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MORIZ WINTERNITZ

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gung zieht Śaṅkara noch Śat. Br. 12, 4, 1, 1 heran, wo das Agnihotra *jarāmaryam* genannt wird mit der Begründung, daß nur Alter oder Tod den Menschen von dieser rituellen Verpflichtung befreie, d. h. nicht etwa das rechte Wissen um den Ātman. Der als Pūrvaṅpakṣin auftretende Mīmāṃsaka hat also damit festgestellt, daß Īśā 2 nur im Sinne des Werkdienstes gemeint sei.

Dagegen hat der Vedāntin als Siddhāntin bei Bādarāyaṇa zwei Argumente: 3, 4, 13 *nāviśeṣāt* und Sū. 14 *stutaye 'numatir vā*. Zwischen beiden besteht ein erheblicher Unterschied. In Sū. 13 wird Īśā 2 als *niyama*, d. h. als den Werkdienst verordnend anerkannt und nur dagegen gesagt, daß diese „Feststellung“ keinen Bezug auf den Ātmankerker nehme. Sie ist also — so können wir Śaṅkara mit Ānandagiri ergänzen — nur für den gedacht, der vom wahren Wesen des Ātman nichts weiß. Das aber ist der Standpunkt, den Śaṅkara auch im Upaniṣadbhāṣya einnimmt, wie wir gesehen haben.

Nach Sū. 14 aber ist der Werkdienst in unserm Upaniṣadverse nur gestattet, um das Wissen in höherem Glanze erscheinen zu lassen. Wenn nämlich wegen des Zusammenhanges (*prakaraṇa*) der Wissende nicht, wie Sū. 13 meint, ignoriert werden kann, dann ist Īśā 2 folgendermaßen zu verstehen: „Kraft des Wissens gereicht dem wissenden Mann, auch wenn er lebenslänglich Werke tut, das Werk nicht zur Befleckung.“

So findet Īśā 2 eine doppelte Deutung: Einmal lehrt der Vers den *Karmamārga*, während V. 1 den *Jñānamārga* vertritt, so daß die beiden Wege hier nebeneinander sichtbar werden wie in dem zitierten Vyāsa-Śuka-saṃvāda. Das ist die Deutung von Br. Sū. 3, 4, 13 und Śaṅkaras im Upaniṣadbhāṣya. Andererseits ist unser Vers nur *vidyā-stutaye* und scheint über das rituelle Werk hinaus auf alles irdische Tun zu gehen. Das ist der Sinn von Sū. 14.

Diese doppelte Deutung zeigt die Zwiespältigkeit gegenüber dem Werk-Wissen-Problem, die in verschiedener Ausformung den Vedānta charakterisiert. Dieser Zwiespalt ist in der praktischen Unmöglichkeit begründet, nur den höchsten und in Wahrheit einzigen Weg der Schau zu lehren. Gauḍapāda hat das unbekümmert um Soziologisches getan — die Gītā, Bādarāyaṇa und Śaṅkara tragen den praktischen Verhältnissen Rechnung.

Das ist, auf kürzeste Weise angedeutet, der große geistesgeschichtliche Zusammenhang, in den die scholastische Deutung des Anfangs der Īśā-Upaniṣad hineingehört und der, von zentraler Wichtigkeit in Indien, schließlich für alle Religionsgeschichte von Belang ist.

Jñāna and vijñāna.

By

FRANKLIN EDGERTON.

Repeatedly in the epic period, and sometimes in later Sanskrit, we meet these two words in close association. This fact is enough to suggest that they were not synonyms, that some difference was felt between them, and certain passages clearly support this view. Thus in Bhagavadgītā 7. 2 and 9. 1 Kṛṣṇa promises to explain to Arjuna *jñāna* along with *vijñāna* (*savijñānam* or *vijñānasakṛitam*). But unfortunately it is hard to find from the texts themselves what the difference was. Both are commonly taken to mean „knowledge“ or „wisdom“. The context seldom, and in the epic never so far as I know, throws any light on the distinction between the two. Both things seem to be regarded as religiously and philosophically important, perhaps equally so. Both help man to his goal. But in what specific ways? We are not told.

An examination of the later Hindu commentators on these and similar passages shows a bewildering variety in their interpretations. See, for instance, HOPKINS' note on Manu 9. 41 (in BURNELL-HOPKINS, translation) for a collection of their guesses. It is obvious that they cannot all be right, and the presumption is raised that in later times the original distinction between the two words or concepts had been forgotten, and that none of the commentators can be relied upon. The same applies to most commentators on the Gītā, including Rāmānuja, who understands *jñāna* as „knowledge“ in general, and *vijñāna* as „discriminatory knowledge“, knowledge of distinctive traits or characteristics of the thing known. This is evidently an attempt to do justice to the prefix *vi-*; it is an etymological interpretation, rather than one based on actual usage (*yoga* rather than *rūḍhi*, as the Mīmāṃsakas say, cf. my Mīmāṃsā Nyāya Prakāśa, p. 10, and text and translation, §§ 98, 229). As such it could be accepted only provisionally, *faute de mieux*, so long as we could find in actual usage no evidence as to the meaning.

This desideratum, a passage in which the context itself makes clear the difference between the two words, has now been found, in

one of the stories of the Vetālapañcaviṃśati. It is the sixth story in Jambhaladatta's and Kṣemendra's versions, the fifth in Somadeva's and Śivadāsa's¹). In it three men are suitors for one girl, who suddenly disappears. Of the three suitors, one excels in *jñāna*, by the exercise of which he discovers that the girl is held captive by an ogre in a certain place. The second possesses *viññāna*, which enables him to construct a magic car whereby they travel thru the air to the place of the girl's captivity. The third is a man of valor (*śūra*); he fights and kills the ogre and rescues the girl. The question then is, which of the three deserves the girl, as having contributed most to her rescue?

In three of the four main versions of the Vetāla collection, namely Jambhaladatta, Somadeva, and Kṣemendra, the story is told in substantially these same terms. In Śivadāsa's version, which is very secondary and inferior here, the properties of the three suitors are not clearly stated; yet in the dénouement (UHLE p. 22, l. 29) the first two are referred to as *jñāni-viññānināu*, thus preserving a clear trace of the original and completing the proof that the Ur-Vetāla must have told the story in this way.

It is evident that as used in this story *jñāna* means knowledge of facts, theoretical knowledge, and *viññāna* knowledge of how to do something, practical or applied knowledge. (TAWNEY in his translation of Somadeva makes the unfortunate guess that *viññāna* means „magic power“. As we shall presently see, this is much too restricted.) The possessors of the two differ much as the closet scholar differs from the applied scientist; roughly, as a professor of mathematics differs from an engineer, or a professor of chemistry from a commercial chemist. The two need not be as completely divorced as is represented in the Vetāla story. It is possible and desirable to possess both, as the Gītā makes clear. Indeed, the ideal man must possess both; he must not only know the truth abstractly, but also be able to apply his knowledge in a practically useful and effective way. But the difference between them is perfectly clear. Their use together in one passage is not tautological; those translators who render them by such vague,

¹ Kṣemendra's Brhat Kathā Mañjarī, Kāvya-mālā ed., 9. 2. 339 ff.; Somadeva's Kathā Sarit Sāgara 79 (12. 12); Śivadāsa's Vet., UHLE's ed., story 5. For Jambhaladatta I have used the doctoral dissertation of my friend and pupil, Dr. Murray B. EMENEAU, of Yale University, an edition and translation of Jambhaladatta's recension of the Vetālapañcaviṃśati. This dissertation was accepted in 1931, but has unfortunately not yet been published. It was from Dr. EMENEAU's excellent work that I learned of the true interpretation of these words.

indefinite terms as „knowledge“ and „wisdom“ do not understand them.

As we have seen, the extant versions of the Vetāla make it certain that the original of this work, to which they all go back, must have used the two words in this way. Unfortunately the date of this lost original is quite unknown, except that it must be older than Somadeva and Kṣemendra (eleventh century). We have already seen that the tradition about the true meaning of the words in question was lost by the time of Rāmānuja, and that later commentators do not understand them. I think it can be proved, however, that the great Śaṅkara, in his commentary on the Bhagavadgītā, understood them correctly, tho his words on the subject have been generally misunderstood in modern times. If my interpretation of Śaṅkara is correct, this would be very important; for Śaṅkara, who is usually dated in the 8th or 9th century (see WINTERNITZ, Gesch. d. ind. Lit. 3. 434), is undoubtedly older than any other known commentator on the Gītā or the epics generally, or on Manu. His is therefore the oldest interpretation of these words which we possess.

Śaṅkara, in commenting on Gītā 3. 41, says: *jñānaṃ śāstrata ācāryataś cātmaḍīnām avabodhah, viññānaṃ viśeṣatas tadanubhavaḥ*. That is, „*jñāna* is the realization of the self and other (truths) from (literary) authorities and teachers, *viññāna* is the experiencing of that (knowledge) in specific instances“. On Gītā 6. 8 he says: *jñānaṃ śāstrak-tapadārthānāṃ pariññānam, viññānaṃ tu śāstrato jñātānāṃ tathaiḥ svānubhavakaraṇam, . . .* but *viññāna* is the making of things known from science part of one's own experience in the same way (as taught)“, i. e. their application in practice. So *saviññānam* in Gītā 7. 2 is rendered *svānubhavasamyuktam*, and *viññānasahitam* in 9. 1 by *anubhava-yuktam*; here the subcommentator Ānandagiri remarks, *viññānam anubhavaḥ śakṣātkāras tena sahitam ity arthah*; that is, *viññāna* is experiencing, realization, or application. On Gītā 18. 42 Śaṅkara makes no comment, but Ānandagiri says *jñānaṃ śāstrīyapadārthajñānam, viññānaṃ śāstrārthasya svānubhavāyattatvāpādanam, . . . viññāna* is the bringing of the objects of scientific knowledge into relation with one's own experience.“

The interpretation of *jñāna* and *viññāna* given by TELANG and GARBE (on Gītā 3. 41) seems to be based on a misunderstanding of Śaṅkara. TELANG's note says: „Knowledge (*jñāna*) is from books or teachers, experience (*viññāna*) is the result of personal perception“. And GARBE's note says *jñāna* is „die Erkenntnis der philosophischen

Wahrheit“, and *viññāna* „das durch die eigene Erfahrung erworbene Wissen“. Likewise DEUSSEN on *Gītā* 3. 41 renders „Erkenntnis“ and „Lebenserfahrung“, but in later passages (6. 8, 7. 2, 9. 1) he renders *viññāna* simply „Wissen“, which abandons any real attempt at a differentiation. Most *Gītā* translators, like DEUSSEN, use vague synonyms for the two words.

It seems to me that TELANG and GARBE failed to understand what Śaṅkara meant by his use of *anubhava*, which is the key-word in his interpretation of *viññāna*. They took it that he meant knowledge gained from experience (*anubhava*). But what he really meant is rather the application of (theoretical) knowledge to experience in life, the putting of it into practical effect. This is clear enough when one compares Śaṅkara's words with the Vetāla story referred to above. It is confirmed by Ānandagiri on *Gītā* 9. 1 and especially on 18. 42 (quoted above), where matters of scientific knowledge (*śāstrārtha*), the objects of *jñāna* as stated just before, and not any knowledge of different origin, are applied to one's own experience by *viññāna*. And Śaṅkara himself, on 3. 41 (see above), in explaining *viññāna* by *tadanubhavaḥ*, clearly refers back (with *tad-*) to the knowledge (*jñāna*) derived from authorities, and cannot have meant that *viññāna* was derived from any other source, such as „experience“. It is not the source of knowledge which is different in the two cases, as TELANG and GARBE assume. Rather, *jñāna* is abstract, unapplied knowledge; *viññāna* is applied, practical knowledge.

BÖHTLINGK in the Petersburg Lexicon states that *jñāna* means „die Erkenntnis der höheren Wahrheiten auf dem Gebiete der Religion und Philosophie“, and *viññāna* „profanes Wissen“. This seems to be based on certain commentators on *Manu* 9. 41 (see note in BURNELL-HOPKINS, quoted above). After what has been said it is hardly necessary to spend more time in refuting it; but it may be noted that, according to HOPKINS, at least one commentator on this *Manu* passage (Nandanācārya) interprets the words in precisely the opposite way (*jñāna* is „worldly knowledge“). Other late commentators on the two words seem to have had ideas similar to Nandanācārya's, and contrary to BÖHTLINGK's. It is not worth while to quote them, however; for I trust it will now be evident that all attempts to distinguish the two words on such grounds as these are quite off the track.

Hemacandra's *Abhidhānacintāmaṇi* is quoted by BR. s. v. as defining *viññāna* by *śilpa*, *kalā*. This supports my understanding of the word.

What is Ananyatvam?

By

M. HIRIYANNA.

The first Pāda of the second chapter of Bādarāyaṇa's Vedānta-sūtra is of particular interest to the modern student of philosophy, for it sets forth the rational basis for the teaching of the Vedānta¹). One of the important topics discussed there is the nature of the relation between Brahman and the world. This relation is described as *ananyatvam* (Sūtra 14) which Śaṅkara explains as *vyatirekeṇa abhāvah* or 'non-existence apart from'. It means that the world has no being apart from Brahman; or, if the same be stated in a generalised form, that the effect does not exist apart from its material cause. The explanation by itself is not quite clear; but we know what exactly Śaṅkara means by it, not only from our knowledge of his doctrine in general, but also from his commentary on the remaining part of the Sūtra in question. He means that the relation is not real, because the world is only a phenomenal appearance of Brahman, not an actual emanation from it. The object of this paper is to find out whether this is the only implication of the term *ananyatvam* or whether there may be any other for which the support of early Sanskrit usage can be quoted.

The word *ananyatvam* is very old in the language and is found used even in Vedic literature²). But we need not go so far back, especially as the determination of the precise significance of Vedic words is not always easy. It will do for us to select some early writer who uses it in a sense which is quite unambiguous. Such a writer we find in Kātyāyana, the well-known annotator of Pāṇini. He seems besides — to judge from the first of his Vārttikas — to have been more than a grammarian and to have had his own world-view. In his work, the word occurs more than once³). It is used, for example, in his Vārttikas

¹) Strictly, this statement applies only to Sūtras 4—37, the first three being concerned with the relation of Vedānta to the teaching of the several Smṛtis. See Śaṅkara's comm.

²) Cf.: *ananyaprokṭe gatiratra nāsti*. Kaṭha-Up. I. ii. 8.

³) See e. g. I. i. 39, 2; 56, 10.