Vidhi / arthavaada

[LGoehler at aol.com]

In einer eMail vom 10.11.1996  17:17:23, schreiben Sie:

>I am wondering whether the hermeneutic rules regarding the distinction
>between vidhi and arthavaada only apply to sentences of a normative
>character or also to assertions ("judgments"). Generally this distinction
>aims exclusively at being able to decide what part of a sentence should be
>understood as a prescription for action and what can be left out as praise
>or explanation. But is it nowhere discussed whether this distinction also
>apply to the possibility of ascertaining what is true (about the nature of
>things, not about what ought to be done) and what is not?

 These topics are discussed at lengh in the MImAMsA. According to her view
sentences about the nature of things are closer to arthavAda than to vidhi.
As arthavAda's they have no sense of their own but depend on the vidhi they
are produced for. A ascertainment of the state of things only makes sense if
it supports directly or indirectly the understanding of vidhi, e.g. to state
the contitions that should be known to be able to follow the vidhi. 

KumArila states explicitely (ZlokavArttika, Zabdapariccheda 5) that
statements about the nature of things (svarUpakathana) are of secondary or
dependent importance (aGgatva) in [his] ZAstra. - This is the view of the
MImAMsA; NyAya-VaizeSika would probably not agree with this.

Best wishes
Lars Goehler