Questions on Indian idealism

[birgit kellner]

Satya Upadhya wrote:
-->> I have taken a look at the Lusthaus article, and i do not agree with his
SU> conclusions. I may mention that he appears to be factually wrong in several
SU> important instances like when he says that there is no Yogacara text which
SU> admits only ideas to be real. This appears to be  wrong as such texts do
SU> exist, to the best of my knowledge. For example, there is the text
SU> "Alambana-pariksa" [meaning 'the critical examination of the material
SU> objects alleged to correspond to ideas'] by the great Dignaga in which he
SU> wants to prove that the admission of such objects is philosophically
SU> untenable.

I shall not comment on Lusthaus' arguments, but at least as far as the
AlambanaparIkSA (plus -vRtti) is concerned, it strikes me as
incorrect to attribute to it the view "only ideas are real".

The underlying question that guides the
text is "what can be the object-support of a perceptual awareness?".
More precisely put: IF it is granted that an "object-support" (Alambanapratyaya) is something (a)
that serves as a cause for perceptual awareness and (b) which shares
a correspondence with the image which appears in a perceptual
awareness, what type of entity can be said to be an object-support?

DignAga examines two [or three, depending on one's reading of the text] "external" candidates for such an
"object-support": Single atoms and an accumulation of several atoms.
Single atoms are causes for perceptual awarenesss, but there is no
image in perceptual awareness that corresponds to them. Conversely,
there is an image that corresponds to an accumulation of several
atoms, but as an accumulation is not substantially real - and only
entities which are substantially real can serve as causes -, it cannot
serve as a cause for perceptual awareness. I.e. single atoms fulfil
condition (a), but not condition (b), whereas accumulations of atoms
fulfil condition (b), but not condition (a).

DignAga concludes that the only type of "entity" which
fulfills both criteria is the cognized image inside perceptual
awareness (antar jJeyarUpaM), which is presented to consciousness as something
external (bahirvad avabhAsate). For it is first of all an image within
perceptual awareness (vijJAnarUpatvAT), and secondly serves as a cause
for perceptual awareness (tatpratyayatayA 'pi ca, AP k.6, Sanskrit
terms cited after a fragment from the TattvasaGgrahapaJjikA). DignAga
then goes on to present two alternative accounts for the causal
process involved, which need not concern us here.

At any rate, he does *not* present any ontological arguments concerning the reality of
external world which would justify the ascription of the claim "only
ideas are real". Rather, he arrives at the conclusion that, *if* it is
accepted that an object-support must cause a perception in which a
corresponding image appears, then external reality cannot fulfill this
particular function - only the internal image in a perceptual
awareness can. This may be interpreted as denying the
epistemological relevance of external reality, but not - at least not
without making additional assumptions - as denying the reality of
external entities.

Another issue is, of course, whether AP(V) should be classified as a
"YogAcAra" text. The answer to this question depends a lot on what
sort of statements within a text one would count as unmistakeable
evidence for such a classification, and on just how strong one's desire
is to have every text fall neatly within one or the other "school" of
Buddhist philosophy. As my desire in this respect is practically
non-existent, I shall leave further discussion to others :-)

[There is a footnote on this issue in Richard Hayes' article "The Question of
Doctrinalism in the Buddhist Epistemologists." Journal of the American
Academy of Religion 52/4 (1984), 645-670, and further remarks in the
footnotes to Masaaki Hattori's "DignAga. On Perception" (Harvard
1968), pp.102ff.]

---
Best regards,

Birgit Kellner
Institute for Tibetan and Buddhist Studies
Vienna University