overemphasis on magic

[LGoehler at aol.com]

>As for the passages cited above, and the apparent inconsistency between the
RSi's >belief in the efficacy of his ritual and the philosopher's apparent
skepticism, I think the >following anecdote might be relevant.  These are the
words of a ritual specialist from >Senegal [recorded by Pierre Smith]:

>"When we announce to the future initiates that the masks are going to cut
off their >heads, they should act as if they believe it.  If one of them acts
skeptical or put out, it >is very serious and he must be severely punished.
 But if one of them believes too >strongly and gets upset, tries to run away
or loses control, it is even more serious.  >This is the sign that he will
never be able to live among us as a man, and in the old >days they preferred
to kill him and be done with it."

>["Aspects of the Organization of Rites" in 'Between Belief & Transgression:
>Structuralist Essays in Religion, History & Myth', [eds. M. Izard & P.
Smith] Univ. >Chicago Pr. 1982]

 I have more questions than answers about this interesting quotation which
indeed seems to be of importance to this discussion.  Does it mean that the
Rgvedic RSI's had, say, a certain mythology and at the same time could stand
beside themselves saying that one should on the one hand not neglect it and
on the other not believe too much in it?  

 It seems to have a certain parallel in way the MImAMsA 'rationalized' Vedic
texts according to her pramANa's, so that we find e.g. mythological elements
and their explanation according to MImAMsA-methods co-existing. Jan Houben
has rightly emphasized the role of the ArthavAda's in this context: At the
one hand they are, as parts of the smRti, absolutely authoritative and on the
other hand one should not take them "too serious" since they are only meant
to emphasize the authoritativeness of the vidhi. (Some truth-claims are
certainly involved here but I think that, more than this, Vedic texts
according to the MImAMsA had a claim for validity or authoritativeness.)

  As for the satyakriyA my question is: How far do they derive their 'force'
from the words themselves or form their 'magical grammar'? Austin says that
the person uttering a performative must be entitled to do so. In the words of
Bourdieu it is the 'mystery of the ministry'  of the speaker that gives the
force to the his words. Which role does the priest-function play in this
context?


Two additional remaks about the interesting contributions of G. Thompson:

>[in the end *everything* is performative for Austin!].
This may be true, but see his 12th Lecture (How to do things with words)
 "How did the 'constatives'-'performatives' distinction look in the light of
our later theory? ... The doctrine of the performative/constative distinction
stands to the doctrine of locutionary and illocutionary acts inthe total
speech-act als the SPECIAL theory to the GENERAL theory."


>I also have cringed at this passage [among others] cited from Elizarenkova,
which >seems to be very much out of date, with its evolutionary
presuppositions, etc.

Can we say that evolutionary concepts are outdated? Or is it a paradox,
because the word *outdated* would presuppose an evolutionary concept, at
least for an *evolution in theory*?

sincerely
Lars Goehler