Dear Madhav,

I don’t think that Śāntideva supports a true anavasthā argument. One might say that, for him, the buck stops with Buddha….

best,

Matthew 

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On Sat, Jun 8, 2024 at 20:56, Madhav Deshpande via INDOLOGY <indology@list.indology.info> wrote:

Dear Howard,

Glad to remind you of your teacher, Professor Scharfe. As his book is in German, it has not drawn as much attention in the Anglophone world.

Itaretarāśraya is like a chicken and egg argument. Apratiṣṭhāna, as brought up in the Brahmasūtra [tarkāpratiṣṭhānād anyathānumeyam iti ced evam api avimokṣaprasaṅgaḥ] says that all Tarka is apratiṣṭhita, and hence even if we bring up a superior Tarka, that superior Tarka can be shown to be faulty by an even more superior Tarka. Thus, there is a resulting Avimokṣa "no final solution." In an interesting way, this argument reminds me of a line from Śāntideva's Bodhicaryāvatāra "bādhyante dhīviśeṣeṇa yogino 'py uttarottaraiḥ" [this attribution is from my aging memory]. Here the argument is that any Yogic experience can be superseded by a higher level Yogic experience. This is also a sort of Anavasthā.

Many systems have placed arbitrary limits to avoid Anavasthā. For example, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśrṣikas, there is a relationship of Saṃyoga between the monkey and the branch upon which the monkey is sitting. Now the Saṃyoga as a Guṇa relates to the monkey with the relation of Samavāya, and the same Saṃyoga relates to the branch with another Samavāya. Fine, but then what relation would connect the Samavāya to Saṃyoga? Does this need another Samavāya? So there is an interesting regresso ad infinitum situation. But the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas say that no further relation is needed to connect a Samavāya to Saṃyoga. But this is quite arbitrary.

Thanks for bringing up this topic. Best wishes,

Madhav

Madhav M. Deshpande

Professor Emeritus, Sanskrit and Linguistics

University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, USAg

Senior Fellow, Oxford Center for Hindu Studies

Adjunct Professor, National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore, India

[Residence: Campbell, California, USA]

On Sat, Jun 8, 2024 at 9:03 AM Howard Resnick <hr@ivs.edu> wrote:

Thank you Madhav for this information, and thank you for bringing to mind my first and much appreciated Sanskrit professor, Hartmut Scharfe, whom I studied with as an undergraduate at UCLA.

Regarding itaretarāśṛaya, often taken to mean ‘mutual dependence’, can this be seen as an indirect or oblique indication of infinite regress, by way of an apratiṣṭhāna, foundationless, situation?

Thanks and best wishes!

Howard

On Jun 8, 2024, at 11:07 AM, Madhav Deshpande <mmdesh@umich.edu> wrote:

Another source for discussions of topics like Anavasthā and Itaretarāśraya may be Hartmut Scharfe's book: "Die Logik im Mahābhaāṣya," Berlin 1961.

Madhav M. Deshpande

Professor Emeritus, Sanskrit and Linguistics

University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA

Senior Fellow, Oxford Center for Hindu Studies

Adjunct Professor, National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore, India

[Residence: Campbell, California, USA]

On Sat, Jun 8, 2024 at 6:47 AM Howard Resnick via INDOLOGY <indology@list.indology.info> wrote:

Thank you Philipp. Very helpful.

All the best,

Howard

On Jun 8, 2024, at 3:00 AM, Philipp Maas via INDOLOGY <indology@list.indology.info> wrote:

Dear Howard,
On anavasthā and related terms in various systems of thought, see also Oberhammer, G. (1991). Terminologie der frühen indischen Scholastik in Indien. Vol. 1. A-I. Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, p. 32f.

Best wishes,

Philipp

__________________________

Prof. Dr. Philipp A. Maas

Professor for Modern Indology

Institute of Indology and Tibetology

Ludwig-Maximilians-University Munich

___________________________

https://spp1448.academia.edu/PhilippMaas

Am Di., 4. Juni 2024 um 11:05 Uhr schrieb Howard Resnick via INDOLOGY <indology@list.indology.info>:

Dear Scholars,

Does the nyāya system speak about the problem of an infinite regress of proofs? Aristotle famously identifies and then avoids this problem through the notion of a self-evident foundation or starting point of knowledge. In Western epistemology, this strategy is often called foundationalism.

Is there anything at all similar or analagous in nyāya or other Indian schools? The Caitanya-caritāmṛta several times affirms that the Veda is ’self-evident’, svataḥ pramāṇa, but the term is not used there as a general or secular epistemic strategy. Is the CC simply repeating a well-known epistemic principle?

All help will be greatly appreciated.

Thanks!
Howard

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