

龍谷大学

佛教文化研究所紀要

第 22 集

UNIVERSITY LIBRARY
APR 1 1984
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

1983

180
081

BULLETIN
OF
INSTITUTE OF BUDDHIST
CULTURAL STUDIES
RYUKOKU UNIVERSITY

No. 21

INSTITUTE OF BUDDHIST CULTURAL STUDIES
RYUKOKU UNIVERSITY KYOTO

1982

CONTENTS

- Discipline and Interest in EducationNoriyuki UMITANI.....(1)
- A Study of Amida's Primal Vows..... Rishō OHTA.....(21)
- The Powerful Family and Religion in Ancient Japan
 —on the legends of Mononobe-uji— Akira HINO.....(36)
- A Study of *Kai-gyō* in Buddhism Tensei KITABATAKE.....(57)
- On the Politics and Religion in the Formative Period
 in the Modern Society Hirotaka FUKUSHIMA.....(94)
- On the Development of Shinbuddhist "Orders"
 —The Case of Kotō (湖東) Area in Shiga—
 Kōchō FUKUMA.....(139)
- Buddhism in a Thai Rural Village, An Anthropological
 Study of its Temple, Rituals and World-View.
 (A Progress Report 1)..... Masuo KUCHIBA.....(1)
- British and American Men of Letters and Christianity (VI)
 Keiichi MASUNAGA.....(28)
- Tolerance and Intolerance in Western Thought.....Sadao YAMAUCHI.....(76)
- The *Trisvabhāva* Doctrine in India & China
 —A Study of Three Exegetical Models—
 Alan SPONBERG.....(97)
- A Study of Cultural Leaders in Japan TodayReiko TSUBOUCHI.....(120)

reality which was the truth of the time experienced by people in prisons and concentration camps. To write the truth about this, one would have to enter into this cave of fire, but in doing so one would be destroyed.¹³⁾

ここには、現実の重圧を自ら体験せずして人生の真相に迫り得るであろうかという若者の一途な心情がにじみでている。

左翼詩人グループの出現が英国文壇をゆるがす大事件であったのと同様、一群のプロレタリア作家の登場も画期的な現象であったといえよう。このグループは二分できる。労働者出身の作家たちと、高等教育を受けた中産階級出身の作家たちとであった。前者は B. L. Coombes, George Garrett, Willy Goldman, Leslie Halward ら文学史上に名をとどめることの少なかった作家たちである。後者は Edward Upward, George Orwell, Christopher Caudwell, Clutton-Brook, Noel Blackiston らであり、このうち多くの者が文学史上に名を残すことになる。¹⁴⁾ 両者ともレーマン (Lehmann) の主宰する *New Writing* 誌 (1935年創刊) に健筆をふるった。以上の革新的詩人や作家たちの信条は、のちにスペイン内戦 (1936—39年) によって真に試されることになった。

1930年代の英国文壇の左傾化現象を考える時に必ず生じる疑問の一つは、彼らの長期にわたる一途なマルキシズムへの傾倒と、ソ連および共産党に対する寛大な態度を招来した要因が何であったかということである。この問題を以下の第Ⅱ部において、「論争の30年代」を可能にせしめた寛容な英国の政治風土の問題とも噛み合わせて考察してゆきたいと思う。

註

- (1) Paul Kennedy, *The Realities Behind Diplomacy* (Fontana Paperbacks, 1981), pp. 230—243.
- (2) A. J. P. Taylor, *English History 1914—1945* (Penguin Books, 1981), pp. 332—340.
- (3) A. J. P. Taylor, *Thirties—British Art and Design Before the War* (Arts Council of Great Britain, 1979), p. 5.
- (4) Julian Symons, *The Angry 30s* (Great Britain: Eyre Methuen Ltd), p. 6.
- (5) Paul Kennedy, *The Realities Behind Diplomacy*, p. 237.
- (6) T. R. Fyvel, *Intellectuals Today* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1968), pp. 17—18.
- (7) Richard Storry, *Japanese and the Decline of the West in Asia—1894—1943* (London: Macmillan Press, 1979), p. 138.
- (8) 久松潜一ほか編、「現代日本文学大年表、昭和篇Ⅰ」(明治書院、昭和46年。昭和5年—14年の部分を参照)
- (9) Richard Storry, *Japanese and the Decline of the West in Asia*, p. 139.
- (10) George Orwell, *The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell, Vol. I, Inside the Whale* (London: Secker & Warburg, 1968), p. 508.
- (11) John Lehmann, *New Writing in Europe* (Pelican Books, 1940), pp. 15—16.
- (12) John Lehmann, *Ibid.*, p. 19.
- (13) Stephen Spender, *The Thirties and After* (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), p. 11.
- (14) John Lucas (edit.), *The 1930s*, H. Gustav Klaus: Socialist Fiction in the 1930s (Sussex: Harvester Press), pp. 21 & 25.

THE TRISVABHĀVA DOCTRINE IN INDIA & CHINA:

—A Study of Three Exegetical Models—

Alan Sponberg

The *trisvabhāva* or triple nature of existence is a central doctrine in the Yogācāra school of Mahāyāna Buddhism. It is this doctrine that expresses the distinctively Yogācāra formulation of the problem of appearance and reality, and as such it can be seen as both a response to and a development of the two truths doctrine in the Mādhyamika school. Both doctrines have their roots in the Perfection of Wisdom Literature, both are extensions of the basic Buddhist axioms of interdependent co-origination (*pratitya-samutpāda*) and emptiness (*śūnyatā*). The parallel function and yet distinctively different directions characterizing the two truths and three nature doctrines warrant careful consideration. An examination of their corresponding role in the two systems of thought can tell us much about the close interrelationship between Mādhyamika and the various stages in the development of Yogācāra thought.¹⁾ A more thorough understanding of the three nature doctrine itself would also help us appreciate how the Classical Yogācāra masters sought to go beyond what they saw as an inherent limitation in the Mādhyamika position while, at the same time, being very careful to retain the fundamental insight into the emptiness of all composite and interdependent elements of experience.

While much work has been done on the development of the two truths doctrine, our picture of the three natures remains rather sketchy, especially that available in the English-language secondary literature on Mahāyāna. There are of course many reasons why Yogācāra scholarship, in general, has lagged behind that on Mādhyamika. The systematic developments of the Yogācāra school, drawing on early Mahāyāna thought as well as the long tradition of Abhidharma analysis, are richer, more complex, and certainly more scholastic than what we find in early Mādhyamika. The problems arising from this complexity of doctrine are, moreover, further exacerbated by the fact that most of the Yogācāra literature has not survived in the original Sanskrit. An adequate picture is not to be obtained from the sources available in any single canonical language.²⁾

Besides these basically technical problems there are serious (and perhaps even more tenacious) hermeneutical problems as well. This seems especially to be the case with respect to the place of the three nature doctrine in Yogācāra. Indeed, there appears to be a reluctance in some instances to even recognize the central position of the three natures in Yogācāra thought. Even as eminent a scholar as

the Mādhyamika specialist Jacques May has felt that a discussion of the *trisvabhāva* doctrine was not necessary to include in his otherwise excellent introductory article on Yogācāra. It is unnecessary, he explains in a footnote, because the doctrine is not particularly idealistic and is thus not relevant to the interpretation of Yogācāra he presents.³⁾ There is a significant problem in such an approach: the fact that the *trisvabhāva* doctrine cannot be easily assimilated into a view that seeks to explain Yogācāra in terms of Western immaterialist idealism surely suggests not an excuse to minimize its crucial place in the system but rather the need to refine and redefine our interpretive efforts to understand Yogācāra soteriology. Certainly a better grasp of the *trisvabhāva* doctrine and its place in the overall system is essential to a more complete and hermeneutically sound picture of Yogācāra thought.

Any attempt to come to terms with the three natures is further complicated, however, by additional historical problems. Our confusion regarding the doctrine has arisen, in part, from the often unacknowledged fact that the various sources we employ present the doctrine in different stages of its historical development. It is understandably difficult to settle on one interpretation of the three natures when different textual accounts seem inconsistent. True to its basic principle of impermanence Buddhist doctrine was far from static. We should expect that a careful diachronic study of any central doctrinal element like the *trisvabhāva* will show a development of thought, a historicity that will reveal itself in a series of successive reformulations and reinterpretations.⁴⁾

The three nature doctrine, precisely because of its central position in Classical Yogācāra thought and its subsequent development, thus provides a useful benchmark to trace the history of Yogācāra thought. A comprehensive diachronic study of this doctrine (and Yogācāra generally) will remain a desideratum for some time.⁵⁾ We can only begin by filling in the picture bit by bit. Indeed, much basic textual work remains to be done before such a diachronic study can even be undertaken. The present article is an attempt to explore one facet of the place of *trisvabhāva* in Yogācāra thought and, in so doing, to suggest also some hermeneutical considerations that it is hoped will prove useful in future studies.

The Three Natures in India and China

In the history of the introduction of Yogācāra thought from India into China the 7th century translations of Hsüan-tsang^a along with the commentaries and essays of K'uei-chi^b represent one of several critical points of transmission. While later than the earliest introduction of Yogācāra ideas by Paramārtha, Bodhiruci and others, this transmission provided a more coherent picture of the classical and early scholastic period of Yogācāra thought in India. Through the work of the great pilgrim-scholar and his disciple-collaborator a vast body of religious and philosophical exploration was thus introduced into the current of Chinese thought. Especially in the later writings of K'uei-chi in particular in his essays compiled in the *Ta-sheng*

fa-yüan i-lin chang^c encyclopedia^{d)}—we can see the efforts undertaken to make this highly complex and scholastic tradition accessible and palatable to the elite monastic circles of the early T'ang court, to the core of Chinese intelligentsia at the beginning of one of the great periods of Chinese history. A comparison of K'uei-chi's formulation of the three nature doctrine with that found in his Indian sources and also with later East Asian formulations should yield some insight into the historical development of this doctrine and also into the broader issue of cross-cultural dissemination.

There are two types of questions we should attempt ultimately to answer in such an effort. First: what were the shifts that took place in the successive reformulations of the doctrine as it moved through the different stages of Yogācāra thought in India and then subsequently into China to begin yet another transformation there? Second: what is the broader meaning of those successive shifts? That is to say, what were the historical and cultural circumstances that provide a context that will enhance our understanding of the process of reformulation and development?

These two questions cannot of course be fully answered in mutual isolation, either without some reference to the other. Still, the latter is much broader in scope, and an adequate answer to it can only be built on our preliminary efforts to explore the first. With that limitation in mind the present article will focus primarily on the first question in order to suggest what kind of further inquiry will allow us to answer the second. At this stage of the game we need fruitful problems even more than pat answers.

In order to clarify some of the key features of the three nature doctrine in K'uei-chi's writings it will be helpful to first explore two alternative models that have been employed in *trisvabhāva* exegesis. The first, which I shall call the pivotal model, is based on the primary presentation of the three natures in the *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha* (Chapt. II), the most systematic and comprehensive work of Classical Indian Yogācāra. The second, which we can call the progressive model, is based on the understanding of the doctrine that came to be standard in the later East Asian tradition.

The Pivotal Model of Trisvabhāva Exegesis

In the *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha* the *trisvabhāva* doctrine is presented in the second chapter as a major topic under the heading "Characteristics of What is to be Known." That chapter along with the preceding which discusses the store function of cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna*) as the cognitive base of experience comprise almost one half of the whole text, an indication of how important these two doctrines are.⁷⁾ In that second chapter we find the three referred to as both characteristics and natures in a discussion that presents them as three interrelated aspects of phenomenal existence. An analysis of these three aspects as presented in this text reveals

the following relationships:

1. The primary aspect of existence is the Dependent characteristic or nature (*paratantra-lakṣaṇa/śvabhāva*) ; it is the manifold of all causally conditioned and conceptually mediated phenomenal experience.

EITHER: 2. One reifies that Dependent phenomenal experience, clinging to it as corresponding or referring to a realm of predeterminate facts or objects: i. e., the Imaginary characteristic or nature (*parikalpita-°/°*) . . .

OR: 3. One realizes that, because they are causally conditioned, the events of this phenomenal experience are inextricably interrelated and thus cannot refer to any realm of predeterminate or essential facts; thereby coming to see the Dependent phenomenality of existence in its Consummate characteristic or nature (*pariniṣpanna-°/°*).

Notice carefully the axial position of the Dependent in this analysis. This pivotal role of the Dependent is the most distinctive feature of the *trisvabhāva* doctrine in Classical Yogācāra. The Dependent can be mistaken to be something totally Imaginary; or, it can be understood in its true or Consummate nature. The shift from the one perspective to the other represents the fundamental reorientation of the cognitive basis of our knowledge, the *āśraya-parāvṛtti* that is the soteriological culmination of Yogācāra praxis. The relational structure of the three terms is thus crucial. Schematically it can be represented as follows:




fig. 1: The Pivotal Model⁹⁾

What exists is the Dependent (D). It can be mistaken as referring to a realm of predeterminate objects, the Imaginary (I); or, by realizing its Consummate nature

(C), the “thusness” of its causally conditioned phenomenality, one can see it as it truly is.

The dotted line separates the diagram into two planes or levels of discourse. These are two different perspectives, what we might call the epistemic and the ontologic, though the apparent duality holds only so long as one is caught up in the Imaginary, remaining thus alienated from the Dependent in its true or Consummate nature. In that sense the Imaginary and the Consummate are two, mutually exclusive aspects of the Dependent. Epistemically we can speak of a soteric shift from the Imaginary to the Consummate, from bondage and suffering to liberation and freedom; but ontologically, we see that what *is*—i. e., the Dependent—continues on just as it is. The important point in this model then is the emphasis on the Dependent. Regardless of whether one is bound to the Imaginary or liberated in the Consummate, the Dependent in either case remains. There is no question of rejecting the Dependent; nor, strictly speaking, of even transcending it. Its fundamental phenomenal existence is firmly asserted.

The Progressive Model of Trisvabhāva Exegesis

The second model to be considered presents the popular interpretation of the three nature doctrine as it subsequently came to be understood in East Asia.⁹⁾ We shall see that the structural relationship among the three natures in this model is quite different from that of the previous model. Here the structural dynamic emphasized is a sequential movement progressing successively from one nature to the next. Here the three natures or characteristics are closer to being three levels, each revealing a progressively deeper degree of reality. Again it is important to note the order in which the three terms are presented. Whereas the Dependent is usually discussed first in the case of the pivotal model, interpretations conforming to the progressive model invariably begin with the Imaginary, progress then to the Dependent, and culminate with the Consummate.¹⁰⁾

In this model we have first the superficial level of existence, the level at which, in our delusion, we cling to our ‘self’ and to ‘things’ as truly existing. In fact they are purely Imaginary and totally nonexistent. We come to know that, however, only on reaching the second level where we see that these ‘things-in-themselves’ are actually reifications of phenomenal experience. These phenomena must, at this level, be seen as interdependent, arising as the result of cause and condition. Thus, while more real than the Imaginary, they are still impermanent and Dependent.

Having gotten rid of the mistaken ‘self’ and ‘things’, we are still very much caught up in the web of things-as-phenomena. They too, in this model, must be left behind. The goal then is to move through that Dependent level of conventional existence finally to achieve the level of Consummate reality, the pure, unchanging ultimate thus-ness of all being beyond the impermanence of the Dependent. The “Thusness” referred to in this case is the essential purity underlying the transitory

and phenomenal. As such it has begun to take on the character of an ontological Absolute or Ultimate Existence, the pure ground of all being. Schematically this model may be represented in this way:




fig. 2: The Progressive Model

While the Consummate is now to be realized as the underlying ground of existence, the movement, in terms of praxis, is vertically upward. We begin with the Imaginary and work towards the Consummate. The movement is also strictly sequential with each successive step excluding the previous level. We see the Dependent only on cutting off the Imaginary; and we attain the Consummate only on rejecting or transcending the Dependent. The contrast between this model and the previous one should now be apparent. Here we no longer see the dynamic interaction among the three natures. Here the ultimate existence (and existent) is the Consummate, separated now from the conventional existence of the Dependent.

With that shift we have lost the ontological significance of the assertion that the Dependent—i. e., phenomenal existence—is known, and can only *truly* be known, after realizing the Consummate nature. Indeed the position and the role of the Dependent and the Consummate have been virtually reversed. In this model what exists finally and ultimately, at the end of one's practice, is the Consummate standing beyond the conventional existence of the Dependent. This is in marked contrast to the *trisvabhāva* doctrine in the *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha* where we are told quite explicitly that without the existence of the Dependent there can be no Consummate (*MS*: II. 25).¹¹

To summarize we may say that the progressive model differs from the pivotal model most significantly in: 1) the relegation of the Dependent to the Consummate, 2) the progressive nature of the movement which requires rejecting the Dependent in order to attain the Consummate, and 3) the deemphasis of the respective reciprocal relationships between the Dependent and both the Imaginary and the Consummate.

If the distinction between the two models is now more apparent, one might well still wonder if there is really anything of importance at stake here. What happens when we cash out these two alternative descriptions of human existence and reality? Do we actually end up with something so significantly different? It would seem that indeed we do.

On realizing the transformational shift depicted in the first model one is left with the phenomenal world quite intact, though profoundly revalorized in one's experience. The world in all its multifold phenomenality or facticity remains, seen now free of the web of delusion which binds all unenlightened activity. In this first model it is precisely the phenomenality of experience that *is* reality; it must, however, be seen for what it is.

In the second model, on the other hand, that same phenomenality is, ultimately, to be rejected. What we have here seems to be much more of a move from the phenomenal world to a purer, transcendent level of existence. The phenomenal is ultimately only illusory; while only the pure is truly real. Even if the two, the Dependent and the Consummate, are seen as related, they remain very much two distinct levels. And the point is to get from one to the other.

Each of these models thus seems to reflect a rather different solution to the basic soteriological issue in Mahāyāna Buddhism, the problem of the non-duality of the world of suffering and that of liberation, the problem of the equation of *samsāra* and *nirvāṇa*. The first model resolves the apparent duality in favor of a pure experience of the true phenomenality; while the second opts for an experience of the purity behind the illusory phenomenality. In the first case, the Dependent *is* reality, when properly seen. In the second, the Dependent is what must be penetrated or transcended in order to *reach* Reality. Ontologically, we must say these are indeed different positions. Each reveals a distinctively different view of human existence in the world.

K'uei-chi's Understanding of the Three Natures

With these two models clearly distinguished we can now undertake an analysis of the *trisvabhāva* doctrine in K'uei-chi's writings, seeking specifically to determine his understanding of the relational structure connecting the three terms. My thesis shall be that K'uei-chi's understanding shows a basic affinity with the earlier pivotal model, though structurally it differs from both the pivotal and the progressive model in significant ways. It is best understood as representing a transitional stage or perhaps even a synthetic position between the two.¹² In the remainder of this article I shall thus be primarily concerned with establishing that K'uei-chi's view retains critical features from the first model while also, in some respects, moving towards the second. Having done that I will also suggest, in the conclusion, how this thesis raises some very useful problems with regard to our current picture of early Yogācāra in India and China.

Exploring those problems will, I think, eventually tell us a great deal more about the complex relationship between Indian and Chinese Yogācāra developments during the 5th and 6th centuries. First it is necessary, however, to show that K'uei-chi's *trisvabhāva* interpretation does indeed show a closer affiliation with his Indian predecessors than with his subsequent "followers." To do that requires that we

analyze the relationship of the three natures in K'uei-chi's exegesis in light of the two models discussed above.

The picture I find in K'uei-chi's works, especially in his "Essay on the Doctrine of Nothing but Cognitive Expression (*viññapti-mātra*)"¹³ and his commentaries on the *Ch'eng-wei-shih-lun*,¹⁴ can best be summarized as reflecting an attempt to retain the dynamic, medial role of the Dependent while at the same time shifting the emphasis of discussion to focus on the Consummate as the most important of the three. Since these two directions are somewhat incompatible, the resulting position is more complicated than either of the two models presented above, a fact indicated by the awkwardness of any schematic illustration.¹⁵ The key features are shown in the following diagram:




fig. 3: A Model of K'uei-chi's Interpretation

We shall see in this model that K'uei-chi retains, with some modifications, two critical features of the earlier, pivotal model, features that were subsequently lost in the later, progressive model. First, the Dependent, if no longer in quite the same pivotal position, remains dynamically medial rather than becoming simply transitional. That is to say it remains a crucial link between the Imaginary and the Consummate without becoming simply another stepping stone on the way to the Absolute. Second, at least some element of the integral and reciprocal relationship between the Dependent and the Consummate is retained, a feature we shall see reaffirmed in the recursive move from the Consummate back to the Dependent, the move in which the enlightened cognition acquired subsequent to the realization of the Consummate gives one access once again to the Dependent seen now as it truly is. Let us look more closely at the way in which these features are sustained in K'uei-chi's interpretation.

Parallels between K'uei-chi's View and the Pivotal Model

A key element in K'uei-chi's model, one derived directly from the *Mahāyana-saṃgraha* (MS: II. 29), is the notion of the Dependent having two parts or aspects,¹⁶ one defiled and one pure, the first corresponding to the Imaginary and the second corresponding to the Consummate. The enlightenment process depicted in K'uei-chi's model is thus a gradual separation of the defiled from the pure, leaving

only the latter which is the Consummate nature of existence, that is to say the Dependent in its pure aspect. The relationship between the Dependent and the Consummate is, in this sense, still much tighter than that in the progressive model where the Dependent is ultimately to be rejected altogether. A defining difference between the pivotal and the progressive turns on just this point: What is the relationship between the Dependent and the Consummate? Are they integrally connected, or is the former to be cut off to reach the latter?

In the *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha* this distinctive relationship between the Dependent and the Consummate is carefully established, a relationship, as we saw above, reflecting a difference more of aspect than of essential substance. At MS: II. 17 we are told that the three natures are neither different nor identical, because the Dependent, besides being dependent, is also in one sense imaginany and in one sense consummate. Vasubandhu develops this same theme in a famous verse from his *Triṃśikā* which says that the Dependent and the Consummate are neither different nor non-different (*naiṃvānya-nānanya*).¹⁷ In India that became the standard definition of the relationship. What happened with the introduction of these ideas into China?

In the *Ch'eng-wei-shih-lun*, an abridged synopsis of ten Indian commentaries to Vasubandhu's *Triṃśikā* edited by Hsüan-tsang and K'uei-chi, we find the crucial phrase rendered quite literally as *fei-i fei-pu-i*:^d "neither different, nor not different."¹⁸ We also find it glossed as *fei-i fei-i*:^e "not different, not one" (cf. MS: II. 17 mentioned above);¹⁹ and elsewhere as *pu-chi pu-li*:^f "not identical, not separate."²⁰ TAKEUCHI Shōkō has drawn attention to the fact that this last gloss suggests a somewhat different understanding of the relationship than Vasubandhu had in mind, one that may be distinctively Chinese.²¹ We shall come back to this point when we consider the differences between K'uei-chi's model and the pivotal model. The important point to establish at this stage of the argument, however, is that these passages in the *CWSL*, along with K'uei-chi's commentary on them,²² make it quite clear that he was aware of the importance of this special Dependent-Consummate relationship.

Even if the specific nature of the relationship shows some development in K'uei-chi's understanding as we shall see later, it remains inseparably tight. K'uei-chi could not have advocated a complete rejection of the Dependent because such a separation would be impossible in the type of relationship indicated in the citations above. As long as some reciprocal relationship between the Dependent and the Consummate is emphasized, we can say that the dynamic, medial quality of the Dependent is retained. And, as long as the Dependent stands in some medial and reciprocal relationship to the Consummate, there can be no question of it being ultimately rejected or transcended in realizing the Consummate.

We can find further confirmation of these two critical features in a doctrine formulated by K'uei-chi himself, the contemplation on the five levels of cognitive

expression only (*viñaptimātratā*).²³⁾ In his discussion of the first level K'uei-chi states quite emphatically that both the Dependent and the Consummate must be retained as existing, while the Imaginary is to be rejected as non-existent. He adds that the Dependent and the Consummate are existent as the objective domain or the manifold (*ching-chieh*²⁴⁾ *viśaya*) of the two cognitions.²⁴⁾ This is a reference to the important Classical Yogācāra doctrine of the two divisions of enlightened cognition: the correct or fundamental cognition (*samyag / māla-jñāna*) realized at the moment of enlightenment, and the subsequently acquired cognition (*prṣṭhalabdha-jñāna*) that follows allowing the Buddha or bodhisattva to remain active in the causally conditioned world working for the benefit of other beings.²⁵⁾ These two cognitions are a major theme throughout K'uei-chi's writing. The importance he gives them plus their correlation with the Consummate and the Dependent emphasizes the necessity in his *trisvabhāva* interpretation of a strong recursive movement allowing one to move back from the Consummate to the Dependent. This, in turn, entails a retention of the same entative status of the Dependent that we saw in the pivotal model.²⁶⁾

Later in this same discussion of the contemplation on the five levels of cognitive expression only we find, at the fifth level, the section containing the famous passage on the rope that is mistaken to be a snake. It is this section that has given rise to confusion regarding K'uei-chi's interpretation of the *trisvabhāva* doctrine, and it thus warrants special attention here.²⁷⁾

K'uei-chi seems in this passage, especially in the truncated form widely circulated in the later tradition,²⁸⁾ to be denying any re-affirmation of the Dependent after the Consummate is realized. He seems to be saying that one gets rid of the Imaginary in order to see the Dependent, and then one rejects the Dependent in order to reach the Consummate. Indeed we are told in this passage that one should dismiss the phenomenal aspects to realize the true nature (*ch'ien-hsiang cheng-hsing*²⁹⁾). K'uei-chi further makes it quite clear, in the same passage and elsewhere, that the phenomenal aspects (*hsiang*) correspond to the Dependent and that the true nature (*hsing*) is the Consummate. Taking only this much into account one can see why the later tradition could hold that this passage supports the progressive model, totally dispensing with the Dependent in favor of an ontologically quite distinct Consummate. There is, in K'uei-chi's original text, more to this passage however.

Overlooked, or suppressed, in that later interpretation of the passage is the remainder of the section in which K'uei-chi goes on to clarify that this is a special application of the *trisvabhāva* theory, one that must be understood in the context of his general interpretation. It is worth citing the passage in full with italics added to emphasize the portions most pertinent to our purpose here. K'uei-chi begins by citing a verse on the rope-snake analogy, (one that is actually from *Asvabhāva*'s commentary to the *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha* rather than the *MS* itself³⁰⁾), and then goes on to give his exegesis of the passage.

A verse from the *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha* says:

From a rope arises the notion of a snake,
But on seeing that it is a rope, one understands that this ['snake']
object does not exist.

And, when one realizes the constituent [nature] of that 'rope',
One knows that it, like the perception of the 'snake', is a delusion.

What is said here is that once we have the notion of a rope, we have dismissed the notion of a 'snake'. This illustrates how one dismisses Imaginary notions by contemplating the Dependent. Once we see the various constituents making up the rope, we have dismissed the notion of a 'rope'. This illustrates how one dismisses *the notion of 'Dependent'* by seeing the Consummate.

The meaning of this verse is clear. The [false] notions that are to be dismissed are both Dependent. When one has cut off this defiled portion [of the Dependent], the [false notions of] self and things, like the Imaginary 'snake' and 'rope', will no longer be experienced.³¹⁾ *With regard to the Dependent, however, just because we say "dismiss it", this does not mean that both are eliminated together.*³²⁾

The 'snake' appears as a result of delusion, and so is completely without either substance or function. The rope, however, comes into being by virtue of its constituent hemp fibers and also is not without conventional function. The hemp fibers illustrate the universal of Thusness, while the rope illustrates the Dependent. Once one knows the substance and the function of the rope and hemp fibers, the deluded opinion that there is a snake will have spontaneously ceased. Because the deluded opinion that there is a snake has ceased, the 'snake' no longer is experienced. This is called "dismissing the Imaginary."

*It is not as if the Dependent should be eliminated by the Holy Path.*³³⁾ This is so because, gradually coming to understand Thusness, one is enlightened with regard to the rope and its constituent parts by penetrating the emptiness of the 'snake.' At the stage that one realizes the contemplation of Thusness, conventional particulars are made evident [as they truly are] by understanding the universal of Thusness. Once the universal and the particulars have become evident, the [deluded clinging to] self and things cease. *It is precisely this that is the essence of what was contemplated at the first level.*³⁴⁾

The first level, as we saw above, presented the general proposition asserting the emptiness of the Imaginary which is to be dismissed and the existence of the Dependent and the Consummate which are to be retained. Also, in K'uei-chi's termino-

logy, the universal and the particulars mentioned in the text correspond, respectively, to the Consummate and the Dependent. The passage thus does not say that the Dependent is to be simply rejected or transcended. Quite the contrary: only after one has understood the universal of Thusness do the conventional particulars become, for the first time, truly evident. The last paragraph makes it clear that the passage as a whole must be understood in light of the basic Yogācāra principle that the Dependent is truly known, i. e., in its pure aspect, only subsequent to the realization of the Consummate nature.³⁵⁾

In K'uei-chi's doctrine of the five levels of understanding cognitive expression only the first level establishes the general objective: to see the Imaginary as empty and non-existent while preserving both the Dependent and the Consummate as existent. In praxis, however, that cannot be realized quite so directly. As long as one clings to the Imaginary it cannot be separated or distinguished from the Dependent: it is, after all, nothing other than the Dependent falsely seen. Speaking tactically, or in terms of praxis, the *only* Dependent that the deluded can know is the Imaginary, i. e., the 'Dependent' mistaken in its Imaginary nature or defiled aspect. In that sense the 'rope' (as something clung to) is as unreal as the 'snake.' That 'Dependent', K'uei-chi says, must indeed be rejected. And that is done only on seeing its Consummate nature.³⁶⁾

The immediate, tactical concern of the aspirant must thus be focused on the Consummate. It is that perspective that accounts for the progressive, Consummate-oriented *appearance* of K'uei-chi's model. As indicated in the text cited above however, that perspective must be seen in the context of the total progression of practice which culminates with the subsequently acquired wisdom with which the Dependent is truly known. It is only when that crucial recursive move to the Dependent in its medial position is disregarded or forgotten that K'uei-chi's position resembles that of the East Asian Yogācārins who held that the Dependent is to be totally rejected (both defiled and pure aspects) in order to reach the ultimately pure Consummate.

Contrasts between K'uei-chi's View and the Pivotal Model

The preceding section has shown that K'uei-chi recognizes the crucial dynamic aspect of the relationship between the Dependent and the Consummate and that he retains (and regains) the Dependent as existing even subsequent to enlightenment by employing the distinction between the defiled and the pure aspects of the Dependent. This places K'uei-chi's model of the *trisvabhāva* very close to the pivotal model of the *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha*. Yet to be explored is the question of how his interpretation can be said to differ from that of the pivotal model. In what ways can we indeed see some movement away from that model and towards the second?

To demonstrate this part of my thesis requires several further observations. In contrast to the pivotal model we must note that K'uei-chi's interpretation: 1) does shift emphasis away from the Dependent and onto the Consummate; 2) it does reduce the pivotal function of the Dependent; and 3) it seems to add a new interpretation to the peculiar *naiwānya-nānanya* relationship between the Dependent and the Consummate. Each of these assertions will be examined in turn.

First, K'uei-chi's presentation of the three natures, even while retaining the crucial subsequently acquired cognition of the Dependent, nonetheless focuses much more on the Consummate rather than the Dependent as the most important of the three. This shift of focus, as already indicated above however, must be understood in the context of K'uei-chi's concern for praxis. And, we must at this point also be careful to distinguish K'uei-chi's emphasis on the Consummate from that seen in the progressive model. If we look more closely at the progression of practice in each of the three interpretations we can see more clearly how K'uei-chi's use of the *trisvabhāva* differs from both the pivotal and progressive models in its emphasis on the Consummate.

The question to ask here is: which of the natures is emphasized in each model, and how does that emphasis relate to the progression of practice through the three natures? The most straight-forward progression is, of course, that of the linear progressive model. There we find the sequence:

Imaginary → Dependent → Consummate

The Consummate is emphasized because it is ultimate.

In the case of the pivotal model, because of its more dynamic and non-linear structure, it is harder to picture such a successive progression. The Dependent is emphasized as ontologically basic, while the practical move is from Imaginary to Consummate. Perhaps this is best shown as:

Dependent: Imaginary → Consummate

The sequence we find in K'uei-chi is somewhat more complicated. Looking at the complete presentation of his theory as seen in the passage cited above and taking into account his emphasis on the tactical concerns of the practitioner, what we see is something more like:

Imaginary ('Dependent') → Consummate → Dependent (~Imaginary)

One must reject the Imaginarily mistaken 'Dependent' by means of the Consummate in order to see the true Dependent which is the complete negation of the Imaginary.³⁷⁾ The Consummate is emphasized, but it is emphasized as the *immediate* goal of the practitioner. This does not alter the basic ontology shared by his model and the pivotal model, however. It is just that their concern is different: if the pivotal model is more theoretical or philosophical, K'uei-chi's is more practical or soteriological.

In the progressive model on the other hand, while we do see a focus on the Consummate as in K'uei-chi, the two cannot be equated. In that case the point is to

give the Consummate a special ontological status and not simply to stress its practical significance. With regard to the first of the three points of contrast then, we can say that K'uei-chi differs from both models, doing so in a way that leaves him still closer to the basic structure of the pivotal model.

The second point of difference cited above is perhaps more substantial. It can be seen in the fact that this shift of focus from the Dependent to the Consummate alters the relational dynamic among the three natures. The pivotal model, as we saw, is best understood as a structure connecting two planes or levels of discourse. The soteric transformation—a shift from the Imaginary to the Consummate—takes place on the epistemic plane while the Dependent remains in the pivotal position ontologically unaltered below. In K'uei-chi's model this distinction in levels of discourse is collapsed into one plane, and with that the movement that occurs does begin to appear more linear and progressive rather than pivotal and disjunctive (i. e., either / or). In the pivotal model the transformation that occurs must, logically, be a sudden, definitive epistemic revolution: the Dependent can be seen as either the Imaginary or the Consummate, there is no middle ground. In K'uei-chi's model we seem to be moving towards the idea of a transformation effected by a more gradual process of purification, a process whereby the impurities of the defiled part of the Dependent are refined away until one is left with only the pure part.

This is the significance of the second point of contrast. It indeed can be seen as one step towards the sequential structure of the progressive model. We must at the same time note, however, that it can also be seen as a result of the Abhidharma influence already operative in the shift from Classical Yogācāra to Scholastic Yogācāra in India.

Finally, the third point of difference listed above was that K'uei-chi introduces a new element into his definition of the special relationship between the Consummate and the Dependent. As mentioned in the previous section, the *Ch'eng-wei-shih-lun* interpretation of the “neither different, nor not different” (*naivānya-nānanya*) relationship between the Consummate and the Dependent probably reflects some development from the idea as it was understood by Vasubandhu. In the *CWSL* this phrase was interpreted as “neither the same, nor separate”, an understanding that suggests (or at least allows) something more like two closely related things rather than one thing seen in two ways. The *CWSL* goes on to clarify its position with the explanation that the relationship between Dependent and Consummate is comparable to that between phenomena (*dharmas*) and phenomenality (*dharmatā*) or that between the conventional (*saṃvṛti*) and the ultimate (*paramārtha*).³⁸ These comparisons thus suggest a universal and particulars distinction or relationship, the type reflected in K'uei-chi's frequent use of the Chinese *li*¹ (universal or principle) and *shih*² (facts, affairs, particulars) distinction.³⁹

K'uei-chi seems to take this development yet another step further, however, when he defines the relationship between the Consummate and the Dependent in

terms of “substance” and “function” (*t'i / yung*^k).⁴⁰ Here we have something that is unequivocally Chinese. The Chinese terms he used here cannot be traced directly back to anything in the Indian Buddhist terminology. On the other hand they do, of course, reflect an indigenous Chinese philosophical distinction, one that was becoming very popular in the 6th and 7th centuries.⁴¹

K'uei-chi's use of these terms raises a number of problems that go beyond our topic here. Some caution must be taken in attempting to understand what these terms meant to K'uei-chi. They had, by the early T'ang become an important theme in the Chinese Buddhist *problematik*, but their importance in the debates of that time stemmed precisely from the prevailing disagreement over their meaning and the ontological nature of their relationship to each other. We should take as our starting point, I think, the assumption that K'uei-chi was seeking more to redefine *t'i* and *yung* in terms of his understanding of the Consummate and the Dependent rather than *visa-versa*. The bearing this has on the prevailing *t'i-yung* controversy in the Sui and early T'ang must be left for a later article.⁴² What we can say in this context, however, is that K'uei-chi's use of this pair of terms does reflect a different picture of the dynamic structure of the relationship between the Consummate and the Dependent. It would be quite difficult to map these two terms, however they might be understood, onto the relationship we find in the pivotal model. There the role of the Dependent is too basic and yet too phenomenal to fit either of the two Chinese terms.

We can thus say, in regard to this third point of difference, that the use of the Chinese *t'i / yung* terminology does help to set the stage for the development of the later progressive model. The noumenal-phenomenal connotation the two had—certainly for later Chinese Buddhists if not for K'uei-chi—could only have facilitated the move towards a more transcendent, essentialist ontology, the sort we find in the progressive model.

Conclusion: Some Broader Questions Raised by this Study

We can now see how K'uei-chi's exegesis of the *trīsvabhāva* differs from the pivotal model of the *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha*. The three main differences discussed here all involve a relegation of the Dependent to the Consummate. Each of them make some move towards emphasizing a linear, successive progression of practice rather than the pivotal epistemic shift characterizing the first model. At the same time, we must not lose sight of the significant ways in which K'uei-chi's interpretation still falls well short of the very different view presented in the progressive model. We saw that K'uei-chi retained a close, if somewhat redefined, relationship between the Dependent and the Consummate, one that insures that the phenomenality of the Dependent is not eliminated or simply reduced to the transcendent purity of the Consummate. We also saw quite clearly that there is an important recursive if not pivotal movement with respect to the Dependent, the crucial move

in which the Dependent is regained in the wisdom acquired subsequent to enlightenment.

Having completed then the task of showing that K'uei-chi's interpretation of the relational structure of the three natures thus represents a position somewhere between the pivotal "Indian" model and the progressive "East Asian" model, we can now turn to some of the implications of this finding. At the beginning of our look at K'uei-chi's interpretation I suggested that the difficulty of fitting him into either of the standard models would raise some intriguing questions about the development of Yogācāra in both India and East Asia. To conclude this article I want to raise some of these questions to suggest some directions for further Yogācāra studies.

The thesis presented here raises two basic sets of problems. The first stems from the differences we found between K'uei-chi's interpretation and that of the *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha*. The second stems from the differences between K'uei-chi's interpretation and the later East Asian understanding of the *trivabhāva* doctrine. There are broader issues, especially the relationship between Yogācāra and Tathāgatagarbha thought in both India and China that connect the two sets of problems in important ways to be sure, but for heuristic purposes it is useful first to consider them separately.

We saw first that K'uei-chi's understanding, while still close to the dynamic characteristic of the pivotal model, nevertheless shows some important differences in emphasis. This raises questions concerning the scholastic development of Yogācāra in the period subsequent to the classical formulation in the *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha*, questions that require further research on this transitional period within Indian Yogācāra. There are two ways to account for these differences in K'uei-chi's understanding. The easiest and most straightforward way would be to say that they are the result of the inevitable "secondary distortions" that arose in the transmission of a complex set of ideas and practices from one culture into another with its own, very different traditions. That would be to say that the differences originated with K'uei-chi (or perhaps with Hsüan-tsang).

The cultural gap between India and China was indeed great, and such a culturally mediated reformulation undoubtedly did occur. This fact must not however blind us to other possibilities of accounting for many of the differences between what we see in the *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha* and what we find in K'uei-chi. As we saw in two of the three points of contrast discussed above, much of the difference may reflect changes that had already taken place in India, with the transition from Classical to Scholastic Yogācāra. We need to know much more about that set of changes before we can say what, in a transitional figure like K'uei-chi, is really "Chinese" and what, still "Indian". Even at this stage however, the data presented here do seem to suggest that many of the differences between K'uei-chi's view and the pivotal model can be traced back into Indian scholastic developments, perhaps

even as far back as Vasubandhu. Even the most likely exception—K'uei-chi's use of the *t'i / yung* distinction—might very fruitfully be considered in light of the tension between the Yogācāra and the Tathāgatagarbha traditions in India and how that tension was played out in earlier Chinese Yogācāra developments during the 6th century.

To minimize in any way this organic connection between scholastic Indian Yogācāra and early Chinese Yogācāra would be to overlook the great potential for employing these early Chinese sources, especially K'uei-chi's voluminous commentaries, to expand our as yet limited knowledge of Indian Yogācāra. The usefulness of these sources has been taken for granted in the case of some topics—the Chinese record of the development of the various perceptual *bhāga* theories in India, for example. Perhaps though, we have not yet fully explored their usefulness for understanding more complex issues like the development of the *trivabhāva* doctrine and the assimilation of Tathāgatagarbha ideas into Scholastic Yogācāra and Mādhyamika. To make too sharp a division between Indian and Chinese Yogācāra—seeing in one the pure source, and finding in the other only "secondary distortion"—can only limit our understanding of both.

The other set of questions I see raised by K'uei-chi's *trivabhāva* exegesis is directed more towards our understanding of Yogācāra in China, both earlier and later. If K'uei-chi's interpretation differs so significantly from the progressive model, how can we account for the development of that widespread view? Again the simplest answer is simply to say that the progressive model is just a later Chinese "distortion." But that is not really an answer. The question, properly put, is: Why did the East Asian Yogācārins come to feel that the later model yielded a more satisfying or more edifying resolution of the appearance-reality problem? They went to some trouble to ignore or explain away those portions of K'uei-chi's text that did not fit their model. What was the historical process by which the progressive model came to prevail in a tradition that piously reveres K'uei-chi as its first patriarch? What earlier sources, both Indian and indigenous did they draw on to construct this reformulated view that was then subsequently ascribed to K'uei-chi? What then, if not early Fa-hsiang, was the provenance of the linear, successive structure of the progressive model? Is it simply the logical conclusion of what we see already beginning in K'uei-chi, or were there other, perhaps even more important inputs? Now that we see that certain aspects of that model do not seem to derive from K'uei-chi, perhaps we need to take another look at the earlier Chinese Yogācāra tradition stemming from Paramārtha, Bodhiruci and Ratnamati—the transmissions of Yogācāra that had much influence on the formation of the "new Chinese Buddhism of the 6th century."

We might also ask why it was that this new Chinese Buddhism—in particular the Hua-yen critics of Fa-hsiang with their concern for the interrelationship of universal and particulars—overlooked the significance of the pivotal model of the

trivabhāva doctrine. Why did they fail to appreciate both the reciprocal relationship between the Consummate and the Dependent and also the ontological implications of the subsequently acquired wisdom, especially since these features were preserved in K'uei-chi's *trivabhāva* exegesis? And again, if these same two ideas eventually lost their significance in later Fa-hsiang and Hossō, were they perhaps preserved, in some form at least, in other branches of early Chinese Buddhism, in early Ch'an perhaps?

While the immediate results of the preliminary study presented above must remain somewhat limited, they have I feel implications of much broader significance. Perhaps the questions and problems outlined here in conclusion will help to provide the stimulus for a fresh look at both Indian and Chinese Yogācāra.

Abbreviations and Notes

CWSL *Ch'eng-wei-shih-lun*:¹ References are given to the Kandō edition of SAEKI Kyokuga (*Kandō zōho Jōyūshikiron*; ^m Kyoto; 1884) which allows easy access to the French translation of Louis de La Vallée-Poussin (*Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi: La Siddhi de Hsiuan-tsang*; Paris, 1928-1948) and also to the more recent edition of SAEKI Jōin (*Shindō Jōyūshikiron*; ⁿ Nara, 1940). *Taishō* references are also provided.

MS *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha*: References to chapter and section divisions are to the Tibetan edition of Étienne Lamotte (*La Somme du Grand Véhicule d' Asaṅga*, Tome I; Louvain, 1938). That allows easy access to Lamotte's French translation (Tome II of the above), to the *Taishō* edition of Hsiuan-tsang's translation of the MS and its commentaries, and to the forthcoming Japanese translation of NAGAO Gadjin^o (Tokyo, 1982-). Where comparison of Hsiuan-tsang's version with the other three Chinese translations is useful, references are provided to the parallel edition of the four Chinese versions edited by SASAKI Gesshō (*Kanyaku shihon taishō Shōdaijōron*,^p 1931).

S SASAKI Gesshō edition of MS.

T/*Taishō* *Taishō shinshū daizōkyō*,^q edited by TAKAKUSU Junjirō and WATANABE Kaikyoku; Tokyo, 1924-32.

This article is based on research done during 1981-82 while I was a fellow at the Bukkyō Bunka Kenkyūjo of Ryūkyō University,^r Kyoto, Japan with funds from a National Endowment for the Humanities Translation Project grant. I would like to express my thanks to Ryūkyō University, to the NEH, and to Princeton University for their joint support.

I would also like to acknowledge a tremendous debt to NAGAO Gadjin and TAKEUCHI Shōkō.^s Their generous counsel and kind patience enhanced my research in Kyoto immeasurably. Also very helpful during my stay was YOSHIMURA Hiromi,^t Lecturer at Ryūkyō University.

Some of the ideas in this article were originally presented in a paper entitled "The Five-

level Contemplation of Vijñaptimātratā" presented at the Association for Asian Studies Meeting, Los Angeles, 1979.

- 1) The historical development of Indian Yogācāra has not yet been adequately studied. For my purposes I am employing a tentative periodization dividing the developments in India up to the 6th or 7th century into four stages: 1) Early Yogācāra: encompassing several lines of development including the Yogācāra sutras and also the Abhidharma tradition reflected in the *Yogācārabhūmi*; 2) Transitional Yogācāra: the *Dharmadharmatāvibhāga*, the *Madhyānta-vibhāga*, and the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra*; 3) Classical Yogācāra: the *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha*; and 4) Scholastic Yogācāra: beginning with the *Viṃśatikā* and *Triṃśikā* and including the later commentators in India. Excellent work on sorting out the complex stratification of the early period is being done by Lambert Schmithausen and ARAMAKI Noritoshi.^u The Scholastic Period especially is in need of similar historical study. On the problems of Yogācāra textual history see Schmithausen's "Zur Literaturgeschichte der älteren Yogācāra-schule" (*Zeitsch. d. Deut. Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, Supp. I, Vol. 2, 1968).
- 2) This is the problem with a work like A. K. Chatterjee's *The Yogācāra Idealism* (2nd. rev. ed.; Banaras, 1975) which attempts a survey of Yogācāra thought using only the few (and disparate) sources surviving in Sanskrit.
- 3) "... [le système du Vijñānavāda] comporte nombre de thèses, certaines fort importantes, qui n'ont rien de particulièrement idéaliste au sens que j'ai défini au début du présent exposé." (p.265-7) And in the corresponding note: "C'est ainsi que je ne traiterai pas de la théorie des trois natures, imaginaire, dépendante et accomplie, bien qu'elle appartienne en propre au Vijñānavāda; elle n'offre en effet aucun élément de nature véritablement idéaliste." From "La philosophie bouddhique idéaliste" (*Études asiatique*; XXV, 1971, pp.265-323).
- 4) To many it may seem unnecessary to draw attention to something as obvious as the historical nature of human thought (even enlightened human thought). There is, however, a substantial body of modern Buddhist scholarship (especially from Tibetan sources) that shows surprisingly little historical awareness. The basic affinity between the hermeneutical principle of historicity and the Buddhist understanding of impermanence, interdependent coorigination and emptiness is a topic that warrants further discussion.
- 5) The most useful work done to date on *trivabhāva* are the four articles written by NAGAO Gadjin^v and recently republished along with others in his *Chūkan to yūshiki* (Tokyo, 1978).
- 6) *T*: 1861. XLV. 245-374.
- 7) The *trivabhāva* doctrine is also discussed in Chapt. III though that discussion is a special application of the general theory presented in Chapt. II; see n. 27 below.
- 8) This diagram is an adaption of one used by both NAGAO Gadjin and TAKEUCHI Shōkō (though it does not appear in their written works). I shall use it here in a somewhat different context, to bring out the contrasts among different theories of the *trivabhāva*. The following two diagrams are my own.
- 9) Both this view and something closer to K'uei-chi's view can be found in later medieval Japanese Hossō scholarship, the clearest distinguishing feature being seen in the dispute

- over whether only the defiled aspect of the Dependent or both pure and defiled are to be rejected (see below). FUKAURA Seibun mentions this controversy briefly in his *Yuishikigaku kenkyū* (Kyoto, 1954), vol. II, pp. 604-5. It is a problem on which more research needs to be done.
- 10) The converse however is not necessarily true. The I-D-C sequence is found, for example, even in the *MS* itself though only in a specific context (see n. 27 below). It is worth noting here that both sequences are found in the *CWSL* as well. In the initial presentation of the three (*CWSL*: VIII. 26a-31b; *T*: XXXI. 45c8-46c6) the order is I-D-C following the order in the corresponding *Triṃśikā* verse. At the conclusion of that section however, the three are summarized in the D-I-C order (VIII. 31b-32a; *T*: XXXI. 46c7-13).
 - 11) Lamotte's translation of this verse (*La Somme*, p. 120) does not make the point as strongly as it is expressed by Hsüan-tsang (*T*: XXXI. 140a28-29):

If the Dependent did not exist, the Consummate also would not exist;
If everything did not exist, there would never be any defilement, nor any purification.
 - 12) I shall, for the present, intentionally leave open the question whether this transition was begun in China to culminate in the progressive model, or whether it is the Chinese version of a controversy already raised in Indian Mahāyāna circles.
 - 13) *T*: 1861. XLV. 258-374.
 - 14) *T*: 1830. XLIII. 229-606.
T: 1831. XLIII. 607-658.
 - 15) This scholastic awkwardness, it should be noted, is one thing that suggests the possibility of seeing K'uei-chi's interpretation not just as a transitional stage between an earlier and a later position, but rather as a conscious, if cumbersome, attempt to reconcile two already current, but fundamentally divergent interpretations of the *trisvabhāva* doctrine. To say more on that distinction will require first further research into the *trisvabhāva* doctrine in 6th century China.
 - 16) The idea of a dual Dependent nature is encountered several places in the *CWSL*, e. g., VIII. 30a (*T*: XXXI. 46b6-9); cf. K'uei-chi's commentary: *T*: XLIII. 545a7-15.
 - 17) *Triṃśikā*: 22, (pp. 14 & 40 in the edition of Lévi).
 - 18) *CWSL*: VIII. 26a & 30b (*T*: XXXI. 45c12 & 46b19)
 - 19) *CWSL*: VIII. 31a (*T*: XXXI. 46b21)
 - 20) *CWSL*: VIII. 30b (*T*: XXXI. 46b15)
 - 21) "Phenomena and Reality in Vijñaptimātra Thought (I)" in *Buddhist Thought and Asian Civilization* ed. by L. S. Kawamura & K. Scott (Emeryville, CA, 1977); see esp. pp. 258-9.
 - 22) See esp. *T*: XLIII. 546a9-547a13.
 - 23) K'uei-chi discusses this doctrine in two different works, in his *Commentary on the Heart Sutra* (*T*: XXXIII. 526c16-527b10) and in his "Essay on the Doctrine of Nothing but Cognitive Expression" (*T*: XLV. 258b21-259c27).
 - 24) *T*: XLV. 258b23-24.
 - 25) These two cognitions or wisdoms along with their relationship to the *apratīṣṭhitānirvāṇa* doctrine in the *MS* are discussed in my article "Dynamic Liberation in Yogācāra Buddhism" (*Journal of the Int. Assoc. for Buddhist Studies*: II. 2, 1979, pp. 44-64).

- 26) In Section 5 of the "Essay on the Doctrine of Nothing but Cognitive Expression," esp. at 5.3 (*T*: XLV. 261c5-8) K'uei-chi discusses how the Dependent is the object of the subsequently acquired cognition. He states that this involves cognition of the phenomena individually as well as the principle or special characteristic of their phenomenality (in each individual case).
- 27) K'uei-chi's exegesis of the rope-snake analogy is an expansion of that found in *MS*: III. 8-9. Taken in isolation it suggests a progressive interpretation of the *trisvabhāva*, as would the original *MS* text. In both cases it is important to note however that this analogy occurs in a specific context—in a discussion of how, in practice, one comes to understand the doctrine of cognitive expression (*vijñaptimātratā*). In both cases we have a special application of the *trisvabhāva* doctrine, one that can be properly understood only with reference to the broader general theory of *trisvabhāva*. In the *MS* this general theory is presented in Chapt. II; in Section 7 of K'uei-chi's "Essay on the Doctrine of Nothing but Cognitive Expression" (*T*: XLV. 262b16-263a2) we can find his version of a general theory. I hope to explore this point more fully in a later article specifically on the rope-snake analogy.
- 28) For a revealing example of how K'uei-chi's five levels can be easily misconstrued compare the summary account of the doctrine found in the *Hasshū kōyō kōgi* (Bukkyō kaikan ed., Kyoto, 1927; pp. 260-262). There the reader is clearly left with the impression that the Dependent is rejected completely in reaching the Consummate. The core portion of this work, it is interesting to note, was written by Gyōnen in 1268. With the more recent *kōgi* commentary it is still widely studied in Japanese universities as an introduction to Buddhist doctrine in East Asia.
- 29) *T*: XLV. 259a12. There is no question that this phrase in K'uei-chi is easily misunderstood. For a similarly ambiguous text well within the Indian tradition compare *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra* XI: 13 (Lévi ed., p. 58). There too we are told that the Dependent is to be cut off.
- 30) In Hsüan-tsang's translation of Asvabhāva's commentary to the *MS* the verse is found at *T*: XXXI. 415c11-12. What appears to be the same verse is also found in the *Hastavālaprakaraṇa*, a work the Tibetans ascribe to Āryadeva and the Chinese to Dignāga; see F. H. Thomas & H. Ui: "The Hand Treatise" (*Jour. of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1918; pp. 267-310).
- 31) Lit.: "... will no longer be encountered in deluded experience."
- 32) The "both ... together" here is ambiguous, but given the opening phrase of the sentence and what we know of K'uei-chi's view of the Dependent, it would seem most naturally to refer to the two aspects of the Dependent, the defiled and the pure. In other words K'uei-chi is saying that when he says to dismiss the Dependent, he means the defiled aspect and not the pure aspect; cf. the commentary of Kiben: *T*: LXXI. 606a28-b4.
- 33) This is the most problematic line in the text, and also the one that has given the later commentators the most difficulty, especially those who wish to show that K'uei-chi advocated a complete rejection of the Dependent, both pure and defiled. Some commentators construe it to say "This [spontaneous dismissing of the Imaginary] is different from the [gradual] severing of the Dependent on the Holy Path." The problem with this reading is that it suggests a stronger differentiation of the Imaginary and the defiled

aspect of the Dependent than I find elsewhere in K'uei-chi's views on *trisvabhāva*. Some problems on this point remain.

- 34) The meaning of this line is very important because it establishes the circular link between the contemplation at the first level and that at the fifth level, showing that they are essentially the same. This is indicated by the fact that K'uei-chi uses *i-ch'ung*^{aa} rather than *i-chung*.^{ab} In some cases these two expressions would be interchangeable, but here it is extremely unlikely since K'uei-chi discusses in this essay both the *wu-ch'ung wei-shih*^{ac} and the *wu-chung wei-shih*,^{ad} two quite different doctrines requiring that *ch'ung* and *chung* be distinguished.
- 35) K'uei-chi's immediate sources for this idea would have been *Triṃśikā*: 22d and the corresponding discussion in *CWSL*: VIII. 31a-31b (*T*: XXXI. 46b26-29) where we find the unequivocal statement: "It is impossible to see the Dependent without having realized the Consummate, for without having understood the emptiness of the Imaginary one cannot truly know the Dependent. Only once the nondiscriminating wisdom has realized Thusness is one able, with the subsequently acquired wisdom to discern and understand the illusory particulars of the Dependent." In K'uei-chi's own works this idea that the Dependent and the Imaginary are truly known only after realizing the Consummate is found as the theme of Section 7 of the "Essay on the Doctrine of Nothing but Cognitive Expression" (see esp. *T*: XLV. 262c8-263a) where he explains that the *MS*: III. 8-9 passage on the rope-snake analogy applies only at the level of an intellectual understanding at the preliminary stages of practice. With regard to true realization he concludes that the proper sequence is the realization of the Consummate followed by true cognition of the Dependent which entails negation of the Imaginary.
- 36) see n. 35 above.
- 37) It is interesting that K'uei-chi's sequence here—I('D')→C→D(-I)—is slightly different from what we find in the *CWSL* passage cited in n. 33 above. There the sequence would be I('D')→C(-I)→D. The priority of realizing C first remains the important point in both cases however.
- 38) *CWSL*: VIII. 30b-31a (*T*: XXXI. 46b21-c4) and K'uei-chi's commentary at *T*: XLIII. 546c26-547a13.
- 39) Eg., *T*: XLV. 258c4 where they are used in correlation with the Consummate and the Dependent respectively.
- 40) Eg., *T*: XLV. 259a13-14.
- 41) See SHIMADA^c Kenji's "*Taiyō no rekishi ni yosete*"^{ao} (*Tsukamoto Festschrift*, Kyoto, 1961, pp. 416-430).
- 42) We do seem to have here a case of K'uei-chi introducing an Indian Yogācāra doctrine into a distinctively Chinese controversy. It should be remembered, however, that the Chinese *ts'i/yung* debates resulted from attempts to understand the early Buddhist literature. For K'uei-chi the pair of terms was certainly as much Buddhist as Chinese.

CHARACTERS

- a: 玄奘 b: 窺基
c: 大乘法苑義林章 d: 非異非不異
e: 非異非一 f: 不即不離

- | | |
|------------------------|---------------------|
| g 境界 | h 遣相証性 |
| i 理 | j 事 |
| k 体用 | l 成唯識論 |
| m 佐伯旭雅: 冠導成唯識論 | n 佐伯定胤: 新導成唯識論 |
| o 長尾雅人 | p 佐々木月樵: 漢譯四本対照撰大乘論 |
| q 高楠順次郎, 渡辺海旭: 大正新修大藏經 | r 龍谷大学仏教文化研究所 |
| s 武内紹晃 | t 芳村博実 |
| u 荒牧典俊 | v 長尾雅人: 中観と唯識 |
| w 深浦正文: 唯識学研究 | x 八宗綱要講義 |
| y 煥然 | z 基弁 |
| aa 一重 | ab 一種 |
| ac 五重唯識観 | ad 五種唯識 |
| ae 島田度次: 体用の歴史に寄せて | |