Yogacara idealism

[Satya Upadhya]

Sat, 23 Dec 2000 12:45:17 -0500, Birgit Kellner wrote


>
>You have not read carefully enough what I wrote. I pointed out that
>two of the instances you cite in support of the thesis
>"only ideas are real" are ill-chosen, because the statements they make
>are *compatible* with the assumption that external objects exist and
>are real. These instances were DignAga's AlambanaparIkSA and
>DharmakIrti's sahopalambhaniyama-inference. I have *not* stated that
>YogAcAra does not deny external reality; on this issue (and on Dan
>Lusthaus' ideas) I have no firm opinion as yet, and I actually doubt
>that it is useful to discuss such a general and vaguely formulated
>thesis with respect to a school of thought as diverse as YogAcAra. At
>any rate, it is important to
>be careful in choosing one's textual support for statements made about
>Indian philosophers - yours were not carefully chosen.

And again:


>
>Let me try to state, in simple terms, why the sahopalambhaniyama-inferences
>as presented
>in this form does not state that "only ideas are real" and let me
>assume, for the sake of argument, that no additional assumptions over
>and above the inference as given in this form are to be introduced: Images
>appear
>in perceptual cognitions. These are said to be not different from the
>perceptual cognitions themselves.
>Leaving aside the many meanings which this "non-difference" can have,
>one is at any rate justified in concluding that perceptual cognitions
>*directly*
>apprehend only what is given within them, or within consciousness. But
>this does not preclude that blue objects, composed of atoms, *exist* -
>only access to them is not possible in a direct fashion and must be
>explained in a more indirect fashion. Hence, the
>reality or existence of external entities is not per se incompatible
>with the sahopalambhaniyama-inference. It may be possible to derive a
>denial of some sort of external reality from other passages in
>DharmakIrti's texts, but not from this one.
>


I am tempted to quote directly from several scholars i have read, who would
disagree with what Mr/Ms Kellner says. It is tedious work, but i will try. I
request Mr/Ms Kellner (forgive me, but i can't make out ur sex from ur name)
and also other Budhist scholars (Stephen Hodge, etc) to comment on what
follows:

M.Hiriyana in "Outlines of Indian Philosophy" writes (pgs 204-206):

"Budhistic idealism also is of two types: The first of them is pure
subjectivism...The followers of this view are known as Yogacara...In fact in
the triple factor commonly assumed wherever experience arises--"knower",
"known", and "knowledge"--the last alone is here taken to be true. There is
neither subject nor object but only a succession of ideas. The specific form
which cognition at any particular instant assumes is determined in this
view, not by an outside object presented to it, but by past experience. That
is, the stimulus always comes from within, never from without. It is in no
way dependent upon objects existing outside, but is to be traced to an
impression ("vasana") left behind by past experience, which in its turn goes
back to another impression, that to another experience and so on
indefinitely in a beginningless series. At no particular stage in the
series, it must be noted, is the experience due to an external factor. In
other words, the ideas signify nothing but themselves. Since the Yogacara
believes in the reality of nothing but these ideas ("vijnana"), he is also
designated as "vijnana-vadin".

We may mention some of the main arguments by which this extreme view is
maintained. First comes the obvious analogy of dreams where experience
arises without corresponding objects, and internal thoughts appear as
external. The second argument is based upon the view which the Yogarcara
holds in common with the rest of the Budhists that cognition becomes aware
of itself. In self-cognizing cognition, we have a case in which what is
known is identical with what knows; and the Yogacara argues that the same
may be the case in all experience, there being no reason why an explaination
which is not absurd in one case must be so in another. In the awareness of a
jar also,knowledge and the known may be identical. All knowledge is thus
only self-knowledge and the distinction felt between jnana and content is a
delusion.

A third support which the Yogacara cites in favour of his view is the
invariable association ("sahopalambha-niyama") existing between cognition
and its content. Thoughts and things always appear together; and neither
without the other. There is consequently no need to assume that they are
distinct, and they may well be viewed as different phases of one and the
same factor. Lastly, it is argued that the so called objects are seen to
impress different persons differently and even the same person at different
times-- a circumstance which would be inexplicable if the objects were real,
each having its own defined character.

The arguments are much the same as those commonly advanced whenever
subjectivism is sought to be maintained except for the additional
circumstance that everything is conceived here as momentary. But they are by
no means convincing. To take the last of them as an example: It is stated
that objects of experience cannot have any intrinsic nature, for no two
persons agree in their perceptions of them. The argument assumes not only
that there is no agreement whatever between one perceiver and another in
this respect, but also that when anything is presented, it must be
apprehended precisely as it is. But it is forgotten that the content
apprehended may have a subjective side and may, at the same time, point to a
real object outside. Individual variations in the matter of perception do
not, therefore, necessarily mean the non-existence of external objects."

----------------------------------------------------------------------
I will deal with Dignaga later (i think its easier to be convinced that he
was an idealist). Let us stick for now to Dharmakirti, and take a look at
his "Sahopalambha niyama" (which Hiriyana has discussed above) and how
modern scholars see it. On page 14 of his book "Perception: An essay on
classical Indian theories of knowledge", B.K. Matilal writes (pg 14):

"The classic argument of Dharmakirti in favor of Budhistic phenomenalistic
idealism is summed up in an oft-quoted line from one of his lost works:
"sahopalambha-niyanad abhedo nila-taddhiyoh", "the blue and our awareness of
blue are non-distinct, for they are always apprehended together." The
general idea is that if two entities are always and necessarily revealed
together in our consciousness, we will have hardly any criterion for
distinguising between them. The notion of blue as external to our awareness
of it is thereby rendered extremely dubious. To counter this, Udayana has
put his point synoptically in the following line-- "na grahya-bhedam
avadhuya dhiyo 'sti vrttih":  "There is no awareness that arises (in us)
repudiating the distinctness of the apprehensible (object from the
apprehension self)."

-Satya

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