Does the puruSa will? (was: Re: A text dealing with Ayurveda)

[Paolo Magnone]

On 4 May 99 Ferenc Ruzsa wrote:



> I do have misgivings about the notion of a purpose *of an intelligent subject*
> not willing it. The puruSa is conscious; it has purposes; therefore (I think) he
> wills. SK 21 is controversial, but it is perfectly clear that the purpose is the
> purpose of the puruSa only and not of the pradhAna; cf. e.g. puruSArtha eva
> hetur (31); svArtha iva parArtha ArambhaH(56); tasyArtham apArthakaM carati
> (60).


As I said previously, from the fact that X serves Y's purpose it does not follow
that Y actually purposes X. SK 57 is quite clear about this: as milk acts (i. e.
flows), albeit unwittingly, for the growth of the calf, so does nature act for the
liberation of the puruSa.

By comparing this passage to the preceding kArikA quoted by you, which
reads "pratipuruSavimokSArtham svArtha iva parArtha ArambhaH" it
becomes apparent that "pratipuruSavimokSArtham" in SK 56 is the same as
"puruSavimokSanimittam" in SK 57, and must be understood accordingly.
The meaning is *not* that creation is effected by nature because the puruSa
wills or purposes it, but rather it is effected *for the sake* of the puruSa's
liberation, exactly as the milk flows *not* because the calf wills it, but just
*for the sake* of the calf's growth.

What we have here is a sort of built-in teleology which can dispense with the
need of conscious purposes; but in any case, if there is purpose at all, it is
the nature's. SK 60 describes how nature goes out of her way to do what is
beneficial to the puruSa without reaping any reward for herself.

Thus it is nature who can be said to "purpose" *in a sense*, and in the same
sense we can speak of nature's purpose (subjective genitive). On the other
hand, when we speak of the puruSa's purpose (puruSArtha) this must be
understood as a (sort of) objective genitive: not as purpose entertained by the
puruSa, but as purpose having the puruSa as object.


> > the puruSa is described as impartial, neutral, inactive and even
> > impassive. This being granted, I cannot envisage any more space for
> > volition as I understand it.
> A judge [ in Sanskrit, draSTR :-) ] may be impartial, neutral and even
> impassive and at the same time he may want the criminal to be punished.


This is a misrepresentation! draSTR is certainly not meant to signify a judge
in the SK. In the "juridical" vein, the puruSa is more aptly styled sAkSin, a
mere witness with no deliberative implication whatsoever.


> > adhyavasAya is akin to vyavasAya as used in BhG 2.41 with the
> >meaning of "resolution"
>  I disagree: the context is significantly different. Here the buddhi *can* be
>  vyavasAyAtmikA, and can be its *opposite*; in the SK it *is* adhyavasAya.

Even in SK 23 buddhi is adhyavasAya, so to speak, "in principle", i. e. in its
sAttvika form, characterized by jJAna etc. But surely, when buddhi is
overwhelmed by tamas, hence characterized by ajJAna and the rest, it
cannot be equated with adhyavaSaya in point of fact?

>  Larson's suggestion (buddhi = will) is a bit surprising after his clear
>  analysis of buddhi as involved in the last stage of the process of perception.
>  It is only natural that he later changed his mind - in the Encyclopedia of
>  Indian Philosophies he translates SK 23: "Intellect is characterized by
>  reflective discerning". As from SK 5 (prativiSayAdhyavasAyo dRSTaM) it is clear
>  that adhyavasAya is essential to experience/perception, something like
>  conceptualization / understanding / categorizing / grasping would seem more
>  appropriate than resolution / will, as no volition is needed for perception.

I did not mean to endorse Larson's previous equation of buddhi to will, but
only to suggest that it was at all possible because the notion of
adhyavasAya entails a principle of determination and fixation which is
common to both intellectual categorizing and volitional deliberation. It is
precisely on account of this common ground that GauDapAda can
understand this determination in terms of conceptualization: "this is a pot,
this is a cloth" ---and VAcaspatimizra, on the other hand, in terms of
deliberation: "this is to be done by me".

Regards,






----------------------------
Paolo Magnone
Catholic University of Milan
pmagnone at mi.unicatt.it
http://www.agora.stm.it/P.Magnone/jambu.htm