Questions on Indian idealism

[birgit kellner]

Wednesday, December 20, 2000, 3:54:11 PM, Satya Upadhya wrote:

-->> I have not read Dignaga's text, and my understanding of this is based on
SU> D.P. Chattopadhyaya's "What is living and what is dead in Indian
SU> Philosophy". On page 35 of his book, Chattopadhyaya writes:

SU> <i> Thus, he [Dignaga] writes a famous work called "the critical examination
SU> of the material objects alleged to correspond to ideas" (Alamabana-pariksa),
SU> in which he wants to prove that the admission of such objects is
SU> philosophically untenable. The main theme of the book is the refutation of
SU> atomism--a theme on which his master Vasubandhu had already written.

I have already summarized the arguments presented in AP in another
posting. Based on that summary, you will see that Chattopadhyaya's
assertions are misguided.

-->> No, i am relying on Vasubandhu's "Vimsatika", Dignaga's "Pramana
SU> samuccaya" (along with a commentary by Jinendrabudhi(circa 8th century
SU> A.D.)), Dharmakirti's "Nyaya-bindu" (along with commentaries on it by
SU> Vinitadeva (circa 7th century AD) and Dharamottara (circa 8th century AD),
SU> and also the commentary on Dharmottara called
SU> "Nyayabindu-tika-tippani"-often referred as "tippani"--by someone considered
SU> to be a junior contempory of Dharmottra); and also Dharmakirti's
SU> "Pramana-vartika". Please note that Dharmakirti and Dignaga cannot be
SU> understood unless you have read their commentators, as far as i understand.
SU> I am also relying on Vachaspati's Mishra's interpretation of Dignaga's
SU> views, and also the views of Dharmakirti as given in the
SU> "SarvadarsanaSangrah" of Madhva.

I am sincerely impressed by the amount of materials you must have read
and carefully studied, no doubt in their original language, or in the
Asian language in which they are preserved (Tibetan in the case of the
PramANasamuccaya and commentary, as well as in the case of
VinItadeva's commentary on NB) - as anyone dealing with this
particular school of Indian thought would no doubt do.

The following assertion suggests to
me, however, that your interpretations are problematic insofar as
statements made in the sources are taken out of context and
then interpreted largely according to, loosely put, whatever notions
you associated with the expressions that occur in them:

-->> In particular, i draw your attention to the claim that Dharmakirti's
SU> "sahopalambha-niyama" argument (the claim that one can  never jump out of
SU> the circle of one's own ideas and reach the object directly, and hence what
SU> one knows is invariably only one's ideas and never the things outside the
SU> mind), designed to strengthen his idealism, has a counterpart (to a great
SU> extent) in the philosophy of Bishop Berkely.

The "sahopalambha-niyama"-argument essentially
says that images such as blue and their perceptual cognitions are non-different,
because they are necessarily cognized together. First of all, this
argument does not entail the non-existence of external
reality - the images within cognitions may well derive from external
entities. Secondly, the sahopalambhaniyama-argument is rather complex
and was used for a variety of purposes within the Buddhist
epistemological tradition (see Takashi Iwata's introduction to his
seminal study on the sahopalambhaniyama-inference). Of course, if you
let your mind wander you may read the "claim that one can never jump
out of the circle of one's own ideas" and so on from the pertinent
passages, but I doubt that in doing so, you would be correctly
representing a view historically held by some Buddhist
epistemologists and connected with the sahopalambhaniyama-inference,
or that you would characterize the theoretical potential of this
inference in an adequate manner. Merely reading Sanskrit sentences or
their translation is not enough to provide a satisfactory
interpretation of their philosophical content.

-->> Lastly, i will say that eminent scholars like S.N. Dasgupta,
SU> S.Radhakrishnan, D.P. Chattopadhyaya,Stcherbatsky and others view the
SU> Yogacara position to be an idealistic one.

Eminent scholars they may well be, but the study of especially
Buddhist epistemology has advanced considerably since those scholars
published their works, because new materials have been made available
and because new methods of interpretation have gained currency.

Information on
studies that are more up to date can be gathered from Ernst
Steinkellner & Michael Torsten Much: "Texte der
erkenntnistheoretischen Schule des Buddhismus." Systematische
Uebersicht ueber die buddhistische Sanskrit-Literatur II. Goettingen:
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. This is a bibliography of secondary literature
on Buddhist epistemology; consulting it is a must for anyone with a
serious interest in Buddhist pramANa.

I am not saying that the above scholars were wrong in calling YogAcAra
"idealistic"; I have not examined this question so thoroughly as to be
compenent enough for a qualified opinion. If you are seriously
interested in this issue, however, I would recommend updating your
sources.

---
Best regards,

Birgit Kellner
Institute for Tibetan and Buddhist Studies
Vienna University