[In 
reply to Paolo Magnone]
 
Dear Paolo,
 
I 
fully agree with your important remark:
> First of all, we should carefully 
distinguish between the theoretical
> and historico-philological import 
of  the discussion. On the
> theoretical side, we may regard a 
certain statement as unwarranted
> or inconsistent, which must not in 
any way hinder our recognition,
> whether or not such statement has 
been made, on the historico-
> philological side.
At the same time I do accept as a 
principle of analysis, that whenever we have two competing interpretations - 
philologically both possible - the more coherent and plausible one is to be 
preferred.
 
> we may have misgivings about the 
notion of a purpose without an
> intelligent subject entertaining 
it. Still the interpretation of SK 21 is 
> not as plain as that.
I do have misgivings about the notion 
of a purpose *of an intelligent subject* not willing it. The puruSa is 
conscious; it has purposes; therefore (I think) he wills. SK 21 is 
controversial, but it is perfectly clear that the purpose is the purpose of the 
puruSa only and not of the pradhAna; cf. e.g. puruSArtha eva hetur (31); svArtha iva parArtha ArambhaH(56); tasyArtham 
apArthakaM carati (60).
 
> the puruSa is described as 
impartial, neutral, inactive and even
> impassive. This being 
granted, I cannot envisage any more space
> for volition as I understand 
it.
A judge [ in Sanskrit, draSTR :-) 
] may be impartial, neutral and even impassive and at the same time he may want 
the criminal to be punished.
 
> adhyavasAya is akin to vyavasAya as used in BhG 2.41 with the
> meaning of "resolution"
I disagree: the context is significantly 
different. Here the buddhi *can* be vyavasAyAtmikA, and can be its *opposite*; 
in the SK it *is* adhyavasAya.
Larson's suggestion (buddhi = will) is a bit surprising 
after his clear analysis of buddhi as involved in the last stage of the process 
of perception. It is only natural that he later changed his mind - in the 
Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies he translates SK 23: "Intellect is 
characterized by reflective discerning".
 As from SK 5 (prativiSayAdhyavasAyo dRSTaM) 
it is clear that adhyavasAya is essential to experience/perception, something 
like conceptualization / understanding / categorizing / grasping would seem more 
appropriate than resolution / will, as no volition is needed for 
perception.
 
> it is hardly possible to pursue a discussion such as this through this 
means.
I am disappointed. (In Hungary there are no one to discuss such matters 
with.) What is the forum you would suggest?
 
Yours, Ferenc