On Jun 8, 2024, at 10:10 PM, Shrinivasa Varakhedi <shrivara@gmail.com> wrote:Dear AllThis is very pertinent question in the context of verification process of truthfulness of knowledge. Infinite regress or anavasthaa is a problem for all philosophers for which Nyaya also tries to find an answer. In fact it is a very serious problem in Nyaya. In order resolve this Nyaya school considers two step higher order in knowledge. As per this agreement, a cognitive event could be grasped only if it is desired so at secondary level. First level cognition is cognised by second one but second one need not be compulsorily cognised. Therefore no need of another cognition which will lead to Anavastha otherwise.Prof.Shrinivasa VarakhediOn Fri, 7 Jun 2024 at 7:18 AM, Howard Resnick via INDOLOGY <indology@list.indology.info> wrote:Andrea Lorene Gutierrez kindly pointed out to me that ‘atiprasṅga’, a synonym of anavasthā, is found in Yoga-sūtra 4.21
cittāntara-dṛśye buddhi-buddher atiprasaṅgaḥ smṛti-saṅkaraś ca
Best,
Howard
> On Jun 6, 2024, at 2:42 AM, Brendan S. Gillon, Prof. via INDOLOGY <indology@list.indology.info> wrote:
>
> Dear colleagues,
>
> I am travelling now and so cannot check this, however, I have a note to
> the effect that `anavasthaa' is mentioned as a fault in Pata~njali's
> Mahaabhaa.sya to A 2.1.1. My source is Esther Solomon's Indian
> Dialectics 1976 p. 29. (I failed to note whether the page is in the
> first volume or in the second.)
>
> Best wishes,
> Brendan
>
>
> On 2024-06-04 06:18, Franco via INDOLOGY wrote:
>> Dear Howard,
>> The earliest surviving example is probably in the Vigrahavyavartani, where the possibility of pramanas being proved by other pramanas is rejected because this would lead to an infinite regress. Most scholars think that Nagarjuna argues there agains the Nyaya, but I take the opponent to be an Abhidharmika.
>> Best wishes,
>> Eli
>>
>> Sent from my iPad
>>
>>> On 04.06.2024, at 11:05, Howard Resnick via INDOLOGY <indology@list.indology.info> wrote:
>>>
>>> Dear Scholars,
>>>
>>> Does the nyāya system speak about the problem of an infinite regress of proofs? Aristotle famously identifies and then avoids this problem through the notion of a self-evident foundation or starting point of knowledge. In Western epistemology, this strategy is often called foundationalism.
>>>
>>> Is there anything at all similar or analagous in nyāya or other Indian schools? The Caitanya-caritāmṛta several times affirms that the Veda is ’self-evident’, svataḥ pramāṇa, but the term is not used there as a general or secular epistemic strategy. Is the CC simply repeating a well-known epistemic principle?
>>>
>>> All help will be greatly appreciated.
>>>
>>> Thanks!
>>> Howard
>>>
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>
> --
>
> Brendan S. Gillon email: brendan.gillon@mcgill.ca
> Department of Linguistics
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