

Sanskrit Double-Object Constructions

Will the Real Object Please Stand Up?^{1,2}

1. Sanskrit ditransitive constructions of the type exemplified in (A)-(K), i.e. with two independent, non-coreferential 'objects', have on several occasions aroused the interest of linguists — as well as caused them a considerable amount of vexation. Both interest and vexation stem from the fact that no matter what their grammatical framework, people are inclined to believe that just as sentences can only have one subject (as a category), so they are limited to no more than one direct object (as a category). The Sanskrit constructions however seem to call for two distinct direct objects.

(A) LEAD **rakṣaḥ adhamam tamaḥ** nayāmi (AV 9.2.17)

A A act.

'I lead the rakshas to lowest darkness'

(B) SPEAK **yad** u bravaḥ ... **nṛn** (RV 10.10.6)

A act. A

'what will you say to the men?'

(C) ASK **pṛchāmi tvā param antam pṛthivyāḥ**

act. A A

(RV 1.164.34)

'I ask you about the far end of the earth'

(D) REQUEST **va śām** ced **enam** yāceyuḥ (AV 12.4.48)

A A act.

'if they should request the cow from him'

(E) BEG **mātaram** ... bhikṣeta **bhikṣām** (M 2.50)

A act. A

'he should beg alms from his mother'

(F) MILK duduhre **payah** ... **ṛṣiṁ** (RV 9.54.1)

act. A A

'they milked the milk from the sage'

(G) WIN **devān** asurāḥ **yajñam** ajayan (MS 1.9.8)

A A act.

'the asuras won the sacrifice from the gods'

(H) ROB yad amuṣṣṇīta ... **pañim gāḥ** (RV 1.93.4)

act. A A

'when you robbed the cows from the niggard'

(I) PUNISH **tān sahasram** daṇḍayet (M 9.234)

A A act.

'he should fine/punish them (by) a thousand'

(J) CAUSATIVE

yatkimcidapi ... dāpayet vyavahāreṇa **jīvantam**

A act A

(M 7.137)

'he should make the one living from commerce give something small'

guruḥ **śiṣyam** śikṣayet **śaucam** (M 2.69)

A act. A

'the guru should teach his pupil purity'

devān ... pāyaya **haviḥ** (RV 2.37.6)

A act. A

'make the gods drink the oblation'

(K) CAUS. of GO

parām eva parāvataṁ sapatnīm gamayāmasi (RV 2.37.6)

A A act.

'we make the co-wife go to the far distance'

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Constructions of this sort are found mainly with verbs meaning 'LEAD' or 'convey' (A), 'SPEAK' or other verbs of oral communication (B), 'ASK' (C), 'REQUEST' or 'entreat' (D),

'BEG' (E), 'MILK' (F), 'WIN' or 'defeat/conquer' (G), 'ROB' (H), 'PUNISH' (I), as well as with CAUSATIVES (J), including CAUSATIVES of GO and other motion verbs (K).

2. At the same time, however, not all verbs having these or related meanings have ditransitive constructions. Thus *kath-* 'speak' only has the dative (or oblique) of the addressee, as in (1). Similarly, *hr-* in the meaning 'take' has the ablative, not the accusative, of the person from whom something is taken, as in (2).

(1) *kāthaya me kathām* (Kathās. 6.5)

act. obl. A

'tell me the story'

(2) *kāṣṭhikebhyaḥ kāṣṭham āharam* (Kathās. 6.44)

Ab. A act.

'I took the wood from the wood-cutters'

3. Moreover, for most of the verbs which do take ditransitive constructions, alternative structures are possible; cf. (A')-(K') below.

(A') *amā sate vahasī bhūri vāmam* (RV 1.124.12)

D act. A

'you carry much treasure to the one who is at home'

(B') *tad ... mahyam āhuḥ* (RV 1.24.12)

A D act.

'that they say to me'

(C') (a) *kam nu pṛcchāmi ... tvadarthe* (MBh. 3.2428)

A act. -arthe 'on account of'

'whom now shall I ask about you?'

(also with A + *pratiḥadhi-kṛtya*, or with L of thing inquired about)

(b) *papraccha anāmayam ... tavoḥ* (MBh. 3.2118)

act. A G

'he asked them (?) about their well-being'

(D') (a) **tam saḥ yācate gamanam prati** (Rām. 2.29.21)

A act. 'about g.'

'he entreats him to come'

(b) **rudrād eva paśūn niryācya** (TS 5.1.2.3-4)

Ab. A 'act.'

'having asked for the cattle from Rudra'

(E') na ... **dhanam sūdrād** ... bhikṣeta (M 11.24)

A Ab. act.

'he should not beg from a Śūdra'

(F') (a) **sarvān kāmān ... saṁvatsarād** duhre (KS 33.5)

A Ab 'act.'

'they milked all desires from the year'

(b) **divaḥ pīyūṣam** duhate (RV 9.85.9)

G A 'act.'

'they milk the cream of/from(?) the sky'

(G') **etasmād vai āvatanād** devāḥ **asurān** ajayan

Ab A act.

(TS 2.2.6.1)

'the gods deprived the asuras of that abode'

(H') ayam **svasya pituḥ āyudhāni** ... amuṣṇāt (RV 6.44.22)

G A act.

this one robbed the weapons of/from(?) his father'

(J') **varuṇena** eva **bhrātrvyam** grāṇayitvā (TS 2.1.8.2)

I A 'act.'

'having caused his enemy to be seized by V.'

(K') (a) net **śirasā śiraḥ** abhyārohayāṇi (ŚB 12.2.2.50)

I A act.

'lest I make one head go on top of (another) head'

(b) **sūryam divi** rohayantaḥ (RV 10.65.11)

A L act.

'making the sun ascend to heaven'

This variation in case use, summarized in Table I, likewise has aroused interest (and vexation) — and conflicting interpretations among different linguists.

	Addressee/Goal/Source/Causee	Other 'Object'	
(A) LEAD		A, D, (L)	A
(B) SPEAK		A, D	A
(C) ASK	A, (G?)	A, - <i>arthe</i> , <i>prati</i> etc.	
(D) ENTREAT	A, Ab.	A, - <i>arthe</i> , <i>prati</i> etc.	
(E) BEG		A, Ab.	A
(F) MILK		A, Ab., (G?)	A
(G) WIN		A, (G?)	A
(H) ROB		A, (G?)	A
(I)	PUNISH	A	A
(J) CAUSATIVE		A, I	A
(K) CAUS. of GO		A, IA.L.D	

Table I: Case variation with ditransitives

4. Finally, to complicate things even more, when both 'objects' of these ditransitives are specified, only one of these can become the (surface) subject of a passive(-like) construction; cf. (A'')-(K''). The constituent which thus can become the subject in each respective construction is marked by underlining in Table I.

(A'') **sah** prācyam nīyase **janam** (AV 5.4.8)

N pass. A

'you are led east to the people'

(B'') **vijayam** uktaḥ taiḥ (Kathās. 18.247)

A N, pass.

'informed about the victory'

(C'') tā u **kavitvanā kavi** pṛchyamānā (RV 8.40.3)

A N pass.

'these two kavis, being asked about their wisdom'

(D'') **vaśām** indreṇa yācitaḥ (AV 12.4.50)

A N, pass.

'asked by Indra for the cow'

(E'') bhikṣitaḥ **vikramān etān trīn** (Bhaṭṭik. 6.9)

N,pass. A

'asked for these three steps'

(F'') tena **iyam gauḥ** ... dugdhā **śasvāni** (Hariv. 79)

N pass. A

'by him this cow was milked produce'

(G'') jitaḥ **rājyam vasūni ca** (Nala 13.23)

N,pass. A

'deprived of his kingdom and possessions'

(H'') **parṇā** muṣitā **vanāni** (RV 10.68.10)

N N,pass. A

'trees deprived of their leaves'

(I'') **sahasram** daṇḍyaḥ (M 8.120)

A N,pass.

'he is to be fined a thousand'

(J'') (a) **sa** rājñā **taccaturbhāgam** dāpyas (M 8.176)

N A pass.

'he is to be made to give one fourth of that by the king'

(b) **agnyupasthānam** vācayitavyaḥ (MS 1.6.10)

A N,pass.

'he is to be made to recite the agnyupasthāna'

(K'') **koṭaram** ... gamite (Mālav. 4.2c/d')

A N,pass.

'the two have been caused to go (in) to the hollow of a tree'

5. The most recent attempt to account for the syntactic behavior and relationships of these constructions seems to be that of Ostler (1979), who in fact proposed two different

analyses. Under both of these, there is just one underlying object in the above constructions, the other accusative NP being assigned a different underlying status.

According to the analysis preferred by him on general grounds, that of 'Case-Linking', one of the two accusative NPs receives case on account of a feature [+ same case]. However, as he himself admits, this approach does not seem to make it possible to predict 'which argument will be the one to be selected, given an arbitrary ditransitive, for promotion to the subject in the passive ... (In advance of making a particular entry in the L(inking) S(pecifications) of the L(exical) E(ntry) of the verb concerned, [our theory] does not predict which the privileged accusative should be.' Moreover, Ostler noted that if the second accusative does indeed receive its case through linking with the accusative of the underlying object, then it is disturbing that it 'retains this case in the passive', even though the other NP does not have an accusative to which the linking could be made. (407).

6. Ostler's alternative, Relational approach at first appears more promising. Under this analysis, structures of the type (B) and (F) can be accounted for as follows: Given the case variation in (3) below, we can claim that the constituents on the right side represent the underlying structures and that the left-side formations are derived through (optional) advancement of the (underlined) non-terms to derived-object status. This advancement, in combination with a general constraint causes the original direct object to lose its status, becoming a *chômeur*. And this, in turn, accounts for the fact that in such ditransitive structures, only the advanced object can be promoted to subject in the passive; cf. (4).

- (3) **gām** payaḥ dogdhi **goḥ** payaḥ dogdhi
 A A act. Ab A act.
 'he milks milk from the cow'
- mānavakam** dharmam brūte **mānavakāya** dharmam brūte
 A A act.' D A 'act.'
 'he tells the boy (his) duty'
- (4) gauḥ payaḥ duhyate *gām payaḥ duhyate

N A pass. A N pass.
 'the cow is milked for milk'
 etc.

This relational approach could easily be extended to the causatives (which Ostler did not consider), since the accusative-marked causee is a demoted underlying subject which can be considered to push the underlying object into *chômage*.

7. Unfortunately, however, case variation is not a reliable guide as to which accusative NP will become the subject of the passive. As Table I shows, at least for the verb ENTREAT (D), both 'objects' have case variation, but only one of them is promotable in the passive. Moreover, non-alternating 'objects' may be promoted (I). In fact, also (C) ASK and (H) ROB belong here. For there is good reason to believe that the genitive NPs in constructions like (C'b), (F'b), (G'), and (H') are adnominal, possessive genitives, i.e., that they have a very different status from the non-adnominal, syntactically motivated ablative, locative, etc. of the other case variants. Thus for the verb *duh-* 'milk', we find constructions like those in (5), in which only a possessive reading of the genitive is possible.

- (5)(a) $\underset{\text{G}}{\text{prśnyāḥ}}$ $\underset{\text{A}}{\text{yad ūdhar}}$... duhuḥ
 (RV2.34.10)
 'when they milked (s.th.) *from* the udder *of* Pṛśni'
- (b) $\underset{\text{A}}{\text{vṛṣabham}}$... $\underset{\text{A}}{\text{śukram}}$ $\underset{\text{G}}{\text{payaḥ asya dukṣata}}$
 (RV 1.160.3)
 'they have milked the bull₁ for *his*₁ light milk.'

Finally, non-promotable 'objects' may show case variation; cf. (A), (C), (D), (G), and (K).

This difficulty can be reduced somewhat by noting that in (A) and (K) it is the *goal* of a transitive motion verb — whether inherently transitive (as in (A)) or 'transitivized' (as in (K)) — which fails to be promotable to subject. As it turns out, this failure seems to be

categorical, even if — as may happen — the other 'object' is not specified; that is, structures as in (6) and (7) do not seem to be grammatical. And this, in turn, seems to be connected with the fact that with 'non-transitive' verbs of motion, the accusative-marked goal only optionally becomes the subject of the passive; cf. (8). That is, it appears that such goals are underlyingly non-objects and can (optionally) become objects only with non-transitive verbs of motion. (Cf. Ostler's similar arguments.)

(6) ***grāmaḥ** nīyate

N pass.

'the village is being led to'

(grammatical only in the meaning 'the village (people) is being led (somewhere)')

(7) ***grāmaḥ** gamitaḥ

N pass.

'the village has been made to be gone to'

(grammatical if the village is the causee)

(8) **janaḥ** gantavyaḥ (MS 1.6.12)

N pass.

beside

sabhām vā na praveṣṭavyam (M 8.13)

A fem. pass.neut.

'to the assembly should not be entered'

Even with this modification, however, the Relational approach does not satisfactorily account for the Sanskrit facts.³

8. An earlier approach, by Speijer (1886 and 1896), accounts for the relation (in non-causative constructions) between accusative NPs and NPs marked by other cases in terms which are just about diametrically opposed to Ostler's Relational analysis, albeit in a quasi-historical perspective: 'Upon the whole, the construction with a double object appears to be the remnant of an old vegetation, which has almost passed away to be succeeded by new stalks and young stems' (1886:35,n.1); and these 'new stalks and young stems' are the

alternative, non-accusative case markings which according to Speijer are frequently used to *avoid* the double-accusative construction and its passive. In his view, the ditransitive construction is most regular with *prach-* 'ask' and with two verbs meaning teach (*anuśās-* and *adhyāpi-*) but is never found with certain other verbs such as *sikṣi-* 'teach'.

Speijer's analysis is questionable on several counts: First of all, the causative *śikṣ-* 'learn' which is used in the meaning 'teach' seems to be quite regularly found in ditransitive constructions; cf. the second example under (K). Secondly, for most of the verbs used in illustrations (A)-(K), the ditransitive construction appears to be the most usual, especially in the later language. It is rather in the early language that alternative case markings are preferred for some of these verbs. This is most strikingly the case for SPEAK which, as Hopkins (1907) has shown, almost always uses the dative to mark the addressee in the early language, but the accusative in the later language. (The accusative may well be an innovation modeled on the inherited accusative of the addressee used with ASK.) Moreover, the verb used to exemplify type (I) and its syntactic construction seem to be a post-Vedic innovation. If anything, then, the ditransitive construction is becoming more vigorous in the history of the Sanskrit language.

9. In some ways perhaps the most satisfactory Western account for the non-causative ditransitives seems to be that of Gaedicke (1880), even though he already adumbrates Speijer's later diachronic claims. As Gaedicke correctly noted, for the verbs of the types (C)-(H), there are besides the ditransitive constructions fully grammatical structures containing one — or the other — of the two objects alone, as in (9) (exemplifying type (C)) and (10) (for type (G)).

- (9) (a) *pr̥chāmi ... nihitā padāni* (RV 1.164.5)
'I ask about the foot-tracks left behind'
(b) *pr̥ṣṭaḥ divi pr̥ṣṭaḥ agniḥ pṛthivyām* (RV 1.98.2)
'asked for in heaven, asked for on earth, Agni ...'
(c) *tam pṛchatā* (RV 1.145.1)

'ask him'

(d) ṛtam voce ... pṛchyamānaḥ (RV 3.4.11)

'I say the truth, being asked'

(10) (a) jītvā tu adya damayantīm (Nala 26.15)

'but having won Damayantī.

(b) sarvam anyad jitam mayā (Nala 9.3)

'everything else has been won by me'

(c) jītvā ca puṣkaram (Nala 26.20)

'and having defeated Puṣkara'

(d) saḥvai dyūte jitaḥ (Nala 17.3)

'he has been defeated in the game'

Gaedicke therefore proposed to see in the constructions of the type (C)-(H) syntactic blends of these coexisting transitive structures, such that both accusative NPs are genuine direct objects. Thus structures like (K), here reproduced as (11), are analysable as having the combined meaning of (11a) and (11b).

(11) devāḥ asurān yajñam ajayan

'the gods won the sacrifice from the asuras'

(a) devāḥ asurān ajayan

'the gods defeated the asuras'

(b) devāḥ yajñam ajayan

'the gods won the sacrifice'

For the type SPEAK (B), to be sure, he advanced a different and less insightful account — a description rather than an explanation —, namely that here the two NPs are related to each other via the verb. Note however that once accusative marking can be used for the addressee of verbs of speaking, it is possible to get constructions comparable to those in (9) and (10); cf. (12). (Note however that structures like (12b) most commonly are accompanied by a direct quote.)

(12)(a) kaḥ arhati ... sarvam satyam vaditum (AB 1.6.7)

'who may tell all the truth?'

(b) mām evam vadatu (Kathās. 18.272)

'let him speak thus to me'

Only for the type (I) PUNISH have I not been able to find examples with only the object of the fine specified. However, there is no reason to doubt the grammaticality of the two constructions under (13). It is therefore possible to derive structures such as (14a) from constructions of the type (14b).

(13)(a) tān daṇḍayet

'he should punish them'

(b) daṇḍam daṇḍayet

'he should exact a punishment'

(14)(a) tān sahasram daṇḍayet

'he should punish them by 1000'

(b) tān sahasramayam daṇḍam daṇḍayet

'he should exact a punishment of 1000'

10. Gaedicke's analysis of our constructions as having two genuine direct objects can be further supported with the evidence of nominalizations. As a general principle of Sanskrit syntax, only underlying subjects and direct objects change their case to genitive with nominalizations; other constituents retain their case; cf. e.g. (15)-(16) vs. (17)-(19), (Subjects alternatively take the instrumental but that is of no relevance here.)

(15) patnyāḥ eva eṣaḥ **yajñasya** anvārambhaḥ (KS 14.8)

G of S

G of O

'this is the holding-on-to of the sacrifice by the wife'

(16) ekaḥ **tvastuḥ** aśvasya viśastā (RV 1.162.19)

G of O

'one is the cutter-up of Tvaṣṭr's horse'

(17) samam abrāhmaṇe dānam (M 7.85)

'a giving to a non-brahmin (yields) the ordinary (merit)'

(18) śiṣoḥ niṣkramaṇam ḡhāt (M 2.34)

(G of S) Ab

'the child's stepping out of the house'

(19) abrāhmnāt adhyahanam (M 2.241)

Ab

'the learning from a non-brahmin'

As it turns out, with nominalizations of double-object verbs, either of the two objects appears in the genitive case; cf. e.g. (20) and (21), with class (F) and (G) verbs respectively. Moreover, although examples are rare, there is evidence that at least with nominalizations of causatives (class (J)), both objects take the genitive; cf. (22). To this we can add the testimony of the grammarians who, however, seem to permit retention of the accusative of the less agentive object as an alternative; cf. (23). (A possible explanation of this alternative, unchanged accusative marking might be that, like the alternative instrumental marking of the subject NP, it serves to avoid the potential for ambiguity between subjective genitive and two coexisting objective genitives.⁴)

(20)(a) **yajñasya** dohaḥ (V 8.62)

G of O

'the milking of the sacrifice (as of a cow)'

(b) **āśiṣām** eva eṣaḥ dohaḥ (KS 21.8)

G of O

'this is the milking of the blessings'

(21)(a) upāyena jayaḥ yādṛk **ripoh** tāvat na hetibhiḥ (Pañc. 212)

G of O

'victory of/over an enemy is not as (easy) by means of

(b) **ādityasya** jayaḥ (Chānd. U. 2.10.6)

G of O

'the winning of the sun'

(22) mantravat prāśanam ca asya **hirānyamadhusarpiṣām**

Causee

(M 2.29)

'and the causing-to-eat of him (causee) of gold, honey, and ghee
(is to be) accompanied with mantras'

(23) atha iha katham bhavitavyam/**netā aśvasya srughnam** iti

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G of O

ahosvit **netā aśvasya srughnasya** iti/ ubhayathā

G of O

goṇikāputraḥ

(Patañjali ad Pāṇini 1.4.51, in fine)

'Now here how should it be? *netā aśvasya srughnam* or *netā aśvasya srughnasya* ("the leader of the horse to Srughna")? Either way (is possible according to) Goṇikāputra.'

11. Also in respect to the passive of these ditransitive constructions Gaedicke proposed the most satisfactory explanation (an explanation accepted also by Speijer and Delbrück): The object which gets promoted is the 'personal' one, i.e. the one which refers to a person rather than a thing. The only modification needed in light of the evidence of constructions like (A'')-(I'') is that the promoted object need not be 'personal', but must simply be more 'agentive' than the other object. Thus in (F'') the promoted object, *gauḥ* 'cow' is not a person, but compared to its milk it is relatively 'agentive'; and in (H''), both the trees and the leaves are non-'personal', but the trees are more 'agentive' (and thus capable of being robbed).

12. None of the linguists whose views so far have been discussed has included in the discussion of ditransitives the causative constructions given under (J) and (K) — at least not in a systematic fashion — although in their behavior, these constructions are very similar to the ditransitives, permitting only one of the two 'objects' (if both are specified) to be promoted to subject. Speijer (1886), to be sure, does address the fact that such a

restriction exists for the causatives, by noting that where both causee and underlying object are specified, it is the causee, not the underlying object, which is promoted. I myself (1981), building on Speijer and on my own research, have speculated that this difference in promotability may be the result of the causee's retaining some of its subject properties. However, as far as I can see now, there is no independent evidence to that effect: subject-sensitive phenomena such as word order, absolutive formation, and reflexivization all seem to treat the causee as a non-subject. I would now argue that it is rather the relative 'agentiveness' of the causee which favors its promotion over other accusative NPs.

13. It is by giving a *general* account for the syntactic behavior of ditransitive and causative constructions that the Sanskrit grammarians contribute significantly to the discussion of these constructions. They do so by defining as *karman* both of the objects of ditransitives, as well as the accusative-marked causee and the underlying object(s) of the causative. Pāṇini's relevant sūtras are given in (24).

(24)(a) kartur īpsitatamam karma/**tathāyuktam anīpsitam** ca (1.4.49-50)

'that which is most desired by the agent is *karman*: and also that which is not desired (but) linked (to the action) in the same way'

(b) akathitam ca (1.4.51)

'also what (is linked in the same way and) has not been as yet specified'

(c) gatibuddhipratyavasānārthaśabdakarmākarmakānām aṇikartā sa nau/hṛkror anyatarasyām (1.4.52-3)

'also the non-causative agent in the causative of roots meaning 'go', 'understand (etc.)', 'consume', 'communicate', intransitives, and (optionally) of *hṛ-* and *kṛ-*'

The exact interpretation of these sūtras and their validity has been a matter of some controversy among Pāṇinian grammarians (cf. the discussion in Patañjali ad Pāṇ. 1.4.23 and 1.4.49-52). Moreover, there is evidence that in the literary tradition of 'Madhyadeśīya'

Sanskrit, the conditions for assigning the causee to the category *karman* were different from those obtaining in Pāṇini's dialect (cf. Hock 1981). (It is under those conditions where the causee is not assigned to the category *karman* that the instrumental cases of (J') and (K'a) come about.)

Leaving aside such matters of detail, we can note that (with proper modifications, where necessary) the above sūtras account for our data as follows: (a) defines what from the point of view of Pāṇinians is the primary object, such as the milk which one wants to obtain by milking a cow (construction (F)). As Patañjali's discussion of Pāṇini 1.4.23 and 1.4.51 shows, (b) specifies that for certain verbs there may be a second, 'secondary' object, such as the cow from whom one wants to obtain milk through milking. Verbs which permit this construction must be specially listed, (presumably) because of the existence of semantically similar verbs which do not occur in ditransitive constructions (cf. (1) and (2) above). Moreover, to the extent that these verbs may occur also in other constructions (such as F'), the choice between these and the ditransitive constructions is not a matter of grammar, but of *vivakṣā*, that is of the speaker's intent to view an action in one way, rather than another. (The concept of *vivakṣā* is applicable in many other areas. Thus, whether we treat an axe as the agent or logical subject of an action, or as an instrument, is a matter of *vivakṣā*, not of grammatical derivation of one structure from the other.)

Finally, toward the conclusion of his discussion of Pāṇini 1.4.51, in what no doubt represents the analysis most acceptable to him, Patañjali subscribes to the view that for ditransitive verbs other than *nī-* (and *vah-*) 'convey', viz. *duh-* 'milk', *yāc-* 'entreat', *prach-* 'ask', *bhikṣ-* 'beg' ... *brū-* (etc.) 'speak' ... the 'secondary', *akathita-* object becomes the subject of the passive, and so does the causee of a causative construction.⁵ That is, he provides for a ranking of the two *karman*s of such constructions. And that ranking, for the roots for which it is defined, does manage to make the right predictions. Thus, in a structure like (F), *payah* 'the milk' is the *īpsitatama* or primary object, and the *ṛṣi-* 'the sage', from

whom the milk is milked, the *akathita* or secondary object. In the passive, then, it is the latter, the *akathita* object which becomes the subject (cf. (F'')). Similarly for the causatives.

However, when we consider structures of the type (G), with *ji-* 'win, defeat, conquer', then it seems to be difficult to decide in each particular case which is the *īpsitatama* 'most desired': the defeat of the enemy, or the winning of booty. Nevertheless, grammatically it is only the enemy who will be come the subject of the passive. That is, the Pāṇinian approach here turns out to be less satisfactory than the 'agentive' modification of Gaedicke's analysis.

Moreover, no explicit generalization is made to account for the fact that both the *akathita*/secondary object and the causee are promotable. (This generalization, however, could be made by referring to both as *akathita* in the sense 'not covered by the sūtras given in (15a)'). Finally, Patañjali's attempt to account for the different behavior of *nī* 'convey' (type (A)), by making it an exception to the '*akathita* rule' (since in his view it is the *īpsitatama* object which is promoted), seems to be misguided. For as we have seen earlier, the goal of verbs of motion can be (or become) a direct object only with non-transitives, not with transitives (like *nī* or with causatives (cf. (K))).

14. While none of the discussed proposals thus has been fully satisfactory, it is possible to draw from them — and from our discussion — certain generalizations which seem to most adequately account for the Sanskrit facts and which are presented here by way of a summary of the conclusions of this paper so far:

- (a) Goals of verbs of motion can behave like direct objects only with non-transitives; constructions of the type (A) and (K) are therefore not ditransitives and thus irrelevant for our discussion.
- (b) Certain, but not all verbs belonging to the semantic categories (B)-(I) must be listed in the lexicon as being capable of taking two different kinds of direct objects which may occur separately or in combination with each other. In the latter case, the resulting constructions are (genuinely) ditransitive.

(c) Similar ditransitive structures, with more than one direct object, result from clause union in the causative.

(d) Of the two objects of such ditransitive structures, that object is promoted to subject in the passive which is higher on the agentiveness hierarchy.

15. The above findings clearly are relevant for general linguistic theory, in that they argue against the validity of the Stratal Uniqueness Law (SUL) of Relational Grammar (cf. most recently Perlmutter and Postal 1983: 92-9 and 109-24). A full discussion of this issue, drawing on similar data from other languages, will be presented elsewhere.

At this point, it may however be noted that in this general theoretical context, the behavior of the Sanskrit causatives is of reduced importance, since taken by themselves, they can be accounted for '*derivationally*', as follows: In the process of clause union, the causee (if present) becomes a direct object and in so doing pushes the original direct object into *chômage*, preventing it from becoming the subject in the passive.

Such a derivational account, however, would not work for the constructions of type (B)-(I). For as noted in section 7, there is no formal criterion which makes it possible to claim that one or the other of the two objects is derived from something else. In fact, the behavior of class (A) verbs and especially of class (K) causatives suggests that if a non-term, adverbial constituent shows case variation between, say, locative and accusative, promotion to direct object is possible only if there is no other direct object, even if that object is not specified by only implicit (such as the causee in the causative). And even under these conditions, promotion of that accusative-marked NP to subject of the passive is only optional. This differs markedly from the situation of class (B)-(I) verbs which freely — and obligatorily — promote either of the two accusative-marked NPs if only one of them is present, without the other NP (even if unspecified) blocking such promotion; cf. section 9. Add to this the evidence from nominalizations (section (10)), and the conclusion seems inescapable that rather than coming about derivationally, these accusative NPs are

introduced at the *underlying* level, as *direct objects* of a class of verbs which are subcategorized for two distinct sets of direct objects that may be specified either separately or side-by-side (but not as a single, conjoined NP). Moreover, because of their parallelism with these double-object verbs, even in nominalizations, also the causatives of type (J) might well be taken to have — derived, to be sure — double-object constructions.

While Sanskrit thus argues against the universal, absolute validity of the SUL, there remains some evidence in favor of the 'Law' as a tendency. The fact that there is a tendency to use alternative case markings, for *either* of the two direct objects, such that the alternatively marked NP ceases to be available for promotion to subject in the passive, may be looked upon as an attempt to eliminate the violation of the SUL. The restriction of promotability to the more agentive of the two direct objects may be considered an alternative response to the violation of the SUL, for in effect it reduces the number of promotable direct objects to one. But note that in order for either of these 'response operations' to be meaningful, the SUL must have first been violated.

Given this situation, it may perhaps be permitted to conclude this theoretical discussion on a note of speculation: Although this is rarely, if ever, stated in writing, there seems to be a much greater readiness to concede 'doublings', violations of the SUL for indirect objects than for direct objects or subjects. Even for direct objects, however, some possible violations have been claimed in the literature, although Postal and Perlmutter's 1983 discussion (with references) suggests the possibility of alternative analyses. The present paper has provided limited,⁶ but I believe incontrovertible evidence for a language which violates the SUL at the direct-object level; at the same time, the paper has also provided evidence for a tendency in Sanskrit to eliminate, or reduce the effects of, these violations. It is only at the subject level that the SUL seems to hold absolutely and universally.

Given these facts it is possible to argue that the SUL of Relational Grammar must be restricted to the level of 'subject' and that its apparent applicability at the direct and indirect object levels, for which many languages seem to provide evidence, is to be attributed to an

indirect effect of this (revised) SUL, in combination with the Accessibility Hierarchy (AH): Given that certain verbs may be subcategorized for more than one distinctly different class of, say, direct objects, such as Skt. *mus-* 'rob' — as well as its English equivalent (*He robs people* beside *He robs money*) —, there is a built-in potential for doubling. However, this doubling creates difficulties in promotion-to-subject processes, since if both direct objects are promoted, this would be a violation of the (revised) SUL. It is in order to avoid difficulties of this sort that in many languages there is a constraint against doubling (cf. Engl. *He robs people of their money* or *He robs money from people* but not **He robs people (their) money*), and that in others such as Sanskrit, there is a tendency to undo doubling (by alternative case marking) or to avoid its effects (by singling out one of the direct objects as being the only one which can be promoted, if both are present). And this avoidance of (the consequences of) doubling will be strongest for the position highest on the AH and therefore most apt to be promoted to subject, namely the direct object. The indirect object, being lower on the AH and thus less apt to promote, then can be expected to permit doubling more freely. Finally, constituents even lower on the AH seem to have the least constraints against doubling.

¹ Earlier versions of this paper have been read at the 1983 South Asian Languages Analysis Roundtable in Urbana-Champaign and before the Linguistics Seminar, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. I have benefited from comments received at these and other occasions, especially from J. Jake, R. Pandharipande, and W. Wallace. Needless to state, the responsibility for any errors and omissions rests with me.

² The following abbreviations and conventions hold in this paper: Sanskrit forms are given in their pre-pausal shape, with removal of the effects of external sandhi: accents are omitted. act. = active (including middle voice); pass. = passive; fem. = feminine; neut. = neuter; obl. = oblique. A = accusative, Ab. = ablative, D = dative, G = genitive, I = Instrumental, L = locative, N = nominative, O = object, S = subject, AB = Aitareya-Brāhmaṇa; AV = Atharva-Veda; Bhaṭṭik. Bhaṭṭikāvya (Calcutta edition); Chānd. U. = Chāndogya-Upaniṣad; Harivaṃśa (part of MBh.); KS = Kāṭhaka-Samhitā; Kathās. = Kathāsaritsāgara; M = Manu/Mānavadharmasāstra; MBh. = Mahā-Bhārata (Calcutta edition); MS = Maitrāyaṇī-Samhitā; Mālav. = Mālavikāgnimitra (Tawney's edition); Nala = Nalopakhyāna (part of MBh.); Pañc. = Pañcatantra (Kosegarten's edition); RV = Rig-Veda; Rām = Rāmāyaṇa; Schlegel/Corresio edition); ŚB = Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa; TS = Taittirīya-Samhitā; VS = Vājasaneyī Samhitā.

³ Similar arguments hold for the case-grammar approach in Kumar 1976 which likewise starts out with the notion of 'one-instance-per-clause'. An additional disadvantage of this latter approach is that at least for categories (B), (C), and (F) it is forced to introduce a new case category, 'Receptive', solely to avoid the doubling of terms. Finally, this approach suffers from not sufficiently considering the behavior of the causatives, especially in the passive.

⁴ An alternative explanation would be that the unchanged accusative of the cited example is simply due to the fact that this really is an unpromoted adverbial, not an object. However, the form with genitive marking, as well as the general context, makes it likely that the example is intended to cover the whole range of double-object verbs.

⁵ The exact wording is as follows:

pradhānakarmaṇy ākhyeye lādin āhur dvikarmaṇām/ apradhāne duhādīnām/ ṇyante
kartuśca karmaṇaḥ// (Vārtr. 8-10 on Pāṇ. 1.4.51)

'they say that the verb endings are used to express the main object of ditransitive verbs (in the passive), but the non-main object in the case of *duh-* etc. and the causee-object with causatives' (i.e., only with class (A) does the 'main object' act as the major object for the purposes of passivization.)

⁶ Cf. also Wallace 1984 for Nepali direct-object violations of the SUL.

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