2013), Adluri (2015). For the role of emotions in religious experience, see Pyysiainen (2001).

his unmanifest self (*ātman*), conceived in these terms. In the blend, Arjuna would be himself (1) united with his charioteer (2) and would be him who would act in the world in its innumerable forms and shapes, without attachment because his self goes beyond what is manifest.

However, does this final compression take place? It is not described in BhG 11. This might be connected with the fact that the Composer wanted to include the concept of love between man and God which is the result of the various emotions felt by Arjuna earlier in his vision. In its first phase of his vision (*mysterium fascinans*), Arjuna is described as amazed, the metonymic symptom of his amazement is the hair bristling on his body (BhG 11.14). In the second phase (*mysterium tremens*), he is utterly terrified, the metonymic symptom of this emotion is trembling (BhG 11.25, 35). These emotions are resolved in the ultimate feeling of love towards Kṛṣṇa, his friend identified with the highest cognitive agent. The logic of the input space of love implies a difference between two persons in love. The next step of liberating cognition when unity of oneself and reality is realised is still ahead of Arjuna. But if he made it, then he could find support in the Veda. In BU 2.4.5, Yājñavalkya says that when a man loves human beings and loves values, he actually loves himself (*ātmānam*). Arjuna would understand that his love for Kṛṣṇa is love for himself.

### 5.1.2. The mystic experience as a conscious compression of vital relations

The analysis of mystic experience, seen as a conceptual blending, may facilitate better understanding of the mental work undertaken during liberating cognition and practice. As mentioned, everyday conceptual integration is usually done automatically and unconsciously:

These mental models and worldviews created in this process are the natural products of cognition itself and the outcome of the brain's tendency to strive for the integration of perceptual and conceptual material over time. The term 'large-scale neural integration' refers to the nervous system's cross-modal unification of many sources of experience into a single abstract model or percept.<sup>9</sup>

The above quotation is from Merlin Donald's paper where he discusses the human ability to create and understand art from an evolutionary perspective. He gives an example of large-scale neural integration. It is an 'event-perception, which can unify a blur of millions of individual sensations of sight, sound,

<sup>9</sup> Merlin (2006: 4).

touch, taste, smell, and emotions into unitary event precepts' (Donald 2006: 4). This capacity is very limited in simple organisms but human beings have acquired 'a very abstract capacity to integrate not only the raw materials of experience but also the constituents of memory itself'. (Donald 2006: 4). In the same volume, Turner (2006) refers to Donald's work and sees this capacity as the capacity for the creation of double-scope blends (see Introduction 6.5). It allows human beings to perceive the world as relatively stable wholes and not to be aware of the complex process of integration which takes place not only on conceptually, but also on a neural level and between them. Turner (2006: 95) makes the following point:

This neurobiological creation of stability is profound and evident in everything we human beings do, despite our obliviousness to it. It is only under sedulous discipline during an ingenious experiment, for example, that we can begin to detect hints of the literal blind spots in our vision, caused by gaps where axons dive through the retina.

Notwithstanding the kind of experiment Turner has in mind, it is important for us that there are situations when it is possible to decompress the blend. In another study Fauconnier and Turner (2000) write:

The development of sciences leads consciousness to live in the entire network: global and creative insights require the blended space, and proof, analysis, and verification and communication of theories require explicit unpacking of cause and effect. (294)

We can argue that the practices, done under the guidance of a teacher leading to a mystic experience realised during liberating cognition, are such cognitive situations. Everyday training that leads to the reformatting of one's way of understanding the world can be seen as training to decompress old frames of thinking and the compression of new input spaces to make it conscious and possible to be mastered. The presence of the teacher and his guidance guarantees its proper performance, it also prevents the practitioner against insanity which could appear if the compression went in a dangerous direction.<sup>10</sup> Having perceived Kṛṣṇa as the benevolent protector of the cosmos,

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<sup>10</sup> Kakar (1981: 25): 'the guru's role in *pratyahara* is to sanction and facilitate this process of integration while all the while keeping a watchful eye on the 'patient's' ego lest it be prematurely engulfed. The presence of the guru provides the necessary support against the danger of psychotic breakdown. Unlike the alert, sanctioning support conveyed in words in most Western psychotherapies, the guru's support is given through 'look, touch and silence' – the language of the *chitta*.'

Arjuna also sees him as the source of death and destruction which causes his fear. Fear is overcome when Arjuna compresses the cosmic form of Kṛṣṇa with the form of his closest friend. Thus, under the guidance of Kṛṣṇa, Arjuna runs the blend in a way that does not destroy him mentally. From utter fear utter love appears. This also shows that control over compression does not exclude the novelty of the vision, just the opposite: Arjuna runs his blend in a way which is new in comparison with the Vedic way of thinking.

The blend is created and elaborated in an extremely short time period. The mastery of those whose practice is described in the early Smṛti texts (and later, in yogic and religious traditions) was to become aware of this instantaneous process and to be able to influence it. Viewed from this point of view, it is not surprising that work on the mind is described as difficult and that later stages of liberating cognition are available to only a few.

If this hypothesis is right, it would allow us to grasp one of the main differences between Hindu and Christian concepts of this experience. In Christian tradition, the God's grace is the main source of mystic vision and it often comes suddenly (Caciola 2004). It can also be seen as influenced by the Devil. Then its content does not agree with Christian dogmas and leads the mystic astray (Caciola 2004). Putting this in frames of the blending theory, we could say that here the blend is run unconsciously. It is a creation of a mind free from any constraint which cannot be controlled by the subject. Probably because of that it is often understood as given by supernatural forces.

Although the Composer of the BhG emphasises that the vision of Arjuna cannot be gained by those who are not devoted to Kṛṣṇa the way it is possible to be gained, that is described in the next chapter (*Bhaktiyoga*), is the same as the way presented in the description of liberating cognition in *Dhyānayoga* and in other early Smṛti texts analysed in this study. One should restrain one's senses and focus one's mind and reason on Kṛṣṇa.<sup>11</sup> The descriptions of a person devoted to Kṛṣṇa are the same as the descriptions of the yogin: he is equal towards all dualities (*samaduḥkhasukha* 12.13) without a sense of 'mine', without the I-form (*nirmamo nirahaṃkāra*, 12.23), and without hatred to other beings (*adveṣṭā sarvabhūtānām* 12.13, *yasmān nodvijate loko lokān nodvijate ca yaḥ* 12.15). The Composer also describes various ways of cognition of Kṛṣṇa, depending on man's abilities,<sup>12</sup> and then he states:

<sup>11</sup> Which is interpreted in terms of the same image schema of container as in the descriptions of liberating cognition, BhG 12.14: *saṃtuṣṭaḥ satataṃ yogī yatātmā dṛḍhaniścayaḥ | mayy arpitamanobuddhir yo madbhaktaḥ sa me priyaḥ ||*

<sup>12</sup> BhG 12: *atha cittaṃ samādhātuṃ na śaknoṣi mayi sthiram | abhyāsayogena tato mām icchāptuṃ dhanamjaya || (9) abhyāse 'py asamartho 'si matkarmaparamo bhava | madartham api karmāni kurvan siddhim avāpsyasi || (10) athaitad apy aśakto 'si kartuṃ madyogam āsritāḥ Bhg 12.011a: sarvakarmaphalatyāgaṃ tataḥ kuru yatātmavān || (11)*

**BhG 12.12**

*sreyo hi jñānam abhyāsāj jñānād dhyānaṃ viśiṣyate |  
dhyānāt karmaphalatyāgas tyāgāc chāntir anantaram ||*

Knowledge is higher than study, thoughtful concentration<sup>13</sup> transcends knowledge, the relinquishment of the fruits of acts surpasses thoughtful concentration<sup>14</sup>, and upon resignation follows serenity.

In this stanza, the Composer of the BhG enumerates the stages of a pupil's learning. One can be pupil in one life or throughout many lives. In both cases, practice (*abhyāsa*, verses a–b) leads to knowledge (*jñāna*, verses a–b), it should be remembered that knowledge was gained during the learning of the Veda by heart which is reached by everyday discipline of the mind. When one has learnt the Veda, one can begin thoughtful concentration in his mind (*dhyāna*, verses b–c), which leads to suspension of subject-object cognition. Then, he should confirm his mental state in action i.e., act with the senses of action without attachment to the objects of senses of reason that are restrained thanks to concentration (*karmaphalatyāga*, verses c–d). This is the way to mental peace which characterises those who 'have mounted on yoga' (BhG 6.3), even if the body is in constant movement<sup>15</sup> and thus supports the coherence of the world (*lokasaṃgraha*). This state is realised during expanded subjectivisations.

In the last stanza of BhG 11, the Composer also states that a lack of attachment and of hatred is a necessary condition of realising one's identity with Kṛṣṇa which is again reminiscent the descriptions of a yogin:

**BhG 11.55**

*matkarmaḥṇ matparamo madbhaktaḥ saṅgavarjitah |  
nirvairah sarvabhūteṣu yah sa mām eti pāṇḍava ||*

Only he comes to me. Pāṇḍava, who acts for me, who holds me as the highest, who is devoted to me without self-interest and without any animosity against any creature.

It follows then that the early bhakti attitude described in the BhG needed conscious reframing of thought: man had to focus his mind on Kṛṣṇa, the personal god, instead on brahman, the impersonal reality. In other words, man must create a new conceptual network with the concept of Kṛṣṇa as one of its input spaces and project him into the blend thanks to the compression

<sup>13</sup> Buitenen (1981: 123): 'contemplation.'

<sup>14</sup> Buitenen (1981: 123): 'contemplation.'

<sup>15</sup> The action is performed only with one's body: *nirāśīr yatacittātmā tyaktasarvaparigrahaḥ | śārīram kevalam karma kurvan nāpnoti kilbiṣam ||* (BhG 4.21).



of vital relations. In the first stanza of BhG 12, Arjuna asks who is better: a person who is constantly yoked and worships Kṛṣṇa, or a person who is focused on the syllable OM (*akṣara*) and on the unmanifest aspect (*avyakta*). Kṛṣṇa answers that a person totally focused on him is the best yogin. But then explains that the latter ones also can reach him but their practice is much more difficult, because the unmanifest road and aim (*gati*) is difficult to be obtained by the embodied ones. Then he states:

### BhG 12.6–7

*ye tu sarvāṇi karmāṇi mayi samṇyasya matparāḥ |  
ananyenaiva yogena mām dhyāyanta upāsate || (6)*

On the other hand, those who, absorbed in me, resign all their acts to me and contemplatively attend on me with exclusive yoga,

*teṣām ahaṃ samuddhartā mṛtyusaṃsārasāgarāt |  
bhavāmi nacirāt pārtha mayy āveśitacetasām || (7)*

soon find in me their savior from the ocean that is the run-around of deaths, Pārtha, for their minds are conducted to enter into me.

The Composer conceives the activity of Kṛṣṇa towards man in terms of taking him out of the ocean. In terms of the ocean, the manifest aspect is conceived where death is constantly present. In the context of the previous statement, the recipient understand that it is easier to be successful in one's mystic efforts when one imagines the unmanifest aspect in terms of a benevolent rescuer from a flood, implied by the source domain, than as an abstract concept. This is confirmed by the experience of Arjuna which made him feel, and think, helpless in his love. We can call the act of helping human being as grace but this grace does not refer to the possibility of gaining the mystic experience as that is difficult to gain. The mystic has to learn how to run his blend consciously in a last act of compression that allows him to unite with reality in the blend. It is easier to create when it is conceived in terms of a close friend and not in abstract terms.

There is discussion among researchers of mystic experience as to what extent it is culturally entrenched. Forman (1999, 1990) claims that beyond these culturally entrenched experiences there is, common to all mystics, one that is beyond words and thoughts. There are input spaces which seem to be universal, for example the concept of light or fire is evoked in many mystical traditions. However, in many cases, the input spaces are motivated by a given culture. Arjuna could not create the input space of a crucified man in the same way as John of the Cross could not see the many-headed figure. It can be

argued that the main difference between Christian and Hindu mystics lies in the extent to which they can control the process of creation of input spaces and of running the blend. It is not argued that there are no practices in the Christian tradition that aim at conscious inducing and controlling the mystical experience.<sup>16</sup> Rather Christian mysticism seem to be work on inducing altered states of consciousness more than on further conscious work on them.

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The use of the theory of conceptual blending in the analysis of the content of BhG 11 allows us to interpret mystic experience as a mental process which consists in the conscious decompression and compression of vital relations which unite the input spaces of the blend. The inner-space vital relations of UNIQUENESS and ANALOGY create a new and powerful meaning of one reality that manifests in the cosmos and in man who is its active embodiment. A new unique compression between reality and a common charioteer allows the Composer to propose a new relationship between reality and man conceived in terms of the love between two human beings. Thus, the BhG 11 can be seen as one of the earliest sources of the religious and philosophical bhakti movement on the conceptual and emotional level.

The specific cadence of the description according to which one goes through successive phases of amazement, utter fear and immense love strengthens the psychological probability of the process. One could speculate if something similar happened to Paul the Apostle on the road to Damascus and many other mystics. A comparative work on the mystic ability of humans still awaits its realisation though it is suggested that cognitive tools allow us to understand it rather better.

It is also argued that the early Smṛti texts attest the mental and physical practice which aim at control over unconscious blending which is intersubjective and which can be learnt from those who are experienced in it. Hindu tradition has come a long way. Its first step is attested in the R̥gvedic descriptions of exaltation under the influence of soma. These betray attempts by its authors to understand and describe their mental state with the use of various specific nouns that analytically split various states of consciousness using rich metaphors and blends. The next step is attested in the Brahmanas the Composers of which were focused on attaining the state caused by soma without the use of soma. It was gained through physically tiring exercises and during recitation with the use of deep breathing (attested already in the late hymns of the RV and AV). The Āraṇyakas, the Composers of which were focused on the power

<sup>16</sup> Such as practices of the medieval convents, see e.g., Miller (2007: 8). For a more general perspective on the ways mystical experience is obtained, see Miller (2007: 6–14).

of recitation, are the next step. The Composers of the Upaniṣads perfected the practice so they could reach unmanifest reality. They did not describe how it looked but it involved recitation with breathing and by watching the sun. The theories of three, four and five selves (*ātman*) described in the BU, CU and TU (Jurewicz 2016/18) confirm that the work on the mind consisted of the decompression of the self in order to achieve its final compression but from a different perspective. The Buddha, the dissenter, looked for a practice which would satisfy his intellectual needs and his analytical abilities. That practice he followed allowed him not only to succeed in his mental work, but also to describe it. The practice attested in the Smṛti texts derives from both sources, and it can be seen that the Brahmin philosophers consciously worked on this process. The next step is attested in classical Yoga where, among other things, work of the mind (*manas*) and of the reason (*buddhi*) is separated. The history of Indian cognitive practices attests efforts to gain control over states of consciousness not experienced in everyday life. At least part of this control, it is argued, is through control over the compression and decompression of the vital relations.

## **5.2. Storytelling and the two perspectives of the highest cognitive agent**

In this section we look at the adoption of storytelling which, as an important formative experience for Brahminic culture, allowed recipients to better understand the basic cosmogonic and cosmological frames of its philosophical thinking, of the concept of creation and of liberating cognition.

Storytelling is a part of being human. In that respect, nothing has changed since the dawn of our minds. Stories are not only part of artistic creativity. They are also part of our everyday social activity. We recount to each other what happened last night, yesterday, during holidays or illness. Some of us are good storytellers, some of us are boring, but all of us tell stories in order to be listened to and understood. A well told story has overwhelming power over its recipients which makes them intellectually and emotionally involved, causes them to forget about everything beyond the story and to be completely immersed in the story even if it is seemingly about nothing e.g., about a lost button. An expression of artistic creativity, they are not only a literary form, but have different visual forms including advanced computer games where we are invited to experience a story even more vividly than in traditional ways.

In ancient India, oral tradition encompassed not only Vedic studies, but also simple stories told by humans at night by the fire (Dunbar 2014, Dunbar,

Gowlett 2014, Wiessner 2014). Two great epic texts, MBh and Ramāyāna, are a magnificent elaboration of such simple stories and the best proof for the rich tradition of storytelling in India in between the eras. Although in the texts analysed in the following analysis, the story is the Veda, it will be shown that the way it is transmitted in cosmogonies is motivated by general storytelling tradition. The Veda is a story which reality tells about itself, which is listened to and repeated by consecutive manifestations while the creation of the cosmos is conceived in terms of their retelling by consecutive manifestations of reality. Such a conceptualisation of the creation of the cosmos has important implications for cosmological assumptions and the role of man.

### 5.2.1. Storytelling and cognitive linguistics

The phenomenon of storytelling is analysed in cognitive linguistics as a part of a more general research on literary narratives.<sup>17</sup> In the present analysis we will refer to the outcomes of the research by Barbara Dancygier (2012) who focuses on our ability to understand and change viewpoints as the story proceeds. As she argues, this ability is realised thanks to the compression and decompression of viewpoints. Dancygier adopts the concept of narrative spaces to define mental constructs that participate in the emergence of the meaning of the story. Narrative spaces are ‘a source of narrative structure and of viewpoint configurations’ (2012: 61). They have distinctive topology and narrative status, and are linked to other narrative spaces in a way that facilitates construction of the story. Dancygier distinguishes three types of narrative spaces depending on the viewpoint from which they are created (2012: 63). There is the story-viewpoint space (SV) where the narrator is located. The second viewpoint is the main narrative space (MN), which is the overarching structure or the primary plot. And there are Ego-viewpoints that are those of the protagonists.<sup>18</sup> As Dancygier emphasises, our ability to compress and decompress viewpoints between the narrative spaces is crucial for understanding a story and this ability is used by the storytellers who trigger us, by special literal devices, to do just that (Dancygier 2012).

<sup>17</sup> Just to mention some of them: Freeman (2002, 2007abc, 2008), Hiraga (1999, 2005), Hogan (2003), Dancygier (2012), Semino, Culpeper (2002), Jaén, Simon (2012), Dancygier, Sanders, Vandelanotte (2012), Borkent, Dancygier, Hinnel (2013), Bernaerts, de Geest, Herman, Varvaecq (2013).

<sup>18</sup> The model proposed by Dancygier is more complex, but this simplified version is enough for this argument.

### 5.2.2. Cosmogony as storytelling

Let us briefly review the basic assumptions of the Smṛti ontology presented by the texts analysed in this study. Reality is one and creation is a manifestation of its aspect. In its unmanifest aspect reality is called *brahman*. Creation is a cognitive act: reality begins to think and to speak about itself. Thus, it divides itself into the cognising aspect and the aspect which is cognised. It is an epistemic division (as in the self-cognitive process) that preserves the ontological unity of reality. The cognised aspect, expressed in words, is also called *brahman*, which is another name for the Veda, the sacred knowledge and the sacred text.

In the cosmogony of the MS, the words of reality become the cosmos which is conceived in terms of the Golden Egg. Within it, the highest cognitive agent, Brahma, appears who repeats the first act consisting in the epistemic division into subject and object and then recognises their ontological identity. In consecutive acts of self-cognition Brahma arranges the Golden Egg (seen as his own manifestation). The Veda is the category used by Brahma in the creation of his mental and sensorimotor self, which is stated implicitly by the use of the verb *nir mā-* ‘to measure’ (MS 1.16) and explicitly (words of the Veda, *vedaśabda*, MS 1.21, see chapter 1.1.4, 1.1.6). The subject which creates the ritual self of Brahma are the gods and the Sādhyas who transform the category of the Veda into the form known by human beings i.e., divided into the Ṛg-, Yajur- and Sāmaveda (MS 1.23, see chapter 1.1.6). The Creation of the social self of Brahma is expressed in a concise way but a recipient well versed in tradition may evoke RV 10.90, where the division of the Man’s (*puruṣa*) body is performed after the creation of the triple Veda, and understand that the Composer of the MS is also thinking about this category. Then the first human subject, Manu, is created. The fact that the Veda is the category he applies in further creation is metonymically expressed by the use of the expression *tapas taptvā* ‘having heated himself in heat’ (MS 1.34) in the description of the creation of the seven sons of Prajāpati and other subjective powers which finally arrange the cosmos with the power of heat *tapoyogāt* (MS 1.41, see chapter 1.1.8).

Thus, the creation of the world can be seen as the transmission of the Veda. The relationship between the nouns *bráhman* (reality), *brahmán* (the highest cognitive agent) and *brāhmaṇa* (Brahmin) expresses a family relationship and reflects the father-son succession of the sacred knowledge. Since in early Hindu culture, education took place in families and the sacred texts were transmitted from father to son (Scharfe 2002, Lubin 2005), we can see the motivating influence of traditional teaching on philosophical concepts: at the most basic

level, creation is conceived as teaching and remembering texts. We can then describe creation of the world, generally, as the transmission of the story expressed in the Veda which transforms itself as more and more perceptible manifestations emerge.

The process of creation thus conceived reflects the structure of story proposed by Dancygier. Reality in its unmanifest aspect, brahman, corresponds to the story viewpoint space (SV). The cosmos is the main narrative space (MN) as told by Brahma. The next subjective manifestations tell the story from their Ego-viewpoints. We should bear in mind that brahman, the narrator of the story viewpoint space, is also the listener of the story. Moreover, as the aspect of reality manifest in the Veda, it is the story itself. Hence, from its viewpoint, all elements of action (subject, object and action) are one as described in BhG 6.5–6 (see chapter 4.10.2.a).

When Brahma is created, there are two tellers and two listeners of the story. Brahman, the absolute narrator from the story view-point space (SV), constantly tells the story listened to by Brahma in the main narrative space (MN). Brahma listens and repeats it. Thus, the story is told back to brahman. It is the same for the next subjective manifestations who listen to the story and tell it back to brahman from their Ego-viewpoints. When they tell the story, it becomes true: the words of the Veda acquire forms within the temporal and spatial main narrative space (MN). We could say that they create material anchors that cause the story to be even more real.<sup>19</sup>

Brahman is fully aware of the story, but is not directly involved in it. Using Dancygier's terms, brahman is generally the off-stage narrator (2012: 66–68). It becomes the on-stage narrator (Dancygier 2012: 64–66) in two cases. Firstly, when it introduces the changes into the plot of the cosmic story, of when it goes wrong and there was a danger that it would become meaningless. In later Viṣṇuism, such an interference into the story is conceived in terms of the 'descent' (*avatāra*) of Viṣṇu himself incarnated in a perceptible being. This idea is already attested in the BhG where Kṛṣṇa is seen as Viṣṇu incarnated<sup>20</sup> although the term *avatāra* is not yet used in this text. Secondly, brahman becomes an on-stage narrator in free men.

<sup>19</sup> For the concept of material anchor, see Hutchins (2005), Sweetser (2012), Sweetser, Stec (2013).

<sup>20</sup> See BhG 4.7: *yadā yadā hi dharmasya glānir bhavati bhārata | abhyutthānam adharmasya tadātmānam sṛjāmy aham ||*

### 5.2.3. Brahman as an on-stage narrator in the cosmogony of *Mokṣadharmā* 335

In order to show how the direct intervention of reality in the creation of the world can be interpreted as a situation when brahman becomes the on-stage narrator, we will briefly analyse the beginning of cosmogony presented in a late chapter of the MDhP (335). It belongs to the *Nārāyaṇīya* section,<sup>21</sup> the religious issues of which will be omitted leaving them to future research. We will focus on this aspect of the cosmogony which allows us to see it as the transmission of the story (the Veda) which is expressed much more explicitly than in the early Smṛti texts analysed in this study.

The general model of creation presented in MDhP 335 is the same as in the MS and in other cosmogonies. It is, however, enriched with a detailed description of the stage when the cosmos is present in its potential form. In this stage, the borderline sphere between the two aspects of reality is created where the highest cognitive agent is located. The focus on the borderline sphere recalls Vedic philosophy, the crucial difference lies in that, in Smṛti philosophy, the borderline sphere is possible to be crossed by men in liberating cognition. It is argued that the fact that the Composer could elaborate the borderline sphere again proves that, in the Smṛti period, the range of what is knowable and expressible in liberating cognition has greatly expanded. Since the focus is on the issues connected with the transmission of the Veda, we will analysis this description from that perspective.

The description of creation is preceded by a description of cosmic destruction (*pralaya*). Its sequence is as follows: the successive great beings merge one into another (11–13ab), then the last one (space, *ākāśa*) merges into the mind (*manas*), the mind into what is manifest (*vyakta*), then what is manifest into what is unmanifest (*avyakta*). Then unmanifest disappears in man omnipresent (*puruṣa sarvagata*, 13c–14ab)<sup>22</sup> which evokes the Ṛgvedic conceptualisation of reality in terms of man with a thousand feet (*sahásrapāt*). Then darkness appears when nothing can be cognised.<sup>23</sup> In this way, the Composer activates conceptualisation of the state of the lack of cosmos in

<sup>21</sup> For the *Nārāyaṇīya* and its role in the whole MBh see, Schreiner (1997) on one hand, Biarreau (2002), Hildebeitel (2004, 2011a: 569–624, 2011b: 49–72, 187–220), Adluri (2015), on the other.

<sup>22</sup> MDhP 335: *dharanyām atha līnāyām apsu caikārṇave purā | jyotirbhūte jale cāpi līne jyotiṣi cānile || (12) vāyau cākāśasaṃlīne ākāśe ca manonuge | vyakte manasi saṃlīne vyakte cāvryaktatām gate || (13) avyakte puruṣaṃ yāte puṃsi sarvagate 'pi ca | (14.a–b)*

<sup>23</sup> MDhP 335.14cd: *tama evābhavat sarvaṃ na prājñāyata kiṃ cana*. See MS 1.5, MDhP 176.10 (see chapters 1.1.1, 1.2.1.b)

terms of a sleeping man.<sup>24</sup> As we have seen, this conceptualisation is also attested in the earlier cosmogonies of the MDhP and of the MS (see chapter 1).

The cosmogony begins with a description of the appearance of brahman from darkness (15a). We can interpret this description as presenting the first manifestation of the cognitive power of reality which consists on giving a name to itself which is brahman i.e., the Veda. Thus, reality is divided into two aspects: brahman which is impossible to be named and brahman which can be named. i. e. told in a story.<sup>25</sup> The latter aspect is the cosmos in its potential form. According to verse 15d brahman assumes a human body (*tanu*, 15d). Thus, the Composer expresses the self-reflexive nature of the creative process: the pre-creative state of the cosmos is conceived in terms of a man who sleeps and its named aspect is again conceived as a man. The logic of the source domain implies that the difference between them consists in that now man is awake and the recipient may create, in the source domain, an image of a man who, having woken up, recites the Veda. It is the narrator located in the story viewpoint space (SV).

In 17cd, the Composer describes the highest cognitive agent (Hari Nārāyaṇa) who, within the frames of storytelling, is the narrator from the main narrative space and the recipient understands the story from his viewpoint. Hari Nārāyaṇa is presented as preparing a bed (*śayana*) for himself in waters (17c). Let us note that the concept of waters is used to conceive the unmanifest aspect of reality seen from the perspective of its manifest aspect (MS 1.8–9, see chapter 1.1.3). The concept of water is used already in RV 10.129.3 to conceive of the impossibility of cognition of the object (Jurewicz 2010). If the recipient activates this metaphor, he will understand that the highest cognitive agent continues to cognise itself and he sees the object of his cognition as not yet cognised. The next stage is conceived in terms of the creation of a support in water (conceived in terms of a bed). The recipient well versed in tradition can understand the concept of a bed in a general way, as a foundation, and thus activate the Vedic cosmogonies where the foundation is the Veda (Jurewicz 2016/18). The support enables further creation. At the same time, since the concept of water metonymically evokes the concept of a woman, preparation of a bed activates the general domain of Procreation and metonymically evoke the concept of the sexual act thanks to which sons appear (see below).

<sup>24</sup> This state is called the night of Brahma.

<sup>25</sup> For *śabdabrahman*, see: MDhP 224.60: *dve brahmaṇī veditavye śabdabrahma paraṃ ca yat | śabdabrahmaṇi niṣṇātaḥ paraṃ brahmādhigacchati ||* MDhP 228.7: *evaṃ hy etena yogena yuijāno 'py ekam antataḥ | api jijñāsamāno hi śabdabrahmātivartate ||* MDhP 229.22: *dharmajñānapraṭiṣṭhaṃ hi taṃ devā brāhmaṇaṃ viduḥ | śabdabrahmaṇi niṣṇātaṃ pare ca kṛtānīścayam ||* MDhP 232.30: *evaṃ sarvātmanaḥ sādhoḥ sarvatra samadarśinaḥ | ṣaṇmāsān nityayuktasya śabdabrahmātivartate ||*, see also MaU 6.22.



Having created a bed for himself, Hari Nārāyaṇa falls asleep (17d). His sleep is different from the sleep of reality when the world is absent. It is a yogic sleep during which he dreams of the manifold or colourful (*citra*) creation of the world and during which the category of classes is used (*bahugūṇodbhava*, 17ef).<sup>26</sup> The source domain of this conceptualisation is a yogin who is just before liberation and is able to cognise and experience all forms of the manifest aspect. This is the form seen by Arjuna. At the same time, in this context, the concept of dreaming sleep is the source domain for the conceptualisation of artistic creation. It is possible that the Composer also had in his mind the meaning of *citra* as a noun which is ‘picture, sketch, delineation’. The compound *bahugūṇodbhava* that qualifies creation literally means that it appears thanks to various classes. If the recipient activates the literal meaning of the noun *gūṇa*, he will understand creation as measuring which, literally, could refer to measuring an image and, metaphorically, to recitation of the Veda (see chapter 1.1.3, 1.1.6). In context of storytelling the ability to use classes, *gūṇa*, can be seen as the creative skill of the narrator.

The first class that Hari Nārāyaṇa uses is called ‘the great class of himself’ (*mahān ātmagūṇaḥ*, 18ab).<sup>27</sup> We can interpret this formulation in accordance with earlier cosmogonies analysed in this study. The highest cognitive agent creates a general category (*gūṇa*) that allows him to categorise himself as great (see chapter 4.5, 4.9.4). The expression *mahān ātmagūṇaḥ* phonetically activates the concept of Great Self (*mahan ātman*) which is the first manifestation of Brahma in MS 1.15 (see chapter 1.1.4). Then the I-form (*ahaṃkāra*, 18c) appears which implies that Hari Nārāyaṇa cognitively splits himself into subject and object. We could imagine him thinking in this moment: ‘Wow, I am so great!’.

This thinking results in appearance of Brahma (18d). Within the frames of storytelling Brahma is the first protagonist of the story who creates a particular Ego-viewpoint. Both Hari Nārāyaṇa as the narrator of the main narrative space and as the recipient who listens to the story, compress their viewpoints with the Ego-viewpoint of Brahma. He could be named as the highest cognitive agent in the cosmos to be distinguished from Hari Nārāyaṇa. Brahma is the highest cognitive agent in the cosmos because his cognition will be limited to the cosmos, while the cognition of Hari Nārāyaṇa also includes the borderline sphere (where he is located) and the unmanifest aspect of reality.

<sup>26</sup> MDhP 335.17: *vidyāsahāyavān devo viṣvakseno hariḥ prabhuḥ | apsv eva śayanaṃ cakre nidrāyogam upāgataḥ | jagataś cintayan sṛṣṭim citrāṃ bahugūṇodbhavām ||*

<sup>27</sup> MDhP 335.18: *tasya cintayataḥ sṛṣṭim mahān ātmagūṇaḥ smṛtaḥ | ahaṃkāras tato jāto brahmā śubhacaturmukhaḥ | hiraṇyagarbho bhagavān sarvalokapitāmahaḥ ||*

The way of description of appearance of Brahma implies that he is identified with the I-form (*ahaṃkāra*), so is able to repeat again the cognitive split into subject-object cognition in order to recognise his identity with the object. Brahma is also called the *hiranyagarbha*, ‘a golden womb’ (with an embryo inside it, 18e). The concept of the embryo highlights the potentiality of a story which will become the cosmos. It also evokes the general domain of Procreation and allows the recipient to conceive of the appearance of Brahma in these terms: he is born from waters sexually united with Hari Nārāyaṇa. We may also presume that the concept of the golden embryo evokes the concept of the Golden Egg elaborated in MS 1.9, 12–13 in reference to the cosmos (see chapter 1.1.3–4). Identification of Brahma with the golden embryo implies that Brahma recognises his identity with his object i.e., the cosmos in its potential state. Its identity with the first manifestation of reality in the Veda (brahman) is expressed in verse 19a where the Composer states that Brahma has appeared from *aniruddha* ‘unobstructed’ the epithet of brahman in 16a.<sup>28</sup> The logic of the general domain of Procreation strengthens the identity of the son with his father.

Brahma is described as a shining man with four faces (18d) which implies his omniscience (as far as the cosmos is concerned). He has eyes like lotus petals and sits in a lotus with thousands of leaves. Since the noun *garbha* (used as the second part of the compound *hiranyagarbha*) also means a calyx of a lotus, the recipient understands that the golden embryo now has become a fully grown child or a young man (ŚB 11.1.6). The logic of the concept of a growing plant allows him to blend the concept of its stalk with the concept of the umbilical cord. It links Hari Nārāyaṇa (conceived as androgyne namely a man who inseminates a woman and a woman who gives birth to a child) with Brahma (conceived as his/her son).<sup>29</sup>

Brahma looks at the cosmos. In its potential form the cosmos is conceived in terms of waters (20b).<sup>30</sup> Since reality in its unmanifest aspect and the borderline sphere are conceived in the same way (see above), the recipient understands that the difference between the aspects of reality is still not clear

<sup>28</sup> MDhP 335.19: *padme ‘niruddhāt sambhūtas tadā padmanibhekṣaṇaḥ | sahasrapatre dyutimān upaviṣṭaḥ sanātanaḥ ||*

<sup>29</sup> Thus, the earliest sources of tradition are blended with the present description. Firstly, the concept of a plant is used to conceive creation in RV 4.58 (Jurewicz 2010). Secondly, the whole image activates the model of Child Of The Waters: Brahma is Hari Nārāyaṇa, the calyx of lotus which encircles him are waters in their activity of surrounding, feeding, giving birth and being inseminated by the Child present in them. For lotus as the source domain in cosmogony see MDhP 175.15, chapter 1.2.1.a.

<sup>30</sup> MDhP 335.20: *dadṛśe ‘dbhutasamkāse lokān āpomayān prabhuḥ | sattvasthaḥ parameṣṭhī sa tato bhūtagaṇān sṛjat ||*

in this stage of creation. The logic of the source domain which is the concept of lotus allows the recipient to assume that the waters are dark, so nothing is visible in them as it is in the case of the muddy water from which lotuses appear. The potential state of the world is also expressed by Brahma seeing it in miraculous closeness (*adbhutasamkāṣe*, 20a). This implies that the division into sky and the earth has not yet been created. The adjective *adbhuta* highlights the unnaturalness of this state from the point of view of everyday experience.

Brahma is presented as standing in *sattva* (*sattvastha*, 20c) which allows the recipient to understand that he is that manifestation of Hari Nārāyaṇa able to use this class. Brahma begins to create the groups of beings (18d) according to the Veda.<sup>31</sup> The concept of the Veda is mentioned explicitly for the first time in cosmogony, but its earlier composition is such that the recipient knows that it is the Veda which has appeared in the first creative stage as all sounding brahman. Taking into account that in oral culture a text exists in social space only when it is spoken, we could say that Brahma begins to tell the story contained in the Veda from his Ego-viewpoint.

The Composer now invites his recipients to leave the viewpoint of Brahma and return to the main narrative space. He describes the creation of two other classes. Before Brahma was created, two other classes (*guṇa*) have already been applied by Hari Nārāyaṇa. They are called *uttara* (*guṇottarau*) which means ‘superior’ but also ‘left’ as opposed to *dakṣiṇa* which means ‘right’ in a ritual context when men should face east. Both interpretations suggest the necessity of their presence although their evaluation is a contradiction: as the superior these protagonists are better than Brahma but, as the left, they are connected with the inauspicious parts of the cosmos. One could suggest that this reflects the conviction of the Vedic and the early Smṛti composers that the aspects of reality which appear as first in creation become, when the cosmos is created, the embodiment of the object which is cognised by the subject. The existence of the object is necessary for the subject-object cognition but men should choose the subjective activity. As it has been shown, objective manifestations are evaluated as morally bad in order to force men to avoid them (see chapter 2.6).

But let us go back to the story. The two classes are conceived as two drops of water lying at the lotus leaf (21cd).<sup>32</sup> The logic of the concept of the growing of a plant implies that, in this moment, the calyx has not yet appeared. At the same time, conceptualisation of classes in terms of drops of water implies that they are conceived as his sons because the drops in this

<sup>31</sup> We are told explicitly about them when the asuras stole the Veda from Brahma, see below.

<sup>32</sup> MDhP 335.21: *pūrvam eva ca padmasya patre sūryāṁśusaprabhe | nārāyaṇakṛtau bindū apām āstām guṇottarau ||*

context can be interpreted as drops of semen. We are then told that there are other sons apart from Brahma, so the act of insemination was repeated three times. And only the last one was successful.

Hari Nārāyaṇa looks at the first of his drops it and the drop begins to shine (335.22–23ab). Then it becomes the Asura Madhu who are born from darkness (*tamas*).<sup>33</sup> This description suggests that Hari Nārāyaṇa, cognises himself as a drop (which is conceived in terms of its shining), then realises that in this form he is not able to cognise further and classifies this state with the aid of the class of *tamas*. Thus, the first character of the story, personified as Asura Madhu, is created. His Ego-viewpoint is determined by his ability to use the *tamas* class. His name *Madhu*, which literally means ‘honey’, implies the appearance of light from darkness which, in turn, implies that Hari Nārāyaṇa regains his cognitive and creative abilities for a moment only to lose them. In the source domain, Madhu is an unsuccessful firstborn son. In the target domain, it is the first manifestation of the highest cognitive agent which is not able to continue subject-object cognition. Within the frames of the storytelling, Hari Nārāyaṇa changes his viewpoint: he becomes one of characters of his story, but cannot continue it from this Ego-viewpoint. This echoes the Vedic idea of the creative mistakes of Prajāpati (Jurewicz 2016/18).

Hari Nārāyaṇa wants to continue with the story and this wish is realised: the next character, Asura Kaiṭabha, appears. His Ego-viewpoint is determined by his ability to use the class of *rajas*. The difficulty of this stage of creation is expressed in the qualification of Kaiṭabha as *kaṭhina*, ‘difficult’ (23 c–d).

Then the story returns to the moment when Brahma creates the world. The Asuras climb along the lotus stalk, see Brahma creating worlds with the aid of the Veda and steal it (24–27). Conceptualisation of the Veda, as an object which can be stolen, is grounded in the storytelling tradition too. As Ready (2018) shows, texts in oral cultures were and are treated as existing independent of their utterances in specific situations, they seem to have an independent pre-existence as a bounded whole and are seen as material objects. According to Ready, this pre-existence of a text and its independence from the present moment of its utterance ‘implies portability and transportability’ from singer to singer.<sup>34</sup>

<sup>33</sup> MDhP 335: *tāv apaśyat sa bhagavān anādinidhano ‘cyutaḥ | ekas tatrābhavad bindur madhvābho ruciraprabhaḥ || (22) sa tāmaso madhur jātas tadā nārāyaṇājñāyā | kaṭhinas tv aparo binduḥ kaiṭabho rājasas tu saḥ || (23)*.

<sup>34</sup> This detachability is ‘at the heart of entextualisation’ which is the process analyzed by Ready. For conceptualisation of sacred words as material shining objects, see Goldman (2016). Thus cosmos, conceived in terms of perceptible unfolding story can preserve its independence from the unmanifest aspect of reality which has been explained as the result of necessity of categories

The disappearance of the Veda means that Brahma forgets its content. Now the recipient is invited to compress with his Ego-viewpoint. Brahma does not know how to create the world and falls into despair (28–32). The Vedas are described by him as his eye (29) which enables him to cognise (COGNITION IS SEEING) and create the story/cosmos. In his lament, Brahma also states that the world become blind without the Veda (30). In this way, the Composer implies ontic identity between the subject (Brahma) and the object (story/cosmos).

Now the story again fails. Hari Nārāyaṇa, the narrator from the main narrative space, has lost the plot. Taking into account what will happen later, it is argued that Hari Nārāyaṇa, compressed with the Brahma Ego-viewpoint also forgets the Veda. The other characters of the story are only able to use the classes of tamas and rajas. They will never be able to bring the story to its end. This dramatic moment again reminds one of the creative mistakes of Prajāpati from the ŚB, but, as in the texts of the Smṛti period, this will be overcome without any danger for the highest cognitive agent.

In this point, the absolute narrator from the story viewpoint space (brahman) becomes the on-stage narrator. Thus, it radically changes his viewpoint. Using the form of the narrator from the main narrative space (Hari Nārāyaṇa), it becomes the next character of the story (Hayaśiras, a man with the head of a horse). It kills the Asuras and gives the Veda back to Brahma. In these terms, the return of memory and to the main plot of the story is conceived. Brahma successfully continues creation conceived as the recitation of the Veda.

A brief resume of the story so far. Reality, in its manifestation as brahman, is the narrator in the story viewpoint space. Hari Nārāyaṇa is the narrator who creates the main narrative space. Madhu, Kaiṭabha and Brahma are the protagonists who constitute their specific Ego-viewpoint spaces depending on the class they use: Madhu uses the class of tamas, Kaiṭabha uses the class of rajas and Brahma uses the class of sattva. It should be noted that the main plot of the story, which is the Veda, concentrates around its transmission. In the source domain, it is transmitted from father to son, in the target domain, from less perceptible manifestations of reality to those more perceptible (brahman – Hari Nārāyaṇa – Brahma). The general domain of Procreation, in terms of which the creation of cosmos/story is conceived, endows the story told by the Composer with dramatic tension as it is one about sons and their father in whose eyes the sons are not equal as only one of the sons will get the Veda with his help.

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used by the highest cognitive agent. But Hildebeitel (2011b: 52) takes this description as an argument for a written form of the MBh.

The fall of the narrator from the main narrative space means the fall of the absolute narrator who needs to create a new character in order for the story to reach its happy-end. The happy-end is restoration of the Veda which is the named aspect of brahman. In other words, it is the restoration of the second self of the narrator within the story. The Veda preserved by the Brahmins is unmanifest reality embodied in language. Within the frames of storytelling, it is the result of compression of the narrator from the story viewpoint space with the particular Ego-viewpoints of those who recite it and the story itself. We will discuss this issue in the next section.

#### 5.2.4. Teleology and storytelling

Each philosophy, which assumes the existence of a perfect being who creates the world, has to answer the answer as to why and for what reasons did a perfect being create that world. The reason for creation in early Indian thought is the mysterious wish of reality to create an aspect of itself where it will cognise itself in subject-object cognition, in the cosmos and in men. This is expressed already in the AU 1.3.13–14 where the self (*ātman*), born within man, looks around and sees that everything is brahman (Jurewicz 2016/2018). Putting this in Dancygier’s terms, reality wants to change its viewpoint and see itself from different viewpoints to confirm that, in spite of its manifest shapes and movements, the subjects and the objects of its cognition are the same. The triumphant exclamation of the self (*ātman*) in the AU 1.3.11, ‘I have seen that!’ (*idam adarśam itī*) may reflect satisfaction that one has after telling or listening to a good story.

In order to explain the process of the change of viewpoint in narratives, Dancygier quotes a fragment of the novel where the woman-narrator states:

She gave me a man’s jacket, a pair of stripped trousers, a derby hat. I put them on and looked at the mirror. I was a man.<sup>35</sup>

Dancygier says that the identity of a woman looking into the mirror undergoes a crucial change (2012: 100). As she states ‘one’s sense of uniqueness is a result of highly compressed blend’. In the moment described above, the self of the narrator in the story is decompressed into two: the narrator is the woman in the story viewpoint space (SV), and simultaneously, the man

<sup>35</sup> *The Picture Palace*, p. 97; Dancygier (2012: 95).

in the main narrative space (MN). The decompression of the self is done in order to again compress herself with her new role as a man.<sup>36</sup>

This narrative example is strikingly similar to the descriptions of the very first stage of creation presented by the cosmogonies analysed in this study. When reality (the story viewpoint space) begins to manifest itself (that is creates the main narrative space, MN), it firstly manifests itself as man (MDhP: Hari Nārāyaṇa, MS the self-existent lord, *svayambhūr bhagavān*). The passage from a sleeping to a waking state is the first change of viewpoints. Then, as a man (within the MN) it changes its viewpoint again and also sees itself as a woman (the concept of which metonymically is evoked by the concept of water (MDhP 335.17, MS 1.8–9). It is worth noting that, in the ŚB, expression of thought in words is conceived in terms of a sexual act between its male and female manifestations (MIND IS MALE, SPEECH IS FEMALE, Jurewicz 2012).<sup>37</sup> The recipient well versed in tradition will evoke this conceptualisation and better understand the source domain of the story created by the Composers of the MDhP and MS. There are two characters with male and female Ego-viewpoints who meet in the sexual act. In MDhP 335, it is conceived in terms of the creation of a bed, in MS in terms of the insemination of waters.

However, similarity between the example given by Dancygier and the early Vedic and Hindu cosmogonies not only concerns literary motives i.e., the source domain which is the change of sex/gender. As stated above, the difference between the two names of reality, *brahman* and *ātman*, can also be explained as motivated by the viewpoint change. The designate of both words is the same: one reality. From the viewpoint of the manifest aspect, *brahman* is its description in the third person, as in sentence ‘brahman exists.’<sup>38</sup> *Ātman* is its description in the first person as in the sentences: ‘myself (*ātman*) exists’ and ‘I (*ātman*) am brahman’. The former sentence ‘brahman exists’ is a theoretical statement which begins the liberating conclusion, the latter is its conclusion: reality sees itself (*ātman*) from the inside of cognising man and the cosmos and understand its unity called *brahman*. This recognition is

<sup>36</sup> For cognitive approach to the phenomenon of decompression of self, see Lakoff (1996), in language, see e.g. Abrantes (2010), in cognitive poetics see e.g., Barreras Gómez (2015). For a more general approach, see Zlatev 2008.

<sup>37</sup> In *Gopatha Brāhmaṇa* 1.1.3, the highest cognitive agent, having created waters (which are conceived in terms of sweat appearing because of its heating), sees its shadow in them into which he emits semen from which it is born (see also *General Conclusion* 3). As Garcia (2018) shows, in one moment of his soliloquy with imagined Achilles, Hektor presents himself as a woman, while Achilles is a man with whom Hektor will not fight, but make love.

<sup>38</sup> TU 2.6.1: *asann eva sa bhavati | asad abrahmeti veda cet | asti brahmeti ced veda | santam enaṃ tato vidur iti |*

described in the exclamation of the self that is presented in the AU where *ātman* recognises that it is brahman.

Following Dancygier's argumentation we could say that the concept of reality just before creation, conceived as the absolute narrator at story viewpoint space (SV), is a highly compressed blend. The creation of the world is a narrative decompression of its self into two conceptual entities: one is the unmanifest aspect (brahman), the second is its self (*ātman*) about which it thinks. That self, expressed in the Veda, is a story about itself. Then, the further decompression takes place. The absolute narrator manifests itself as the cosmic listener and narrator (Hari Nārāyaṇa in MDhP 335, Brahma in MS 1) and thus sets the main narrative space (MN, the cosmos). Next, the absolute narrator further decompresses itself into a multiplicity of Ego-listeners-and-narrators, based on the different frames applied (Dancygier 2012: 101): the story told by some of them will further create the cosmos (seven seers in the Veda, Brahma in MDhP 335, Manu in MS 1), the story told by others (men and other sentient beings) will confirm the ultimate unity of the reality or it will not.

As stated, the final aim of this magnificent story told by reality is that it could listen about itself, and experience itself, from within the main narrative space and various Ego-viewpoints. As Dancygier (2012: 102) writes,

‘decompression for viewpoint compression’ is a narrative technique allowing a single Ego-narrator to represent other viewpoints, constructed *via* decompression, by compressing them with his /her own.

Reality decompresses itself (*ātmānam*) in multimodal ways in order to compress itself again from the viewpoint of each character in its story.<sup>39</sup> The logic of the frame of storytelling implies that, finally, it will return to the awareness of itself as realised in the story viewpoint space (SV). As in the everyday creation of a story the author identifies with his characters but, ultimately, comes back to their personal unity.

### 5.2.5. Liberating cognition as changing viewpoints

As shown, the position of man is unique among the sentient beings (see chapter 4.1). We could say that his role is to listen to the story presented to him by the Veda in the first stage of his life as a pupil and then tell it with his own life. In everyday life, man has access to two viewpoints from which

<sup>39</sup> As Fauconnier, Turner (2003) show, such is the mechanism of understanding blended concepts: compression of the input spaces into the blend is accompanied/ followed by their decompression back into the input spaces.



to tell a story. The first is their individual perspective. The second is that of their social state. We should bear in mind that society is conceived as the cognising man; it is the next decompressed self of reality. As in an organism, each part has its own functions and should properly cooperate with other parts. In the same way, each social state tells its story and enacts it in a different way. Men are expected to tell the story from their social viewpoint too and should not mingle it with other viewpoints. Within the present frames, we can define dharma as the law which obliges men to preserve their social and individual viewpoints and does not allow them to spoil the story.

As we have seen in previous chapters, liberating cognition can be seen as a conscious process of decompression of the amalgamate agent and then of recompression performed in a new way (see chapter 4.7). We will now see this process through the lens of Dancygier's approach. Man should compress his self with reality in order to access the story viewpoint space (SV). Having reached this viewpoint, man's way of cognising and experiencing radically changes and he realises that it is he who is telling the whole story. On the other hand, in such a man the absolute narrator becomes the on-stage narrator and can listen to its story from a specific Ego-viewpoint.

In this state, man is free to act in two ways. The first way is to remain in total compression with the absolute narrator and to end the story as a particular listener and storyteller.<sup>40</sup> The second way is to continue to listen and tell the story. In this situation, man repeats creation in microscale and decompresses his self in the same way as the absolute narrator in *illo tempore*. Having access to the viewpoint of the main narrative space (MN) of Hari Nārāyaṇa (MDhP 335)/Brahma (MS), the cosmic storyteller, his self is further decompressed into multimodal forms and actions of the cosmos. Man understands that he is one and many at the same time, that he has many selves. He is the absolute narrator and, at the same time, himself a particular human being with access to his Ego-viewpoint e.g., Arjuna at the battle field. This is what we do when we listen, watch or read a good story. We are ourselves and James Bond at the same time.

According to Dancygier, the decompression of one's identity into two personas and the change of roles influences the way a person is perceived by others. The roles of reality in its manifest forms in the main narrative space, with a multiplicity of Ego-listeners-and-narrators, is dramatically different from the state when it is unmanifest. Moreover, the way it is perceived by the listeners-and-narrators of the story is totally different from its unmanifest essence. The better the story the stronger the blend and the story told by reality is very good. Yet, sometimes, the story is spoilt.

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<sup>40</sup> This is the proposal of the Buddha.

### 5.2.6. Transmigration – Spoiling the story

Men often do not want to obey their dharma or are not able to do so. Men are free and their freedom constitutes a strong point of the story but also becomes a weak point for the absolute narrator. Yet, as stated above, the cosmic story is very good and convincing. Unfortunately, reality that surrounds us does not confirm its unity. Just the opposite. However, is this not what stories are for? For a recipient to be, even for a moment, someone else even if in case of reality this moment lasts millions of years. The unmanifest aspect of reality retold by the following narrators in the main narrative space (Brahma and Manu in MS, Hari Nārāyaṇa and Brahma in MDhP 335) is multiple, changing, colourful and fascinating. It is easy to forget that one has access to the story viewpoint space (SV) as if ‘at hand’, just inside oneself.

So, men begin to tell the story only from their individual Ego-viewpoints because they are totally compressed within their psycho-physical selves. We could say that they get access to the Ego-viewpoints of Asuras Madhu and Kaiṭabha in MDhP 335. However, the story always becomes true, even if it is told by a deluded narrator. If men describe themselves as ontologically different, they will not access the story viewpoint space from where they could see the unity of reality. In other words, they will not gain the possibility that their life is a story told by themselves. The situation of such men is bleak. For them the story becomes ultimately real. Life with all its beauty but, what is even more important, with all its cruelty affects really them: their suffering is real, they lose those they love and they finally die to be reborn in forms which bring them more and more suffering.

However, the ultimate ‘loser’ in this situation is the absolute narrator present in such men.<sup>41</sup> We could say that it compresses itself so strongly with its own characters that it accepts their Ego-viewpoints as its whole viewpoint. The epistemic viewpoint of a particular character becomes ontologically real and the absolute narrator is enclosed in that man’s organism and transmigrates from life to life. The more difficult the life of a man, the more bleak is the story and it seems that there is no way out. Its retelling by Bhisma to Yudhiṣṭhira and Kṛṣṇa to Arjuna can be seen as the moment when one closes the book or leaves the cinema, looks around and sees everything at its place, breathes a sigh of relief and thinks: ‘Thanks God, it was only a story’.

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<sup>41</sup> This is the reason for the pluralism of some philosophers who are representative of classical Indian philosophy (called Darśanas) and cannot accept the dependence of the Absolute on man and his cognition and activity.

### 5.2.7. The creation of the world and soliloquy

The motivating influence of oral tradition on philosophical thinking can also be grounded in the epic performance of soliloquies. They are attested in Homeric epics.<sup>42</sup> It does not seem as if they are attested in the MBh in a pure form but we may treat the BhG as a soliloquy of Arjuna.<sup>43</sup> This interpretation is supported by Kṛṣṇa being the charioteer of Arjuna's chariot and, as has been shown, the concepts of chariot and charioteer are used to conceptualise the human organism (with their mind) and the self respectively (see chapter 4.6.2). Moreover, the 'phantom other'<sup>44</sup> with which the hero converses usually represents social moral values and expectations (Garcia 2018: 301) and the discrepancy between Arjuna's personal doubts and the expectation of the others, presented by Kṛṣṇa, is the pivotal issue discussed in the BhG.

However, the cosmogonies of the ŚB attest a soliloquy by the highest cognitive agent Prajāpati who, during the whole process of creation, converses with himself (a very good example are ŚB 2.2.4 and 6.1.1.1–3). The fact that soliloquies are performed by a hero 'in the moment of crisis in which his sense of self comes to feel fragmented' (Garzia 2018: 302) only confirms the thesis that creation in the ŚB is a dangerous process for reality (see Jurewicz 2016/2018). As Garcia writes 'the hero is 'divided at heart' as he ponders his situation ... and it is this feeling of division that is expressed in monologues to one's *thumos*' (2018: 302). ŚB 2.2.4.3, having described a situation in which reality is endangered by annihilation states: *tād evāśya mānasy āsa* 'that was in his mind' which implies an internal dialogue of Prajāpati with himself.

There is one more similarity between epic soliloquies and the cosmogonies of the ŚB. Garcia (2018) refers to Athens (1994, 1995) who argues that the 'phantom other' is not only a second interlocutor but in soliloquy creates a 'phantom community' within the mind of the hero. In its manifest aspect, reality creates not only its other self, but also its other selves embodied first of all in human society (Jurewicz 2012). All these similarities between soliloquies and early Hindu cosmogonies allows for the postulation that the experience of soliloquy, as part of oral tradition, also motivated early Hindu philosophical thinking.

<sup>42</sup> Bonifazi (2018), Garcia (2018).

<sup>43</sup> For soliloquy in the Epics, see Hildebeitel (2011a: 481–516, 2011b: 221–257).

<sup>44</sup> Athens (1994, 1995) referred to by Garcia (2018).

### 5.2.8. The concept of the Absolute as a storyteller

In the research presented in this writer's monographs on the history of ancient Indian philosophical ideas (Jurewicz 2010, 2016/18 and present) the term 'Absolute' in reference to reality described by early Indian philosophers has not been used. Instead, the term 'reality' is used because the concept of the 'Absolute' has been created in a concrete tradition and carries its own meanings and connotations. In the RV however, it is the concept of reality called Agni, the fire, that in subsequent tradition up to brahman in the Upaniṣads and in Smṛti thought, that structurally corresponds to the European concept of the Absolute in that it is conceived as something which exists out of itself and which is the basis for all contingent beings.

In his *Horror methaphysicus* (1990), Leszek Kołakowski construes a synthesis of philosophical investigation on the Absolute in the main stream of European thought. He defines it as something whose non-existence is a logical and ontic contradiction. On this basis, he proposes a definition of the Absolute as something whose non-existence is a logic and ontic contradiction. Such a definition of the Absolute is deeply grounded in a Greek and Judeo-Christian background; one of the first definitions of the Yahweh is that given to Moses: 'I am who is' (*Exodus* III, 14). He sees the necessary existence of the Absolute as its most basic attribute, and claims that from that attribute other attributes of the Absolute can be logically deduced such as: self-sufficiency, permanence, uniqueness, pure actuality, timelessness, lack of complexity.

In early Hindu thought however, the monistic assumption demands an explanation of how the one can transform into the plural so the attributes of the Absolute are conceived in a different way. Thus, the most basic attribute of the Indian concept of the Absolute is freedom which allows other attributes to be denied: if the Absolute does not want to be the Absolute, it is free enough to do that. And this happens during creation: one becomes many, immovable becomes movable, omnipotent becomes limited, omniscient becomes deprived of knowledge and cognising. In early cosmogonies of the Brahmanas it can even deny its own existence (especially ŚB 2.2.4, see Jurewicz 2016/2018). If Moses questioned the Absolute in northern India during early Vedic times, he would get the answer 'I am the one who does not have to be'. Freedom of the Absolute finds its expression in its ability to limit itself to its own manifestations with all the consequences of this fact: the emotional consequences such as ultimate fear, the epistemological ones such as the inability to think and the ontological ones such as old age and death.

The earliest experience which could have motivated such a conceptualisation of the Absolute, attested in the RV, are the altered states of consciousness

under the influence of soma which allowed men to experience themselves as free from all constraints such as poverty, lack of knowledge, inability to move freely, illnesses and death. Under the influence of soma, they felt rich, omniscient and omnipresent, able to fly and change the size of their bodies, ever healthy and immortal (Jurewicz 2010). These experiences motivate the conceptualisation of Agni, the fire, as internally contradictory and are explicitly expressed in RV 10.129 where the Absolute before creation is neither being/truth (*sat*) nor non-being/untruth (*asat*) and after creation it is both.

However, such experiences were not the only motivation for the concept of the Absolute as free. It can be argued that a significant factor was oral tradition which remained when soma was lost in the early stages of history and which has been continued in subsequent centuries of Hindu cultural development. The seemingly contradictory concept of the Absolute, as described above, is grounded in common human experience. Thanks to our ability to create stories and to compress the viewpoints of their narrators and protagonists, we are able to deny our real identity and become someone or something else. The experience of being dependent on the characters of a story is not unfamiliar to the authors themselves: it often happens that a character escapes them and becomes different to the one imagined at the beginning of the story.

However, when a story ends, authors and their recipients decompress the blends created by it and come back to their own identity. The viewpoints of gods, seven seers and free men allow the absolute narrator to experience how it is not to be the Absolute, but finally it recognises its absoluteness and confirms its freedom. The viewpoints of those who do not cognise properly are those in whom the absolute narrator forgets itself. In other words, it is conceived similarly to those people who do not decompress the narrative blends when the story is closed and who are diagnosed as insane. One would like to emphasise, however, that within those Ego-viewpoints the freedom of the Absolute, expressed in its total negation, is ultimately confirmed. As totally free, it creates free characters that are able to become independent from it and make it forget itself.

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In this section, we have analysed the basic philosophical concepts of early Hindu philosophy applying the approach of cognitive linguistics used in literary analysis. We adopted the analytical frames of Dancygier (2012) who investigates our ability to understand the various viewpoints created in stories. Since oral tradition was still prevailing at the time the early Smṛti texts were composed, it is not surprising that their Composers were motivated by

this experience in their philosophical theories. Within its frames, cosmogony is seen as a transmission of a story (Veda) from father to son. Reality is conceived in terms of a storyteller and the motive for the creation of the world and man is its wish to experience something different from the eternal existence that is impossible to be described and cognised. The most obvious way, to realise this wish, is to split unity and become many.<sup>45</sup> The split is not ontological, but epistemological: the manifoldness of Ego-listeners-and-narrators and their viewpoints is as real as they are real in our experience as storytellers and listeners. The fact that the source domain of storytelling is based on a very common human experience causes the early Indian metaphysics to be understood in spite of its peculiarity and contradictions. Taking into account that the story of the reality is multimodal, it would be interesting to investigate it with the tools proposed in the analysis of multimodal stories.<sup>46</sup>

The basic scenario of storytelling which needs a teller, a listener and a story strengthened the basic model of creation seen as the creation of the possibility of subject-object cognition which is accepted not only in Hinduism but also in Buddhism (Jurewicz 2005). Let us note that the composition of the MBh and the MS also reflects the relationship between the author and his recipients in oral tradition. In his study on the structure and composition of the MS, Olivelle (2013a) analyses the relationships between ‘listeners’ and ‘hearer’ which form the frame of the expositions. As he writes:

The narrator narrating what he had heard and placing his narrative in the distant past is also at the heart of the Mahābhārata structure. Although its narrative structure is much simpler, the same is true of the M[ānava] [Dh]armaśāstra as well. We have here five layers of ‘telling’, ‘hearing’ and ‘re-telling’. At the most remote level, we have the creator himself soon after his creative activity composing a treatise and reciting it to his son Manu (1.58).<sup>47</sup>

This shows how deeply oral transmission of knowledge was anchored in the minds of the early Smṛti composers to the extent it was used as the basic constructional frame. In case of the MS, Olivelle sees this narrative structure as one of two great innovations of Manu in comparison with the Dharmasūtras which are ‘nothing more than scholarly works’ (2013a: 195) and he assumes possible Buddhist influence.<sup>48</sup> The introduction of Manu as the first single

<sup>45</sup> The cosmogonies of the Brāhmaṇas usually begin with the description of the cognitive power of the Absolute (called Prajāpati) who wonders how can become many.

<sup>46</sup> e.g., Alonso, Molina, Porto (2013), Porto, Alonso (2014), Molina, Porto (2016), Dancygier, Vandelanotte (2017).

<sup>47</sup> Olivelle (2013a: 196). See also Hildebeitel (2016: 17), Brodbeck (2013: 151–152).

<sup>48</sup> Similar to Hildebeitel (2001).

hearer of dharma could be patterned, according to him, after the Buddhist suttas which conventionally begin with the sentence ‘Just I have heard.’ We can also assume that their structure was motivated by the traditional way of teaching and that this shared tradition of Buddhists and Brahmins is why the authors of the MS accept this structure so easily in their composition. The grounds for it being the self-existent Lord (*svayaṃbhūr bhagavān*) who begins the story and then tells it through his consecutive manifestation can be found not only in the personal teachings described by the Brāhmaṇas and the Upaniṣads (Olivelle 2013a: 196), but also in the very structure of creation seen as the transmission of speech (*vāc*) or of the threefold knowledge (*trayī vidyā*) which in turn reflects experience.

The fact that the Veda was preserved orally among the Brahmins and existed only when it was recited during personal studies and practice and in groups can be seen through the lens of modern neurocognitive theories (e.g., Gazzaniga 2012, Damasio 2018). These argue that the social mind arises when there is contact between multiple brains to become an emergent structure the meaning of which cannot be reduced to its parts. This argues for treating the Veda, memorised and recited, as a kind of independent entity which can be analysed as a philosophical concept. Common recitation which engaged the mental and bodily activity of the reciters strengthened the ease with which concepts of tradition could be activated and its influence could be overwhelming. Such an experience of the Veda, as an independent object, could be crucial factor that allowed some philosophers such as Bhartṛhari or those from Mimāṃsā to see the concept of a story (Veda) as a philosophical concept which has to be investigated and explained.

It should be noted that there is an important difference between philosophical discourse and that of storytelling though in both cases metaphors and blends are used. Philosophical discourse is focused on those aspects of source domains and input spaces which are projected into target domains and blends, because creation of abstract concepts is the aim of such discourse. The aim of storytelling, on the other hand, is not only to transfer information but also to arouse emotion. Because of that elements of the source domains and input spaces are also elaborated. The Composer of the MS aims at the abstract description of a creative stage when he states that the self-existent lord (*svayaṃbhūr bhagavān*) pours his semen into waters he has created. The Composer of MDhP 335 also aims at literary expression when he creates the image of a man who prepares a bed for himself.

In the last part of this section, a definition of the Absolute is proposed which is complementary to the European one. It exists out of itself; it is the cause of contingent beings and it is free. Its freedom allows it to create

the world thanks to the negation of its other attributes, such as existence or omniscience. It has been argued that the experience of storytelling is an important formative experience which led to such a concept of the Absolute. Western philosophy and religious studies would benefit if it included such a concept of the Absolute into its consideration. After all, it is still widely accepted by many strands of Hinduism and Buddhism and billions of people on earth believe, discuss and elaborate it.

### 5.3. Early Smṛti philosophy and play

In this chapter, we will discuss the philosophy analysed in the present study using the concept of play. The concept of storytelling can be seen as a part of this concept though we will focus on play the content of which is played by its participants. Conceptualisation of creation and the functioning of reality in terms of such play is well attested in later Smṛti philosophy, especially in Purāṇas.<sup>49</sup> Here, however, it will be shown that the concept of play, if used as the source domain of transformations of reality, not only allows us to understand philosophical issues, even those in early tradition, in a better way. We will also be able to trace back the sources of the later concepts of cosmic play (*līlā*) and how the frames of such a way of thinking were construed. The cognitive approach proposed in this study is especially useful in such research.

Generally, the metaphor CREATION OF THE WORLD/EXISTENCE OF THE WORLD IS PLAY, allows us to answer the most difficult question in any philosophy that assumes a perfect reality. What were its reasons to create the world? Reality as self-contained *ex definitione* needs nothing else. The monistic and cognitive assumptions do not answer the question either, because they do not explain why one reality wanted to cognise and multiply itself. Already in BU 4.4.22 it is stated that it does not grow with good deeds and is not diminished by wrong ones. As we will see creation, and the existence of the world seen as play, allow us to answer these questions. Moreover, this conceptualisation will shed some more light on the understanding of the highest cognitive agent when it manifests in man.

The chapter will be divided into two main parts. In the first, it will be shown that the general theory of the creation of the cosmos, its existence and the role of man presented by the Smṛti texts and analysed in this study, can be seen as motivated by the concept of play as seen by Western theories

<sup>49</sup> See especially Handelman (1992), Handelman, Shulman (1997), see also O'Flaherty (1984).



of play. The implications of this approach are important for three reasons. Firstly, it confirms yet again that the philological analysis of texts based on the search for words and their semantic analysis is insufficient to fully reconstruct philosophical thought. Secondly, it will show that it is possible to use the terminology of Western philosophy to describe the philosophy presented in the Sanskrit texts and to use Sanskrit concepts in European philosophical inquiry. Thirdly, it will reveal that many assumptions of modern phenomenological and psychoanalytical theories have been accepted and elaborated already in early Hindu thought. The conclusions presented in this chapter should be treated as a preliminary basis for future research that could be done with other than cognitive tools, as it will be shown that the results of such interdisciplinary research can be promising.

In the second part of this chapter, we will analyse the use of words which denote play in Sanskrit *krīdā* and *līlā*. These are not numerous in early Smṛti thought (nor in the Veda) but they do raise important issues as far as the conceptualisation of the creation of the cosmos, its existence and the relationship between it and unmanifest reality are concerned.

The analysis in this part will also allow us to reconstruct the kinds of play the Composers had in mind although they did not always express it explicitly. The main game used in the philosophical context is the concept of dicing. Since the game of dice is a pivotal moment in the plot of the MBh and can be seen as the direct cause of war, and since the war of the MBh takes place on a change of eras (conceived in terms of consecutive throws) from Dvāpara to Kali,<sup>50</sup> we can assume that the concept of this game has had some motivating influence on early Smṛti thinking.

In his study on play, Sutton-Smith (1997) presents seven rhetorics of play. He uses the word rhetoric as ‘the way play is placed in context within broader value systems, which are assumed by the theorists of play rather than studied directly by them’ (Sutton-Smith 1997: 8). Gambling belongs to the rhetoric of play as fate (1997: 10), also called games of chance. Sutton-Smith (1997: 68) argues that these games are useful concept to be used when thinking about other kinds of phenomena:

These phenomena also picture the events and outcomes of play as originating outside the player, as when the gods are at play, the physical universe is at play, or the brain itself is (constantly) at play.

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<sup>50</sup> For discussion on the problem of connection of the Epics and four Yugas, see Gonzalez-Reimann (2002).

It seems however that in Hindu tradition the concept of ‘fate’ can only be applied from the viewpoint of those who are not free. If we assume that reality is free and that men themselves compose their future life in consecutive lives, they are not dependent on any incomprehensible force, but on themselves. This actuality is part of the knowledge of a free man.

It is also possible that the concept of play as the source domain for philosophical concepts has been motivated by development of external visual imagery in early Smṛti times<sup>51</sup> and by the development of theatre.<sup>52</sup> The concept of a puppet theatre is evoked in some places of the MBh. We will also see that some aspects of children’s play are evoked by the Smṛti Composers and thus children’s play could be seen as a formative experience too. Interestingly enough, the concept of sexual play is not elaborated as the source domain, contrary to the Veda.<sup>53</sup> Notwithstanding any particular play which could motivate philosophical thinking, its main features are general enough to be applied in this analysis.

The first comprehensive theory of play was formulated by Huizinga (1949) who sees it as the source of all meaningful human activity.<sup>54</sup> We will refer to the frames proposed by him while being aware that much research has been done since the publication of his work. Aspects of that research could be helpful in an analysis of early Smṛti philosophy and we will refer to some of it. However, it should be noted that the research that has been continued after Huizinga, accepts the basic frames of the play that he proposed.<sup>55</sup> The researchers rather focus and develop various aspects of play that have not been investigated in detail or were omitted by the Dutch scholar. Since our goal is to reconstruct the motivating influence of play on early Hindu philosophy, the general framework of play proposed by Huizinga is sufficient. It will be treated as the Idealised Cognitive Model (ICM) which includes the prototypical scenario of play of which some features can be seen in various plays and games, and others in others.<sup>56</sup> As we will see, all of them can be seen in Smṛti ontology.

<sup>51</sup> Srinivasan (1997: 180–181), Malinar (2007: 9, 247), Hegarty (2012: 28).

<sup>52</sup> It is estimated that the *Nāṭyaśāstra* was composed ca 200 BCE–200 CE (Lidova 2014).

<sup>53</sup> It is worth recalling here Malamoud (1996b: 218) who refers to the *kraīḍina* offering (a part of the Cāturmāsya sacrifice, ŚB 11.5.2) which reconstructs the penis of Prajāpati and of the immortal body (*ātman*) of the sacrificer, because with ‘that (man) sports as it were’ (Eggeling’s translation; *śiśnāny evāsya kraīḍinām haviḥ śiśnair hi krīḍatīva*).

<sup>54</sup> Huizinga himself has studied Indian theatre which could influence his general theory of play (Wesseling 2002).

<sup>55</sup> See Caillois (2001), for a greater summary, see Salen, Zimmerman (2004).

<sup>56</sup> Interestingly, it was the concept of game which Wittgenstein used as the example of category based on the family-resemblance principle and not on classical categorisation principles (*Philosophical Investigations* § 65–71).

### 5.3.1. THE CREATION OF THE WORLD, AND ITS EXISTENCE, IS PLAY

In this section the cosmogony presented in the early Smṛti texts (mostly MS 1) will be analysed with use of Huizinga's ICM of play. This analysis will be enriched with comments of other philosophers who think in a similar vein either in the footnotes or in the main texts. As we will see, the use of this concept will allow us to better understand the logic of creation and, as stated above, solve some philosophical problems connected with its relation between aspects of reality, the role of the highest cognitive agent and man's action.

**'All play is a voluntary activity. It is free, is in fact freedom.'**<sup>57</sup>

As has been stated many times, freedom is the most important attribute of reality in early Hindu thought. Its freedom is expressed in its internally contradictory nature and its ability to perform internally contradictory activities. In RV 10.129, the power is ascribed to 'That One'. The first manifestation of the creative power of reality is called *svadhā*, which means the ability to perform internally contradictory activity in terms of which a free entity is conceived (Jurewicz 2010). It is worth noting, however, that this attribute is not explicitly mentioned in the early Smṛti texts. It logically follows from the way reality is understood. We may also infer it on the basis of descriptions of the liberated man who reaches the state called 'freedom' (*mokṣa*, *mukti*) and who is described as fully identified with reality. Reality creates the cosmos just because it can and because it is able to manifest itself.

**'Play is a stepping out of 'real' life into a temporary sphere of activity with a disposition all of its own.'**<sup>58</sup>

The manifest aspect of reality is conceived in terms of the Golden Egg. Such a conceptualisation highlights the clear boundaries between the aspects similar to that which separate the real world from the world of play. Within its manifest aspect, reality will undertake cognitive activity which is different from its usual state of being unmanifest in which it is omniscient and immovable.

**'Play is distinct from 'ordinary' life both as to locality and duration... It is 'played out' within certain limits of time and place.'**<sup>59</sup>

The first activity of Brahma within the Golden Egg is to create the category of time and arrange it spatially. Thus, the duration of the different activity of

<sup>57</sup> Huizinga (1949: 9).

<sup>58</sup> Huizinga (1949: 8).

<sup>59</sup> Huizinga (1949: 9).

reality within the manifest aspect and its scope is precisely established.<sup>60</sup> The logic of the source domain of play implies that Brahma, as a child, creates its play-ground.

**Play ‘can be repeated at any time.’<sup>61</sup>**

The repetitive nature, of creation and dissolution of the cosmos, is conceived in terms of man who goes to sleep at night and wakes up in the morning. The period of being unmanifest is conceived in terms of the night of Brahma, the period of manifestation in terms of the day of Brahma. The source domain of play, to conceive of repetitive creations and disappearances of the cosmos, is explicitly evoked by MS 1.80, MDhP 292.28 (see below, section 5.3.7.a).

**‘Inside the play-ground an absolute and peculiar order reigns. Here we come across another, very positive feature of play: it creates order, is order.’<sup>62</sup>**

The first manifestation of the cosmos takes place in a free act but, having manifested its cognitive power as the highest cognitive agent, reality preserves the subjective-cognitive scenario of its activity and thus the subjective-objective structure of its manifestation in the cosmos. Cognitive categories (name, time three and five classes, action, sacrifice and dharma/adharma) that allow the highest cognitive agent to recognise itself at ever lower levels of manifestation, become the rules and norms for those manifestations that follow and should follow them. These rules create the order of the cosmos and of society.

According to Huizinga, this closeness between play and order might be the reason why play ‘has a tendency to be beautiful’ (Huizinga 1949: 10). We can recognise that play, the concept of which could be used as the source domain of creative activity, can also be a story or a theatrical performance. It is therefore possible that the same affinity between the cosmos conceived in these terms, and beauty, was also seen by the Smṛti philosophers. The problem of whether the ‘aesthetic factor is identical with the impulse to create orderly form’ (Huizinga 1949: 10), could be a fascinating subject for further studies on Smṛti thought.

<sup>60</sup> Huizinga (1949: 8). See also Fink (2016: 25): ‘The play-world does not even have, strictly speaking, a position or duration in the actual context of space and time – but it has its own inner space and its own inner time. And yet we spend actual time playing and need actual space.’

<sup>61</sup> Huizinga (1949: 10). See also Gadamer (2004: 104): ‘The movement of playing has no goal that brings it to an end; rather, it renews itself in constant repetition.’

<sup>62</sup> Huizinga (1949: 10).

**‘All play has its rules... The rules of a game are absolutely binding and allow no doubt.’<sup>63</sup>**

Reality in the form of the highest cognitive agent submits itself to the rules of subjective-objective cognition with necessity.<sup>64</sup> The cosmic processes are a manifestation of the constant separation of the object from the subject in order to recognise their identity. If the highest cognitive agent broke these rules, the process of self-knowledge would be stopped. This is expressed by Kṛṣṇa in BhG 3.20,22 where he states that if he didn’t act (if he stopped acting) in the cosmos, it would mean the destruction of the world (see chapter 4.11.3).

**Play ‘interpolates itself as a temporary activity satisfying in itself and ending there.’<sup>65</sup>**

The fact that play is autotelic and has no external causes nor goals is one of its most important features that allow its concept to be taken as the source domain for creative activity and for the relationship between reality, the highest cognitive agent and the world. Reality does not need the cosmos or man and it does not have to manifest itself. Its creative activity is superfluous. As Huizinga states ‘for the adult and responsible human being play is a function which he could equally well leave alone’ (Huizinga 1949: 8). The same is true for reality. Within the frames of this thinking, the answer to the perennial question as to why the Absolute created the world is: because it just wanted to play. Everyday experience of play allows us to understand that there is no external reason for playing. It is never boredom or lack of anything. If one plays because of boredom or because of the lack of something, one will never have the fun that can be experienced only during play and is finished when the play is over. Yes, after play one may feel better but it is not because of this that one begins to play.

The highest cognitive agent constantly splits into subjects and objects in order to recognise and confirm their ontic unity. In this way, the coherence of the cosmos (*lokasaṃgraha*) is sustained and preserved. The cause and purpose of the world is realised in its very existence, just as the cause and purpose

<sup>63</sup> Huizinga (1949: 11).

<sup>64</sup> See Fink (2016: 27): ‘Play is primordially the strongest *binding* power.’

<sup>65</sup> Huizinga (1949: 9). See also Fink (2016: 21): ‘Play is a fundamental phenomenon of existence, just as primordial and independent as death, love, work and ruling, but it is *not* directed, as with the other fundamental phenomena, by a collective striving for the final purpose. It stands *over and against* them, as it were, in order to assimilate them to itself by portraying them. We play seriousness, play genuineness, play actuality, we play work and struggle, play love and death.’

of play is realised in it. Huizinga (1949: 10) writes about the playground in the following way:

‘[I]t is invested with the noblest qualities we are capable of perceiving in things: rhythm and harmony.’

It is argued that the same idea of rhythm and harmony could be expressed by the word *lokasamgraha* (BhG 3.20, 25, see chapter 4.11.3).

**‘The element of tension in play ... plays a particularly important part. Tension means uncertainty, chanciness; a striving to decide the issue and so end it.... Play is ‘tense’, as we say.’<sup>66</sup>**

When the highest cognitive agent manifests in man, the next element of play is introduced, namely tension and uncertainty. Tension is caused by human freedom. When manifesting in the cosmos, the highest cognitive agent always submits perfectly to its own categories. One could even speculate as to whether the play is getting boring. The creation of man is a creation of chance and, as has been shown, in most cases men forget about their unmanifest self and act as if they did not possess it.

**‘Play demands order absolute and supreme. The least deviation from it ‘spoils the game’, robs it of its character and makes it worthless.’ (Huizinga 1949: 10)**

From the point of view of the highest cognitive agent men, who do not subject themselves to the rules of its manifestations, could be viewed as spoil-sports.<sup>67</sup> Although the Golden Egg sets distinct borders between aspects, they are fragile at the same time, because reality is one and because man is free.

The philosophical implications of the conceptualisation of the presence of reality in men in terms of the play of reality are very interesting. The highest cognitive agent, enclosed for thousands of years in a cognitive single monad experiences ontological separateness of itself-as-a-part from itself-as-a-whole. The fragility of the magic circle reality created in the beginning manifests not in its unity, but in its duality that it cannot overcome. The highest cognitive agent faces the disconcerting reality of play which is that,

<sup>66</sup> Huizinga (1949: 10–11).

<sup>67</sup> Huizinga emphasises that there is a difference between a spoil-sport and a false player: ‘for the latter pretends to be playing the game and, on the face of it, still acknowledges the magic circle’ (1949: 11). See also Salen, Zimmerman (2004: 275): the spoil-sport reveals fragility of the play-world, he is ‘the representative from the world outside the game.’

when nothing is pretended, everything is serious. It also experiences its dependence on the player within whom it manifests itself. The spoil-sport 'robs play of its illusion' (Huizinga 1949: 11) which becomes for the highest cognitive agent the ontological truth as it is the truth for the player enclosed within it.

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The ICM of play proposed by Huizinga includes the very basic features of play and, most probably, can be applied to all kinds of plays and games, at least for dicing, hide-and-seek play, theatrical performances and children's play which are the kinds of play mentioned in the Vedic and early Smṛti texts. It is a free activity which creates order in a place that is temporarily separated. Within this space, rules should be obeyed by all the participants, who should not reveal the fragility of the play and spoil it. Play involves tension over its results and can be repeated. As we have seen, all these features are features of Smṛti cosmogony and ontology. The difference from the source domain of storytelling is that within the frames of this metaphor it is easier to cognitively separate reality from its manifest aspect. As have stated many times, the relationship between both aspects of one reality is the most difficult philosophical problem for the early Smṛti Composers, one they found impossible to solve in a satisfactory way. The concept of play as the source domain could provide a better solution than that of the concept of storytelling. Reality remains in its incomprehensible and inexpressible unmanifest state while its cognitive manifestation, the highest cognitive agent, plays within its manifest aspect and bears all the consequences of playing.

### **5.3.2. Play as emergent meaning**

There is one more feature of play which is highlighted by those who investigate computer games (Salen, Zimmerman 2004) and generally our interaction with computer technology (Hobart and Schiffman 2000). They investigate the problem of the meaningfulness of complex systems and suggest that the play involved in such systems create meanings which are a consequence of the way the systems work. According to Salen and Zimmerman, emergence is a crucial factor for making the system of the game meaningful to players (2004: 158). In words of Holland (1998, quoted after Salen, Zimmerman 2004: 159), 'emergence is above all a product of coupled, context-dependent inter-actions'. Then he states:

We can no more truly understand strategies in a board-game by compiling statistics of the movement of its pieces than we can understand the behaviour of an ant colony in terms of averages.<sup>68</sup>

The cognitive movement of reality within its manifest aspect consists in the continuous separation and reconnection of the subject and object in all levels of its cosmic manifestation. It is governed by categories that become rules and norms for the lower levels of manifestation which can be seen as the system of play which it is possible to analytically disassemble into its parts and explain (as has been done in this book). However, there is much more meaning in manifestations of reality in the cosmos and in men, which can be called the emergent meaning, and which is understood and experienced by the highest cognitive agent. His transformations within its manifest aspect are not automatic, but meaningful, not only on the epistemic level but also on the emotional level: it cognises its ability to separate itself and to reunite and experiences fear and anger when it is separated and joy when it re-unites.<sup>69</sup> Men also create emergent meaning by their lives, whether or not they follow dharma, and this contributes to the emergent meaning of the whole manifest aspect.

What is fascinating is that the neurocognitive research has shown that human brain works in a similar way. It is seen as a complex system which works between different levels of organisation. As Gazzaniga writes, ‘you’d never predict the tango if you only studied neurons’.<sup>70</sup> As he argues, it is impossible to understand the functioning of the whole brain taking into account only the work of its particular parts, because the brain works on many levels simultaneously. Let us note that philosophers of the Brāhmaṇas counted a whole separately and additionally to its parts (Srinivasan 1997: 71, 166).<sup>71</sup> It does not mean that they knew what the modern neuroscience knows. It only means that they were aware that they take part in a whole which cannot be reduced to its parts and that this whole can be investigated and cognised by work on the mind.

Another crucial feature of a game described by Salem and Zimmerman is its cognitive frame. It is a concept connected to the question of the ‘reality’

<sup>68</sup> According to Campbell (1982), quoted after Salen and Zimmerman 2004: 158): ‘a modest number of rules applied again and again to a limited collection of objects leads to variety, novelty and surprise. One can describe all the rules, but not necessary all the products of the rules.’

<sup>69</sup> Conceived in terms of orgasm, Olivelle (2013h), see also Buitenen (1979).

<sup>70</sup> Gazzaniga (2012: 249).

<sup>71</sup> As Salen, Zimmerman (2004: 159) put it: ‘Because an emergent system will play out in unpredictable ways, the whole of the game is more than sum of the part.’



of a game, of the relationship between the artificial world of the game and the ‘real’ life context that it intersects.<sup>72</sup>

The cognitive frame communicates that players are in the space that is separated from everyday reality and that the rules of that reality are suspended within this space (within the ‘magic circle’ as Huizinga puts it). In other words, the meanings produced and gained within this space are different from the meanings produced and gained outside this space. The general message gained thanks to the cognitive frame can be subsumed as ‘This is play.’ Salen and Zimmerman call communication of this fact metacommunication (2004: 371).<sup>73</sup>

The highest cognitive agent in its cosmic manifestation is aware of the frame constituted by the unmanifest aspect of reality that is totally opposed to its manifest aspect which is immersed in subjective-objective movement. The painful loss of meaning that happens when a man is a spoil-sport occurs because the highest cognitive agent loses its cognitive frame and forgets that ‘this is play’. This feature of play is also the feature of storytelling and has already been discussed (see section 5.2). However, since play is perceptible, contrary to a story, the conceptualisation of the situation of the highest cognitive agent as a spoil-sport is much more impressive.

### 5.3.3. Play and phenomenology

The concept of play attracted the attention of philosophers of the 20th century, especially phenomenologists<sup>74</sup> such as Eugen Fink and Hans-George Gadamer. They used this concept to explain the nature of existence of human beings confronted with the world (Fink) and human creativity (Gadamer). Putting their thinking in cognitive terms, they created a mega-metaphor the source domain of which was play elaborated by them in detail in order to conceive abstract philosophical issues.<sup>75</sup> We will look at some aspects of their concept of play to show that Smṛti philosophy can be expressed using contemporary phenomenological apparatus. But it will also demonstrate that some, apparently modern, European theories had been anticipated and discussed two thousand years ago. It is remarkable how the basic logic of

<sup>72</sup> Salen, Zimmerman 2004: 370.

<sup>73</sup> After Bateson (1972: 192): ‘the statement ‘This is play’ looks something like this: These actions in which we now engage do not denote what those actions *for which they stand* would denote.’ For further discussion, see Sutton-Smith (1997: 40–41).

<sup>74</sup> Analysis of the concept of karman through the lens of another phenomenologist, Roman Ingarden, will be presented in a separate section (5.4). For application of methodology of Hermann Schmitz, see Sellmer (2011).

<sup>75</sup> Actually, a lot of philosophical research is based on the analysis of the source domains and their logical implications.

the ICM of play applied to abstract concepts of the creation of the cosmos and its relationship with the ultimate reality has lead philosophers along the same lines of reasoning, both in India at the turn of the eras and in Europe in the 20th century.

### 5.3.3.a. Eugen Fink

In his work, *Play as Symbol of the World*, Fink uses the concept of play in order to explain the nature of the world and man's participation in it. In order to do that, he analyses the concept of play and elaborates it to show its ontological role. As we will see, his analysis is very useful for understanding the cognitive state of reality in its manifest aspect. It will be shown that some implicit assumptions of early Hindu philosophy can be expressed precisely in the language of European philosophy.

The state of man who participates in play (be it a story or a theatrical performance) is called by Fink (2016: 24) 'a splitting of the human being', 'a very peculiar, though in no way pathological, schizophrenia.' In the same terms one can describe the state of reality in its first manifestation and its manifestation of the highest cognitive agent which splits itself into many selves.

In his explanation of participation in play, Fink writes:

Within the internal context of the sense of play, however, he takes on a *role*. And now we must distinguish between the real human being who 'plays' and the human role within the instance of play.<sup>76</sup>

And then he explains:

The player 'conceals' himself by means of his 'role'; in a certain measure he vanishes into it. With an intensity of a peculiar sort, he lives *in* the role – and, yet again, not like a person who is deluded, who is no longer able to distinguish between 'actuality' and 'appearance.' The player can call himself back out of the role. In the enactment of play, there remains a knowledge, albeit strongly reduced, about his double existence.<sup>77</sup>

We can conceive the highest cognitive agent in terms of 'the real human being who plays', and its manifestations are its roles.<sup>78</sup> It hides itself against itself in its manifest aspect, it 'vanishes into it' just in order to again recognise itself. On the cosmic level, it can always 'call itself back' out of the role

<sup>76</sup> Fink (2016: 24–25).

<sup>77</sup> Fink (2016: 25).

<sup>78</sup> This conceptualisation is activated in the MaU 2.7.

because of its knowledge ‘about its double existence’. As a player in a game, it ‘exists in two spheres – but not from forgetfulness or from a lack of concentration’ (25). Fink writes:

This doubling belongs to the essence of playing. All the structural aspects touched on until now come together in the fundamental concept of the *playworld*.<sup>79</sup>

The cognitive doubling of the highest cognitive agent is realised in its consciousness of its unmanifest aspect and of its manifest aspect conceived in terms of a play-world. Within this aspect it is both the subject of cognition (conceived in terms of the audience) and the object (conceived in terms of the manifold players).

The ontological sense of the play-world is a difficult problem. This is an enigmatic field that ‘is not nothing and yet is nothing actual’.<sup>80</sup> Fink discusses the ontological status of the play-world against the actuality of Being and sees the play as the appearance. However, it is not the mere appearance of the mind but also contains objective ontic elements:<sup>81</sup>

By virtue of a production imaginatively carried out, the little girl designates the material body of a doll as a ‘living child,’ and assumes the role of the ‘mother.’ Actual things always belong to the play-world – but in part they have the character of ontic appearance, and in part they are clothed with a subjective appearance stemming from the human soul.<sup>82</sup>

In the same way, the highest cognitive agent projects its subjective appearances onto the manifest aspect in subject-object cognition. If we conceive of the activity of reality within its manifest aspect in terms of play, we could apply Fink’s description:

as a strange interpenetration of ‘Being and ‘Appearance’ – is, as it were, an appearing Being and an existing Appearance. A thorough ontological clarification of play requires an insight, not easy to attain, into the ‘interplay’ of Being and Appearance.<sup>83</sup>

<sup>79</sup> Fink (2016: 25).

<sup>80</sup> ‘We play in the so-called actual world but we thereby attain [*erspielen*] a realm, an enigmatic field, that is not nothing and yet is nothing actual.’ (Fink 2016: 25).

<sup>81</sup> ‘What kind of appearance *is* the play world? The play world contains subjective elements of fantasy and objective, ontic elements’ (Fink 2016: 28).

<sup>82</sup> Fink (2016: 29).

<sup>83</sup> Fink (2016: 54).

Within the frames of this interpretation reality is ‘Being’ and the cosmos is ‘an existing appearance’. This conceptualisation brings us closer to the concept of *māyā* which will be discussed below (section 5.3.6, see also chapter 2.2.2).

The way Fink discusses the relationship between the player and play can also be used in the description of the situation of the highest cognitive agent within its manifest aspect:

Whenever the player slips into a ‘role’ and wraps himself up therein, the activity of play becomes two-dimensional: there is at the same time the activity of the player and the activity of the human being *in* the play-world. What sort of strange character of ‘non-actuality’ belongs to a play-world? This non-actuality is not simply nothing, it is an ‘appearance’ that *is*, an existing appearance.<sup>84</sup>

In search of a similar way of thinking, we can go back to the early Upaniṣads where philosophers explain the levels of reality in its unmanifest and manifest aspects with use of the word *satya* (Jurewicz 2016/18). In CU 6.1–7, ultimate reality in its creative activity is called *sat* whereas its transformations are called *satya*. The Composer of BU 2.1.20 uses the word *satya* in reference to the manifest aspect, the unmanifest aspect is called *satyasya satyam*. Thus, the Upaniṣadic philosophers try to express the ‘non-actuality’ of the cosmos which nevertheless ‘is’ as it exists, although in a different manner than unmanifest reality. The manifest aspect constituted by the cognitive movement of the highest cognitive agent in its various manifestations can be seen as the play-world, the agents of which are real, but their activity creates a new level of meaning, an emergent meaning which is more than just a sum of the activities of its parts (see section 5.3.2). It is real as long as it is perceived as such by the highest cognitive agent who sees, using Fink’s wording ‘the play simultaneously as a play of simply actual human beings and as the portrayed life of the play-worldly figures’ (2016: 88).<sup>85</sup>

<sup>84</sup> Fink (2016: 87–88).

<sup>85</sup> See also his example of Hamlet (Fink 2016: 78) ‘In the activity of play, above all insofar as it involves playing a role [*Darstellungsspiel*], the role-player also performs actual activities – but they have, so to speak, a ‘double ground’ they are activities of the one who is role-playing and, in another way, also activities of the player according to the ‘role’ that he has assumed in the instance of play. Everything that he does proceeds in a strange ‘simultaneity’ on two ‘levels’ that is an actual comportment of a human being in the ‘actual world’ and is at the same time an activity in accordance with roles in a ‘non-actual world of appearance’. ‘The actor [*Schauspieler*] on the stage is as actual as the spectators, the *mise en scène*, the lights, the theater (79) building, but he is at the same time ‘Hamlet’ the prince of Denmark, who wants to avenge the death of his father and for sheer thinking cannot act. Is Hamlet less actual than the actor – does the talk here of less and more have any specifiable sense? If we call the theater-appearance, the play world, merely ‘non-actual’ have we thereby already sufficiently characterised it? The “non-actual” as the simple antonym of the “actual” is indeed

In his analysis of the concept of play in order to explain the relationship between Being and its appearances, Fink also emphasises the reality of the emotions experienced during play:

To be sure, it is an actual, if also ephemeral happiness, but an actual happiness in regard to the illusionary non-actuality that lies in its very self.<sup>86</sup>

These emotions are not only happiness but also ‘the awful horrors of tragedy’ (Fink 2016: 91). Moreover, he pays attention to the fact that play can make the player feel ‘as if he were ‘master’ of his imaginary products’ but it can also lead him to the very opposite extreme of freedom:

For sometimes a relief from real world-actuality can extend all the way to rapture, to enchantment, to succumbing to the daemonic character of the mask. Play can contain within itself the bright Apollonian aspect of free selfhood, but also the dark Dionysian aspect of panic-stricken self-abandonment.<sup>87</sup>

Fink’s exposition is culturally entrenched but taken out of its European cultural frame it highlights the unpredictability of the activity of the highest cognitive agent which can experience the most exalting emotions but also great fear.

We have seen that the Smṛti philosophers, in accord with earlier tradition, conceived of the cognitive manifestation of reality as the creation of its self (*ātman*). Self is created not only in the moment of the first manifestation (which is elaborated in the earlier Upaniṣads), but also within the manifest aspect constituted by the constant recognition of its self in its own manifestations. This recognition is undertaken by the highest cognitive agent. Fink calls playing ‘an illusionary variation on human self-actualisation’ (2016: 90) and in these terms the cognitive activity of reality in its manifest aspect can be conceived.

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that which is utterly nugatory, that which is not at all. The ‘appearance-world’ of the theater is, however, nevertheless something that is, which, as appearance, has precisely a special sort of actuality. Now, however, the Danish Prince has the event of the king’s death presented on the open stage so that the culprits will understand that he knows of their guilt. There thus comes to be another theater played out in the theater, and a double “non-actuality” is introduced. What kind of remarkable and strange “appearance” is this, an appearance that belongs to the kind of play that involves playing a role, indeed in a certain way to play in general, which is, to be sure, actual but presents nothing actual? Can the “non-actuality” of such worlds of appearance be arbitrarily repeated? How can a non-actuality be actual at all?

<sup>86</sup> Fink (2016: 91).

<sup>87</sup> Fink (2016: 25).

### 5.3.3.b. Hans-Georg Gadamer

For Hans-Georg Gadamer play<sup>88</sup> is the way we can understand human creativity in the art and in texts. In his approach both the spectator/reader and the object of art/text are the players and yet the perceiving human subject is also the object perceived. The play that goes on between the subject and object is a to-and-fro movement between the players (Gadamer 2004: 104). It takes place ‘in between’ the players and the audience in which both players and the audience are totally absorbed. He states:

The spectator has only methodological precedence: in that the play is presented for him, it becomes apparent that the play bears within itself a meaning to be understood and that can therefore be detached from the behaviour of the player. Basically, the difference between the player and the spectator is here superseded. The requirement that the play itself be intended in its meaningfulness is the same for both.<sup>89</sup>

In Smṛti philosophy, the spectator also has precedence, both cognitive and ontic. As the analysis of cosmogony in MS 1 shows, at each level of manifestation, the subject appears first in order to create categories which allows him to present himself as the object. However, when the cosmos is created, it is the cognitive relationship between the highest cognitive agent as the subject, and the highest cognitive agent as the object, which has most importance. Without that self-recognising activity, the highest cognitive agent and its objective manifestations would not exist. As we have seen in chapter 2.4, it is the elements categorised by the *rajas* class that are the most important in monistic ontology because they are manifestations of the ontic unity of reality. Putting this ontology in Gadamer’s terms we could say that it is play which gives the meaning of unity to disparate subjects and objects and it is here where the emergent meaning appears.

Moreover, the play, in terms of which Gadamer conceived hermeneutical experience, always takes place between ‘I’ and ‘Thou’ (2004: 369–370). In the analysis of storytelling as the philosophical source domain, it was proposed to see the relationship between brahman and ātman as a relationship between two kinds of expression, with the use of the third person and the use of the first person (see section 5.2.4). The realisation of the experience of ‘I’ and ‘It’ is expressed as ‘I am it’ (*aham brahmo’smi*). The relationship between ‘I’ and ‘Thou’ could be created only when the concept of a personal relationship

<sup>88</sup> He uses this metaphor of play in his interpretation of a work of art. For Gadamer’s concept of play, see Vilhauer (2010).

<sup>89</sup> Gadamer (2004: 109–110).

between the highest cognitive agent and men appears. This relationship is described in BhG 11. In this relationship ‘Thou’ is not treated as an object to be investigated. On the contrary as ‘I’ and ‘Thou’ are not just two selves immersed in their historical condition-ness. In case of the highest cognitive agent, it is not historical conditions that make ‘Thou’ different from ‘I’ but their various involvements in the manifest aspect of reality that make the otherness of ‘Thou’. Their understanding can only be obtained thanks to the openness created in the hermeneutical play in terms of which the creation of the cosmos can be conceived. One could say that this openness allows the highest cognitive agent to transcend the influence of the I-form (*ahaṃkāra*) that was necessary to create the division between ‘I’ and ‘Thou’ but it is finally suspended if self-recognition is fulfilled. One could also imagine the joy and happiness of ‘I’ when it enters the play with the various ‘Thou/s’ in order to recognise itself in the most fantastic forms of the cosmos. The creation of the world and its existence’ seen through the lens of Gadamer’s concept of play similarly to those of Fink, highlights it meaning as the creation of the self (*ātman*).<sup>90</sup>

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The analysis proposed above should be treated as a beginning of a more in-depth studies on conceptual connections between phenomenological philosophy and early Hindu philosophy. We have seen that the way European thinkers construct their ideas, and the terminology they use, can express important aspects of Hindu philosophy. The use of their philosophical apparatus is worthwhile not only because it shows the closeness of these theories, but because it highlights some aspects of Hindu thinking which are not explicitly expressed. This thinking can be reconstructed on the basis of the logic of the concept of play used as the source domain. One is not claiming that all the inferences from this logic are identical, but those based on the prototypical features of the ICM of play probably are. This fact makes one think that many Hindu philosophical concepts and terms could be of use in European investigations. However, this issue needs much more research by specialists of both philosophical strands, Hindu and European.

<sup>90</sup> Fink (2016: 90): ‘That playing as playing is an actual, real enactment of life, that it occurs amid and among the serious activities of life, no one would contest – but the actuality of playing is determined as such precisely by the fundamental character of a non-serious acting-as-if. Playing is an illusionary variation on human *self-actualisation*. Playing itself decides nothing, but it copies in manifold ways the enactment of life in which each moment decides in one way or another. e non-seriousness of play frequently consists in precisely the illusionary imitation of serious life. Play is imitation in the space of the imaginary.’

### 5.3.4. Play and Psychoanalysis

The research of British psychoanalyst, Donald W. Winnicott, is especially interesting, because it is based on clinical experience and his conclusions are based on his work with patients, both children and adults. He used the concept of play to explain a special relationship developed between an infant and its ‘good-enough-mother’ i.e., a mother who allows her infant to safely undergo the process that begins with the illusion of omnipotence and ends with the recognition of its falseness. This process is fundamental for the infant as it can begin to discover its true self. He writes:

It is in playing and only in playing that the individual child or adult is able to be creative and to use the whole personality, and it is only in being creative that the individual discovers the self.<sup>91</sup>

As this present book aims to demonstrate, the creation of the self is the motive for Hindu cosmogonies (both Vedic and Smṛti) and of the activity, negative or positive, of human beings. Since men repeat the creative activity of reality, let us look at the creation of the cosmos through the lens of Winnicott’s concept of play.

In clinical practice, it is important to enable a patient to experience once again ‘a non-purposive state, as one might say a sort of ticking over of the unintegrated personality’ (Winnicott 2002: 74). Winnicott calls this ‘formlessness’. It is a state of relaxation reached thanks ‘to trust and to acceptance of the professional reliability of the therapeutic setting’ (Winnicott 2002: 74) that creates the room for free mental activity without which any creativity, any play is impossible. The cumulation of such experiences forms the basis of a sense of self. Winnicott writes:

In these highly specialised conditions, the individual can come together and exist as a unit, not as a defence against anxiety, but as an expression of I AM, I am myself. From this position, everything is creative.<sup>92</sup>

The order of the states from formlessness to recognition of the self that is expressed in ‘I AM’ reflects the order of the earliest creative states of reality. It first manifests itself as something deprived of any form in order to manifest its cognitive power in the highest cognitive agent who states

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<sup>91</sup> Winnicott (2002: 72–73).

<sup>92</sup> Winnicott (2002: 74).



‘I AM’ (*sò’ hám*, BU 1.4.1).<sup>93</sup> Let us evoke RV 10.129 where formlessness is expressed with negations and questions before ‘That One’ appears. The state of formlessness is expressed in MS 1.5 and in MDhP (176. 10, 335.14) as darkness (*tamas*) that the Composer qualifies as impossible to be cognised (*apratarkyam avijñeyam*). This state precedes the appearance of the highest cognitive agent which is able to think and create.

According to Winnicott, the state of formlessness is crucial for the discovery of the self:

The searching can come only from desultory formless functioning, or perhaps from rudimentary playing, as if in neutral zone. It is only here, in this unintegrated state of personality that that we describe as creative can appear.<sup>94</sup>

Viewed from this perspective, the psychological states recognised as tamasic can be seen as an important source for the beginning of the liberating process. We must remember that *tamas* is conventionally qualified as impossible to be cognised (*apratarkyam avijñeyam*) not only in cosmogonies, but also in reference to the experience of an individual human being (see chapter 2.1.2).

In other places, Winnicott states that the search for the true self begins ‘after relaxation which is the opposite of integration’ (Winnicott 2002: 86). The source domain of relaxation is used in the ŚB (6.1.2.12, 7.1.2.1) where Prajāpati’s state after creation (conceived in terms of a run) is expressed by the verb *vi srams-* ‘to fall asunder, break down, collapse, be broke’. The creation of Prajāpati’s self in the cosmos is conceived in terms of gathering himself together through the power of fire (Jurewicz 2016/18). The concept of relaxation is also present in the concept of sleep used as the source domain for the pre-creative state of reality in MS 1.5 (MDhP 176.9, 335.17). As we have seen, in liberating practice, the creation of the self is conceived in terms of gathering together (*sam ā dhā-*) which is a similar concept to ‘coming together’ used by Winnicott to describe the moment when an individual is able to be and say ‘I AM.’

Discovering the self takes place during play within the ‘potential space between the baby and the mother’ (Winnicott 2002: 55, 144, 146). Play evolves in several stages. First there is the total emergence with his mother (called here the object). In the next, the object i.e., the infant’s mother, is ‘repudiated, re-accepted, and perceived objectively’ (Winnicott 2002: 63). Like Gadamer,

<sup>93</sup> *ātmaivēdām āgra āsīt pūruṣavidhaḥ | sò ’nuvīkṣya nānyād ātmāno ’paśyat | sò ’hām asmīty āgre vyāharat | tāto ’haṃ nāmābhavat | tāsmād āpy etārhy āmanrito ’hām ayām ity evāgra uktvāthānyān nāma prābrūte yād asya bhāvati |*

<sup>94</sup> Winnicott (2002: 86).

Winnicott sees the to and fro movement as an important element of play, in this case it is the oscillation between a baby and its mother:

The mother (or part of mother) is in a 'to and fro' between being that which the baby has a capacity to find and (alternatively) being herself waiting to be found.<sup>95</sup>

A good-enough-mother allows the infant to repeat the play so that a child becomes confident and feels its omnipotence. In order to express their relationship, Winnicott uses not only the source domain of play, but also of magic:

Confidence in the mother makes an intermediate playground here, where the idea of magic originates, since the baby does to some extent *experience* omnipotence.<sup>96</sup>

The omnipotent state of the highest cognitive agent is expressed in the cosmogonies many times with various metaphors and explicitly. In RV 10.129.2, it is its ability to perform internally contradictory actions (breathing and non-breathing), in RV 10.90.1 it is its multiplicity of heads, eyes and legs, in the MS and MDhP it is implied by the androgenic concept of the highest cognitive agent who is able to inseminate (as a man) and give birth (as a woman).

In the next stage of play, the ability to play alone in the presence of someone appears (in Winnicott's description, it is the mother). The baby is confident that its mother is close and it may even forget about her, but she is still there and will immediately respond to its needs. If we use this concept as the source domain for the early stages of the creative process, we could conceive this state as being when the highest cognitive agent is aware of the object it will cognise and create. In RV 10.129 this state is conceived in terms of 'darkness hidden by darkness' (*tāma āsīt tāmasā gūḥām*), in BU 1.4 in terms of a man and a woman in close embrace, in ŚB 11.1.6 and MS 1.12–13, in terms of Golden Egg, in MDhP 175.15, 335.18–20, in terms of muddy water from which the lotus is about to appear and in the image of Brahma who sees the worlds in amazing closeness. In Winnicott's theory the mother is seen as the object, in Hindu cosmogonies the object is the future world.

The next stage is 'to allow and enjoy an overlap of these two play areas' (Winnicott 2002: 64). In this state, the mother, playing with her baby, begins to introduce her own playing. Winnicott sees this process as a transition from the object-relation state and the object-usage state:

<sup>95</sup> Winnicott (2002: 63).

<sup>96</sup> Winnicott (2002: 63).

Object-relating is an experience of the subject that can be described in terms of the subject as an isolate ... When I speak of the use of an object, however, I take object-relating for granted, and add new features that involve the nature and the behaviour of the object. For instance, the object, if it is to be used, must necessarily be real in the sense of being part of shared reality, not a bundle of projections. It is this, I think, that makes for the world of difference that there is between relating and usage.<sup>97</sup>

The process of transition that happens in between the object-relating state and object-use state:

is the most difficult thing, perhaps, in human development... This thing that there is in between relating and use is the subject's placing of the object outside the area of the subject's omnipotent control: that is, the subject's perception of the object an external phenomenon, not as a projective entity, in fact recognition of it as an entity in its own right.

In this stage the illusion of omnipotence disappears. The baby realises the presence of the external world. The object-relation state is the state of fusion with the mother. This is a paradoxical state 'the baby creates the object, but the object was there waiting to be created' (Winnicott 2002: 119). Winnicott describes this process of disillusionment as destroying of the object by the baby (Winnicott 2002: 120). And then the baby finds the object again, as external to itself and possible to be used. The capacity to use the object is part of the change to the reality principle.<sup>98</sup> The destroyed object survives destruction and becomes meaningful to the subject, it can be loved or hated:

In other words, because of the survival of the object, the subject may now have started to live a life in the world of objects, and so the subject stands to gain immeasurably; but the price has to be paid in acceptance of the ongoing destruction in unconscious fantasy relative to object-relating.<sup>99</sup>

As Winnicott concludes:

my thesis is that the destruction plays its part in making reality, placing the object outside the self.<sup>100</sup>

<sup>97</sup> Winnicott (2002: 118).

<sup>98</sup> 'To use an object the subject must have developed a *capacity* to use objects. This is part of the change to the reality principle.' (Winnicott 2002: 119).

<sup>99</sup> Winnicott (2002: 121).

<sup>100</sup> Winnicott (2002: 122).

In Smṛti cosmogonies, the process of creation is a cognitive process that takes place much more smoothly than in the cosmogonies of the ŚB where the death of Prajāpati in the cosmos is often presented as a necessary stage before his self is created within the cosmos. The death of Prajāpati in the cosmos can be seen as reflecting the psychological moment of destruction of the object-relation state; the next stage is the creation of the self (*ātman*) of Prajāpati that is different from the object. Then the object is recognised as belonging to the subject conceived in terms of its eating. In the cosmogony of MS, the same stage is expressed by the source domain of breaking the egg the result of which is the creation of the cosmic self of the highest cognitive agent. The highest cognitive agent then creates objects cognised by it that are ontologically identical with him although epistemologically different and independent from him, provided their identity with the subject is not recognised. The cosmogony of MDhP 335, is especially interesting in this context. The moment of destruction of the object-relation self can be seen in the loss of the Veda by Brahma, which is subsequently restored by Hari Nārāyaṇa conceived as the parent of Brahma. The intervention of Hari Nārāyaṇa causes Brahma to regain his reason (*buddhi*) and recall the Veda. Sudhir Kakar (1983) discusses the differences between Indian and European upbringing on the basis of stories in the MBh and Puranas and his own psychoanalytical experience. He argues that in the former case the separation of a child from his mother is never as total as it is in the case of the latter. This is also confirmed by the cosmogony of MDhP 335 (see section 5.2.3). First the Veda, which can be seen as the embodiment of the object, is not totally destroyed. Secondly the form of Hayaśiras is another form of the object which is not only not destroyed, but helps his child go through this process. Brahma himself is not able to do that himself and needs the help of his parent.

The functioning of the cosmos from the viewpoint of the highest cognitive agent (and a free man) can be explained using Winnicott's theory. Taking into account that the activity of the highest cognitive agent is restricted by the rules of subjective-objective cognition, the cosmos is a manifestation of play that is in constant transition between the object-relation state and object-user state.

The good-enough-mother allows her child to go through this process in a safe way. In the cosmogonies of the Brāhmaṇas, the first stage of creation is conceived in terms of the experience the child has when his mother is not good enough. Prajāpati feels overwhelming fear because of the possibility of his death, the same is felt by a child who is afraid that the destruction of the object means the destruction of itself. In the cosmogonies of the early Upaniṣads and the early Smṛti texts the creative process goes more smoothly. It is as if the not-enough-good-mother were replaced by the good-enough-

mother, especially in the case of MDhP 335. The oscillation between both states confirms the self of the subject and the external nature of the objects, in order to enlarge the self that begins to encompass everything that is created.

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We have seen fascinating similarities between the process of creation of self in human development as presented by Winnicott and in early Hindu cosmogonies. As mentioned previously this issue needs a more profound interdisciplinary analysis, but there is no doubt that Hindu philosophers had deep insight into the human mind. It is difficult to believe that their theories were composed solely under the influence of the unconscious. The general hypothesis is that the creative process of Prajāpati reflects processes which took place in men's mind and body when they looked for altered states of consciousness which they then recalled thanks to everyday recitation of the Veda. It was clearly a conscious work on the mind and body based on trial and error in order to find the most efficient mode of action leading to the state seen as satisfactory. This trial-and-error method was conveyed interdisciplinarily, by groups of teachers and students. The results the early Indian philosophers achieved as far as knowledge of mind and its processes are remarkable.

### **5.3.5. The perspective of free man. Freedom as play**

Despite the differences between the philosophy of Fink and Gadamer and the psychoanalytical perspective of Winnicott on the one hand, and the early Smṛti philosophers on the other concerning both source and target domains, the use of the concepts and terms proposed by the former enlarges the philosophical meanings and implications of the latter. Now we will discuss the situation of a free man with the use of the concept of play as the source domain.

In chapter 5.2.5, it was shown how viewpoint theory clarifies and makes possible a better understanding of the mental state of free man seen as the ability to experience a story without losing one's own identity. Play has the same ability and we will now focus on the problem of free action as described by the BhG (see chapter 4.11.3). Taking into account that free man is identical with the highest cognitive agent, features of the former also belong to the latter. However, their analysis in microscale as features of man, will reveal some emotional and moral implications which are important for the proper functioning of society.

First of all, the concept of action without attachment to its results can be seen as a playful action. As it is stated by Huizinga and other scholars,

play is autotelic and one plays only for the pleasure (and other emotions) experienced during play. In the same way, a free man engages in actions just because he wants to take part in the cosmic play in accordance with the role he has developed in previous incarnations. So, Arjuna should take part in the battle with the attitude of a player who knows that all the players, those who win and those who lose, are manifestation of his own self. From the point of view of the audience and the players, all events that happen in the play-world, even death and life, are not real in the ultimate sense. They are not actual (*satya*) as is the Being (*satyasya satyam*) (as Fink and the Composer of the BU would put it). The concept of rebirth fits very well within the frames of metaphor EXISTENCE OF COSMOS IS PLAY, because one of the features of play – as Huizinga points out – is that it can be repeated. In the same, way one's life can be repeated and every birth is a chance.

Moreover, Arjuna should play seriously, he should be fully absorbed in the play in the same way as those who act are motivated by the results of their activity (BhG 3.25, see chapter 4.11.2). This impossible state of mind, that unites full engagement and a lack of engagement, has been described with the use of the theory of viewpoint compression (see chapter 5.2), but the metaphor PROPER ACTION IS PLAYING highlights physical engagement of man in action better than the metaphor PROPER ACTION IS STORYTELLING. It also highlights rather better the ease (*kausāla*) with which a free man acts, ease that is gained thanks to endless exercises which finally allows one to move the body without disturbing one's mental equanimity. And this

ease of play – which naturally does not mean that there is any real absence of effort but refers phenomenologically only to the absence of strain – is experienced subjectively as relaxation.<sup>101</sup>

In his research on play, Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi (1991) introduces the concept of a flow state that is realised during playing. This psychological state comes thanks to an activity that is performed over time with some effort and difficulty. In this state, a person 'feels a sense of achievement and accomplishment, and a greater sense of self' (Salen, Zimmerman 2004: 336). Most of the eight components of flow enumerated by Csikszentmihalyi,<sup>102</sup> can

<sup>101</sup> Gadamer (2004: 105).

<sup>102</sup> Csikszentmihalyi (1991: 49): 'First, the experience usually occurs when we confront tasks that we have a chance of completing. Second, we must be able to concentrate on what we are doing. Third and fourth, the concentration is usually possible because the task undertaken has clear goals and provides immediate feedback. Fifth, one acts with a deep but effortless involvement that removes from awareness the worries and frustrations of everyday life. Sixth, enjoyable experiences allow people to exercise a sense of control over their actions. Seventh,

be seen as components of liberating cognition and practice under the guidance of a teacher. It is a challenging activity that requires skill, with clear goals and feedback. Although it is difficult to state if the goals presented by a teacher to his pupil can be called clear, there is no doubt that liberating practice requires skill and needs clear feedback from a teacher. In this state, an agent focuses his attention on the activity itself. The agent is in a paradoxical situation, he feels that he has control over his action, even if situation is uncertain (as it is in play). Moreover, his self ‘becomes subservient to the greater whole of the experience’ (Salen, Zimmerman 2004: 337) which means he loses his concerns for his self and ‘yet paradoxically the sense of self emerges stronger after the flow experience is over’ (Csikszentmihalyi 1991: 49). If we want to see the activity of a free man in these terms, we might speculate that, when the flow is over, man realises his identity with the unmanifest reality as his self.

The next characteristic feature of the flow is that agents are so absorbed in the activity that it ‘becomes spontaneous, almost automatic; they stop being aware of themselves as separate from the actions they are performing’ (Csikszentmihalyi 1991: 63). Thus, this state seems to be a realisation of Gadamer’s ideal of playing (see above, section 5.3.3.b). Finally, the experience of time changes during flow which is what should happens during liberating cognition.<sup>103</sup> If we understand the experience of ease (*kauśala*) in terms of the flow felt during playing, we could also understand the state experienced by a free man who engages into activity without attachment to its results.<sup>104</sup> Csikszentmihalyi (1990, 1997) prefers to enlarge the results of his research on play and apply them to any autotelic activity where goals are absent.<sup>105</sup> Even so the concept of flow seems to be very useful concept in explanation of the mental and psychological state of Arjuna immersed in his play on the battle-field which is expected by Kṛṣṇa.<sup>106</sup>

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concern for the self disappears, yet paradoxically the sense of self emerges stronger after the flow experience is over. Finally, the sense of the duration of time is altered; hours pass by in minutes, and minutes can stretch out to seem like hours. The combination of all these elements causes a sense of deep enjoyment that is so rewarding people feel that expending a great deal of energy is worthwhile simply to be able to feel it.’

<sup>103</sup> See Henricks’ (2016: 17) description of flow experience which also seems to grasp the experience of a free man: ‘Recall Csikszentmihalyi’s (2000) theory of engagement, or flow, which emphasises the relationship between technical challenges of the situation at hand (measured perhaps by the difficulty level of a mountain climb or the ability of a tennis player across the net) and the skill of the player. Too much difficulty creates worry or anxiety; it distracts players from the tasks at hand. Too little challenge is boring.’

<sup>104</sup> Johnson, Eberle, Henricks, Kuschner (2015).

<sup>105</sup> Johnson, Eberle, Henricks, Kuschner (2015).

<sup>106</sup> For creation of status, power and division in play according to various theorists, see Henricks (2014, 2016). See also Fink (2016: 25): ‘Every sort of playing is the magical production of

Winnicott's concept of play between a mother and her baby contributes even more to our understanding of the situation of Arjuna. We could say that, in his vision described in BhG 11, he is confronted with a not-enough-good mother from the Brahmanas. 'She' does not leave the space for playing and Arjuna is afraid that when he destroys the object (his enemies), he will be destroyed by her too. His fear is relieved when he comes back to the object-relation state with Kṛṣṇa seen as his beloved friend in order to separate from him once again and thus create his own self (*ātman*). In Winnicott's psychoanalytic theory of play, the first object is a mother, in the same way as teachers who choose the side of Kauravas who are manifestation of Kṛṣṇa. Hence, their killing will not kill either Kṛṣṇa, or Arjuna. Just the opposite as in this way Arjuna will confirm his self (*ātman*). But to confirm it, he has to take part in play and place the object outside himself (Winnicott 2002: 122) and then destroy it. Then Arjuna could have said the same as Winnicott's subject in his imagined talk to the object:

Hello object! I destroyed you. I love you. You have value for me because of your survival of my destruction of you. While I am loving you, I am all the time destroying you in (unconscious) *fantasy*.<sup>107</sup>

Now Arjuna can use the objects of the cosmos from the perspective of a free man identified with the highest cognitive agent and the whole reality. Winnicott says that 'here fantasy begins for the individual'. In early Hindu philosophy the play between the subject and object is not fantasy but real within the frames of the manifest aspect.

However, it is important to notice the fundamental differences between Winnicott's and Smṛti understanding of illusion. For Winnicott, whose main aim is to cure people, illusion is the omnipotence of the subject while disillusion is its lack. In Smṛti philosophy, illusion is lack of omnipotence of the human subject immersed in his false assumptions of a duality between him and the cosmos. Disillusionment, gained in liberating practice, guarantees the omnipotence of the subject. The second difference is that, for Winnicott, play is the basis for creation of the self that is different from the world that surrounds it. For the Smṛti philosophers, play is the basis for the creation of the self that encompasses everything.

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a play-world. In it lie the role of the one playing, *the changing roles of the community of play*, the binding nature of the rules of play, and the significance of the plaything.'

<sup>107</sup> Winnicott (2002: 120–121).



### 5.3.6. Play and māyā<sup>108</sup>

The logic of the source domain of play led some of above-mentioned researchers and philosophers to an investigation of the problem of illusion. This again brings us to the concept of māyā which is literally defined as the power to be measured (see chapter 2.2.2). In more general terms, māyā expresses the mystery of the two-aspects of one reality. It is the power of reality which makes the impossible possible, to manifest what is unmanifest and reveal and hide at the same time. Conceived in terms of play, the existence of the cosmos, is somewhat illusionary although it is real. Fink describes this mystery in the following way:

This play-world is itself something unreal, although it involves actual human beings.... The “play-world” is not an actual/real situation of actual/real human beings; it has a peculiar “illusoriness” – it is nothing actual and yet not nothing.<sup>109</sup>

Such a formulation precisely grasps the mystery of māyā. A little earlier, Fink states:

Seen in this manner, ‘non-actuality’ is thus an essential, fundamental feature of human play. And it is not merely *a* fundamental feature; it is the decisive fundamental feature. The actuality of play activity is a perpetual, continual, productive comportment to the “non-actuality” of the play-world. Wherever there are philosophical questions about play that are connected to the general problem of Being, it is precisely the moment of actual ‘non-actuality,’ the strange entwinement of Being and appearance, that requires conceptual mastery.<sup>110</sup>

The concept of māyā presented in the BhG expresses this strange entwinement of Being and appearance, of what is unmanifest and what is manifest, what is one and what is many, what is imperishable and what is perishable. This entwinement has been discussed in the Hindu philosophy from its beginning where it was conceived in terms of the flowing of what does not flow (*tātaḥ kṣāratī ākṣaram*).

Salen and Zimmerman (2004: 47) define design of a computer game as ‘the process by which a designer creates a context to be encountered by a participant, from which meaning emerges’. This is a very good definition

<sup>108</sup> We will not discuss the possible correspondences between the concept of māyā and theories of play, because it does not often appear in the texts analysed in this study.

<sup>109</sup> Fink (2016: 112).

<sup>110</sup> Fink (2016: 92).

of *māyā* in the early Smṛti texts and it brings us closer to the concept of storytelling. Thus, we could conceive reality in its creative activity in terms of a designer (the absolute narrator in the story viewpoint space). It creates the manifest aspect that is conceived as a context (main narrative space); this context is constantly created by the highest cognitive agent who is, at the same time, a cosmic participant of the game. The most important participants, however, are human beings. Design results in the emergence of meaning construed by the activity of the context and by men.

\*

The analysis presented above has shown the similarities between the concept of play analysed as a specific kind of human activity and used as the source domain in western philosophy and psychoanalysis and its use in examining the ontology of the early Smṛti thought. It is suggested that the concept of play can be seen as a general domain which motivated the thinking of the Smṛti Composers and became explicitly used in later Smṛti thought. This ontology should find its place in general philosophy research because it expresses deep human intuitions about ourselves in the world. The fact that it is expressed with the use of specific Sanskrit terminology does not make it impossible to investigate and understand, in the same way as the specific terminology of many European philosophers, beginning with Plato and ending with Heidegger does not intimidate thousands of people who devote their life to their study.

It should be noted that the roots of such thinking are grounded deep in tradition. They can be found not only in the explicit use of the concept of hide-and-seek play in the cosmogonies in the ŚB and the BU. Following Malamoud (2005: 127–128, Jurewicz forthc.) the Vedic ritual can also be seen as a kind of secret play, similar to children's play where the spectators are not needed, contrary to theatre which is the play assumed by Malamoud. Let us summarise the argument.

Typically, the first phase of such a play is to prepare the place of play, agents and toys<sup>111</sup>. It is as much an important part of the play as the play itself. The new meaning of places, agents and toys is created very simply: the participants just agree that someone will be e.g., father of the family and someone else, mother or children. Only then can the play commence. The preparatory phase of the Vedic ritual looks similar. Firstly, the sacrificial place is prepared with the agents and necessary objects. The change of meaning

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<sup>111</sup> This word is used in a general sense of any object that us used in play.

and the transformation of agents and objects then takes place thanks to the recitation of mantras. If we recall Taves' definition of the religious phenomenon as something that is set apart, we will see that in case of Vedic ritual a playful activity leads to its creation.

With all the differences which occur between ritual and play, preparation of the agents and objects has the same solemn playful nature (Huizinga 1949) as a collection of leaves and stones by little girls who transform them into food for their dolls who are, in their minds, their children. As Sicart puts it:

One of the most fascinating capacities humans have is being able to toy around with almost any object they can find. From pebbles to tree branches, to more complex technological objects, humans seem to enjoy playing with things, using them in ways other than those expected, intended, or recommended. We use our hands, our body, to appropriate an object and explore its functionalities and meaning in ways often unexpected. We spin the pen, make a ball of a piece of trash, and invent ways in which a phone or a computer can be entertaining. Anything can be turned into a toy.<sup>112</sup>

It should be noted that implements used in Vedic ritual are relatively simple (in comparison with many other rituals known from archaeological and anthropological research). Their preparation, however, takes much time, attention and skill which further confirms its playful character. However, it is the power of mantras which finally gives them a different ontological status that is real only in the sacrificial place, within the ritual playground. The logic of the concept of play with its basic assumptions of a possibility to temporarily and spatially change one's status, or the status of a group of people, has been well understood by the Brahmin and could be easily applied and elaborated when ontology changed.

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<sup>112</sup> Sicart (2014: 87). And Fink (2014: 24–25): 'To every game belongs also a toy or plaything [*Spielzeug*]. ... A plaything can be an artificially produced thing; however, it need not be. Even a simple piece of wood or a broken-off branch can serve as a 'doll.' The doll is considered to be a product of the toy industry. It is a piece of material and wire or a mass of plastic, and can be acquired for purchase at a determined price; it is a commodity. But, seen from the perspective of a playing girl, a doll is a *child*, and the girl is its *mother*. At the same time, it is in no way the case that the little girl actually believes that the doll is a living child. She does not deceive herself about this. She does not confuse something on the basis of a deceptive appearance. Rather, she simultaneously knows about the doll-figure and its significance in play. The playing child lives in two dimensions... There is the 'child,' who indeed lives and breathes there – but in simple actuality is only a doll or even a piece of wood. In the projection of a play world the one who plays conceals himself as the creator of this 'world.'

### 5.3.7. Play (*krīḍā*) as the source domain in early Smṛti philosophy

From this section onwards we will consider the use of the nouns *krīḍā* and *līlā* in the philosophical contexts in the early Smṛti texts. Their use, although rare, will confirm the motivating influence of the concept of play on the thinking of Composers.

#### 5.3.7.a. Play (*krīḍā*) as the source domain in the cosmogonies of the *Manusmṛti* and *Mokṣadharmā*

The verb *krīḍ-* and its derivative *krīḍā* are used to express creative activity. The most explicit case is MS 1.80 where after the description of the division of time in creation, the Composer states:

#### MS 1.80

*manvantarāṇy asaṃkhyāni sargaḥ saṃhāra eva ca |*  
*krīḍann ivaitat kurute parameṣṭhī punaḥ punaḥ ||*

The countless Epochs of Manus, as also creation and dissolution – the Supreme Lord does this again and again as if playing.<sup>113</sup>

Taking into account that the names of the four epochs are the names of the four throws in dice (*kṛta*, *tretā*, *dvāpara*, *kali*, see above), one may presume that the play which is activated here is dicing. Creation of each epoch is conceived in terms of throwing dice. We have seen that the repetitiveness of play is its important feature according to Huizinga. This feature is also noticed by Gadamer ‘The movement of playing has no goal that brings it to an end; rather, it renews itself in constant repetition’ (2004: 104). So, we can speculate that the concept of time as cyclical could also be motivated by the fact that creation was conceived in terms of play.

The noun *krīḍā* in a cosmological context is used in the MDhP twice, in a later chapter that describes Vasistha’s teaching to Karālanaka<sup>114</sup> and then in MDhP 336. The whole analysis of this teaching will be discussed in the forthcoming monograph; here, however, we will only look at those stanzas that use the word *krīḍā* to describe the activity of the highest cognitive agent. Having presented creation and the annihilation of the cosmos, the Composer states:

<sup>113</sup> Olivelle (2005: 89): ‘as a kind of sport.’

<sup>114</sup> MDhP 291–296, *Vasiṣṭhakarālanakasaṃvāda*. This teaching will be analysed in details in my future study.

**MDhP 292.28–29**

*raśmijālam ivādityas tatkālena niyacchati |  
evam eṣo 'sakṛt sarvaṃ kṛīḍārtham abhimanyate || (28)*

As the sun in that time restraints its net of rays, in the same way he presupposes everything repeatedly, just for play –

*ātmarūpaguṇān etān vividhān hṛdayapriyān |  
evam eva vikurvāṇaḥ sargapralayakarmanī || (29)*

his own forms and classes, manifold and agreeable to himself – and thus he transforms itself in creations and destructions.<sup>115</sup>

In 28ab, the Composer evokes the source domain of the sunset. The highest cognitive agent is conceived in terms of the sun and its cognitive faculties, the activity of which maintains the world in terms of net or web of rays. This source domain is often used to express the appearance of the cognitive activity of reality (see MDhP 271.20, chapter 2.1.4). The concept of *jāla* (net or web) activates not only the order of the cosmos but also, in its meaning of a net for catching birds (see MaU 3.2), its power to delude.

In 28cd, it is stated that the highest cognitive agent presupposes everything in order to play. The verb *abhi man-* is used to denote the main function of the I-form (*ahaṃkāra*), i. e. presupposition (*abhimāna*), by which, as previously stated, the highest cognitive agent is not deluded. Just the opposite, he uses it in order to be able to perform his constant recognition in subject-object cognition.

This presupposition is done with the aid of its own classes and forms (*ātmarūpaguṇān*, MDhP 29a). It should be noted that the concept of form (*rūpa*) activates the concept of *karman*, because it refers to the perceptible forms of reality which are dynamic. Identification of the concept of *karman* and *rūpa* is attested in BU 1.4.7 (Jurewicz 2016/18). These forms, of the highest cognitive agent, are manifold and bring it pleasure (MDhP 29b). As has been stated many times, the motive of creation is to cognise and feel emotions. The same is the motive for play. The playfulness of creations and destructions of the world is also attested in the repetitiveness evoked by the adverb *asakṛt* (28c).

Then the nature of the divine play is presented:

<sup>115</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

**MDhP 292.30**

*kriyākriyā pathe raktas triguṇas triguṇātigaḥ |  
kriyākriyāpathopetas tathā tad iti manyate ||*

Coloured in the path of action and non-action with three classes and beyond them, abiding in action and non-action thinks ‘So it is.’<sup>116</sup>

Reality in its manifest aspect uses three classes (as highest cognitive agent) and, at the same time, is beyond them in its unmanifest aspect (30c). Its manifestations are conceived in terms of tinting (30a). Within the frames of this source domain, reality becomes visible thanks to the colours it assumes. This metaphor is activated earlier, in MDhP 291.44–45 where each class is conceived in terms of colour: sattva is white (*śukla*), rajas is red (*lohita*) and tamas is black (*kṛṣṇa*).<sup>117</sup> This conceptualisation activates the basic meaning of the word *guṇa* which is thread and metonymically activates the domain of theatre where the actors wear cloths of various colours (COLOUR FOR THREAD, THREAD FOR CLOTH, CLOTH FOR ACTOR, ACTOR FOR PERFORMANCE).<sup>118</sup> As actors are not the same as their clothes and their roles, in the same way, reality is not the same as its manifestations.

The next source domain is the concept of a journey (30a): the highest cognitive agent is presented as being on the path of actions and non-actions. It is conceived in terms of a man who walks a path, raises its dust and becomes dirty. Both source domains imply that something invisible becomes visible, thanks to either clothes or dirt. In the target domain the activity of the highest cognitive agent consists on becoming someone else, exactly as it is in every play.

Pay attention to the short sentence that expresses the thinking of reality when it manifests more and more in its perceptible dynamic forms: *tathā tad iti manyate* (30d). It evokes the concept of the preliminary stage of play when new meanings are to be given to the participants and objects and new rules invented, which will organise the new play. As has been stated, this stage is already play. The rules are now presented which are the rules of subject-object cognition:

<sup>116</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

<sup>117</sup> MDhP 291.44: *tamasā tāmasān bhāvān vividhān pratipadyate rajasā rājasāmś caiva sātṭvikān sattvasaṃśrayāt | śuklalahitakṛṣṇāni rūpāny etāni trīṇi tu sarvāny etāni rūpāni jānīhi prākṛtāni vai ||*

<sup>118</sup> See MaU 2.7: *svasthas cārtabhug guṇamayena paṇenātmānam antardhāya avasthita iti avasthita iti |* The concept of colour of the cloths is not explicitly mentioned there, but is implied from the whole context.

**MDhP 292.31**

*evaṃ dvaṃdvāny athaitāni vartante mama nityaśaḥ |  
mamaivaitāni jāyante bādhante tāni mām iti ||*

In this way these dualities will go on incessantly. They are mine; they will be born and will bind me.<sup>119</sup>

It is worth noting that now the Composer is in the first person. Thus, the recipient may understand that the rules are invented by the highest cognitive agent who is aware of what will happen to it when it divides itself into subject and object according to those rules. In the next stanza, the rules are called *nistartavya* (32a), possible to be passed over or overcome or conquered, because the player can always suspend or break the play.<sup>120</sup> At the same time, they are well-done (*sukṛta*) and caused by the lack of cognition (*abuddhitva*) of the highest cognitive agent. The recipient understands that if reality invents the rules, they must be good (similarly as man is well-done, *sukṛta*, in AU 1.2.4). Within the frames of this analysis, the lack of cognition of the highest cognitive agent in this stage implies that it accepts the rules and submits to them which will result in limitations of its omniscience when it manifests itself as the object. In this way reality manifests its freedom.

In the following stanzas (33–36), the Composer still uses the first person to describe the emotions of the highest cognitive agent, its happiness in heaven and its suffering among men and in hell.<sup>121</sup> Then (37–40) he changes the narrative viewpoint which is marked by the change of the person: now the description switches to the third person.<sup>122</sup> Within the source domain of play, the highest cognitive agent now gets a perspective such that it thinks and talk about itself as if it were different from itself. The content of the stanzas is the same as the content of the earlier stanzas (33–36) i.e., its manifestations in heaven, hell and as among men. The possibility of changing perspectives has already been discussed as expressed in the opposition brahman – ātman. In the viewpoint settled here, the recognition of the highest cognitive agent

<sup>119</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

<sup>120</sup> MDhP 292.32: *nistartavyāny athaitāni sarvāñīti narādhipa | manyate 'yaṃ hy abuddhitvāt tathaiva sukṛtāny api ||*

<sup>121</sup> MDhP 292: *bhoktavyāni māyāitāni devalokagatena vai | ihaiva cainam bhokṣyāmi śubhāśubhaphalodayam || (33) sukham eva ca kartavyam sakṛt kṛtvā sukham mama | yāvadantaṃ ca me saukhyam jātyam jātyam bhaviṣyati || (34) bhaviṣyati ca me duḥkham kṛtenehāpy anantakam || mahad duḥkham hi mānuṣyam niraye cāpi majjanam || (35) nirayāc cāpi mānuṣyam kālenaiṣyāmy aham punaḥ (36ac)*

<sup>122</sup> MDhP 292: *manuṣyatvāc ca devatvam devatvāt pauraṣam punaḥ | manuṣyatvāc ca nirayam paryāyēnopagacchati || (36cf) ya evaṃ veti vai nityam nirātmāmaguṇair vṛtaḥ | tena devamanuṣyeṣu niraye copapadyate || (37)*

is opposed to that which takes place in liberating cognition. When the higher cognitive agent settles, as Salem and Zimerman would put it, the cognitive frame of the game together with the rules of play it uses the first person. The play consists on thinking about itself in the third person.

The use of the concept of play allows the Composer to express the paradoxical state of the highest cognitive agent: it does not lose its eternal knowledge about its unmanifest aspect and its manifestations but, at the same time, it is enveloped and hidden by its own cognition with the use of categories of classes and actions which leads to its manifestations among gods and men and in hell. It is able to do that thanks to the sense of *mamatva* ‘mine’ that allows it to separate itself into those spheres which belong to it and those which do not. Because of that it revolves in the perceptible forms the end of which is death for thousands of years.<sup>123</sup> The recipient also understands that even the experience of suffering brings pleasure to the highest cognitive agent (*hrdayapriya*, 29b).

Then the Composer describes the role of the signs in play:

#### MDhP 292.42

*alīngām prakṛtiṃ tv āhur līngair anumimāhe |  
tathaiva pauraṣaṃ līngam anumānād dhi paśyati ||*

They call that the nature does not gave signs. We infer it through its signs. In the same way, one infers that someone is man through his sign.<sup>124</sup>

The second half of the verse is ambiguous. In its literal sense, it describes the way the male sex is recognised (on the basis of its sign i.e., a penis). In its metaphorical sense it refers to the highest cognitive agent conceived in terms of man. As stated earlier, the first manifestation of the highest cognitive agent is conceived in terms of a woman (see section 5.2). In BU 1.4.4, the highest cognitive agent, conceived in terms of man, is presented as hiding himself in the female form in order to recognise itself again thanks to the proper male form he assumes. In the cosmogonies of the MS 1 and MDhP 335, the concept of water metonymically activates the concept of a woman (see chapter, section 5.2.3). This conceptualisation is activated here too: the noun *prakṛti* is feminine. The essence of play is conceived as becoming one’s opposite: reality firstly manifests as man (i.e., as the highest cognitive agent) and then as a woman. In the source domain, a woman as a mother is *prakṛti*

<sup>123</sup> MDhP 292.38: *mamatvenāvṛto nityaṃ tatraiva parivartate | sargakoṭisahasrāṇi maraṇāntāsu mūrṭiṣu ||*

<sup>124</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.



literally ‘created in front’ or ‘before’ her son. The recognition of this entails the acceptance of one’s own eternity conceived in terms of the sexual act between the highest cognitive agent and his female.

Thus, liberating inference is not direct: the first step is to recognise the manifest aspect of reality conceived in terms of a female (water) which is without sign (*liṅga*). The recipient might evoke the conceptualisation of the pre-creative state of the cosmos presented in RV 10.129 as ‘water without any sign’ (*apraketāṃ salilām*, Jurewicz 2010). Then one reaches the highest cognitive agent conceived in terms of man with the sign (*liṅga*). In the third step, one has to deny it and finally understand that at the deepest unmanifest level there is no sign at all. Within the frames of the metaphor of play, reality disguises itself as a man, then hides again, and disguises itself as a woman. Next, the highest cognitive agent prepares itself as player:

### MDhP 292.43

*sa liṅgāntaram āsādyā prākṛtaṃ liṅgam avraṇam |  
vraṇadvārāny adhiṣṭhāya karmāny ātmani manyate ||*

Having assumed the sign – the unwounded manifest sign, he, having abided/  
governed the doors of the wounds, thinks that actions take place in himself.<sup>125</sup>

The sequence of verses again reflects the sequence of cosmogony. In verse a, the highest cognitive agent is presented as assuming the sign (it is conceived in terms of man). In verse b, its manifestation as the cosmos is conceived in terms of a pre-existing woman (activated by the adjective *prakṛta*). The recipient may feel deluded, because he was just told that the manifest aspect, conceived in terms of a woman, does not have sign (*liṅga*). However, when he recalls that the manifest aspect is a manifestation of subject-object cognition, he will realise that the noun *liṅga* now refers to the signs of the highest cognitive agent who is created in this process. As we have seen, the same noun is used to denote the human organism (and *nimitta*, see chapter 3.4.1.b, 4.12). The use of the same noun is coherent not only because the cosmos and man are the sign of self-cognition, but also because the cosmos is conceived in terms of the human body with mental cognitive faculties and senses.

The concept of senses is evoked in verse c *via* the noun *dvāra* ‘door’ the second part of the compound *vraṇadvāra* (verse c). The noun *vraṇa* (the first part of this compound) literally means ‘a wound’. Conceptualisation of the senses in terms of wounds activates the metaphorical conceptualisation of

<sup>125</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

subjective powers in terms of breaking holes in the body (AU 1, MaU 2.6). The appearance of the senses of reason is described in verse c and conceived in terms of breaking holes. Remember the qualification of the embodiment of the class of *rajas*, the Asura Kaiṭabha in MDhP 335 (see section 5.2.3), as ‘difficult’ *kathina*. The moment of transmission from mental cognition to sensual cognition is the final realisation of the difference between the subject and the object and it is implied that it is difficult and even painful. Thus, the tragic cosmogonies of the ŚB are evoked. At the same time, the source domain allows the recipient to understand that even this is a part of the pleasure experienced by the highest cognitive agent.

In verse d, the creation of the senses of actions is described and the highest cognitive agent begins to think that it is active and that this activity takes place in its manifest aspect.

Then its play, consisting of subject-object cognition and of constantly hiding and finding itself that is akin to hide-and-seek, is described:

#### MDhP 292.44a–d

*śrotrādīni tu sarvāṇi pañca karmendriyāṇi ca |  
vāg ādīni pravartante guṇeṣv eva guṇaiḥ saha ||*

All senses of reason, beginning with hearing, and all senses of actions, beginning with speaking, are active place among the classes together with the classes.<sup>126</sup>

The highest cognitive agent enters its manifestation and then endows itself with subjective, sensual powers: the senses of reason (activated metonymically by the concept of hearing) which enables him to cognise mentally and the senses of action (activated metonymically by the concept of speaking)<sup>127</sup> which enable him to cognise through its actions. Together with the senses their categories (classes, *guṇa*) appear, and the objects created by them. At the same time, if the recipient recalls the context set in 28–29, he will understand that since categories become the rules of further manifestations, they are can be interpreted as the rules of play.

Now the Composer again allows the highest cognitive agent to speak for itself, because he describes the way the highest cognitive agent plays from within the cosmos and men:

<sup>126</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

<sup>127</sup> THE FIRST PHASE OF THE PROCESS FOR THE WHOLE PROCESS, THE SENSE CREATED AS THE FIRST FOR ALL THE SENSES.

**MDhP 292.44cd–45ab**

*aham etāni vai kurvan mamaitānīndriyāṇi ca |  
nirindriyo 'bhimanyeta vraṇavān asmi nirvraṇaḥ ||*

It is me who make these (actions) and these senses are mine. He who is without senses presupposes 'I have senses which I do not have.'<sup>128</sup>

The highest cognitive agent begins to participate in a play during which the player becomes the opposite of himself. According to these rules, just to quote some examples, the highest cognitive agent which is without signs imagines itself as endowed with signs, that which is beyond time becomes time, that which is immortal becomes death and that which is without creation becomes creation.<sup>129</sup> The description ends in the following way:

**MDhP 292.48**

*abhavo bhavam ātmānam abhayo bhayam ātmanaḥ |  
akṣaraḥ kṣaram ātmānam abuddhis tv abhīmanyate ||*

He who does not exist or think presupposes himself as existing, he who is afraid presupposes that he is unafraid, he who is imperishable presupposes that he is perishable – thus he who is without reason presupposes himself.<sup>130</sup>

Verse d is ambiguous. On one hand it means that, in its unmanifest aspect reality is beyond all manifest faculties *buddhi* included, on the other it means deprivation of the ability to think properly. This is the essence of play: to become someone else, to get another viewpoint, to experience emotions thanks to that and finally, to come back to one's identity.<sup>131</sup> In the next chapter (293), where the Composer uses the concept of the moon and its fifteen phases (*kośa*) to conceive the manifestations of reality, the sixteenth interlunar phase is the source domain to conceive the highest cognitive agent.<sup>132</sup> It is

<sup>128</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

<sup>129</sup> MDhP 292: *aliṅgo liṅgam ātmānam akālah kālam ātmanaḥ ||* (45cd) *asattvaṃ sattvam ātmānam atattvaṃ tattvam ātmanaḥ | amṛtyur mṛtyum ātmānam acarāś caram ātmanaḥ ||* (46) *akṣetraḥ kṣetram ātmānam asargaḥ sargam ātmanaḥ | atapās tapa ātmānam agatir gatim ātmanaḥ ||* (47)

<sup>130</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

<sup>131</sup> MDhP 293: *aprabuddham athāvyaktam imaṃ guṇavidhiṃ śṛṇu | guṇān dhārayate hy eṣā sṛjaty akṣipate tathā ||* (1) *ajasraṃ tv iha krīḍārtham vikurvanti narādhipa | ātmānaṃ bahudhā kṛtvā tāny eva ca vicakṣate ||* (2)

<sup>132</sup> MDhP 293: *candramā iva kośānām punas tatra sahasraśaḥ | līyate 'pratibuddhatvād evam eṣa hy abuddhimān ||* (3) *kalāḥ pañcadaśā yonis tad dhāma iti paṭhyate | nityam etad vijānīhi somaḥ ṣoḍaśamī kalā ||* (4) *kalāyām jāyate 'jasraṃ punaḥ punar abuddhimān | dhāma tasyopayūñjanti bhūya eva tu jāyate ||* (5) *ṣoḍaśī tu kalā sūkṣmā sa soma upadhāryatām | na tūpayujyate devair devān upayunakti sā ||* (6) *evam tāṃ kṣapayitvā hi jāyate nṛpasattama | sā hy asya prakṛtir drṣṭā tatṣayān mokṣa ucyate ||* (7)

worth noting that this source domain also allows the Composer to express the perceptibility of what is imperceptible: the invisible moon can be seen when it shines, when interlunar it is recognised on the basis of its lack of its sign. It is worth noting the correspondence between this source domain and the conceptualisation of creation in terms of assuming signs discussed above (see analysis of MDhP 292.42). The moon corresponds to highest cognitive agent, the moon's shine is its sign. The interlunar sky corresponds to the world in its pre-creative state, conceived in terms of a woman without a sign (i.e., without a penis). The appearance of the moon the following night corresponds to the beginning of manifestation of the highest cognitive agent during which it acquires various signs.

In the later part of the MDhP, the highest cognitive agent is explicitly conceived in terms of a playing man:

### MDhP 336.55cd–56

*eṣa lokanidhir dhīmān eṣa lokavisargakṛt || (55cd)*

*akartā caiva kartā ca kāryaṃ kāraṇam eva ca |*

*yathecchati tathā rājan kṛḍate puruṣo 'vyayaḥ || (56)*

He is the treasure of the world, wise, he creates the world and makes it disappear. He is agent and non-agent; he is the result and the cause. And this imperishable man plays, as he wants.<sup>133</sup>

\*

The way the cosmogonies use the noun *kṛḍā* in MS 1.80 and MDhP 292 allows us to assume that its Composers were motivated by the concept of play. The repetitiveness of the creations and destructions of the cosmos presented in MS 1.80 and MDhP 292.28–29 accords with one of the important features of play proposed by Huizinga and Gadamer. If the recipient of MDhP 292 has in mind the context of play introduced in the beginning of the cosmogony, he will see that the subject-object structure of the cosmos in which the highest cognitive agent cognises itself and, more significantly experiences emotion, can be seen as its play with itself. Its basic characteristic is to become someone else, totally opposite to its unmanifest aspect. Thanks to this, the highest cognitive agent can think about itself in the third person as if it were a story about itself or a performance in which it is the audience and the actors simultaneously.

<sup>133</sup> See also MDhP 339.20: *caturvibhaktaḥ puruṣaḥ sa kṛḍati yathecchati | evaṃ sa eva bhagavāñ jñānena pratibodhitāḥ ||*

### 5.3.7.b. Play as becoming dirty (*krīḍā, līlā*)

In this section, we look at a specific concept of play during which the player becomes dirty. The concept of becoming soiled during activity is used to conceive the manifest aspect of reality (MDhP 292.30a *kriyākriyā pathe raktas*, see above, section 5.3.7.a). There, however, the activity which is evoked as the source domain is a journey. Another activity which makes man dirty is farming the concept of which is used to conceive the influence of the previous deeds (see chapters 3.2.2, 4.9.6). We now focus on the play the result of which is the soiling of the players.

We begin with RV 10.72 which uses the concept of dancing in order to conceive creation:

#### RV 10.72.6–7

*yád devā adāḥ salilé súsamrabdhā átīṣṭhata |  
átrā vo nṛtyatām iva tīvró reṇúr ápāyata || (6)*

When, o gods, well clasped to one another, you stood there in the flood,<sup>134</sup> then the bitter dust<sup>135</sup> dispersed from you, like the dust /sweat of those dancing.

*yád devā yátayo yathā bhūvanāni ápinvata |  
átrā samudrá á gūlhám á sūryam ajabhartana || (7)*

When, o gods, just as the Yatis did, you swelled the living worlds, then you brought here the sun, which was hidden in the sea.

The whole hymn needs a separate analysis, so we will limit ourselves to noting some issues important for the present analysis. In the source domain, activated in 6c, the image is one of people who dance holding hands; most probably they dance in a circle. Their dance raises dust and they sweat. The concept of sweating activates the general domain of Cleansing By Heat (Jurewicz 2010). The gods dance in the flood (*salilá*, 6a). We have already discussed the use of the concept of *salilá* in the cosmogonic concepts where the pre-creative state of the world is conceived in its terms, both in the Veda and in the early Smṛti texts. The same state is activated in the description of gods dancing in the flood in the above stanza.

This activity, the result of which is the appearance of dust during which water begins to overflow or ripple (*pinv-*, 7b) with the hidden sun finally appearing (7d),<sup>136</sup> activates the general domain of Cleansing By Heat in its

<sup>134</sup> Jamison, Brereton (2014: 1500): ‘ocean.’

<sup>135</sup> Jamison, Brereton (2014: 1500) add: [=spray].’

<sup>136</sup> We can refer to Jamison and Brereton (2014: 1500), when they write: ‘Or again in 7a the Yatis are ritual priests, whose death resulted in the rains that swell ‘the living worlds’ (cf. Jamison

specific realisation of the preparation of butter (dust and water metaphorically corresponds to cream, and the sun to butter). The word *reṇú* is most often used in the RV to denote the dust raised by running horses.<sup>137</sup> So the recipient can also activate this concept and blend it with the concept of the dance of gods; in the blend gods are horses which run in a circle as in a race. The next input space can be the image of playing child/children dancing in a circle.<sup>138</sup> In the blend, the dust obstructs the view so, in the blend, the sun is invisible. Thus, the Composer express the ambiguity of creation which both reveals and hides.

In this description, the verb *krīḍ-* and its nominal derivative *krīḍā* are not mentioned, but the concept of dance is activated. In other hymns of the RV, the verb *krīḍ-* is used to describe movement of the horses in the RV<sup>139</sup> which strengthens the possibility that the recipient would think about their movement and a chariot race. In the MBh the word *reṇu* is, in most cases, used with the same meaning as in the RV: it denotes dust raised by running horses (see e.g. MBh 6.92.70, 14.89.16). In some places, the Composer expresses that the dust is so dense that it is impossible to see anything. In the MBh the context is a battle which, with its specific rules (*dharmayuddha*), can be seen as a kind of play. Further the synonym of the word *reṇu*, *pāṃsu*, is used in the *Kāmasūtra* in the meaning of dirt or sand raised during activity which is expressed by the noun *krīḍ-* in the description of a play (*krīḍā*) with one's friend in childhood (*pāṃsukrīḍita*).<sup>140</sup> The same meaning, of a play which raises dust, is expressed by the noun *līlā* only twice (MDhP 271.13 and 297.17.) The stanzas are almost identical and the context of both of them is purification from the influence of past actions:

### MDhP 271.13

*līlayāpam yathā gātrāt pramṛjyād ātmano rajah |*  
*bahu yatnena mahatā doṣanirharaṇam tathā ||*

1991: 111).<sup>7</sup> This interpretation allows us to see the solar-rain cycle of the cosmos according to which the appearance of the sun ultimately causes rain (Jurewicz 2010).

<sup>137</sup> RV 1.33.14, 4.17.13, 42.5, 6.18.

<sup>138</sup> In the blended images activating conceptualisation of soma in terms of horses (RV 9.100.10), and of the sun and the moon (10.85.18, with use of the noun *māyā*). Other images as possible input spaces are the rivers (RV 8.13.8) wave (RV 9.108.5) and the Maruts (e.g., RV 1.166.2). The cognitive analysis of the verb *krīḍ-* (similarly as the verb *mā-* and its derivative *māyā*) in the RV needs a separate study.

<sup>139</sup> In the blended images activating conceptualisation of Agni and soma in terms of horses e.g., RV 4.45.5; 9.80.3; 86.26, 44; 106.11; 10.79.6.

<sup>140</sup> *Kāmasūtra* 1.5. 23.1: *saha pāṃsukrīḍitam upakārasambaddham samānaśīlavasyanaṃ sahadhyāyinaṃ yaścāsya marmāni rahasyāni ca vidyāt yasya cāyaṃ vidyād vā dhātrapatyaṃ sahasaṃvrddham mitram ||*

As one can easily wipe dust from his body when there is not much of it, in the same way one needs a lot of effort to destroy one's faults.<sup>141</sup>

In the source domain, it is implied that one can clean oneself easily when one is not very dirty. In the opposite case, one needs a lot of effort to become clean. In these terms, the work on oneself in order to remove the results of action is conceived. The word *ātman* allows the recipient to activate the human body in the source domain and the highest cognitive agent present in man in the target domain. Let us pay attention to the verb *mṛj-* which, already in the ṚV, is one of the words activating the general domain of Cleansing By Heat in terms of which liberating cognition is conceived (Jurewicz 2010). Here the word *līlā* means 'ease' rather than 'play' but it might also activate the pleasure man experiences washing with cool water in hot weather.

The argument we can put forward is that, although the instrumental of instrumental form *līlāya* in verse a corresponds to *yatnena* in verse c, a supplementary interpretation is possible. *līlāya* can also mean an instrumental cause and then the meaning could be that dirt is the result of play e.g., the play of children. Such dirt can be easily removed. Moreover, a child's play is without aim, it happens just here and now. These interpretations make sense of the comparison: as easy as it may be (*līlāya*) to wash off dust caused by a child's play (*līlāya*) it is much more difficult to get rid of one's faults.

Thus, we can reconstruct the concept of play begun in the ṚV and used to express cosmogony: it is the play which raises dust, like a dance, chariot race or the play of children. The players are covered with it, so their external appearance changes during this process. On one hand, they are hidden under the dirt, on the other, they are more visible.

### 5.3.7.c. The use of the noun *krīḍā* in the descriptions of liberating cognition

In MDhP 236.23, the word *krīḍā* is used in the description of a man in the fourth stage of his life who is described as one who finds pleasure in himself (*ātmarati*) and finds support playing by himself (*ātmakrīḍātmasaṃśrayaḥ*).<sup>142</sup> Such a description of the free man who has cognised his unity with reality can be found in tradition:

<sup>141</sup> Jurewicz's translation. MDhP 297.17: *līlayālpam yathā gātrāt pramṛjyād rajasah pumān | bahuyatnena mahatā pāpanirharaṇam tathā ||*

<sup>142</sup> MDhP 236: *caturthe cāyusaḥ śeṣe vānaprasthāśramam tyajet | sadyaskārāṃ nirūpyeṣṭiṃ sarvavedasadaḥṣṇām || (22) ātmayājī so 'tmaratir ātmakrīḍātmasaṃśrayaḥ | ātmany agnīn samāropya tyaktvā sarvaparigrahān || (23)*

**CU 7.25.2**

*sa vā eṣa evaṃ paśyann evaṃ manvāna evaṃ vijānann ātmaratir ātmakrīḍa  
ātmamithuna ātmānandaḥ sa svarāḍ bhavati | tasya sarveṣu lokeṣu kāmācāro  
bhavati |*

A man who sees it this way, thinks about it this way, and perceives it this way; a man who finds pleasure in the self, who dallies with the self, who mates with the self, and who attains bliss in the self – he becomes completely his own master; he obtains complete freedom of movement in all the worlds.<sup>143</sup>

We can argue that the sequence of the compounds reflects the sequence of the scenario of sexual play evoked in the source domain: a man feels pleasure when he sees a beautiful woman (*ātmarati*), then he plays with her in order to allure her (*ātmakrīḍa*), then he sexually unites with her (*ātmamithuna*) to finally feel orgasm (*ātmānanda*). Liberating cognition is conceived in these terms. Here, the noun *krīḍā* means sexual play before sexual union, the play is full of tension and of uncertainty as to whether the seduction will be successful. The result of liberating cognition is freedom conceived in terms of being one's own ruler and of having the capability to move wherever one wants (Lakoff 2006). In the next sentence, the Composer states that those who cognise reality otherwise, are ruled by others and cannot move where they want.<sup>144</sup> Thus we can see the next possible play which motivated the Composer's mind: it is amorous play.

In another description of the CU, *krīḍā* has a broader meaning:

**CU 8.12.3**

*sa tatra paryeti jakṣat krīḍan ramamāṇaḥ strībhir vā yānair vā jñātibhir vā  
nopajanam smarann idaṃ śarīram |*

He roams about there, laughing, playing, and enjoying himself with women, carriages, or relatives, without remembering the appendage that is this body.<sup>145</sup>

The source domain activates play with women, but also chariot races or meeting one's family. The common feature of these activities is pleasure. Play with women and chariot races are obviously characterised by uncertainty as to their results and meeting with relatives might also be seen as such. Thus, social relationships are seen as play and the concept of this experience is used to conceive the happiness realised when one becomes ultimately free.

<sup>143</sup> Olivelle's (1998) translation.

<sup>144</sup> Cu 7.25.2: *atha ye 'nyathāto vidur anyarājānas te kṣayyalokā bhavanti | teṣāṃ sarveṣu lokeṣu akāmācāro bhavati ||*

<sup>145</sup> Olivelle's (1998) translation.



\*

We can see that even the analysis of words which are used rarely, or its synonyms, can reveal not only the way of thinking of the Composers but also the experience which motivates it. The analysis presented in these two sections has allowed us to reconstruct other concepts of play such as children's play, chariot races, amorous play and close social relationships. Let us note that meeting a family means meeting one's parents or children, gurus and close friends, and these relationships constitute the conceptual basis for understanding the relationship between a devotee and the highest cognitive agent in the religious assumptions of bhakti.

### 5.3.8. The despair of Draupadī

In this section, we consider the psychological situation of the spoil-sport i.e., the human being who assumes ontic duality between himself and the world. BhG 11 describes the fearful aspect of Arjuna's mystic vision where he feels that he is surrounded by fire that comes from Kṛṣṇa's hungry mouth, he sees it wherever he looks and finds no escape. It is metaphysical claustrophobia, an echo of the Ṛgvedic experience of the lack of freedom expressed by the noun *āmhās* and of the cosmogonies of the ŚB. One may activate the concept of the grim hide-and-seek play in ŚB 6.2.1 where the Composer presents Agni as hiding from Prajāpati because of the fear that Prajāpati would eat him and see the situation of Arjuna in these terms. Within the frames of this conceptualisation, Arjuna is in a position when he realises that 'it is not play' and that transformations of the manifest aspect characterised by death are real and there is no place to hide or escape. His fear will be resolved thanks to his love for his friend identified with whole reality (see section 5.1, chapter 4.12).

The word *krīdā* is used once in the MBh as the source domain to denote the activity of the highest cognitive manifest aspect of reality when it is conceived in terms of a cruel player. The context is as follows. The Pāṇḍavas and Draupadī have lived in the forest for thirteen months after the fatal game of dice. MBh 3.28–37 presents a quarrel between them that is sophisticated and full of philosophical arguments. Draupadī tries to convince Yudhiṣṭhira to attack Duryodhana and his brothers and to take back the kingdom lost in the game. Yudhiṣṭhira strongly opposes this. The arguments of both sides have been discussed by some scholars,<sup>146</sup> but a brief summary of the arguments of Draupadī, presented in MBh 3.31, is useful. She perceives the cosmos and

<sup>146</sup> Bailey (1983, 150–57), Hill (2001, 168–76), Biardeau (2001, 1: 423–26, 437–44), Malinar (2007b), Hildebeitel (2011a: 481–516).

its rules as separate from herself; in the same way she perceives the highest cognitive agent whom she calls the Placer (*dhātṛ*) and Ordainer (*vidhātṛ*). She argues that in this world man never obtains virtue<sup>147</sup> thanks to good deeds prescribed by the dharma. Yudhiṣṭhira is the best example of that, because he has been devoted to dharma even more than herself and his brothers. His life is proof of his love of dharma, because he has observed all the rules prescribed by it. She bitterly states that dharma protects kings who protect it, but did not protect Yudhiṣṭhira. She reminds the others of all Yudhiṣṭhira's good deeds. Only once did he act against it because of his addiction to dicing and then he lost everything. Draupadī cannot understand this and is full of pain because of it.

Then she tells an old story according to which the world is in the power of a King (*īśvara*, 20). As we know, the highest cognitive agent is conceived in these terms. Draupadī describes this power in terms of a play. She states that the highest cognitive agent moves each part of the bodies of men as if they were wooden puppets (*dārumayī yoṣā*, 22).<sup>148</sup> 'The King', having pervaded all creatures like space (*ākāśa*), distributes what is good and what is bad (23). So, the recipient may elaborate the source domain of the puppet theatre and understand the presence of the highest cognitive agent in creatures in terms of a puppeteer who moves the puppets and thus makes them alive. As a puppeteer, it is invisible to the audience. They see only the puppets moving according to the will of someone the audience does not understand. She states that the body, called the field (*kṣetra*), is only a means for the highest cognitive agent to force people to perform good and bad actions (30). The logic of this source domain implies that the highest cognitive agent is as unsympathetic towards its creatures as a farmer (the Field Knower) is towards its field which he only wants to use for his benefit. At the same time, Draupadī shows that she is well educated in philosophy.

According to her, the highest cognitive agent uses living beings to kill themselves. The activity of Kṛṣṇa in his cosmic form is presented in the same way in BhG 11. Draupadī calls the power with which it does this, *māyā*, and this power confuses creatures. Because of that, as the recipient may presume, living beings take part in his destructive activity. Even the seers who know the Veda are deluded by *māyā*: they see one thing, but act in a different way.

<sup>147</sup> As Buitenen (1975: 280) so translates *śrī*. Is the fact that Draupadī is the human incarnation of Śrī also important here?

<sup>148</sup> Draupadī also activates other source domains to conceive the dependence of man on the highest cognitive agent: a bird tied to a string (24), a pearl strung on a string (25), a tree flowing in a quick flowing river (26), grass bent under the force of the wind (28). Dhṛtarāṣṭra also uses this source domain in MBh 5.32.12, 5.39.1 (*sūtraprotā dārumayīva yoṣā*).

Their state is conceived in terms of rapid streams of rain which cannot be stopped. The same is for other people: they think in one way, but the King makes the world act differently. Then Draupadī states:

**MBh 31.34–37**

*yathā kāṣṭhena vā kāṣṭham aśmānaṃ cāśmanā punaḥ |  
ayasā cāpy ayaś chindyān nirviceṣṭam acetanam || (34)*

As one breaks wood with wood, stone with stone, iron with iron, the inert with the insentient,

*evaṃ sa bhagavān devaḥ svayambhūḥ prapitāmahaḥ |  
hinasti bhūtair bhūtāni chadma kṛtvā yudhiṣṭhira || (35)*

so, the blessed Lord, the self-existent, great grand-grandfather, hurts creatures with creatures, hiding behind a disguise, Yudhiṣṭhira.

*saṃprayojya viyojyāyaṃ kāmākāraḥ prabhuḥ |  
krīḍate bhagavan bhūtair bālaḥ krīḍanakair iva || (36)*

Joining and unjoining them, the capricious Lord plays with the creatures like a child with its toys.

*na mātrpitṛvad rājan dhātā bhūteṣu vartate |  
roṣād iva pravṛtto 'yaṃ yathāyam itaro janaḥ || (37)*

The Placer does not act towards his creatures like a father or mother, he seems to act out of fury, like every other person.<sup>149</sup>

Draupadī elaborates the concept of play. Now, she evokes the concept of a child (*bala*) who in anger destroys its puppets by hitting one with the other. Taking into account that *bala* also means ‘stupid’ one could also imagine a mad, perverse puppeteer who destroys his puppets and conceive in these terms the highest cognitive agent. Within the frames of this metaphor, there is no place for love or mercy.

One cannot agree with Hildebeitel (2011a: 515) that the ‘imagery of the Placer as a puppeteer moving his playthings around with strings attached’ is ‘very mechanical, and plausibly materialistic.’ More precisely, he misses the important psychological meaning of this source domain. A puppet theatre involves the presence of a puppeteer and the audience is aware of him, although not during the play (if it is good enough). But each play ends and the audience come back to their real life.

Draupadī’s position is built on the conviction the cosmos and men are radically different from the highest cognitive agent, at least epistemologically.

<sup>149</sup> Buitenen’s (1981) translation.

But she does not deny its existence! Using viewpoint theory, her viewpoint is that of a particular ego-viewpoint, using the metaphor EXISTENCE OF COSMOS IS PLAY, she is enclosed in the play-world. It is worth noting that her arguments are similar to those presented in BhG 11.<sup>150</sup> Just as Arjuna in the first part of his vision, she sees the cruel aspect of the highest cognitive agent who creates creatures only to make them kill themselves. Conceptualisation of man in terms of means (*hetu*), by which the highest cognitive agent acts, is similar to that presented by Kṛṣṇa according to which Arjuna should only be a sign (*nimitta*) of what Kṛṣṇa is doing in the world (see section 4.12). Further, Draupadī also evokes the concept of parental love but states that the highest cognitive agent does not love his children, rather it hates them to such an extent that he wants to kill them: its creation is motivated by anger and not by love.

For Draupadī, the story becomes true, the play is real, and there is nothing else beyond it. She has no access to the viewpoint from which she could identify herself with the highest cognitive agent and understand that they are the same. Remind ourselves of Fink’s statements about freedom and the dangers of play:

In the enactment of play the human being manages to exist at two extremes. Play can at one time be experienced as a peak of human sovereignty; the human being then enjoys an almost unbounded creativity. He creates productively and without inhibition because he does not produce in the realm of real actuality. The player feels as if he were “master” of his imaginary products... [W]e also find the opposite extreme of freedom in play. For sometimes a relief from real world-actuality can extend all the way to rapture, to enchantment, to succumbing to the daemonic character of the mask. Play can contain within itself the bright Apollonian aspect of free selfhood, but also the dark Dionysian aspect of panic-stricken self-abandonment.<sup>151</sup>

Draupadī is in panic. She is confronted with rules of play in which the highest cognitive agent cognises itself constantly and, merciless from her viewpoint, splits itself into subject and object. The highest cognitive agent hides itself in the objects and then finds itself in them. The ontological manifestation of this process is life and death. This meaning is expressed openly in BhG 11 and is deeply grounded in tradition (see chapter 4.12). As long as man mentally remains in the play-world, he will never see the emergent meaning of the play. And he will never see the sense of life and death.

We will not discuss all of the philosophical quarrel between Draupadī and Yudhiṣṭhira but only the conclusion from the first answer of Yudhiṣṭhira. Having

<sup>150</sup> Hildebeitel (2011a: 514) also pays attention to the parallels between these two fragments of the MBh.

<sup>151</sup> Fink (2016: 25–26).

told her wife about the role of dharma which is described in the Vedas and proclaimed by the great seers and which should always be obeyed, he admits that the relationship between an act and its result is a mystery of the gods (*devaguhyāni*) which is kept in secret by them (33–34).<sup>152</sup> This reminds us of the formula *paroksakāmā hi devāh*, ‘the gods like mysteries’ used by the Brāhmaṇas in their definition of the nature of things expressed by the secret words ‘secretly’ (*parokṣam*). Then, Yudhiṣṭhira states that only those Brahmins who fast, with good vows, who have burnt their defilements with heat (*tapas*) understand the secret words with their clear minds (35).<sup>153</sup> In this way he continues the conviction of the Brāhmaṇas that there are those who know the secret language of the gods (Malamoud 1996c, Jurewicz 2012a). However, the fact that the result of actions is invisible for other people should not make one doubt either the law or the gods. One is reminded about Tertullian’s maxim *credo quia absurdum*: one can have faith only in what is impossible to be cognised and understood. And this faith is the basis for obeying law with necessity: one should sacrifice with full attention (*yaṣṭavyaṃ... apramattena*) and be bountiful without envy (*dātavyaṃ... anasūyatā*, 36).<sup>154</sup> The content of dharma and of human’s faith is such that the results of our actions exist. This has been proclaimed by Brahma to his sons and understood by the seer Kaśyapa (37).<sup>155</sup> The implicit implication of Yudhiṣṭhira’s argument is that if he obeys dharma, he will finally win, but to accept this implication one has to believe in what is said. One has to believe that reality, which is incomprehensible for people who are not free, is ultimately at least just, even good. Then Yudhiṣṭhira states:

### MBh 3.32.38

*tasmāt te saṃśayaḥ kṛṣṇe nīhāra iva naśyatu |*  
*vyavasya sarvam astīti nāstikyam bhāvam utsṛja ||*

Therefore, let your doubts perish like mist, Kṛṣṇā: and resolving that all this *is*, you must shed your lack of faith.

<sup>152</sup> MBh 3.32: *karmaṇām uta puṇyānām pāpānām ca phalodayaḥ | prabhavaś cāpyayaś caiva devaguhyāni bhāmini ||* (33) *naitāni veda yaḥ kaś cin muhyanty atra prajā imāḥ 03,032.034c rakṣyāṇy etāni devānām gūḍhamāyā hi devatāḥ ||* (34)

<sup>153</sup> MBh 3.32.35: *kṛśāṅgāḥ suvratāś caiva tapasā dagdhakilbiṣāḥ | prasannair mānasair yuktāḥ paśyanty etāni vai dvijāḥ ||*

<sup>154</sup> MBh 3.32.36: *na phalādarśanād dharmāḥ śaṅkitavyo na devatāḥ | yaṣṭavyaṃ cāpramattena dātavyaṃ cānasūyatā ||*

<sup>155</sup> MBh 3.32.37: *karmaṇām phalam astīti tathaitad dharma śāśvatam | brahmā provāca putrāṅām yad ṛṣir veda kaśyapaḥ ||*

On the basis of this faith Draupadī should disperse her doubts and agree on its implications which are that everything exists, the results of actions included, and make the correct decision about her future. She will then be able to abandon, as Buitenen translates *nāstikyaṃ bhāvam*, her lack of faith. Yudhiṣṭhira's statement enumerates all the initial stages of the liberating process: right faith (*śraddhā*), work on the mind (*manas*) to dispel doubts and create right desire (verses a–b) and right decisions (*vyavasāya*) undertaken by the reason (*buddhi*) to keep the mind in this state (verse c). Thus, the change of the mental state (*bhāva*) will be possible (verse d). And then Yudhiṣṭhira seems to return to the puppet theatre metaphor:

### MBh 3.32.39

*īśvaraṃ cāpi bhūtānāṃ dhātāraṃ mā vicikṣipah |  
śikṣasvaināṃ namasvaināṃ mā te bhūd buddhir īdṛśī ||*

Do not revile the Lord of the beings, who is the Placer. Learn from him, bow to him, do not harbor such notions!

On the explicit level, Yudhiṣṭhira urges Draupadī to behave according to the faith he professes and to behave accordingly to it. But the composition of verse a is such that it may trigger the recipient to think about another description of the highest cognitive agent presented in the BhG:

### BhG 18.61

*īśvaraḥ sarvabhūtānāṃ hṛddeśe 'rjuna tiṣṭhati |  
bhrāmayan sarvabhūtāni yantrārūḍhāni māyayā ||*

In the space of the heart of all beings there is their king who makes them revolve with his power to measure, Arjuna!<sup>156</sup>

This stanza has already been discussed in chapter 2.2.2 as evoking the concept of a puppet theatre. As we can see verses a of both stanzas are almost identical and unique in the whole MBh (in the Critical Edition).<sup>157</sup> The suggestion is that the recipient is prompted to activate this stanza in the context of MBh 3.32. Yudhiṣṭhira would then say: 'yes, I agree with the way you see the world, but the puppeteer knows how to play and we are in good hands.' The next stanza confirms this idea, because in his concluding statement Yudhiṣṭhira refers to the concept of a loving relationship between man and the highest cognitive agent that is characteristic for the bhakti attitude:

<sup>156</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

<sup>157</sup> According to DSC.

**MBh 3.32.40**

*yasya prasādāt tadbhakto martyo gacchaty amartyatām |  
uttamaṃ daivatam kṛṣṇe mātivocaḥ katham cana ||*

It is by the grace of the supreme Deity that a devoted mortal becomes immortal  
– do not censure him, Kṛṣṇā, in any way!

The highest cognitive agent is called, in an abstract way, ‘the supreme Deity’ (*uttamaṃ daivatam*, verse c). It is as if Yudhiṣṭhira gives Draupadī the freedom to choose how she will understand ultimate reality conceived in terms of a puppeteer. He only highlights its positive attitude towards its puppets which is expressed in its grace (*prasāda*, verse a). When a mortal being confidently and lovingly participates in this reality (*tadbhakta*, verse a), the mortal becomes immortal which means that he gets full access to the viewpoint of the puppeteer and unites with him.

However, the expression *yasya prasādāt* leads us further. It should be noted that it is used in the MBh very consciously. In all cases it appears in the first position of hemistich (according to DCS). Let us briefly summarise all the instances. It is used again by Draupadī who complains at the unhappiness she must endure at Virāṭa’s palace (4.19.13).<sup>158</sup> She begins with blaming herself for it: she states that she must have done something unpleasant (*vipriyam*) to the Placer as a child or because of her stupidity (*bālayā... mayā*, verses a–b), but then she blames the Placer himself: it is by his ‘grace’ she is now enduring such suffering (verses c–d). Buitenen (1978, II: 55) reads *aprasādāt*, because he translates this expression ‘by his disfavour,’ but it seems that *prasāda* is used here ironically to evoke the grace about which Yudhiṣṭhira talks in MBh 3.32.40. According to Yudhiṣṭhira it makes the mortal being immortal but, according to Draupadī, the Placer takes revenge on humans, as an angry merciless parent. This is what his grace looks like!

Then the expression *yasya prasādāt* is used three times in reference to Droṇa’s grace: twice by Dhṛtarāṣṭra after Droṇa’s death and once by Gandhārī during her lament on the battle-field.<sup>159</sup> It is by the grace of Droṇa that the Pāṇḍavas could perform their deeds on the battle-field, because it was him who taught them the art of war. The recipient may also see the irony in the use of the noun *prasāda*, it is now formulated from the view-point of Droṇa’s who is

<sup>158</sup> MBh 4.19.13: *nūnaṃ hi bālayā dhātur mayā vai vipriyam kṛtam | yasya prasādād durnītam prāptāsmi bharatarṣabha ||*

<sup>159</sup> Dhṛtarāṣṭra: MBh 7.169.3: *yasya prasādāt karmāṇi kurvanti puruṣarṣabhāḥ | amānuṣāṇi saṃgrāme devair asukarāṇi ca ||*; 8.1.38: *yasya prasādāt kaunteyā rājaputrā mahābālāḥ | mahārathatvam samprāptās tathānye vasudhādhipāḥ ||*; Gandhārī: MBh 11.23.28: *yasya prasādād bībhatsuh pāṇḍavaḥ karma duṣkaram | cakāra sa hataḥ śete nainam astrānyapālayan ||*

finally killed by Arjuna, his best pupil. The relationship between Droṇa's and the Pāṇḍavas can be seen as the manifestation of a relationship between the highest cognitive agent and men conceived in terms of a loving relationship between a master and his pupils. His death at their hands again reminds us of the Brāhmaṇas and the cosmogonies of the ŚB which assume that reality dies in order to manifest itself. The ambiguous social position of Droṇa who was born as a Brahmin, but behaves like the Kṣatriya might reflect the ambiguous nature of reality. This topic, however, need further investigation.

The examples of the use of the formula *yasya prasādāt* given till now refer either explicitly or implicitly to the highest cognitive agent and its relationship with its human manifestations. However, in MBh 6.16.7, *prasāda* refers to the grace of Vyāsa thanks to which Sañjaya obtained his super-natural abilities that allow him to describe the battle to Dhṛtarāṣṭra.<sup>160</sup> Within the main narrative space (using Dancygier's approach) Dhṛtarāṣṭra's father, Vyāsa, is a character that constitutes one of the Ego-viewpoints. Yet as the narrator of the MBh he is also located outside it, in the story-viewpoint space. Within the main narrative space Vyāsa, as a character, equips Sañjaya with super-natural abilities, but outside that he, as the narrator, just invents a specific hero who possesses them taking into account that another hero is blind and cannot watch the battle.<sup>161</sup>

According to the Critical Edition *prasāda* is used once again in MDhP 331.19 just before the story about the White Island (*Śvetadvīpa*) where the manifestation of Nārāyaṇa to the seer Nārada takes place. Here Vaiśampāyana pays homage to Vyāsa thanks to whose grace he can tell the auspicious story of Nārāyaṇa.<sup>162</sup> It should also be noted that, according to the critical apparatus, the same stanza appears in MBh 1<sup>163</sup> and in the beginning of the Book 2 (slightly changed).<sup>164</sup> In the second case, the homage is paid to Nārāyaṇa and to Nara who is the greatest of men (*naraṃ... narottamam*) and the syntax implies that it is his grace which allows the story about Nārāyaṇa to be told.

<sup>160</sup> 6.16.7: *namaskṛtvā pituste 'haṃ pārśāryāya dhimate | yasya prasādād divyaṃ me prāptaṃ jñānam anuttamam ||*

<sup>161</sup> The reasons why the battle is described in this way can be more complex, but this issue goes beyond the present study. The double role of Vyāsa, as the narrator and hero is also discussed by McGrath (2019).

<sup>162</sup> MDhP 331.19: *namo bhagavate tasmai vyāsāyāmitatejase | yasya prasādād vakṣyāmi nārāyaṇakathāṃ śubhāṃ ||*

<sup>163</sup> after 24: *namo bhagavate tasmai vyāsāyāmitatejase | yasya prasādād vakṣyāmi nārāyaṇakathāṃ śubhāṃ*

<sup>164</sup> *nārāyaṇaṃ namaskṛtya naraṃ caiva narottamam | yasya prasādād vakṣyāmi nārāyaṇakathāṃ śubhāṃ ||*



One is tempted to think that Nara is Vyāsa, but, as Biardeau (1999) points out, Vyāsa is also identified with Nārāyaṇa himself (MDhP 334.9).<sup>165</sup>

Hiltebeitel, on the basis of comparative research between the Critical Edition and the versions not included in it, has convincingly shown that the *Nārāyaṇīya* can be seen as ‘as a kind of epitome’ of the whole MBh (2011b: 192, 201–206). It seems that the fact that many manuscripts introduce the same stanza in the beginning of the whole MBh, and the story about the White Island, confirms Hiltebeitel’s hypothesis.

It also adds to the present interpretation as to who the Placer is in the MBh about whom Draupadī is so angry and whom Yudhiṣṭhira trusts so much. It is Vyāsa, the narrator of the story. The Composers of the MBh constantly play with two viewpoints, that of the story and that of the main narrative space and invite their recipients to compress and decompress them. Thus, the MBh also describes the experience of an author who feels that his characters sometimes become independent, so he has to change the plot to preserve the internal coherence of his story or the psychological probability of his characters and may even forgets about the world outside the story to become totally immersed in the story.

But as a whole, the MBh describes the philosophical truth about reality as it is presented in the present study and which is also expressed by Draupadī in her metaphor. The highest cognitive agent, conceived terms of a puppeteer, is outside the cosmos, but at the same time he identifies with his puppets and is even dependent on them. As Hiltebeitel notes, one of the names of Draupadī is Pāñcālī which ‘means not only a daughter of Pāñcāla but evokes a word for ‘marionette’ (Hiltebeitel 2011a: 510, 2011b: 322). And it is she who presents the viewpoint of the marionette placed in the main narrative space, and never goes beyond it, at least not in the fragments discussed here.

\*

The first part of this chapter discussed the concept of play as it is seen in Western research, philosophy and psychoanalysis. Its first aim was to show that the basic features of the ICM of play, proposed by Huizinga and other scholars, can be reconstructed to reflect the way the Smṛti Composers thought about cosmogony, ontology, the role of the highest cognitive agent and the role of men. The features of the ICM of play are its separateness from everyday life, repetitiveness, the necessity for rules which are to be treated seriously, the

<sup>165</sup> MDhP 334.9: *kṛṣṇadvaipāyanaṃ vyāsaṃ vidhī nārāyaṇaṃ prabhum | ko hy anyah puruṣavyāghra mahābhāratakr̥d bhavet | dharmān nānāvīdhāṃs caiva ko brūyāt tam ṛte prabhum ||*

fact that it can only be played by free agents who have no any other goal than that of taking part, the emotions felt during play and its emergent meaning. The similarity of this ICM to the early Smṛti concept of creation, the existence of the cosmos and of man allows us to suppose that the Composers were motivated by the experience expressed in the ICM of play. Conceptualisation of creation, the existence of the cosmos and man in terms of play enlarges our understanding of early Smṛti metaphysics and provides answers to some fundamental questions such as the reason for creation of the world and the sense of its existence.

The second aim was to present the striking similarity between philosophic and psychoanalytical theories and early Smṛti thought when the concept of play is elaborated as the source domain. This similarity becomes the starting point for comparative research but also confirms the possibility for the mutual use of philosophical approaches and concepts. The conceptualisation of human existence when confronted with the mystery of the world, conceived in terms of play elaborated by Fink who argues we take part in the intertwining of being and non-being, reflects Hindu ideas that are expressed already in RV 10.129. Gadamer's understanding of relationship between man and its creation in terms of play in which the relationship between 'I' and 'Thou' becomes possible accords with early bhakti understanding of the relationship between man and the highest cognitive agent which in later tradition becomes God. Finally, the stages of the early development of human self that, as Winnicott claims, can only successively occur in play between mother and a child are the stages of the creation of the cosmos presented already in the Brāhmaṇas and then developed in early Smṛti thought. It is also shown that the features of the activity of a free man, such as a lack of attachment and skill, are also features of play. On the other hand, men who are not free can be seen as spoil-sports, who break the rules of play and thus, in a perverse way, become enclosed in play seen by them as ultimate reality. They also spoil the play of the highest cognitive agent enclosed within themselves.

In the second part, we looked at the use of the nouns *krīḍā* and *līlā* which rarely appear in early Smṛti texts, but the contexts of their use made possible the reconstruction of thinking about philosophical issues in terms of play. The analysis of the use of the noun *krīḍā* in the cosmogonies of the MS and MDhP confirmed that their Composers were motivated by the experience of play. Then, we have turned to the specific use of the nouns *krīḍā* and *līlā* in early Smṛti texts, the analysis of which allowed us to reconstruct other kinds of play which motivated the thinking of their Composers such as children's play, chariot races, amorous play and social contacts (with close relatives). In the last section, we discussed the position of a spoil-sport, represented by Draupadī, who sees the human condition as helpless dependence on a mad and

cruel player. This conclusion is inevitable if one assumes, as does Draupadī, the duality between men and their creator. It should be noted, by the way, that Yudhiṣṭhira calls her a heretic (*nāstikī*) in spite of her good understanding of philosophy.

In this analysis, we referred to Vedic tradition, bringing to mind the cosmogonies of the ṚV (together with ṚV 10.72 where the concept of dance is used as the source domain) and the ŚB. It was also argued that Vedic ritual can be seen as a kind of play during which a religious concept of ‘something that is set apart’ (Taves 2009) is realised in strictly determined time and space and with the use of strictly determined objects. There is no doubt that the use of concept of play in philosophy was a natural elaboration of earlier philosophy which postulated one internally contradictory reality which began to cognise itself. The aim was not only to show this, but to provide a backcloth for later religious and philosophical theories which use the concept of play as the main source domain in their explorations. Moreover, the use of the concept of play as the source domain refers the recipient to his everyday experience, which is just play, when his mind functions in different perspectives simultaneously. The same happens when listening to a story. Within these frames, the creation of the cosmos and liberating cognition turn out to be experience that is well known from everyday life, although, of course, their concepts are philosophically elaborated.

Finally, the analysis shows that the cognitive turn, which begun in Europe in the 17th century<sup>166</sup> and which slowly broke through the maze of other convictions and beliefs, directed European philosophical interests to the problems of the relationship between mind, body and culture. This was an area that had been explored by Indian thinkers since the dawn of that culture. Thus, the way to mutual cooperation between European and Indian philosophers is open and more of us should meet collaboratively than has been the case till now.

#### 5.4. Early Smṛti philosophy, karman and responsibility<sup>167</sup>

In the section we will consider the concept of karman, as presented in the BhG, using the concept of responsibility proposed by Roman Ingarden (1983), a Polish phenomenologist and disciple of Edmund Husserl.<sup>168</sup> As

<sup>166</sup> Schnädelbach (1991: 79–88).

<sup>167</sup> This is a revised version of Jurewicz (2006, 2018c).

<sup>168</sup> In his paper *On Responsibility. Its Ontic Foundations* (Ingarden 1983: 53–119). For use of Husserlian phenomenology in religious studies, see Kamppinen (2001).

previously mentioned the semantic range of the word *karman* encompasses the whole scenario of action, i.e., action, its value and its link with the agent and it has a result. Now it will be argued that the concept of responsibility, as understood by Ingarden, can be applied instead of the word ‘result’. The use of Ingarden’s concept of responsibility will disclose the moral aspect of the early Hindu theory of action and clarify the aspects of this theory which are usually expressed in metaphors, or only implied, but which are fundamental for its understanding. It will also allow us to see some similarities and differences between Hindu ethics on one hand and those proposed by Ingarden on the other.

### 5.4.1. *Karman* and *vidhāna*

As mentioned earlier, one of the most common source domains used to explain the impact of action on a human being is the concept of farming: just as a farmer inevitably gets dirty while he works in the field, similarly man inevitably gets dirty when taking any action. The dirt remaining on man is the external expression of his relationship with the act he committed: just as washing out removes dirt, similar action destroys or breaks that relationship. This source domain is further elaborated: the results of actions are conceived in terms of fruits which are eaten when the plants ripen and which form and shape the body of the eater. Some strands of classical Hindu philosophy (Mīmāṃsā, Vaiśeṣika), conceptually separated the agent’s relationship with the act, calling it by the separate terms *apūrva* and *adr̥ṣṭa* (Halbfass 1991: 291–345).

It is worth noting that the Composer of MDhP 174 uses a word to denote the link between the agent and his actions which will influence him in the future. This is the word *vidhāna* ‘rule, order, arrangement.’ In the MDhP and MS, it is usually used to denote the rule which regulates cosmic processes and should regulate human behaviours. In the present analysis, we will leave this word in its original meaning.

Vidhāna is described in the following way:

#### MDhP 174.8–9

*suśīghram api dhāvantaṃ vidhānam anudhāvati |  
śete saha śayānena yena yena yathā kṛtam || (8)*

Vidhāna follows even the one who runs quickly. It lies down with one who lies, with everyone whatever deed he has committed.<sup>169</sup>

<sup>169</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

*upatiṣṭhati tiṣṭhantaṃ gacchantam anugacchati |  
karoti kurvataḥ karma chāyevānuvidhīyate || (9)*

It stands near with someone who stands, it follows the one who walks. Like a shadow action yields to the one who has committed it.<sup>170</sup>

Vidhāna is described as constantly following man: it runs after him when he runs, follows him when he walks, lies with him when he lies and stands behind him when he stands. It is conceived in terms of the shadow of activity (9d) and is defined as an action which has been done by an agent (9c). The activity of vidhāna is expressed with the same root *anu vi dhā-* from which the noun *vidhāna* is derived which highlights its necessity.

In the next stanza, its manifestation in the agent is expressed with the verb *bhuj-* which activates the source domain of eating fruits of the plants a man has planted earlier:

#### MDhP 174.10

*yena yena yathā yad yat purā karma samācitam |  
tat tad eva naro bhunkte nityaṃ vihitam ātmanā ||*

Whatever and in what way an action has been gathered, it is interruptedly eaten by man who has arranged it by himself.<sup>171</sup>

This conceptualisation allows the Composer to highlight the role of vidhāna thanks to which past actions unite with their agents. The way one arranges or organises his past actions so that they influence him is again expressed with the use of the participle of the verb *vi dhā-* (*vihita*, verse d, see also 174.14a) which implies a kind of cooperation between the agent and the necessity with which vidhāna links him to his earlier actions.

Vidhāna could not operate, if it were not connected with time:

#### MDhP 174.11

*svakarmaphalavikṣiptaṃ vidhānaparirakṣitam |  
bhūtagrāmam imaṃ kālaḥ samantāt parikarṣati ||*

From all directions time drags this multitude of beings scattered by its actions and protected by *vidhāna*.<sup>172</sup>

<sup>170</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

<sup>171</sup> Jurewicz's translation. See also 174: *ātmanā vihitam duḥkham ātmanā vihitam sukham | garbhaśayām upādāya bhujyate paurvadehikam || (14) bālo yuvā ca vṛddhaś ca yat karoti śubhāśubham | tasyām tasyām avasthāyām bhunkte janmani janmani || (15)*

<sup>172</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

In verse a, the relationship between action and time is described. As we remember, time is a category which classifies movement. In the stanza it is presented as dragging the beings (verse c–d), because the Composer has in mind those who are not able to use categories properly because of the wrong cognition. They are subjected to it.

Action is classified by the category of time but is itself a category that differentiates living beings (verse b). The differentiating influence of action is strengthened by the general meaning of *karman* which means ‘action, value and the result’. Living beings differ not only in the activities they perform in the present, but they are also composed of actions performed earlier and these actions are different.

Vidhāna is conceived in terms of a protector (verse b) who guards this difference. Without it, past deeds could unite with agents who had not committed them and thus disorder (*varṇasamkara*) would appear in society, of which Arjuna is so afraid (BhG 1.41). This would be unjust. The disorder would also appear at a cosmic level.

The way time rules over beings is conceived in a conventionalised way (see chapter 2.1.1):

### MDhP 174.12–13

*acodyamānāni yathā puṣpāṇi ca phalāni ca |  
svakālaṃ nātivartante tathā karma purākṛtam || (12)*

Action<sup>173</sup> committed by a person in the past develops just like flowers and fruits: it cannot be hurried up, and does not exceed its ordained time.

*saṃmānaś cāvamānaś ca lābhālābhau kṣayodayau |  
pravṛttā vinivartante vidhānānte punaḥ punaḥ || (13)*

Once committed action<sup>174</sup> manifests itself over and over again, at the end *vidhāna*.<sup>175</sup> That is why a person experiences respect and contempt, gain and loss, and disintegration and growth.

Actions are conceived in terms of flowers and fruits which ripen when the time comes and no one can influence the process. In the same way, when the time comes, the results of past actions will appear in the agent. Since the influence of time over beings is conceived in terms of the general domain of Cooking (see Chapter 2.1.1), one can interpret its power over actions in the same way. This interpretation makes the farming metaphor even more

<sup>173</sup> Wynne (2009: 89): ‘The karma.’

<sup>174</sup> Wynne (2009: 89): ‘karma.’

<sup>175</sup> Wynne (2009: 89): ‘of the period ordained.’

consistent: within its frames, time is fire and a cook who prepares the food until it is ready to be eaten.

It is worth noting that when the actions unite with their agents, vidhāna ends. This means that it is active only when an agent and his actions are divided by time, between past and present. It disappears when the past action is obtained by the agent. Using the source domain of farming, it disappears when the fruit is consumed. The Composer does not clarify the ontic nature of vidhāna. It could be conceived that it potentially remains in the agent to appear in the right moment. Neither does he make clear if vidhāna disappears in the beginning of experience, which is the result of the previous actions, or if it remains until the experience is finished. What is important is that vidhāna is the factor which ensures that the result of an action will reach its agent.

The next three stanzas highlight one's personal responsibility for one's emotional state: happiness or unhappiness is arranged by oneself (*ātmanā*, 174.14ab). The participle *viḥita* again expresses the process of arranging or preparing one's emotional state and its bearing is conceived in terms of eating (*bhuj-*). In MDhP 174,16, the link between an agent and his previous deeds is conceived in terms of the ability of a calf to find his mother even among a thousand cows. On a more general level, we could say that it is conceived in terms of naturally necessary processes. This accords with the assumption that cosmic subject-object cognition which constitutes the existence of the cosmos takes place all the time and that categories are applied with necessity.

However, the natural necessity of vidhāna can be overcome. The Composer of MDhP 174 conceives this process in terms of cleaning under the influence of water or fire:

### MDhP 174.17–18

*samunnam agrato vastraṃ paścāc chudhyati karmaṇā |*  
*upavāsaiḥ prataptānām dīrghaṃ sukham anantakam || (17)*

After a cloth has been soaked right through it can be cleaned by one's own endeavours. In the same way, those who are heated<sup>176</sup> by fasting will attain limitless bliss for a lengthy period of time.

*dīrghakālena tapasā seviteṇa tapovane |*  
*dharmanirdhūtapāpānām saṃsidhyante manorathāḥ || (18)*

By the practice of heating<sup>177</sup> for a long time in a grove of those who heat themselves,<sup>178</sup> a person's evil deeds can be expunged by righteousness and his heart's desires obtained.

<sup>176</sup> Wynne (2009: 89): 'practice asceticism.'

<sup>177</sup> Wynne (2009: 89): 'practicing asceticism.'

<sup>178</sup> Wynne (2009: 89): 'an ascetic's grove.'

The Composer creates a conceptual network the input spaces of which are: 1) the concept of cleaning clothes which comes from the farming metaphor; 2) the general domain of Cleansing By Heat (in its specific realisation of purification under the influence of fire); 3) the transformation of a man. The generic space is the concept of transformation. In the blend heating practices (tapas), thanks to which the bad results of action are burnt by the fire of dharma (the verb *nir dhū-* is also used to denote fanning during kindling fire), toughens the self of man and cleanses him in the same way as water can clean dirty clothes. Let us note that the factor which transforms man is again conceived in terms of water and fire (see chapter 4.9.5) which implies its contradictory nature. This accords with tradition according to which the self (*ātman*) of man performs liberating action and is liberated by ambivalent reality conceived as fiery and liquid. Within the context of the whole exposition, the recipient understands that *vidhāna* disappears during this process.

The semantic range of the concept of *vidhāna* as the necessary link between an agent and his past action is close to the semantic range of the concept of responsibility in Ingarden's approach. However, this appears to be the only case in the texts analysed in this study where the holistic concept of *karman* is split into; an action, its results and the link between them. In other cases, Sanskrit speakers easily understood from the context which semantic aspect of this concept is highlighted. It is likely that European readers have made a mistake in seeing *karma(n)* as hypostases and the result of action. If we understand the meaning of *karman* as the holistic expression of action and responsibility, we can see the Hindu theory of action is a moral theory, the core of which is responsibility seen as an inseparable element of action.

#### 5.4.2. The features of the responsible agent

Ingarden begins his discussion on responsibility with an analysis of features which should characterise the agent who should bear it. The most important feature of such an agent is that he should be aware of what he does and what are the consequences of his action (Ingarden 1983: 55–56). According to the BhG too, awareness should characterise the agent and its range is even wider than that proposed by Ingarden. Man should be fully aware of the whole context of his action, social, cosmic and, finally, of the context of the whole reality. The aim of Kṛṣṇa's teaching is to make Arjuna aware of this context.

Moreover, Ingarden states that the agent who is able to be responsible for his action should actively perform it. His action cannot be 'a purely



passive tolerating of something which happens to the agent, or some involuntary, automatically induced reaction' (p. 56). In the same way, Arjuna should fight actively and with full involvement (BhG 3.25–26, see below, section 5).

#### **5.4.3. The features of an action for which one can be responsible. Action and its value**

Having discussed the features of the responsible agent, Ingarden analyses features of the action for which a person can be responsible. He says that these are the actions which 'are carriers of some positive or negative value' or 'they at least indirectly lead to the emergence of a factual state bearing a value character' (Ingarden 1983: 58). The agent is not to be judged as responsible or otherwise for the activity of playing solitaire in his free time. However, if this activity makes someone neglect his duty, then responsibility emerges, but then 'the responsibility weighs on him not for the harmless playing of solitaire, but for the neglect of his duties' (Ingarden 1983: 58).

The concept of *karman* also encompasses the meaning of the activity of parts of the cosmos and of action which should be performed by men and regulated by *dharma*. Both the cosmos and man are manifestations of reality. Reality manifest in the cosmos submits to its categories always and unconditionally. However, man is free and may submit to *dharma*, or may not. And this is the case of Arjuna: he does not want to perform action prescribed by his *dharma* of the warrior. We can see then that within the semantic range of *karman*, the meaning of the action which carries a moral value is also present. If man performs the duty ascribed to him by *dharma*, he will realise the positive value of his *karman*. If he evades it, he will realise its negative value.

According to Ingarden, the fact that there are positive and negative values which can be realised in action, is the first ontic fundament of responsibility (Ingarden 1983: 69). Values should not be considered as historically conditioned and the fact that they are not always and everywhere recognised is not the argument that they do not exist. Their negation leads to negation of the possibility for responsibility (Ingarden 1983: 76). In the moral philosophy presented in the Smṛti texts analysed in this study, the ontic dimension of values can also be seen in the real influence of values of an action onto the agent which determines his future incarnation. Man is embodied in the form adequate to the values of his deeds, we could say, he is the visible form of those values.

#### 5.4.4. The features of an action for which one can be responsible. 'Own' action

According to Ingarden 'the agent is responsible for the deed performed by him and for its result if and only if it is his *own* deed' (p. 59). It should 'spring forth from the I-centre' of the agent (Ingarden 1983: 60). The I-centre should constantly command and direct 'the execution of action which emanates from it' (Ingarden 1983: 60).

Ingarden discerns two kinds of one's own action. In the first case 'I-centre' undertakes an action only out of necessity, because it cannot do otherwise (p. 61). Here 'the approval is granted to some mode of behaviour, without the I actually assimilating it or making it its own' (Ingarden 1983: 61). This kind of action is not real own action.

According to the BhG, there are people who undertake actions in accordance with their dharma and thus fulfill their duties just because they think that they should be done and fulfilled (see chapter 4.11.3). In BhG 3.25–26, Kṛṣṇa describes them as attached to their actions (*saktāḥ karmanī*) They are obsessively focused on the aim of their action. This mental attitude is based on the conviction that the agent does not possess something, but he can possess it thanks to his action.<sup>179</sup> Such agents are called ignorant (*avidvāmsah*) because they do not understand the truth about the unity of reality.

However, Kṛṣṇa postulates that such agents should be the example for a wise man, that is for an aware agent who knows the truth. He should be involved in his action in the same way as they with a similar effort and involvement because, as Ingarden would put it, only then he can be the responsible agent (see above, section 5.4.3). Moreover, he should not meddle with them in their everyday practice. This is because their actions carry some positive values for themselves and for the world (see below, section 5.4.6). Their actions, however, do not emerge from their deepest 'I-centre' but from an external necessity (like social expectations, sense of duty etc.). In Ingarden's terms, their actions are not fully their own actions.

The second kind of action which, according to Ingarden, can be called one's own is performed when 'I' is not conditioned by any external motivations and causes. It 'proceeds to engage in the endeavour of acting' (Ingarden 1983: 61). According to the BhG, such a state of complete unconditionality from external motives and reasons can be realised by a free man. Such a man has awoken his self (*ātman*) and has experienced his ontic unity with everything that exists. For such a man there is no external motive or reason

<sup>179</sup> The reverse situation is when the agent, through his action, wants to avoid something of which he is afraid.

of his action. In BhG 3.17–18, they are described as taking pleasure only in their self (*ātmarati*), they are satisfied only with their self (*ātmatṛptaś*) and find contentment only in their self (*ātmany eva ca saṃtuṣṭas*). Such people do not have to do anything (*tasya kāryaṃ na vidyate*), because they do not have an aim in what has been done and did not fail in what has not been done. Moreover, nothing in the world constitutes the basis for any goal.<sup>180</sup>

A free man acts in the same way as Kṛṣṇa, the highest cognitive agent described in BhG 3.22: he has nothing to gain in the world, and nothing which he has not already gained, but still he acts.<sup>181</sup> In Ingarden's terms, such a person performs his own action.

#### 5.4.5. The paradoxical nature of the highest state of responsibility

Summing up his analysis on the relationship between one's own action and responsibility, Ingarden states that the highest degree of responsibility is realised when 'the deed is undertaken and accomplished in full awareness, with intent, and with premeditation by the personal I' (Ingarden 1983: 65). And, as he points out, here we come across the paradoxical nature of responsibility. If an agent agrees to assume responsibility for his action, this finally leads to the annihilation of blame in reference to this concrete action. As he puts it:

But the assuming of responsibility and compliance with the requirements directed at the agent which follow therefrom, as well as the fulfillment of what is demanded from him, relieve him of his blame<sup>182</sup> and his responsibility becomes thereby debilitated or annulled.<sup>183</sup>

In the BhG, the relationship between the free agent and responsibility is understood in a similarly paradoxical way. There are people who perform actions according to their dharma with their self (*ātman*) not awake (see section 5.4.3). They realise positive value for the world and for themselves. The world preserves its consistence and harmony (*lokasaṃgraha*) thanks to their actions. Moreover, thanks to performance of actions which carry positive value, those agents positively influence their future incarnations.

<sup>180</sup> BhG 3: *yas tv ātmaratir eva syād ātmatṛptaś ca mānavaḥ | ātmany eva ca saṃtuṣṭas tasya kāryaṃ na vidyate || (17) naiva tasya kṛtenārtho nākṛteneha kaś cana | na cāsya sarvabhūteṣu kaś cid arthavyapāśrayaḥ || (18)*

<sup>181</sup> BhG 3.22: *na me pārthāsti kartavyaṃ triṣu lokeṣu kiṃ cana | nānavāptam avāptavyaṃ varta eva ca karmaṇi ||*

<sup>182</sup> Here the responsibility is identified with blame which makes Ingarden's exposition less clear (see also below, Conclusion).

<sup>183</sup> Ingarden (1983: 67).

And it may happen that those people will develop so valuable a psycho-mental organism that they will be able to wake up their self (*ātman*). It may happen after many incarnations, but will happen for sure. When Arjuna asks Kṛṣṇa about the future of people who did not manage to finally liberate themselves in this life, Kṛṣṇa answers:

### BhG 6.40–41, 42

*pārtha naiveha nāmutra vināśas tasya vidyate |  
na hi kalyāṇakṛt kaś cid durgatiṃ tāta gacchati || (40)*

Arjuna, my friend, neither in this world nor in the next does that one perish, for anyone who has done some measure of good cannot possibly take the wrong path. No, Pārtha, neither here nor hereafter is he lost,

*prāpya puṇyakṛtāṃl lokān uṣitvā śāśvatīḥ samāḥ |  
śucīnām śrīmatām gehe yogabhraṣṭo 'bhijāyate || (41)*

for no one who does good can go wrong, my friend. He goes to the worlds which are gained by merit, and when he has dwelled there for years without end, this ‘failed yogin’ is born high in the house of pure and prosperous folk.

*tatra taṃ buddhisamyogaṃ labhate paurvadehikam |  
yatate ca tato bhūyaḥ saṃsiddhau kurunandana || (43)*

There he will recover the purposiveness of his previous life, scion of Kuru, and strive once more to perfect it.

When the highest cognitive agent of man is awoken, man begins to act under its guidance and will never be reborn. This is because action manifests in such a man in the very moment of its performance and only then. Using the frames of the Farming metaphor, one could say that the actions do not leave any dirt and they do not ripen in order to give fruits later. This is the state in which action, its value, its aim and its result are realised all at once. In this state only pure action remains. As stated before, this situation is expressed by the concept of *karman* the meanings of which are fully compressed. The highest cognitive agent manifests itself in action, in constant splitting and uniting in subjective and objective manifestations. Its action is stopped only in men who do not cognise it.

Ingarden’s concept of responsibility allows us to see this situation very precisely. When a free man, consciously and of his own volition, directed by his self (*ātman*), undertakes the action prescribed to him by dharma, he assumes responsibility which is abolished in the very moment of its assumption. The composer of the BhG is aware that such an action cannot be called action in the everyday sense in which the meanings of *karman* are decompressed and he calls such action as non-action (BhG 4.18).

### 5.4.6. The opposite state of the highest responsibility

Ingarden also describes the state which is opposed to the state of highest responsibility. It takes place when the agent is forced to act either because the external conditions exert the highest influence on the agent or because he is not aware of what is going on. In this state, there is no responsibility at all. Ingarden uses as the example the situation of a woman who is raped (Ingarden 1983: 65).

The BhG does not use this example, but also discusses situation where an action is a result of external influence. Kṛṣṇa says:

#### BhG 18.60

*svabhāvajena kaunteya nibaddhaḥ svena karmaṇā |  
kartuṃ necchasi yan mohāt kariṣyasi avaśo 'pi tat || (18.60)*

Fettered by your own action,<sup>184</sup> which springs from your nature, Kaunteya, you will inevitably do what you in your folly do not want to do, Arjuna.

At this moment of discussion Arjuna's dilemma is not 'to fight or not to fight?'. Now, his dilemma can be formulated as 'to fight voluntarily or coercively?'. Arjuna is a very well-trained warrior, taught how to react instinctively.<sup>185</sup> Together with Kṛṣṇa, he stands between two armies eager to fight. The battle will take place notwithstanding the decision Arjuna will take. And when anyone attacks him, he will respond automatically. Most probably, Arjuna is also somehow forced by social expectations of which he may be aware. Arjuna can activate his self (*ātman*) and voluntarily make a decision to be a visible sign of the activity of arms (BhG 11.33). If he does not make this decision, he will anyway perform this action he does not want to perform – as if 'raped' by the necessity of categories (*svabhāva*).

Remind ourselves of the classification of the agents presented in BhG 18. The features of the sattvic agent are very similar to the features of the agent able to assume responsibility enumerated by Ingarden. According to him, these are: moral courage, bravery, internal strength, perseverance in bearing responsibility, skill to grasp positive and negative values, sensitive conscience, strength to overcome his own inclinations or desires (Ingarden 1983: 84). In the BhG, the agent is free of the I-form (*ahaṃkāra*)<sup>186</sup>, his awareness

<sup>184</sup> Buitenen (1981: 143): 'task.'

<sup>185</sup> Ingarden also gives a situation of fight as the example of an automatic reaction: 'when a blow instantly elicits a counterblow, a counterblow from which the given person cannot refrain and whose particular nature he cannot apprehend.' (p. 56)

<sup>186</sup> On the concept of the I-form (*ahaṃkāra*), see also below, section 8.

should not be clouded by attachment (18.17),<sup>187</sup> he is determined and vigorous, unchanged by success or failure (18.26),<sup>188</sup> his reason discerns between activity and its cessation, between what is obligatory and what is not, between fear and fearlessness (18.30)<sup>189</sup> and his resolve allows him to control his organism (18.33).<sup>190</sup>

On the other hand, the tamasic agent is the agent who does not properly cognise the world and himself, is even not able to understand his situation and is forced to act by the external factors and not his own free will.<sup>191</sup> BhG 18.60 presents delusion (*moha*) as the reason why Arjuna could refrain from his duty. Thus, if he makes this decision, he will be a tamasic agent. Probably, Ingarden would interpret that Arjuna in such a situation is forced by the social and cosmic influences so he is not be responsible for his actions. According to Kṛṣṇa, however, Arjuna will bear the responsibility which will shape the afterlife form of tamasic agents in hells and on earth as grim and full of suffering (see BhG 16).

We can see then that, according to the Composer of the BhG, the state which opposes the state of highest responsibility realised by the free man can also be seen as the state of the highest responsibility but realised in an opposite way. The more unaware is the agent, the higher is his responsibility and the more difficult it is to be rid of it. When man becomes an aware agent, he is able to assume the highest responsibility to be immediately rid of it. If Arjuna kills his enemies when forced by external circumstances he will be reborn in hells and then in a miserable form on earth. If he kills out of his free will, motivated by his self (*ātman*), he will not bear any responsibility for his action and never be reborn.

<sup>187</sup> BhG 18.17: *yasya nāhaṃkṛto bhāvo buddhir yasya na lipyate | hatvāpi sa imāṃl lokān na hantī na nibadhyate*

<sup>188</sup> BhG 18.26: *muktasaṅgo 'nahaṃvādī dhṛtyutsāhasamanvitaḥ | siddhyasiddhyor nirvikāraḥ kartā sāttvika ucyate || (18.26).*

<sup>189</sup> BhG 18.30: *pravṛtīm ca nivṛtīm ca kāryākārye bhayābhaye | bandhaṃ mokṣaṃ ca yā vetti buddhiḥ sā pārtha sāttvikī ||*

<sup>190</sup> BhG 18.33: *dhṛtyā yayā dhārayate manaḥprāṇendriyakriyāḥ | yogenāvyabhicāriṇyā dhṛtiḥ sā pārtha sāttvikī ||*

<sup>191</sup> BhG 18: *anubandhaṃ kṣayaṃ hiṃsām anapekṣya ca pauraṣaṃ | mohād ārabhyate karma yat tat tāmasaṃ ucyate || (25) adharmāṃ dharmāṃ iti yā manyate tamasāvṛtā | sarvārthān viparītāṃs ca buddhiḥ sā pārtha tāmasī || (32) yayā svapnaṃ bhayaṃ śokaṃ viṣādaṃ madam eva ca | na vimuñcati durmedhā dhṛtiḥ sā pārtha tāmasī || (35).*

### 5.4.7. The ontic fundaments of responsibility. The personal identity of the agent

As already mentioned, Ingarden sees value as the first ontic fundament of responsibility. The second fundament is the personal identity of the agent. It is the necessary condition of the possibility to assume responsibility and to be rid of it (p. 78).

In Hindu thought, the personal identity of the agent is guaranteed by the I-form (*ahaṃkāra*). As long as it is treated ontologically, the self (*ātman*) present in the human agent cannot be awakened. In BhG 18.59, Kṛṣṇa sees the I-form as the reason for the wrong decision about the resignation from action. When man realises that the division into subject and object is only epistemic and not real, he will understand the unity of reality. Such a man becomes free. Ingarden's concept of responsibility is again useful in the description of this situation: when the personal identity disappears in the moment of liberation, the responsibility for past actions disappears too.

The I-form is a faculty of the agent who is endowed with reason (*buddhi*), mind (*manas*) and the ten senses (of reason and of action). This cluster of cognitive abilities envelops the highest cognitive agent self and transmigrates from one physical body to another. All human beings have the same self (*ātman*), but their psychophysical organisms differ, because they are shaped by their past actions. It is the amalgamate agents which differ among themselves and, in Ingarden's words, it is they who bear responsibility for their past actions.

In his discussion of the personal identity of the agent, Ingarden emphasises that responsibility can be assumed only by personal 'I' and not by the pure ego of the original transcendental consciousness (Ingarden 1983: 81). Although 'both, the pure ego and the personal 'I' can be equally correctly considered as the axis of every action and responsibility' (p. 82), the pure ego is an abstraction recognised during the process of phenomenological reduction. According to Husserl, in this process, it is transcendental consciousness which is recognised as the metaphysical residuum which opposes the real man and, especially, his soul or person (Ingarden 1983: 83). And, as Ingarden claims, we can talk about responsibility only in case of a real agent characterised by specific features, psychic and physical, who performs a real action conditioned by real circumstances (Ingarden 1983: 84).

In the philosophy of the BhG, the pure transcendental consciousness corresponds to the self (*ātman*) of the agent and the personal 'I' corresponds to the amalgamate agents which envelop the self. In the moment of liberation, the self (*ātman*) becomes active and annihilates responsibility for all the actions performed by the human organism. The amalgamate agent is decompressed.

Contrary to classical Sāṃkhya, the problem as to what happens to the body of the free man is not discussed in early Smṛti thought, although we have seen that the body is seen as his important part (see chapter 4.5). We can presume that the body of the free man is constantly created as long as he acts. If he stopped, the body would disappear because there is no personal agent and no responsibility which could weld the agent and his actions.

#### **5.4.8. The ontic fundamentals of responsibility. The temporality of the world**

The temporality of the world is the next ontic fundament of responsibility (Ingarden 1983: 105 ff.). He writes:

Responsibility, and the fulfillment of the requirements which are imposed by it on the agent, is intertwined with time in the threefold manner: 1) through the agent's remaining *responsible* after accomplishing the deed; 2) through remaining valid of the values which are created or destroyed by the agent's deed and for destruction of which he is responsible; 3) through the connection of all these actions with the causal order of the world, which on its side presupposes the temporal structure of the world.<sup>192</sup>

He argues that some conceptions of time

make it impossible to speak meaningfully about responsibility, and some which make its realisation possible.<sup>193</sup>

All three conditions are met in Smṛti philosophy: 1) The agent is responsible for his deed after he accomplishes it. 2) It is the value of the past action which decides on quality of the future rebirth, so its validity is preserved. 3) The world is structured by time, category and rules of manifestation of reality which enables the highest cognitive agent to cognise itself. Without time, past actions would manifest simultaneously in the agents. Within the frames of blending theory, we could say that it is time which causes the decompression of the agent, his action and the result. It is his responsibility to compresses them again in a right moment. This role of time is expressed in the following stanza in a more general way, as decompression's cause and effect and their new compression:

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<sup>192</sup> Ingarden (1983: 106).

<sup>193</sup> Ingarden (1983: 106).



**MDhP 204.11**

*nātyeti kāraṇaṃ kāryaṃ na kāryaṃ kāraṇaṃ tathā |  
kāryāṇāṃ tūpakaraṇe kālo bhavati hetumān ||*

A cause cannot outdo the effect, an effect cannot outdo the cause. It is time which is reason in the appliance of effects.<sup>194</sup>

It is suggested that the concept expressed by the noun *upakaraṇa* (translated as ‘appliance’) corresponds to the concept of *vidhāna* discussed above (section 5.4.1) which links the agents with their responsibility. When time is abolished (as in the situation of the free man), responsibility is abolished too.

**5.4.9. The ontic fundaments of responsibility. The freedom of the agent**

According to Ingarden, freedom is the next ontic fundament of responsibility. He says that freedom is possible thanks to the structure of the person and of the world in which that person acts which ensure freedom of decision and action (p. 84). As has been discussed, freedom is the most important attribute of reality in its unmanifest state and is reflected in the structure of the cosmos and man. At the end of his teaching Kṛṣṇa says:

**BhG 18.63**

*iti te jñānam ākhyātaṃ guhyād guhyataraṃ mayā |  
vimṛśyāitad aśeṣeṇa yathecchasi tathā kuru ||*

Reflect upon this knowledge I have propounded to you, this mystery of mysteries in its entirety, and then do as you are pleased to do.

Arjuna is completely free in his decisions about his actions. Although he has cognised and experienced his self (*ātman*) thanks to Kṛṣṇa teaching and manifestation (chapter 11), he himself will decide about his participation in the battle and the way he will fight.

\*

This analysis has endeavoured to shown that the concept of responsibility proposed by Ingarden is a very good tool to understand the Hindu concept of *karman*. The fact that the one word, *karman* encompasses action and its value and responsibility, betrays the conviction of the Hindu philosophers that they

<sup>194</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

are inseparable in everyday life. They can be separated only during liberating cognition which leads man to a state of breaking all everyday rules and the realisation of ultimate freedom.

The conclusion is that responsibility should be seen as the fundamental concept of Hindu moral philosophy. It is responsibility that shapes the form of man, in his mental, psychic and physical dimensions. It is possible only in temporal world where the man can act as personal agent, aware and free. In this respect, moral philosophy of Ingarden and of the BhG postulate the same.

There are other important similarities between the moral thought of Ingarden and the Composers of the BhG. Both postulate that responsibility is a necessary aspect of action. Both assume that responsibility influences the personal agent, and that the highest state of responsibility causes its annihilation. However, this state is conceived differently. In the BhG, it takes place when the agent identifies with reality. According to Ingarden, the agent can be rid of responsibility only with regard to his concrete deeds. His ontic situation does not change: he is still a mortal being facing new and new challenges.

The difference can also be seen in the way that the state opposite to the highest state of responsibility is seen. It happens when the agent is not aware of what is going on and is forced to perform an action. According to Ingarden, in this state, the agent is not responsible for his action at all. In the BhG, this is the state of highest responsibility which finally manifests itself in a bleak outcome for the agent.

On the basis of the argument presented above one could also argue that it is responsibility which can be seen as the main motive for creation of the world. In the pre-creative state, reality is not active. In reference to this state, the concept of responsibility (as any other concepts) has no meaning. When it manifests as active (we can call this manifestation the highest cognitive agent), there is no responsibility either, because it is pure action. Responsibility appears when the highest cognitive agent creates its cosmic, social and human organisms and manifests as various agents whose actions (*karman*) and responsibility (*karman*) are various too. The state of a free man is again the state in which action, its value, its aim and its result are realised all at once. His organism can be seen as the acting agent, but this organism does not bear any responsibility for his deeds, because it is the highest cognitive agent who acts through him. This situation goes beyond everyday understanding of action, because it is the absolute in the most literal meaning: it is the Absolute which acts through the human agent. In other words, if the Absolute wants to act, it will act in a totally opposed way to any other created being.

Let us recall again the outcomes of neuroscientific research which indicate that our brains are complex systems which interacts on many levels and there

is no one centre which would be seen as managing our thinking, willing and acting. Due to this fact, Gazzaniga (2014) argues that morality belongs to the social mind which, in turns, is an emergent structure of many brains. As shown elsewhere, cosmogonies of the Brāhmaṇas are based on the concept of the social nature of language (Jurewicz 2012a). According to this interpretation, the sacrificial place is the space where one reality, manifest in gods and men, can talk. The creation of karman (action and responsibility) is seen as possible only when there is a multitude of agents. This also anticipates modern research. It must be emphasised that this is not to claim that the Smṛti Composers were neuroscientists and had already discovered what Western science has been arduously discovering for the last 200 years. It is rather that the point of departure for their thinking were human being and their cognition. This, together with deep metal thought, gave them some insights into man's mental and psychical abilities and the way human beings act in the world and in society. Some of these insights are now confirmed scientifically in a much more detailed and elaborated way. Let us note that viewed from this point of view, freedom from moral responsibility and all other social constraints can be realised only when there are no other agents, when one realises one's identity with reality. This agrees with the concept of the emergent social mind. We could say that the early Indian philosophers were simply aware of that fact. But it is also argued that this awareness was gained by their insights into their minds and was experientially proven in a long tradition of teaching, memorising, repeating and looking for that part of our mind where one could experience real freedom.

The Hindu understanding of responsibility is also useful in the analysis of Ingarden's philosophy. Ingarden usually refers to the responsibility that is created when negative values are realised and at times, he seems to identify responsibility with guilt. This model is not very clear as to how Ingarden understood responsibility for right action. In the Hindu concept of karman, both kinds of responsibility are balanced. Responsibility is symmetrical and the nature of how it is assumed differs only in signs: each action, good or bad, is linked with the agent in the same way and one can get rid of it in the same way too. If Ingarden had known of these Hindu moral concepts, he could well have incorporated them in his own theory with very effective outcomes.

# General Conclusion

## 1. Concluding remarks

The basic argument of this book is that tradition is preserved not only in words constituting stories or philosophical expositions but also in general frames which are formed in the beginning of a culture and which are then seen not merely as a description of the world but as a part of that world and constitute a scaffold on which following generations construe their own mental edifices. When a certain way of interpreting tradition is exhausted, when it ceases to sufficiently explain the changing world, another attempt to read it is made which emphasise aspects previously overlooked or expresses already known contents in a new language. It can be said that when the language of tradition is completely inappropriate to describe the new reality, a given culture more or less loses its identity and may even disappears. This is exactly what Western culture has been dealing with, especially in the last half century.

No attempt is being made here to recreate the historical and cultural processes of the period when the early Smṛti texts were composed and the way in which they influenced the various interpretations of Vedic tradition. The goal is more modest: observing the basic continuity of assumptions one sees changes some of which are now discussed in this study. In this sense the research could be called comparative since it is concerned with the comparison of Vedic thought with the thought of the early Smṛti period. However, such research also allows us to see the development of thought, the way in which concepts are created that allow a culture to grasp the world anew using the potential of earlier tradition. Already the RV testifies to such an effort, although we do not have access to the sources to which the Ṛgvedic Composers refer. The Brāhmaṇas reused Ṛgvedic conceptual frames to construe their philosophy the external image of which was ritual. The Āraṇyakas and the early Upaniṣads came back to the RV and the Brāhmaṇas used Ṛgvedic concepts in their descriptions of the world and themselves. The early Smṛti Composers referred to all three layers of their tradition but also to non-orthodox religious and

philosophical movements. They were able to create a magnificent composition of Hindu thought which took for itself many of the concepts which were originally invented in opposition to it. In some way nothing new is said in this study but a new approach is proposed. It is to reconstruct the influence of tradition where it is not expressed directly in part because it was so obvious to the Composers that it was not worth debating. It was something that they absorbed with their mother's milk, the recitation of the Vedas. And in order to discover those deepest layers of tradition, it was necessary to know the Vedas, and to combine philology, philosophy and cognitive linguistics.

The basic continuity can be seen in the cognitive assumptions of Indian culture and the conviction that the cosmos is the manifestation of subject-object cognition performed by reality unmanifest in its totality. One specifically writes Indian, not Hindu, because early Buddhist thought also accepted this assumption (Jurewicz 2006a). Beginning with the RV, Indian thinkers described the world in cognitive terms and in their likeness. Manifesting in subject-object cognition, reality creates its second self (already called *ātman* in the Brāhmaṇas) conceived in terms of man: with his cognitive abilities and his physical organism. Man's role was to repeat the creativity of reality and to create his immortal self in ritual and (beginning with the Upaniṣads) in liberating process and thus come back to the beginnings of the world.

In the early Veda, reality was conceived as fiery and internally contradictory which was expressed in the coexistence of its two aspect, the fiery and the liquid which alternatively manifest during creation. In the early Upaniṣads, the fieriness of internally contradictory reality is not developed although it still motivates thinking about the creation of the world and the liberating process. In early Smṛti thought the concept of fire as the source domain is, in most cases, used to conceive creation to describe human creators and liberating activity. Only in the BhG do the Composers explicitly revive the philosophy of the Brāhmaṇas and conceive of the creation of the cosmos as a manifestation of fire. There, the assumption of internally contradictory nature of reality is preserved and expressed, as in the early Upaniṣads, using abstract terms. This assumption is inextricably linked with the assumption of the freedom of reality throughout all Brahminic philosophy, beginning with the RV.

The precedence of cognition before being and the use of cognitive concepts and terms in ontology were interpreted epistemologically which allowed one to see the coherence of early Smṛti thought. In order to analyse its cosmogonies, the stages of creation of the cosmos were interpreted as stages in which successive subjective manifestations create categories which allows them to cognise themselves as objects. Thus, the first category is name which initiates the creative subject-object thinking of reality. The next category is time which

allows the cognitive movement between the naming and the named to be measured. *Guṇas* (always translated as ‘classes’) are categories which express the subject-object structure of the cosmos. Action is a category which expresses the specific cognitive movements of the cosmos and living beings including man. Finally, categories are sacrifice and *dharma/adharma* which express the subject-object structure of society.

The epistemic interpretation of these ontological concepts allowed one to see the general coherence of early *Smṛti* metaphysics and to solve some important issues, the most important of which is the tension between freedom and determinism. It is shown that the categories are used by the highest cognitive agent, the first subjective manifestation of reality, as they are necessary in order to preserve the subject-object nature of the cosmos. It is assumed that reality obeys them in a free act because it wants to manifest that way. The ability to be limited according to one’s will, is one of the expressions of absolute freedom. Man is manifestation of the absolute freedom of reality and is able to realise it. At each manifestation of reality, he is subjected to the necessity of categories. From the point of view of everyday subject-object cognition, man is determined by them. But he is able to free himself from this determinism and see its only epistemic dimension, because ontologically he is one with free reality. This recognition is realised during liberating practice.

The role of memory of the experience of soma, and of the altered stages of consciousness gained thanks to it, described particularly in the *ṚV*, are emphasised. It is argued that the cosmogonies of the *ŚB* which present *Prajāpati* who toils and heats himself, reflect practices which pattern the first post-somic experience which is feeling hot. At the same time, specific effects were obtained during recitation combined with appropriate breathing were attested already in the *RV* (see 10.189, Jurewicz 2016/18). The *Āraṇyakas* and the early *Upaniṣads* attest the development of the latter techniques and of better control over them. The liberating practices realised during the early *Smṛti* period were based on them although the influence of non-heterodox practices cannot be excluded. They consisted in recitation with breathing and of work on the mind (*manas*). These aimed at the suspension of subject-object cognition thanks to correct decisions undertaken by reason (*buddhi*) and by perseverance. The early *Smṛti* texts emphasise the fiery nature of this process which is expressed in the use of the word *tapas* (heat) and in the descriptions of the results of the practice. The practice is called *yoga* and is conceived most often in terms of a dangerous journey on a chariot to a desired aim which is freedom. Such a conceptualisation goes back to the *RV* where *yoga* metonymically means military raid to obtain the wide space (*urú loká*).

The theoretical approach of cognitive linguistics and the use of models of thinking give one access to the conceptual background that is contemporary to that of the composers and to the background that is expressed in tradition. The Smṛti Composers continue expressing their metaphysical and ethical issues in stories – a tradition that began in earnest in the Brāhmaṇas – which should be treated as rich source domains of metaphors the aim of which is to create a complex abstract target domain about the activity of reality in and through man. The theory of conceptual metonymy and metaphor is a wonderful analytic tool to distinguish between words used to activate – metonymically or metaphorically – other concepts. Language of exposition is not so compact (as it is in the RV), but there are stanzas which are similar to the R̥gvedic ones in this respect and which not only activate many target concepts, but also trigger the recipient to create complex conceptual networks. Usually, one of their input spaces is content coming from tradition. Thanks to blending theory the way meaning is construed and its conceptual sources can be analysed. The same cognitive tools were useful in the analysis of the creation of abstract concepts and the role of experiential concepts in this process. A fully developed abstract concept is one which is understood without reference to its experiential basis because the basic logic of the structure or of the scenario of the experience is already incorporated within the target concept. Such a creation of abstract concepts had already begun in the RV, the Composers of whom process concepts from experience and culture more often than tell stories at length. The concepts of Golden Egg or of māyā can serve as the examples of such a process.

The early Smṛti also use large source domains called here the general domains, most of them are inherited from the RV. These general domains play an important part in the general conceptual frames accepted implicitly by the Smṛti Composers. These include, first of all, general domain of Procreation and of Cleansing By Heat. The specific realisations of the latter are Churning Butter and the Refining Of Gold/Production Of Iron (see also below, section 3). The next general domain is that of Cooking which began to be elaborated in the Brāhmaṇas. The general domain of Journey (in its specific realisation as Riding In A Chariot) was not elaborated in the Veda, but the experience of a journey to freedom constituted a leading motif of the RV to conceive of the main cosmic and social processes. It is included into the so-called defining events (Jurewicz 2010) which are the concepts which generally motivated the thinking of the R̥gvedic Composers. It is possible that the experience of journey and of fighting became again important experiences for the Brahminic Composers after the fall of the Mauryan Empire (Mahadevan 2008, 2006) and because of that, these concepts became so meaningful. The influence of

the metaphoric concepts of non-heterodox movements is also possible, but this is not the topic of the present study.

It is clear that the application of the methods of cognitive linguistics, of philosophical theories developed in phenomenology and of psychoanalytic approaches to the study of the early Smṛti texts is promising and fruitful. It not only enlarges our knowledge about Hindu philosophy between the empires but it also contributes to our understanding of human thinking generally and the creativity of human mind and the role of mystic experience, storytelling and play for metaphysical and ethical theories. The fact that early Hindu philosophical tradition can be expressed with the use of the Western philosophical theories and terms shows its deep human dimension and its potential to address some problems which Western culture faces with many of its paradigms now shaken.

Only some texts have been chosen being those considered representative for the early phase of the development of the Smṛti tradition when efforts to settle and codify the new Brahminic tradition began. But, as a Vedic scholar, one is now convinced that Hindu tradition is correct in regarding everything as being in the ṚV. Not modern science of course (although it does seem that the early Indian theory of the mind and cognition is, in some respects, closer to the outcomes of modern neurosciences than the theory of Descartes) nor technology as some followers of Hindutva aim to prove. It is rather the fundamental conceptual background from which everything developed thanks to concerted efforts to orally preserve the texts, to processing them and to compose their underlying concepts in new ways so that the background content remains meaningful.

The analysis of the source domains for the concepts of the Absolute in philosophies and religions can be a basis for comparative studies. Although conceptualisation of the Absolute in terms of man seems to be universal, the type of man accepted as the source domain and the activity he performs differs among cultures. In Judeo-Christian and early Indian thinking, many specific source domains are the same. For example, in both traditions, God is conceived in terms of a guardian of cattle: shepherd in the former and cowherd in the later.<sup>1</sup> However, the nature of the relationship between the God and men can differ according to the source domain: a shepherd can take the lost sheep in his arms and bring it home, a cowherd cannot do this. In the ṚV, the motive of a lost calf or cow is used as well but here the concept of tracks which betray its presence is elaborated more than its finding and returning to the herd.

<sup>1</sup> In both traditions the God is also conceived in terms of a king or a father (Wierzbicka 2001, DesCamp, Sweetser 2005.).



In the creation myth presented in *Genesis* 1, the source domain is not clearly expressed, however the recipient is prompted to imagine the aesthetic creation of objects: God looks at his work and is satisfied with it ‘And God saw that it was good’ in the same way as an artist is satisfied with their creation. It seems that the Composer refers to the creation of something which can be perceived and which is different from its creator. The source domain of storytelling also implies artistic creation though its object (story) is ontologically not different from its subject. Thus, the logic of the source domain motivates certain features of the target domain, and basic philosophical assumptions, such as dualism or monism (Lakoff, Johnson 1999).

Some features of the source domains have been so inextricably blended with the target domains that later generations of philosophers think that a given conceptualisation of God and his relationship with his creation are true and undeniable. Reconstruction of metaphoric conceptualisation of philosophical concepts allows us to understand the very beginnings of religious traditions and the way that thought that has developed, based on those primeval assumptions, is set in metaphorical thinking. Seen within these frames the differences between religions become less strict and the possibilities for religious dialogue seem to be more real.

Among monotheistic religions, it was Islam which consciously rejected any source domain to express a fully abstract concept of God. In the early Hinduism, such a concept of God had also been created and was expressed in the earliest textual strand of the Veda (RV 10.129.1–2a b).<sup>2</sup> Here, the Absolute in its unmanifest state is presented as impossible to be described in any positive assertion. However, in Islam, Allah is a purely abstract concept even after the creation of the cosmos. In Hinduism, only the unmanifest aspect of the Absolute is abstract to this extent. Moreover, this very unmanifest reality creates the cosmos because it wants to be less abstract – at least within one its aspects. Why it wants to be less abstract is a mystery. Within the frames of the source domain of storytelling we could say that it became bored with its own unknowability. But since it is impossible to conceive the unmanifest aspect of reality with use of any empirical and experiential source domain, we will never now. Unless we mentally reach this aspect, which is, as the early Smṛti Composers assure us, possible.

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<sup>2</sup> Only negations and questions are possible: “1. The nonexistent did not exist, nor did the existent exist at that time. There existed neither the airy space nor heaven beyond. What moved back and forth? From where and in whose protection? Did water exist, a deep depth? 2. Death did not exist nor deathlessness then. There existed no sign of night nor of day” (Translation by Jamison, Brereton 2014). See Jurewicz (1995, 2010).

In the following pages of the *Conclusion*, we will come back to the title of this book. We will see again how contemporary knowledge, about the general human ability to memorise, is useful to understand the influence of tradition on the Composers of the early Smṛti texts. Then we will discuss the problem as to how Vedic tradition is preserved and redefined in the early Smṛti texts taking as an example the metaphor CHURNING IS CREATION. Finally, we will discuss some basic claims of the theory of mind in Thomas Nagel's approach in order to show some striking similarities between those and the early Smṛti theory of the self (*ātman*).

## 2. Memory

In his *Origins of the Modern Mind. Three Stages in the Evolution of Culture and Cognition* (1991), Merlin Donald divides its history into three phases: Mimetic (ca 2 million years ago), Mythic (ca 150 thousand years ago), and Theoretic (approximately last 2 thousand years). During the first, mimetic skill appeared thanks to which humans could voluntarily control and improve their bodily activities in a systematic way which led to their ability to create the first external memory stores such as toolmaking, fire-tending, painting and dance. During the Mythic phase these mimetic skills were enlarged with language and an ability to synthesise symbols. The Theoretic phase came with the appearance of skills such as writing (but not only) which opened the way to more and more intense development of the external memory stores which, in turn, made possible their meta-analysis. In his later paper, Donald writes,

[t]he progression is cumulative and conservative, with each preceding stage remaining in place, and continuing to serve its specialised cognitive function in human society, as each new stage emerges.<sup>3</sup>

Thus viewed, the history of human mind can be seen as the increasing ability to externalise and share memory in a process called by Donald the 'distributed cognitive processes of culture' (2006: 14). According to him,

[h]uman culture is uniquely cognitive in its function. Human culture is a marketplace of ideas and images, feelings and impressions. Indeed, it is a vast cognitive network in its own right. The cultural network introduces an entirely new element to human life: immersion in a cognitive collectivity, or community

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<sup>3</sup> Donald (2006: 7–8).

of mind.... Human culture is based on the sharing of mental representations, and we are tethered to that network. It allows us to achieve things that are far beyond the capabilities of an ape or, for that matter, a socially isolated human brain.<sup>4</sup>

Because of the lack of any theoretical framework in psychology from which one could understand his concept of the external memory, Donald uses a concept from the field of computing science as the source domain, namely, networks (2006: 308–309). The cooperation between a computer and a network enlarges the cognitive ability of the former and it is the same with human minds. The point is, says Donald, ‘in a true network the resources of the system are shared, and the system functions as a unit larger than any of its individual components’.<sup>5</sup> Individuals:

share a common memory system; and as the data base in that system expands far beyond the mastery of any single individual, the system becomes by far the greatest determining factor in the cognitions of individuals. The memory system, once collectivised into the external symbolic storage system, becomes virtually unlimited in capacity and much more robust and precise.<sup>6</sup>

Early Indian tradition was unique in that it transmitted its texts orally. The earliest visual forms of culture, connected with Buddhism, are dated to the Mauryan Imperium and the edicts of Aśoka are its earliest written evidence. The earliest examples of Hindu religious images are dated circa 2–1st BCE (Srinivasan 1997: 180–181). Taking into account that the hymns of the RV are dated circa 13 BCE, this means that for more than one thousand years the only cultural artefact were the texts. And taking into account that the RV presents a very sophisticated literary and conceptual construction, it might be assumed that the tradition reaches deeper into the past. During the times of the composition of the early Smṛti, the oral transmission of the texts was still crucial for the preservation of the Veda. But it is not the oral transmission which is unique in the early Indian thought but the fact that these texts are different from those that scholars of orality usually investigate. The texts labelled as the Veda, and preserved by the Brahmins, are not epics or folk narratives but consistent theories about the world and men together with a theoretical investigation on linguistic and ritual issues. In many cases, the concepts from the narrative tradition are used not for themselves, but serve

<sup>4</sup> Donald (2006: 14).

<sup>5</sup> Donald (1991: 310). We can see the similarity of implication of this source domain and the source domain of play in that the system is more than just collection of its elements (see chapter 5.3.2).

<sup>6</sup> Donald (1991: 311–312).

as meta-concepts used to describe other problems. The Vedic texts attest the ability of their Composers to consciously reference and redefine their tradition and to create abstract concepts and theories. In many respects the Vedic culture betrays the features of the Theoretic phase which would imply that we should push its beginnings back at least half a millennium.

Donald's approach allows us to understand better what the Veda was for the Brahmins. We all experience the influence of tangible external stores of memory. However, there is no reason to assume that it is lesser when the store exists only when recited. It may be assumed that the fear of its disappearance could make it even stronger. It is, probably, not the 'pre-logic', 'mythic' or 'mystic' spirit of oral cultures which made their participants believe that word is as real as the thing it denotes. It was the overwhelming power of the influence of 'the distributed cognitive processes of culture' which has not changed since the dawn of the Mythic phase. Quoting Donald:

External memory is a critical feature of modern human cognition, if we are trying to build an evolutionary bridge from Neolithic to modern cognitive capabilities or a structural bridge from mythic to theoretic culture. The brain may not have changed recently in its genetic makeup, but its link to an accumulating external memory network affords it cognitive powers that would not have been possible in isolation. This is more than a metaphor; each time the brain carries out an operation in concert with the external symbolic storage system, it becomes part of a network. Its memory structure is temporarily altered; and the locus of cognitive control changes.<sup>7</sup>

For the Brahmins, the locus of their memory structure was the Veda. The creation of the early Smṛti texts transformed the external memory store in such a way that its core could not only be preserved, but also shared by more participants. It should be noted that the use of writing was not the crucial element of this transformation although it could play an important role. It was the content of the external memory store which was crucial. Even if the MBh or the MS were written down they could not be read by many people. The main vehicle was still oral. But its content was so expansive that it provided the frames for the following centuries of Indian culture. Its power also came from the Vedic Composers on whose shoulders the Smṛti texts were built.

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<sup>7</sup> Donald (1991: 312).

### 3. Tradition

In this section we will discuss motives for the story about Śuka, the son of Vyāsa (MDhP 310–321), from the perspective of Vedic tradition. The arguments about the power of tradition presented here can be taken as a summary of the research presented in this book. We will not discuss the history of the motives but rather try to reconstruct the conceptual frames due to which the story is described as it is.

In his seminal book *Rethinking the Mahābhārata. A Reader's Guide to the Education of the Dharma King*, Hildebeitel proposes to understand this story as an 'allegory of writing' (2001: 278). He comes back to this issue in his later papers, for example:

I propose that the story of Śuka, Vyāsa's son, is an allegory of writing, describing the scene under which Vyāsa imparts the *Mahābhārata* as fifth Veda not only to the four Brahman disciples who include Vaiśampāyana, but to the son he has before his three other sons Dhṛtarāṣṭra, Pāṇḍu, and Vidura. That is, he imparts the *Mahābhārata* to Śuka and the other four disciples before it could have happened. This would be a sign of fiction. One of the images that suggests an allegory of writing is the churning of the firesticks that gives birth to Śuka, which I interpret as a metaphor for churning out semen (and with it, the production of instant character) as analogous to the churning out of text. I propose that a second hint at writing comes with the impartation of this fifth Veda on the 'back of the mountain', which seems to be where Vyāsa has his mysterious Himalayan hermitage, from which Śuka parts for mokṣa. I propose that 'the back of the mountain' is an image for the *mise en scène* of writing.<sup>8</sup>

The metaphor WRITING IS CHURNING is never explicitly expressed in the story about Śuka but, speaking cognitively, Hildebeitel assumes that the target domain (the concept of writing) is somehow evoked in the story in such a way that the recipient can activate the whole metaphor. While Hildebeitel's argument, that it is written composition which is the hidden but intended meaning of the story of Śuka in the MBh, is not entirely convincing, he does show that it is possible to reconstruct the metaphor in a more general way, namely: CREATION OF A STORY IS CHURNING. In this section we will look at some arguments for the existence of this metaphor, based on the traditional metaphors that seem to motivate the thinking of the Composers of the Śuka

<sup>8</sup> Hildebeitel (2011b: 14–15); See also see Hildebeitel (2011b: 184, 215. See also Hegarty (2012: 96 ff.; e.g. 'It is in the context of the self-revelation of Nārāyaṇa in the *Śāntiparva* that we find a fascinating shifting of churning imagery to textual transmission' (p. 100).

story. Generally speaking, without reference to this Vedic background, it is impossible to answer the simple question: what was it that prompted people to speak about churning and think about mental or creative activity? This conceptualisation does not seem to be universal, at least, it is not evident in Western cultures.

It is postulated that the meaningfulness of the metaphor CREATION OF A STORY IS CHURNING is based on the Ṛgvedic general domain Cleansing By Heat (Jurewicz 2010). Remember that general domains are concepts which are never explicitly expressed in the text. They are activated *via* their specific verbal realisations in a coherent way to make the recipient understand that the specific realisations have something in common on a more general, conceptual level. The specific realisations of the general domain of Cleansing By Heat are: Anointing (A Person) With Balm, Clarification Of Butter, Grooming (Of A Horse), Licking (Of A Calf/Foal), Refining Of Gold, Sharpening (Of Metal Object, e.g. an axe) and Sweating (Jurewicz 2010). What all these activities have in common is that they make their objects clean, shining and beautiful thanks to heating. Their main target domains are the concepts of the kindling of fire, of the pressing of soma and of cognition which is always expressed in hymns. In the story of Śuka, the target domain of cognition (now in a story) is the most important target domain which will become one of the input spaces of the conceptual network created by the Composer. The target domain of kindling fire is the next input space, the rest of them will be discussed below.

It will also be argued that the story about Śuka is, at least partly, based on the Ṛgvedic general model of Reality Transformations which allows for conceiving of the creation of the cosmos, its functioning and cognition in terms of the alternate manifestation of the opposing (fiery/somic) aspects of one reality (Jurewicz 2010). Finally, the motivating influence of the Vedic cosmogonies (presented in the ṚV and the ŚB) will be shown. We will therefore see that these are not only Vedic words, expressions and concepts which make the description meaningful and Hiltebeitel's postulates plausible, but also basic conceptual models preserved since the dawn of the culture.

The concept of churning is a general concept and can refer to several activities. We begin with the metaphor CHURNING OF AN OCEAN IS CREATION OF A STORY which is explicitly expressed in the following stanza describing creation of the MBh:

### **MDhP 326.116**

*surāsurair yathā rājan nirmathyāmṛtam uddhṛtam |  
evam etat purā vipraiḥ kathāmṛtam ihoddhṛtam ||*

In the same way, as the gods and asuras, having churned [the ocean], drew up the nectar of immortality,<sup>9</sup> in this way the seers had drawn up the nectar of story in the beginnings.<sup>10</sup>

The Composer compares creation of ‘the nectar of story’ (*kathāmṛta*, verse d) which took place *in illo tempore* and was done by the seers (verses c–d) to the churning of the ocean performed by the gods and asuras thank to which immortality was gained (verses a–b).<sup>11</sup> This story (called *amṛtamanthana*) is described in the first book of the MBh (1.15–17) and the Vedic antecedents of the *amṛtamanthana* has been already discussed by some scholars (Long 1976, Lidova 1994, Feller 2004). Let us now briefly reconstruct the conceptual network which is created by the Composer of the story about churning of the ocean. As we will see, most of the specific realisations of the general domain of Cleansing By Heat and all its target domains constitute its input spaces and it is suggested that it is this domain that endows the *amṛtamanthana*-blend with coherence and makes its description meaningful.

On the most literal level, the story describes the transformation of water (the ocean, *samudra*) during its churning (*manth-*). Since churning involves heating of a churned substance, the first and the most obvious input space is the concept of the boiling of water. However, during churning the substance is not heated by fire, but by quick movements. A similar conceptualisation of transformation of water is attested already in the RV 1.164.41–42, which has been mentioned many times, which describes a female buffalo which stamps in the mud (*salilā*) and thus causes the flow of water<sup>12</sup> in terms of which the creation of the cosmos and of speech is conceived expressed in the paradoxical sentence *tātaḥ kṣarati akṣāraṃ*; creation of speech activates the concept of mental transformation because speech is always the expression of the supernatural mental state realised under the influence of soma in the RV<sup>13</sup>. If the recipient activates this conceptualisation, he will understand that the concept of cognition is the input space of the *amṛtamanthana* blend.

The concept of transformations of water is also used in ŚB 6.1.3 where Prajāpati toils, heats and produces water that are further transformed under the

<sup>9</sup> We will remain with this translation, for more proposals for translation see below.

<sup>10</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

<sup>11</sup> For discussion of this and the next stanza, see Hildebeitel (2011b: 187–220).

<sup>12</sup> Note that the vertical action of the female buffalo’s legs is similar to the vertical movement of a stick (*mānthā*) used to press soma (RV 1.28.4).

<sup>13</sup> Another possible image is that of RV 10.72.6 where the image of gods dancing in the flood (*salilā*), called also ‘the ocean’ (*samudrā*) is activated (see chapter 5.3.7.b). Thus, one cannot agree with Kuiper (1983: 99) who states that the connection between the image of the dancing gods and the story about the churning of the ocean ‘is notoriously a moot point’.

influence of heat to finally become liquid gold (as we remember, sweating and refining of gold are the next specific realisation of the general domain of Cleansing By Heat). The gods and asuras are presented as toiling, heating, so sweating (MBh 1.16.16: *śramasaṃtāpakarśita*). The concept of refining of gold is evoked in the description too (MBh 1.16.26).<sup>14</sup> The process of churning is presented as taking place in stages and the penultimate stage is conceived in terms of the flow of gold. The concept of refining of gold is the next source domain of the network. The same state is conceived in terms of the appearance of clarified butter from milk (1.16.27).<sup>15</sup> The concept of clarification of butter (the next specific realisation of the general domain of Cleansing By Heat) is the next source domain of the network. It should be noted that the clarification of butter is a long process which begins with milking a cow, then the milk is cooked, its cream is churned and thus butter appears which can be clarified. The image of the gods and asuras who churn water with aid of a mountain as a churning stick and the snake as a rope highlights the churning of butter as a separate input space. The idea of transformation of water into milk is also grounded in tradition: in the cosmogony presented in BU 1.2.1–2 where Death (*mṛtyū*) toils, heats and produces water which is in turn produces cream (*śāra*). This description attests the existence of a concept of a liquid, watery-milky substance which is a blend composed of the concepts of milk and water.

That the process conceived in terms of churning is the process of heating, is explicitly expressed in that the first result of churning is the appearance of smoke and then of fire (MBh 1.16.15, 22–23). Thus, the concept of kindling fire is the next input space of the network. It should also be noted that it is presented as alternating manifestations of fire and water (1.1.15: fire, 1.1.16: rain, 1.16.22–23: fire, 1.16.24: rain). In this way, not only the process of refining of gold is activated during which the cooling of heated gold is repeatedly performed. It also activates the general model of Reality Transformation within the frames of which, as stated above, manifestation of reality is conceived in terms of alternate manifestations of fiery and fluid aspects.<sup>16</sup> Since in the Ṛgvedic form of the model the fluid aspect is soma, the concept of its pressing<sup>17</sup> can also be activated.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>14</sup> MBh 1.16.26: *teṣām amṛtavīryāṇām rasānām payasaiva ca | amaratvaṃ surā jagmuḥ kāñcanasya ca niḥsravāt ||*

<sup>15</sup> MBh 1.16.27: *atha tasya samudrasya taj jātam udakaṃ payaḥ | rasottamair vimiśraṃ ca tataḥ kṣīrād abhūd gṛtam ||*

<sup>16</sup> Then they reach the borderline sphere of cosmos and need help of Viṣṇu-Nārāyaṇa (MBh 1.16.28–30).

<sup>17</sup> The third target domain of the general domain of Cleansing By Heat.

<sup>18</sup> *via* the verb *math-* (Jurewicz 2010: 149–154) and the adjective/noun *amṛta*, ‘immortal, immortality.’



So, the input spaces of the *amṛtamanthana* blend<sup>19</sup> are as follows: 1) the concept of boiling water; 2) the concept of churning butter; 3) the concept of clarifying butter; 4) the concept of the refining of gold; 5) the concept of the kindling of fire; 6) the concept of cognition implied by the state of immortality; 7) the concept of the pressing of soma and 8) a more general concept of the acquisition of a desired good. The next input space is the general domain of Cleansing By Heat. Except for the first input space, all the input spaces are either its specific realisation or its target domains. The generic space of the network is the concept of transformation.

The blend created in the story about the churning of the ocean does not equally highlight all the input spaces of the blend. The main ones are the concepts of churning butter and its clarification, the kindling of fire, the refining of gold and the acquisition of a desired good which is immortality. The general domain of Cleansing By Heat, although not explicitly expressed, is what makes the blend and its description coherent and meaningful. As we have seen, all the input spaces evoke the process of obtaining a perfect form of an object under the influence of heat. The complex concept composed of input spaces 1–4 is used to conceive the complex concept composed of input spaces 5–8. Coming back to the most explicit meaning of the story, without this domain it would not be possible to conceive reaching the state of immortality in terms of churning butter.

The *amṛtamanthana* blend is also activated in the following stanzas to conceive creation of story in terms of churning:

#### MDhP 331.2–4

*idaṃ śatasahasrād dhi bhāratākhyānavistarāt |  
āmāthya matimanthena jñānodadhim anuttamam ||*

Yes, having churned the utmost ocean of cognition with the churning stick of thought from the story about Bharata extended in hundred thousand (verses),

*navanītaṃ yathā dadhno malayāc candanaṃ yathā |  
āraṇyakam ca vedebhya oṣadhibhyo 'mṛtaṃ yathā ||*

like they take out fresh butter from milk, sandal from the Malaya mountain, Āraṇyakas from the Vedas, nectar from the plants,

*samuddhṛtam idaṃ brahman kathāmṛtam anuttamam |  
taponidhe tvayoktaṃ hi nārāyaṇakathāśrayam ||*

you, O Brahmin who are the ocean of heat, have recited this nectar of story – the resting place of the Nārāyaṇa story – drawn up (from your mind).<sup>20</sup>

<sup>19</sup> We will not discuss other input spaces of the *amṛtamanthana* blend as its cognitive analysis is beyond the scope of the present study.

<sup>20</sup> Jurewicz's translation.

In 2cd, the *amṛtamanthana* blend is activated *via* the verb *math-* (*āmathya* ‘having churned’ verse c) and its derivative *mantha*, ‘churning stick’ (verse c) and *via* the verb *udadhi* ‘the ocean’ (the second part of the compound *jñānodadhi*, verse d). Here the Composer highlights the input space of cognition creating the blended concepts of the churning stick of thought (*matimantha*) and the ocean of cognition (*jñānodadhi*).

In stanza 3, the source domains are expressed which are meant to clarify to the recipient the nature of the creation of the poem. The first one is churning butter which again evokes the *amṛtamanthana* blend (verse a). The second is obtaining sandal from trees which grow at the Malaya mount (verse b), creation of the Āraṇyakas from the Veda (verse c) and production of healing juice from the plants (verse d). Note that production of sandalwood needs chopping which naturally heats wood and the production of sandal oil needs crushing of wood into powder and then its heating.<sup>21</sup> The herbal juice is also produced in crushing the plant, its pressing and/or heating. Note also that in the story about churning of the ocean these two experiences are evoked in MBh 16.25–26ab where the essence of great trees and plants is exuded which is the first form, nectar.<sup>22</sup> The fact that the creation of the Āraṇyakas is mentioned between the concept of the production of sandal and the production of herbal juice highlights its conceptualisation in terms of heating in order to obtain the essence of an object. It may also activate the way the Vedic texts are composed i.e., recitation with proper breathing which heats the reciter. The general domain of Cleansing By Heat frames thinking of the recipient so that he can understand all the source domains as processes as transformation under the influence of heat which leads to a new perfect form of the object identified with its essence.<sup>23</sup>

Creation of the story mentioned in stanza 4 is conceived in these terms. Conceptualisation of the mind of the Composer in terms of the ocean<sup>24</sup> is attested already in ṚV 4.58.5a where thoughts, appearing in the mind under the influence of soma, are conceived in terms of rapid rivers flowing from the

<sup>21</sup> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eZ8wEc53c8c&t=365s>

<sup>22</sup> MBh 1.16: *mahādrumāṇām niryāsā bahavaś cauśadhīrasāḥ | teṣām amṛtavīryāṇām rasānām payasaiva ca ||* (25) *amaratvaṃ surā jagmuḥ kāñcanasya ca niḥsravāt* (26ab).

<sup>23</sup> Note that participle *samuddhṛta* evokes the image of taking water from a container (e.g. MBh 3.185.22, 9.9.5). It is also used in the description of the story in MDhP 238.15.

<sup>24</sup> Hildebeitel (2011b: 181) writes: ‘As to the *Mahābhārata*, we began with the question of what a “Bhārata” without upākhyānas might have signified, and looked at how and where upākhyānas are woven into the *Mahābhārata*. There is, however, one other reference to the epic’s upākhyānas that is yet to be plumbed. It occurs toward the end of Book 12 in the highly devotional *Nārāyaṇīya*, and takes us back where we began: to the “oceanic mind” of the author, and also to the Āstīkaparvan substory called “The Churning of the Ocean” (1.15 17).’

ocean (*etá arṣanti hṛdiyāt samudrāt*).<sup>25</sup> The compound *taponidhi* is translated here as ‘the ocean of heat’. This translation is more appropriate in a context which confirms that the creation of a story is conceived in terms of the process of perfection of an object under the influence of heat and that the initial form of the object is fluid. The expression *taponidhi* understood as ‘ocean of heat’ activates the Ṛgvedic philosophical model of Child Of The Waters with its image of fire burning among streams of waters.

We now turn to a discussion of the Vedic elements in the story about Śuka discussed already by Shulman (1993) and Hildebeitel (2001). Yudhiṣṭhira asks Bhīṣma about the birth of Śuka. Bhīṣma begins the story with a statement that it is heat (*tapas*) which is the source of everything (MDhP 310.7a *tapomūlam idam sarvam*) and that heat appears when one restrains one’s senses (MDhP 310.7cd *tad indriyāṇi saṃyamya tapo bhavati nānyathā*). In this way, the recipient’s mind is turned towards Vedic cosmogonies where heat is seen in the same way, as the source of the cosmos. Since creation of the cosmos is conceived in terms of recitation the concept of which is within the semantic range of the word *tapas*, the recipient understand that the beginning of the story is the beginning of the cosmos. Hildebeitel interprets *tapas* as ‘creative fervour as authorship is linked with suffering’ (2001: 287). While *tapas* can be interpreted as ‘creative fervour’ it seems more likely that it should be linked to effort (*śrama*) which is the cause of the fervour but it is not necessarily connected to suffering. In order to show this, we will briefly discuss the beginnings of cosmogony presented in ŚB 6.1.1.

This cosmogony is discussed at length (Jurewicz 2016/18) so we will limit the discussion to an analysis of the experiential concept used as the source domain to conceive creation of the cosmos. It is the concept of a man who is toiling and getting hot (*so śrāmyat sā tāpo tapyata*) when he starts reciting and creating some material object. Man begins to recite and thus speech (the triple Veda) appears,<sup>26</sup> but whenever man tries to perfect it i.e., to recite in a more perfect form) it melts. This happens twice (ŚB 6.1.1.9 and 12). The definition of water (*āpas, vār*) is presented here as that which reaches everywhere and conceals everything.<sup>27</sup> Each time, when his creation fails, man again starts toiling and feels hot. When he begins for the third time, he manages to create foam from water.<sup>28</sup> Man sees the foam and realises

<sup>25</sup> See also ṚV 10.5.1ab: *ékaḥ samudró dharūno rayīnām asmād dhṛdó bhūrījanmā ví caṣṭe*.

<sup>26</sup> ŚB 6.1.1.8: *sā śrāntās tepāno brāhmaivā prathamām asrjata trayóm evā vidyām pratiṣṭhābhavata*.

<sup>27</sup> ŚB 6.1.1.9: *yád āpnot tāsmād āpo yád āvṛṇot tāsmād vāḥ*.

<sup>28</sup> In ŚB 6.1.3 which elaborates this source domain in a more detail it is stated because of that when water is boiled foam appears on it.

that he has created a different form and that this form is abundant.<sup>29</sup> So he wants to toil more (*śrāmyāṇy evéti*). Thanks to his efforts foam is transformed into clay, mud, saline soil and sand, gravel, rock, iron ore, gold; the whole process is conceived in terms of heating (see ŚB 6.1.3). Finally, plants and trees appear. Man covers the earth with them. Then the Composer concludes:

### ŚB 6.1.1.15

*sèyām sārvaḥ kṛtsnā mānyamānāgāyad yād āgāyat tasmād iyām gāyatry ātho āhur agnir evāsyai pṛṣṭhé sārvaḥ kṛtsnó mānyamānò 'gāyad yād āgāyat tasmād agnir gāyatrā iti tasmād u haitādyāḥ sārvaḥ kṛtsnó mānyate gāyativaivā gītē vā ramate |*

And she (the earth), thinking herself quite perfect, sang; and inasmuch as she sang (*gā-*), therefore she is Gāyatrī. But they also say, 'It was Agni, indeed, on her (the earth's) back, who thinking himself quite perfect, sang; and inasmuch as he sang (*gā-*), therefore Agni is Gāyatra.' And hence whosoever thinks himself quite perfect, either sings or delights in song.<sup>30</sup>

The first input space of the blend activated by the Composer in this description is the concept of a clay or golden doll (the first input space). The second input space is the image of a living woman who sings knowing her perfect beauty.<sup>31</sup> The third is the creation of the earth as we know it today. The fourth is speech (metonymically activated by the noun *gāyatrī*), identified with the earth created in the very beginning of the process. The general domain of Cleansing By Heat can be seen either as an input space (then the generic space is process of transformation) or as the generic space specifying the features of this transformation. In the blend, the creative process is the transformation of one substance (water) to make it beautiful and perfect. Earth is conceived in terms of a doll or a woman while trees and plants are her hair. Each stage of the process begins with effort (*śram-*) and heating (*tap-*). So, if the Composer of the story of Śuka referred in the beginning of his story to Vedic cosmogonies, he would use the concept of heat (*tapas*) as an abstract concept. During the process of abstraction, the noun *tapas* becomes the metonymic sign of the fact that creative efforts begin to bring some result.

<sup>29</sup> 6.1.1.13: *sò 'ved anyād vā etād rūpām bhūyó vai bhavati.*

<sup>30</sup> Eggeling's translation (1894: 147–148).

<sup>31</sup> In the source domain, the female is presented as being the foundation of the male and 'spread out' under him who is on her back. The source domain either blends the concept of human and animal sexual union or reflects the real experience of the way human sexual union looked like in those times.

With this in mind, let us further analyse the story of Śuka against its Vedic background.<sup>32</sup> Note that the Vyāsa performs activity called *tapas* and he is presented as shining. This clearly highlights the fiery nature of creative activity.<sup>33</sup> The name of the Apsaras who appears before Vyāsa, Ghṛtācī, literally means ‘dripping butter’ and the recipient may activate the image of a beautiful woman who has been anointed with a balm so is hot.

Toil that heats Vyāsa’s while he churns fire is reminiscent of Prajāpati (described in ŚB 2.2.4) who produces milk while churning fire; milk can be interpreted as his semen.<sup>34</sup> Taking into account that the female form of Prajāpati is the same as him, one can also understand the Apsaras as one with Vyāsa as his female form. Her name, Ghṛtācī, ‘dripping butter’ also refers to the sacrificial ladle and activates the image of Vyāsa who holds its long handle in a rotating movement. The recipient may blend the concepts of the vertical kindling stick, handle of the spoon and penis; he will then understand the identity of Vyāsa and the Apsaras and of Vyāsa’s activity as masturbation.<sup>35</sup> The second form of the Apsaras, the form of a parrot (*śuka*), might also evoke the cosmogony of ŚB 2.5.1.1 where the first manifestation of Prajāpati are birds.<sup>36</sup> The first form of Prajāpati manifest as the cosmos, composed of seven men, is also a bird (ŚB 6.1.1.3–4). It might be argued that the Composer of the MBh was motivated by these descriptions. At the end of his study, Hildebeitel (2001: 322) writes that ‘[t]he sounds of birds both inspire the poets and penetrate the poetics of both of the Sanskrit epic.’ This agrees with the Vedic understanding of the first form of Prajāpati which is speech and confirms the suggestion that the Apsaras is the female part of Vyāsa.

It seems that Śuka is not metaphorically conceived in terms of fire but is fire, so that the recipient is expected to create a blended concept. Fire in the RV is conceived as the son of two sticks (3.29.2, 5.9.3),<sup>37</sup> in the

<sup>32</sup> Conceptual links between the Veda and this story are discussed by Hildebeitel (2001), Feller (2004). For the discussion of the story of Śuka, see Shulman (1993), Doniger (1993), Dhand (2007), White (2009: 71–73), Malinar (2011), Adluri (2015).

<sup>33</sup> MDhP 310: *tatra divyaṃ tapas tepe kṛṣṇadvaiṇāyanaḥ prabhuh | yogenātmānam āviśya yogadharmaparāyanaḥ ||* (12) *dhārayan sa tapas tepe putrārthaṃ kurusattama | na cāsya hīyate varṇo na glānir upajāyate ||* (13)

<sup>34</sup> As the result of pouring milk earth is covered with plants and trees (Jurewicz 2016/18).

<sup>35</sup> Hildebeitel (2001: 289) proposes to link ‘the creative fervour’ (*tapas*) of Vyāsa ‘with something like mental masturbation.’

<sup>36</sup> ŚB 2.5.1.1: *prajāpatir ha vā idam āgra ēka evāsa | sā aikṣata káthaṃ nú prajāyeyēti sò ‘śrāmyat sā tápo ‘tapyata sā prajā asṛjata tā asyá prajāḥ sṛṣṭāḥ párababhūvus tānīmāni vāvāmsi pūruṣo vai prajāpater nēdiṣṭhaṃ dvipād vā ayám pūruṣas tásmād dvipādo vāvāmsi |*

<sup>37</sup> RV 3.29.2ab: *aranyor nihito jātavedā garbha iva sudhito garbhiniṣṭu; RV 5.9.3ab: uta sma yaṃ śiśuṃ yathā navam janīṣṭāraṇī.*

same way as Śuka who is called ‘son of the firestick whose womb is fire stick (*āraṇeya*: 311.21, 312.41, 314.25, Hildebeitel 2001: 288). Shining with his burning energy, he is compared to fire which appears during sacrifice (MDhP 311.10).<sup>38</sup> The fact that the way Śuka burns is compared to fire without smoke (*vidhūmo* ‘gnir iva *jvalan*) is a reference to the R̥gvedic philosophical model of Child Of The Water which uses the doubly paradoxical image of fire in waters which has no smoke (R̥V 2.35.14: *adhvasmābhir viśvāhā dīdivāmsam*, Jurewicz 2010: 208). This model seems to be continued in the next stanza:

### MDhP 311.12

*taṃ gaṅgā saritāṃ śreṣṭhā merupṛṣṭhe janeśvara |*  
*svarūpiṇī tadābhyetya snāpayām āsa vāriṇā ||*

At the peak of Meru, Gaṅgā, the best of rivers, o king, approached him in person and bathed him in water.<sup>39</sup>

One of the inputs spaces of the philosophical model of Child Of The Waters (described in detail in R̥V 2.35, Jurewicz 2010) is the concept of cows which lick new-born calves. In the blend, waters are conceived in terms of cows, Agni in terms of a calf. The concept of licking is one of the specific realisations of the general domain of Cleansing By Heat. Here Gaṅgā is described as the only mother who bathes her child which implies that the experience evoked here is human birth. Activation of the model of Child Of The Water highlights the fiery nature of Śuka. The fact that the river is present on the sun agrees with the R̥gvedic concepts too. Not only are four rivers presented there, but the sun is conceived in terms of a fiery container filled with soma e.g., an udder with four teats, from which four rivers flow (R̥V 1.62.6, 8.100.10, 9.74.6, 9.89.5, Jurewicz 2016a).

Hildebeitel also discusses the meaning of the noun *pṛṣṭha* which can be interpreted as ‘the hind part or rear of anything’ or ‘the upper side, surface, top, height’ (2001: 290–291) and tries to find out a more precise localisation of the events described in the story. Notwithstanding its possible meanings in the MBh in the R̥V this noun, in locative, is used to denote the highest place

<sup>38</sup> E.g., MDhP 311.10: *yathādhvare samiddho* ‘gnir bhāti havyam upāttavān | *tathārūpaḥ śuko jajñe prajvalann iva tejasā* || The Vedic background of the concept of Śuka can also be seen in that his path is the first (*agrya*, MDhP 310.10: *śukasyāgryām gatim caiva durvidām akṛtāmabhiḥ*); the feature of being the first is essential feature of fire in the R̥V (Jurewicz 2016a).

<sup>39</sup> Jurewicz’s translation.

in the cosmos conceived in terms of a cow or bull.<sup>40</sup> In terms of the back (*pr̥sthá*) of the animal the zenith is conceived, reached by the sun according to the general model of Reality Transformations. Here soma which fills the sun is finally purified. We should bear in mind that there is not an ontological difference between fire and soma: they are two aspects of one reality. When soma is poured into fire in the morning, fire mixed with soma becomes the rising sun which goes upwards to reach zenith (Jurewicz 2010).

Note that that the reference to tradition will allow us to understand Śuka as soma too. As mentioned above he is compared to fire blazing in a sacrifice (MDhP 311.10). The concept of sacrifice involves its whole logic: where fire is, the oblation is too which is poured into fire and in the RV soma is identified with semen (*rétas*, Jurewicz 2010). From the perspective of the Vedic background, Śuka can be interpreted as the transformation of Vyāsa's semen (AU 2.1). So, his first form in semen is soma poured into the fiery womb of the Apsaras. His next form is soma mixed with fire which is now finally purified (expressed in the image of Gaṅgā who bathes Śuka) at the highest point of the cosmos conceived in terms of the peak of a mountain. Thus, the reference to Veda enlarges the coherence of the description. Śuka is a composition of his mother and father, of fire and soma, he is a man, but at the same time, his name Śuka betrays that he is also a woman (on the basis of metonymy PARROT FOR SPEECH, see above).

The concept of purification is also implied by the description of his Upanayana ceremony performed at the beginning of the stage of the student (*brahmacārin*). Indra, called by his R̥gvedic name Śakra, gives him the divine water-jar (*kamaṇḍalu*) which looks miraculous (*adbhutadarśana*) and the divine cloths.<sup>41</sup> The noun *kamaṇḍalu* is used in the description of churning the ocean in reference to the jar carried by Dhanvantari.<sup>42</sup> Taking into account the conceptual links between the story of Śuka and the churning of the ocean discussed above, the recipient may be prompted to think that the jar contains the nectar of immortality, the same nectar which has been churned out as the best form of the ocean during the process conceived in terms of Cleansing By Heat. From the Vedic perspective, the divine jar filled with fluid called *amṛta* can be interpreted as the sun filled with purified soma which is also

<sup>40</sup> RV 1.125.5: *nākasya pr̥sthé*; 1.164.10: *divó amúṣya pr̥sthé*, 3.2.12: *divás pr̥sthám*. It is an example of the zoomorphic conceptualisation, see Heine (1997).

<sup>41</sup> MDhP 311.19: *tasya deveśvaraḥ śakro divyam adbhutadarśanam | dadau kamaṇḍalum pr̥ityā devavāsāmsi cābhibho ||*

<sup>42</sup> MBh 1.16.37: *dhanvantaris tato devo vapuṣmān udatiṣṭhata | śvetam kamaṇḍalum bibhrad amṛtam yatra tiṣṭhati ||*

called *amṛta* in the RV<sup>43</sup> and its mixing with water, milk or clarified butter during purification is conceived in terms of its clothing (RV 9.69.5).<sup>44</sup>

Moreover, in the Veda, the sun is the form of the cosmos seen in liberating cognition (beginning with the AV, Jurewicz 2016/18). In this way, the input space of liberating cognition is activated. It is also activated by the concept of Indra who gives the jar to Śuka. Many times in the Veda, the concept of Indra is used to express the moment when liberating cognition begins (definition of the ŚB 6.1.1.2 as *indha*) or culminates (definition in the AU 1.3.14 as *idandra*). In case of Śuka, it is the beginning of liberation, the story then proceeds to describe his search for final freedom.<sup>45</sup> As one can suppose, Śuka is still carrying his jar which means that he sees the aim of his cognition which has now to be realised. At the same time, the image of a man carrying a jar evokes the concept of the sacrificer of the Agnicayana who carries fire in a jar during his year-long initiation (*dīkṣā*).

The conceptual network created in this description consists of the input spaces of sacrifice (activated by the concept of churning fire),<sup>46</sup> the general domain of Procreation elaborated in its all phases (insemination, birth and growth of a son), the general model of Reality Transformation (in its first phase which is the rising son), the concept of liberating cognition and the concept of creation of the MBh (as Hildebeitel proposes) In the blend, Śuka is born as a fiery boy who gets a mysterious jar in the beginning of his journey. During his birth the cosmos appears when Vyāsa churns fire in order to sacrifice, his semen being the oblation. When the oblation is mixed with fire, the sun appears which is the head of a fiery boy who rises up to zenith, his head is the sun filled with soma, his body is the cosmos. But the growth of the boy is a cognitive process which is realised in zenith.

<sup>43</sup> Feller (2004: 186) writes, to one's surprise: 'In the MBh episode of the soma-theft, the drink of immortality is interchangeably called *amṛta* or soma (the latter term being perhaps used to mark the continuity between the Vedic myth and that of the MBh), whereas the term *amṛta* is rare in the Veda' (she refers to Gonda 1964: 61–63, Dumezil 1924: 3, and Grassmann 1996, under *amṛta*). However, in the RV this adjective is used 116 times (Lubotsky 1997, I: 106–108) and in many times it metonymically refers to soma (EFFECT FOR CAUSE). Researchers' assumptions at the time regarding the relationship between language and thought prevented them from perceiving this metonymy and in many cases, they interpreted the words *sōma* and *amṛta* as having different meanings.

<sup>44</sup> RV 9.69.5ab: *amṛktena rūśatā vāsasā hārīr amartyo nirnijānāḥ pāri vyata*.

<sup>45</sup> It might also be argued that the birds which fly around Śuka when he obtains the jar are also meant to activate the concept of waters which surround their child (MDhP 311.20: *haṃsās ca śatapatrās ca sārasās ca sahasraśaḥ 12,311.020c pradakṣiṇam avartanta śukāś cāśās ca bhārata*).

<sup>46</sup> Metonymy FIRST PHASE OF THE PROCESS FOR THE WHOLE PROCESS.



If we accept Hildebeitel's argument that Śuka 'epitomises the *Mahābhārata* itself' (2011b: 184, 201), the concept of its composition is the next input space of the story. Vyāsa begins to compose the MBh, its first form is conceived in terms of a beautiful woman and the sacrificial ladle, its second form in terms of a parrot. The first recognition of the unity of the author and his work is conceived in terms of the sexual act which also involves some effort and heating. The next stage of composition is conceived in terms of the appearance of a little bird-boy who is the initial form of the story. The story is developed which is conceived in terms of further transformations of Śuka. All the processes are conceived in terms of the general domain of Cleansing By Heat and one can argue that this domain is the generic space of the blend. The blend compresses the vital relations of time and space and the recipient has access to two viewpoints: the viewpoint of that which creates the cosmos which can be seen as the sun (the viewpoint of Vyāsa who can see the cosmos as the whole and, at the same time, compress it to the sun) and the viewpoint of the character (the viewpoint of Śuka who is on the sun in this moment of story). It can be hypothesised that Vyāsa's viewpoint (at least in this story) is that of the main narrative space while Śuka's viewpoint is that of an Ego-viewpoint. Since it is Nārada who advises Vyāsa and Śuka what to do when they are lost, his viewpoint is that the story-viewpoint i.e., of the narrator of the story who tells the story as to how the story was created and is known everywhere. But this issue needs separate investigation.

Analysis of the next chapters of the story of Śuka against the background of tradition goes beyond the present short analysis and will be left for a separate study. We will briefly recapitulate some of the most important issues. According to the general model of Reality Transformation the second phase of the cosmic process is rain which is purified soma flowing down from the sun. And it is possible to activate this concept in the description of what happens when Śuka comes back to his father after his long and tiresome journey.<sup>47</sup> The image of the four disciples of Vyāsa who are sent to the earth to spread the Vedas everywhere (the MBh included, 2001: 294)<sup>48</sup> activates the concept of four streams of water. The interpretation is based on the metaphoric conceptualisation of speech in terms of flowing water and conceptualisation of the sun in terms of a water container from which four streams flow. Since rain is always beneficial in Indian tradition, we can presume that the influence of the MBh on people living on earth will be similarly beneficial. Vyāsa, who commands his disciples

<sup>47</sup> As Hildebeitel (2001) emphasises, although Śuka is a bird, he has to walk on foot. Śuka must be very tired and very hot when he reaches the peak of the mountain which again betrays the work of the general domain of Cleansing By Heat.

<sup>48</sup> MDhP 314.41: *bhavanto bahulāḥ santu vedo vistāryatām ayam.*

to become many and to spread the Veda, evokes the desire of Prajāpati to become many (e.g., ŚB 6.1.1.8: *bhūyānt syām prajāyeyēti*). The disciples of Vyāsa, his sons by the initiation (upanayana) will multiply Vyāsa in his story in the same way as Prajāpati multiplies himself in his creatures (*prajā*), the sounds of the Veda incarnated.

The ‘post-composition blues’ (Hiltebeitel 2001: 296) felt by Vyāsa when his pupils leave him is reminiscent of the cosmogonies of the ŚB when Prajāpati, having created the cosmos (which is conceived in terms of giving birth) feels empty and terrified of death (see ŚB 10.4.2.2–3). Of course, in the early Smṛti texts the situation of the Creator is not so alarming. Without Vyāsa’s recitation the cosmos loses its shine and beauty, but it is not endangered with annihilation as it is in the Vedic cosmogonies. Under the advice of Nārada, Vyāsa, together with Śuka, begin to recite together and the world becomes filled with sound.<sup>49</sup> When a strong wind appears, Śuka asks about it and Vyāsa explains how the seven breaths/winds sustain the existence of living beings and the cosmos.<sup>50</sup> The fact that the cosmos is composed of breath confirms this interpretation because the pre-creative form of the cosmos is conceived in the same way as in ŚB 6.1.1.1 where non-being/un-truth (*ásat*) is defined as seers (*śśayas*) metonymically defined as breaths (*prāñā*).<sup>51</sup>

The last wind described by Vyāsa is the irresistible breath which is exhaled by Visnu and can make the earth tremble.<sup>52</sup> In this way the concept of the borderline sphere between two aspects is activated. It is conceived in terms of a reciting mouth. The image of the open mouth can also activate the concept of eating which is elaborated in the MBh to conceive the borderline sphere seen as the sphere where time begins (see chapter 2.1.1, 4.11.3). As stated many times, the concept of eating metonymically evokes the concept of cooking and conceptualisation of the borderline sphere in terms of the edges of the pot. Time is conceived in terms of a cook who stirs the ladle. This image is activated in the beginning of the story where Vyāsa is presented as churning fire and stirring the sacrificial ladle. We could say that Śuka has come back to his womb. And again, tradition may be at work here: sonic exaltation is conceived in terms of coming back to one’s womb or home (Jurewicz 2010).

<sup>49</sup> MDhP 315.23: *śukena saha putreṇa vedābhyāsam athākarot | svareṇoccaiḥ sa śaikṣeṇa lokān āpūrayann iva ||*

<sup>50</sup> MDhP 315.31: *prthivyām antarikṣe ca yatra saṃvānti vāyavaḥ | saptaita vāyumārgā vai tām nibodhānupūrvaśaḥ ||*

<sup>51</sup> *ásad vā idām ágra āsīt | tād āhuḥ kiṃ tād ásad āsīt ity śśayo vāvā tè ‘grē ‘sad āsīt tād āhuḥ ké tá śśaya iti prāñā vā śśayas té yāt purāsmāt sárvasmād idām ichántaḥ śrámeṇa tásasāriśams tásamād śśayaḥ |*

<sup>52</sup> MDhP 315.55: *viṣṇor niḥśvāsavāto ‘yaṃ yadā vegasamīritaḥ | sahasodīryate tāta jagat pravayathate tadā ||*

In their recitation, Vyāsa and Śuka have reached the borderline sphere between aspects of reality which is the highest sphere possible to be gained in the Veda. But, since in the early Upaniṣads liberating cognition expands to the spheres of reality impossible to be expressed in words, so Vyāsa stops their recitation. Moreover, he leaves Śuka, hiding himself in the heaven of Ganga (*vyomagaṅgā*, MDhP 315.57c). In the ṚV, the noun *vyòman* is used in the expression *paramá vyòman* to express the zenith reached by the rising sun the movement of which demarcates the borderline sphere (Jurewicz 2010). Śuka is expected to proceed further with his mental activity, but now in silence and Vyāsa will remain at the borders of the cosmos in the main narrative space. Creation again is somehow stopped, but now in the reverse order and only for Śuka. Śuka reaches the state of the cosmos before creation, he is in ‘the empty interval’ (*antare śūnye*, Hiltebeitel 2001: 298). Silence accompanies Śuka when he continues his mental activity:<sup>53</sup> there is no sound of birds and they cannot be seen which activates the concept of night which is also used to conceive the pre-creative state of the world (since the ṚV).<sup>54</sup> It is as if Śuka is again on earth, alone and cold and begins practice watching the east. He is sitting still. Then the dawn appears and Śuka burst out laughing which might remind one of the morning cries of parrots.<sup>55</sup>

The description of the final stages of his liberating cognition is too long to be analysed here but, as Hiltebeitel writes, ‘Śuka is seen to move vertically, as if he were targeting the still rising sun like an Indian Icarus’ (2001: 303). But Icarus fell down to the earth because he did not know how to fly and nothing like this happens to Śuka. He is repeating the path described already in the ṚV where men exalted with soma fly up with the rising sun followed by the sacrificers of the Brāhmaṇas thanks to their oblations. Then he will cross the borderline sphere similarly to those who are on the path of the sun (*devayāna*), described in the early Upaniṣads.

Having lost his son, Vyāsa is unhappy. Śiva consoles him and tells him that he should not grieve for his son because Śuka has reached the state of ultimate freedom. Moreover, his fame (*kīrti*) will remain imperishable (*ākṣaya*) as long the mountains and oceans will last.<sup>56</sup> In the ṚV the immortal state under the influence of soma, conceived as realised in the sun, is zenith expressed by the cluster of concepts *śrī/śrávas/yáśas/ksatrá*. *kīrti* is used here in a similar

<sup>53</sup> After Nārada’s teaching who represents the story viewpoint.

<sup>54</sup> MDhP 319.4: *na tatra pakṣisaṃghāto na śabdo nāpi darśanam | yatra vaiyāsakir dhīmān yoktuṃ samupacakrame ||*

<sup>55</sup> MDhP 319.5: *sa dadarśa tadātmānaṃ sarvasaṅgaviniḥśṛtam | prajāhāsa tato hāsaṃ śukaḥ saṃprekṣya bhāskaram ||*

<sup>56</sup> MDhP 320.36: *yāvat sthāsyanti girayo yāvat sthāsyanti sāgarāḥ | tāvat tavākṣayā kīrtiḥ saputrasya bhaviṣyati ||*

meaning. It highlights the meaning of royal rule (expressed by *ksatrá* in the RV) and of fame (expressed most clearly by *śrávas*).

But it seems that the Composer of the story wants to activate more than the meaning of immortality realised thanks to soma. Note that the compound *kathāmṛta* means more than ‘nectar of immortality.’ A more literal translation opens other possibilities. It can also mean ‘the immortality of story’ or ‘immortality which is story.’ The expression *akṣayā kīrtiḥ* (imperishable fame) evokes the Ṛgvedic expression *śrávas ákṣitam* which, as Nagy (1974) has shown, is cognate with the Greek *kleos apthiton* which goes back to Indo-European tradition (see also McGrath 2019). The Composer of the MBh seems to be adding a further means for achieving a state of immortality: it cannot be soma which is lost, it is not only śrama and tapas (as in the Brāhmaṇas) and not only sons (as in Vedic and early Smṛti thought); it is artistic creativity and the ability to compose eternal poems which will never be forgotten. It is in full accord with the highest goal of the Ṛgvedic and Greek poets who aimed at *śrávas ákṣitam/kleos apthiton* in their poems. The Composer is refreshing the earliest roots of his tradition and makes Śiva’s consolation convincing: since *illo tempore* poets became immortal thanks to their creation.

Śiva further consoles Vyāsa that he will always see his son who will remain close to him; in his shadow which will look like his son.<sup>57</sup> When Vyāsa looks at his shadow he becomes happy.<sup>58</sup> Earlier, in MDhP 315.29ab, the concept of shadow is evoked by Nārada to explain to Śuka the essence of liberating cognition during which he will see his shadow – himself by himself – as in a mirror (*ādarśe svām iva chāyām paśyasy ātmānam ātmanā*).<sup>59</sup> The syntax of the hemistich is such that the recipient is prompted to conceive

<sup>57</sup> MDhP 320.37: *chāyām svaputrasadrśīm sarvato ‘napagām sadā | draṅsyase tvam ca loke ‘smin matprasādān mahāmune ||*

<sup>58</sup> MDhP 320.38: *so ‘nunīto bhagavatā svayaṃ rudreṇa bhārata | chāyām paśyan samāvṛttau sa muniḥ parayā mudā ||* The participle *samāvṛta* which means ‘turned back, returned’ and metaphorically ‘completed, finished’ evokes the concept of the Vedic student, Brahmācārin, who comes back home having finished his studies. In this way, the Composer might imply that creation of story involves transformation and spiritual development of the same kind as learning the Veda which, in turn, involves tapas seen as general practice of heating during recitation, fasting, walking in the heat and begging for food for his master and collecting fuel for his fire.

<sup>59</sup> Let us note that mirror was one of the objects used in the ceremony performed at the end of study (Parpola 2019). If Śuka’s self is conceived in terms of the shadow and reflexion in the mirror, one can speculate that Vyāsa’s self, identified with Śuka and conceived in terms of the shadow, can also be conceived in terms of a mirror. This fact would confirm the suggested hypothesis that Vyāsa, having created his story is now in the same situation as the Vedic student at the end of his studies. Now he will have to take part in the story in order to preserve it, in the same way as every man in this situation has to marry and get children in order to preserve cosmos (see chapter 4.11.3, 5.3.5).

the self in terms of a shadow. The same conceptualisation is attested in the cosmogony of the *Gopatha Brāhmaṇa* where brahman is presented as looking into waters (which have appeared after a long process of alternating heating and sweating) and sees its shadow in them. It emits its semen into it, so the recipient understands that the shadow is the self of brahman, now manifesting as man and woman.<sup>60</sup> Thus brahman gains the foundation to continue creation within its manifest aspect as his own son.<sup>61</sup> At the same time, it is the son who the self (*ātman*) of the father. The conceptual network created here by the Composer of the MBh is composed of the following input spaces: the concept of shadow (*chāyā*), the concept of the self (*ātman*) and the concept of the son. In the blend, the shadow is Vyāsa's son identical with him. The recipient may enlarge the network with the concept of Agni paradoxically identified with shadow in the RV (Jurewicz 2010).<sup>62</sup> The next input space is the concept of the MBh that in the blend becomes Śuka. This mini-blend is part of the mega-blend created throughout the whole story part of which has been reconstruct above.

To conclude: Hildebeitel is correct that churning is the source domain for the conceptualisation of creation in the MBh. The metaphor is meaningful not only because of the mastery of the composition of the MBh, but because it is deeply grounded in tradition thanks to which its implicit frames and ways of reasoning were obvious for the recipient. This therefore suggests that these frames are the general domains, philosophical models, basic scenarios of creation, views on the functioning of the cosmos and of liberating cognition that were created more than a thousand year earlier. Most of their meaning was unconsciously accepted and taken for granted not as describing the state of affairs but as the state of affairs itself. One more thing should be mentioned. Whether Vyāsa was a real person or not, whether the MBh was composed by one person or many or whether it was composed orally or written is irrelevant as in one respect the Composer of the MBh is totally correct. His fame is imperishable and his story has remained alive until our time.

<sup>60</sup> In close embrace (as in BU 1.4.3).

<sup>61</sup> The description of the *Gopatha Brāhmaṇa* is a concise abstract description which incorporates the logic of the various source domains used more explicitly in the earlier Vedic texts. *Gopatha Brāhmaṇa* 1.1.3: *tā apaḥ sṛṣṭvānvaikṣata | tāsu svām chāyām apaśyat | tām asyeḥsamāṇasya svayaṃ reto 'skandat | tad apsu pratyaṣṭhat | tās tatraivābhyaśrāmyad abhyatapat samatapat |*

<sup>62</sup> The concept of mirror used as the source domain to conceive the self also may lead us to the concept of Agni. As Parpola writes 'in a Brāhmaṇa text (in the proper sense of the word) – namely, in the *Taittirīya-Brāhmaṇa* –, it does not yet denote 'mirror' but is an attribute of 'fire (altar)', meaning something like 'gaze able, visible' (2019: 3): the fire altar is a mirror (*ādarśā*) of Agni.

#### 4. The Self

As argued throughout this book, the Smṛti philosophers continued the quest for the immortal self (*ātman*) that can be experienced by human being within the frames of his own body as they were told by the Veda. The principle, of the primary character of cognition over being, allowed them to create a clear model according to which man becomes what he thinks about. When he desires and thinks about the object, he becomes the object and is reborn in the manifest aspect in an inauspicious form. When he desires and thinks about the subject, he becomes the subject and is reborn in the manifest aspect in auspicious form. When he desires to go beyond subjective-objective cognition and knows how to do it, he liberates himself and unites with the unmanifest sphere.

The most important general conclusion of this present research is that according to Smṛti philosophy (in that it continues the earliest R̥gvedic background) the only aim of the manifestations of reality is to understand ‘what is like to be a bat’ putting this in Thomas Nagel’s terms (1979). What is it like to be changing, to be mortal, to be feeble and to be unique in one’s cognition, even if performed from the viewpoint of inanimate matter? It is reality that creates its selves in its manifestations.

In this section, about the Self, we will consider the outcomes of this book with the use of Nagel’s philosophical theory presented in *The View from Nowhere* (1986). It will be shown that it is enough to deny at least one commonly accepted axiom of culture – and a new system of thought can be built which is the logical conclusions of such a move. Of course, only some aspects of Nagel’s ideas will be discussed being those considered relevant for the purpose presented.

Nagel is among those philosophers who posit some version of neutral monism. Stubenberg (2018) quotes a fragment of personal communication with Nagel in which he explains that the most basic constituents of the universe:

would be neither merely physical nor merely mental, but something that was necessarily both physical and mental or protomenta. Since we cannot imagine the direct connection between the physical and mental, we should assume that the real nature of these constituents is something more basic that accounts for their being both physical and protomenta.

Such a theory of mind is called dual (or double) aspect theory. As we can immediately see, it negates the Cartesian dualism which has so powerfully influenced European thinking.<sup>63</sup> As we will see, once Cartesian dualism is

<sup>63</sup> Not only philosophy created under the influence of Christianity. Baruch Spinoza was expelled from the Jewish community for his views which also can be labelled as neutral monism (Stubenberg 2018).

rejected, a new theory of the cosmos and of man appears, based on logical implications which is very close to the early Hindu theory of the self (*ātman*). Nagel is aware that he is going beyond commonly accepted ways of thinking:

Because of the apparent intimacy of the relation between the mental and its physical conditions, and because of a continued attachment to the metaphysical theory of substance and attribute, I am drawn to some kind of dual aspect theory. This is probably due to lack of imagination, but I still want to explore the possibilities and problems of a theory of this type.... *I believe it will be useful to see what happens if we try to think about the mind in these terms.*<sup>64</sup>

The logical implication of dual aspect theory is the acceptance of the ‘non-ownership’ view (1986: 30). Thus, mental events ‘just occur without being properties or modifications of anything, of soul or body.’ (1986: 30) Here the Buddhist philosophers would find basic convergence with their views, but Nagel assumes the existence of ‘something’ which is ‘in advance with the potential of being affected with mental manifestations, if lightning a match is to produce a visual experience in a perceiver’ (1986: 30). Nagel, however, does not define this ‘something’ because till now ‘the correct model has never been thought of’ (1986: 30).<sup>65</sup>

A further implication of the denial of Cartesian dualism is the denial of his concept of the self, seen as something the essence of which can be revealed in introspection that is purely subjective. Nagel follows Wittgenstein’s assumption that ‘even subjective concepts have their appropriate objectivity’ (1986: 35) and claims that the nature of the self can be explained within the framework of dual aspect theory. If the concept of the self refers to anything,

it must refer to something essentially subjective, often identifiable non-observationally in the first person and observationally in the third, which is the persisting locus of mental states and activities and vehicle for carrying forward familiar psychological concepts when they occur.<sup>66</sup>

He therefore introduces two perspectives on seeing the self. On one hand, the universe is centreless, it is just an ‘objective flow of cosmos’ (1986: 55). This is the view of the perspective Nagel calls the objective self. On the other, this universe

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<sup>64</sup> Nagel (1986: 30).

<sup>65</sup> Similarly, Donald (1991, see section 2), Nagel insists on the necessity of creation of a new theory of mind similar that of modern physics (Nagel 1986: 51–52).

<sup>66</sup> Nagel (1986: 40).

have produced me, of all people – and produced me by producing T[homas] N[agel]. There is no such thing as me for ages, but with the formation of a particular physical organism at a particular place and time, suddenly there *is* me, for as long as the organism survives... How can the existence of one member of some species have this remarkable consequence?<sup>67</sup>

Each one of us is a combination of two perspectives:

The objective self that I find viewing the world through TB is not unique: each of you has one. Or perhaps I should say each of us is one, for the objective self is not a distinct entity. Each of us, then, in addition to being an ordinary person, is a particular objective self, the subject of a perspective less conception of reality.<sup>68</sup>

There is obvious convergence between the Nagel's theory of mind and early Hindu philosophy according to which man (and other creatures) are manifestations of one reality and combine its cognitive perspective and the perspective of an individual psycho-physical agent. Recognition of this fact occurs when reality, in the form of the highest cognitive agent, manifests in the various species of the cosmos including man. The goal of human life is to allow reality to recognise that. Putting this again in Nagel's terms, we should arrive at the centreless perspective, the view from nowhere, without losing the personal.

The process of arriving at this perspective is, according to Nagel, the process of abstraction of the objective self. We will not delve into the details of the way Nagel believes that this process can be realised. As with many other issues discussed in this book, this must be left for another study. Generally speaking, the process begins by stepping away from 'the unconsidered perspective of a particular person I thought I was.'<sup>69</sup> Within this theory, there is a close connection between intersubjectivity and objectivity. At the first stage of the process

the intersubjectivity is still entirely human, and the objectivity is correspondingly limited... But if the general human perspective is then placed in the same position as part of the world, the point of view from which this is done must be far more abstract, so it requires that we find within ourselves the capacity to view the world in some sense as very different creatures also might view it when abstracting from the specifics of their type of perspective.<sup>70</sup>

<sup>67</sup> Nagel (1986: 55).

<sup>68</sup> Nagel (1986: 63–64).

<sup>69</sup> Nagel (1986: 63).

<sup>70</sup> Nagel (1986: 63–64).



There is a similarity between the stages of activation of the objective self as described by Nagel and the liberating process described in the early Smṛti texts. It consists in expanding the awareness of one's own self to other people, then to other beings, then to the entire cosmos to finally achieve the perspective of the highest cognitive agent, a perspective which is the starting point to realise one's identity with the unmanifest.

As mentioned above, Nagel is aware of the difficulties that arise from dual aspect theory:

They are not only theoretical and logical. The problem becomes even greater when it comes to agreeing them in the context of human action. Values belong to the objective perspective and express the objective will, but each of us also belongs to one's own, subjective particular perspective from which one acts. Moral action needs awareness of two perspectives and engagement not just from outside the present moment, but from outside one's life. Thus, in a sense I come to act on the world from outside my particular personal place in it – to control the behaviour of TN from a standpoint that is not mine qua TN. The objective self whom the problem of free will arises is co-opted into agency.<sup>71</sup>

Nagel highlights that a pure objective perspective makes our life insignificant and absurd:

Most of us have felt suddenly giddy at the thought of the extreme unlikely-hood of our birth or the thought of the world sailing on after we are dead. Some of us feel a constant undertow of absurdity in projects and ambitions that give our lives their forward drive. The jarring displacements of the external view are inseparable from the full development of consciousness.<sup>72</sup>

He calls full withdrawal from the subjective perspective and denial of all its claims as 'Draconian.' He writes:

I cannot speak from experience, but this seems to me a high price to pay for spiritual harmony. The amputation of so much of oneself to secure the unequivocal affirmation of the rest seems a waste of consciousness. I would rather lead an absurd life engaged in the particular than a seamless transcendental life immersed in the universal.<sup>73</sup>

And then he adds:

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<sup>71</sup> Nagel (1986: 135).

<sup>72</sup> Nagel (1986: 210–211).

<sup>73</sup> Nagel (1986: 219).

Perhaps those who have tried both would laugh inscrutably at this preference. I reflect the belief that the absurdity of human life is not such a bad thing. There are limits to what we should be prepared to do to escape it – apart from the point that some of these cures may be more absurd than the disease.<sup>74</sup>

Life with its pain and happiness is worth living. The same is expressed so clearly in BU 1.4 where the self, having realised that it is one and alone, accepts fear as the cost of happiness and the joy of being with another person. And then in the BhG when Arjuna is urged to act without attachment in order to preserve the harmony (*lokasamgraha*) of the cosmos. Early Hindu philosophy, with its belief that there is nothing except the self which manifests in creatures, promises that once we realise our unity with it, we may feel the absurdity of our manifestation in our body, but this feeling will not kill us, because we are much more than our psycho-physical organism.

Nagel gives another argument to suggest that it is worth trying to unite both perspectives. If we try to imagine the world without us, we are also getting rid of the objective self:

and this begins to feel like getting rid of the world itself than of something in it. It is as if there were a natural illusion that the world is not completely detachable from my conception of it.<sup>75</sup>

This is exactly how this author understand the concept of *loka* (the world, the cosmos) especially in Vedic tradition but also in Buddhist<sup>76</sup> and Hindu yogic traditions (see chapter 4). Starting from the R̥gvedic meaning of the word *loka* as a luminous space, that is, a sphere that makes it possible to know, one must presume that *loka* denotes a space of experience from a particular point of view. During liberating cognition man becomes able to experience the points of view of various manifestations of reality i.e., of the self, and blend them into one omniscient vision. This vision can be described in Nagel's words:

Although the world is not essentially my world, the objective recognition of my contingency has to coexist in my head with a total world picture whose subject *is* inescapable me. The person whose contingency I recognise is the epicentre not just of the world as it looks from here, but of my entire world view. To suppose that he should never have existed is to suppose that my world should never have existed.<sup>77</sup>

<sup>74</sup> Nagel (1986: 219).

<sup>75</sup> Nagel (1986: 212).

<sup>76</sup> See especially the results of research of Sue Hamilton (2000).

<sup>77</sup> Nagel (1986: 212).

Such kind of thinking is expressed more or less explicitly in all Vedic and early Smṛti cosmogonies. Reality's will is to create the world (*loka*), the sphere where its subject-object cognition will take place. And the world (*loka*) totally depends on its cognitive activity, in macro and microscale. In the Brāhmaṇas, the price for the creation of a space of experience, for the existence of *loka*, the world, is dramatic because it involves the death of the manifestation of reality. In later thought, it is the awareness of the suffering associated with existence ending with death which is particularly strongly expressed. But in all cases, it is good to be here because without us a world, *loka*, a cognitive perspective, would be lost.

Nagel does not believe that there is a credible way to eliminate the inner conflict arising from the coexistence of two perspectives. But we can reduce it and 'it is possible to promote a degree of harmony between the two standpoints without taking drastic measures' (1986: 221). Objective reason, although it is entangled with the passions of a particular individual, has the capacity to look at a broader view, to recognise that these are passions of that individual which is no more important than those for anyone else.

'So, the objectivity is split into spectator and participant' – writes Nagel (1986: 221). He chooses the same concept to metaphorically express the combination of perspectives he discusses. As we remember a similar source domain, that of play used by the early Smṛti philosophers who wanted to describe the coexistence of two aspects of reality in the cosmos and in men and to know whether it is free or not (chapter 5.3).

Morality is one of the devices which helps to reduce conflict between two perspectives. Nagel calls morality as a 'form of objective reengagement.' It allows to 'reduce the difference between yourself and other people, yet not so far outside that all human values vanish in a nihilistic blackout' (1986: 222). Dharma can be defined in the same way: as a form of action undertaken with the awareness of one's own self that is far greater than one's small body but with the conviction that it is important to sustain it in a given form as long as it is needed and to respect other manifest forms of the self.

It is the hope of this author that she has shown the general similarities between Nagel's theory of mind and the early Smṛti theory of the self (notwithstanding particular differences). It is argued that early Hindu philosophers came to similar conclusions to those of the 20th century Western philosopher because of their similar assumptions. But it should be noted that in case of the Vedic and early Smṛti philosophers, their assumptions were not the result of pure theoretical investigation as in the case of Nagel. They were the result of experience acquired thanks to soma which induced altered states of consciousness and later, thanks to various kinds of mental and physical

practices. It seems that already, in the times of composition of some parts of the Brāhmaṇas (connected with secret teachings on Agnihotra in the ŚB and JB) and in the Āraṇyakas and the early Upaniṣads, they had the ability to control practice and to manage it in a more and more conscious way. They could investigate, as if from afar, the mental and physical changes which took place in their bodies and construe a theory of mind. But, in both cases, ‘the feeling of amazement – a strange sense that I both am and am not the hub of the universe,’<sup>78</sup> was foundational to philosophical thought.

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<sup>78</sup> Nagel (1986: 64).

# Acknowledgements

I wrote this book at a difficult time, combining it with other professional duties at the university, with teaching, with the filling out of thousands of forms for an ever more demanding administration, with the need to earn extra money and with the need to manage family life. Mentally I was accompanied by my grandfathers and my father, sitting at their desks in their book filled rooms who I was not to disturb during their scholarly endeavours. I have been living this blend for years, in constant amazement, frustration but with the satisfaction that I can manage just as they did.. It is their strength and the strength of my grand-mothers and mother that has somehow survived in me and has allowed me to complete my task.

But I could not have made it without the many people around me who contributed to this book in one way or another. These include my colleagues from the Department of South Asia and UNISA in Pretoria and my Indological colleagues whom I met at conferences and and with whom I corresponded on Indology lists or in private correspondence.

First of all I pass my thanks to Ania Trynkowska and Monika Nowakowska who were always ready to share their deep Indological knowledge with me and to answer all my questions and doubts. My gratitude also to the rest of the team working on the translation of the *Mahābhārata*: Andrzej Babkiewicz, Sven Sellmer and Przemek Szczurek. I thank Ola Turek and Justyna Wiśniewska-Singh for the help they gave me when I needed it and Kuba Wilamowski-Hilchen for his support in a difficult time. I also want to thank very much our archeo-oriental team for our inspiring interdisciplinary work: to Kamil Kuraszkiewicz, Hanna Rubinkowska, Zuza Augustyniak and Ania Klingofer-Szostakowska. Warm thanks go to our librarian, Wiesława Marczuk, and to our accountant, Beata Kryśkiewicz.

My heart goes out for Suren Naicker from UNISA, Pretoria, who has passed away this year because of Covid. Our cognitive-Indological collaboration has been painfully severed, and I still have drafts of our joint articles on my computer.

Thanks to Suren I could spend my time in Pretoria, where – in addition to sharing my research with the scholars of the Department of Linguistics and Modern Languages and other UNISA researchers – I was able to devote myself more easily to research work. There I met people with whom conversations were inspiring and which opened up completely new horizons. Among them I would like to mention Ania Krajewska, who has become one of my closest friends, inspiring me intellectually and spiritually, and also Glynn Meter, one of the wisest and most empathetic woman I have ever met. I still remember breakfast in her garden with Ania Krajewska, and with other living beings, first of all with cats, which made it a magic event like breakfast at the Hatter's. I also remember our talks with Richard Alan Northover about rock art and other mysteries of the human mind.

When it comes to friends and colleagues in Indology, it is impossible to list them all. The conferences, workshops and roundtables in which I participated, both *in situ* and online, during which I not only listened to interesting lectures but also exchanged thoughts and ideas about Indian culture, gave me a lot of food for thought! I would especially like to thank for their inspiration and kindness Shrikant Bahulkar, Greg Bailey, Finnian M. M. Gerety, Silvia d'Intino, Nathan McGovern, Chiara Robbiano, Caley Smith, Philippe Swennen, Michael Witzel, Dominik Wujastyk, Dr. Alex Wynne, Dr. Natalia Yanchevskaya. I would also like to thank my colleagues in the cognitive linguistics field, especially Agnieszka Libura and Jordan Zlatev with whom I could discuss various aspects of application of cognitive methodology to ancient Indian thought. Finally, I am grateful for fascinating talks on psychoanalysis and art to my friends Ewa Modzelewska, Zbyszek Kossowski, Marzenka and Zbyszek Kaimowie, Dorota and Dawid Bienkowsy, and to Anna Czownicka for her help in the finding of Winnicott's book. Intellectual exchange with them all broadened my knowledge and stimulated my thinking. At the same time, I would like to emphasise that all the mistakes and inaccuracies in the book are solely mine but that atmosphere of free discussion, of asking about a given issue or a seeking a source is a soil on which something meaningful can grow.

Great thanks go to Wirginia Raj for teaching me how to breathe and sing.

I am also lucky that I am surrounded by a large group of friends who supported me in various ways while writing the book – they themselves know best how much they contributed to the fact that I could write it at all. I owe them so much... I would like thank wholeheartedly Richard Gombrich for his support, kindness and care, for inspiration and encouragement. My warmest thanks go to Ewa i Piotr Bury, Beata Czarnacka-Chrobot, Michał Goliński, Ewa Jakimowska, Joanna i Marek Kuś, Ania i Darek Michalscy, Kasia Pachniak, Staszek Radzio, Michał Radziwiłł, Iza i Marcin Sękowscy, Ewa Szczerkowska,

Agnieszka Szyszło-Osuch, Asia Szczudłowska and Ewa Woyciechowska. I hope that I will be able to repay, in some way, that same kindness and goodness I have experienced from them.

I thank my daughter, Zosia, for everything – for her energy and joy, for her patience and persistent accompanying me in this long endeavor, although it was not always easy for her. Finally I can change the perennial Present Continuous into Present Perfect and tell you, Zosia, that I have finished the book!

A huge thank goes to Tim Clapham, my language editor. Finding someone who is ready to edit a book on such a niche topic is almost a miracle. Tim has accompanied me from the first volume of my history on the earliest Indian philosophical ideas. He struggled with me on the metaphors of *Ṛgveda* and its self-contradictory, fiery-somic concepts, through the surrealist images of *Atharvaveda*, the bloody cosmogonies of *Śatapathabrāhmaṇa*, the concepts of man identical with God and his liberation of the older Upaniṣads, to finally reach with me the early Smṛti texts. He was unafraid of fragments of Sanskrit texts, so often obscure and even bizarre, he was always ready to understand their meaning and to make suggestions and advice that would allow me to express my thoughts as clearly as possible. Again, I want to emphasise that all mistakes are my responsibility. But Tim's help was invaluable.

And finally, I would like to thank Dr. Pascal Eechout, Dr. Marta Roszkowska and the medical team of the 1st ward of the Provincial Infectious Hospital in Warsaw, especially Dr. Maria Dobrowolska and Iwona Cielniak, under whose care I came out of a serious illness and thanks to whom, recovering in a comfortable hospital bed, I was able to write these acknowledgements.

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ISBN 978-83-8017-311-8



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