Yogacara idealism

[John Dunne]

This is just a quick note in regard to sahupalambhaniyama; the following
supports Birgit Kellner's position. [Abbreviations: PS =
Pramaa.nasamuccaya; PSV = PS-v.rtti; PV = Pramaa.navarttika]

In brief, Dharmakiirti's argument from the sahopalambhaniyama are NOT his
primary critique against the existence of external objects (baahyaartha).
This argument on its own cannot be used for this purpose because, to
restate Dr. Kellner's point in a slightly different fashion, the
sahoplambhaniyama is necessary to demonstrate the impossibility of external
objects, but it is not in itself sufficient evidence for any such
demonstration.

This is best understood by recalling the primary purpose for the
presentation of the sahopolambhaniyama: namely, to demonstrate that pramiti
(equated here with pramaa.naphala) and pramaa.na are not distinct
entities.The upshot is that the aakaara ("image") in cognition, inasmuch as
it is identical to that cognition, is at once the means of knowledge
(pramaa.na) and the knowledge itself (pramiti/pramaa.naphala). This holds
true REGARDLESS of whether or not one accepts external objects.

Dignaaga makes this point in PSV ad PS1.1.8cd-10 (Hattori 1968:28-29; cf.
Hattori's notes, 1.55-67, pp.97-107). Dharmakiirti discusses the same issue
at several points, the most salient being PV3.311-319 and PV3.334-341.

Now, it is true that in the latter section (PV3.334-341), Dharmakiirti does
indeed make an argument for the nonexistence of external objects (334-336).
However, within that same section, he specifically explains how
sahopalambhaniyama ALSO holds true when the object of perception is assumed
to be other than the mind (PV3.339). This quite clearly demonstrates that
the argument from the sahopalambhaniyama is not in itself sufficient to
demonstrate the nonexistence of external objects. And without wishing to be
harsh, I would say that any claims to the contrary are simply uninformed.

If the argument from the sahopalambhaniyama is not sufficient to disprove
external objects, why then would Dharmakiirti dismiss external objects when
discussing this niyama at PV3.334-336? The reason is that he has already
presented his definitive argument against external objects, and he is here
simply building on that earlier discussion. The definitive argument is
found at PV3.194-224, where Dharmakiirti analyses the possibility of
citrataa in both the object of cognition and cognition itself. The upshot
of this argument is that, at the highest level of analysis, external
objects cannot exist because they cannot pass the test of being either one
(eka) or many/variegated (citra, which in the finaly analysis amounts to
being sthuula). When pushed to its limit, this argument leads to the
conclusion that Dharmakiirti is an aliikaakaaravaadin, as is demonstrated
by the earliest known commentaries on PV, namely, those of Devendrabuddhi
and S'aakyabuddhi.

At the risk of seeming immodest I will add that, in addition to covering
portions of the above in my dissertation, I have also recently presented a
(quite rough) paper on the topic along with translations of the relevant
passages from PV. I hope to have some of this in print before too terribly
long.

Yours,

John Dunne



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John D. Dunne
Assistant Professor
Languages and Cultures of Asia
University of Wisconsin-Madison