Yogacara idealism

[Satya Upadhya]

The post i am sending now has been rejected twice before. Hope it can be
read. Interesting to note that John Dunne believes that Dharmakirti denies
the reality of external objects.

Aside to John Dunne: According to you, has the "sahopalambha niyama" been
successfully refuted by other Indian philosophers?
-Satya

>
>I had sent the following msg yesterday to indology but it got rejected (2
>post limitation). Hence, am sending again. One point to be noted is this:
>how do the opponents of the Yogacara view the sahopalambha niyama i.e. how
>do they understand it? The argument, as they see it, can be framed in two
>different ways: in the first way, one may conclude that the "object has no
>reality apart from the idea, which means that it is the same as the idea."
>In the second way, one may conclude that "the idea and the object are
>experienced as identical and hence have to be admitted as identical."
>[words
>in quotes from "What is living and what is dead in Indian philosophy" , pgs
>375 and 377]
>
>As i mentioned down below, one may understand the "sahopalambha niyama"
>better if one reads the refutation of this argument by the opponents of the
>Yogacara position (Vaibhasika budhists, Jains, Mimansakas,
>Nyaya-Vaisesikas,
>etc.). Such refutations do exist, and i have mentioned those who refute
>this
>argument in my post below.
>
>Comments from Stephen Hodge, birgit kellner and others would be much
>appreciated.
>
>As an aside, i have to wonder whether being a Mahayana Budhist scholar
>makes one develop a bias (so that any refutations, traditional or modern,
>of
>any Budhist idealistic  arguments, like the "sahopalambha niyama", are not
>taken seriously).
>
>-Satya
>
> >
> >In his "What is living and What is dead in Indian Philosophy", D.P.
> >Chattopadhyaya writes in the chapter "Idealism and Logic: A
>clarification"
> >(pgs 56-59):
> >
> >"Though Indian idealism, generally speaking, seeks its sanction from the
> >outright condemnation of the pramanas, a section of the later
> >representatives of Vijnana-vada--apparently flouting the attitude of
>their
> >own predecessors or the earlier Vijnana-vadins--somehow or other develop
>a
> >keen interest in the problems of the pramanas. The most prominent of them
> >are Dignaga, Dharmakirti and their followers. They cannot do this without
> >taking the pramanas seriously. And the fact is that they attach great
> >importance to these. As Dharmakirti opens one of his shorter works with
>the
> >assertion: "All successful human action presupposes right knowledge.
>Right
> >knowledge is twofold, namely direct experience ("pratyaksa") and
>inference
> >("anumana"). Thus these philosophers remain idealists, wanting to outgrow
> >at
> >the same time the anxiety of their fellow philosophers to condemn or
>reject
> >the truth of experience and reason.
> >
> >Are we then to amend the generalised claim that obscurantism is one of
>the
> >main pillars of Indian idealism? We are going to argue that we need not
>do
> >this, for the commitment to idealism on the part of these philosophers
> >does
> >not fully fit with their enthusiasm for logic.
> >
> >To begin with, let us not the fact that are quite indisputable.
> >
> >First, ther is no doubt that Dignaga and Dharmakirti are fully committed
>to
> >the general metaphysical position of vijnana-vada, or the view that ideas
> >and ideas alone are real. As a matter of fact, some of the most
> >sophisticated arguments in defense of this view are evolved by them.
> >Secondly, there is no doubt either that they are among the most advanced
>of
> >the Indian thinkers who discuss the problems of the pramanas, admitting
>the
> >validity of these. As it is rightly pointed out, they infuse Indian logic
> >and epistemology with a new vitality and introduce reforms of far
>reaching
> >consequence into these.
> >
> >However, admitting both these facts, we are still left with an important
> >question. How far does their renewed interest in the pramanas strictly
> >agrees with their commitment to idealism? Are they logicians in the real
> >capacity of being idealists? The question is too important to be
> >overlooked,
> >though for discussing it even in bare outlines we have to digress into
>some
> >technical details of their writings.
> >
> >To begin with , the actual interpreters of Dignaga and Dharmakirti see
>some
> >difficulty about the question and none of them manages to claim
> >straightaway
> >that the Masters write their works on the pramanas with an exclusive
> >commitment to idealism.
> >
> >The most important interpreter of Dignaga is Jinendrabudhi, without whose
> >detailed commentary on the main work of Dignaga (Pramana samuccya), it
> >would
> >be practically incomprehensible for modern scholars. Jinendrabudhi is
> >placed
> >in the 8th century A.D. Most popular among commentars of Dharmakirti are
> >Vinitadeva and Dharmatottara. The special importance for us of
>Vinitadeva's
> >commentary is its simplicity and literalism. He is primarily interested
>in
> >explaining the plain meaning of what Dharmakirti says. Vinitadeva belongs
> >to
> >the 7th century A.D. Dharmottara, who belongs roughly to the next
>century,
> >is more scholastic. For understanding his commentary we have often to
> >depend
> >on a subcommentary written on it called the
> >"Nyayabindu-tika-tippani"--often
> >referred to briefly as "tippani"--by somebody whose name is controversial
> >but who is probably a junior contempory of Dharmottara.
> >
> >These then are the interpreters of Dignaga and Dharmakirti, on whom we
>have
> >to depend. It is therefore not of little interest to note that that none
>of
> >them finds it permissible to assert outright that the discussion of the
> >pramanas on the part of the Masters is fully consistent with their
> >idealism.....
> >
> >...Interestingly, the same difficulty is felt by Vinitadeva, when he
>wants
> >to be clear about the actual metaphysical position from which Dharmakirti
> >writes on the pramanas. He can see that this position is not that of the
> >uncompromising idealist. So he says that Dharmakirti has the intention of
> >explaining the views of both the Sautantrikas and Yogacaras. This cannot
> >but
> >appear strange to us, when we remember that Sautantrika is the name of an
> >earlier form of Budhist philosophy, whose firm commitment to the reality
>of
> >the external world is obligatory for the Yogacaras or Vijnana-vadins to
> >reject outright. Dharmottara makes no comment on this point, but his
> >commentator--the author of the "tippani"--comes out with the startling
> >declaration that , though otherwise a famous follower of Vijnana-vada,
> >Dharmakirti in fact writes the work on logic not from the viewpoint of
>the
> >idealist but accepting for the purpose the standpoint of the Sautantrikas
> >i.e. admitting the reality of the world."
> >
> >---------------------------------------------------------------------
> >
> >Chattopadhyaya then goes on to describe the above in some detail (giving
> >extensive quotes from the original sources).
> >
> >He also gives the "Sahopalambha-niyama" argument in some detail in his
> >book,
> >and then goes on to give the refutations of this particular argument from
> >four different directions--from the Vaibhashika buddhist Subhagupta; the
> >Jain philosopher Akalanka ; Kumarila Bhatta of the Mimansa school; and
>the
> >Nyaya-Vaisesika philosophers.
> >
> >Comments on the above, from Birgit Kellner, Stephen Hodge, and other
> >Budhist
> >scholars, sincerely solicited.
> >
> >-Satya
> >
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