Indian Syllogism

[Peter M. Scharf]

As I believe Plamen attempted to point out 25.2.06

Given the premises:in A
1.	Wherever there is smoke there is fire
2.	There's smoke on the mountain

It is a deduction, not induction, to conclude

3.	There is fire on the mountain.

This is no less a deduction than in B
1.	All men are mortal
2	Socrates is a man
Therefore
3	Socrates is mortal

To establish the major premise in B or the vyApti in A is another 
matter.  Induction is involved in establishing a vyApti and is 
objected to on these grounds by, for example, the Carvaka, as being 
only probable, not universal.  The same charge could be laid against 
B1.  If it is argued that B1 is universal because it is an analytic 
statement rather than inductive, a similar argument could be put 
forward with regard to 1 by defining smoke as that which is produced 
by fire.  If it is admitted that B1 requires verification just as A1 
is admitted in the Indian arena, the same sort of reasoning from 
anvaya and vyatireka would be used.  One could for instancce put 
forward the counterexample to B1, of Yuddhisthira, who obtained 
heaven with his body.

-- 
**************************************************
Peter M. Scharf             (401) 863-2720 office
Department of Classics      (401) 863-2123 dept
Brown University
PO Box 1856                 (401) 863-7484 fax
Providence, RI 02912        Scharf at brown.edu
http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Classics/Scharf/
http://sanskritlibrary.org/
**************************************************