Yogacara idealism

[birgit kellner]

A last (I promise!) clarification on Satya Upadhya's last message on
"Yogacara idealism":

-->> The sahopalambha niyama argument can be framed in two different ways (as
SU> i pointed out in my earlier post). You do not dispute this, so i presume u
SU> agree with what i said on how the two variations of the argument can be
SU> framed.

Presuming that the discussion of the sn-argument is still motivated by
the question that initiated it, namely whether or not YogAcAra can be
considered "idealism", my contributions so far aimed to point out that
the sn-argument is not the best starting-point to investigate this
issue. Therefore I did not enter any detailed discussions of this
particular argument up to this point, for which reasons you are not
entitled to attribute to me any agreement or disagreement with your
interpretations.

-->> In both variations of this argument, there is a denial of the
SU> independent existence of the external object.

The "two versions", as you put them, are "the object has no reality
apart from the idea, which means that it is the same as the idea", and "the idea and the object are experienced as
identical and hence have to be admitted as identical." A literal
translation of the sn-argument runs as "blue and its perception are
non-different, because they are necessarily perceived together".
Leaving aside the fact that there are different intepretations of the
expression "non-different" (abheda) amongst DharmakIrti's
commentators, note that the argument merely states that what is
perceived, i.e. the phenomenal object of a perceptual cognition, and
its perception are non-different. The argument does not directly
address the status of external objects. The main difficulty in your
above rephrasings of this argument is the ambiguity of the word
"object": You read the argument as talking about external objects; in
fact, it deals with phenomenal object, with percepts, images,
representations - in other words, that which appears in perception.
This is one reason why the sn-argument cannot be taken to directly
address the existence of external objects.

-->> Do you dispute the fact that the PS is the most important work of
SU> Dignaga?
I fail to see what this has to do with the sn-argument.

-->> How do you propose to make sense out of the PS if you refuse to follow
SU> the commentary of Jinendrabudhi, if his is the only commentary on the work.
SU> I am not saying u need to follow him blindly, but you do have to recognize
SU> his importance.
The question is not "making sense" in terms of textual understanding
(please note also that both PS and PST are, for the most part, extant
only in Tibetan translation, which, no matter how good the translation
is, always imposes limits on understanding). The question is whether
or not the PST can, or should be, a somehow privileged source for
understanding the sn-argument - this I would rather doubt.

-->> I have taken a look at Vinitadeva's commentary, and i personally found
SU> it to be illuminating in as much as we get the hint from him first that
SU> Dharmakirti may be  writing his book ["Nyaya Bindu"] not from the Yogacara
SU> position but from the Sautantrika position.
What exact subject-matter from the NyAyabindu are you talking about?
If you are talking about the definition of perception, the above
statement is incorrect, as VinItadeva is one of those commentators who
declare the qualifier "non-erroneous" (abhrAnta) in the definition to
mean "reliable"/"non-belying" (avisaMvAdakatva) precisely because the
definition is to be applicable on BOTH YogAcAra and SautrAntika
presuppositions. Apart from that, note that this interpretation solely
applies to the definition of perception - not to the composition of
the NyAyabindu as such.

-->> Your argument that we ought to disregard Vinitadeva because Dharmottara
SU> disagrees with him appears presumptious.
This was not my argument. My argument was that you lumped VinItadeva
and Dharmottara together as those commentators of DharmakIrti that we
should mainly rely on. I thought this to be quite ironic, because
precisely amongst these commentators, you will find much disagreement
and, in fact, a huge difference in approach to writing a commentary.

-->> As i have read, the Tippani is quite clear in that Dharmakirti does not
SU> discuss the problem of perception from the Yogacara standpoint, and that he
SU> actually assumes the position of a Sautantrika philosopher, assuming for the
SU> purpose the reality of the external world. Here is a sentence from the
SU> Tippani (19), as quoted by Chattopadhyaya in his book: "bahyanayena
SU> Sautantrika-matanusarena acaryena laksanam krtam".

As I stated above, there is a controversy amonst commentators
regarding the interpretation of the qualifier "abhrAnta" in the
DharmakIrtian definition of perception. VinItadeva and KamalazIla,
perhaps also ZAntarakzita, interpret "abhrAnta" as "avisaMvAdaka"
("non-belying"/"reliable") in order to harmonize the definition with both YogAcAra and SautrAntika
presuppositions, whereas Dharmottara interprets it "not erroneous with
respect to an object-suppoert", i.e. as solely based on SautrAntika presuppositions (the Tippani merely reiterates his view).
This disagreement, by the way, calls into question your sweeping
generalization that "Dharmakirti includes the principle of "abhranta"
in his defn. of perception and he no longer remains a Yogacara when he does that, and that is why he creates a problem for his
commentators".

The key issue underlying the discussion of "abhrAnta" is whether error is assumed to be due
solely to conceptualization or also due to deficient sense-faculties:
In the former case, perceptions like that of a double-moon which arise
from damaged senses would either have to be admitted as correct or as
instances of conceptual error - both approaches create further
problems. In the latter case, problems arise regarding DignAga's
definition of perception solely by the qualifier "devoid of
conceptualization".

DharmakIrti clearly advocates both sensory and conceptual error,
whereas DignAga's position is - as I see it - more difficult to
reconstruct. There are passages like the famous list of
"pseudo-perceptions" in PS I 7cd-8ab which may indicate an acceptance
solely of conceptual error, but then there are others in which
sense-faculties are also mentioned as producing error. There is quite
a bit of scholarly discussion on this issue (articles by Masaaki
Hattori, Eli Franco, Toru Funayama), and I shall not go into further
details. At any rate, commentators introduced the criterion of a harmonization with YogAcAra- and/or
SautrAntika-presuppositions rather as a tool in order to justify their
respective interpretations of this expression, and in order to
harmonize DharmakIrti's definition with that of DignAga - the question
as to whether DignAga/DharmakIrti ARE YogAcArins or SautrAntikas was
not their main concern in this context.

SU> At least give some names if you dispute this so strongly. (I may mention
SU> that Chattopadhyaya is a highly respected scholar, so one would not expect
SU> him to make such childish mistakes as you imply.)

I am not interested in exegesis of Chattopadhyaya, whose work is not
available to me so that I cannot pass judgment on it (from the
passages you quote, it seems to me that his English terminology is
simply not refined enough to capture the implications of the arguments
presented by DharmakIrti etc.), but in understanding and assessing arguments by Buddhist epistemologists.
Chattopadhyaya should have taken into account commentaries and texts by
Devendrabuddhi, ZAkyabuddhi, ZAntarakSita and PrajJArakaragupta. See
for yourself whether he did, and how.

-->> As i understand, if you wish to work with pramanas you have to admit the
SU> independent existence of external objects (or else you have to change your
SU> defn. of the pramanas, as Dignaga in fact does). If you insist that
SU> ideas-and ideas alone- are real, and still wish to work with pramanas, then
SU> you do have a problem.

DignAga does not provide an explicit definition of pramANas, so I
would find it quite difficult to actually find a definition that he
"changed". Furthermore, as you state the "problem", I think it is put
in an overly crude fashion which does not do justice to problems that
Buddhist epistemologists in fact had to deal with. As such, the notion of "working with pramANas" is
sufficiently broad as to include representationalist, idealist, and
whatever other presuppositions. The question is always what criteria
are produced for (a) the production of cognitions and (b) their
justification - on both issues, you can of course develop
representationalist or idealist approaches. At the risk of stating the
obvious: It always depends on what problems you want to solve through
what approach.

-->> I understand that you (and Stephen Hodge) dispute this claim that the
SU> Yogarcara philosophers admit the reality of only ideas, but that is not what
SU> i have read. (Already i gave u extensive quotes of Hiriyanna and
SU> Chattopadhyaya for this purpose.) Would you care to comment on why there is
SU> this seemingly appaling discrepancy between how scholars are viewing the
SU> Yogacara?

For the umpteenth time: I do not dispute the claim that YogAcAra
philosophers admit the reality of only ideas. I have no opinion on
this issue, because (a) the statement "admitting the reality of only
ideas" is too vague, I think, to yield any philosophically interesting
understanding of the issues at hand, and (b) I am not competent
enough to assess the works ascribed to AsaGga, Vasubandhu, Sthiramati,
DharmapAla and so forth in this respect. I merely aimed to point out
that the sn-argument, and now also the dispute on "abhrAnta", are not
good starting-points for looking into this question.

SU> "There is thus no doubt that in his logic Dharmakirti is making statements
SU> that are apparently peculiar for a strict Vijnana-vadin. He says
SU> "arthakriya-samarthya-laksanatvad vastunah": a real thing ("Vastu": real
SU> thing?) is that which is characterised by the capacity of producing
SU> practical success.

Well, if mental events alone are accepted as real, then this statement
would have to be interpreted as propunding that mental events are
characterized by their capacity for the fulfilment of a
purpose/realization of a goal. "vastu" is merely some state of affairs
that is real, it need not be a material object, or an external entity.
"arthakriyA" can certainly also be interpreted on these
presuppositions, so this particular statement would not strike me as
peculiar for a "strict" VijJAnavAdin.

SU> Dharmakirti comes out with a remarkable answer to this. "How
SU> knowledge," he says, "which is the sole existing reality, can appear in the
SU> form of objects, even i do not know..Just as people, under the spell of
SU> magic, see pieces of mud, etc. not in their own form but in certain other
SU> forms, so does knowledge appear there not in its own form but in the form of
SU> objects" (NB i.14).

This passage does not appear in NB, so please recheck your sources.

On the whole, I have the impression that you are not reading my
messages thoroughly, or if you do, that you are not taking my statements into account
properly when you compose yours. Otherwise I would not have to repeat myself
for so many times, and I would not encounter statements in your
messages again that I had already clarified before. You also have not made
use of the important contribution by John Dunne, who pointed out
many revealing passages and ideas that should assist in investigating
the avobe issues. Furthermore, it seems to me that your key interest lies in defending Chattopadhyaya rather
than evaluating his interpretations on the background of primary
sources - which are, after all, what one should mainly be interested
in, unless one were to establish Chattopadhyaya as an original
philosopher rather than a scholar of Indian Philosophy.

I consider this a rather unhelpful approach to discussing these
issues, which is unlikely to generate any further or deeper
understanding - which is why I shall bow out now and consider this
thread closed at least from my side.

---
Best regards,

Birgit Kellner
Institute for Tibetan and Buddhist Studies
Vienna University