Date of Udhayana

nanda chandran vpcnk at HOTMAIL.COM
Mon Jul 17 16:24:28 UTC 2000


>I'll be brief. The mImAMsaka and the vedAntin have to argue
>for svataH prAmANya, because they have to hold that scripture
>is self-valid (but for different reasons). Generally, most
>arguments about a creator and scripture boil down to,
>"scripture is valid because God wrote it; God exists because
>scripture says so." By holding to svataH-prAmANya, this
>circularity is avoided.

>The naiyyAyika does not accept that scripture, or for that
>matter, any other kind of knowledge, is self-valid. No
>proposition is valid unless it can be proved to be true. The
>naiyyAyikas have had to pay much attention to the nature and
>structure of proof, like logicians elsewhere in the world.
>Scripture derives its validity from being the composition of
>a creator God.

I do not think the concept of svatah praamaanya vaada and
pratah praamaanya vaada of the Miimaamsakaa and the Naiyaayika
are as simple as this. The main point of these doctrines is
to check the validity of knowledge itself - that which you
"know" - from the pramaanas.

I accept that for the Miimaamsakaa since some knowledge is
intrinsically valid, he would accept the shruti the same way.
But again for the Miimaamsaka other kinds of knowledge are
not intrinsically valid - like the testimony of wise men,
since the validity of the testimony is inferred from the
trustworthy character of the person.

Basically the NaiyAyika stand is that at the time of cognition
knowledge is neutral and it is only later that the question of
the validity of knowledge arises. The validity of knowledge is
dependent on external factors like some excellence in the
causes of knowledge or the fruitful activity it gives rise to.

But Miimaamsakaa refutes this on the grounds that mere freedom
from defect and contradiction is enough to generate valid
knowledge. And for them the concept of "neutral" knowledge is absurd.
Validity of knowledge and belief in its validity arise simultaneously along
with knowledge itself.

So the stress is basically on validating knowledge itself and
does not relate to proving things by logic.

>To avoid the circularity mentioned above, any "worthy" nyAya author simply
>*has* to prove the existence of such a creator through independent
>arguments. He cannot say
>that he accepts a creator just because scripture says so. He
>has to validate his philosophical stance through what he would
>consider to be valid proof. And this is irrespective of when
>he may have lived, and irrespective of whether his opponents
>were "great" or not. If he had not made these arguments, he
>would not have been considered "worthy" or the "top" author
>of his school.

If what you say is true even earlier NaiyAyikas should have
done the same thing. But we see neither Gautama nor VAtsyAyana
or UdhyotakAra fighting for the cause. And also NyAya along
with Vaishesika believes in adhrsta or the unseen power which
moves the world. How can you provide logical arguments for such
a concept? And we find that whenever they are unable to prove
something by logic, they immediately take shelter in adhrsta.
This hardly matches the description of somebody who has to
prove everything by logic.

>No, it is not. I don't expect anybody who hasn't made an
>attempt to understand the logical method followed by Sankara
>to get any sense of the nature of how nyAya (note, I don't
>include vaiSeshika here) has influenced him. The influence of
>nyAya on advaita is at least as heavy as on viSishTAdvaita.

> From ontology we move to logical method and is this where
NyAya has influenced Advaita? This doesn't cut too much ice
either for almost all schools both Astika and nAstika, have
benefitted by NyAya's standards and formulations in logic.
But again when comparing Advaita and NyAya, there's a vital
point which should not be missed. For NyAya *knowledge*
of the true nature of the sixteen categories is what will lead
to liberation. Most of the other pre-bhakti schools too believed
that knowledge in some form or the other is what'll fetch
liberation. So logic and the means of knowledge is very
important to them in their scheme for liberation.

But the MAdhyamaka and Advaita differ in this vital regard.
For they do not believe in the ultimate validity of knowledge
itself. None of the pramAnas can grasp reality and are invalid
at the paramArtha level. That's the basis for the two levels
of reality. NAgArjuna's and Shankra's dialectic is aimed at
destroying empirical knowledge itself. But this lower knowledge
should not be confused with the higher knowledge - Atma jnAnam
or knowledge of the Self - which is true knowledge. So unlike
the NaiyAyikas Advaitins do not seek an end in logic itself and
Shankara himself condemns those who are addicted to logic to
an endless cycle of birth and death (quite like the Buddha in
BrahmajAlasutta). Shankara says that he wouldn't be
bothering with philosophy and dialectic if they weren't too
many false views being prevalent. He wants us to give up this
theoretical philosophizing and practice Atma VichAram which is
what will lead to liberation.

So logic is for the MAdhyamikas and the Advaitins, as Chandrakirti
says, only of negative value - useful in destroying the validity
of empirical knowledge, after which it should be given up. So
even in this regard Advaita is diametrically opposed to the NyAya.

PS : Regarding your questions on MAdhyamaka and Advaita, I'm posting my
response under a different subject.
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