[INDOLOGY] Analogues to Anselm's Ontological Arguments in Indian Philosophy?

Mon Jun 24 23:48:01 UTC 2024

Greetings All,

Thanks to Jeff, Aleksandar, Matthew, Dan, Dimitry and Howard for this great
discussion.

I don't want to extend an already extended discussion, but I do have a few
observations.

Anselm moved from the idea of God, to existence. Rūpa moved from the
existence of Nārāyaṇa and Kṛṣṇa to the superiority (or originality) of
Kṛṣṇa because of his specific qualities. Thus, Anslem sought to establish
God's existence, and Rūpa to establish a particular form of God among
options, so to speak.

Anselm's properties of God seems contained in a broadly philosophical
concept of God (perhaps a European scholastic bias?), whereas Rūpa's God is
from the theological aesthetics of the Bhāgavatapurāṇa.

Howard, what stops the devotee of Viṣṇu-Nārāyaṇa from contesting that
Nārāyaṇa is by quality superior to Kṛṣṇa, turning the logic to their own
side? Would that be a problem? It seems that one could argue that Rūpa's
argument rests on a more subjective idea of God (e.g. what is beautiful)
than Anselm's more generic concept of God, and that Rūpa's argument could
be turned to establish the superiority of Śiva, Devī (or others) if one
took them as a given.

Sincerely,
Jonathan Edelmann

On Mon, Jun 24, 2024 at 4:42 PM Howard Resnick via INDOLOGY <
indology at list.indology.info> wrote:

> Dear Aleksandar,
>
> Thank you for raising an important distinction: Rūpa did not arrive at his
> Kṛṣṇa-bhakti a posteriori, but he also certainly did not reason his way
> there by any kind of a priori logic. He begins from the conviction of
> Kṛṣṇa’s reality and then reasons *about* Kṛṣṇa, rather than *to* Kṛṣṇa.
>
> Within the Caitanya-bhakti tradition, Rūpa and others are considered to be
> enlightened souls with direct experience of Kṛṣṇa. Thus, from this
> perspective, their epistemic method is something like
> divya-pratyakṣa-jñāna, knowledge by direct spiritual experience. This is
> somewhat of a paraphrase of Bhagavad-gītā 9.2, where rāja-vidyā is said to
> be pratyakṣa-avagamam, understanding by direct experience. The Gītā very
> often compares ‘knowing’ to ’seeing’, as in the reference at 4.34 to
> tattva-darśinaḥ, which I would translate as ’seers of categorical truth.'
>
> And of course we have the example of Arjuna himself.
>
> Thanks again, Aleksandar, for your clarification.
>
> Best,
> Howard
>
>
>
>
>
> On Jun 24, 2024, at 10:37 AM, Uskokov, Aleksandar <
> aleksandar.uskokov at yale.edu> wrote:
>
> Dear Howard,
>
> Could you elaborate on the claim that Rupa assumes the existence of the
> said divinities a priori? My impression is that for him these are
> scriptural facts. There is a case to be made that some, including Rupa’s
> nephew Jiva, have understood some kinds of linguistic cognition to be a
> priori, in some sense—I.e., analytic insofar as, say, Himalaya as
> linguistic fact means repository of snow and as such linguistic fact cannot
> be without snow—but is there anything like it in Rupa’s understanding of
> the various divinities? Would it not be more accurate to say that, while he
> does not derive their existence from the world, he does not derive them
> from reason either?
>
> If so, I think that Matthew's caution stands. In any case, it is perhaps
> telling that hardly anyone has a problem registering how the argument from
> design has something in common with the Nyaya arguments from productness,
> sentience, and the use of instruments, while with Anselm we are grasping
> for straws.
>
> In any case, perhaps a good thing to clarify first is what reason for
> Anselm is.
>
> Best wishes,
> Aleksandar
>
> Get Outlook for iOS <https://aka.ms/o0ukef>
> ------------------------------
> *From:* INDOLOGY <indology-bounces at list.indology.info> on behalf of
> Howard Resnick via INDOLOGY <indology at list.indology.info>
> *Sent:* Monday, June 24, 2024 10:02 AM
> *To:* Matthew Kapstein <mattkapstein at proton.me>
> *Cc:* Indology List <indology at list.indology.info>
> *Subject:* Re: [INDOLOGY] Analogues to Anselm's Ontological Arguments in
> Indian Philosophy?
>
> Thank you Matthew for your comments. I will respectfully defend the notion
> of a real and significant philosophical link between Anselm and Rupa, and
> perhaps other medieval Indian thinkers.
>
> I realize that this is an Indology group and not a forum on European
> scholasticism, however I think the connection between a major Scholastic
> thinker and medieval Indian apologetics is worth pursing a little farther
> here.
>
> I suggest that the major problem with the argument against an Anselm-Rupa
> link is that it takes Anselm out of his 11c historical context and portrays
> him almost as a modern analytic philosopher, concerned with ontology for
> its own sake. Thus the claim that “He is sneakily making a purely logical
> point,” does not seem consistent with historical evidence. Anselm includes
> the argument in his *Proslogion, a *“meditative prayer” where he declares
> his intention as “faith seeking understanding.” ("fides quaerens
> intellectum" or "faith seeking understanding”). It would be balanced and
> accurate to see Anselm as keenly interested in logic, but sincerely
> engaging that study in God’s service, a view entirely consistent with his
> historical period.
>
> You mention the opposition of Thomas Aquinas, but Thomas' objection was
> that Anselm’s argument is a priori, based on reason alone. Thomas favored
> posteriori arguments since he believed that our knowledge, even of God,
>  begins with sensory experience and proceeds to reason.
>
> Rūpa, like Anselm, makes an a priori argument, since he a assumes a priori
> the existence of Kṛṣṇa, Nāṛāyṇa, Śiva etc. He does not infer their
> existence from his experience of the world. Thus the opposition of Thomas
> reinforces the link between Anselm and Rupa, rather than refuting it.
>
> Best wishes,
> Howard
>
>
> On Jun 24, 2024, at 4:06 AM, Matthew Kapstein <mattkapstein at proton.me>
> wrote:
>
> Dear all,
>
> It seems to me that there may be some uncertainties about the precise
> nature of Anselm's argument in this thread. It is not to be identified as
> an argument about "maximal greatness" per se, a topic that was very well
> investigated in the Buddhist context by Paul Griffiths in his book On Being
> Buddha
> https://sunypress.edu/Books/O/On-Being-Buddha2
> and that seems to me, in one way or another, to be at stake in many of the
> interesting comments made by contributors to thus thread, which concern the
> bigger and better qualities ascribed to the divinity.
>
> This is not what Anslem is doing, however. He is sneakily making a purely
> logical point.
> First, the very conception of "that than which no greater can be
> conceived" must include the concept of being, for that which lacks being is
> less great that that which does not. Note that this premise is not at all
> about superadding or magnifying all sorts of qualities - it concerns, in
> pure abstraction, a logical entailment of the concept "that than which no
> greater can be conceived."
> If we then suppose, as Anselm does, that God alone fills this concept -
> and again it is a purely logical point that "that than which no greater can
> be conceived" must be unque; this follows from the concept itself, call it
> God or what you like - then it follows that the concept of God includes the
> concept of being.
>
> The problem is, of course, that even if we buy into this conceptually
> (which St. Thomas, and I. Kant, for example, did not), it seems to imply
> only something about the concept of God, and not about its real existence.
> This is where the second iteration in terms of necessary being comes in,
> for the concept of necessary being, it would seem, can only apply to a
> being that really is. A necessary being cannot be something that is not. QED
>
> None of the arguments that have so far been adduced in this thread as
> "resembling" Anselm's seem to me to resemble it in fact in its central
> concerns with the logical entailments of conceivability and necessity. I
> have been trying for years to find something in Indian philosophy that
> might prove otherwise, but have not so far succeeded. But Indian philosophy
> is a vast domain, approaching maximal greatness, so something may well turn
> up. I hope that someone will respond to Dan Lusthaus's suggestion about
> Vallabha, for instance, to see whether there might be something there. It
> is certainly true that Indian philosophy knew the main elements from which
> the ontological argument is forged - this much seems true for the Vedantic
> idea of sac-cid-Ananda, which shows us that the very concept of Brahman
> entails its being - but were the few additional steps taken by Anselm ever
> really paralleled?
>
> I suggest that we distinguish clearly between the general idea of maximal
> greatness and Anselm's very precise assertion that any such idea, without
> the explicit assumption of being and the logical entailments thereof,
> remains incomplete.
>
> best to all,
> Matthew
>
> Matthew T. Kapstein
> Professor emeritus
> Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, PSL Research University, Paris
>
> Associate
> The University of Chicago Divinity School
>
> https://ephe.academia.edu/MatthewKapstein
>
> https://vajrabookshop.com/product/the-life-and-work-of-auleshi/
>
>
> https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9781501716218/tibetan-manuscripts-and-early-printed-books-volume-i/#bookTabs=1
>
>
> https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9781501771255/tibetan-manuscripts-and-early-printed-books-volume-ii/#bookTabs=1
>
> https://brill.com/edcollbook/title/60949
>
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>
> On Monday, June 24th, 2024 at 8:16 AM, dmitry shevchenko via INDOLOGY <
> indology at list.indology.info> wrote:
>
> Dear Jeffery,
>
> In the *Yogasūtra-bhāṣya*, attributed to Vyāsa, there is a following
> argument, which is somewhat akin to the ontological argument. We observe in
> the world creatures with various cognitive capacities. Some perceive very
> small things, other very large things, some very remote things, etc. The
> fact that there are various degrees in cognitive capacities suggests that
> there must be the highest cognitive degree, i.e., omniscience. And the
> omniscient being is *īśvara. *
> It is not entirely clear whether the purpose of the argument is to prove
> the existence of God. I believe it is primarily meant to establish the
> possibility of omniscience, against which argue some Mīmāṃsakas.
> Nevertheless, it is based on a similar usage of the idea of "greatness" and
> on conceivability of its possession in the greatest measure...
> I'm attaching Larson's translation of this argument from the YSBh on the
> YS 1.25, with an elaboration by Vācaspati Miśra, who further atttempts to
> establish that omniscience can only be ascribed to God, and not to human
> teachers such as the Buddha and Mahāvīra.
>
> Best wishes,
> Dimitry
>
> On Monday, June 24, 2024 at 01:11:44 AM GMT+3, Jeffery Long via INDOLOGY <
> indology at list.indology.info> wrote:
>
>
> That is extremely helpful, Howard. Thank you!
>
> All the best,
> Jeff
>
>
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>
> On Sunday, June 23, 2024, 6:07 PM, Howard Resnick <hr at ivs.edu> wrote:
>
> Dear Jeff,
>
> There is a passage in the Bhakti-rasāmṛta-sindhu by Rūpa Gosvāmī which is
> a sort of variation on Anselm’s argument. Anselm of course is making an
> ontological argument for the existence itself of God, whereas Rūpa argues
> that Kṛṣṇa must be the most complete form or conception of God, in
> comparison to Nārāyaṇa, Śīva etc, because he possesses the greatest number
> of divine qualities.
>
> What somehow connects Anselm and Rūpa, is that both assume that if God is
> infinitely great, then the greatest conception of God is closest to the
> truth. Anselm deploys this argument, of course, in assuming that existence
> itself is a positive attribute which must therefore be possessed by God.
>
> Rūpa assumes existence and then argues in terms of other attributes. But
> both share the assumption that if God is infinitely great, then then
> greatest conception is closest to the truth. That is what connects them, in
> my view.
>
> Thanks for the topic!
>
> Best wishes,
> Howard
>
> On Jun 23, 2024, at 12:17 PM, Jeffery Long via INDOLOGY <
> indology at list.indology.info> wrote:
>
> Dear Colleagues,
>
> Forgive me if this question has already been raised at some point on this
> list.
>
> Are any of you aware of arguments developed in Indian philosophical
> systems akin to the ontological arguments for the existence of God raised
> by St. Anselm? The closest thing I can think of is Śaṅkara’s argument that
> existence is self-evident.
>
> With much gratitude in advance,
>
> Jeff
>
>
> Dr. Jeffery D. Long
> Carl W. Zeigler Professor of Religion, Philosophy, & Asian Studies
> School of Arts & Humanities
> Elizabethtown College
> Elizabethtown, PA
>
> https://etown.academia.edu/JefferyLong
>
> Series Editor, Explorations in Indic Traditions: Ethical, Philosophical,
> and Theological
> Lexington Books
>
> “One who makes a habit of prayer and meditation will easily overcome all
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>
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>
>
>
>
>
>
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