Consciousness in visishtadvaita
Mani Varadarajan
mani at SHASTA.STANFORD.EDU
Thu Jan 14 18:56:09 UTC 1999
Martin Gansten wrote:
> Thanks for your reply. However, I wished to know specifically if the two
> kinds of knowledge (svarupa- and dharmabhuta-) are mentioned explicitly in
> any of Ramanuja's writings. Do you know?
I cannot recall offhand, but I am almost positive that
Ramanuja makes a difference between the svarUpa-jnAna of
a jIva and dharma-bhUta-jnAna. It is fundamental to his
philosophical approach. I will check and get back to you.
> >In Visishtadvaita, there are two kinds of consciosness,
> >attributive and substantive. [...]
> >Fundamentally, the individual self is a "knower", not mere
> >knowledge as held in schools of Advaita. The substantive
> >consciousness is how the self knows itself [...]
> >The attributive consciousness is how the self knows things
> >other than itself. [...]
> >So van Buitenen's statement is correct.
>
> But it seems to me that what you just said above contradicts van Buitenen's
> statement. You say (like Desika et al.) that there is a substantive
> consciousness, different from the attributive consciousness. Surely this
> means that the *substance* of the jiva is consciousness? Else what is the
> meaning of "substantive"?
I think your question boils down to what the jIva essentially
"is". Is it consciousness or something else? I think we have
to look at Ramanuja's approach to the question. According to
Ramanuja, everything that is predicated of an object is an
attribute of that object. This is because attributes define an
object. One of the reasons Ramanuja makes this point is to
show the impossibility of any description, Vedic or otherwise,
of an Advaitic Brahman, which would consist of pure,
undifferentiated consciousness. The very fact that one calls
It consciousness imbues it with the attribute of consciousness,
according to Ramanuja.
I believe Ramanuja is operating under this premise,
and that the jIva is best described as a locus of
consciousness, action, etc. I surmise then that
the svarUpa-bhUta-jnAna is also an attribute; it is
is substantive because it reveals the svarUpa of the
jIva to itself, nothing more, nothing less. It is also
substantive because it is an essential, _immutable_
attribute of the jIva. However, this is not the
end-all and be-all of the jIva. The jIva has to know
other things as well, and this is where dharma-bhUta-jnAna
comes in, as described before.
I will have to check with someone more knowledgable and
well-read in Sribhashya before I give a more conclusive
answer.
> Advaita and visishtadvaita would then disagree only in as much as the latter
> accepts a second form of consciousness (the attributive), the possession of
> which makes the jiva a knower (jnatr) and not mere knowledge (jnanamatra).
> But they would agree on the substance or essence of the jiva being jnana,
> whereas van Buitenen in his commentary denies this and seems to say that
> Ramanuja accepted *only* dharmabhutajnana. Or am I missing something?
I don't think van Buitenen says that Ramanuja accepts _only_
dharma-bhUta-jnAna; he was better read than that. van Buitenen,
following Ramanuja directly, is emphasizing the point that
because the jIva has consciousness as its essential attribute
(svarUpa-bhUta-jnAna), it can be described as consciousness
itself, as is done sometimes in the Upanishads. However, as
stated in the Brahma-Sutras, the jIva is best described as
"jnaH", a knower or locus of consciousness.
Mani
More information about the INDOLOGY
mailing list