Yogacara idealism

[Satya Upadhya]

birgit kellner on  Sun, 7 Jan 2001 19:19:48 -0500:

>I believe, and I think that John
>Dunne would agree with me on this, that the
>sahopalambhaniyama-argument is not a particularly good argument to
>rely on for such an investigation, and I frankly don't understand why
>it is considered as necessary by Satya Upadhya to concentrate on this
>argument for an examination of whether or not YogAcAra can be
>considered as "idealism".

--> The sahopalambha niyama argument can be framed in two different ways (as
i pointed out in my earlier post). You do not dispute this, so i presume u
agree with what i said on how the two variations of the argument can be
framed.

--> In both variations of this argument, there is a denial of the
independent existence of the external object. This is why i think it serves
the purpose of "idealism".


>Jinendrabuddhi is the only one whose commentary on DignAGas PS has
>been transmitted. Arguing that he is *therefore* the most important
>interpreter of DignAga is quite a stretch - philosophically speaking,
>I would say that DharmakIrti is the most important interpreter of
>DignAga.

--> Do you dispute the fact that the PS is the most important work of
Dignaga?

>>Furthermore, even if it is not possible to make textual sense
>of a text without reading a certain commentary, this does not mean
>that one has to accept all philosophical interpretations of that
>commentary, nor that these interpretations are particularly important
>either historically or philosophically.

--> How do you propose to make sense out of the PS if you refuse to follow
the commentary of Jinendrabudhi, if his is the only commentary on the work.
I am not saying u need to follow him blindly, but you do have to recognize
his importance.

>
> >>Most popular among commentars of Dharmakirti are
> >> >Vinitadeva and Dharmatottara.
>
>Most populare where, when, and with whom? Dharmottara's importance for
>the development of the Buddhist epistemological tradition
>nonwithstanding, I fail to see the crucial importance of VinItadeva,
>whose textual interpretations - and philosophical interpretations he
>hardly provides anyway - are on the whole treated with great
>scepticism by (guess whom) Dharmottara. Arriving at an idea about the
>philosophical impact of DharmakIrti's writings on the basis of
>VinItadeva's commentary seems a quite futile undertaking to me,
>given the character of VinItadeva's work.
>

--> I have taken a look at Vinitadeva's commentary, and i personally found
it to be illuminating in as much as we get the hint from him first that
Dharmakirti may be  writing his book ["Nyaya Bindu"] not from the Yogacara
position but from the Sautantrika position.

--> Your argument that we ought to disregard Vinitadeva because Dharmottara
disagrees with him appears presumptious. To give an example, Kumarila Bhatta
of the Mimansa school has three major commentators--Parthasarathi Mishra
being the most important one. On a few important issues, Parthasarathi
disagrees with the other commentators on interpreting Kumarila. This doesn't
mean that we need to disregard what the other commentators wrote.


>Actually, the TippanI is only transmitted for a part of the first
>chapter of the NyAyabinduTIkA, so we cannot depend on it for reading
>Dharmottara's NyAyabinduTIkA on the whole. What *we* rely on most in
>case of problematic passages is the sub-commentary of Durvekamizra,
>entitled "DharmottarapradIpa".

--> As i have read, the Tippani is quite clear in that Dharmakirti does not
discuss the problem of perception from the Yogacara standpoint, and that he
actually assumes the position of a Sautantrika philosopher, assuming for the
purpose the reality of the external world. Here is a sentence from the
Tippani (19), as quoted by Chattopadhyaya in his book: "bahyanayena
Sautantrika-matanusarena acaryena laksanam krtam".




>These are by no means the only interpreters of DignAga and
>DharmakIrti, nor are they necessarily the most competent ones for all
>contexts and purposes.

At least give some names if you dispute this so strongly. (I may mention
that Chattopadhyaya is a highly respected scholar, so one would not expect
him to make such childish mistakes as you imply.)

Furthermore, I would like to know on what basis
>it is asserted that neither of them finds it "permissible" to claim
>full consistency between idealism and the discussion (which one in
>particular?) of pramANas.

--> As i understand, if you wish to work with pramanas you have to admit the
independent existence of external objects (or else you have to change your
defn. of the pramanas, as Dignaga in fact does). If you insist that
ideas-and ideas alone- are real, and still wish to work with pramanas, then
you do have a problem.

--> I understand that you (and Stephen Hodge) dispute this claim that the
Yogarcara philosophers admit the reality of only ideas, but that is not what
i have read. (Already i gave u extensive quotes of Hiriyanna and
Chattopadhyaya for this purpose.) Would you care to comment on why there is
this seemingly appaling discrepancy between how scholars are viewing the
Yogacara?

As stated above, idealist notions are simply
>not relevant to certain arguments in DharmakIrti's works, so it is
>quite understandable why certain interpreters do not regard it as
>necessary to expressly state full consistency with idealism, or
>YogAcAra.

--> As i mentioned earlier, you either admit the independent existence of
objects in the world or you deny this and admit that only ideas are real. If
you deny them, and still wish to work with pramanas (which presuppose the
independent existence of objects) then you have a problem.

--> It is for this purpose that Dignaga drops the principle of "abhranta"
("non-illusory") in his defn of perception , so as to make his work on
pramanas consistent with the denial of external objects with Yogacara. [
Vachaspati Mishra (c. 9th century), reacting to Dignaga's defn. of
perception, comments that: "The master has dropped the characterestic of
non-illusoriness, since this non-illusoriness is suicidal for his whole
system." (quoted in Chattopadhyaya 65)]   Dharmakirti includes the principle
of "abhranta" in his defn. of perception and he no longer remains a Yogacara
when he does that, and that is why he creates a problem for his
commentators.


>In general, it is quite dubious to argue from "N.N. does
>not state that A is fully consistent with B" to "N.N. does not consider it
>as permissible to state that A is fully consistent with B".

I agree. I had typed out some intro material, and had clarified in my last
post that Chattopadhyaya goes into details after the intro. I wanted u to
read the intro, because your views are a lot different from his and also
several other scholars on the Yogacara. Here is another quote from
Chattopadhyaya (pgs 62-63):

"There is thus no doubt that in his logic Dharmakirti is making statements
that are apparently peculiar for a strict Vijnana-vadin. He says
"arthakriya-samarthya-laksanatvad vastunah": a real thing ("Vastu": real
thing?) is that which is characterised by the capacity of producing
practical success.

What does Dharmakirti mean by this? What, in particular, does he mean by
"object", when as a Vijnana-vadin he is convinced that only knowledge or
idea is real? Dharmakirti comes out with a remarkable answer to this. "How
knowledge," he says, "which is the sole existing reality, can appear in the
form of objects, even i do not know..Just as people, under the spell of
magic, see pieces of mud, etc. not in their own form but in certain other
forms, so does knowledge appear there not in its own form but in the form of
objects" (NB i.14). This is way of saving idealism no doubt, and, as we
shall see, it is perhaps the way in which Dignaga also wants to save
idealism. But the consequence of this for logic is disastrous. It means that
as a consistent idealist he cannot really speak of objects over and above
bare knowledge, which, for the purposes of logic, he is obliged to do. When
he is doing this, he is acting like one under the general spell of magical
illusion--deluded by the appearance of objects where there are actually
none. The discussion of the pramanas, in other words, are discussions only
within the general framework of illusion. This is the position of the
Sunya-vadins, Maya-Vadins, and early Vijnana-vadins. And if this is also the
real position of Dignaga and Dharmakirti, what after all does their
enthuiasm for discussing right knowledge of objects really mean? Apparently
it is not easy to reconcile logic with idealism and Dharmakirti perhaps
feels that the easiest way to proceed in logic is to feign indifference to
the problem of such reconciliation. Thus, he declares, "Closing, like
elephants, our eyes to the real situation, we proceed like ordinary people
to consider the nature of objects" (PV iii.353-5). This, it is not difficult
to see, is more of the nature of the admission of a crisis than a resolution
of it.
The crisis is most sharply felt in the understanding of direct experience or
perception as a pramana..."


-Satya
_________________________________________________________________________
Get Your Private, Free E-mail from MSN Hotmail at http://www.hotmail.com.